Fate of a party of 200 Acadians coming from Quebec—The Acadians on the Gulf coast send delegates to Colonel Frye—Their submission and fate—The Compiler—New persecutions—Motives of the local authorities—Belcher’s administration—1761-1763)— General Amherst four times refuses to allow him to deport the Acadians— He applies to the Iords of Trade and is refused—He deports the Acadians to Boston without orders—They are refused a landing there and are taken back to Halifax—Severe blame from the Home authorities—Belcher is replaced by Colonel Montague "Wilmot—The Compiler.

Immediately after the capture of Quebec, two hundred Acadians who had sought refuge there applied to the authorities for the purpose of taking the oath of allegiance and obtaining permission to return to Acadia and settle on their former property. The oath being taken. Judge Cramahe gave them a certificate, signed with his own hand, by which he certified that these people had taken the oath and that consequently Brigadier-General Monckton had permitted them to return to their lands or to settle on St. John River. Provided with this certificate, they set out accompanied by their families. The undertaking was extremely painful; they had before them a journey of 700 miles, 500 of which were across a forest without habitations, without roads, at the approach of winter, with children of every age. As may be imagined. their sufferings and their privations were necessarily terrible; but, after all, they were alleviated by the hope that they might at length live in peace in their dear Acadia. Ha\ mg set out from Quebec at the beginning of October, they reached Fort Frederick on St. John River towards the end of November. On their arrival they presented their certificate to Colonel Arbuthnot, who commanded this post. He referred the matter to Lawrence, who declared that this permission had been obtained under false pretences, on the supposition that these people belonged to some other river St. John in Canada. Consequently it was decided, November 30th, 1759, that they should be brought to Halifax and retained as prisoners while awaiting a favorable opportunity to send them to England.

This was a fresh outrage added to all the rest, and it was still more disgraceful in that the pretext invented by Lawrence was contradicted by the circumstances. In fact, Monckton could not have made the mistake attributed to him, because there was no other such place in Canada, and especially because Monckton was as well acquainted with Acadia and the Acadians as Lawrence himself. For it was the same Monckton who, four years previously, had directed the deportation of the Acadians from the innermost parts of the Ray of Fundy; it was also, I believe, the same Monckton who had established Fort Frederick on that same River St. John. Besides Monckton could not but have known that those who asked him to be reinstated m the possession of their lands were and could only be Acadians, because nobody in Canada had been dispossessed of his lands after the taking of Quebec. It is probable that several of these unfortunate people had left their families at Quebec until the formation of their projected new settlements. The least Lawrence should have done, if there remained in liim any vestige of lionor, was to permit them to return to Quebec.

I have elsewhere related that a band of Acadians, among whom were my ancestor, Michel Richard, then 15 years old, his sister Felicite, aged 11 years, his grandfather Ren6 Richard, aged 79, and Madeleine Pellerin, aged 5, who afterwards became Michel’s wife, had. ascended the St. John River during this same summer of 1759, reaching Cacouna on the St. Lawrence River about the middle of October. According to all probability this party of Acadians coming to Canada and those who were returning to Acadia met somewhere in the neighborhood of Cacouna. This meeting must necessarily have suggested an exchange of sad thoughts, and it is easy to imagine what formed the subject of their intercourse after four long years of distress. However there was still some hope; one group thought themselves on the point of entering again into possession of their lands; they had reason to hope that, after hard and persevering work, they would be able eventually to recover their former comfort and ease; for the other party, this hope was more distant, though they also thought they would be able a little later to enjoy the same advantages. All their relatives and friends dispersed here and there would return; the old fatherland would be restored, and, since France had lost its colonies in America, they would no longer be troubled by the vicissitudes of war. All this was yet far off and uncertain; but at least hope was the undercurrent of their thoughts. All were about to be undeceived, and especially those who mistakenly thought they had most reason to hope.

The peace of Quebec had led to the submission to England of the Acadians in Canada, and, as soon as the news was known, their example was followed by those on the Gulf of St. Lawrence. As early as Nov. 16th, Alexandre Brassard, Simon Martin, Jean Bastarache and Joseph Brassard presented themselves at Fort Cumberland (Beausejour) before Colonel Frye to signify their submission. They said that they were delegated for this purpose by 190 persons then refugees along the rivers Petitcodiac and Memramcook; that they were without means of subsistence, and they begged the authorities to assist them during the winter. It was agreed, between Colonel Frye and these delegates, that a third of them would come to the fort, where they would be fed during the winter, and, until their arrival, Alexandre Brassard was retained as hostage. “After the siege and fall of Quebec,” says Murdoch, “the Missionaries Manach and Maillard were disposed to induce their followers, both Acadians and Indians, to submit themselves to the English as a conquering nation. The French officer Boishebert, who had been left on the-frontier to guard and promote French interests, was very angry with these priests, because they advised their people to submission.”

Two days later, Pierre Surette, Jean and Michel Bourg presented themselves in turn to the commander of the fort, as delegates for about 700 persons of Mira-michi, Ricliibouctou and Bouctouche. It was similarly agreed that a third of these people should betake themselves to the fort where they would receive rations till spring. “By all which it pretty evidently appears," wrote Colonel Frye to Lawrence, “that early in the spring, there will be at this place and Bay Verte, about 900 souls, to be disposed of as Your Excellency shall see fit.”

Colonel Frye’s conduct was approved by the council; His Excellency acquainted the Council that he was informed, from Fort Cumberland, that the number of Acadians that might be collected there would amount to near 1,200; and that, as he apprehended that these people are on the same footing with those who have lately come to river St. John from Quebec, he desired the advice of the Council whether it would not be proper to send away the whole.

“The Council were of opinion that such a measure would be extremely proper.”

The fifth of the following August, Colonel Frye informed the governor that he had at his disposal 400 Acadians, and that he expected 700 others in a few days.

“The Council having taken the same into consideration, did advise that His Excellency would be pleased to take up vessels to transport such of those inhabitants to Halifax as were not able to travel by land, in order to their being disposed of as hereafter may be thought proper.”

All these people, or at least a great part of them, were in fact transported to Halifax while awaiting the opportunity for their deportation.

Here begins, against the Acadians, within the limits of Nova Scotia, a new series of iniquitous measures on which it is not easy to pass a correct judgment. This part of the history is almost as obscure as that which concerns the first deportation. Only one writer seems to have understood it, and even he very imperfectly. The volume of the Archives furnishes but meagre data. It contains, no doubt, numerous documents, but those we should expect to find therein, those which appear to us the most important are not there. I do not desire to overload my work by pointing out at every turn the numerous omissions I meet with; but some are so gross that I could not help indicating them. Let the reader judge. He will readily admit that the most important documents, those which have a vital bearing on the history of Nova Scotia, are the letters of the governors either to the Lords of Trade or to other personages. Now, we find from 1756 to 1761, thirty-four letters to Lawrence without a single one of his replies, namely: fifteen from General Amherst, five from Governor Pownall, four from General Whitmore, three from Shirley, three from Governor Phips, and four from Hutchinson, Gibson and Rutherford. We find, moreover, in the volume of Archives during the same period, letters from generals or officers of lesser rank serving in other parts of America to other generals or officers likewise on duty outside Nova Scotia. These documents, discoursing on events of the war in other parts of America, may be important for history in general; but, surely, in a volume, the aim of which was to collect the documents which referred to the special history of the province, the letters of one of its governors should have been deemed far more important than those of officers writing to one another outside the Province. Such, very properly, was the intent ion of the Legislature of Nova Scotia, as may be gathered from the resolution of this assembly concerning the publication of this volume.

“The house of Assembly of N. S., on the motion of Hon. Joseph Howe, adopted the following resolution: That His Excellency the Governor be respectfully requested to cause the ancient records and documents illustrative of the history and progress oj society in this province, to be examined, preserved and arranged,” etc., etc.

If there were question only of a few letters not published, I would pass over the omission in silence, as I have very often done elsewhere; but, when there is a total of thirty-four letters, and not a single reply from him who was Governor of the province, the omission appears so strange as to be positively astounding. It cannot be that Lawrence never answered the letters that were addressed to him, since General Amherst, writing from Albany on May 29th, 1759, acknowledged the receipt of three letters, dated April 15tli, 23d and 27th. On the 5th of February, 1760, the same Amherst acknowledged the receipt of four, namely, one of Aug. 22d, another of Sept. 17th, and two others of the-month of December. Have they also disappeared from the Archives like all the other documents that related to the first deportation, and of which Haliburton speaks ? If so, is it not astonishing that the Compiler of these Archives has not, in some short note at the foot of the page, such as he very often inserts when it suits him, mentioned this strange fact, even without comment if comment displeases him, in order to inform the reader of this disappearance or of the reasons he might have for suppressing them? Lawrence had every advantage for saying only just what he wished, he was stating and pleading his own case; but the public would thereby have been, to a certain extent, in possession of the facts and able to judge of them in spite of the artful diplomacy of his language; it was little, but this little might still be dangerous. Such is the only explanation I can suggest. The too complaisant Compiler Sid not dare to put the public in a position to examine into the reasons of that disappearance or of his own silence.

However, in spite of all these omissions, I will try to get at the bottom of this lamentable history and expose the turpitude that lies hidden under this interested curtailment which time-serving worthies like Parkman and Thomas B. Akins try to conceal.

No great array of documents is needed to betray the motives of Lawrence, Belcher, Wilmot, and the rest of Lawrence’s crew. The little we have is quite sufficient. With less documents the labor is greater; but the end is attained just as surely.

In the obscure parts of history the task of the historian becomes a process of careful pondering rather than one of rapid search through numerous documents. In the present instance this is the only available method. It has stood me in good stead in previous chapters by lighting up dark corners, and will, I feel sure, be equally serviceable in the umllumined region I have yet to traverse.

Quebec had surrendered; the people had yielded up their arms and taken the oath of allegiance; all had been left in the peaceful possession of their property. Amherst, writing to Lawrence under date of May 4th, 1760, said: “Six thousand Canadians have taken the oath, and brought in their arm; they seem much pleased with their change of masters; we employed several of them, whom we paid, and they did their business cheerfully and well.”

The two hundred Acadians who bore a permit from Monckton had taken the oath at about the same time, and they hoped for similar treatment, to which they had a greater right than the Canadians. The same may be said of the Acadian refugees oil the Gulf coast, since, in spite of the pressing solicitations of the French commandant, de Boishbert, they left him to throw themselves on Lawrence’s mercy. For the hitter, this was a good opportunity to ensure at one stroke; the immediate, complete and final pacification of Nova Scotia, and to annex a group of hard-working, virtuous people that could not but contribute to the progress and development of the country. They were anxious for rest and quiet; they longed for the cessation of hostilities In order to see the. end of their sufferings, to resume their former peaceful life, to begin again, if need be in some other part of the Province, the long and painful labors that had earned for them that abundance of which they had been unjustly despoiled. These were tlie motives that prompted them to surrender to Lawrence at the first news of the taking of Quebec. It would 110 doubt have been cruel to drive them away from their lands at a time when these were still unoccupied: but I think they would have accepted without a murmur any other uncleared lands in a suitable place.

Nothing of the sort was offered them. As soon as they had submitted to Colonel Frye, it was decided that they should be deported; but, in order not to alarm them and thus hinder their gathering together under military supervision, this decision was withheld from them as long as was deemed necessary. Meanwhile, although they learnt the shameful way in which their brothers coming from Quebec under protection of an official promise had been treated, yet all those w ho had promised to surrender made, it a point of honor to fulfil their promise.

There still remained a good many Acadians in the Baie des Clialeurs, and a few in the upper reaches of the St. John River. These would have been ready to submit* had they Dot had before their eyes the example of the treatment inflicted upon the refugees from Quebec. Seeing that submission wa*s followed by imprisonment and threats of future woes, might it not to be better to preserve their liberty, wretched though it was, and even to become the irreconcilable enemies of a nation that was so unrelenting ?

Such was the situation. Whoever strips himself of preconceived notions and opens his eyes to the light will find no difficulty in understanding what was going on. What, then, was the motive that prevented Lawrence, Belcher and Wilmot from welcoming the unarmed Acadian remnant? This question many have put themselves Without answering it plainly, because a plain answer would have been too disagreeable. Why worry over a problem when the solution threatens to be humiliating? Why do justice to a small nation which by this time has probably forgotten its history, and none of whose sons will be likely to dive into this lost chapter? No such hindrances stand in my way; I mean to probe the matter to the bottom, to clear up, as far as I can, every mystery, to explain what seems inexplicable.

Cruel as Lawrence was, his cruelty cannot stand as a full explanation; we have to look elsewhere. There remains, therefore, but one alternative. When obvious motives do not suffice, some motive of self-interest must be sought for. It could not be fear of firmed hostilities that prevented Lawrence from allowing these unarmed people, surrendering at discretion, to settle in the country. France was conquered, dispossessed of Canada,

Cape Breton, Prince Edward Island; there was no longer a single French soldier in the whole country; what, then, was there to fear from this handful of settlers, who were longing for quiet and who proved the peacefulness of their intentions by spontaneously giving themselves up against the will of French officers directly after the fall of Quebec ?

It is certain that Lawrence had made up his mind to deport them before they had given any cause for complaint ; this is proved by the imprisonment of those who had come to settle on the St. John River with the permission of Monckton, and by Lawrence’s suggesting to his Council, as soon as he heard of Acadians submitting to Colonel Frye, that these Acadians should be -deported. His motive is not far to seek. Do we not know that his Councillors had voted to each of their number a grant of 20,000 acres from the lauds of the Acadians? Do we not know that, later on, either to satisfy the greed of influential persons who were jealous of the Councillors’ windfall, or to force them to endorse their conduct, the remainder of the Acadian farms were parcelled out to all those who had any standing in the Province ? Do we not know that, later still, in order to ensure impunity and powerful support from the Home Government, the crown lands were handed over to be pillaged by the highest officers of the army, by noble lords and doughty generals, by Lord Egremont, Lord Colville, Dr. Franklin (soon afterwards Postmaster-general of England), Generals Bouquet and Haldimand, Sir Robert Wilmot, Lady Wilmot and many others?

All this had not yet come to pass at the time I am now speaking of; but the pillage was beginning and was to continue with ever-increasing vigor. These grants were not all gratuitous nor unconditional; there were great, middling and small privileges proportioned to the influence of the grantees; hut all were equally eager for the spoils, and each aspirant for booty earned away the consoling morsel that earned his silence or his support, and was at liberty to flaunt it in the face of the legitimate Acadian proprietor or of the poor tenant who should take the latter’s place. As may well be imagined, Lawrence’s councillors were not recipients of the small privileges. Belcher, his successor, had his goodly share, and so must Wilmot have had his.

“In closing the outline of the year 1765,” says Murdoch, “and reflecting on the very large land grants, sanctioned by Governor Wilmot and his Council, 1 cannot help thinking it an ugly year, and that the growth of the Province was long retarded by the rashness of giving forest lands away from the power of the crown or the people in such large masses,”

When all the lands of the Acadians had been thrown to these hungry vultures, the authorities had to fall back on the uncleared lands, and these were flung, by the thousand acres at a time, to favorites. There must have been many assumed names among the grantees; one grant was not enough for the more greedy ones, who went on the principle that you can’t have too much of a good thing; but, when they received more than one grant, they could easily mask their identity under a name borrowed for a consideration.

Such was the state of affairs in what Murdoch calls that “ugly year,” 1755. How many fortunes date their inception from this shameful complicity! How many

scamps sprang from this mud into lordly grandeur! If one had to go hack to the beginnings of great families whose descendants browbeat one with their opulence, if one had to scrutinize the foundations of many great names, the man of stainless honor would perhaps thank Providence for the lowliness of his own origin. For my part, I deem it a greater satisfaction to be descended from humble victims of oppression than from their haughty oppressors.

The reader is now in a position to understand why the poor Acadians, who threw themselves on the mercy of their oppressors, were not kindly welcomed as they should have been, but imprisoned until they could be deported; why they were not even suffered to settle in some isolated part of the Province ; why their oppressors persisted in deporting them to such a distance that they would never think of returning; why Lawrence, and, after him, Belcher and Wilmot, importuned A rollers t to allow them to get rid of the Acadians; why they described the latter as discontented, dangerous and incapable of appreciating what they called "the lenity and sweet of English rule.” Strange sweetness indeed, which treated them as prisoners and convicts directly after they had submitted, and was on the look-out for a chance of deporting them to the ends of the earth ! These men would have been either more or less than human, if they had not felt the humiliations and the mental tortures that were inflicted upon them, if they had not resented them in words. Even the most submissive hound will snap and snarl when the lash is applied unsparingly. And yet, despite this accumulation of wrongs, can there he found, amid all the documents of their oppressors, mention of one single act of rebellion on the part of the Acadians, from the date of their surrender in December, 1759, till 1766? If any mention of such an act can be produced, I should be curious to see it. We read, in the letters written with a view to obtain leave to deport them, that fears were entertained about the future, that the Acadians were dangerous beings who would seize the first opportunity to revolt. Such statements were necessary in order to obtain the desired leave; but there is no mention of a single act of insubordination, though, if any such act had occurred, it would beyond a doubt have been mentioned in the letters to Amherst. The only charge made, and from it strong inferences are drawn, is that certain groups of Acadians had not yet submitted and “were lurking in the woods.” Does this not prove how baseless were the grievances of the authorities? Pray, were these poor people obliged to give themselves up to imprisonment, followed as it was to be by deportation? The marvel is that the men thus dragged to prison did not hurl themselves upon their oppressors and rend them limb from limb, before receiving the fatal blow that would have put an end to their embittered and hopeless lives. Ah ! but they thought of their sorrow-stricken families groaning under want, separation and the bereavements of death, and they feared to add to their anguish and to leave them without support or solace in the throes of their agony. They also found in their religion—a subject of mockery for their tyrants—the strength and the courage to bear and forbear and mayhap to forgive.

Let us now examine the mutilated correspondence of the Governors to see if we can detect, in these artfully constructed documents, some unguarded expression that betrays the secret they were so anxious to hide. While making this examination, we must bear in mind that these land-robbers felt they would be exposing themselves to the pressing of claims dangerous for their own tranquillity, if they allowed the Acadians to remain in the Province. If these Acadians were once admitted, all the others who could return from exile would have to be admitted likewise. Would they consent without a murmur to become the tenants-at-will of Lawrence’s councillors on lands that belonged to them and had been cleared by their forefathers? And if they consented to plunge into the forest, there to carve out a new homestead, would uot the daily and involuntary nearness of their misery be a continual reproach to their despoilers ? Does the criminal enjoy being all his life confronted with his victim? Does the successful swindler build his splendid mansion next to the hovel of the mail he has ruined? Might not this awkward neighborhood open the eyes of the public and the Lords of Trade, disgrace the land-robbers and bring about the annulment of the titles they either had already secured or were about to secure? And this was no small risk, since, even with all their wise precautions, the Lords of Trade, a few years later, cut down their grants from 20,000 to 5,000 acres. Hence it became an urgent necessity to scatter the Acadian refugees far and wide, so that they might forget their country, their nationality, their language, their religion and lose the very remembrance of what they had been in the past.

Lawrence and his councillors -were not slow to scent the danger ahead, and, 'at the first intimation of the arrival of 200 Acadians with permits to settle in the Province, it was resolved that they he banished once more. As soon as Frye sent in liis first communication announcing that the Acadians of the coast were about to submit, Lawrence advised his Council to deport them. “he desired the advice of the Council whether it would not be proper to take up Transports to send away the whole.”

Whereupon, “The Council, were of opinion that such a measure would be extremely proper, and seemed absolutely necessary, in order to facilitate the settlement of the Acadian lands by the persons who are coming from the Continent for that purpose, who, otherwise, would be always liable to be obstructed in their progress by the incursions of these French inhabitants. Whereas, on the contrary, if they are removed out of the Province, the settlement will remain in perfect security.”

The motive is clear enough. The lands they wanted to protect against troublesome claims and exposure were now theirs; it could not be expected that a resolution of this kind would contain any explicit mention of the danger that threatened the Councillors’ own spoils; they had to cloak their thoughts with the welfare of the settlement in general; but to any one reading between the lines, it was the “perfect security” of their private interests they wished to protect. All great rogues adopt similar tactics.

However, before deporting all these Acadians, it was necessary to obtain the consent of the authorities in other countries. England had received her share of Acadian exiles; the provinces of New England thought they had more than their share. To act without their consent might be dangerous. What was to be done?

On February 20th, 1761, Belcher, who had succeeded Lawrence after the latter's demise, submitted to his Council a letter in which General Ainherst recommended “the continuation of the Acadian» in the Province.'”

Whereupon, etc., etc., “The Council proceeded to take the same into (consideration, etc., etc. And that it is their unanimous opinion that the said French Acadians cannot by the said Royal order and the said Provincial law. be permitted to remain in the Province, and the (council did advise that this their opinion may be submitted with all deference to the consideration of His Excellency General Amherst.”

On March 22d Amherst replied to this resolution of the Council:

“New York, 22d March, 1761.

“Your dispatch of the 25th of February reached m> hands last night; 1 have nothing more at heart than the advantage and the security of the Province of Nova Scotia ; if the removal of the Acadians still remaining within the same could add to either, I should be the first to advise their expulsion; but as under the new circumstances of that valuable and flourishing Province, I do not see that it can have anything to fear from those Acadians, but On the contrary that great advantages might be reaped in employing them properly; I must own I should incline towards letting them in the Province under proper regulations and restrictions.”

Amherst, as a stranger to the Province and probably unaware of the secret motives of Belcher and his Council, could not, it would seem, do otherwise than accept without discussion their views. Had he done so, there would have been no ground for surprise; but, being a thoughtful man. anxious for the welfare of the country, he did not see the wisdom of their request.

Not content with sending to Amherst the resolution of liis Council, Belcher wrote him two other letters on the same subject before he had received the answer given above. One of these letters bears date March 11th, the other, March 19th. These two letters are not in the volume of the Archives ; but the answer shows that they referred again to the desired permission to deport the Acadians. Amherst replies on April 10th:

“I beg to differ in opinion with you on the insufficiency of troops in your Province. Those that are, destined to remain there are far more than requisite under your present circumstances, for the danger the late Governor might last year have some reason to apprehend is now entirely removed. The few Acadians at Ristigouche that are said rot to have yet surrendered under the capitulation, can, I am certain, make no object, even were they to persist in their error; hut depend upon it, they will soon awaken out of it and rejoice at our acceptance of their submission."

This was a rebuke. After three such categorical answers, all implying a refusal, it would seem Belcher and his Council ought to have definitely given up their plan of deportation. But they were not satisfied. On April 15tli, in a long letter to Amherst, Belcher enumerates anew all his fears for the peace and tranquillity of the Province; but this time he adds a new motive, which, he hopes, must persuade Amherst to grant the longed-for permission:

“Besides the reasons I have already offered to you, why attempts from these people are to be feared, there yet remains one of some •weight, which is, that there are many amongst the Acadians at, Ristigouche, who were formerly in possession of some of those lands in the District of Tieaubassin. and as they have not yet lost hopes of regaining them, through notions which they have received from priests and Frenchmen, I think it at least probable that they will disturb the beginnings of these settlements, in which case, the loss of two or three lives will strike such terror as ma; not only intimidate and drive away the people of these townships, but may also greatly obstruct the settlement of other parts.”

There yet remained one more solitary reason, and Belcher could not give up tlw game without invoking it. In fact, it was no new reason, but the only and true one disguised: the danger for the security of his spoils. He thought it strong enough to justify his importunity, but Amherst was no man to yield to mere ungrounded insistence. Apparently this new reason had prompted this new letter; Belcher thought it decisive. Though lie had, for a whole year, kept about a thousand Acadiaus imprisoned at Halifax, the only grievance he could trump up was fear for the future. He could not point to one fact, one murder, one assault, one theft, not even to a refusal to obey. Verily, this was a bitter disappointment; his 20,000 acres were in jeopardy.

Amherst replied on the 28th of April by another refusal, the fourth:

“I cannot say I am under apprehensions for the settlements Which are to be established at Braubassin. The Acadians may not be so thoroughly well disposed as I, could wish, but I expect a different behavior from them, for they never have been in the situation they are now in, and they can hardly be mad enough to attempt anything against the. establishment of the Province at this time.”

Thereafter Belcher seems to have abandoned all hope of obtaining from that quarter the authorization he so eagerly desired; for we find no other correspondence between him and Amherst for a long time, with the exception of the following letter, asking leave to employ the Acadians in work for the new colonists. He thus refuted himself, since he could, without danger, employ these men whom he had represented as so dangerous. The colonists themselves can have apprehended no danger, since the leave was asked at their own request.

“Halifax, 18th June, 1761l.

“By representations made to me from the new settlement# in this Province, it appears extremely necessary that the inhabitants should be assisted by the Acadians in repairing tli^ dykes for the preservation and recovery of the marsh lands, particularly as on the progress of this work, in which the Acadians are the most skillful in the country, the support and subsistence of several of the inhabitants will depend.

“This weighty reason, together with the consideration of the great service rendered these settlements through the Acadians by the late governor last year, urges me to repeat my application. . . . And I shall expect the less difficulty on this occasion, as the Secretary of Military Affairs assured me some time since, from you, that the Acadians should be ready to receive my orders on half an hour's warning.”

Thus were the Acadians set to work on their own lands, to assist those who had been put in t heir places and who were profiting by the labor of a century. Think of these dangerous Acadians submitting to a compulsory labor that racked their very souls, and that “at half an hour’s warning!” They had submitted to this imposition the previous year, apparently without resistance, and now it was required of them again. What more is needed to demonstrate that all the fears of Belcher and his Council were merely contemptible pretexts invented to cover their real fears about their own land grants? And yet the Acadians were perverse enough, forsooth, not to appreciate “the lenity and the sweet of English rule!”

The volume of the Archives does not contain any letter of Belcher’s showing that, after his fourfold failure with Amherst, he applied to the Lords of Trade; but the following extract from one of their letters proves that he did:

“Whitkhatj,, 23d June, 1761.

"The number of Acadians you state to have been collected together in different parts of the Province, and their hostile disposition, appears to us to be a very untoward circumstance in the present state of the Province, but as it does not properly belong to our department to give directions upon a matter of this nature, we must refer you to His Majesty’s Secretary of State, to whom we have transmitted copies of such of your letters, and the papers received with them, as relate tin this subject.”

The Compiler produces nothing but the above short extract of this important letter; however it is sufficiently clear for my present purpose; Belcher had written to the Lords of Trade and his letters and papers (not produced), in which lie asked leave to banish the Acadians, were referred to Lord Egremont, the Secretary of State, that he might answer them.

This answer is notin the volume of the Archives; but, seven months later, January 9th, 1762, we find a letter from Belcher to the Secretary of State. The usual asterisks show that it is garbled in passages that appear important; yet, by the way in which he presents new motives for the deportation, it clearly implies that his request had been refused:

“I beg leave to represent to your Lordship, that besides these persons, there are many others of the Acadians in this Province, who although they have surrendered themselves, are yet ever ready and watchful for an opportunity, either by assistance from the French, or from hopes of stirring up the Indians to disturb and distress the new settlements lately made, and those now forming; I am perfectly convinced, from the whole course of their behavior and disposition, that, they cannot with any safety become again the inhabitants of it.”

Though the volume of the Archives does not contain the answer of the Secretary of State, we can infer with certainty that it was unfavorable, because nearly seven months went by without Belcher’s making any move toward deportation. Had the reply been favorable, Belcher would, undoubtedly have hastened to make use of a permission lie was so anxious to obtain. This inference is made still more evident by the letter of the Lords of Trade under date of the 3d of the following December, reproduced further on, in which they distinctly condemn the deportation that had then just taken place.

On July 26tli, 1762, Belcher and liis Council decided upon banishing all the Acadians. The resolution embodying all the motives of their decision is very long; all possible grievances are collected therein; and yet, strange to say, it contains no mention of any act of hostility or actual resistance; on the contrary, it is strictly confined to apprehensions about the future. One feels that the Council is making a last decisive effort to draw up a, document in self-defence in case of need. This resolution, as we shall see, speaks of no authorization whatever, either from the Secretary of State or General Amherst; and how could it, since, as is evident, its raison d'etre, was the very refusals Belcher had met at their hands ? Lawrence had succeeded by sheer audacity ; they were trying the same plan. In the event of a rebuke, Belcher would plead the opinion of his Council and the local circumstances which imperatively called for some such action. Here is the conclusion of this document:

“For all which reasons, the Council are of opinion that, in this time of danger it is absolutely necessary immediately to transport the Acadians out of this Province, as their continuing longer in it may be attended with the worst circumstances to the projected new settlements in particular, as well as to the general safety of the Province. And therefore, the Council do unanimously advise and recommend, in the most earnest manner, for the safety and security of this Province and its new settlements, that the Lieutenant-Governor would be pleased to take the speediest method to collect and transport the said Acadians out of this Province; and do further advise that, as the Province of Massachusetts is nearly adjacent to this Province, that the Lieutenant-Governor would be pleased to cause them to be transported to that Province with all convenient dispatch.”

This new deportation, after so many explicit refusals, both from Amherst and the Home authorities, was a piece of audacity on a par with Lawrence’s; Belcher’s disobedience was even far worse, and the danger he was placing himself in was such that it is legitimate to 'lifer that he had, or thought he had, great private interests to serve thereby. Lawrence had sheltered himself behind his Council, so did Belcher; and we may well suppose that this strongly-worded resolution was handed ready-made by him to his subservient and equally interested Council. This was a wise precaution, but the penalty, if B>ny, could not very well fall on his Council; he alone would be made to suffer. The sequel will show that he did.

Belcher was successful only in so far as he succeeded in obtaining from Amherst a sort of semi-approval of the accomplished fact. Here is the part of Amherst’s letter which refers to it:

“Although I cannot help thinking that these people might have been kept in proper subjection while the troops remained in Nova Scotia, yet I must own I am glad you have taken the measures for removing them, as they might have become troublesome when the Province was drained of the forces.”

This is, briefly, what liacl happened. Directly after the resolution of his Council, Belcher sent off in great haste to Boston five vessels filled with Acadians. The Legislature of Massachusetts peremptorily refused to receive the exiles. The urgent entreaties of Captain Brooks and even of Governor Bernard could not overborne the resistance of that Assembly. They went so far as to refuse to await the return of a messenger that was to be despatched to General Amherst Hancock, who in Boston represented the Government of Nova Scotia, refused to provide provisions. After waiting two or three weeks in Boston harbor, Captain Brooks, commander of the expedition, was obliged to return to Halifax with his shipment of exiles.

Their return provoked in Belcher’s camp an explosion of anger against the Massachusetts Legislature, which

“I will try,” answered Bouquet, “to introduce smallpox by means of blanket, which we will cause to fall into their hands.”

That suggestion was adopted by Amherst. “You will do well,” he again wrote him, “to try to spread smallpox by means of blankets, and by every other means which might help to exterminate that abominable race.”

A few months afterwards smallpox made awful havoc among the unfortunate tribes.

This is the same Captain Brooks Watson who in 1791, wrote for the Bev. Dr. Brown the description of Acadian manners, quoted in a previous chapter. Elsewhere, he speaks as follows of their behavior in exile and of their return.

“Their orderly conduct (in Georgia I, their integrity, sobriety and frugality, secured to them the good will of the people and gained them comfortable support. But, still longing for their native country, all their industry was stimulated, all their hopes supported, by that landmark of their former felicity; many of them built boats, and. taking their families, coasted the whole American shore. froLP. Georgia to Nova Scotia. But, what did they find? All was desolated; for, the more effectually to drive them out of the country, all their houses had been burnt, all their cattle kitted by order of Government; hence they found no shelter; still they persevered with never-failing fortitude, with unremitting industry, and established themselves in different remote parts of the Province, where, they hail been suffered to .remain; but without any legal property; at least, I have not heard of any land having been granted to them. . .

had refused to be, for the second time, a party to such odious persecution. The situation was a critical one for him; he had to explain matters to the Lords of Trade and the Secretary of State. This foolish enterprise had been undertaken without their assent, without that of Amherst, His was, indeed, a most ticklish position. Happily for him, however, Amherst had, after the event, granted a semblance of approval to the fact; and this is the point Belcher insists on most strongly in his defence, taking care to speak of it in veiled language as if the approval had preceded the fact. Yet, incredible to relate, after so many rebuffs, he still persisted in asking leave to deport the Acadians.

The Compiler does not produce the answer of the Secretary of State. As to the Lords of Trade, their answer, which Is also absent from the volume of the Archives, can be gathered from the following extract of the minutes of their meetings to be found in the Archives :

“Dec, 3d, 1762.

“Their Lordships. upon consideration of Mr. Belcher’s letter of 26th October, 1762, which relates to the removal of the Acadians, are of opinion that this measure and the tuture disposition of these Acadians is entirely within the department of the Secretary of State. Their Lordships, however, could not but be of opinion, that, however expedient it might have been to have removed the Acadians at a time when the enterprises of the enemy threatened danger to the Province, yet, as that danger is now over and hostilities between the two nations have ceased, it was neither necessary nor politic to remove them, as they might, by a proper disposition, promote the interest of the colony, and he made useful members of society, agreeable to what appear to he the sentiments of General Amherst in his letter to the Lieutenant-Governor.’'

The castigation was severe and vigorously applied.

Moreover, we are led to understand that Belcher distorted the meaning of that letter of General Amherst from which he pretended to seek support. This was not the time nor the place for the Lords of Trade to express an opinion on the first great deportation of 1755; hut the language in which they allude to it seems to imply condemnation.

As I gather from the above minutes of proceedings, the matter was deemed too important for the Lords of Trade to adjudicate upon. Belcher’s conduct was to be judged by the Secretary of State himself; but, so stupid and cruel did it appear to them, that they could not refrain from expressing an opinion. It follows, as a matter of course, that the Secretary of State wrote to Belcher on the subject. It is but reasonable to suppose that his blame was still more severe, and, likely, it contained his dismissal, for, shortly after, Belcher was removed from office. Where is this letter? Why is it not in the volume of Archives ? It would be one of the most important in the whole volume, just as much so as the letter of the Lords of Trade to Belcher reciting Lawrence’s many misdeeds, the same also omitted from that volume.*

The sequence of events just related is fairly orderly and clear; but it would be a mistake to suppose that the Compiler of the volume of the Archives has followed the order I have adopted. On the contrary, to disentangle this confused part of the Archives required an amount of patience which no one else appears to have brought to bear upon it. From the end of 1759 to 1763, the papers are jumbled together without order of dates or even of years, and great pains arc needed to reconstitute the natural connection of the facts. This disorder is inexplicable, unless it be the result of design.

On a close and pitiless examination of all the incidents of the successive Acadian expulsions, some of the blame might be made to rest with those who lield in their hands the destinies of England; but there are two considerations that almost completely save the honor of the Home Government. One is the system of misrepresentation begun by Lawrence and continued by Belcher and others; this was a conspiracy of calumny and opportune silence, the very existence of which was most probably not suspected in England. The other is the breaking out of the war, which was already certain when first the Lords of Trade learned of the deportation, and which absorbed all other concerns of what seemed to them minor importance. Sony as this comfort is for those who have suffered so much, the descendants of the exiled Acadians will welcome it as a solace in their misfortune.

If audacity often triumphs, if nothing succeeds like success, conversely, nothing fails like failure. Belcher’s usefulness was gone. He was replaced, soon after his fiasco, by that same Wilmot whom the Rev. Hugh Graham called a poor tool, and who “once upon a time” paid the bounty for twenty-five Acadian scalps, saying “that the law might be strained and that there was a necessity for winking at these things.”

This was drifting from bad to worse. Opportunities for wholesale spoliation are like revolution ; they throw up to the surface hideous monsters of greed, hungry jackals hankering for their prey.

Before taking leave of Belcher I will relate another incident of his administration, and it is a new iniquity. Among the powerful reasons he laid before the Lords of Trade, to obtain leave to deport the Acadians, there was one on which he insisted strongly as an unanswerable proof of their evil dispositions:

“I beg leave to remark further, that none of the Acadians have ever made voluntary submission, but on the contrary, their wants and terrors only have reduced them to it, of which there is an instance from some of them remaining at the village of Ste. Anne on the St. John’s River, to the amount of forty, who have yet made no offers of surrender.”

This was true; these few families had not given themselves up. They had preferred—horrible to relate—their freedom with the wretched and precarious existence it entailed to a submission that would mean imprisonment and deportation. This was their crime. The remoteness of their retreat shielded them from persecution long enough to enable them to await the peace-making orders of the Lords of Trade; but, in the mean time, the lands they occupied had been included in the numerous grants that were being bestowed everywhere; their clearings had whetted the greed of the covetous, and the harvest was about to be gathered in. Belcher notified them to quit immediately the lands they occupied. Here is their reply, which gives us an insight into the facts of the case and the dispositions of these people. The tone of this letter is certainly not threatening nor even rebellious, though the order of banishment was so unjust and so cruel :

“We have received with respect the orders which the Commandant of Fort Frederick published to us in your name to evacuate the River St. John. We would have obeyed these orders immediately, had we not hoped that, through compassion for our past misfortunes, you would deign to spare us new ones. In truth, sir, we were beginning to issue out of the awful calamity to which war had reduced us; the appearances of an abundant harvest promised us provisions for the ensuing year. If you absolutely order us to depart before the harvest, most of us being without money, without provisions, we shall be obliged to live after the manner of the. savages wandering hither and thither; on the contrary, if you allow us to pass the winter in order to dry our grain, we shall be in a fit state to till new lands wherever you will order us to withdraw to. Your sagacious minds enable you to understand that a husbandman who settles on hitherto uncultivated soil without provisions for a year, can only become a poor creature useless to the government under which he lives. We hope, sir, that you will ha\e the goodness to grant us a priest of our religion ; this will make us bear with patience the hardships inseparable from such a migration. We await your final orders on this subject, and we have the honor to be with all possible respect and submission, sir,

Your most humble and obpdient servants.

The Inhabitants of the River St. John.

[Received August 8th, 1763.]

This petition is not in the volume of the Archives. Brown, who never let himself he swayed by mean motives, found it important enough to give it a place in his manuscript. There is a flavor of artlessness about this letter that is not devoid of charm; at any rate it was not written by a priest, since it asked for a priest. Their principal request—to reap what they had sown— was not unreasonable, especially as the season for harvesting was at hand.

We know that they had to quit the country ; but we do not know if they were allowed to enjoy their harvest. We trust they were.4 We should like to believe that Lawrence, Belcher, and their henchmen were not all so utterly wicked as to delight in the mere infliction of useless pain. But a man’s better self is often stifled by prejudice, particularly if he serve an unprincipled master skilful enough to give him a share in his shameful speculations. In such cases a man sinks to the level of the brute, and forgets everything but the glutting of his grosser appetites. The ties of kinship broken, the tears shed, the sighs and sufferings of ail kinds which he provokes, all these are nothing; he sees nothing, feels nothing; his mind is filled with the absorbing thought of the dainty morsel dangling before his mental vision.

In this, as in a nutshell, lies this whole historical question. This lost chapter is rooted in private greed. Public interest had nothing to do with it from beginning to end. Nor had national animosity any decisive bearing on it. True, some Acadians at one time harassed the British troops; but that was after the first deportation and before the fall of Quebec, when, hunted and harried like wild beasts, they were exasperated and sought revenge for the iniquitous and inhuman persecution they had suffered; and such isolated cases do not touch the true motive of this persecution: private greed; a motive which none but the thoughtless or the mentally obtuse can gainsay.

In the minutes of the Halifax Council we find the following, one of the last official acts of Belcher’s administration: “The Lieutenant-Governor acquainted the Council that he had the opinion of the Lords of Trade against the general removal of the Acadians from this Province.” This declaration, it is easy to surmise, was forced on Belcher by the instructions contained in the letter which the Compiler has omitted.