June 28th Lawrence announces to the Lords of Trade the taking of Beausejour—He says he has ordered Monckton to expel the Acadians from Beausejour—July 15th Lawrence gets Boscawen to approve the expulsion—Which had long since been decided upon—Proofs—Morris’s report—Lawrence seeks pretexts—His letter of July 18th to the Lords of Trade—He disguises his designs—July 25th one hundred Acadian delegates appear before Lawrence—Refusal of the oath—They are Imprisoned—The priests carried off—Letter from Daudin.

The material part of the deportation was henceforth an easy matter. But there remained another far more serious difficulty : so barbarous an act could surely not be accomplished without the consent of the metropolitan authorities. This consent was out of the question. Never would England sanction such an infamous deed. Should the situation become unbearable, should the Acadians rebel, England would prefer to annihilate them on the spot by force of arms rather than to lend herself to a project like that which Lawrence had conceived. However the Home Government must be gradually prepared for some such issue; hence it was that, in the preceding year, when he gave a sombre picture of the Acadians, he had vaguely intimated it would be better that they were away.”

On the 28th of June, 1756, less than two weeks after the evacuation of Beausejour, and a few days before the consideration of the petition just analyzed, Lawrence, announcing this event to the Lords of Trade, added:

“The deserted Acadians are delivering up their arms, I have given him (Monckton), orders to drive them out of the country at all events though, if he wants their assistance in putting the troops under cover, he may first make them do all the service in their power.”

This letter would imply that Monckton had orders that he should command such Acadians as dwelt in the territory which France had just evacuated to quit the country, and, in case of refusal, that he should constrain them thereto by force of arms. Yet this was not Lawrence’s intention ; far from it; but it did not suit his purpose to unveil clearly to the Lords of Trade his plan. He had to leave them under an indefinite, half-and-half impression, by way of preparation for the extreme measures he had resolved upon. Before announcing his intentions with regard to those who had remained quiet on their lands in the Peninsula, it was better to make mention of those only who had long been refugees at Beausejour, and about whom the Lords of Trade would feel less concern. Almost any piece of audacity may be made a success if prepared with skilful gradation. This was the second step. Were the “deserted Acadians” expelled in accordance with the order he said he gave Monckton? By no means. He took good care that no such expulsion should take place. We shall soon see that he was completely successful in creating the indefinite impression he wished in the minds of the Lords of Trade; and we shall also see that his project, mutilated as it was and presented in a softened aspect, gave rise to alarm and was severely blamed but it was too late then, the crime was consummated.

Lawrence shows us by this letter that even these Acadian refugees obeyed the order to deliver their arras. To all appearances they were peaceable and submissive, and Lawrence entertained no fears about them, since he intended, before expelling them, to employ them on the fortifications of Beausejour.

Another point, which proves that Lawrence sought to prejudice the Lords of Trade against the Acadians, is that in his letter he makes no mention of the fact that the three hundred Acadians found armed .at the surrender of Beausejour were pardoned by Monckton be cause they had taken up arms only under pain of death. Surely this was important enough to deserve mention. With a similar end in view, writing to the Lords of Trade the preceding year, he told them that those who had crossed the frontier had done so “willingly,” although he was aware that the contrary was the truth. And, after all, where was the guilt of those three hundred Acadians, French subjects, taken with arms which they had accepted only under pain of death, especially when we know that many of them deserted, and that, at last, those who remained absolutely refused to fight? Moreover, if they were pardoned, why should they be punished? And the one thousand two hundred others, on the French side, who stubbornly refused to go to the fort and arm themselves, what were they guilty of? All these considerations afford clear proof of their peaceable dispositions, a proof which applies with still greater force to the Acadians of the Peninsula.

Not daring openly to ask the Lords of Trade to approve his project of deportation, Lawrence sought support elsewhere. He needed some one, outside of his council, to share with him the heavy responsibility he was going to assume. He must secure a defence beforehand and prepare a plea of urgency to justify himself. Probably because his audacity was dreaded he had received orders—he himself tell us so—to consult the commander of the fleet in every unforeseen juncture that threatened the security of the Province. These orders he turned to his own advantage and thus obtained the support of the Vice-Admiral then at Halifax, Boscawen, aptly nicknamed “Heart of Oak.” He was just the man for Lawrence, who knew his dispositions and had skilfully prepared him to accept the cherished plan.

“The Lieut.-Governor acquainted the Council that he was instructed by His Majesty to consult the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, upon any emergency that might concern the security of the Province.”

The next day Boscawen, accompanied by his assistant, Mostyn, appeared before the Council:

“They approved of the said proceedings, and gave it as their opinion, that it was now the properest time to oblige the said inhabitants to take the oath of allegiance or quit the Country."

The trick was thus successfully played. This occurred July 14th, 1755.

The reader should not forget that he is face to face with a man of consummate artfulness, with a house-painter’s apprentice who, by sheer duplicity, has in a few years raised himself to an exalted position. The superiority of his intelligence would of itself suffice to account for his success. One would have to be very simple to believe that the events I have just related were the result of unforeseen accidents, which Lawrence met as best he could from day to day. His letters to the Lords of Trade, the seizure of arms, his feigned indignation, his imaginary grievances, his consultations with Boscawen, all this was but the get-up of the drama he was preparing, so many means to an end. Happily, to enlighten us as to his intentions, we now have access to a document, which had long ago disappeared from the Archives and was discovered by the Rev. Andrew Brown. It affords a strong presumption that Lawrence had resolved upon the deportation long before the siege of Beausejour, and that, as a consequence, his grievances, his special pleading anent the oath, etc., had nothing to do with his decision. True, this document is undated, but it bears intrinsic evidence that it was drawn up before the events I have related above. Mr. Grosart, the finder and purchaser of Brown’s MS., wrote at the bottom of this document: “This invaluable paper was drawn up by Judge Mends early in 1755.” Morris, then Provincial Surveyor, had been charged by Lawrence with the preparation of a report on the most effectual method of deporting the Acadians. His report is very long and replete with details. “One must read it attentively,” says Casgrain, “to form a just estimate of the undertaking and of the man, to be in a position to appreciate them, I mean, to treat them both with deserved contempt.”

Morris begins his paper, continues Casgrain, with most minute topographical details. He describes each parish, each village, and even each small cluster of houses, which he enumerates one by one. He indicates the situation thereof, whether on the seashore, near the rivers or in the interior. He points out all the waterways and roads by which the Acadians could escape and suggests how they could lie intercepted. He omits neither one patrol to guard a land-route nor one cruiser to protect a sea-passage. In all this he exhibits a feline sagacity that forcibly reminds one of a. cat watching a mouse. But the good judge really surpasses himself in the variety of snares and Lies he invents to surprise and seize, the poor Acadians. For instance, an effort must be made to spread among them beforehand a rumor that they are to be transported, not into exile into a foreign country, but to Canada. Once they come under this false impression they will be more willing to do as they are bid. If only they could be persuaded to give themselves up of their own accord! But that is hardly feasible. No doubt on Sundays, when they are together in church, they might be surrounded and arrested. What if they were surprised in their beds? But they are too numerous and too scattered for that. Finally, the judge lays his linger on the best method, the one which was adopted at last: send to Mines and elsewhere strong detachments of soldiers to make the people prisoners after they had come together for a public meeting.

For the better understanding of this document, I append a few extracts:

“The number of men necessary to remove the Acadians, and the places to post them will depend much on their behaviour, and it will much facilitate their readiness to go, if a persuasion could obtain among them that they are to be removed to Canada, could it be propagated by common report, for it is natural to think they will be unwilling to quit their possessions, and to offer themselves voluntarily to be transported they know not whither. I apprehend such a persuasion would greatly facilitate the enterprise. . . If they can possibly be persuaded to surrender themselves voluntarily, or if they can In? apprehended by any stratagem. The rest might submit willingly; but, if they prove obstinate, and take to the woods, and take up arms, it will require the whole force of the Colony to subdue them.

“If strong detachments were placed in the villages of Grana Pre, Pigiguit and Canard, at a certain day, they might be all summoned to attend, and then seize on all those that attend; 01 -whether to invest their churches on a Sunday to be agreed on, and to seize on all present: or whether to invest their villages in the night, and seize them in bed; their living in such scattering situation will render this difficult; a number of whaleboats would be absolutely necessary if this were concluded on, to seize all those contiguous to tho Basin, which would be best stationed at Grand Pre, as being near the centre of the settlements from whence they may be sent out.

“In short, it id difficult to conjecture how it maybe accomplished, but the circumstances as they arise, will afford the best information of the most effectual methods of dealing with them. Happy would it be, if they, in general, come in of their own accord!

“Is it not possible to employ some person who can be confided in, and who has been among them, to sound their present disposition and intention, and from thence to take measures accordingly?”

What treachery! To what acts of base servility may not the desire of self-advancement impel a man, perhaps otherwise upright enough, who wants to please an odious despot! Morris’s reward was a judgeship.

It is noteworthy that, among all Morris’s infernal combinations, not the slightest allusion occurs to the unrestricted oath, about which so much fuss was to be made a few weeks later. Evidently, it was of little consequence whether the Acadians took this oath or not; they were in any case condemned to deportation. “ They are at all adventures to le rooted out;” these are Morris’s own words. Was I not right in saying that the oath was but the semblance of a motive, a sham to make the deportation plausible? The same may be said of all Lawrence’s other shifts.

This is how Brown himself brands that hideous paper and its author:

“The subject was referred to Mr. Morris, as best acquainted with the country and the inhabitants. He wrote this report in consequence, little honorable to his heart, as it is replete with unjustifiable stratagems, cruel advice and barbarous counsel. . . I found this paper among the council fyles. From it I corrected a less perfect copy put into my hands by his son and from it got this transcript taken."

Morris's report bore this heading:

Some reflections on the situation of the inhabitants, commonly called Neutrals, and some methods proposed to prevent their escape out of the colony, in case, upon being acquainted with the design of removing them, they should attempt to desert over to the French.

Whoever carefully reads this title will see that it implies that the project of deporting the Acadians was already formed when Morris received instructions to prepare his report. All he had to do was to furnish information as to the method of carrying out the project, and to prevent the Acadians from joining the French. Therefore, Lawrence was deceiving the Lords of Trade when he wrote to them that he had ordered Monckton to banish from the country the Beausejour Acadians, since at that very moment he was doing his best to find some means of preventing their departure, so that he might have them in his power to scatter them at his own chosen time. Indeed Morris, in the following passage, distinctly hints that they are to be transported to English Colonies: “It will much facilitate tlieir readiness to go if a persuasion could obtain among them that they are to be removed to Canada, for it is natural to think they w ill he unwilling to offer themselves voluntarily to be transported they know not whither.”

Morris felt pretty sure that, should the Acadians become persuaded of their future deportation to Canada, they would submit to their fate. I think he was right. But, once more, does not this prove that they were not and could never become rebels, except under extraordinary provocation from their rulers? For, we must bear in mind—and this is fresh evidence that Morris’s report was prepared before the siege of Beausdjour—that the Acadians still had their arms, since, while enumerating his skilful combinations, Morris says: “but if they prove obstinate and take up arms, it will require the whole force of the colony to subdue them.” This he certainly could not have said if their arms had already been taken from them.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate, I think, first, that this document was prior to the siege of Beausejour, and to Lawrence’s dealings with the delegates, and, secondly, that Lawrence had already decided upon the deportation. But by analogous reasoning we are led to place the date of Lawrence’s decision still further back; we must go beyond the mere drawing up of the report to the time when Lawrence instructed Morris to prepare it. Now a document of this length and importance, comprising a multitude of minute details and a complete census of the population, is not the work of a day or a week either. Besides, the idea of giving such an order to Morris cannot have sprung all at once from Lawrence’s head like a jack-in-a-box. It was and must have been there for a long time ; he had slowly hatched it; he had himself matured the means of realizing it. By an indisputable chain of facts we come to the con-elusion that, long before the siege of Beausejour, Lawrence had resolved to cast away the Acadians on the shores of New England. We also come to this other parallel conclusion, that he seized the Acadians’ arms for the double purpose of creating pretexts and of more securely executing his project; that he took offence at a respectful petition because it was his interest to appear hurt; that he forbade the delegates to consult their fellow-countrymen lest his proposal of an unrestricted oath might be accepted; that for the same reason he rejected their tardy consent to take this oath; that he imprisoned them because he wished the mass of the Acadians to believe that their delegates had peremptorily and constantly refused to comply with his behests, for he knew that the example of the delegates’ acceptance would have great weight with the people; that, if he consulted Boscawen, “Heart of Oak,” it was only because he had prepared and won him over to his views, and because be was most anxious to shield himself behind another’s responsibility, for he knew full well that he could never obtain the consent of the Lords of Trade, and that, if he did not protect himself, he ran great risk of being blamed and disgraced; that his letter of June 28th to the Lords of Trade was a trick to mask his designs.

“I would fain believe,” says Casgrain, “that the historians who have striven to justify the deportation had not in' hand all the documents we possess to-day; but I must say that he whose narrative is the most famous had a complete copy of those documents before his eyes while he wrote.”

Casgrain here alludes to Brown’s MS. and to Park-man. In fact this writer could not but know all about Brown. It would, indeed, be astonishing if he who devoted almost iifty years of his life to the history of this country, and who took the trouble to get sixty-two volumes of manuscripts copied from the Paris Archives, should have never heard of Brown’s MS. deposited in the British Museum in 1852, and copied by the Nova Scotia Hist. Soc. a few years before Parkman’s narrative on Acadian affairs. Besides, if need be, I can prove beyond question that Parkman bad read this manuscript. And yet he has never quoted Brown’s opinions nor the documents his MS. contains, nor so much as mentioned his name. Did he think that the views of Brown, a minister of the Gospel, a professor of a celebrated university, a citizen of Halifax, a contemporary of the actors and witnesses of the tragedy, passing judgment as between absent foreigners and fellow-countrymen with whom he was intimate and whose very reminiscences he was using, were not worth the views of Pichon the traitor and spy? At all events, the documents contained in Brown’s MS. had a voice of their own; Parkman might quote them and name the author of the MS. without a blush, without being forced to conceal his identity as he felt he must do for Pichon.

Where had Brown found Morris’ document? He tells us himself: in the Archives. Since that time it has, like so many other papers, disappeared therefrom. Many people were of course interested in suppressing such dangerous witnesses of villainy. The Historical Society of Halifax got a great part of Brown's MS. copied into its collections, but all the odious portion of Morris’s report is cut away, the topographical descriptions alone being preserved. May we not be warranted in supposing that there was somebody at work who was interested in shielding one of his ancestors from public contempt?"

About the middle of July, as far as I can ascertain, the priests were arrested and the Archives of the Acadians carried off, The Halifax archives do not mention these important facts. By this time the reader must have ceased being surprised at these omissions. The Abbe Le Guerne, who spent many years on the Gulf coasts with the Acadians that had escaped the deportation, tells us that the arrest of the priests took place about the middle of July, and he names, among those who were thus carried off, the Abbes Daudin, Cliauvreulx and Le Maire. These were the only priests then dwelling in the Peninsula with the exception of Desenclaves, who succeeded in escaping by taking to the woods. We find him afterwards at Cape Sable with the remnants of some families that had escaped the deportation. The series of Lawrence’s persecutions would not have been complete without this carrying off of the priests. He knew that whatever touched the religious faith of the Acadians was for them a very sore point. Perhaps he had hoped thus to exasperate them and drive them into acts of resistance that would make a great show and emphasize his accusations. If so, he was doomed to disappointment. But what could have been Lawrence’s motive in seizing the archives of the Acadians? Had he foreseen, so far ahead, the possibility of petitions to the King and denunciations of his conduct? This would have been a correct forecast, seeing that, two years later, the Acadians deported to Philadelphia, in a petition to the King, explain that it was impossible for them to prove their assertions because their archives had been carried off. And since a detail apparently so insignificant did not escape the fertile and watchful mind of Lawrence, it is easy to understand why the archives are so incomplete, why he has so effectually blotted out all vestige of his crime, why we are confronted with a lost chapter.

In his letter of June 28th to the Lords of Trade, Lawrence had mentioned expulsion with regard only to the Acadian refugees at Beausejour. It was not becoming that he should take action against those who had always remained in the Province, without giving the Lords of Trade a vague hint at least of his plans. His own interest with a view to meet the difficulty of justifying his conduct made this imperative. His fault would be deemed all the greater and his justification all the more difficult, the more completely he would be leaving the Lords of Trade in the dark as to his designs. There was no doubt a serious inconvenience, nay, a danger in giving them any inkling of his purpose: they might forbid him to carry it out; but, three months would have to elapse before an answer came back, and meanwhile the deportation would be an accomplished fact. He would not dare to disobey a positive prohibition; but he flattered himself he could make them accept an accomplished fact without grave disadvantage to himself. If, however, contrary to his expectation, the Lords of Trade took a threatening view of his conduct, he would intrench himself behind the approval of his Council and of Boscawen, he would plead necessity and urgency. Moreover, there was actual war between France and England; that war might become official at any moment, and it is always easier to fish in troubled waters. The engrossing cares of a military campaign, scattering attention over so many points at a time, would not suffer that attention to rest on one special point, ami that an isolated one, lost on a little-frequented shore, where the very bitterness of the struggle would make observers indulgent, and the din of battle would smother the cries of the victims. So long as the war lasted there could hardly be any question of making an investigation into his conduct. Men “don’t swap horses when they’re crossing a stream.” The war bid fair to be long and lively, and afterwards . . . well, afterwards, all would be forgotten or confused. If final victory crowned the efforts of England, all would be buried under the trophies of triumph. Lawrence was playing high; he knew it, but he also knew that circumstances were in his favor. Does not fortune favor the bold ? Audaces for tuna juvat.

No; there was no reason to stay his hand. He had better let the Lords of Trade know a part of his plan. This he did on the 18tli of July.

After having stated that the Acadians had never yet taken an “unqualified” oath, he informs their Lordships that he took advantage of their coming before the Council with an extremely insolent petition, to propose to them the oath; which they obstinately refused.

“The next morning they appeared and refused to take the oath without the old reserve of not being obliged to bear arms, upon which, they were acquainted that, as they refused to become English subjects, we could no longer look upon them in that light, that we should send them to France by the first opportunity, and, till then, were ordered to be kept prisoners. Your Lordships will see our proceedings in this case, as soon as it is possible to prepare the minutes of the Council."

Not a word does this letter contain about the subject-matter of this supposedly impudent letter, not a word about the seizure of arms, about the confiscation of the boats, about the order to give up all fire-arms and the immediate delivery thereof, about the arrest of the priests and the carrying off of the Acadian archives, not a word on points the knowledge of which was so very important to enable the Lords of Trade to understand the state of affairs.

Once more his object is manifest; he wants to conceal his actions and intentions. His whole behavior has the same general trend; we have here not merely one isolated fact, lost amid others of a different nature, or unconnected with the tenor of his conduct, but an uninterrupted series of connected facts which could have only one objective point. Nor can it be alleged that these omissions were immaterial; on the contrary, they were a flagrant violation of duty : for he was evidently bound to acquaint the Lords of Trade with all these grave events and to enter the record of them in the Archives.

Lawrence knew very well that, unless he could cite clear cases of rebellion, it would' be difficult, not to say impossible, to convince the Lords of Trade that the Acadians were to be feared. The Home authorities had the experience of forty-five years to go by; they knew, from Mascarene’s letters, that, in exceptionally painful circumstances, they had never once resorted to arms; they knew that it had not been otherwise under Cornwallis and Hopson. Often, it is true, complaints had been made of their lack of sentimental attachment to England, of their partiality for the French, of their stubbornness about the oath; but this was all. The Lords of Trade were anxious to keep them in the country ; they were known to be peaceable, moral and hardworking. What, then, would the Lords of Trade have thought of Lawrence’s plans, even as toned down in their presentment, if he had informed them that lie had tricked the Acadians out of part of their arms and that they had delivered up the remainder as well as their boats on a simple order to that effect; that he had imprisoned their priests and carried off their archives ; that, despite this cruel treatment, he could not reproach them with a single act of rebellion or resistance; that the only complaint he could make referred to a Petition which he called insolent, but which he neither reproduced nor explained, taking good care not to mention the second petition in which they developed and justified the good intentions of the former? Doubtless the Lords of Trade would have replied in some such strain as this: By your insulting and arbitrary measures you have exposed the province to an insurrection; you have sown discontent and distrust among a people which we were trying to assimilate or at least to attach to our interests. You have mined or at least jeopardized a policy which we have long been following with great care. And, since they have undergone your humiliations and your cruelty without breaking the peace, without violating their oath of fidelity, can you not see how excellent are their dispositions? Finally, since they have neither boats in which to escape nor arms for attack or defence; since the majority of their brethren who dwell with the French refused to take up arms; since those who did were forced to it under pain of death; since the French have been repulsed and driven from their posts all along the coast; since it is henceforth impossible for the Acadians to have any intercourse with the French, what in the world have you to fear?

Another ruse of Lawrence's was his assertion, in this letter to the Lords of Trade, that he had declared to the Acadian delegates that “he should send them to France,” whereas we have seen how, long before, he had made up his mind to deport, not merely the few delegates he had imprisoned, but the entire population, not to Canada nor to France, but to places he must carefully keep them ignorant of. Even with respect to the imprisoned delegates he treacherously veiled his purpose in vague terms as if his decision as to them might be reversed: “They have since desired to be admitted to take the oath, but have not been admitted, nor will any answer be given them until we see how the rest of the inhabitants are disposed.”

A little further po, however, at the close of his letter, as if he thought better of it and as if he had a far-off vision of the disgrace he might incur should he not shield himself more carefully against the imputation of purposely disguising his projects, he adds: “I am determined to bring the inhabitants to a compliance or rid the •province of such perfidious subjects.”

During the ensuing week, on July 25th, a hundred new delegates from all parts of the Province met at Halifax in compliance with Lawrence’s orders. Were they to have the same fate as the fifteen delegates he had put in prison and still held in St. George’s Island ? They could hardly doubt it, since they came with a final answer that they would not take the oath he required. There was self-denial, if not heroism, in accepting a mandate that exposed them to rot in prison; but they did not flinch; some one must voice the will of the people, and so they braved the anger and vengeance of the tyrant. But why so many delegates when twenty-four was the usual number? What need was there of a hundred men merely to carry an answer ? We shall see later on. This was another of Lawrence’s clever machinations, and one that shows how artfully he had planned, far in advance, all the details of his crime, and how far he carried his inhumanity.

The reply of the inhabitants of Annapolis reads as follows:—

"Having received Your Excellency’s orders, dated July 13th, 1755, we assembled on Sunday the 13th (July) in order to read them to all the inhabitants, wishing always to observe a faithful obedience.

“We have unanimously consented to deliver up our iire-arms to M. Handfield, our very worthy commandant, although we have never had any desire to make use of them against His Majesty’s Government. We have therefore nothing to reproach ourselves, either on that subject, or on the subject of the fidelity we owe to His Majesty’s Government. For, sir, we can assure Your Excellency. that several of us have risked our lives to give information to the Government concerning the enemy; and have also, when necessary, laboured with all our heart, on the repairs of Fort Annapolis, and other work considered necessary by the Government, and are ready to continue with the same fidelity. We have also selected thirty men to proceed to Halifax, whom we shall recommend to do or say nothing contrary to His Majesty’s Council ; but we shall charge them strictly to contract no new oath. We are resolved to adhere to that to which we have been faithful, as far as circumstances required it; for the enemies of His Majesty have urged us to take up arms against the Government but we have taken care not to do so.

“Signed by two hundred and seven of the said inhabitants.”

“They were told that they must now resolve either to take the oath or quit their lands. Upon which they said they were determined, one and all, rather to quit their lands than to take any other oath than what they had done before. They were given till next day at 10 o’clock in the forenoon, to reconsider the matter.”

The delegates of Grand Pre, Pigiguit, Riviere aux Canards, being brought before the Governor, present their reply:—

“The inhabitants of our Districts having been informed by M. Murray, etc., etc. We take the liberty of representing, that, after having taken the oath of fidelity to His Majesty, with all the circumstances and reservations granted to us in the name of the King, by His Excellency Governor Philipps, which allegiance we have observed as far as possible, enjoying peaceably our rights according to the terms of our oath in all its tenor and reserve; and always having relied on our oath of fidelity, we are resolved with one consent and voice, to take no other oath. We have taken the oath of fidelity in good faith, We are very well pleased and satisfied. We hope, sir, that you will have the kindness to listen to our just reasons; and, in consequence, we all with a unanimous voice, beg His Honor to set at liberty our people who have been detained at Halifax for some time [the previous delegates’], not even knowing their situation, which appears to us deplorable. We have full confidence, sir, that you will have the goodness to grant us the favor which we have the honor most humbly to beg. Charity for our detained inhabitants, and their innocence, oblige us to beg Your Excellency to be touched by their miseries, and to restore to them their liberty with all possible submission and the most profound respect.

“Signed by two hundred and three.”

“The Deputies were then called in and peremptorily refused the oath.

“Those of Annapolis also appeared and refused the oath.

“Whereupon, they were all ordered into confinement.

“As it had been before determined to send all the Acadians out of the Province if they refused to take the oath, nothing now remained to be considered but what measures should be taken to send them away, and where they should be sent to.

“After mature consideration, it was unanimously agreed, to prevent as much as possible their attempting to return and molest the settlers that may be set down on their lands, it would be most proper to send them to be distributed amongst the several colonies on the Continent, and that a sufficient number of vessels should be hired with all possible expedition for that purpose.’’

Under any circumstances these petitions may be deemed excessively deferential, but particularly so in the present case when causes of discontent were so grave and so numerous. There is in all these petitions a ring of sincerity which, for the unprejudiced reader, is far more convincing than the vague and really childish accusations of Lawrence. No ; these good people who so unanimously obeyed all the iniquitous commands Lawrence chose to lay upon them could not be dangerous either with or without arms. Those who would gainsay this give the lie to all historical reasoning in the search after truth; and, since Lawrence made the remaining in the country depend upon the taking of the oath, the few writers who approve the deportation, the “rar nantes,” have but one resource left, they must base their defence of that act on the simple refusal to take the oath. But those who, like myself, are convinced that the Acadians afforded 110 reasonable excuse for their deportation, and that their refusal to take the oath could not have been Lawrence’s real motive, will be forced to admit that he had his own interest in view, to attain which he did ail he could to prevent the taking of the oath. Knowing that kindness would win the Acadians, he treated them harshly. We cannot fix the date of the arrest of the priests; l’Abbe Le Guerne places it in the middle of July (a, la mi-juillet), and this meeting of the delegates was on the 25th of that month. If the priests had already been arrested, this was quite enough to prevent the taking of the oath, as it clearly meant that the exercise of their religion was at aii end. However this may be, there are enough other facts of a grave character to warrant the inference that Lawrence would not have the oath, that lie behaved so as not to get it, and that, if it had been taken, the deportation would have been accomplished all the same under other pretexts.

Parkman, with the candor that distinguishes him, tells us that the Acadians refused the oath “in lull view of the consequences.” But, have we not just seen that Lawrence declared to them, “You must now resolve to take the oath or quit your lands?” Was this the same as the deportation which he had decided on, and which was actually soon to be a matter of fact? As well might we say that the moon was like green cheese. From this declaration of Lawrence’s the Acadians could draw but one conclusion: namely, that, in ease they refused, they would have to give up their lands and go wherever they pleased. In this case history would have been silent as to their fate. There would have been cruelty, injustice, bad faith, violation of a treaty and of solemn engagements ; but this fact would have been like some others that stain the pages of history and are forgotten by reason of the time in which they occurred or of the frequency of their occurrence. Cruel as the order to give up property and fatherland would have been, they would have obeyed and accepted the alternative. There can be no doubt of this, neither did Morris doubt it, since he thought they would be resigned to their fate even if they were to be deported, provided they were led to believe that they would be transported all together to Canada. At the very moment when Lawrence was hypocritically declaring that they would have to quit their lands, his resolution was thus expressed : “ As it has been before determined to send all the Acadians out of the Province.” And, at the same sitting of the council, it was decided that they should be scattered up and down the British colonies; in other words, this Resolution was but the fulfilment of formalities connected with a decision long since arrived at.

By way of relieving the dry monotony of official documents, always drawn up with a keen eye to self defence, I will insert here the recital of these last events by Abbe Daudin, who must then have been a prisoner at Halifax.

“For along time,” says he, “the English never spoke to the Acadians except to announce their ruin in the near future. They were, told that they would be made slaves, that they would be dispersed like the Irish; in short, everything foreboded the destruction of their nation; there was talk of nothing else than burning the houses and laying waste the fields. However, the inhabitants were not discouraged, as is proved by the most abundant harvest that was ever seen in the country. Prayer is the only weapon they used against the English.”

"After the taking of Beausejour they made a show of commanding the inhabitants on holidays to go to the Fort and sharpen all their instruments of war, telling them these weapons were to destroy them, after they had cut up into pieces their brethren who were refugees with the French.”

“When the Grand Pre delegates had started for Halifax, there came to Annapolis an order promulgated at the church door on Sunday. July 6th, which order enjoined on all the inhabitants to carry their arms to the Fort, and to meet for the nomination of thirty delegates who should immediately go to join at Halifax those of the other parishes. The very next day the arms were brought in and the delegates left the following Wednesday. After their departure, the canoes were demanded and burned.”

“When the delegates from all parts had arrived to the number of about one hundred, they were called before the Council, where they were immediately told that no propositions nor explanations would be received from them. Those from Annapolis wished to show their privileges granted by Queen Anne, since acknowledged and ratified by the reigning King ; but in vain. The Governor replied to them that he wanted no answer but yes or no. He put the following very plain question to them: ‘Will you or w ill you not swear to the King of Great Britain that you will take up arms against the King of France, his enemy? ’ The answer was not less laconic1 than the question. ‘Since,' said they, ‘ we are asked only for a yes or a no, toe will all answer unanimously, No; ’adding, however, that what was required of them tended to despoil them of their religion and everything else.”

“Immediately the Governor gave orders to transport them on a small island, distant as far as a cannon-ball would carry from Halifax, whither they were conducted like criminals, and where they remained until the end of October I fed on a little bad bread, deprived of the liberty of receiving any assistance as well as of speaking to any one.”

“The Governor imagined that this harshness would soften their courage ; he found them as firm as ever. He took the resolution of betaking himself to the aforesaid island with a numerous retinue, accompanied by all the instruments of torture, in order to try to soften their courage at the sight of this spectacle. In the midst of this display befitting a tyrant he asked them if they persisted in their answers. One of them replied*Yes, and more than ever; we have God for us and that is enough.’ The Governor drew his sword and said: ‘Insolent fellow, you deserve that 1 should run my sword through your body.' The peasant presented his breast to him, and, drawing nearer, said: ‘Strike, Sir, if you dare; I shall be the first martyr of the band; you can kill my body, but you shall not kill my soul.' The Governor in a sort of frenzy, asked the others if they shared the feelings of that insolent fellow who had just spoken; all with one voice exclaimed:

‘Yes, Sir! Yes, Sir!......

“After the carrying off of the priests, the English raised their flag al)ove the churches and made the latter into barracks when their troops passed there.....The missionaries reached Halifax with this fine accompaniment, drums beating. They were led out on the parade, where they were exposed during three quarters of an hour to mockery, contempt and insults.”

The official documents, mutilated as they are, let us catch hut a faint glimpse of Lawrence’s oppression. It could hardly be otherwise even if they were complete: a despot does not register bis misdeeds, especially when he is responsible to a higher authority and when lie is playing a dangerous game without the knowledge of that authority. Lawrence seems to have taken especial delight in figuring as a tyrant, in making poor wretches who could only hold their tongues quail and quake before his eye. None but an upstart could carry to such lengths the abuse of his power merely because the Acadians refused to lend themselves to an act against nature; and, if we give credit to Daudin, he was careful to render this oath more terrible by intimating that they would have to fight the French. Evidently, he was anxious to fail.

This letter of Daudin’s confirms the intrinsic evidence of Morris’s report as to Lawrence’s intentions having been formed long ago. Long before the taking of Beausejour, whether he avowed his purpose or merely let it be guessed by the people about him, the English officials used to say to the Acadians that they would be dispersed, that their houses would be burned.