Major Charles Lawrence, President of the Council, acts as administrator in expectation of Hopson’s return—His character— His behavior towards the English colonists, the Germans and the Acadians, causes great dissatisfaction.

The good feeling which Hopson had so happily restored was to disappear with him. He had made the governorship an easy task, if only his successor had had some of the virtues for which he himself was so eminently distinguished. Unfortunately, Lawrence, a first-rate soldier, a bold and active man, endowed with more than common intelligence, with that insinuating manner which so often is the intriguer’s passport to success, was totally devoid of moral sense and utterly heartless. The be-all and end-all with him was his ambition, to which he had vowed all the resources of his lively mind. Imperious and cruel to his subordinates, he was supple and obsequious to his superiors. Of humble birth, having begun life as an apprentice to a house-painter, he had raised himself, while yet in the prime of life, to a position which a nobleman’s son might have envied.

A knowledge of the character of this man is very important: for on the judgment that shall be meted out to him depends, to a great extent, the judgment history must pass on the extraordinary act that marked his government. By the help of the public documents alone—his own documents, garbled as they are—any one can convince himself that my opinion of him is not too severe, since, throughout his whole career, one looks in vain for a single deed, and, in all the documents, for a single line that might hint at the semi dance of any feeling of delicacy.

My search after further information to confirm or modify the impression produced upon me by the mere perusal of the volume of the Archives has been rewarded beyond my hopes ; and I can now safely assert that my first view fell far short of the reality. I will adduce some of my proofs in the course of the narrative; for the present, I need only give a short extract from a long petition addressed by the citizens of Halifax in 1757 to a distinguished person in England whose name does not appear in the document supplied by Rev. Andrew Brown.

“We are extremely obliged to you for your favor of the 3rd of July last and for your assiduity in our affairs.

"We can assure you, sir, that we were almost without hopes of being considered as English subjects; the haughty and disdainful behaviour of our governor to all our remonstrances, although tender&l with the utmost submission, gave us much reason to think lie was countenanced at Home.....

'Your letter has revived the hopes of the inhabitants, and it lias been great comfort to them to find an Englishman in England who lias their unhappy state and condition at heart and commiserates their bondage under oppression and tyranny. .........

"These are all the friends Governor Lawrence has at Home, for on this side of the water he has none, either of the inhabitants or gentlemen of the army, who hold him in the utmost contempt, except those formerly mentioned, to yon his agents in oppression. . . .

“Perhaps you will be surprised to hear how this gentleman, who, some time ago, was only a painter's apprentice in London, should have advanced himself to such heights. We are obliged to confess that he has a good address, a great deal of low cunning, is a most consummate flatterer, has words full of the warmest expression of an upright intention, though never intended, and with much art most solicitously courts all strangers whom he thinks can be of any service to him. By these and such arts has he risen to he what he is, and, elated with his success, is outrageously bent upon the destruction of every one that does not concur in his measures.

“Another of the Governor’s acts is to misrepresent and abuse all below him. He has publicly called his Conncil a pack of scoundrels, the merchants a parcel of villains and bankrupts, and has represented at Home the whole as a people discontented and rebellious.'’

Such was, according to his fellow-countrymen, the man who conceived and carried out the deportation of the Acadians. If he painted the citizens of Halifax in such sombre colors, we need not wonder that the Acadians should be met with the same treatment. Nor should we wonder that he grievously oppressed them, since the oppression he exercised on those whom it was manifestly his interest to spare had driven them to extreme exasperation.

His must have been a strangely cruel and perverse nature, since he could not curb it when his fellow-citizens might denounce him, overwhelm him with disgrace and ruin his prospects forever. But what had he to fear from the Acadians? Would their complaints find an echo beyond the sea? Would these complaints even so much as reach England? Clearly not.

In dealing with a man of this stamp, would it be wise to take his own documents literally, garbled as they were purposely later on by himself and his accomplices, in order to justify an unjustifiable act? Have we not at least the right of requiring from him well-proved facts and not unsupported assertions? Now, as I am about to demonstrate, in all that part of the Archives which refers to Lawrence’s administration, despite the one-sidedness displayed in the compilation of that volume, there is not one single instance, throughout the whole extent of the peninsula, of resistance that can be imputed to the Acadians, subjected though they were to intolerable provocation.

The better to set this forth, I will review the documents contained in the volume of the Archives, dwelling especially on those which contain accusations or complaints against the Acadians.

At first, while Hopson, absent on leave for his health, was expected to return, Lawrence was merely Administrator pro tem. of the province with the title of President of the Council. By making himself measurably agreeable to the people under his care, and still more to the Lords of Trade, he could reasonably hope, provided his friends helped him at home and Hopson did not return, to be soon appointed governor. The nomination was slow in coming, but it came at last in the November of the following year. Up to this time his conduct seems to have been more guarded and perhaps also less harsh and more just.

On December 5th, 1753, shortly after Hopson’s departure, he wrote to the Lords of Trade:

“I take the earliest opportunity of doing myself the honour to write to Your Lordships, though hardly anything worth your notice has happened since Governor Hopson’s departure. . . .

I come next to the Acadians who are tolerably quiet as to government matters, but exceedingly litigious amongst themselves. As this spirit shows the value they set upon their possessions, it is so far a favorable circumstance. But, as there is no regular method of administering justice amongst them, they grow very uneasy at the decision of their disputes having been so long pat off. To give them a hearing in our Courts of Law would be attended with insuperable difficulties; their not having taken the oath of allegiance is an absolute bar in our law to their holding any landed possessions, and Your Lordships may imagine how difficult it must be for the courts to give judgment in cases where the proprietors’ claims are far from being ascertained, and where the disputes commonly relate to the bounds of lands that have never as yet been surveyed that I know of.

“The French emissaries still continue to perplex them with difficulties about their taking the oath of allegiance; and though they have not been in the least pressed to it of late, yet they seem to think we only wait a convenient opportunity to force it upon them, as they every day magnify to themselves the difficulties they should lie under with the Indians if they take the oath, as well as the notion that it would subject them to bear arms.”

From the foregoing it appears that the Acadians were then “pretty quiet as to government matters, but exceedingly litigious amongst themselves.” There is no reason to question this statement. Hopson had given them satisfaction on many important points, and, for a long time, there had been no talk of the oath; this was all that was needed to ensure quiet. Nor have we any motive for doubting that there must have been difficulties among themselves anent the limits of their lands. More than twelve years before, Mascarene, iu a letter I have produced elsewhere, had begged the Lords of Trade to alter the regulations excluding Catholics from Crown Land grants:

“They have,’" said he, “divided and subdivided amongst their children the lands they were in possession of, as His Majesty’s instructions prescribe the grant of unappropriated lands to Protestant subjects only. ... If they are debarred from new possessions, they must live here miserably and consequently be troublesome, or they must withdraw to French colonies. If we give occasion of disgust to these people, the French in case of war will soon make an advantage of it.”

Now we gather from Lawrence’s letter that nolhing had been done to right this crying wrong; and yet the sinister forecasts of Mascareue had not been realized, in other words, the Acadians had neither given trouble to the government nor left the country because of a wrong which was in itself so grievous. In spite of this “occasion of disgust,” and of Shirley’s plans more disgusting yet, the French had failed, during the late war, to shake their fidelity. How grave soever was this question of land grants, it was after all a matter of secondary importance to the Acadians in comparison to the oath and its consequences, and therefore was not made the subject of co%8plaint to the authorities. Still 't stands to reason that lands which had never been surveyed, and which had been divided and subdivided into small parcels during forty years, must have given rise to many disputes. And, as if to perpetuate this state of affairs, the settlement of the difficulty was indefinitely postponed and evaded, for the unavowed reason that the nonacceptance of the oath “was a bar in our law to their holding any landed possessions.” This really meant, according to Lawrence’s contention, that the Acadians had no legal right to the property which they enjoyed in virtue of the treaty of Utrecht.

Up to 1730, in spite of the growth of the population, the Acadians did not address themselves to occupying new land nor to fixing the limits of the old, nor to making improvements, for the very obvious reason that their stay in the country wras uncertain. After the agreement with Philipps, exempting them from military service, they thought their status was definitely settled, and then only did the land question assume importance in their eyes. As new grants were refused to them, they were forced to subdivide their old farms, and as these bad never been properly surveyed, difficulties arose. Their disputes were svbmitted to the governor as early as 1731, when Armstrong said of them that they were litigious. The only way to settle the rival claims was to have the land surveyed; but, in Lawrence’s time, ten, fifteen, twenty and more years had elapsed since the disputed claims had been filed and placed in the governor’s hands, and as yet nothing had been settled. No wonder Lawrence could say: “They grow uneasy at the decision of their disputes having been so long put off.” Surely there was more than enough to make them uneasy. Lawrence lets out the secret of these endless delays when lie says: “Their not having taken the oath of allegiance is an absolute bar in our law to their holding any landed possessions.” This amounts to an avowal that, since 1730, the delay of surveys and settlement of claims was intentional, and was owing to the restrictive clause contained in the oath accepted by Governor Philipps. But, then, it becomes evident that the acceptance of this oath was only a deception, since it did not give the Acadians any right to their land. If, however, I should happen to have mistaken the drift of Lawrence’s letter, there is at least this other inference to be drawn, that the governors were but very little concerned to end the bickerings of the Acadians, or they might have readily done so by ordering the necessary surveys.

To deprive them of new grants called for by the increase in their numbers was not enough of an injustice; they must, furthermore, be refused all right to the parcels of land which they held in virtue of a treaty. They were ordered to take an unrestricted oath, which would not even have given them any claim to new grants of land, these grants being reserved, by regulation, “to Protestant subjects only." Thus was being secretly prepared for them the fate of outcasts and pariahs. Perhaps their only resource now was to buy land from those Englishmen who had taken up, as I mentioned elsewhere, 100,000 acres around the settlements of Mines and Beaubassin. But it is easy to understand that the precariousness of their position was apt to make them mistrust such purchases.. Besides, was there any security against future annulment of all their title-deeds in virtue of Lawrence’s contention as to their being barred out by the law?

These few considerations give an inkling of Lawrence’s deep-laid schemes. The sequel will show that it is well nigh impossible to find one of his state papers that is not a fresh masterpiece of duplicity.

The Acadians must, forsooth, have been the most submissive and peace-loving people under the sun. “The lenity and the sweet of English rule,” on which Parkman dilates, may apply reasonably enough to the Home Government, but assuredly not to the provincial administration. Had the New England colonists been in the same situation, they would long ago have raised the standard of revolt and broken every trammel, as indeed they did a few years later to destroy abuses that were far less blameworthy and affirm rights that were far less important, for the sake of stamps and tea, when their language, their religion, their feelings, their lands were in no way threatened. Because the Acadians scorned rebellion, because they were too nobly obedient, they were deported like cattle, they were hunted like wild beasts, while statues were raised in honor of successful rebels; and, to crown their misfortune, they have to-day to bear the humiliation of the dying lion kicked by the ass from one who—be it said -without blame— bends low before the heroes of the revolution. To the vulgar mind success is the proof of merit, and the old saying.

Donee eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,

is accepted as an exhortation to the worship of success. Had England quelled the revolt, as she very probably would have done without the timely succor the French gave Washington, and had she deported the American rebels, true rebels these with far less grievances than the Acadians, how would Parkman have attuned his lyre?

It is strange that Mascarene's equitable suggestions were not acted upon by the Lords of Trade. Their conduct in this matter contrasts with their usual equity. Had the grantees of the 100,000 acres—amongst whom were a Secretary of State, his brother and a future Secretary of State—enough influence successfully to plead in bar of Mascarene's request? I cannot say.

Lawrence’s letter threw the Lords of Trade into great perplexity, as may be seen by the following extract from their answer of March 4th, 1754:

“The more we consider this point, the more nice and difficult it appears to us; for, as on the one hand great caution ought to be used to avoid giving any alarm and creating such a diffidence in their minds as might induce them to quit the Province, and by their numbers add strength to the French settlements, so, on the other hand, we should be equally cautious of creating an improper and false confidence in them, that by a perseverance in refusing to take the oath of allegiance, they may gradually work out in their own way a right to their lands.”

To a man of Lawrence’s character this was tantamount to saying: Deceive them if necessary, give them vaguely to understand that titles will be granted to them, taking great care, however, not to commit yourself to any formal promise. Nevertheless, do all that is needed to prevent them from leaving.

And yet this much must be said in palliation of the Lords of Trade: from their point of view, they were imparting counsels of prudence and moderation that might serve as a check on Lawrence’s impetuous and perverse nature. Of course there is no denying the trickery implied in this letter; but we should bear in mind that, for the last forty years, trickery had become so interwoven with the traditional policy that it was impossible for the best of well-meaning men entirely to free themselves from its meshes. Moreover, this letter was written at a time when the Lords of Trade hardly knew what decision to take on the matter at issue; and, in order to be perfectly fair towards them, this letter should be collated with another dated on the 29th of the ensuing October, which may be viewed as completing and greatly modifying it.

In the letter cited above from Lawrence, there is a long account of an insurrection of German Protestant settlers at Lunenburg, who belonged to Cornwallis’s colony. Before becoming president of the council, Lawrence had been commandant at that place, and his presence had been marked by troubles and by many desertions doubtless due to the severity of his rule. Directly after his departure the discontent broke out, men rushed to arms, and to avert the actual shedding of blood nothing less was needed than the presence of troops from Halifax, and as Murdoch says: “Monckton advised that, as the people there were so generally implicated, the better course would be to grant a general-forgiveness, but Lawrence desired to punish the ringleaders. . .

According to his invariable habit the Compiler has mutilated Lawrence’s letter, leaving out all that relates to the insurrection of the Lunenburg colonists. As we know the Compiler’s purpose, we quite understand that it would have been impolitic for him to bring to light such facts, for they constitute a glaring contrast to the obedience of the Acadians, albeit the latter must have been still worse treated than those Protestant colonists who had been brought out and established at the expense of the government.

Now that Ave know the effect of Lawrence’s administration among the English and German colonists, and what they thought of him at the outset of his career, we are in a position to judge of the reputation he had left behind him among the Acadians according to a letter from Captain Murray, commander of Fort Edward (Pigiguit) to Lawrence himself, wherein he reports to him what they had said of him: “That he was a man they personally hated, and dislike his government so much they ii'ould never be easy under it, he having treated them so harsh when amongst them.” However, he had never been able to provoke the least resistance, whereas the Germans had no intention of so meekly enduring oppression.

On June 21st, 1754, Lawrence “ informed the Council that he had received a letter from Captain Scott, commandant at Fort Lawrence, acquainting him that on the 14tli of June instant, the deserted inhabitants of Beaubassin District who had petitioned for leave to return to their lands, came and brought him their answer in relation to the resolution of Council of 27th September last, which was that. Unless the President of the Council •would assure them, from under his hand, that they should remain neuter and be exempt from taking up arms against any person whatsoever, it would be impossible for them even to think of returning, as they would, every day run the risk of having their throats cut and their cattle destroyed by the savages, and this they gave as their last answer.”

“Wherein it was resolved that nothing further would be done than as resolved by the Council on the said 27tli of September.”

This resolution of September 27tli had been passed under Hopson’s administration, and the communication of the Acadians mentioned above was the answer thereto ; but, since that time, Lawrence himself had made proposals to them inducing them to return to their lands. He had declared to them that it was not his intention at, present to oblige them to military service; which meant that he bound himself to nothing. Such an offer coming from Hopson would have deserved consideration; coming from Lawrence, it was worthless. Some more formal engagement was needed, with his signature into the bargain; else it were impossible “even to think of returning.”

Their motives for mistrusting Lawrence were too numerous to admit of their falling into the snare, and they had been too often deceived to be satisfied with vague promises. But, why was Lawrence so anxious for their return? For we must not forget that the deportation is now less than a twelvemonth ahead. Had the Acadian voluntary exiles been turbulent, seditious, dangerous, it would have been the acme of imprudence to receive a hostile element in the very heart of the province, and worse still to invite them to come. Now, contemptible as Lawrence was, he was no fool. Therefore, we may safely say, the presence of this new Acadian element was desirable, useful, almost or quite free from danger; therefore their behavior had been hitherto submissive enough to warrant Lawrence’s pressing invitations; therefore, in fine, to justify the depoitation, motives must be sought in the twelvemonth that followed. In point of fact no valid reason exists anywhere, not more and perhaps less during this twelvemonth than before it.