Cornwallis’s proclamation is followed by the departure of some families—The emigration threatens to become general—In the beginning of May, 1730, the Acadian deputies, assembled at Halifax, ask leave to quit the country—Cornwallis, frightened, changes his tone— He avoids giving an answer; will give it when they have done their sowing—Seed-time over, the deputies return to Halifax—Fresh subterfuge.

Cornwallis seemed at length to understand that he was not going to obtain from the Acadians the oath he required; that they would submit to the cruel alternative of abandoning their property and leaving the country rather than consent to an act that did violence to their feelings. All the old artifices, all the cheats of Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong and Philipps were to be repeated to prevent their departure.

In Nicholson’s time, as we have seen, the Acadians were not allowed the benefit of the clauses of the treaty. Under various pretexts their departure was made impossible. On the one hand, French vessels were forbidden to enter the ports; on the other, the Acadians were not permitted to take passage in English ships. They built themselves small vessels; but, when they wanted to equip them at Louisburg. this was refused. Later on, they were forbidden to apply at Boston. Undismayed, they begged the French authorities to act as mediators in their favor at the English court. When the order of the English Government instructing

Nicholson to give the Acadians full permission to leave was handed to Colonel Vetch, he pretended that he had no authority to act, that he must await the arrival of the govern01. Nicholson, on his return, in order to avoid obeying orders, reserved certain points to the decision of the Queen.

For three years the Acadians, who, perhaps, trusted artlessly in the good faith of their rulers, waited for the. answer to these reserved points; it never came. Subsequently, Philipps, thinking that the time had come for exacting an oath of allegiance, issued a proclamation ordering the taking of this oath within four months, or, in default thereof, departure from the province without taking away anything but clothes. Ill informed of the character of this people, he believed, as his predecessors did, that love of property and the absence of all means of transportation would force them to accept his proposals. Great was his surprise when he saw them at work opening out a road for their departure. This contingency had not entered into his calculations. He was equal to the emergency and forbade them to continue that road.

At last, Sliding that matters could not be settled otherwise, the Acadians resigned themselves to remain in the countn and to take the oath, on condition that they should not bear arms against the French. This condition being accepted, the struggle came to an end. Thenceforth they were called by themselves, by their rulers, by everybody, “ The French Neutrals.” During twenty years, relying on this solemn agreement, they lived in the most perfect tranquillity. Not only the agreement was not disavowed, but both sides observed it scrupulously during all that time, and especially during the war. At bottom, there was good faith only on one side; the government was waiting for an opportunity to repudiate what had been merely a makeshift to get out of a difficulty.

The opportunity was now at hand in the foundation of Halifax. Cornwallis could now, he thought, speak as a master, ego nominor leo; agreements were of little weight with him; nor was it necessary for him to plead want of fidelity on the part of the Acadians, for of this he says not a word. Might for him was all sufficient; with that, a soldier of his importance could snap his fingers at arguments. Like his predecessors, he believed the Acadians would elect to take the required oath rather than lose their possessions. Instead of a year or four months—the delay granted by Philipps—he allowed three months only; and, like Philipps, he forbade them to take anything away. When, at last, he came to realize that the Acadians would quit the country rather than submit to his oath, he, too, adopted “ways that are dark: ” “ As they stayed to have copies of my answer in Writing, I made them answer, without changing anything of my former declaration, or saying one ivord about it. My view is to make them, as useful as possible while they do stay.

This happened in September. He hoped that, when the season would be more advanced, there would no longer be question of leaving in winter; by the time spring came round, lie could find some other pretext, should they persist in their intentions.

The French, as I have already pointed out, remained, after the Treaty of Aix-la-Ohapelle, in the northern part of the Bay of Fundy. This territory was disputed by the two crowns, and the question referred to a commission. As soon as the foundation of Halifax was resolved upon, the French, supposing that the intention of the English was also to occupy and colonize the district of Beaubassin, had a mind to settle there permanently. Cornwallis’s proclamation to the Acadians determined the French to improve the occasion and try to win them over. The Governor of Canada, M. de la Jonquiere, sent the Chevalier de la Come with reinforcements strongly to occupy the isthmus from Beaubassin to Bay Verte.

During this autumn of 1749, the English were too busy putting things into shape at Halifax to make any effective opposition to the manoeuvres of the French. The latter, taking advantage of the state of alarm into which the Acadians had been thrown by the Proclamation, left no stone unturned to induce them to choose the alternative of departure and emigrate all together. The French had to make haste, for the English would not fail, the next year, to thwart their plans. .Meanwhile, as a check on them, Cornwallis threw a small garrison into Grand Pr6 under Captain Handheld. Instigated by the French, no doubt, three hundred Indians in October (1749), blockaded this garrison with a view to enable the Acadians to quit the country without being molested by the soldiers. The attempt was made in vain; not one of the Acadians wished to leave before obtaining a final answer from the Governor and without his permission. A few days later, seeing the uselessness of their efforts, the Indians raised the blockade, taking away with them the notary Le Blanc, Captain Hamilton and eighteen soldiers who had been surrounded and made prisoners in one of the sorties of the garrison. As no one was killed, it is evident that the only object of this attack was to facilitate the departure of the Acadians.

On the affidavit of Honord Gauterot, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Charles Hubert, Francois Le Prince, Claude Le Prince, Renauchon Aucoin, Joseph Vincent, accused of having assisted the Indians; but they could not be arrested. At Cobequid. where there were no troops, no protection of any sort, the Indians, by threats and violence, forced a part of the population to follow them before the arrival of the troops.

In the following March (1750), Cornwallis wrote to the Duke of Bedford :

I propose to defer pressing them upon that head (the oath of allegiance) till we see what can be done at Beaubassin, and what settlers come from England; then I will demand a peremptory answer.''

This letter had not yet reached its destination when Cornwallis received from the Secretary of State the order not to exact the oath for the present, and to treat the Acadians with kindness in order to wean them from their intention of quitting the country.

At last, in the month of May, when the Acadians came to Halifax to beg leave to depart, there was nothing left but to choose between consenting and inventing some new dodge. Pretexts were getting rare: Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong and Philipps had almost exhausted the supply. However, listen to Cornwallis:

“You were indebted to me for not having made you leave the country even during winter. But, after having past the winter in the province, it is ridiculous to come and tell me, that you will not soon having resolved to withdraw. My friends, you must go and sow your lands in order that they may be left in that condition in which they ought to be at this season, without that you will have no right to expect the least favor from the government. When you have done your duty in this respect, 1 will give you a more precise reply to your request."

They had not been allowed to leave in English. French or Acadian vessels, by sea or land, in the autumn; now the springtime is denied them, for they must sow their land. This long series of subterfuges, which •would be incredible if the proof were not before our eyes, consigned in documents written by the governors themselves, is, however, not yet ended, as far as Cornwallis’s contribution is concerned. The Acadians were determined to have the last word. Seeing that, in order to obtain permission to quit the country, they had to sow their land for the benefit of strangers, they did so. When this work was over, on May 25th, they once more stood before the Governor, hoping that this time no new objection would be raised. Once more they were doomed to disappointment. There yet remained one pretext which had not been unearthed by Nicholson, nor Vetch, nor Philipps, nor hitherto by Cornwallis himself. Only, there was danger lest the Acadians, detecting his purpose, should refuse any longer to submit to his trickery. Hence the oratorical precautions with which lie approaches the subject. The irrepressible martinet, who, shortly before had been so harsh and haughty, finally understood that he must change his face; he became gentle, insinuating, even flattering. Parkman, who has noticed nothing of the farce played anent the Acadians, or who has purposely ignored it, is deeply affected by Cornwallis’s words:

“We promised to give a precise reply to the inhabitants, with respect to the permission they ask to leave the Province then they shall have sown their lands, and, as it appears that you have obeyed our orders in that particular, we will explain to you our sentiments on that very important affair, with the same sincerity that we have always made, use of towards you.

My friends, the moment that you have declared your desire to leave and submit yourselves to another government, our determination was to hinder nobody from following what he imagined to be his interest.

“We frankly confess, however, that your determination to leave gives us pain.

“We are well aware of your industry and your temperance, and that you are not addicted to any vice or debauchery. Thin Province is your country; you or your fathers have cultivated it; naturally you ought yourselves to enjoy the fruits of your labour.

“When we arrived here, we expected that nothing would give you so much pleasure as the determination of His Majesty to settle this Province. Certainly nothing more advantageous to you could take place. You possess the only cultivated lands in this Province; they produce grain and nourish cattle sufficient for the whole colony. In short, we flattered ourselves that we would make you the happiest people in the world. . . In your petitions you ask for a general leave. As it is impossible that you could all meet at a certain rendezvous in order to set out all together, with all your families, one must understand by the expression, a general permission to set out whenever you shall think proper, by land, or by sea, or by whatever conveyances you please. In other to effect this, we should have to notify all the commanders of His Majesty’s ships anil troops to allow every one to pass and repass which would cause the greatest confusion. . .

. .The only manner iy which you can withdraw f rom the Province, is to follow the regulations already established. The order is, that all persons wishing to leave the Province shall provide themselves with our passport. And we declare that nothing shall prevent us from giving such passports, the moment that peace and tranquillity are re-established in the Province.

Cornwallis must have thought himself very skilful, and indeed lie showed great skill in striving to reverse the unfortunate impression he had at first produced, and to pevent at any cost the departure of the Acadians. Tired of short-lived tricks, which had several times betrayed his bad faith, he was now to hold the key of the situation ; he would make that situation last as long as lie pleased. Nobody could leave the country without first coming to him; it was always :n his power to refuse under pretext that the country was not quiet, or under any other pretext, it mattered little which; the main thing was to put an end to these deputations that worried him.

This subterfuge was, I believe, Cornwallis's last; the country was tranquil, and would never be more so. The Acadians seemed to understand that those passports would never be granted to them; for thenceforth they ceased to press their claims. They had been told to take the oath or go; and, in point of fact, they had no alternative but to remain at the good pleasure of the Governor or leave without permission. The}' remained quietly on their lands until the time of the deportation. Those who had chosen to emigrate to French soil had done so, for the most part, the previous autumn after Cornwallis’s proclamation.

Cornwallis's behavior toward the Acadians was not only unjust, it could not have been more unwise than it was at his arrival in the country. He was confronted by a moral and peaceful people, from whom be had reason to hope for the most Willing assistance and the most complete submission. To ensure their permanent attachment to the Crown, all he need do was to let them understand that they had nothing to fear from him, and to treat them with gentleness and humanity.

After giving such evident proofs of their fidelity to the oath during the recent war, in exceptional circumstances which enhanced their merit, after receiving the assurances of His Majesty through the Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, the Acadians might have hoped that the bearing of the governors would not change. Cornwallis had only to let his better nature appear. Mildness and justice have always been infallible methods of action; obedience and sympathy spring from kindness as water from its source; no bond is lasting that is not woven of sympathy and justice. Scarcely had Cornwallis touched the soil of Acadia, when the Acadian deputies hastened to do him homage. What must they have thought, when, instead of the cordial welcome they had a right to expect, they were received with arrogance, when so severe a proclamation was flung in their teeth? Did not this sudden change seem to say: “So long as we were weak, we had recourse to all sorts of subterfuges and stratagems to keep you in the country; now that we are strong, we are going to speak as your lords and masters; we mean to treat you in a very different way?” Had they not reason to fear that, their privileges would be taken from them one by one? that the free exercise of their religion would be impeded, perhaps done away with? Since the solemn agreements made twenty years before in the matter of the oath were no longer respected, why should their other privileges escape the same fate?

For still another reason was this an excellent occasion for winning their affectionate fealty. The way the French officers had treated them during the invasions of the late war had considerably weakened their natural sympathy for France. A little kindness, together with the assurance that the foundation of Halifax would not alter the good understanding of the last ten years, would have sufficed to bind them to England more closely, and to induce them later on, "without pressure and without trickery, to take the much-desired oath.

It would seem, at first sight, that with the foundation of Halifax the retention of the Acadians had ceased to he an important object. Their farms were the most fertile in the province, their system of dikes represented an enormous expenditure of labor; these farms could give plenty to a. population of 12,000 souls. Quite true; but there was a lion in the path, as ready to devour now as he was in 1713. The Indians were still the irreconcilable enemies of the English. This hostility was skilfully fostered by the French of Cape Breton. So long as the latter owned a square mile of territory thereabouts, it would be impossible or, at least, dangerous, to establish new colonies without effectively protecting them at great expense against those Indians. Otherwise no one would risk settling there.

However, the strongest motive for keeping the Acadians was the increase of strength the accession of their great numbers would give to France. This consideration, weighty enough in the days of Nicholson and Philipps, was doubly so now. The addition of thirteen thousand souls might make the situation of England in the peninsula very precarious. This was clear to Cornwallis, and just as clear to his successor, Hopson, when he begged the Lords of Trade not to force him to urge this question of the oath, alleging that, for the moment, it was impossible to make them take it, and that their departure would be the ruin of the country.

The French were as much interested in getting them to quit Acadia as the English were in keeping them there. The question of the oath had been settled under Philipps for the benefit of England, and thenceforth

France had seemed indifferent. But Cornwallis’s proclamation, by withdrawing the long-standing agreement, had re-opened the whole question and now left the Acadians free to depart. As the proclamation itself said, the only issue was submission to an unrestricted oath or departure.

Cornwallis severely criticises the conduct of the French striving to win over the Acadians, and their conduct was indeed blameworthy, rather in its methods than in its purpose, for it was France’s right and duty, as a party to the Treaty of Utrecht, to have an eye to the fulfilment thereof. Since the Acadians had the undoubted right to quit the country, the French had an equal right to persuade them to do so; further than persuasion this right did not go. Because they used undue pressure and violence, they are to be blamed, and this blame they deserve to receive much more from the Acadians than from the authorities at Halifax. However, the guilt of the French does not surpass nor even equal that of the governors: in the one case there was violence in the exercise of a right, in the other, violence against the exercise of a right. This oath, agreed to by Philipps, was for the Acadians the necessary condition of their remaining in the country, it bound the English Government quite as much as the Acadians. To say the least, they ought to have been restored to the position they occupied before Philipps’s compromise; that is, they ought to have once more become free to withdraw within the space of a year with all their effects, and even with the proceeds of the sale of their property. Cornwallis had, with no little subtlety, laid down the principle that no man can be a subject conditionally. But governments, as well as individuals, are bound to the conditions which they accept. There is no loophole of escape here. Either leave to depart must be granted to the Acadians who claimed it as a right recognized by a solemn treaty, or the conditions of their settlement must be sanctioned. This latter alternative having been accepted, the Government was as strictly bound as private persons are by contracts. Did not the autocratic Tzar accept the settlement of the Mennonites in his empire under the same condition of not bearing arms? True, this agreement was revoked a century later, but after notice given long beforehand and with the privilege of selling and carrying away all that belonged to them. Could a constitutional government like that of England do less? As the Acadians wished to leave, they would have been justified in taking no account of Cornwallis’s hindrances, and in departing with their effects and without passports, since the exacting of the latter was only a trick to keep them. But the generality of them did no such thing. They once more withstood all the seductions and threats of the French, as they had done during the war: a new proof of their firmness and submission to the Government; a new proof also, may be, of the non-intervention of their clergy, if not of the slight influence of the latter.