Administration of Philipps (1730-1722)—Taking the required oath of allegiance or departure within four months without carrying away anything—Decision to depart—Disappointment of Philipps—New omissions of the Compiler—The Acadians undertake to open a road in. order to effectuate their departure —Philipps orders the suspension of the works—Prolongation of the delay—Cajoleries to keep back the Acadians—Important letter of the Secretary of State Craggs—Parkman.

In 1720 General Philipps, who in reality had already been for almost three years Governor of Nova Scotia, came to Annapolis to take charge of his province. He was invested with more ample jurisdiction than his predecessors, and his high position in the army added weight and importance to his authority. At first he dealt very haughtily with the Acadians. Hardly had he arrived when he issued a proclamation ordering them to take the oath without reserve or to leave the country within four months, without being able either to dispose of their goods or to transport them. “ It is expressly prohibited to those who will choose to leave the country to sell, dispose or bring with them any of their effects.” These conditions were excessively hard. Is that the reason why the Compiler omits this important document, this proclamation?

Thus the temporizing plan invented by Vetch, and continued by Nicholson and his successors, attained the desired result. The only fault of the Acadian was their having let themselves be duped and their having so meekly awaited a reply, which the rulers took good care not to give them.

Philipps’s intention was evident. he well knew that, without means of transport, the Acadians could not depart, especially on such short notice. He believed that they were so attached to their property that his prohibition to carry away anything with them would force them to accept his terms of the oath without reserve, and even all the conditions that he would be pleased to exact. He was, however, deceived. Nevertheless, such severe orders spread consternation all around; the agitation was most violent; a prompt decision was imperative. They replied in substance as follows: “We cannot take the oath which you demand of us, and the question is still more difficult with regard to the Indians than to the French, because the former daily threaten us with revenge if our reservation do not extend to them. Since you cannot grant us this reservation, there only remains to us the alternative of retiring from the country even on the hard conditions you impose, life being dearer to us than all our goods. As the sowing season has just elapsed, and there remains hardly any more grain to nourish our families, the only favor we beg of you is to prolong the delay a little, so as to give us time to gather in our grain and permission to carry it away with us, and also to make use of the vehicles that we own or of those we might make or otherwise procure, hoping that Your Excellency will permit us to send to Cape Breton Island to ask help for our departure.”

I have in hand, relating to these facts, six documents or letters, all most important and absolutely indispensable for the clear understanding of these events. They consist of a reply of Father Justinian to Philipps, 30th April, 1720; two memorials of the Acadians of Annapolis and Mines to Philipps, both presented May 26th, 1720; a letter of the Governor of Louisburg to Philipps, June 8th, 1720 ; a letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg and the latter’s reply. None of these documents are found in the volume of the. Archives, and yet the first four are found in the Colonial Records in London, just alongside those which the Compiler produces; his volume contains all the- letters of Philipps to the persons mentioned above, but not a single one of the replies. Oh! I am wrong; there is one, not here mentioned, and it is the one that is the worst drawn up, the least explicit. Is that the reason why it is there ? Is that also the reason why we find in his volume a letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg, when there was another far superior to it as a statement of the situation. The Compiler renders his case more complicated by the insertion of this document, for this letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg, it will be understood, could not reasonably be found in the archives either of Halifax or of London ; it could be had only in the archives of the Marine in Paris. Did lie go there to ferret it out? If so, then, he studied those archives, and why in the world did he go out of his way, while he was passing over so many impoitant documents in London, which should have been brought to Halifax ? However, not to run the risk of being unjust to him, I will not hold him responsible for any other omissions than those relative to the archives of these two last places.

In spite of my desire to fill up the void that the Compiler has left, in spite of the importance of the documents omitted, I shall present only short extracts. The letter addressed by the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg contains among other things the following:

“You are, sir, aware of the difficulties opposed to our departure wlien we petitioned for it, and the impossibility in which we were, to accomplish what was demanded of us. And yet now they wish to constrain us to take this oath, or to abandon the country, and it is impossible to do either. . . We are resolved not to take this oath imposed upon us, but we cannot quit the country without suitable facilities, such as were promised to us by the Court of France and refused by the Court of England. Our situation is painful and perplexing, and we beseech you to assist us.”

In his reply to Philipps, Sir. de Brouillan, governor of Louisburg, says:

“Allow me to state, that the inaction of the Acadians neither can nor should be imputed to them, both on account of their want of the assistance essentially requisite for their transmigration, and on account of the obstacles which the Governors, general or local, who preceded you, have put in their way.

“I cannot, moreover, refrain from representing to you that the clauses of your proclamation that refer to the term and the circumstances of their departure seem to me but little in keeping with ordinary kindness, especially after a treaty ami an agreement of mutual good faith between Queen Anne and King Louis XIV., a treaty that has been executed in its entirety by France and partially by England.

“You are aware, sir, that by this agreement the lot of the inhabitants of Acadia was to be the same as that of the inhabitants of Plaisance. It were impossible to add to the kindness and sincerity with which this evacuation of Plaisance was accomplished, and I have the honor to represent to you. that nothing could be harsher than the extremity or rather the impossibility to which these poor people would be reduced, should you not consent to be less severe, for the time and the manner in which you exact their departure."

To prove the obstacles opposed to the departure of the Acadians, I have quoted, so far, more than twenty documents, all of which are omitted in the volume of the Archives. What is there in this volume against these clear and precise affirmations? Nothing. Nowhere do we find that these affirmations have be on contradicted in reply to those who made them. Neither Nicholson nor Doucette replied to the affirmations of Costabelle and de Brouillan. The only passage that looks like a formal contradiction of these affirmations is found in a letter of Philipps to the Lords of Trade, in which he says:

“At the time of the surrender of the country, it was stipulated in behalf of the Acadians, to have their choice, either to remain in the Province if they would transfer their allegiance, or, in case of the alternative, to dispose of their estate and effects to the best advantage ; to determine which, one year’s time was allowed them ; but, at the expiration thereof, finding their new masters in no condition to oblige them to the observance of one or the other, they have remained.”

Philipps himself knew nothing of the obstacles we have mentioned; lie could, doubtless, be informed by Vetch, Caulfield, Doucette, and other officers of the garrison; but it is clear that they were not eager to accuse themselves of their own trickery. We may judge of the credit we should give to the declaration of Philipps by the trouble he takes to disfigure the treaty he had under his eyes. Clearly, the treaty gave the Acadians the right to carry away their movable effects, their cattle, etc. Phlipps converted this clause into a right to sell or dispose of them, and nothing more. If he erred so grossly as to the terms of a treaty, what are we to think of his second-hand assertions picked up from persons interested in deceiving him ? This prohibition to carry anything away with them was not only inhuman, it was also a fraud. He well knew that, since they were the only inhabitants of the country, they would have no one to whom they might sell tlieir goods in case they departed, and that is why he chose this means of attaining his end, and preventing their departure. He was soon to be convinced that the people about him had deceived him respecting the reasons that had prevented their departure, and that he deceived himself, if he fancied his barbarous orders were going to produce the result he expected.

As the Acadians no longer hoped to work upon the Governor’s determination, as they no longer hoped either for timely help or for a prolongation of the appointed delay, they set to work to devise ways and means to effect their departure. Unable to withdraw in ships, they had 110 other alternative than the land route; but, for that, they would be obliged to open new roads where there were none.

The Beaubassin people could easily withdraw by Bay Verte, but the case was otherwise with those of Mines, and especially of Annapolis. Between these two places there was a space of from twenty to thirty miles which had never yet been opened to vehicles.

To this point the Acadians of Mines first directed their efforts, and thus came to the assistance of their Annapolis brethren. All the able-bodied population set resolutely to work, and the road-making was rapidly advancing. In presence of this determination to leave the country, which was shown in so unmistakable a way, Philipps was alarmed ; but what could be done ? Cmdd he reasonably oppose these works, indispensable as they were to the transmigration ? Certainly not, since it was the only means left them to depart and to conform to the alternative of his proclamation !........

And, nevertheless, they must not be allowed to depart!

His conduct would be incredible, had I not before me the official documents that establish indisputably the means which Philipps used to balk the Acadians once more, as had previously done Vetch, Nicholson and Caulfield. There was only one means; it was to forbid the continuation of these works ; he did so.

“At a Council held, &c., &c.

“Present :

“His Honor Lieut.-Governor Armstrong, &c., &c., &c.

“The Honorable Lieut.-Governor acquainted the Board, that His Excellency, General Philipps, having advice that the Acadians of this river are cutting a road from here to Mines, which gives him suspicion that they design by it either to molest this place, or to drive off their cattle and carry their effects from hence by that way, in order to settle in a body, either there or at Beaubassin, and stand in defiance of the Government, Advised and agreed:

“That his Excellency be desired to send his special orders to the Acadians of this river and Mines not to cut any such road without having His Excellency’s leave in writing.”

We have also the proclamation drawn up conformably to the above order-in-council. In this proclamation he adds: “And I do further forbid any persons to quit their habitations clandestinely and without my leave."

Naturally, as might be expected, the order was drawn up jus if he supposed other designs than that of quitting the country, but one’s perceptions would have to be very dull indeed not to understand the true sense of what was meant by this order, “not to cut a road nor quit their habitations without leave.”

Philipps and his council were Well aware that their object could not have been to molest anybody, but merely to leave the country. When writing to the Lords of Trade, he does not feel constrained to disguise his purpose under false pretexts; hence, in rendering an account of these events, he does not make a mystery of their intention, which, he says, was, or must have been, to leave the country by way of Bay Verte: “Being joined in a body, they can march off at their leisure, by the way of the Bay Verte with their effects, and destroy what they leave behind, without danger of being molested by the garrison.” So, as is clearly shown, in this opening of a road, Philipps did not see anything but the means and the design of leaving the country. His fear was not that his garrison might be molested by them, but, on the- contrary, that his garrison might not be able to molest them and prevent their marching off. The case is widely different.

It reminds us somewhat of the fable of the crocodile and the child:—“Why do you shed tears at the lamentations of this child? Have you of late become so tender-hearted?” was remarked to him.—“I weep,” retorted the crocodile, “because I could not reach him and swallow him up.”

It was the settled fate of the Acadians that they should not leave the country except by deportation. Once more were they detained against their will. An alternative had been offered them, but eventually they had none. At first, they had thought they could leave in English vessels; these were refused. They had asked that French ships might be allowed to enter the ports of Acadia; this was opposed. Having constructed small vessels, they wished to procure the necessary equipment at Louisburg ; this was forbidden'; at Boston, forbidden again. This time the order to take away nothing extended even to vehicles, and, as that did not suffice to deter them, the route by land was likewise forbidden. There still remained the air route ; but the manageable balloons of the twentieth century, nay, even the primitive tire-balloons had not yet been invented. The letter of Queen Anne extended their right to the selling of their immovable property, but, with obstacle on obstacle, restriction on restriction, ruse on ruse, the result was this much simplified statement: “If you go away, you shall not take even your effects with you.” And to strike the lowest note of the scale: “Go away, if you like, but you shall not take away even your bodies; your bones will have to remain here. When the time for your departure shall come, we ourselves will see to your transportation, and we will scatter you upon all the shores of the new world.” Considered in all its naked reality, such was the situation.

Only peaceable persons, as they were, could have submitted to so many unjust impositions. They could put on foot six times more fighting men than were numbered in the garrison of Annapolis. The decision of the Acadians had rendered Philipps’s situation very perplexing. In the same letter to the Lords of Trade he writes :

“For the sake of gaining time, and keeping all things quiet, till I have the honor of your further commands in what manner to act, I have thought it most for His Majesty’s service to send home the Acadian deputies with smooth words and promises of enlargement of time."

He ends his letter as follows:

“They say they will oblige themselves to be good subjects in every respect, excepting that of taking up arms against the French and Indians. . . And I would humbly propose that if an oath were formed for them to take, whereby they should oblige themselves to take up arms against the Indians, if required, etc., etc., how far this may be thought to bind them.”

It is easy to see, while following this correspondence of Philipps with the Secretary of State and the Lords of Trade, that he was profoundly humiliated by his want of success. He had flattered himself that his high position in the army, the renown of his name, would overthrow all the obstacles that a little simple and ignorant population might oppose to him. Arriving with the air of a conqueror, he had issued a pompous and severe proclamation which admitted of no reply; then he had encountered difficulties which he could have smoothed away, but which he had only increased by his demeanor. He would have liked to retrace his steps and to resort to conciliation, but he had sown mistrust and was reaping alarm. He had thought that these Acadians were so attached to their goods that the short delay granted them to leave the country and the prohibition to take away their effects would infallibly determine them to accept the proposed oath. As to that, lie had fallen into the same, error as Nicholson, and, like him. he found himself obliged to prevent at any price the departure of the Acadians, with this difference, that Nicholson could use subterfuges, while he had not even this resource. His own order, which forbade the inhabitants to open a road leading out of the country, while his proclamation to evacuate it was still fresh, must have jarred his sense of consistency. And, what a humiliation here for a man that deserved, I believe, on other occasions, the reputation of being able, affable and conciliating.

The more meek and amiable he became towards the Acadians, the greater was his bitterness and the more malevolent his insinuations with regard to them in his correspondence. He had suffered failure. To justify or attenuate it, lie did what has always been done, what is still done: he laid the blame on others. In order to do so, he had to represent the Acadians as headstrong, ungovernable, directed by “bigoted priests;” this he did to the best of his ability.

“They will never, said he, in substance, make good subjects. They cannot be let go now at least: their departure, if they went to swell the colony of Cape Breton, would render onr neighbors too powerful ; we need them to erect our fortifications and to provision our forts, till the English are powerful enough of themselves to go on, and they must not withdraw before a considerable number of British subjects be settled in their stead. On the other hand, if they withdraw in spite of its, a great many fine possessions will become vacant. I believe it will not be difficult to draw as many people almost from Xew England as would supply their room, if it were not robbing a neighboring colony without gaining much by the exchange; therefore, hope there are schemes forming at home, to settle the country with British subjects in the spring, before which time these inhabitants do not think of moving, having the benefit of enlargement of time I granted, until I shall receive your further commands. What is to be apprehended in the resettling these farms is disturbance, from the Indians, who do not like of the Acadians going off, and will not want prompting to mischief.”

In his vexation Philipps had shown only the dark side, and had painted it so vividly as to affect the Lords of Trade, who wrote under date of December 20th, 1720:

.....“ As to the Acadians of \ova Scotia, who appear so wavering in their inclinations, we are apprehensive they will never become good subjects to His Majesty. . . . We are of opinion they ought to be removed as soon as the forfix which we have proposed to be sent to you shall arrive in your Province4, but as you are not to attempt their removal without His Majesty's positive order for that purpose, you will do well in the meanwhile, to continue the same prudent and cautious conduct towards them, to endeavor to undeceive them concerning the exercise of their religion which will doubtless be allowed them if it should be thought proper to let them stay where they are."

Parkman had this document before him. For an historian of fifty years standing he should have eagerly seized a letter that threw so much light on history; it was a real tit-bit .’. . but it was not of the- right kind.

On reading this one feels as though a leaden cloak were falling on his .shoulders, and as though there was not enough air to breathe freely. The sinister project of the deportation has just been hatched. A cold shiver runs down one’s spine. One fancies he hears the first blasts of the trumpet that was to order the embarkation.

I append, by way of elucidation, a version of the same letter in familiar style:

“My Dear Philipps:

“I see you do not get the better of the Acadians as you expected before your departure. It is singular all the same that these people should have, preferred to lose their goods rather than be exposed to fight against their brethren. This sentimentality is stupid. These people are evidently too much attached to their fellow-countrymen and to their religion ever to make true Englishmen. It must be avowed your position was deucedly critical ; it was very difficult to prevent them from departing, after having left the bargain to their choice. However, you did well to act thus, it was your only resource. The treaty be hanged ! Don’t bother about justice and other baubles any more than Nicholson and Vetch did; those things will not advance our interests. Their departure will, doubtless, increase the power of France; it must not be so; they must eventually be transported to some place, where, mingling with our subjects, they will soon lose their language, their religion and the remembrance of the past, to become true Englishmen. For the moment, we are too weak to undertake this deportation; but we purpose effecting it in the spring time, when we shall have sent to you the required troops. Do nothing of your own accord before we have given you orders. Meanwhile, my dear friend, lay aside your high and mighty airs, show yourself affable and kind towards them. Encourage them ith any hopes you choose, say what you like ; provided you obtain the desired end, which is none other than to prevent their departure, you will merit our gratitude.

“Yours,

“Okaggs,

“Secretary of State.

“N. B.—Make them believe that we shall leave them the free exercise of their religion; we shall see later on what we shall do on this score, if it be decided to leave them in the country. In this case it is probable we shall allow them the free exercise of their religion.

“p. s.—There is a great storm brewing against Aislabie, Stanhope and myself relatively to the South Sea Co. . . . I am all of a tremble at it. . . . Must I. . . .

“Ceaggs.*

The reader will iind the document I have just paraphrased hardly agrees with the declaration of my introductory remarks, exonerating the home government from all complicity in this iniquitous deportation. It was, indeed, a Secretary of State who had resolved to execute it, hut a man of the stamp of Craggs is rarely met with in history. There was certainly no question here of a government project, but of the scheme of a single individual, who had begun his career by a fraud that brought him to the Tower, and ended it by another which ought to have sent him back thither. Thus, the deportation was conceived by a barber who became Secretary of State, and it was executed thirty-five years later by a house-painter who became Provincial Governor. It was conceived by a plunderer and executed for the sake of plunder. One man died as he was planning it, the other as he was realizing it. The one had been shut up in the Tower, and avoided a return thither by an opportune death ; the other escaped the same fate in the same manner. Under such exceptional circumstances I think it would be unjust to throw the responsibility of this document on the home government in virtue of the ministerial responsibility. It was none the less an unfortunate deed; for Lawrence, who knew of it, took pattern from it; he saw or thought lie saw therein his justification.

Tlie good-natured souls who have pitied the deportation and sad fate of the Acadians, says Rameau, have uo need, by way of explaining the fact, to credit them with imaginary crimes. After this document, it may be said that the proscription was not a deed improvised in anger: it was premeditated as early as 1720. Lawrence, upon whom this crime is charged, was acquainted with this document.

It cannot be said that the Acadians had been rebellious, nor even that they had had recourse to violence, since their submission embraced even obedience to the order to depart without taking away anything, and to the still more unjust order that put a stop to their departure, and this, when they were powerful enough to snap their fingers at authority. Examples of such peaceable dispositions are very rare in history. Their extreme peaceableness was their misfortune. Had they not been so meek, they would have had to be let go.

This document, Rameau says again, would suffice, in default of others, to show what nervous apprehension the Board of Trade in Europe and the Governor of Annapolis in America felt lest the Acadians escape from their control. They wish at all costs to avoid this misfortune; so, in spite of the bitter anger which Philipps’s disappointment caused him, see how he lavishes kind words upon them, with what insinuating sweetness, while praising the tenderness of King George, he slips in those perfidious assurances of liberty, of peacefulness, of religious freedom, in order to protract their present condition and make them accept a provisional tolerance that should not be binding for the future, until the favorable hour should strike when they might be deported without risk.

Philipps perfectly understood his instructions; he, who had made his fortune amid the intrigues of the court, was now altogether on his own ground: he put away his' great sabre and the high-flown phrases of his first appearance on the scene, and continued the policy he had just inaugurated: wheedle the Acadians so as to make them remain on their lands, exact allegiance if the occasion presents itself, if not, then lavish fine words without promising anything definite ; keep a way open for retreat, so as to prove no promises had ever been made, but only attempts at agreement. Thus was obtained from the Acadians the desired amount of usefulness, by freely granting them tolerance without ever affording them any certainty.

Philipps made this situation last two years more without allowing their departure, but also without accepting or refusing the restricted oath which the Acadians claimed; he still kept them on their lands by protracting their uncertainty. lie thus reached the year 1722, when he returned to Europe, leaving in his place Captain Doucette as lieutenant-governor.

In his work entitled “Wolfe and Montcalm" Park-man, falling in with the Compiler, affirmed that the Acadians had remained in the country of their own free will. Since writing what precedes I have noticed in his new work, “A Half Century of Conflict," that he has modified his first opinions on this subject. It was indeed difficult not to yield to evidence that; was supported by such a considerable mass of documents as that collected by Casgrain in the “Canada Franqais.” Howbeit, it is with pleasure I give Parkman credit for this implied concession. I cannot reasonably expect him to do as much with respect to all his other errors, for then it would be necessary to destroy almost all that he has written on the history of Acadia.

“Governor Nicholson,” says he, “like his predecessor, was resolved to keep the Acadians in the Province if he could. This personage, able, energetic, headstrong, perverse, unscrupulous, conducted himself even towards the English officers and soldiers in a manner that seems unaccountable and that kindled their utmost indignation. Towards the Acadians his behavior was still worse. . .The Acadians built small vessels and the French authorities at Louisburg sent them the necessary rigging. Nicholson ordered it back, forbade the sale of their lands and houses and would not even let them sell their personal effects ; coolly setting at naught both the treaty of Utrecht and the letter of the Queen. Caulfield and Doucette, his deputies, both in one degree or another, followed his example in preventing, so far as they could, the emigration of the Acadians.”

All that this citation contains is, in a general way, true; but, as a question of fact, it is not strictly accurate; thus, Nicholson did not order the Acadians to send back the rigging to Louisburg, but forbade them to procure any, nor did he forbid them to sell their effects, but only to take them away with them. Though these variations would be unimportant in an ordinary chronicler without such pretensions as Parkman has to historic accuracy and fairness, still, it would have been better to be absolutely precise, when it was so easy for him to be so.

After having made this concession, apparently so frank and candid, let us see how he sets to work to nullify it:

“If they had wished to emigrate, the English Governor had no power to stop them. . . They were armed and tar outnumbered the English garrison. To say that they wished to leave Acadia, but were prevented from so doing by a petty garrison at the other end of the Province, so feeble that it could hardly hold Annapolis itself, is an unjust reproach upon a people who, though ignorant and venk of purpose, were not wanting in physical courage. The truth is, that front this time to their forced expatriation, all the Acadians, except those of Annapolis, were free to go or stay at will ,”

It is perfectly true, as Parkman says, that the Acadians, except those of Annapolis, had the numerical strength to enforce their departure from the country; nor, as is most probable, were they wanting in physical courage, and they undoubtedly had the right to act thus; hut we must not judge their actions according to our own ideas. Parkman, as all this history clearly proves, should have understood that these people, these ignorant peasants, as he never fails to call them, had, far otherwise than we, the love of peace, respect for and submission to authority. Instead of overthrowing by force the iniquitous obstacles opposed to their departure, they applied to the French authorities to put an end to them. In their naive ignorance the stipulations of a treaty seemed sacred, and, thought they, eventual Injustice would prevail; they did not suspect, so well as we should, the perverseness of their rulers. It is this spirit of submission that later on enabled Lawrence to deport them. Would Parkman have it imputed to them as a crime? And, because they might have effected their departure in spite of the authorities, does this fact relieve the authorities from all blame for their unjust proceedings? Did that iniquitous detention oblige the Acadians to take the oath exacted of them? Is Mr. Parkman’s indulgence and commiseration invariably for the oppressor as against the oppressed ? To depart without having the requisite facilities for deportation meant to leave behind them their effects and their cattle, all which was very painful, especially when the right to take them away was guaranteed by a treaty.

There are still other very important considerations to which Mr. Parkman, from the snugness of his easy chair, did not even take the trouble to advert. Thus, if it be true that the Acadians of Beaubassin and Mines had sufficient strength to effectuate their departure, and they would. I believe, have succeeded therein, it was not so for those of Annapolis, as he admits. By withdrawing, the former would leave these latter behind them; they would leave a large number of their compatriots, their relations and brethren at the mercy of a power that held out no hopes of equitable treatment. Not being able to depart in English, French or even Acadian vessels, it was expressly to permit those of Annapolis to effect a union with themselves that the Acadians of Mines had set to work to open a road between the two places, in which attempt they were frustrated by an order from Philipps. To withdraw thus and leave their relations behind would mean a lifelong separation, unless they should chance to meet as adversaries upon the held of battle, in case a war should break out between France and England. Parkman makes no account of this separation, or more probably he did not even think of it; these ignorant people, who were guided in their actions by the humane feelings inherent in our nature, bore most heavily this separation with all its dreadful consequences ; they had weighed and pondered it; they had felt the delicacy of their situation ; they had seen farther and more correctly than Parkman with all his learning.

Pursuing the same idea Parkman adds:

“The year had long ago expired, and most of them were still in Acadia, unwilling to leave it, yet, refusing to own King George.”

Thus does Parkman endeavor to nullify all the merit of liis former admission. He had admitted that Vetch, Nicholson, Caulfield and Doucette, in one way or another, did all in their power to render the departure of the Acadians impossible, and yet these Acadians, in spite of all these efforts, “were unwilling to go.” It is very hard to reconcile these two conflicting statements, but we must be prepared to see Parkman contradict himself on one and the same page; *the public has so eagerly bolted his first ten volumes that he ceased to be on his guard in the eleventh. After he had said in a general way that the Acadians “were unwilling to leave,” I find, thirteen lines further on, the following, relative to the proclamation of Philipps:

“They protested to M. de Brouillan that they would abandon all rather than renounce their religion and their King; at the same time they prepared for a general emigration by way of the isthmus and Bay Verte, when it would have been impossible to stop them.”

The contradiction is flagrant enough, but it would be still more so, if Parkman, by a trick that is familiar to him. had not, as it were, cut his sentence in two, so as not to let us know what, this time, had prevented the departure of the Acadians. We have only to add, in order to complete the unfinished sentence, the following words: “but they were stopped in their preparations by an order of Governor Philipps, forbidding their cutting a road between Annapolis and Mines and forbidding their leaving their habitations.” This addition is not long, and these few words supply the reader with information of great importance. By cutting his sentence in two, Parkman stopped, so to speak, on the brink of a precipice, for I am merely yielding to evidence in saying, that the avowal, which the completion of his sentence entailed, would have been extremely painful to him. Should the reader doubt it, I can assure him that his hesitation will be dispelled long before, reaching the end of this work.

And, when Mr. Parkman added: “Yet, refusing to own King George,” had he absolutely persisted in introducing these incorrect terms into his account, he might have explained in a few words that the Acadians, when they saw how their departure was made impossible, unanimously offered to Governor Doucette to take the oath of allegiance with a clause exempting them from bearing arms against the French and the Indians their allies; or simply against the French, if means were afforded to protect them against the Indians; and that, from that time up to their deportation, they never refused such an oath. Many of Mr. Parkman’s readers might have found this detai1 very instructive and very important in order to judge of the spirit that animated the Acadians. Leaving the public under a contrary impression, through omission and misconstruction, was allowing unjust prejudices against them to circulate; which is equivalent to falsifying history.