AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
OF THE EXPEDITION
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS,
IN THE YEAR MDCCLXIV.
UNDER THE COMMAND OF
HENRY BOUQUET, ESQ.
COLONEL OF FOOT, AND NOW BRIGADIER GENERAL IN AMERICA.
Including his Transactions with the INDIANS,
Relative to the DELIVERY of their PRISONERS,
And the PRELIMINARIES of PEACE.
With an INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNT of the Preceding CAMPAIGN,
And BATTLE at BUSHY-RUN.
To which are annexed
MILITARY PAPERS,
CONTAINING
Reflections on the War with the Savages; a Method of forming Frontier
Settlements; some Account of the INDIAN Country; with a List of
Nations, Fighting Men, Towns, Distances, and different Routs.
The whole illustrated with a MAP and COPPER-PLATES.
Published, from authentic Documents, by a Lover of his Country.

PHILADELPHIA, PRINTED:
LONDON, Re-printed for T. JEFFERIES, Geographer to his MAJESTY,
at Charing Cross. MDCCCLXVI.
THE general peace, concluded between Great-Britain, France and
Spain, in the year 1762, although viewed in different lights by per-
sons variously affected in the mother country, was nevertheless uni-
versally considered as a most happy event in America.

To behold the French, who had so long intrigued and supported the In-
dians, in the most destructive wars and cruel depredations on our frontier
settlements, at last compelled to cede all Canada, and restricted to the
western side of Mississippi, was what we had long wished, but scarcely hoped
an accomplishment of in our own days. The precision with which our
boundaries were expressed, admitted of no ground for future disputes, and
was matter of exultation to every one who understood and regarded the
interest of these colonies. We had now the pleasing prospect of "entire
security from all molestation of the Indians, since French intrigues could
no longer be employed to seduce, or French force to support them."

"Unhappily, however, we were disappointed in this expectation. Our
danger arose from that very quarter, in which we imagined ourselves in the
most perfect security; and just at the time when we concluded the In-
dians to be entirely awed, and almost subjected by our power, they sud-
denly fell upon the frontiers of our most valuable settlements, and upon
all our out-lying forts, with such unanimity in the design, and with such
savage fury in the attack, as we had not experienced, even in the hottest
times of any former war."

* The several quotations in this introduction are taken from the Annual Register, 1763, which
is written with great elegance and truth, so far as the author appears to have been furnished with
knowledge.
Several reasons have been assigned for this perfidious conduct on their part; such as an omission of the usual presents, and some settlements made on lands not yet purchased from them. But these causes, if true, could only affect a few tribes, and never could have formed a general combination against us. The true reason seems to have been a jealousy of our growing power, heightened by their seeing the French almost wholly driven out of America, and a number of forts now possessed by us, which commanded the great lakes and rivers communicating with them, and awed the whole Indian country. They probably imagined that they beheld “in every little garrison the germ of a future colony,” and thought it incumbent on them to make one general and timely effort to crush our power in the birth.

By the papers in the Appendix, a general idea may be formed of the strength of the different Indian nations surrounding our settlements, and their situation with respect to each other.

The Shawanees, Delawares and other Ohio tribes, took the lead in this war, and seem to have begun it rather too precipitately, before the other tribes in confederacy with them, were ready for action.

Their scheme appears to have been projected with much deliberate mischief in the intention, and more than usual skill in the system of execution. They were to make one general and sudden attack upon our frontier settlements in the time of harvest, to destroy our men, corn, cattle, &c. as far as they could penetrate, and to starve our out-posts, by cutting off their supplies, and all communication with the inhabitants of the Provinces.

In pursuit of this bold and bloody project, they fell suddenly upon our traders whom they had invited into their country, murdered many of them, and made one general plunder of their effects, to an immense value.

The frontiers of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, were immediately over-run with scalping parties, marking their way with blood and devastation wherever they came, and all those examples of savage cruelty, which never fail to accompany an Indian war.

All our out-forts, even at the remotest distances, were attacked about the same time; and the following ones soon fell into the enemies hands — viz. Le Boeuf,
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Le Boeuf, Venango, Presqu'Ile, on and near lake Erie; La Bay upon lake Michigan; St. Joseph's, upon the river of that name; Miamis upon the Miamis river; Ouachitanon upon the Ouabache; SanduIfky upon lake Juenundat; and Michilimackinac.

Being but weakly garrisoned, trusting to the security of a general peace so lately established, unable to obtain the least intelligence from the colonies, or from each other, and being separately persuaded by their treacherous and savage assailants that they had carried every other place before them, it could not be expected that these small posts could hold out long; and the fate of their garrisons is terrible to relate.

The news of their surrender, and the continued ravages of the enemy, struck all America with consternation, and depopulated a great part of our frontiers. We now saw most of those posts, suddenly wrested from us, which had been the great object of the late war, and one of the principal advantages acquired by the peace. Only the forts of Niagara, the Detroit and Fort-Pitt, remained in our hands, of all that had been purchased with so much blood and treasure. But these were places of consequence, and we hope it will ever remain an argument of their importance, and of the attention that should be paid to their future support, that they alone continued to awe the whole power of the Indians, and balanced the fate of the war between them and us!

These forts, being larger, were better garrisoned and supplied to stand a siege of some length, than the places that fell. Niagara was not attacked, the enemy judging it too strong.

The officers who commanded the other two deserved the highest honour for the firmness with which they defended them, and the hardships they sustained rather than deliver up places of such importance.

Major Gladwin, in particular, who commanded at the Detroit, had to withstand the united and vigorous attacks of all the nations living upon the Lakes.

The design of this publication, and the materials in my hands, lead me more immediately to speak of the defence and relief of Fort Pitt.
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The Indians had early surrounded that place, and cut off all communication from it, even by message. Tho' they had no cannon, nor understood the methods of a regular siege, yet, with incredible boldness, they posted themselves under the banks of both rivers† by the walls of the fort, and continued as it were buried there, from day to day, with astonishing patience; pouring in an incessant storm of musquetry and fire arrows; hoping at length, by famine, by fire, or by harrassing out the garrison, to carry their point.

Captain Ecuver, who commanded there, tho' he wanted several necessaries for sustaining a siege, and the fortifications had been greatly damaged by the floods, took all the precautions which art and judgment could suggest for the repair of the place, and repulsing the enemy. His garrison, joined by the inhabitants, and surviving traders who had taken refuge there, seconded his efforts with resolution. Their situation was alarming, being remote from all immediate assistance, and having to deal with an enemy from whom they had no mercy to expect.

General Amherst, the commander in chief, not being able to provide in time for the safety of the remote posts, bent his chief attention to the relief of the Detroit, Niagara, and Fort-Pitt. The communication with the two former was chiefly by water, from the province of New-York; and it was on that account the more easy to throw succours into them. The detachment sent to the Detroit arrived there on the 29th of July, 1763; but Captain Dalyell, who commanded that detachment, and seventy of his men, lost their lives in a rencontre with the Indians near the fort. Previous to this disaster he had passed thro' Niagara, and left a reinforcement there.

Fort Pitt remained all this while in a most critical situation. No account could be obtained from the garrison, nor any relief sent to it, but by a long and tedious land march of near 200 miles beyond the settlements; and through those dangerous passes where the fate of Braddock and others still riles on the imagination.

Col. Bouquet was appointed to march to the relief of this fort, with a large quantity of military stores and provisions, escorted by the shattered remainder of the 42d and 77th regiments, lately returned in a dismal condition.

† The Ohio and Monongahela, at the junction of which stands Fort Pitt.
from the West-Indies, and far from being recovered of their fatigues at the
siege of the Havannah. General Amherst, having at that time no other
troops to spare, was obliged to employ them in a service which would have
required men of the strongest constitution and vigour.

Early orders had been given to prepare a convoy of provisions on the
frontiers of Pennsylvania, but such were the universal terror and con­fema­
tion of the inhabitants, that when Col. Bouquet arrived at Carlisle, nothing
had yet been done. A great number of the plantations had been plundered
and burnt, by the savages, many of the mills destroyed, and the full-ripe
crops stood waving in the field, ready for the sickle, but the reapers were
not to be found!

The greatest part of the county of Cumberland, thro' which the army had
to pass, was deserted, and the roads were covered with distressed families,
lying from their settlements, and destitute of all the necessaries of life.

In the midst of that general confusion, the supplies necessary for the expe­
dition became very precarious, nor was it less difficult to procure horses and
carriages for the use of the troops.

The commander found that, instead of expecting such supplies from a mi­n­er­able people, he himself was called by the voice of humanity to bestow on
them some share of his own provisions to relieve their present exigency. How­
ever, in 18 days after his arrival at Carlisle, by the prudent and active measures
which he pursued, joined to his knowledge of the country, and the diligence of
the persons he employed, the convoy and carriages were procured with the
assistance of the interior parts of the country, and the army proceeded.

Their march did not abate the fears of the dejected inhabitants. They
knew the strength and ferocity of the enemy. They remembered the former
defeats even of our best troops, and were full of diffidence and apprehen­sions
on beholding the small number and sickly state of the regulars employed in
this expedition. Without the least hopes, therefore, of success, they seemed
only to wait for the fatal event, which they dreaded, to abandon all the
country beyond the Susquehannah.

In such despondency of mind, it is not surprising, that tho' their whole was
at stake, and depended entirely upon the fate of this little army, none of them
offered to assist in the defence of the country, by joining the expedition; in which they would have been of infinite service, being in general well acquainted with the woods, and excellent marksmen.

It cannot be contested that the defeat of the regular troops on this occasion, would have left the province of Pennsylvania in particular, exposed to the most imminent danger, from a victorious, daring, and barbarous enemy; for (excepting the frontier people of Cumberland county) the bulk of its industrious inhabitants is composed of merchants, tradesmen and farmers, unaccustomed to arms, and without a militia law.

The legislature ordered, indeed, 700 men to be raised for the protection of the frontiers during the harvest; but what dependence could be placed in raw troops, newly raised and undisciplined? Under so many discouraging circumstances, the Colonel (deprived of all assistance from the provinces, and having none to expect from the General, who had sent him the last man that could be removed from the hospitals) had nothing else to trust to, but about 500 soldiers of approved courage and resolution indeed, but infirm, and intire strangers to the woods, and to this new kind of war. A number of them were even too weak, as not to be able to march, and sixty were carried in waggons to reinforce the garrisons of the small posts on the communication.

Meanwhile Fort-Ligonier, situated beyond the Allegheney-Mountains, was in the greatest danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, before the army could reach it. The stockade being very bad, and the garrison extremely weak, they had attacked it vigorously, but had been repulsed by the bravery and good conduct of Lieutenant Blanc who commanded there.

The preservation of that post was of the utmost consequence, on account of its situation and the quantity of military stores it contained, which if the enemy could have got possession of, would have enabled them to continue their attack upon Fort-Pitt, and reduced the army to the greatest straits. For an object of that importance, every risk was to be run; and the Colonel determined to send through the woods, with proper guides, a party of thirty men to join that garrison. They succeeded by forced marches in that hazardous attempt, not having been discovered by the enemy till they came within sight of the Fort, into which they threw themselves, after receiving some running shot.
Previous to that reinforcement of regulars, 20 volunteers, all good woodsmen, had been sent to Fort-Ligonier by Capt. Ourry, who commanded at Fort-Bedford another very considerable magazine of provisions, and military stores, the principal and central stage between Carlisle and Fort-Pitt, being about 100 miles distance from each. This fort was also in a ruinous condition, and very weakly garrisoned, although the two small intermediate posts, at the crossings of the Juniata and of Stony Creek, had been abandoned to strengthen it.

Here the distressed families, scattered for 12 or 15 miles round, fled for protection, leaving most of their effects a prey to the savages.

All the necessary precautions were taken by the commanding officer, to prevent surprize, and repel open force, as also to render ineffectual the enemies fire arrows. He armed all the fighting men, who formed two companies of volunteers, and did duty with the garrison till the arrival of two companies of light infantry, detached as soon as possible from Colonel Bouquet's little army.

These two magazines being secured, the Colonel advanced to the remotest verge of our settlements, where he could receive no fort of intelligence of the number, position, or motions of the enemy. Not even at Fort-Bedford, where he arrived with his whole convoy on the 25th of July, for tho' the Indians did not attempt to attack the fort, they had by this time killed, scalped, and taken eighteen persons in that neighbourhood, and their scouring parties were so spread, that at last no express could escape them. "This" (want of intelligence) "is often a very embarrassing circumstance in the conduct of a campaign in America. The Indians had better intelligence, and no sooner were they informed of the march of our Army, than they broke up the siege of Fort-Pitt, and took the rout by which they knew we were to proceed, resolved to take the first advantageous opportunity of an attack on the march."

In this uncertainty of intelligence under which the Colonel laboured, he marched from Fort-Bedford the 28th of July, and as soon as he reached Fort-Ligonier, he determined very prudently to leave his waggons at that post, and to proceed only with the pack horses. Thus disburdened, the army continued their rout. Before them lay a dangerous defile at Turtle Creek,
Creek, several miles in length, commanded the whole way by high and craggy hills. This defile he intended to have passed the ensuing night, by a double or forced march; thereby, if possible, to elude the vigilance of so alert an enemy, proposing only to make a short halt in his way, to refresh the Troops, at Bushy-Run.

When they came within half a mile of that place, about one in the afternoon, (August 5th, 1763) after an harrassing march of seventeen miles, and just as they were expecting to relax from their fatigue, they were suddenly attacked by the Indians, on their advanced guard; which, being speedily and firmly supported, the enemy was beat off, and even pursued to a considerable distance.

*But the flight of these barbarians must often be considered as a part of the engagement, (if we may use the expression) rather than a dereliction of the field. The moment the pursuit ended, they returned with renewed vigour to the attack. Several other parties, who had been in ambusc, in some high grounds which lay along the flanks of the army, now started up at once, and falling with a resolution equal to that of their companions, galled our troops with a most obstinate fire.

It was necessary to make a general charge with the whole line to dislodge them from these heights. This charge succeeded; but still the success produced no decisive advantage; for as soon as the savages were driven from one post, they still appeared on another, till constant reinforcements they were at length able to surround the whole detachment, and attack the convoy which had been left in the rear.

This manœuvre obliged the main body to fall back in order to protect it. The action, which grew every moment hotter and hotter, now became general. Our troops were attacked on every side; the savages supported their spirit throughout; but the steady behaviour of the English troops, who were not thrown into the least confusion by the very discouraging

† The above quotation is from the writer already mentioned, and seems so accurately and elegantly drawn up, from the account of this engagement, sent to his Majesty's ministers, that nothing better can be inferred in its room. There are but one or two small mistakes in it, which are here corrected.
nature of this service; in the end prevailed; they repulsed the enemy, and
 drove them from all their posts with fixed bayonets.

The engagement ended only with the day, having continued from one
 without any intermission.

This ground, on which the action ended, was not altogether inconvenient
 for an encampment. The convoy and the wounded were in the middle, and
 the troops, disposed in a circle, encompassed the whole. In this manner,
 and with little repose, they passed an anxious night, obliged to the strictest
 vigilance by an enterprising enemy who had surrounded them.

Those who have only experienced the severities and dangers of a cam­
 paign in Europe, can scarcely form an idea of what is to be done and en­
 dured in an American war. To act in a country, cultivated and inhabited,
 where roads are made, magazines are established, and hospitals provided;
 where there are good towns to retreat to in case of misfortune; or, at the
 work, a generous enemy to yield to, from whom no consolation, but the
 honour of victory, can be wanting; this may be considered as the exercise
 of a spirited and adventurous mind, rather than a rigid contest where all is
 at stake, and mutual destruction the object; and as a contention between
 rivals for glory, rather than a real struggle between sanguinary enemies.

But in an American campaign every thing is terrible; the face of the coun­
 try, the climate, the enemy. There is no refreshment for the healthy, nor
 relief for the sick. A vast un hospitable desert, unsafe and treacherous, sur­
 rounds them, where victories are not decisive, but defeats are ruinous; and
 simple death is the least misfortune which can happen to them. This
 forms a service truly critical, in which all the firmness of the body and
 mind is put to the severest trial; and all the exertions of courage and address
 are called out. If the actions of these rude campaigns are of less dignity,
 the adventures in them are more interesting to the heart, and more amu­
 sing to the imagination, than the events of a regular war.

But to return to the party of English, whom we left in the woods. At
 the first dawn of light the savages began to declare themselves, all about the
 camp, at the distance of about 500 yards; and by shouting and yelling in the
 most horrid manner, quite round that extensive circumference, endeavoured
 to strike terror by an ostentation of their numbers, and their ferocity.
After this alarming preparative, they attacked our forces, and, under the favour of an incessant fire, made several bold efforts to penetrate into the camp. They were repulsed in every attempt, but by no means discouraged from new ones. Our troops, continually victorious, were continually in danger. They were besides extremely fatigued with a long march, and with the equally long action, of the preceding day; and they were distant to the last degree by a total want of water, much more intolerable than the enemy's fire.

Tied to their convoy, they could not lose sight of it for a moment, without exposing, not only that interesting object, but their wounded men, to fall a prey to the savages, who pressed them on every side. To move was impracticable. Many of the horses were lost, and many of the drivers, stupefied by their fears, hid themselves in the bushes, and were incapable of hearing or obeying orders.

Their situation became extremely critical and perplexing, having experienced that the most lively efforts made no impression upon an enemy, who always gave way when pressed; but who, the moment the pursuit was over, returned with as much alacrity as ever to the attack. Besieged rather than engaged; attacked without interruption, and without decision; able neither to advance nor to retreat, they saw before them the most melancholy prospect of crumbling away by degrees, and entirely perishing, without revenge or honour, in the midst of those dreadful deserts. The fate of Braddock was every moment before their eyes; but they were more ably conducted.

The commander was sensible that every thing depended upon bringing the savages to a close engagement, and to stand their ground when attacked. Their audacity, which had increased with their success, seemed favourable to this design. He endeavoured, therefore, to increase their confidence as much as possible.

For that purpose he contrived the following stratagem. Our troops were posted on an eminence, and formed a circle round their convoy from the preceding night, which order they still retained. Col. Bouquet gave directions, that two companies of his troops, who had been posted in the most advanced situations, should fall within the circle; the troops on the right
PLAN OF THE BATTLE NEAR BUSH-IRON.
and left immediately opened their files, and filled up the vacant space, that they might seem to cover their retreat. Another company of light infantry, with one of grenadiers, were ordered "to lie in ambuscade," to support the two first companies of grenadiers, who moved on the feigned retreat, and were intended to begin the real attack. The dispositions were well made, and the plan executed without the least confusion.

The savages gave entirely into the snare. The thin line of troops, which took possession of the ground which the two companies of light foot had left, being brought in nearer to the center of the circle, the barbarians mistook those motions for a retreat, abandoned the woods which covered them, hurried headlong on, and advancing with the most daring intrepidity, galloped the English troops with their heavy fire. But at the very moment when, certain of success, they thought themselves masters of the camp, the two first companies made a sudden turn, and falling out from a part of the hill, which could not be observed, fell furiously upon their right flank.

The savages, though they found themselves disappointed and exposed, preferred their recollection, and resolutely returned the fire which they had received. Then it was the superiority of combined strength and discipline appeared. On the second charge they could no longer sustain the irresistible shock of the regular troops, who rushing upon them, killed many, and put the rest to flight.

At the instant when the savages betook themselves to flight, the other two companies, which had been ordered to support the first, rose "from the ambuscade," marched to the enemy, and gave them their full fire. This accomplished their defeat. The four companies now united, did not give them time to look behind them, but pursued the enemy till they were totally dispersed.

The other bodies of the savages attempted nothing. They were kept in awe during the engagement by the rest of the British troops, who were so posted as to be ready to fall on them upon the least motion. Having been witnesses to the defeat of their companions, without any effort to support or assist them, they at length followed their example and fled.
This judicious and successful manoeuvre rescued the party from the most imminent danger. The victory secured the field, and cleared all the adjacent woods. But still the march was so difficult, and the army had suffered so much, and so many horses were lost, that before they were able to proceed they were reluctantly obliged to destroy such part of their convoy of provisions as they could not carry with them for want of horses.

Being lightened by this sacrifice, they proceeded to Bully-Run, where finding water, they encamped.

A plan of this engagement is annexed, and it was thought the more necessary here to insert a particular account of it, as the new manoeuvres and skilful conduct of the commander, seem to have been the principal means, not only of preserving his army in the most critical situation, but likewise of ensuring them a complete victory.

The enemy lost about sixty men on this occasion, some of them their chief warriors; which they reputed a very severe stroke. They had likewise many wounded in the pursuit. The English lost about fifty men and had about sixty wounded.

The savages, thus signally defeated in all their attempts to cut off this reinforcement upon its march, began to retreat with the utmost precipitation to their remote settlements, wholly giving up their designs against Fort-Pitt; at which place Col. Bouquet arrived safe with his convoy, four days after the action; receiving no further molestation on the road, except a few scattered shot from a disheartened and flying enemy.

Here the Colonel was obliged to put an end to the operations of this campaign, not having a sufficient force to pursue the enemy beyond the Ohio and take advantage of the victory obtained over them; nor having any reason to expect a timely reinforcement from the provinces in their distressed situation. He was therefore forced to content himself with supplying Fort-Pitt, and other places on the communication, with provisions, ammunition, and

† Another reason for being so particular in this account, is that the military papers annexed to this work, and the plan for carrying on any future war with the Indians, were compiled upon the experience of this engagement, by an officer long employed in the service he describes. His own improvement was his principal motive in the composition of them; but being told that they might convey many useful hints to others, and be of much service if laid before the public, he was pleased, upon my request, freely to communicate them to me for that purpose.
stores; stationing his small army to the best advantage he could, against
the approach of winter.

The transactions of the succeeding campaign, will be the subject of the
following work, and we shall conclude this introduction, by shewing the
sense which his Majesty was pleased to entertain, of the conduct and bravery
of the officers and army, on this trying occasion.

Head-Quarters, New-York, Jan. 5, 1764.

Orders.

"His Majesty has been graciously pleased to signify to the commander
in chief, his royal approbation of the conduct and bravery of Col.
Bouquet, and the officers and troops under his command, in the two
actions of the 5th and 6th of August; in which, notwithstanding the
many circumstances of difficulty and distress they laboured under, and
the unusual spirit and resolution of the Indians, they repelled and de-
feated the repeated attacks of the Savages, and conducted their convoy
safe to Fort-Pitt.

"Signed

Moncreif,
"Major of Brigade."
INTRODUCTION

Since the defeat of the British in the recent disastrous campaign, the British fleet has been gradually withdrawn. The remaining forces, under the command of General Washington, will be the object of our attention.

The present state of the British army is such that we have reason to believe that it is unable to oppose any serious resistance. The British fleet, on the other hand, is at our mercy.

CINCINNATI, NEW-YORK, 1778.

ORDER.

I have this day signed the orders of the Congress and the President of the United States, directing the appointment of the following officers:

1. General...
2. Major...
3. Lieutenant...

I hereby direct that the orders of the President and the Congress be carried out in accordance with the aforementioned instructions.

To Colonel...

Office of commanding officer.
as before mentioned, for having insufficient number of troops to garrison the different posts, under his command, and at the same time to cross the Ohio and take advantage of the dejection into which he had thrown the enemy, by the defeat at Bushy-Run, was obliged to
A Map of the Country on the Ohio & Mahoning Rivers

Showing the Situation of the Indian Towns with respect to the Army under the Command of Colonel Bouquet.

By

The Hutchins, A. E. Engineer.
AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF COLONEL BOUQUET'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS IN THE YEAR 1764

In the preceding introduction, some account hath been given of the sudden, treacherous and unprovoked attack, made by the Indians upon the frontiers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, soon after the publication of the general Peace, at a time when we were but just beginning to respire from our former calamities, and looked for an approach of quiet on every side. The principal transactions of the campaign 1763 have likewise been briefly recapitulated, and the reader informed by what means the editor became possessed of the valuable papers, which have enabled him to bring the history of this Indian war to a conclusion, and furnished the materials of the following sheets.

Colonel Bouquet, as before mentioned, not having a sufficient number of troops to garrison the different posts, under his command, and at the same time to cross the Ohio and take advantage of the dejection into which he had thrown the enemy, by the defeat at Busby-Run, was obliged...
to restrain his operations to the supplying the forts with provisions, ammunition and other necessaries.

In the execution of this service, he received no annoyance from the enemy, for they now saw themselves not only forced to give up their designs against Fort-Pitt; but, retreating beyond the Ohio, they deserted their former towns, and abandoned all the country between Presque-Isle and Sanduski; not thinking themselves safe till they arrived at Muhkingam.

Here they began to form new settlements, and remained quiet during the winter. But, in the mean time, having supplied themselves with powder, &c. from the French traders, (and now flattering themselves that the great distance of their settlements would render them inaccessible to our troops) the ensuing spring 1764 presented these savage enemies afresh on our frontiers; ravaging and murdering with their usual barbarity.

To chastise them for their perfidy, General Gage resolved to attack them on two different sides, and to force them from our frontiers; by carrying the war into the heart of their own country. With this view, he defined a corps of troops to proceed under Col. Bradstreet, to act against the Wiandots, Ottawas, Chipwas and other nations, living upon or near the lakes; while another corps, under the command of Col. Bouquet, should attack the Delawares, Shawanees, Mingoes, Mohickons, and other nations, between the Ohio and the lakes.

These two corps were to act in concert; and as that of Col. Bradstreet could be ready much sooner than the other, he was to proceed to Detroit, Michilimackinac and other places. On his return, he was to encamp and remain at Sanduski, to awe, by that position, the numerous tribes of western Indians, so as to prevent their sending any assistance to the Ohio Indians, while Colonel Bouquet should execute his plan of attacking them in the heart of their settlements.
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS, 1764

Col. Bouquet’s expedition was to proceed altogether by land, and was on that account attended with great difficulties. His men were to penetrate through a continued depth of woods, and a savage unexplored country; without roads, without posts, and without a retreat if they failed of success. When once engaged in these deserts, they had no convoy, nor any kind of assistance to expect. Everything was to be carried with them — their ammunition, baggage, tools, stores, and provisions necessary for the troops during the whole expedition. And besides, they were liable to many embarrassments, and difficulties which no prudence could foresee, scarce any caution prevent; so that, in this account, sundry things, which, in the usual method of conducting military operations, might not be thought worthy of a detail, may nevertheless be found highly serviceable to those who may afterwards be employed in this species of war, which is new to Europeans, who must submit to be instructed in it by experience, and in many articles even by the savages themselves.

Part of the 42d and 60th regiments were ordered on this expedition, and were to be joined by two hundred friendly Indians, and the troops required of Virginia and Pennsylvania. The Indians never came, and the Virginians pleaded their inability to raise men, having already in pay about 700 militia for the defence of their own frontier. In Pennsylvania, a bill for raising 1000 men was passed May 30th; but, with the utmost diligence that could be used, the number could not be completed till the beginning of August.

On the 5th of that month, the men being assembled at Carlisle, one hundred and eighteen miles to the westward of Philadelphia, Governor Penn, who had accompanied Col. Bouquet to that place, acquainted the two Pennsylvania battalions with the necessity we were laid under of chastising the Indians for their repeated and unprovoked barbarities on the inhabitants of the Province; a just resentment of which, added to a remembrance of the loyalty and courage of our provincial troops on former occasions, he did not doubt, would animate them to do honour to their country, and that they could not but hope to be crowned with success, as they were to be united with the same regular troops, and

B 2
under the same able commander, who had by themselves, on that very day, the memorable 5th of August in the preceding year, sustained the repeated attacks of the savages, and obtained a compleat victory over them.”—He also reminded them of the exemplary punishments that would be inflicted on the grievous crime of desertion, if any of them were capable of so far forgetting their solemn oath and duty to their king and country, as to be involved in it.”

Colonel Bouquet then assumed the command of the regular and provincial troops; and the four following days were spent in the necessary preparations for their march; the Colonel giving the most express orders to the officers and men to observe strict discipline, and not to commit the least violation of the civil rights or peace of the inhabitants. —He, at the same time, made the most prudent regulations for a safe and commodious carriage of the baggage, taking care to rid himself of all unnecessary incumbrances.

The 13th of August this small army got to Fort Loudoun; but notwithstanding all the precautions taken to prevent desertion, the Pennsylvania troops were now reduced to about 700 men. The Colonel was therefore under a necessity to apply to the government of that province to enable him to compleat their number to the full complement; which was generously granted by a resolve of the Governor and Commissioners August 16th; and the army advancing now beyond the settled parts of Pennsylvania, he made application to the colony of Virginia, where (under the countenance of Governor Fauquier) the men wanted were soon raised, and joined the army at Pittsburg, about the latter end of September.

Nothing material happened in their march, from Fort Loudoun to Fort Pitt, (formerly Fort Du Queîne) on the Ohio, three hundred and twenty miles west from Philadelphia; at which place Col. Bouquet arrived the 17th of September.

During this interval, several large convoys were forwarded under strong escorts; and though the enemy continued their savages all that
time on the frontiers, they durst not attack any of those convoys, which all arrived safe at Fort Pitt.

While Col. Bouquet was at Fort Loudoun, he received dispatches by express from Colonel Bradstreet, dated from Presque-Isle August 14th, acquainting him that he (Colonel Bradstreet) had concluded a peace with the Delawares and Shawanese; but Colonel Bouquet perceiving clearly that they were not sincere in their intentions, as they continued their murders and depredations, he determined to prosecute his plan without remission, till he should receive further instructions from General Gage; who, upon the same principles, refused to ratify the treaty, and renewed his orders to both armies to attack the enemy.

About the time of Colonel Bouquet's arrival at Fort Pitt, ten Indians appeared on the north side of the Ohio, desiring a conference; which stratagem the savages had made use of before, to obtain intelligence of our numbers and intentions. Three of the party consented, though with apparent reluctance, to come over to the Fort; and as they could give no satisfactory reason for their visit, they were detained as spies, and their associates fled back to their towns.

On the 20th of September Colonel Bouquet sent one of the above three Indians after them with a message, in substance as follows—"I have received an account from Colonel Bradstreet that your nations had begged for peace, which he had consented to grant, upon assurance that you had recalled all your warriors from our frontiers; and in consequence thereof, I would not have proceeded against your towns, if I had not heard that, in open violation of your engagements, you have since murdered several of our people.

"As soon as the rest of the army joins me, which I expect immediately, I was therefore determined to have attacked you, as a people whose promises can no more be relied on. But I will put it once more in your power to save yourselves and your families from total destruction, by giving us satisfaction for the hostilities committed against us. And first
first you are to leave the path open for my express from hence to Detroit; and as I am now to send two men with dispatches to Colonel Bradstreet who commands on the lakes, I desire to know whether you will send two of your people with them to bring them safe back with an answer? And if they receive any injury either in going or coming, or if the letters are taken from them, I will immediately put the Indians now in my power to death, and will shew no mercy for the future to any of your nations that shall fall into my hands. I allow you ten days to have my letters delivered at Detroit, and ten days to bring me back an answer."

He added "that he had lately had it in his power, while they remained on the other side of the river, to have put their whole party to death, which punishment they had deserved by their former treachery; and that if they did not improve the clemency now offered to them, by returning back as soon as possible with all their prisoners, they might expect to feel the full weight of a just vengeance and resentment."

We have been the more particular in our account of this first transaction with the Indians; because the Colonel's firm and determined conduct in opening the campaign, had happy effects in the prosecution of it, and shews by what methods these faithless savages are to be best reduced to reason.

On the 1st of October, two of the Six Nation tribes, an Onondago and Oneida Indian, came to Fort Pitt, and under colour of our ancient friendship with them, and their pretended regard to the English, endeavoured to dissuade the Colonel from proceeding with the army. They told him that his force was not sufficient to withstand the power of the numerous nations through whose countries he was to pass, and assured him that if he would wait a little, they would all come and make peace with him; at the same time recommending it particularly to him to send back the two Indians detained as spies. These little arts being clearly made use of to spin out the season till the approach of winter should render it impossible to proceed, they made but little impression. He told them that
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS, 1764.

that he could not depend on the promises of the Delawares and Shawanese; and was determined to proceed to Tuscarawas, where, if they had any thing to say, he would hear them.

In the mean time, he was using the utmost diligence to prepare for his march, and was obliged to enforce the severest discipline. One woman belonging to each corps, and two nurses for the general hospital, were all that were permitted to follow the army. The other women in the camp, and those unnecessary in the garrison, were ordered immediately down the country into the settlements. Two soldiers were shot for desertion; an example which became absolutely necessary to suppress a crime which, in such an expedition, would have been attended with fatal consequences, by weakening an army already too small.

Colonel Bouquet, having at length, with great difficulty, collected his troops, formed his magazines, and provided for the safety of the posts he was to leave behind him, was ready on the 2d of October to proceed from Fort Pitt, with about 1500 men, including drivers and other necessary followers of the army.

As a just idea of the conduct of this expedition, and the great caution taken to prevent surprize, will be best obtained from the ORDER OF MARCH, we shall here insert it, with a Copper Plate for the illustration of it, and an accurate Draught, taken from actual surveys, of the road and adjacent country, through which the army passed.

The Colonel, expressing the greatest confidence in the bravery of the troops, told them, "he did not doubt but this war would soon be ended, "under God, to their own honor, and the future safety of their country, "provided the men were strictly obedient to orders, and guarded against "the surprizes and sudden attacks of a treacherous enemy, who never "dared to face British troops in an open field; that the distance of the "enemy's towns, and the clearing roads to them, must necessarily require "a considerable time; that the troops in those deserts, had no other "supplies to expect but the ammunition and provisions they carried with
COLONEL BOUQUET's EXPEDITION

"them; and that therefore the utmost care and frugality would be necessary in the use of them." He published the severest penalties against those who should be found guilty of stealing or embezzling any part of them, and ordered his March in the following manner.—

A corps of Virginia volunteers advanced before the whole; detaching three scouting parties. One of them, furnished with a guide, marched in the center path, which the army was to follow. The other two extended themselves in a line abreast, on the right and left of the aforesaid party, to reconnoitre the woods.

Under cover of this corps, the ax-men, consisting of all the artificers, and two companies of light infantry, followed in three divisions, under the direction of the chief engineer, to clear three different paths, in which the troops and the convoy followed, viz.—

The front-face of the square, composed of part of the 42d regiment, marched in a column, two deep, in the center path.

The right face of the square, composed of the remainder of the 42d and of the 60th regiment, marched in a single file in the right-hand path.

The first battalion of Pennsylvanians composed the left face, marching in like manner in the path to the left of the center.

The corps de reserve, composed of two platoons of grenadiers, followed the right and left faces of the square.

The 2d battalion of Pennsylvanians formed the rear face of the square, and followed the corps de reserve, each in a single file, on the right and left hand paths; all these troops covering the convoy, which moved in the center path.

* These were the men raised in Virginia to compleat the Pennsylvania troops, and were in the pay of the aforesaid province.

A PARTY
Camp.

Fig. 1.

Disposition to receive the Enemy.

Fig. 3.

General Attack

Fig. 4.

REFERENCES:
1. Regular Troops
2. Hunters
3. Light Horse
4. Artificers
5. Advanced Guards
6. Flankers
7. Reserve
9. Cattle
x. The Enemy

Scale of Feet.
A PARTY of light horse-men marched behind the rear-face of the square, followed by another corps of Virginia volunteers, forming the rear-guard.

The Pennsylvania volunteers, dividing themselves equally, and marching in a single file, at a proper distance, flanked the right and left faces of the square.

This was the general order of march. Nor was less attention paid to particular matters of a subordinate nature. The ammunition and tools were placed in the rear of the first column, or front face of the square, followed by the officers’ baggage, and tents. The oxen and sheep came after the baggage, in separate droves, properly guarded. The provisions came next to the baggage, in four divisions, or brigades of pack-horses, each conducted by a horse master.

The troops were ordered to observe the most profound silence, and the men to march at two yards distance from one another. When the line or any part of it halted, the whole were to face outwards; and if attacked on their march, they were to halt immediately, ready to form the square when ordered. The light horse were then to march into the square, with the cattle, provisions, ammunition and baggage. Proper dispositions were likewise made in case of an attack in the night, and for encampments, guards, communications between the sentries, signals, and the like.

Things being thus settled, the army decamped from Fort-Pitt on Wednesday October 3d, and marched about one mile and an half over a rich level country, with stately timber, to camp No. 2. a strong piece of ground, pleasantly situated, with plenty of water and food for cattle.

Thursday October 4th, having proceeded about two miles, they came to the Ohio, at the beginning of the narrows, and from thence followed the course of the river along a flat gravelly beech, about six miles and a quarter,
a quarter; with two islands on their left, the lowermost about six miles long, with a rising ground running across, and gently sloping on both sides to its banks, which are high and upright. At the lower end of this island, the army left the river, marching through good land, broken with small hollows to camp No. 3; this day's march being nine miles and a quarter.

Friday October 5th. In this day's march the army passed through Loggs-town, situated seventeen miles and an half, fifty seven perches, by the path, from Fort-Pitt. This place was noted before the last war for the great trade carried on there by the English and French; but its inhabitants, the Shawanese and Delawares, abandoned it in the year 1750. The lower town extended about sixty perches over a rich bottom to the foot of a low steep ridge, on the summit of which, near the declivity, stood the upper town, commanding a most agreeable prospect over the lower, and quite across the Ohio, which is about 500 yards wide here, and by its majestic easy current adds much to the beauty of the place. Proceeding beyond Logg's-town, through a fine country, interspersed with hills and rich valleys, watered by many rivulets, and covered with stately timber, they came to camp No. 4; on a level piece of ground, with a thicket in the rear, a small precipice round the front, with a run of water at the foot, and good food for cattle. This day's march was nine miles, one half, and fifty three perches.

Saturday October 6th, at about three miles distance from this camp, they came again to the Ohio, pursuing its course half a mile farther, and then turning off, over a steep ridge, they crossed Big Beaver-creek, which is twenty perches wide, the ford stony and pretty deep. It runs through a rich vale, with a pretty strong current, its banks high, the upland adjoining it very good, the timber tall and young. About a mile below its confluence with the Ohio, stood formerly a large town, on a steep bank, built by the French of square logs, with stone chimneys, for some of the Shawanese, Delaware and Mingo tribes, who abandoned it in the year 1758, when the French deserted Fort Du Quene. Near the fording of Beaver-creek also stood about seven houses, which were
Against the Ohio Indians, 1764

defeated and destroyed by the Indians, after their defeat at Busby-run,
when they forsake all their remaining settlements in this part of the country,
as has been mentioned above.

About two miles before the army came to Beaver-creek, one of our
people who had been made prisoner by six Delawares about a week
before, near Fort Bedford, having made his escape from them, came and
informed the Colonel that these Indians had the day before fallen in with
the army, but kept themselves concealed, being surprised at our numbers.
Two miles beyond Beaver-creek, by two small springs, was seen the
feul of a child, that had been fixed on a pole by the Indians. The
Tracts of 15 Indians were this day discovered. The camp No. 5 is seven
miles one quarter and fifty seven perches from big Beaver-creek; the
whole march of this day being about twelve miles.

Sunday 7th October, passing a high ridge, they had a fine prospect
of an extensive country to the right, which in general appeared level,
with abundance of tall timber. The camp No. 6 lies at the foot of a
steep descent, in a rich valley, on a strong ground, three sides thereof
surrounded by a hollow, and on the fourth side a small hill, which
was occupied by a detached guard. This day's march was six miles sixty
five perches.

Monday 8th October, the army crossed little Beaver-creek, and one of
its branches. This creek is eight perches wide, with a good ford, the
country about it interspersed with hills, rivulets and rich valleys, like that
described above. Camp No. 7 lies by a small run on the side of a hill,
commanding the ground about it, and is distant eleven miles one quarter
and forty nine perches from the last encampment.

Tuesday 9th October. In this day's march, the path divided into two
branches, that to the southwest leading to the lower towns upon the
Mukkingham. In the forks of the path stand several trees painted by the
Indians, in a hieroglyphic manner, denoting the number of wars in which
they have been engaged, and the particulars of their success in prisoners

C 2
and scalps. The camp No. 8. lies on a run, and level piece of ground, with Yellow-creek close on the left, and a rising ground near the rear of the right face. The path after the army left the forks was so brusdy and entangled, that they were obliged to cut all the way before them, and also to lay several bridges, in order to make it passable for the horses; so that this day they proceeded only five miles, three quarters and seventy perches.

**Wednesday 10th.** Marched one mile with Yellow-creek on the left at a small distance all the way, and crossed it at a good ford fifty feet wide; proceeding through an alternate succession of small hills and rich vales, finely watered with rivulets, to camp No. 9. seven miles and sixty perches in the whole.

**Thursday 11th.** Crossed a branch of Muskingham river about fifty feet wide, the country much the same as that described above, discovering a good deal of free-stone. The camp No. 10. had this branch of the river parallel to its left face, and lies ten miles one quarter and forty perches from the former encampment.

**Friday 12th.** Keeping the aforesaid creek on their left, they marched through much fine land, watered with small rivers and springs; proceeding likewise through several savannahs or cleared spots, which are by nature extremely beautiful; the second which they passed being, in particular, one continued plain of near two miles, with a fine rising ground forming a semicircle round the right hand side, and a pleasant stream of water at about a quarter of a mile distant on the left. The camp No. 11. has the abovementioned branch of Muskingham on the left, and is distant ten miles and three quarters from the last encampment.

**Saturday 13th.** Crossed Nemenhecelas creek, about fifty feet wide, a little above where it empties itself into the aforesaid branch of Muskingham, having in their way a pleasant prospect over a large plain, for near two miles on the left. A little further, they came to another small river which they crossed about fifty perches above where it empties into the...
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS, 1764.

the said branch of Muskingham. Here a high ridge on the right, and the creek close on the left, form a narrow defile about seventy perches long. Passing afterwards over a very rich bottom, they came to the main branch of Muskingham, about seventy yards wide, with a good ford. A little below and above the forks of this river is Tuscarawas, a place exceedingly beautiful by situation, the lands rich on both sides of the river; the country on the north-west side being an entire level plain, upwards of five miles in circumference. From the ruined houses appearing here, the Indians who inhabited the place and are now with the Delawares, are supposed to have had about one hundred and fifty warriors. This camp No. 12. is distant eight miles nineteen perches from the former.

SUNDAY 14th. The army remained in camp; and two men who had been dispatched by Colonel Bouquet from Fort-Pitt, with letters for Colonel Bradstreet, returned and reported?—"That, within a few miles of this place, they had been made prisoners by the Delawares, and carried to one of their towns sixteen miles from hence, where they were kept, till the savages, knowing of the arrival of the army here, set them at liberty, ordering them to acquaint the Colonel that the head men of the Delawares and Shawanes were coming as soon as possible to treat of peace with him."

MONDAY 15th. The army moved two miles forty perches further down the Muskingham to camp No. 13, situated on a very high bank, with the river at the foot of it, which is upwards of 100 yards wide at this place, with a fine level country at some distance from its banks, producing stately timber, free from underwood, and plenty of food for cattle.

The day following, six Indians came to inform the Colonel that all their chiefs were assembled about eight miles from the camp, and were ready to treat with him of peace, which they were earnestly desirous of obtaining. He returned for answer that he would meet them the next day in a bower at some distance from the camp. In the mean time, he ordered a small stockaded fort to be built to deposit provisions for the use of the troops on their return; and to lighten the convoy.
As several large bodies of Indians were now within a few miles of the camp, whose former instances of treachery, although they now declared they came for peace, made it prudent to trust nothing to their intentions, the strictest orders were repeated to prevent a surprise.

Wednesday 17th. The Colonel, with most of the regular troops, Virginia volunteers and light horse, marched from the camp to the bower erected for the congress. And soon after the troops were stationed, so as to appear to the best advantage, the Indians arrived, and were conducted to the bower. Being feated, they began, in a short time, to smoke their pipe or calumet, agreeable to their custom. This ceremony being over, their speakers laid down their pipes, and opened their pouches, wherein were their strings and belts of wampum. The Indians present were,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senecas</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Shawanese</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiyahuta, chief</td>
<td>Cusfaloga, chief</td>
<td>Keillinautchtha,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with 15 warriors</td>
<td>of the Wolfe-tribe</td>
<td>a chief,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beaver, chief of</td>
<td>and 6 warriors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Turky-tribe,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with 20 warriors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kiyahuta, Turtle-Heart, Cusfaloga and Beaver, were the speakers.

The general substance of what they had to offer, consisted in excuses for their late treachery and misconduct, throwing the blame on the rashness of their young men and the nations living to the westward of them, suing for peace in the most abject manner, and promising severally to deliver up all their prisoners. After they had concluded, the Colonel promised to give them an answer the next day, and then dismissed them, the army returning to the camp. — The badness of the weather, however, prevented his meeting them again till the 20th, when he spoke to them in substance as follows, viz.

"That their pretences to palliate their guilt by throwing the blame on the western nations, and the rashness of their young men, were weak and frivolous, as it was in our power to have protected them against all these nations, if they had solicited our assistance, and that..."
The Indians giving a talk to Colonel Bouquet in a conference at a council fire, near his camp on the Banks of Muskingum in North America, in Oct. 1763.
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS, 1764

"it was their own duty to have chastised their young men when they did wrong, and not to suffer themselves to be directed by them."

He recapitulated to them many instances of their former perfidy — their killing or captivating the traders who had been sent among them at their own request, and plundering their effects; — their attacking Fort Pitt, which had been built with their express consent; their murdering four men that had been sent on a public message to them, thereby violating the customs held sacred among all nations, however barbarous; — their attacking the King's troops last year in the woods, and after being defeated in that attempt, falling upon our frontiers, where they had continued to murder our people to this day, &c."

He told them how treacherously they had violated even their late engagements with Colonel Bradstreet, to whom they had promised to deliver up their prisoners by the 10th of September last, and to recall all their warriors from the frontiers, which they had been so far from complying with, that the prisoners still remained in their custody, and some of their people were even now continuing their depredations; adding, that these things which, he had mentioned, were only "a small part of their numberless murders and breaches of faith; and that their conduct had always been equally perfidious. — You have, said he, promised at every former treaty, as you do now, that you would deliver up all your prisoners, and have received every time, on that account, considerable presents, but have never complied with that or any other engagement. I am now to tell you, therefore, that we will be no longer imposed upon by your promises. This army shall not leave your country till you have fully complied with every condition that is to precede my treaty with you.

"I have brought with me the relations of the people you have massacred, or taken prisoners. They are impatient for revenge; and it is with great difficulty that I can protect you against their just resentment, which
which is only restrained by the assurances given them, that no peace
shall ever be concluded till you have given us full satisfaction.”

"Your former allies, the Ottawas, Chipwas, Wyandots, and others,
have made their peace with us. The Six Nations have joined us
against you. We now surround you, having possession of all the waters
of the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Miamis, and the lakes. All the
French living in those parts are now subjects to the king of Great-
Britain, and dare no longer assist you. It is therefore in our power
totally to extirpate you from being a people — But the English are a
merciful and generous nation, averse to shed the blood, even of
their most cruel enemies; and if it was possible that you could
convince us, that you sincerely repent of your past perfidy, and that
we could depend on your good behaviour for the future, you might yet
hope for mercy and peace — If I find that you faithfully execute the
following preliminary conditions, I will not treat you with the severity
you deserve.

"I give you twelve days from this date to deliver into my hands at
Wakatamake all the prisoners in your possession, without any exception;
Englishmen, Frenchmen, women and children; whether adopted in
your tribes, married, or living amongst you under any denomination
and pretence whatsoever, together with all negroes. And you are to
furnish the said prisoners with clothing, provisions, and horses, to carry
them to Fort Pitt.

"When you have fully complied with these conditions, you shall then
know on what terms you may obtain the peace you sue for.”

This speech made an impression on the minds of the savages, which,
it is hoped, will not soon be eradicated. The firm and determined spirit
with which the Colonel delivered himself, their consciousness of the
aggravated injuries they had done us, and the view of the same com-
mander
mander and army that had so severely chastised them at Bushy-Run the preceding year, now advanced into the very heart of their remote settlements, after penetrating through wildernesses which they had deemed impassable by regular troops—all these things contributed to bend the haughty temper of the savages to the lowest degree of abasement; so that even their speeches seem to exhibit but few specimens of that strong and ferocious eloquence, which their inflexible spirit of independency has on former occasions inspired. And though it is not to be doubted, if an opportunity had offered, but they would have fallen upon our army with their usual fierceness, yet when they saw the vigilance and spirit of our troops were such, that they could neither be attacked nor surprised with any prospect of success, their spirits seemed to revolt from the one extreme of insolent boldness, to the other of abject timidity. And happy will it be for them and for us, if the instances of our humanity and mercy, which they experienced in that critical situation, shall make as lasting impressions on their savage dispositions, as it is believed the instances of our bravery and power have done; so that they may come to unite, with their fear of the latter, a love of the former; and have their minds gradually opened, by such examples, to the mild dictates of peace and civility.

The reader, it is to be hoped, will readily excuse this digression, if it should be thought one. I now resume our narrative. The two Delaware chiefs, at the close of their speech on the 17th, delivered eighteen white prisoners, and eighty-three small sticks, expressing the number of other prisoners which they had in their possession, and promised to bring in as soon as possible. None of the Shawaneke Kings appeared at the congress, and Keissinauchtha their deputy declined speaking until the Colonel had answered the Delawares, and then with a dejected fullness he promised, in behalf of his nation, that they would submit to the terms prescribed to the other tribes.

The Colonel, however, determined to march farther into their country, knowing that the presence of his army would be the best security for
the performance of their promises; and required some of each nation to attend him in his march.

Kiyashuta addressed the several nations, before their departure, "de-
"firing them to be strong in complying with their engagements, that
"they might wipe away the reproach of their former breach of faith,
"and convince their brothers the English that they could speak the truth;
"adding that he would conduct the army to the place appointed for re-
"ceiving the prisoners."

Monday October 22d. The army attended by the Indian deputies, marched nine miles to camp No. 14, crossing Margaret's creek about fifty feet wide. The day following, they proceeded sixteen miles one quarter and seventy seven perches farther to camp No. 15, and halted there one day.

Thursday 25. They marched six miles, one half and sixteen perches to camp No. 16, situated within a mile of the Forks of Muskingham; and this place was fixed upon instead of Wakautamike, as the most central and convenient place to receive the prisoners; for the principal Indian towns now lay round them, distant from seven to twenty miles; excepting only the lower Shawanese town situated on Scioto river, which was about eighty miles; so that from this place the army had it in their power to awe all the enemy's settlements and destroy their towns, if they should not punctually fulfil the engagements they had entered into. —

Four redoubts were built here opposite to the four angles of the camp; the ground in the front was cleared, a store-house for the provisions erected, and likewise a house to receive, and treat of peace with, the Indians, when they should return. Three houses with separate apartments were also raised for the reception of the captives of the respective provinces, and proper officers appointed to take charge of them, with a matron to attend the women and children; so that with the officers mess houses, ovens, &c. this camp had the appearance of a little town in which the greatest order and regularity were observed.
On Saturday 27th. A messenger arrived from king Custaloga, informing that he was on his way with his prisoners, and also a messenger from the lower Shawanese towns of the like import. The Colonel however, having no reason to suspect the latter nation of backwardness, sent one of their own people, desiring them — "to be punctual as to the time fixed; to provide a sufficient quantity of provisions to subsist the prisoners; to bring the letters wrote to him last winter by the French commandant at Fort Chartres, which some of their people had stopped ever since," adding that, "as their nation had expressed some uneasiness at our not shaking hands with them, they were to know that the English never took their enemies by the hand, before peace was finally concluded."

The day following, the Shawanese messenger returned, saying that when he had proceeded as far as Wakautamike, the chief of that town undertook to proceed with the message himself, and desired the other to return and acquaint the English that all his prisoners were ready, and he was going to the lower towns to hasten theirs.

October 28th. Peter the Caughnawaga chief, and twenty Indians of that nation arrived from Sanduski, with a letter from Colonel Bradstreet, in answer to one which Colonel Bouquet had sent to him from Fort-Pitt, by two of the Indians who first spoke to him in favour of the Shawanese, as hath been already mentioned. The substance of Colonel Bradstreet’s letter was "that he had settled nothing with the Shawanese and Delawares, nor received any prisoners from them. — That he had acquainted all the Indian nations, as far as the Illinois, the bay, &c. with the instructions he had received from General Gage, respecting the peace he had lately made; that he had been in Sanduski-lake and up the river, as far as navigable for Indian canoes, for near a month; but that he had found it impossible to stay longer in these parts; absolute necessity obliging him to turn off the other way," &c.

Colonel Bradstreet, without doubt, did all which circumstances would permit, in his department; but his not being able to remain at Sanduski
Colonel Bouquet's Expedition

Sanduski agreeable to the original plan, till matters were finally settled with the Ohio Indians, would have been an unfavourable incident, if Colonel Bouquet had not now had the chiefs of sundry tribes with him, and was so far advanced into the Indian country, that they thought it advisable to submit to the conditions imposed upon them.

The Caughnawagas reported that the Indians on the lakes had delivered but few of their prisoners; that the Ottawas had killed a great part of theirs, and the other nations had either done the same, or else kept them.

From this time to November 9th, was chiefly spent in sending and receiving messages to and from the Indian towns, relative to the prisoners, who were now coming into the camp one day after another in small parties, as the different nations arrived in whose possession they had been. The Colonel kept so steadfastly to this article of having every prisoner delivered, that when the Delaware kings, Beaver and Cuftaloga, had brought in all theirs except twelve, which they promised to bring in a few days, he refused to shake hands or have the least talk with them, while a single captive remained among them.

By the 9th of November, most of the prisoners were arrived that could be expected this season, amounting to 206* in the whole; besides about 100 more in possession of the Shawanese, which they promised to deliver the following spring. Mr. Smallman, formerly a major in the Pennsylvania troops, who had been taken last summer near Detroit by the Wyandots, and delivered to the Shawanese, was among the number of those whom they now brought in, and informed the Colonel that the reason of their not bringing the remainder of their prisoners, was that many of their principal men, to whom they belonged, were gone to trade with the French, and would not return for six weeks; but that every one of the

* Virginians... Males, 32
Females and Children, 58
Pennsylvanians, Males, 49
Females and Children, 67
In all 206
their nation who were at home, had either brought or sent theirs. He
further said that, on the army’s first coming into the country, it had been
reported among the Shawanese that our intention was to destroy them all,
on which they had resolved to kill their prisoners and fight us; that a
French trader who was with them, and had many barrels of powder and
ball, made them a present of the whole, as soon as they had come to this
resolution; but that, happily for the poor captives, just as the Shawanese
were preparing to execute this tragedy, they received the Colonel’s mes-
sage, informing them that his intentions were only to receive the prisoners
and to make peace with them on the same terms he should give to the
Delawares.

On this intelligence they suspended their cruel purpose, and began to
collect as many of the prisoners as they had power to deliver; but hearing
immediately afterwards that one of our soldiers had been killed near the
camp at Muskingham, and that some of their nation were suspected as
guilty of the murder, they again imagined they would fall under our
resentment, and therefore determined once more to stand against us.
For which purpose, after having brought their prisoners as far as Wakau-
tamike, where they heard this news, they collected them all into a field,
and were going to kill them, when a second express providentially arrived
from Colonel Bouquet, who assured them that their nation was not even
suspected of having any concern in the aforesaid murder; upon which
they proceeded to the camp to deliver up the captives, who had thus
twice so narrowly escaped becoming the victims of their barbarity.

On Friday, November 9th, the Colonel, attended by most of the prin-
cipal officers, went to the conference-house. The Senecas and Delawares
were first treated with. Kiyashuta and ten warriors represented the former.
Cuffaloga and twenty warriors the latter.

Kiyashuta spoke—“With this string of wampum, we wipe the tears
from your eyes—we deliver you these three prisoners, which are the
last of your flesh and blood that remained among the Senecas and Cus-
taloga’s tribe of Delawares, we gather together and bury with this
belt.
"belt— all the bones of the people that have been killed during this unhappy war, which the Evil Spirit occasioned among us. We cover the bones that have been buried, that they may be never more remembered. We again cover their place with leaves that it may be no more seen. As we have been long astray, and the path between you and us stopped, we extend this belt that it may be again cleared, and we may travel in peace to see our brethren as our ancestors formerly did. While you hold it fast by one end, and we by the other, we shall always be able to discover any thing that may disturb our friendship."

The Colonel answered that "he had heard them with pleasure; that he received these three last prisoners they had to deliver, and joined in burying the bones of those who had fallen in the war, so that their place might be no more known. The peace you ask for, you shall now have. The king, my master and your father, has appointed me only to make war; but he has other servants who are employed in the work of peace. Sir William Johnson is empowered for that purpose. To him you are to apply; but before I give you leave to go, two things are to be settled:

1. "As peace cannot be finally concluded here, you will deliver me two hostages for the Senecas, and two for Cuffalogu's tribe, to remain in our hands at Fort Pitt, as a security, that you shall commit no further hostilities or violence against any of his majesty's subjects; and when the peace is concluded these hostages shall be delivered safe back to you.

2. "The deputies you are to send to Sir William Johnson, must be fully empowered to treat for your tribes, and you shall engage to abide by whatever they stipulate. In that treaty, every thing concerning trade and other matters will be settled by Sir William, to render the peace everlasting; and the deputies you are to send to him, as well as the hostages to be delivered to me, are to be named and presented to me for my approbation."

3. A belt or string is always delivered when thus mentioned.

The
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS, 1764.

The Colonel, after promising to deliver back two of their people, Capt. Pipe, and Capt. John, whom he had detained at Fort-Pitt, took the chiefs by the hand for the first time, which gave them great joy.

The next conference was on November 10th, with the Turky and Turtle tribes of Delawares, King Beaver their chief and thirty warriors representing the former; and Kelappama brother to their chief** with twenty-five warriors the latter. The Senecas and Cushtaloga’s tribe of Delawares were also present. Their speech and the answer given, were much the same as above; excepting that the Colonel insisted on their delivering up an Englishman, who had murdered one of our people on the frontiers and brought the scalp to them; and that they should appoint the same number of deputies and deliver the same number of hostages, for each of their tribes, as had been stipulated for Cushtaloga’s tribe.

November 11. King Beaver presented six hostages to remain with Col. Bouquet, and five deputies to treat with Sir William Johnson, who were approved of. This day he acquainted the chiefs present that as he had great reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Nettowhatways, the chief of the Turtle tribe who had not appeared, he therefore deposed him; and that tribe were to choose and present another for his approbation. This they did a few days afterwards—Smile not, reader, at this transaction; for though it may not be attended with so many splendid and flattering circumstances to a commander, as the deposing an East Indian Nabob or chief; yet to penetrate into the wildnesses where those stern West Indian Chieftains hold their sway, and to frown them from their throne, though but composed of the unhewn log, will be found to require both resolution and firmness; and their submitting to it clearly shews to what degree of humiliation they were reduced.

But to proceed. The Shawanese still remained to be treated with, and though this nation saw themselves under the necessity of yielding to the same conditions with the other tribes, yet there had appeared a dilato-

** The Chief of the Turtle tribe, for some reason, chose to absent himself.
rines and fullen haughtines in all their conduct, which rendered it very suspicious.

The 12th of November was appointed for the conference with them; which was managed on their part by Keiflnautchta and Nimwha their chiefs, with the Red Hawke, Laviffimo, Benfivacca, Eweecunwee, Keigleighque, and forty warriors; the Caughnawaga, Seneca and Delaware chiefs, with about sixty warriors, being also present.

The Red Hawke was their speaker, and as he delivered himself with a strange mixture of fierce pride, and humble submission, I shall add a passage or two from his speech.

"Brother, "You will listen to us your younger brothers; and as we discover something in your eyes that looks dissatisfaction with us, we now wipe away every thing bad between us that you may clearly see — You have heard many bad stories of us — We clean your ears that you may hear — We remove every thing bad from your heart, that it may be like the heart of your ancestors, when they thought of nothing but good." [Here he gave a string.]

"Brother; when we saw you coming this road, you advanced towards us with a tomahawk in your hand; but we your younger brothers take it out of your hands and throw it up to God to dispose of as he pleases; by which means we hope never to see it more. And now, brother, we beg leave that you who are a warrior, will take hold of this chain (giving a string) of friendship, and receive it from us, who are also warriors; and let us think no more of war, in pity to our old men, women and children" — Intimating, by this last expression, that it was mere compassion to them, and not inability to fight, that made their nation desire peace.

† Their usual figure for making peace is burying the hatchet; but as such hatchets may be dug up again, perhaps he thought this new expression of "sending it up to God, or the Good Spirit," a much stronger emblem of the permanency and steadfastness of the peace now to be made.
He then produced a treaty held with the government of Pennsylvania 1701, and three messages or letters from that government of different dates; and concluded thus—

"Now, Brother, I beg We who are warriors may forget our disputes, "and renew the friendship which appears by these papers to have subsisted "between our fathers." — He promised, in behalf of the rest of their nation, who were gone to a great distance to hunt, and could not have notice to attend the treaty, that they should certainly come to Fort-Pitt in the spring, and bring the remainder of the prisoners with them.

As the season was far advanced, and the Colonel could not stay long in those remote parts, he was obliged to rest satisfied with the prisoners the Shawanese had brought; taking hostages, and laying them under the strongest obligations, for the delivery of the rest; knowing that no other effectual method could at present be pursued.

He expostulated with them on account of their past conduct, and told them—"that the speech they had delivered would have been agreable to "him, if their actions had corresponded with their words. You have spoken, "said he, much of peace, but have neglected to comply with the only con-"dition, upon which you can obtain it. Keissinautchtha, one of your chiefs, "met me a month ago at Tuscarawas, and accepted the same terms of peace "for your nation, that were prescribed to the Senecas and Delawares; promis-"ing in ten days from that time to meet me here with all your prisoners— "After waiting for you till now, you are come at last, only with a part "of them, and propose putting off the delivery of the rest till the spring, "—What right have you to expect different terms from those granted to "the Delawares, &c. who have given me entire satisfaction by their ready "submission to every thing required of them? — But I will cut this "matter short with you; and before I explain myself further, I insist on "your immediate answer to the following questions—

1st. "Will you forthwith collect and deliver up all the prisoners yet in "your possession, and the French living among you, with all the Negroes "you have taken from us in this or any other war; and that without any "exception or evasion whatsoever?"
2d. "Will you deliver six hostages into my hands as a security for your punctual performance of the above article, and that your nations shall commit no farther hostilities against the persons or property of his majesty's subjects?"

Benevissico replied that they agreed to give the hostages required, and said that he himself would immediately return to their lower towns and collect all our flesh and blood that remained among them, and that we should see them at Fort-Pitt as soon as possible. — That, as to the French, they had no power over them; they were subjects to the king of England. We might do with them what we pleased, though he believed they were all returned before this time to their own country. —

They then delivered their hostages, and the Colonel told them that though he had brought a Tomahawk in his hand, yet as they had now submitted, he would not let it fall on their heads, but let it drop to the ground, no more to be seen. He exhorted them to exercise kindness to the captives, and look upon them now as brothers and no longer prisoners; adding, that he intended to send some of their relations along with the Indians, to see their friends collected and brought to Fort-Pitt. He promised to give them letters to Sir William Johnson, to facilitate a final peace, and desired them to be strong in performing every thing stipulated.

The Caughnawagas, the Delawares and Senecas, severally addressed the Shawanese, as grandchildren and nephews, to perform their promises, and to be strong in doing good, that this peace might be everlasting. —

And here I am to enter on a scene, referred on purpose for this place, that the thread of the foregoing narrative might not be interrupted — a scene, which language indeed can but weakly describe, and to which the Poet or Painter might have repaired to enrich their highest colourings of the variety of human passions; the Philosopher to find ample subject for

† It will appear, by the postscript to this account, that the Shawanese have fulfilled this engagement.
his most serious reflections; and the Man to exercise all the tender and sympathetic feelings of the soul.

The scene I mean, was the arrival of the prisoners in the camp; where were to be seen fathers and mothers recognizing and clasping their once-lost babes; husbands hanging round the necks of their newly-recovered wives; sisters and brothers unexpectedly meeting together after long separation, scarce able to speak the same language, or, for some time, to be sure that they were children of the same parents! In all these interviews, joy and rapture inexpressible were seen, while feelings of a very different nature were painted in the looks of others;—flying from place to place in eager enquiries after relatives not found! trembling to receive an answer to their questions! distracted with doubts, hopes and fears, on obtaining no account of those they sought for! or changed into living monuments of horror and woe, on learning their unhappy fate!

The Indians too, as if wholly forgetting their usual savageness, bore a capital part in heightening this most affecting scene. They delivered up their beloved captives with the utmost reluctance; shed torrents of tears over them, recommending them to the care and protection of the commanding officer. Their regard to them continued all the time they remained in camp. They visited them from day to day; and brought them what corn, skins, horses and other matters, they had bestowed on them, while in their families; accompanied with other presents, and all the marks of the most sincere and tender affection. Nay, they did not stop here, but, when the army marched, some of the Indians solicited and obtained leave to accompany their former captives all the way to Fort-Pitt, and employed themselves in hunting and bringing provisions for them on the road. A young Mingo carried this still further; and gave an instance of love which would make a figure even in romance. A young woman of Virginia was among the captives, to whom he had formed so strong an attachment, as to call her his wife. Against all remonstrances of the imminent danger to which he exposed himself by approaching to the frontiers, he persisted in following her, at the risk of being killed by the surviving relations of many unfortunate persons, who had been captured or scalped by those of his nation.
Those qualities in savages challenge our just esteem. They should make us charitably consider their barbarities as the effects of wrong education, and false notions of bravery and heroism; while we should look on their virtues as sure marks that nature has made them fit subjects of cultivation as well as us; and that we are called by our superior advantages to yield them all the helps we can in this way. Cruel and unmerciful as they are, by habit and long example, in war, yet whenever they come to give way to the native dictates of humanity, they exercise virtues which Christians need not blush to imitate. When they once determine to give life, they give every thing with it, which, in their apprehension, belongs to it. From every enquiry that has been made, it appears—that no woman thus saved is preserved from base motives, or need fear the violation of her honour. No child is otherwise treated by the persons adopting it than the children of their own body. The perpetual slavery of those captivated in war, is a notion which even their barbarity has not yet suggested to them. Every captive whom their affection, their caprice, or whatever else, leads them to save, is soon incorporated with them, and fares alike with themselves.

These instances of Indian tenderness and humanity were thought worthy of particular notice. The like instances among our own people will not seem strange; and therefore I shall only mention one, out of a multitude that might be given on this occasion.

Among the captives, a woman was brought into the camp at Muskingham, with a babe about three months old at her breast. One of the Virginia-volunteers soon knew her to be his wife, who had been taken by the Indians about six months before. She was immediately delivered to her over-joyed husband. He flew with her to his tent, and cloathed her and his child in proper apparel. But their joy, after the first transports, was soon damped by the reflection that another dear child of about two years old, captivated with the mother, and separated from her, was still missing, altho' many children had been brought in.

A few days afterwards, a number of other prisoners were brought to the camp, among whom were several more children. The woman was sent for, and
The Indians delivering up the English Captives to Colonel Bouquet, near his Camp at the Forks of Muskingum in North America in Nov. 1764.
and one, supposed to be hers, was produced to her. At first sight she was uncertain, but viewing the child with great earnestness, she soon recollected its features; and was so overcome with joy, that literally forgetting her fucking child she dropped it from her arms, and catching up the new found child in an extasy, pressed it to her breast, and bursting into tears carried it off, unable to speak for joy. The father seizing up the babe she had let fall, followed her in no les transport and affection.

Among the children who had been carried off young, and had long lived with the Indians, it is not to be expected that any marks of joy would appear on being referred to their parents or relatives. Having been accustomed to look upon the Indians as the only connexions they had, having been tenderly treated by them, and speaking their language, it is no wonder that they considered their new state in the light of a captivity, and parted from the savages with tears.

But it must not be denied that there were even some grown persons who shewed an unwillingness to return. The Shawanese were obliged to bind several of their prisoners and force them along to the camp; and some women, who had been delivered up, afterwards found means to escape and run back to the Indian towns. Some, who could not make their escape, clung to their savage acquaintance at parting, and continued many days in bitter lamentations, even refusing subsistence.

For the honour of humanity, we would suppose those persons to have been of the lowest rank, either bred up in ignorance and distressing penury, or who had lived so long with the Indians as to forget all their former connections. For, easy and unconstrained as the savage life is, certainly it could never be put in competition with the blessings of improved life and the light of religion, by any persons who have had the happiness of enjoying, and the capacity of discerning, them.

Every thing being now settled with the Indians, the army decamped on Sunday 18th November, and marched for Fort-Pitt, where it arrived on the 28th. The regular troops were immediately sent to garrison the different posts.
posts on the communication, and the provincial troops, with the captives, to their several provinces. Here ended this expedition, in which it is remarkable that, notwithstanding the many difficulties attending it, the troops were never in want of any necessaries; continuing perfectly healthy during the whole campaign; in which no life was lost, except the man mentioned to have been killed at Muskingham.

In the beginning of January 1765, Colonel Bouquet arrived at Philadelphia, receiving, wherever he came, every possible mark of gratitude and esteem from the people in general; and particularly from the overjoyed relations of the captives, whom he had so happily, and without bloodshed, restored to their country and friends. Nor was the legislative part of the provinces less sensible of his important services. The assembly of Pennsylvania, at their first sitting, unanimously voted him the following address.

In Assembly, January 15, 1765, A. M.

To the Honourable HENRY BOUQUET, Esq;
Commander in Chief of His MAJESTY's Forces in the Southern Department of AMERICA,

The Address of the Representatives of the Freemen of the Province of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met,

SIR,

The representatives of the freemen of the province of Pennsylvania, in general assembly met, being informed that you intend shortly to embark for England, and moved with a due sense of the important services you have rendered to his majesty, his northern colonies in general, and to this province in particular, during our late wars with the French and barbarous Indians, in the remarkable victory over the savage enemy, united to oppose you, near Bushy-Run, in August 1763, when on your march for the relief of Pittsburg, owing, under God, to your intrepidity and superior skill in command, together with the bravery of your officers and little army; as also in your late march to the country of the savage nations, with the troops under your direction; thereby striking
AGAINST THE OHIO INDIANS, 1764.

Striking terror through the numerous Indian tribes around you; laying a foundation for a lasting as well as honourable peace with them; and rescuing, from savage captivity, upwards of two hundred of our christian brethren, prisoners among them: these eminent services, and your constant attention to the civil rights of his majesty's subjects in this province, demand, Sir, the grateful tribute of thanks from all good men; and therefore we, the representatives of the freemen of Pennsylvania, unanimously for ourselves, and in behalf of all the people of this province, do return you our most sincere and hearty thanks for these your great services, wishing you a safe and pleasant voyage to England, with a kind and gracious reception from his majesty.

Signed, by order of the House,
JOSEPH FOX, SPEAKER.

The Colonel's Answer was as follows, viz.

To the Honourable the Representatives of the Freemen of the province of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met.

GENTLEMEN,

With a heart impressed with the most lively sense of gratitude, I return you my humble and sincere thanks, for the honour you have done me in your polite address of the 15th of January, transmitted me to New-York by your speaker.

Next to the approbation of His Sacred Majesty, and my superior officers, nothing could afford me higher pleasure than your favourable opinion of my conduct, in the discharge of those military commands with which I have been intrusted.

Gratitude as well as justice demand of me to acknowledge, that the aids granted by the legislature of this province, and the constant assistance and support afforded me by the honourable the Governor and Commissioners in the late expedition, have enabled me to recover so many of his Majesty's subjects from a cruel captivity, and be the happy instrument of restoring them to freedom and liberty: To you therefore, gentlemen, is the greater share of that merit due, which you are generously pleased on this occasion to impute to my services.

YOUR
Your kind testimony of my constant attention to the civil rights of his majesty's subjects in this Province, does me singular honour, and calls for the return of my warmest acknowledgments.

Permit me to take this public opportunity of doing justice to the officers of the regular and provincial troops, and the volunteers, who have served with me, by declaring that, under Divine Providence, the repeated successes of his Majesty's arms against a savage enemy, are principally to be ascribed to their courage and resolution, and to their perseverance under the severest hardships and fatigue.

I sincerely wish prosperity and happiness to the province, and have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient, and most humble servant,

HENRY BOUQUET.

February 4, 1765.

Soon afterwards the Colonel received a very polite and affectionate letter from Governor Fauquier, dated 25th of December, inclosing resolves of the honourable members of his Majesty's Council, and of the house of Burgesses, for the colony and dominion of Virginia.

Those respectable bodies unanimously returned their thanks to him for the activity, spirit and zeal, with which he had reduced the Indians to terms of peace, and compelled those savages to deliver up so many of his Majesty's subjects whom they had in captivity. They further requested the Governor to recommend him to his Majesty's ministers, as an officer of distinguished merit, in this and every former service in which he has been engaged.

The Colonel, in his answer, acknowledged the ready assistance and countenance which he had always received from the Governor and colony of Virginia in carrying on the King's service; and mentioned his particular obligations to Col. Lewis, for his zeal and good conduct during the campaign.
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The honours thus bestowed on him, his own modesty made him desirous of transferring to the officers and army under his command; and indeed the mutual confidence and harmony subsisting between him and them, highly redound to the reputation of both. He has taken every occasion of doing justice to the particular merit of Colonel Reid who was second in command; and also to all the officers who served in the expedition, regulars as well as provincials.

The reader will observe that the public bodies who presented these addresses to the Colonel, not only wished to express their own gratitude, but likewise to be instrumental in recommending him to the advancement his services merited. And surely it is a happy circumstance to obtain promotion, not only unenvied, but even with the general approbation and good wishes of the public. It ought, however, to be mentioned, that on the first account his Majesty received of this expedition, and long before those testimonies could reach England, he was graciously pleased of his own royal goodness and as a reward of the Colonel's merit, to promote him to the rank of Brigadier General, and to the command of the southern district of America. And as he is rendered as dear, by his private virtues, to those who have the honour of his more intimate acquaintance, as he is by his military services to the public, it is hoped he may long continue among us; where his experienced abilities will enable him, and his love of the English constitution entitle him, to fill any future trust to which his Majesty may be pleased to call him.

POSTSCRIPT.

It was mentioned in the 25th page of this account, that the Shawneese brought only a part of their prisoners with them to Col. Bouquet at Muskingham, in November last; and that, as the season was far advanced, he was obliged to rest satisfied with taking hostages for the delivery of the remainder at Fort-Pitt, in the ensuing spring.

† The Pennsylvania troops were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francis, and Lieutenant Colonel Clayton.
The escape of those hostages soon afterwards, as well as the former equivocal conduct of their nation, had given reason to doubt the sincerity of their intentions with respect to the performance of their promises. But we have the satisfaction to find that they punctually have fulfilled them. Ten of their chiefs, and about fifty of their warriors, attended with many of their women and children, met George Croghan, Esq; deputy agent to Sir William Johnson, at Fort-Pitt, the 9th of last May; together with a large body of Delawares, Senecas, Sandusky and Munsey Indians; where they delivered the remainder of their prisoners, brightened the chain of friendship, and gave every assurance of their firm intentions to preserve the peace inviolable for ever.

There is something remarkable in the appellation they gave to the English on this occasion; calling them Fathers instead of Brethren.

Lawaughqua, the Shawanese speaker, delivered himself in the following terms.

"Fathers, for so we will call you henceforward; listen to what we are going to say to you.

"It gave us great pleasure yesterday to be called the children of the great King of England; and convinces us your intentions towards us are upright, as we know a Father will be tender of his children, and they are more ready to obey him than a Brother. Therefore we hope our Father will now take better care of his children than has heretofore been done.

"You put us in mind of our promise to Col. Bouquet; which was to bring your flesh and blood to be delivered at this place. Father, you have not spoke in vain — you see we have brought them with us — except a few that were out with our hunting parties, which will be brought here as soon as they return.

"They have been all united to us by adoption; and altho' we now deliver them up to you, we will always look upon them as our relations, wherever the Great Spirit is pleased that we may wish them, Father."
"Father, We have taken as much care of them, as if they were our
own flesh and blood. They are now become unacquainted with your
customs and manners; and therefore, we request you will use them ten-
derly and kindly, which will induce them to live contentedly with you.

"Here is a belt with the figure of our Father the King of Great-
Britain at one end, and the Chief of our nation at the other. It repre-
sents them holding the chain of friendship; and we hope neither side
will flip their hands from it, so long as the Sun and Moon give light."

The reader will further remember that one of the engagements which
the different Indian Tribes entered into with Colonel Bouquet, was to send
deputies to conclude a peace with Sir William Johnson. This has also
been punctually fulfilled; and we are assured that Sir William "has fi-
nished his congress greatly to his satisfaction, and even beyond his ex-
pectations." Thus every good consequence has ensued from this im-
portant expedition, which our fondest wishes could have induced us to ex-
pect from the known valour and spirit of the able commander who had the
conduct of it; and we now have the pleasure once more to behold the
temple of Janus shut, in this western world!

POSTSCRIPT.
REFLECTIONS
ON THE
WAR WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

The long continued ravages of the Indians on the frontiers of the British colonies in America, and the fatal overthrows which they have sometimes given our best disciplined troops, especially in the beginning of the late war, have rendered them an object of our consideration, even in their military capacity. And as but few officers, who may be employed against them, can have opportunities to observe the true causes of their advantages over European troops in the woods, it is with the utmost pleasure that I now proceed to lay before the public the following valuable papers, which I mentioned to have been communicated to me by an officer of great abilities and long experience, in our wars with the Indians.

As scarce any thing has yet been published on a subject now become of the highest importance to our colonies, these papers will undoubtedly be an acceptable present to the reader, and the remarks contained in them may be more and more improved by the future care and attention of able men, till perhaps a compleat system is at length formed for the conduct of this particular species of war.

† See the introduction.
§ It will appear by the account of Indian tribes and towns annexed to these papers, that the enemies we have to deal with are neither contemptible in numbers or strength.
REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR

SECTION I.

OF THE TEMPER AND GENIUS OF THE INDIANS.

The love of liberty is innate in the savage; and seems the ruling passion of the state of nature. His desires and wants, being few, are easily gratified, and leave him much time to spare, which he would spend in idleness, if hunger did not force him to hunt. That exercise makes him strong, active and bold, raises his courage, and fits him for war, in which he uses the same stratagems and cruelty as against the wild beasts; making no scruple to employ treachery and perfidy to vanquish his enemy.

Jealous of his independency and of his property, he will not suffer the least encroachment on either; and upon the slightest suspicion, fired with resentment, he becomes an implacable enemy, and flies to arms to vindicate his right, or revenge an injury.

The advantages of these savages over civilized nations are both natural and acquired. They are tall and well limbed, remarkable for their activity, and have a piercing eye and quick ear, which are of great service to them in the woods.

Like beasts of prey, they are patient, deceitful, and rendered by habit almost insensible to the common feelings of humanity. Their barbarous custom of scalping their enemies, in the heat of action; the exquisite torments often inflicted by them on those reserved for a more deliberate fate; their general ferocity of manners, and the successes wherewith they have often been flushed, have conspired to render their name terrible, and sometimes to strike a panic even into our bravest and best disciplined troops.

Their acquired advantages are, that they have been inured to bear the extremes of heat and cold; and from their infancy, in winter and summer, to plunge themselves in cold streams, and to go almost naked, exposed to the scorching sun or nipping frosts, till they arrive to the state of manhood. Some of them destroy the sensation of the skin by scratching it with the short and sharp
sharp teeth of some animal, disposed in the form of a curry-comb, which makes them regardles of briars and thorns in running thro' thickets. Rivers are no obstructions to them in their wild excursions. They either swim over, or cross them on rafts or canoes, of an easy and ready construction.

In their expeditions they live chiefly by hunting; or on wild fruits and roots, with which the woods supply them almost every where.

They can bear hunger and thirst for several days, without slackening, on that account, their perseverance in any proposed enterprize.

By constant practice in hunting, they learn to shoot with great skill, either with bows, or fire-arms; and to steal unperceived upon their prey, pursuing the tracts of men and beasts, which would be imperceptible to an European. They can run for a whole day without halting, when flying from an enemy, or when sent on any message. They fleer, as if by instinct, thro' trackless woods, and with astonishing patience can lie whole days motionless in ambush to surprize an enemy, esteeming no labour or perseverance too painful to obtain their ends.

They besmear their bodies with bear's grease, which defends them against rains and damps, as well as against the stings of Musquitoes and Gnats. It likewise supple's their limbs, and makes them as slippery as the antient gladiators, who could not be held fast when seized in fight.

Plain food, constant exercise, and living in the open air, preserve them healthy and vigorous.

They are powerfully excited to war by the custom established among them, of paying distinguished honours to warriors.

They fight only when they think to have the advantage, but cannot be forced to it, being sure by their speed to elude the most eager pursuit.
REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR

Their dress consists of the skins of some wild beast, or a blanket, a shirt either of linen, or of dressed skins, a breech clout, leggins, reaching half way up the thigh, and fastened to a belt, with mokawfons on their feet. They use no ligatures that might obstruct the circulation of their blood, or agility of their limbs. They shave their head, reserving only a small tuft of hair on the top; and slit the outer part of the ears, to which, by weights, they give a circular form, extending it down to their shoulders.

They adorn themselves with ear and nose rings, bracelets of silver and wampum, and paint their faces with various colours. When they prepare for an engagement they paint themselves black, and fight naked.

Their arms are a fusil, or rifle, a powder horn, a shot pouch, a tomahawk, and a scalping knife hanging to their neck.

When they are in want of fire-arms, they supply them by a bow, a spear, or a death hammer, which is a short club made of hard wood.

Their usual utensils are a kettle, a spoon, a looking glass, an awl, a steel to strike fire, some paint, a pipe and tobacco-pouch. For want of tobacco, they smoke some particular leaves, or the bark of a willow; which is almost their continual occupation.

Thus lightly equipped do the savages lie in wait to attack, at some difficult passes, the European soldier, heavily accoutred, harassed by a tedious march, and encumbered with an unwieldy convoy.

Experience has convinced us that it is not our interest to be at war with them; but if, after having tried all means to avoid it, they force us to it, (which in all probability will often happen) we should endeavour to fight them upon more equal terms, and regulate our manoeuvres upon those of the enemy we are to engage, and the nature of the country we are to act in.
WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

It does not appear from our accounts of Indian wars, that the savages were as brave formerly as we have found them of late; which must be imputed to their unexpected successes against our troops on some occasions, particularly in 1755; and from the little resistance they have since met with from defenceless inhabitants.

It is certain that even at this day, they seldom expose their persons to danger, and depend entirely upon their dexterity in concealing themselves during an engagement, never appearing openly, unless they have struck their enemies with terror, and have thereby rendered them incapable of defence. — From whence it may be inferred that, if they were beat two or three times, they would lose that confidence inspired by success, and be less inclined to engage in wars which might end fatally for them. But this cannot reasonably be expected, till we have troops trained to fight them in their own way, with the additional advantage of European courage and discipline.

Any deviation from our established military system would be needless, if valour, zeal, order and good conduct, were sufficient to subdue this light-footed enemy. These qualities are conspicuous in our troops; but they are too heavy, and indeed too valuable, to be employed alone in a destructive service for which they were never intended. They require the assistance of lighter corps, whose dress, arms and exercises, should be adapted to this new kind of war.

This opinion is supported by the example of many warlike nations, of which I beg leave to mention the following.

The learned Jesuit † who has obliged the world with a treatise on the military affairs of the ancient Romans, tells us, from Sallust §, that this


§ Neque enim Romanis superbia angustia oblituit, quo minus aliena instituta, a modo proba sufficient, instarrentur; et quod ubique apud locos vel hosce idoneum visum est, cum studio domi exsequentur. — Aliaque ab aliis accepta, ipsi longe facere meliora que quidem digna flatuissent.
wife nation, our masters in the art of war, were never hindered even by the pride of empire, from imitating any foreign maxim or institution, provided it was good; and that they carefully adopted into their own practice whatever they found useful in that of their allies or enemies, so that by receiving some things from one, and some from another, they greatly improved a system even originally excellent.

The defeat of Antony and Crassus by the Parthians, of Curio by the Numidians, and many other instances, convinced the Romans that their legions, who had conquered so many nations, were not fit to engage light-troops, which, harrying them continually, evaded all their endeavours to bring them to a close engagement; and it is probable that if Julius Caesar had not been assassinated, when he was preparing to march against the same Parthians, to wipe off the reproach of the former defeats, he would have added to his legions a greater number of light troops, formed upon the principles and method of that nation, and have left us useful lessons for the conduct of a war against our savages.

That he did not think the attack of irregular troops contemptible, appears clearly in several parts of his commentaries, and particularly in the African war. The various embarrassments he met with from the enemy he had then to deal with, necessarily call to our mind many similar circumstances in the course of our wars with the Indians; and the pains he took to instruct his soldiers to stand and repel the skirmishes of the nimble Africans, may furnish instruction to us in our military operations against the savage Americans.

We are told that while Caesar was on his march "to Scipio's quarters, the enemy's horse and light-armed infantry, rising all at once from an ambuscade,

*Labienus, Afraniusque cum omni equitatu, levique armatura, ex insidiis adorti agmini Caesaris extrems se offerunt, atque ex collibus prins exihilant. — Primo impetu legionum equitatus, levii armaturae hostium nullo negotio loco pulsa ex dejecta eis de coile. Quum jam Caesar exititmaestet hollos pullos deterriorque fines incassendi facturos, et iter erumpere crepitent; iterum celeriter ex proximis collibus erumpunt; atque in Caesaris legionarios impetum factunt Numidios, levique armature, mirabilia velocitatem praedit; qui inter equites pugnabant, et una parte terque cum equibus accurrere et refugere confederabant. Hoc faepius factum est, &c. — Caesaris autem
ambuscade, appeared upon the hills, and attacked his rear. His legions forming themselves, soon beat the enemy from the higher ground. And now thinking all safe, he begins to pursue his march. But immediately the enemy break forth from the neighbouring hills; and the Numidians, with their light-armed foot, who are wonderfully nimble, always mixing and keeping equal pace with the cavalry in charging or retiring, fall afresh on the Roman foot. Thus they frequently renewed the charge, and still retired when he endeavoured to bring them to close engagement. If but two or three of his veterans faced about and cast their piles with vigour, two thousand of the enemy would fly, then returning rally again, making it their business to harass his march, and to press upon his rear, following at some distance and throwing their darts at the legions.

Caesar, having so subtil an enemy to deal with, instructed his soldiers, not like a general who had been victorious in the most arduous exploits, but as a fencing-master † would instruct his scholars; teaching them with what pace to retreat from the enemy, and how to return to the charge; how far to advance, and how far to retire; and likewise in what place and manner to cast their piles. For their light-armed infantry gave him the greatest uneasiness, deterring his troopers from meeting them, by killing their horses with their javelins, and wearying his legions by their swiftness. For whenever his heavy-armed foot faced about, and endeavoured to return their charge, they quickly avoided the danger by flight.

But without going back to the ancients, we have seen this maxim adopted

nuatem non amplius tres, aut quatuor milites veterani, si se coniectissent, ei pila viribus contorta in Numidas inseplos conjectissent, amplius duorum millium numero ad unum terga vertebant; ac rursum ad aciem passum, convertes equis, se colligebant, atque in spatius consesequebantur, et jecula in Legionarios conjicierant.

Caesar contra ejusmodi hostium genera copias suas, non ut imperator exercitum veteranum, victoremque maximis rebus gellis, sed ut lanista tinores gladiatores condolefceret: quo pede 

cere recipient ab holo, &c. — Minifice enim hostium levius armatura auxillum exercitum ejus atque 

sollicitum habebat: quia et equites deterret praeium inire, propter equorum intermitt; quod 

cos ejus interificebat; et legiorianum militem defatigabat, propter velocitatem. Gravis enim armatura miles simul atque ab his infectatus confiterat, in eoque impetu fecerat, illi veloci 

cura facile periculum vihabant.

† Lanista, in Latin, is an instructor of gladiators, which in English can only be translated a "Fencing-master."
in our days. Marshal de Saxe finding the French army harassed by the Huz­
fars and other Austrian light troops, formed also several corps of them of
different kinds; and the king of Prussia in his first war introduced them
into his army, and has augmented and employed them ever since with suc­
cess. We have ourselves made use of them in the two last wars in Europe:
But the light troops wanted in America must be trained upon different prin­
ciples. The enemies we have to deal with, are infinitely more active and
dangerous than the Huzars and Pandours; or even the Africans above­
mentioned. For the American savages, after their rapid incursions, retreat
to their towns, at a great distance from our settlements, through thickety
woods almost impenetrable to our heavy and unwieldy corps, composed of
soldiers loaded with cloaths, baggage and provisions, who, when fatigued by
a long march, must be a very unequal match to engage the nimble savage
in woods, which are his native element.

Another unavoidable incumbrance, in our expeditions, arises from the
provisions and baggage of the army, for which a road must be opened, and
bridges thrown over rivers and swamps. This creates great labour, retards
and weakens the line of march, and keeps the troops tied to a convoy which
they cannot lose sight of, without exposing it to become prey to a vigilant
enemy, continually hovering about to seize every advantage.

An European, to be a proper judge of this kind of war, must have lived
some time in the vast forests of America; otherwise he will hardly be able
to conceive a continuity of woods without end. In spite of his endeavours,
his imagination will betray him into an expectation of open and clear
grounds, and he will be apt to calculate his manoeuvres accordingly, too
much upon the principles of war in Europe.

Let us suppose a person, who is entirely unacquainted with the nature of
this service, to be put at the head of an expedition in America. We will
further suppose that he has made the dispositions usual in Europe for a
march, or to receive an enemy; and that he is then attacked by the savages.
He cannot discover them, though from every tree, log or bush, he receives an
incessant fire, and observes that few of their shot are lost. He will not hesi­
tate to charge those invisible enemies, but he will charge in vain. For they are as cautious to avoid a close engagement, as indefatigable in harraffing his troops; and notwithstanding all his endeavours, he will still find himself surrounded by a circle of fire, which, like an artificial horizon, follows him every where.

Unable to rid himself of an enemy who never stands his attacks, and flies when pressed, only to return upon him again with equal agility and vigour; he will see the courage of his heavy troops droop, and their strength at last fail them by repeated and ineffectual efforts.

He must therefore think of a retreat, unless he can force his way thro' the enemy. But how is this to be effected? His baggage and provisions are unloaded and scattered, part of his horses and drivers killed, others dispersed by fear, and his wounded to be carried by soldiers already fainting under the fatigue of a long action. The enemy, encouraged by his distress, will not fail to encrease the disorder, by pressing upon him on every side, with redoubled fury and savage howlings.

He will probably form a circle or a square, to keep off so daring an enemy, ready at the least opening to fall upon him with the destructive tomahawk: but these dispositions, tho' a tolerable shift for defence, are neither proper for an attack, nor a march thro' the woods.

This is not an imaginary supposition, but the true state of an engagement with the Indians, experienced by the troops who have fought against them. Neither is there any thing new or extraordinary in this way of fighting, which seems to have been common to most Barbarians.

What is then to be done to extricate our little army from impending destruction?

This is a problem which I do not pretend to resolve. But as every man would, in similar circumstances, determine himself some way or other, I

† Vid. Cas. Comm. lib. V. de bello CalEco, et lib. II. de bello civil.
will propose my own sentiments, founded upon some observations which I believe invariable in all engagements with savages.

The first, that their general maxim is to surround their enemy.

The second, that they fight scattered, and never in a compact body.

The third, that they never stand their ground when attacked, but immediately give way, to return to the charge.

These principles being admitted, it follows —

1st. That the troops destined to engage Indians, must be lightly cloathed, armed, and accoutred.

2d. That having no resistance to encounter in the attack or defence, they are not to be drawn up in close order, which would only expose them without necessity to a greater loss.

And, lastly, that all their evolutions must be performed with great rapidity; and the men enabled by exercise to pursue the enemy closely, when put to flight, and not give them time to rally.

These remarks will explain the reasons of the alterations proposed in the formation of a corps of troops, for the service of the woods. It is not, however, to be expected that this method will remove all obstacles, or that those light troops can equal the savages in patience, and activity; but, with discipline and practice, they may in a great measure supply the want of these advantages, and by keeping the enemy at a distance afford great relief and security to the main body.

SECTION II.

GENERAL IDEA OF AN ESTABLISHMENT OF LIGHT TROOPS, FOR THE SERVICE OF THE WOODS.

I shall only venture a few notions suggested by experience upon this subject, chiefly with a view to recommend it to the consideration of persons capable
WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

capable of proposing a proper method of forming such an establishment: and, in order to be better understood, I will suppose a corps of 500 men to be raised and disciplined for the woods, besides two troops of light horse, to which a company of artificers might be added. The fittest men for that service would be the natives of America bred upon the frontiers, and inlisted between the age of 15 and 20 years, to be discharged between 30 and 35.

CLOTHING.

The clothing of a soldier for the campaign might consist of a short coat of brown cloth, lappelled, and without plaits; a strong tanned shirt, short trowsers, leggings, mokawfons or shoe packs, a sailor's hat, a blanket, a knapsack for provisions, and an oiled surlout against the rain. To this

† The following Watch-coat was contrived by an officer, whose name I do not remember, but instead of the oiled linen to be put under the hat, a cap might perhaps answer better. He writes as follows, viz.

"As the Indian war will require frequent incursions into a wild country, where a man sick or wounded, is in several respects more detrimental to the service than a man killed, every thing that may contribute to the health of the men is of moment.

"In this view, I propose a sort of surlout, to preserve men, in a great measure, both from wet and cold.

"Take a large checked shirt, of about half a crown sterling per yard, for it should be pretty fine; cut off the wrist-bands, and continue the opening of the breast down to the bottom; few up the sides from the gussets downwards; rip out the gathers in the fore parts of the collar as far as the shoulder straps, and refew it plain to the collar.

"The shirt will then become a sort of watch-coat like a bed-gown, with very wide sleeves.

"Take a quantity of linseed oil, and boil it gently till one half is diminished, to which put a small quantity of litharge of gold, and when it is well incorporated with the oil, lay it on with a brush upon the watch coat, so that it shall be every where equally wet.

"I suppose the watch coat, hung in a garret, or other covered place, and so suspended by crooked pins and packthreads in the extremities of the sleeves and edges of the collar, that one part shall not touch another. In a short time, if the weather is good, it will be dry; when a second mixture of the same kind should be laid on with a brush as before. When the second coat of painting is dry, the grease will not come off, and the surlout is an effectual preventive from rain; it is very light to carry, and being pretty full on the back, will not only keep the man dry, but also his pack and ammunition.

"The sleeves are left long and wide, to receive the butt end of a firelock (secure) and to cover it below the lock. The coat is double breasted to be lapped over, according to which side the rain drives. A man will be kept dry by one of these surlouts as far as the knees. If, from the vicinity of the enemy, it is improper to make fires at night, he may place his pack on a stone, and, sitting upon it, change his shoes and leggins, and, if he pleases, wrap his blankets:
might be added, in winter quarters or time of peace, three white shirts and stocks, with a flannel waistcoat.

**ARMS.**

Their arms, the best that could be made, should be short fusils and some rifles, with bayonets in the form of a dirk, to serve for a knife; with powder horns and shot pouches, small hatchets and leathern bottles for water.

**EXERCISES.**

The soldiers being raised, clothed, and formed into companies under proper officers, must, before they are armed, be taught to keep themselves clean, and to dress in a soldier-like manner. This will raise in them a becoming spirit, give them a favourable opinion of their profession, and preserve their health. The first thing they are to learn is to Walk well, afterwards to Run; and, in order to excite emulation, small premiums might from time to time be given to those who distinguish themselves. They must then run in ranks, with open files, and wheel in that order, at first slowly, and by degrees increase their speed: this evolution is difficult, but of the utmost consequence to fall unexpectedly upon the flank of the enemy. They are to disperse and rally at given signals; and particular colours should be given to each company, for them to rally by; the men must be used to leap over logs and ditches, and to carry burthens proportioned to their strength.

Vegetius gives an account of many similar exercises, which the Romans found necessary to establish among their military. Miles sylvam cadebat, ad vivum temporebus natabat, ad palum dimicabat, salubritas, cura certavat. Exempla hujus exercitationis crebra sunt apud Livium. Sic ille de Scipione Africano, 3 deca. lib. VI. Prima die legiones in armis IV. milium spatii decurrunt. Secundo die arma curare et tergere ante tentoria jussit. Tertio die exitibus inter se in medium iustus particularum præcipitatis missibus jaculati sunt. Quarto die guies data. Quinto iterum in armis decursum est. - Quibus porro modis obviam eatur elephas. Veget. lib. III. cap. 24.
WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

When the young soldiers are perfect in these exercises, they may receive their arms, with which they are to perform the former evolutions in all sorts of grounds. They will next be taught to handle their arms with dexterity; and, without losing time upon trifles, to load and fire very quick, standing, kneeling, or lying on the ground. They are to fire at a mark without a rest, and not suffered to be too long in taking aim. Hunting and small premiums will soon make them expert marksmen.

They ought to learn to swim, pushing at the same time their cloaths, arms, and ammunition before them, on a small raft; and to make use of snow shoes. They must then be set to work, and be taught to throw up an intrenchment, open a trench, make fascines, clays and gabions; likewise to fall trees, square logs, saw planks, make canoes, carts, ploughs, hand and wheel barrows, shingles and clap-boards, cafs, batteaus and bridges, and to build log houses, ovens, &c.

By example and practice, the most ingenious among them will soon become tolerable good carpenters, joyners, wheelwrights, coopers, armourers, smiths, masons, brickmakers, saddlers, taylors, butchers, bakers, shoemakers, curriers, &c.

LIGHT HORSE and DOGS.

I said that, to compleat this establishment, they should have two troops of light horse, supposed of 50 men each, officers included. The men are to perform the same exercises as the foot, and afterwards be taught to ride, and particularly to be very alert at mounting and dismounting with their arms in their hands, to gallop through the woods up and down hills, and leap over logs and ditches.

The horses ought to be bought up on the frontiers, where they are bred and used to feed in the woods, and are strong and hardy. They are to be thoroughly broke, made to stand fire, to swim over rivers, &c. their saddles and accoutrements very simple, strong and light. The number of horses might be reduced to one half, in time of peace, tho' they would be of little expence, as they might be bred and maintained without charge in the military settlement. This corps should be equipped as the foot, having only a short rifle in lieu of a fusil, and a battle ax with a long handle, the only sort of arms they should make use of in the charge.
Every light horse man ought to be provided with a Blood-hound, which would be useful to find out the enemies ambuses, and to follow their tracts; they would seize the naked savages, or at least give time to the horse men to come up with them; they would add to the safety of the camp at night by discovering any attempt to surprize it.

ARTIFICERS.

The company of artificers should be composed of the most useful tradesmen, and ought to be maintained at all times for the instruction of the soldiers, the use of the settlement, or the service of the army, during the campaign. It will now be time to draw forth this military colony and remove them to the ground laid out for that use in the woods, and at a good distance from the inhabitants. The nature of this settlement will hereafter be more particularly described.

Necessity creating industry, our young soldiers will soon provide themselves with the most useful articles, and in a couple of years be able to raise provisions for themselves.

While the greatest part would be employed in clearing the ground, fencing, ploughing, sowing, planting, building and making utensils and household furniture, others might hunt with their officers, and remain a fortnight or a month out of the camp, without other provisions than a little flour, and what they could procure by hunting and fishing: then to be relieved, and the whole trained up in that way.

The military exercises must still be kept up and practised; and great care taken to inculcate and preserve purity of manners, obedience, order and decency among the men, which will be found much easier in the woods than in the neighbourhood of towns.

In order to make this military establishment more generally useful; I would propose that the soldiers should only receive a very small part of their pay; leaving the remainder in the military chest.

Their accounts should be settled every year, and when their services should intitle them to their discharge, I could wish that each of them had 200 acres of land given him, in a district appropriated for that purpose; and receiving
receiving then the whole ballance of pay due to them, they would be enabled to compleat their settlement. This institution appears not only practicable, but easy, if attended to with patience, assiduity and firmness. The plan I would propose is as follows.

Method of forming such Settlements upon the Frontiers, as might support themselves during an Indian War.

Let us suppose a settlement to be formed for one hundred families, composed of five persons each, upon an average.

Lay out upon a river, or creek, if it can be found conveniently, a square of one thousand seven hundred and sixty yards, or a mile for each side.

That square will contain 640 acres

Allowing for streets and public uses 40

To half an acre for every house 50

To one hundred lots at five and half acres 550

The four sides of the square measure 7040 yards, which gives to each house about 70 yards front to stockade, and the ground allowed for building will be 210 feet front, and about 100 feet deep.

An acre of ground will produce at least 30 bushels of Indian corn. Therefore, two acres are sufficient to supply five persons, at the rate of twelve bushels each person. Two other acres will be a pasture for cows and sheep, another acre for hay, to be sown with red clover. The remaining half acre may be laid out for a garden.

Round the town are the commons, of three miles square, containing, exclusive of the lots abovementioned, 5120 acres. On three sides of the town, five other squares will be laid out of three square miles, containing 5760 acres each, one of which is reserved for wood for the use of the Settlement; the other four to be divided into 25 out-lotts or plantations, of about 230 acres each, so that in the four squares, there will be one hundred such plantations, for the 100 families.

Another township may be laid out joining this, upon the same plan, and as many more as you please upon the same line, without losing any ground.
**Reflections on the War**

The following is a rough sketch of the whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township A</th>
<th>Township B</th>
<th>Township C</th>
<th>Township D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5760 acres wood for the Town A</td>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 lots of 230 acres</td>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Wood for the Town B</td>
<td>Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Wood for the Town C</td>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Wood for the Town D</td>
<td>Commons</td>
<td>Commons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the town, A, has its commons, its woodland, and its 4 squares marked No. 1, each containing 25 plantations of 230 acres, as proposed above. In like manner, the other towns, B, C, D, have their appurtenances respectively marked.

Let us now suppose this plan accomplished, and such corps as these fully settled, trained and disciplined, in the manner abovementioned; I would ask whether any officer, entrusted with an expedition against the savages, would not choose to have them in his army? I may safely answer for all those who have been employed in that service, that they would prefer them to double the number of the best European troops. And when they had served the time limited, namely from their 15th to their 35th year, what vast satisfaction would it be to pay over to them their share of savings from the public chest, and, as a reward of their faithful toils, to vest them and their heirs with their several plantations, which they would now be enabled to cultivate as their own? This prospect would engage many people to enter their sons, in such corps; and those veterans, when thus discharged, would not only be the means of forming and animating others by their example, but in case of a war would still bravely maintain the property they had so honourably acquired, and be the greatest security of the frontier where they are settled.
WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

PREPARATIONS FOR AN EXPEDITION IN THE WOODS AGAINST SAVAGES.

It is not practicable to employ large bodies of troops against Indians; the convoys necessary for their support would be too cumbersome, and could neither be moved with ease, nor protected. It would be better to fit out several small expeditions, than one too unwieldy: I will therefore suppose that a corps intended to act offensively shall not exceed the following proportions:

- Two regiments of foot —— 900
- One battalion of hunters —— 500
- Two troops of light horse —— 100
- One company of artificers —— 20
- Drivers and necessary followers —— 280

In all 1800

The first article to provide is the provisions, and next the carriages.

The daily ration of a soldier in the woods should consist of one pound and a half of meat (which requires no carriage) and one pound of flour, with a gill of salt per week.

Upon that allowance, 1800 men will require for six months or 182 days:

- Flour: 327,600 lb.
- Salt: 81,900 lb.

Allowing one fourth for accident:

- Flour: 81,900 lb.

For six months:

- Flour: 409,500 lb.
- Meat: 614,400 lb.
- Salt: 182 Bushels.

The above quantity would serve the whole campaign, but one half would be sufficient to penetrate from the last depot into the heart of the enemy's country: therefore we shall compute the carriages for this last quantity only.

Every horse carries about 150 lb. neat weight, therefore, to carry flour for three months or 204,750 lb. will require 1365 horses.

HORSES.
Horses for flour brought forward
For 91 bushels of salt
Ammunition
Tents
Tools
Hospital
Officers baggage and staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>1355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tents</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total expenditure: 1731

To reduce this exorbitant number of horses, and the great expense attending it, I would propose, for such parts of the country as would admit of it, to make use of carts, drawn each by four oxen, and carrying about 1300 lb. or six barrels of flour. The above quantity of 204,750 lb. will then be carried by 160 carts drawn by 640 oxen.

Spare oxen with the army: 384

The number of oxen wanted: 1024

This method would not be as expeditious as the carriage by horses, and would require more time and attention in cutting the road, and bridging the swampy places, &c. but, on the other hand, what an expense would be saved! and by killing the oxen in proportion as the flour is used, and abandoning the carts, the convoy is daily reduced, and the grass near the encampment will not be so soon consumed, which is not the case with horses, which must equally be fed though unloaded. This is an object of consequence, particularly near the end of the campaign, when the scarcity of fodder obliges to move the camps every day, and to place them in low and disadvantageous grounds.

I would therefore incline for the use of carts, and they could be made before hand by the hunters and their artificers.

The oxen should be bought in the provinces where the farmers make use of them in their works. One or two soldiers would drive the cart and take charge of the four oxen.

There
WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

There are few rivers in North-America deep in summer, and which these carts with high and broad wheels, could not ford; but if the contrary should happen, the carts, provisions and baggage, may be rafted over, or a bridge built. In a country full of timber, and with troops accustomed to work, no river will stop an army for a long time.

By the above method, 3 or 400 horses would be sufficient to carry the baggage, ammunition, tents, tools, &c.

EXPLANATION OF THE FOUR PLANS, + PLATE II.

Representing the different positions of our army in the woods.

ENCAMPMENT.

The camp (Fig. 1) forms a parallelogram, of one thousand by six hundred feet. Eight hundred men of the regular troops (1) encamp on the four sides, which gives twenty-four feet to each tent, containing six men. The light-horse (3) encamp within the parallelogram. The reserve (7) in the center.

The provisions, ammunition, tools and stores (8) and the cattle (9) are placed between the two troops of light horse and the reserve. The hunters (2) encamp on the outside diagonally at the four angles, being covered by redoubts (5) formed with kegs and bags of flour or fascines. Besides these four redoubts, another is placed to the front, one to the rear, and two before each of the long faces of the camp, making in all ten advanced guards of 22 men each, and 7 centries, covered if possible by breast works of fascines or provisions. Before the army lay down their arms, the ground is to be reconnoitred, and the guards posted, who will immediately open a communication from one to the other, to relieve the centries, and facilitate the passage of rounds.

The centries upon the ammunition, provisions, head quarters, and all others in the inside of the camp are furnished from the reserve. The officers, except the staff and commanders of corps, encamp on the line with their men.

† See this Plate before Pag. 7.
The fires are made between the guards and camp, and put out in case of an attack in the night.

LINE of MARCH, Plate II. Fig. II.

Part of the hunters (2) in three divisions detaching small parties (5, 6) to their front and to their right and left, to search the woods and discover the enemy.

The artificers and ax-men (4) to cut a road for the convoy, and two paths on the right and left for the troops.

One hundred and fifty of the regular troops (1) in two files, who are to form the front of the square; these march in the center road.

Two hundred and fifty regulars (1) in one file by the right hand path; and 250 (1) by the left hand path, are to form the long faces.

These are followed by 150 regulars (1) in two files, who are to form the rear of the square.

The reserve (7) composed of 100 regulars in two files.

The rest of the hunters (2) in two files.

The light horse (3).

The rear guard (5) composed of hunters, follows the convoy at some distance and closes the march. The scouting parties (6) who flank the line of march, are taken from the hunters and light horse, and posted as in plan (Fig. 2) some orderly light horse men, attend the General and field officers who command the grand divisions, to carry their orders. Two guards of light horse take charge of the cattle (9).

The convoy (8) proceeds in the following order.

The tools and ammunition following the front column.

The baggage.

The cattle.
WITH THE SAVAGES OF NORTH-AMERICA.

The provisions.

The whole divided into Brigades, and the horses two a breast.

Defiles.

In case of a defile, the whole halt until the ground is reconnoitred, and the hunters have taken possession of the heights. The center column then enters into the defile, followed by the right face; after them the convoy; then the left and rear face, with the reserve, the light horse, and the rear guard.

The whole to form again as soon as the ground permits.

Disposition to receive the enemy, Fig. (3)

The whole halt to form the square or parallelogram, which is done thus. The two first men of the center column stand fast at two yards distance. The two men following them, step forward and post themselves at two yards on the right and left. The others come to the front in the same manner, till the two files have formed a rank, which is the front of the square.

The rear face is formed by the two file-leaders turning to the center road, where having placed themselves at two yards distance, they face outwards, and are followed by their files, each man posting himself on their right or left, and facing towards the enemy the moment he comes to his post.

As soon as the front and rear are extended and formed, the two long faces, who have in the mean time faced outwards, join now the extremities of the two fronts and close the square.

To reduce the square.

The right and left of the front, face to the center, where the two center men stand fast. Upon the word "march" these step forward and are replaced by the two next, who follow them, and so on; by which means, that front becomes again a column. The rear goes to the right about, and each of the two center men leads again to the side paths followed by the rest.

† These evolutions must be performed with celerity.
REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR

While the troops form, the light horse and each division of the convoy take the ground assigned to them within the square, as if they were to encamp; and the horses being unloaded, two parallel lines will be formed, with the bags and kegs of provisions, to cover the wounded and the men unfit for action. The hunters take post on the most advantageous ground on the outside, and skirmish with the enemy, till the square is formed; when, upon receiving their orders, they retire within the square, where they take their post as in Fig. (3).

The small parties of rangers (5) who have flanked the line of march, remain on the outside, to keep off the enemy and observe their motions.

When the firing begins the troops will have orders to fall on their knees, to be less exposed till it is thought proper to attack.

The four faces, formed by the regular troops, are divided into platoons chequered. One half, composed of the best and most active soldiers, is called the first Firing, and the other half the second Firing.

The eight platoons at the angles are of the second Firing, in order to preserve the form of the square during the attack.

It is evident that, by this disposition, the convoy is well covered, and the light troops, destined for the charge, remain concealed; and as all unexpected events during an engagement are apt to strike terror, and create confusion, among the enemy, it is natural to expect that the savages will be greatly disconcerted at the sudden and unforeseen eruption, that will soon pour upon them from the inside of the square; and that, being vigorously attacked in front and flank at the same time, they will neither be able to resist, nor, when once broke, have time to rally, so as to make another stand. This may be effected in the following manner.

GENERAL ATTACK, Fig. IV.

The Regulars (1) stand fast.

The hunters (2) fall out, in four columns, thro' the intervals of the front and rear of the square, followed by the light horse (3) with their blood-hounds.
hounds. The intervals of the two columns who attack in the front, and of those who attack in the rear, will be closed by the little parties of rangers (5) posted at the angles of the square, each attack forming in that manner, three sides of a parallelogram. In that order they run to the enemy (X) and having forced their way through their circle, fall upon their flanks; by wheeling to their right and left, and charging with impetuosity. The moment they take the enemy in flank, the First Firing of the regular troops march out briskly and attack the enemy in front. The platoons detached in that manner from the two short faces, proceed only about one hundred yards to their front, where they halt to cover the square, while the rest of the troops who have attacked pursue the enemy, till they are totally dispersed, not giving them time to recover themselves.

The sick and wounded, unable to march or ride, are transported in litters made of flour bags, through which two long poles are passed, and kept asunder by two sticks, tied across beyond the head and feet to stretch the bag. Each litter is carried by two horses—

These remarks might have been extended to many other cases that may occur in the course of a campaign or of an engagement, but it is hoped this sketch will be sufficient to evince the necessity of some alteration in our ordinary method of proceeding in an Indian war.
WITH THE TRAVELS OF NORTH-AMERICA.
APPENDIX I.

CONSTRUCTION OF FORTS
AGAINST INDIANS.

As we have not to guard here against cannon, the system of European fortifications may be laid aside, as expensive, and not answering the purpose. Forts against Indians, being commonly remote from our settlements, require a great deal of room to lodge a sufficient quantity of stores and provisions, and at the same time ought to be defensible with one half of their compleat garrisons, in case of detachments or convoys.

I am therefore of opinion that a square or pentagon, with a block-house of brick or stone* at every angle, joined by a wall flanked by the block-houses, would be the best defence against such enemies. A ditch from seven to eight feet deep might be added, with loop holes in the cellars of the block-houses six feet from the ground, to defend the ditch.

Along the inside of the curtains the traders might build houses and stores, covered as well as the block-houses with tiles, or slate, to guard against fire arrows. There will remain a spacious area for free air and use, in which as well as in the ditch, gardens might be made and wells dug.

The powder magazines might be placed in the center of the area, keeping only a small quantity of cartridges in each block-house for present use.

* Experience has demonstrated that fortifications made of wood decay very soon, and are on that account of considerable expense.
The garrisons of such forts would be free from surprizes, even if they had no centries, for nothing can get at them, while the doors are well bolted and barred.

Some reasons for keeping possession of our large forts in the Indian country.

As these forts have been one of the causes of the last war and are a great eye-fore to the savages, they have bent their chief efforts against them; and therefore, while thus employed, they have been less able to distress our settlements. Our forts keep the Indian towns at a great distance from us. Fort-Pitt has effectually driven them beyond the Ohio, and made them remove their settlements at least 60 miles further westward. Was it not for these forts, they would settle close on our borders, and in time of war infest us every day in such numbers as would over-power the thin inhabitants scattered on our extensive frontier. The farmer unable to sow or reap would soon fall back on our chief towns, or quit the country for want of bread. In either case, what would be the fate of the large towns burthened with the whole country, and deprived of subsistence and of the materials of trade and export?

The destruction of these forts being, in time of war, the chief aim of the savages, they gather about them to distress the garrisons, and to attack the convoys; thereby giving us an opportunity to fight them in a body, and to strike a heavy blow, which otherwise they would never put in our power, as their advantage lies in surprizes, which are best effected by small numbers. Experience has convinced them that it is not in their power to break those shackles, and therefore it is not probable that they will renew the attempt; and our posts will continue a check upon them, and save the difficulty and expense of taking post again in their country. Our forts are likewise the proper places for trade, which being closely inspected, it will be easy for us to limit their supplies, to such commodities as they cannot turn against us, and to put a speedy stop to all just causes of complaints, by giving immediate redress.

A few forts, with strong garrisons, I should judge to be of more service than a greater number weakly guarded. In the last war we lost all our small posts; but our more considerable ones, Detroit and Fort-Pitt, resisted all the efforts of the savages, by the strength of their garrisons.
APPENDIX II.

The following Paper was written by an Officer well acquainted with the places he describes; and is thought worthy of a place here, as every thing is material which can encrease our knowledge of the vast countries ceded to us and of the various nations that inhabit them.

Account of the French forts ceded to Great Britain in Louisiana.

The settlement of the Illinois being in 40 degrees of latitude, is 500 leagues from New-Orleans by water and 350 by land.

The most proper time of the year for going there, is the beginning of February. The waters of the Mississippi are then high, and the country being overflowed, there is less to fear from the savages, who are hunting in that season.

The encampments should be on the left of the river, as the enemies are on the right, and cannot have a sufficient number of crafts to cross if their party is large.

They generally attack at day-break, or at the time of embarking.

The inhabitants might bring provisions half way, if they were allowed good pay.

The Delawares and Shawanees lie near Fort Du Quesne, † which is about 500 leagues from the Illinois. The Wiandots and Ottawas, (who are at the Detroit) are about 250 leagues from the Illinois by land. And the Miamis about 200 by land.

Nevertheless as intelligence is carried very fast by the Savages, and as all the nations with whom we are at war, can come by the Ohio, ‡ we must be vigilant to prevent a surprize.

† So the French formerly called what is now Fort Pitt.
‡ Part of the navigation of the Ohio, from Fort-Pitt is described as follows, viz.
That the difficult part of the river is from Fort-Pitt about 50 or 60 miles downwards. There are
APPENDIX II.

The mouth of the Ohio, in the Mississippi, is 35 leagues from the Illinois.

Thirteen leagues from the Mississippi, on the left of the Ohio, is Fort Massiac, or Assumption, built in 1757, a little below the mouth of the river Cherokee.† It is only a stockade, with four bastions and eight pieces of cannon. It may contain 100 men. In four days one may go by land, from this fort to the Illinois.

It is of consequence for the English to preserve it, as it secures the communication between the Illinois and Fort-Pitt.

Fort Vincennes, which is the last post belonging to Louisiana, is upon the river Ouabache ‡, 60 leagues from its conflux with the Ohio. It is a small stockade fort, in which there may be about 20 soldiers. There are also a few inhabitants. The soil is extremely fertile, and produces plenty of corn and tobacco.

The distance from this fort to the Illinois, is 155 leagues by water. And it may be travelled by land in six days.

The nation of savages living at this post is called Pianquicha. It can furnish 60 warriors.

Altho' we do not occupy Fort Vincennes at present, yet it would be of the utmost consequence for us to settle it, as there is a communication from it with Canada, by going up the Ouabache.

From this post to the Ouachitanons is 60 leagues, and from thence to the Miamis (still going up the Ouabache) is 60 leagues further; then there is a portage of six leagues to the river Miamis, and you go down that river 24 leagues to Lake Erie.
Mr. Daubry went by that rout in 1759 from the Illinois to Venango, with above 400 men, and two hundred thousand weight of flour.

Thirty-five leagues from the mouth of the Ohio, in going up the Mississipi, on the right, is the river Kaskasquias. Two leagues up this river, on the left, is the settlement of the Kaskasquias, which is the most considerable of the Illinois.

There is a fort built upon the height on the other side of the river, over against Kaskasquias; which, as the river is narrow, commands and protects the town.

I don’t know how many guns there may be, nor how many men it may contain. There may be about 400 inhabitants.

The Illinois Indians, called Kaskasquias, are settled half a league from the town; and are able to turn out 100 warriors. They are very lazy and great drunkards.

Six leagues from Kaskasquias, on the bank of the Mississipi, is Fort Chartres, built of stone, and can contain 300 soldiers. There may be 20 cannon at most, and about 100 inhabitants round Chartres.

The Illinois Indians at that place, who are called Metchis, can furnish 40 warriors.

Between the Kaskasquias, and Fort Chartres, is a small village, called La prairie du Rocher (the Rock Meadow) containing about 50 white inhabitants; but there is neither fort nor savages.

By the above paper the rout is given up the Mississipi, part of the Ohio, and up the Ouabache to Fort Vincennes, and likewise to the Illinois. Again from Vincennes and the Ouachatas by water, on the weaftly communication to the Miamis portage, then by water down that river by the easterly rout into Lake Erie, proceeding as far as Presqu’ Ile, then by the 15 m. portage into Buffalo or Beef river, lately called French creek, then down the same to Venango on the Ohio. In order, therefore, to carry this rout still further, we shall continue it from Venango to the mouth of Juniata in Susquehannah, which brings it within the settled parts of Pennsylvania, viz.

From Venango to Licking creek, 10 miles. To Toby’s creek, 13. To a small creek, 1. To the parting of the road, 5. To a large run, 3. To Leycaumeyhoning, 9. To Pine creek, 7. To Chuckcaughting, 8. To Weeling creek, 4. To the crossing of ditto, 4. To a miry swamp, 8. To the head of Susquehanna, 10. To Meytauning creek, 18. To Clear Field creek, 6. To the top of Allegheny, 1. To the other side ditto, 6. To Revser dams, 5. To Franks town, 5. To the Cance place, 6. To the mouth of Juniatta, 110. Total 239 miles.

APPENDIX II.

Mr. Daubry went by that rout in 1759 from the Illinois to Venango, with above 400 men, and two hundred thousand weight of flour.

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Near Fort Chartres is a little village, in which is about a score of inhabitants. Here are neither savages nor fort.

Fifteen leagues from Fort Chartres, going up the Mississippi, is the village of the Cafquiars. There is a small stockade fort; I don't know if there is any cannon. There may be about 100 inhabitants.

The Illinois Indians living near this village are called Cafquiars, and can turn out 60 warriors.

I compute that there are about 300 Negroes at the Illinois.

The country of the Illinois is fertile, producing good wheat and corn. All kinds of European fruits succeed there surprisingly well, and they have wild grapes with which they make tolerable wine. Their beer is pretty good.

There are mines of lead, and some salt. They make sugar of maple, and there are stone quarries.

APPENDIX III.

ROUTE from PHILADELPHIA to FORT-PITT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Philadelphia to Lancaster</th>
<th>Miles</th>
<th>Ors.</th>
<th>Per.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to Carlisle</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Shippensburg</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Fort Loudoun</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Fort Littleton</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the crossing of the Juniata</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Fort Bedford</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the crossing of Stoney creek</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Fort Ligonier</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Fort Pitt</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>324</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IV.

**Number of Indian Towns,** situated on and near the Ohio River, and its branches, with their distances from Fort-Pitt, and the distances of the principal branches from each other at their conflux with the Ohio.

#### FIRST ROUT about N. N. W.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Fort Pitt</th>
<th>Distance from one another in Miles</th>
<th>Distance from Fort-Pitt in Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to Kishkiskies Town on Big Beaver-Creek</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up the east branch of Beaver-Creek to Shawningo</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up ditto to Pemotunung</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Mohoning on the west branch of Beaver Creek</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up the branch to Salt Lick</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Cayahoga River</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Ottawas town on Cayahoga</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### SECOND ROUT W. N. W.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Fort Pitt</th>
<th>Distance from one another in Miles</th>
<th>Distance from Fort-Pitt in Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Big Beaver-Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Tucarawas</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Mohickon John's Town</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Junundat or Wyandot town</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Fort Sandufky</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Junqueindundeh</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### THIRD ROUT about W. S. W.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Fort Pitt</th>
<th>Distance from one another in Miles</th>
<th>Distance from Fort-Pitt in Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to the Forks of the Muskingham</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Bullet's Town on Muskingham</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Waukatamike</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to King Beaver's Town on the heads of Hochocking</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the lower Shawanese Town on Sioto river</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Salt Lick town on the heads of Sioto</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Miamis fort</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Fourth Route down the Ohio; general course about S. W.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance from one another</th>
<th>Distance from Fort-Pitt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By water from Fort Pitt to the mouth of Big Beaver Creek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Little Beaver Creek</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Yellow Creek</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the two Creeks</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Weeling</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Pipe Hill</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the long Reach</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the foot of the Reach</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Muskingham river</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the little Canhawa river</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Hocking river</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Letort's creek</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Kiskimenetas</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of big Canhawa or new river</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of big Sandy creek</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of Sio to river</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of big Salt Lick river</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Island</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the mouth of little Mineamie or Miammee + river</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to big Miammee or Rocky river</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Big Bones †</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Kentucky River</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Falls of the Ohio</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Wabash, or Ouabache</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Cherokee River</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Mississippi</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. B. The places mentioned in the three first Routes are delineated in the foregoing map, by an officer who has an actual knowledge of most of them, and has long served against the Indians. The fourth Route down the Ohio was given by an Indian trader, who has often passed from Fort-Pitt to the Falls; and the distances he gives of the mouths of the several rivers that fall into the Ohio may be pretty certainly depended on. Our maps hitherto published are very erroneous in placing some of those rivers.

† These rivers, called Little and Great Mineamie or Miammee, fall into the Ohio between Sio to and the Ouabache, and are different from the Miamis river, which runs into the west end of Lake Erie, below the Miamis fort.

‡ So called from Elephant's bones said to be found there.
APPENDIX V.

Names of different Indian Nations in North-America, with the Numbers of their Fighting Men; referred to in the Note, page 37.

The following list was drawn up by a French trader, a person of considerable note, who has resided many years among the Indians, and still continues at Detroit, having taken the oaths of allegiance to the King of Great Britain. His account may be depended on, so far as matters of this kind can be brought near the truth; a great part of it being delivered from his own personal knowledge.

**Warriors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conawaghrunas, near the falls of St. Louis</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abenaquis</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michmacs</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Amalites,</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Chalas,</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nipiffins,</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algonquins</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Tetes de Boule, or Round Heads, near the above</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Nations, on the frontiers of New-York, &amp;c.</td>
<td>1550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiandots, near lake Erie</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chipwas,</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawas,</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meffiefagues, or River Indians, being wandering tribes, on the lakes</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huron and Superior;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powtewatamis, near St. Joseph's and Detroit</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Puans,</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folleavoine, or Wild-Oat Indians</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Mechecouakis,</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakis,</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maccoutens,</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouiliconfins, on a river of that name, falling into Missipipi on the eait-side</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiffitiaux,</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinaboec, or Affinippoulas</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blancs + Barbus, or White Indians with Beards</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† They live to the northwest, and the French, when they first saw them, took them for Spaniards.

Sioux,
### APPENDIX V.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sioux, of the meadows</td>
<td>towards the heads of MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux, of the woods</td>
<td></td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSOURI, on the river of that name</td>
<td></td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandes Eaux</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAGEES,</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANES,</td>
<td></td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANIS BLANCS,</td>
<td>south of MISSOURI</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANIS PIQUES,</td>
<td></td>
<td>1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padoucas</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajoues, north of the same</td>
<td></td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARKANIES, on the river that bears their name, falling into MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alibamous, a tribe of the Creeks</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OuakanaKEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiakanciesou</td>
<td>Unknown, unless the author has put them for tribes of the Creeks</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machecous</td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOUTITAS</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soukilas</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miamis, upon the river of that name, falling into LAKE ERIE</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delawares (les Loups) on the Ohio</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawaneke on SITO</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kickapoos</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouachitenos</td>
<td>on the Ouabache</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanquicas</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASKAQUIAS, or ILLINOIS in general, on the ILLINOIS river</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pianria</td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catawbas, on the frontiers of NORTH-CAROLINA</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee, behind South-Carolina</td>
<td></td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chickaws</td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natchez</td>
<td>Mobile and MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaftaws</td>
<td></td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above list consists chiefly of such Indians as the French were connected with in Canada and Louisiana. Wherever we knew the names by which the different nations are distinguished by the English, we have inserted them. But the orthography is yet very unsettled, and the several nations marked with an "afterism" are unknown to us, and therefore they are left as they stand in the original list.

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56,500
So large a number of fighting men may startle us at first sight; but the account seems nowhere exaggerated, excepting only that the Catawba nation is now almost extinct. In some nations which we are acquainted with, the account falls even short of their numbers; and some others do not appear to be mentioned at all, or at least not by any name known to us.

Such, for instance, are the Lower Creeks, of whom we have a list according to their towns. In this list their warriors or gunmen are 1180, and their inhabitants about 6000. Thus a comparative judgment may be formed of the nations above-mentioned; the number of whose inhabitants will (in this proportion to their warriors, viz. 5 to 1) be about 283,000.