WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
THE NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Its Official History

ORIGINS AND EARLY YEARS
The Convoy,
by A. Y. Jackson
(Tate Gallery)
THE
NAVAL SERVICE
of CANADA

Its Official History

VOLUME I
ORIGINS AND EARLY YEARS

by
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The wholesome sea is at her gates,
Her gates both east and west.
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

NAVAL history in its Canadian setting has hitherto received little attention from historians. Even that part of the subject which consists of high policy has been told only as a part of more general political accounts, and with most of the purely naval implications omitted. The story of the Naval Service of Canada covers a large part of this field.

When the Second World War began, the Canadian army already possessed a historical unit which was expanded in order to deal with the history of the current war. In February 1940 the Royal Canadian Air Force also established a historical organization, and in May 1941 the writer was appointed as a professional historian to collect material for and to write the official history of the Naval Service.

Late in 1942 a branch unit was set up in London, and two research assistants were obtained to help with the work in Ottawa. At its peak the Naval Historical Section had a staff of twelve engaged in historical work. The Section was responsible for producing a detailed history of the Naval Service from its beginnings to the end of the Second World War.

The policy of appointing professional artists as such to the Canadian armed Services took effect early in 1943. The official naval war artists, of whom at different times there were eight, were attached to the Naval Historical Section. They were asked to interpret the Second World War on canvas, with particular reference to Canadian naval activities, and the paintings which they produced are in the permanent custody of the National Gallery in Ottawa.

The official history of the Naval Service was planned to consist of three volumes, of which the first was to cover the period down to 1939. The remaining two were to be concerned with the Canadian naval effort during the Second World War. Vol. II would deal with activities on shore, principally the work of getting the warships to sea properly manned, armed, equipped, and supplied, and of maintaining them there. Vol. III would be devoted to Operations, including operational policy. In place of the third projected volume, however, it has been decided to publish a popular account of the Operations. This account is being written by Mr. Joseph Schull, and will be printed in the near future. It is also intended that the part
played by the Royal Canadian Navy in the whole Canadian war effort should be dealt with as part of a general story of Canada at war to be issued later.

The sources that have been chiefly used do not lend themselves to compilation into a useful bibliography; this apparatus has consequently been limited to a list of the books referred to in footnotes in this volume. The departmental records upon which much of the story is based are almost all undigested material, and are exceedingly voluminous. Their use for historical purposes has consequently involved much labour. It is well for those engaged in research of this kind to remind themselves constantly that they carry an unusually heavy responsibility, for their work will probably be definitive. In the case of most other practitioners of research, should the well of truth be muddied because they have done inferior work, the water will probably be cleared again by those who follow after.

Five of the chapters in this volume have been published, more or less in their final form, as articles or papers: chs. 8 and 9 in the Canadian Historical Review, March 1947; part of ch. 11 in the Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1941; and chs. 12 and 13 in the British Columbia Historical Quarterly, VII, nos. 1 and 3.

As far as this volume is concerned, the following acknowledgements are due. Warm thanks are herewith expressed to Henry Borden, Esq., K.C., for generous permission to examine the Borden Papers, and to publish material obtained from them and extracts from the Borden Memoirs; to the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, M.P., for his cordial consent to the use made in chs. 8 and 9 of material taken from his unofficial correspondence with Sir Robert Borden; and to the Admiralty for permission to publish in full its secret memorandum of August 20, 1912 (see Appendix VIII). The staffs of the Public Archives of Canada, the Parliamentary Library, and the Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia and British Columbia, have been very courteously helpful. Most grateful thanks are given to Professors George Brown and George Glazebrook for expert editorial advice. Mr. Arthur Pidgeon collected part of the material for chs. 9, 15, and 16, while chs. 6 and 14 are principally his work. Responsibility for the whole volume, nevertheless, rests with the writer.

Gilbert Norman Tucker

Ottawa,
August 1948.
Chapter 1

CANADA AND THE SEA

For peoples who possess the necessary maritime techniques, the sea is not a barrier but a highway. The hollowed-out log of the savage was one of the cardinal inventions, and its essential principle, applied more ambitiously, produced such results as the Viking long-ship, the sailing vessel, and the 30-knot liner. As ships developed in effectiveness civilized man depended increasingly upon them, for the moving of materials and men from one place to another absorbs more time and energy than does any other human activity, and the modern world has come to require a range of commodities so wide that the greater part of the earth must be drawn upon to supply them. Of all means of transportation ships are much the cheapest, until about a century ago they were also the fastest, and with the limited exception of the airplane they are the only vehicles which can cross deep water. It follows that the importance of the sea and the ships that sail upon it can hardly be exaggerated.

The expansion of Europe overseas, which began in the fifteenth century, has probably been the most permanently significant activity of modern times. It was made possible by the relatively advanced maritime techniques of western Europe, for it consisted of exploration and discovery, followed by settlement and trade, and all these depended upon ability to navigate the great oceans. The territory that now forms Canada has been particularly dependent upon and conditioned by the sea.

The great discoverers and explorers who first determined the Canadian coast-lines and the more accessible features of the interior, which the cartographers were then able to enter upon their maps, were seamen. Some bore names that will be famous for all time. One of them, Capt. James Cook, was probably the most adept of all explorers by sea. Besides his great achievements in the southern Pacific, he surveyed the coasts of Newfoundland, the channel of the St. Lawrence
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

River, and the coast of British Columbia, and so “traversed the ocean gates of Canada both east and west.” Jacques Cartier, looking for a way through the continent, discovered the easiest route into the interior of Canada, and reported to his sovereign that the land was good. Cartier and Cook and the others pioneered for pioneers.

In 1608, more than seventy years after Cartier had first seen Cape Diamond, a group of settlers sailed up the St. Lawrence and founded Quebec. These were among the first of the multitude of migrants who from that time onward have embarked at European ports in order to seek a home in Canada. As long as the age of sail lasted, the migrant’s voyage was something to be dreaded; for ships were crowded and insanitary, and the westward crossing of the North Atlantic usually took several weeks and might take months.

The settlers in New France before the conquest were bound to old France by the closest ties. France absorbed most of their exports, chiefly furs and particularly the beaver skins from which gentlemen’s hats were made, and sent manufactured goods in exchange. Governmental authority remained in France, whence local officials were sent out and instructed. Religious authority and cultural leadership were similarly centralized. The colonists relied largely upon France for defence, especially naval defence. Communications with France by sea were accordingly essential to their prosperity, security, and continued existence as a civilized people.

Though French colonists took almost no direct part in their own naval defence, they produced a naval sailor, Pierre le Moyne d’Iberville, whose achievements will never be forgotten. Born in New France in 1661, d’Iberville was educated in Montreal and entered the French navy. He returned to Canada at the age of 22, and during the period from 1689 to 1697 he commanded with extraordinary success four expeditions against the English in Hudson Bay. In 1696 d’Iberville captured St. John’s, Newfoundland, the centre of English strength in that island. He also became the founder and first Governor General of Louisiana.

After the Conquest in 1763 the colonies created by the addition of English-speaking settlers to the French population came to be less dependent upon Great Britain than the French had been upon their mother country, yet they relied heavily upon the North Atlantic sea routes for trade, immigration, protection, and cultural increments. After the middle of the
nineteenth century a considerable part of their external trade was with the United States, and their economy became more self-sufficient as their industry developed, yet Canada's interest in the sea did not noticeably decrease.

Much of this dependence on Europe, and therefore on the sea, was owing to the lack of economic and cultural self-sufficiency which is characteristic of newly-settled countries. Pioneer communities are great producers of food and raw materials, but they have little or no industry. They must therefore import most of their manufactured articles, exporting in exchange their large surpluses of raw products, and their external trade is proportionately very large. Nor are they culturally or technically self-sufficing. In the Canada of a century ago, for example, few books or periodicals were produced, while a good professional, technical, or artistic education could not be obtained. An additional and special reason for Canadian dependence was the fact that eastern Canada was closer to Europe than almost any other area of European settlement overseas.

The large external trade which has characterized the Canadian economy has made the country heavily dependent upon shipping. In the French period the trade was with France and the West Indies. After the conquest the shipping in which Canada was chiefly interested was engaged for the most part in trade with Great Britain, with the West Indies, and with the Orient in the later period, and also in the extensive coastal trade and fisheries that developed on both coasts. In sailing days many ships owned in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces were engaged in ocean trade.

After Capt. James Cook's exploration between 1776 and 1779, a fur-trade with China developed on the west coast, and later the Hudson's Bay Company established itself there. In 1849 Vancouver Island was granted to the company, and the discovery of gold on the mainland nine years later led to the establishment of the colony of British Columbia. Until the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885 the posts and settlements in British Columbia communicated with the outside world only by sea. Since that time the west coast has become a terminus for ships running to the Orient and Australia, and after the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 Vancouver became the outlet for exports of a large hinterland reaching well out into the prairies. The whole of the trade along the 700-mile stretch of coast has also been carried by sea.
Of the ten Provinces of Canada eight touch salt water, and there is no settled part of the country which the sea has not strongly affected. The white man established his permanent influence on the Canadian prairies by way of Hudson Bay. In 1668 the Nonsuch set sail from England for the bay, and after founding a fort on its shores returned home with a valuable cargo of furs. In 1670 the Hudson’s Bay Company was founded, to trade in furs, and having at its disposal by far the shortest route to the centre of northern North America, it throve exceedingly. Agents of the company thereafter extended its influence, a British influence, from the bay to the Pacific Ocean, and it is largely owing to this fact that the prairies and British Columbia in due time became a part of Canada.

In the development of steam-driven ships an active part was played in Canada. The Royal William, the first ship to cross the Atlantic driven all the way by steam, was built at Quebec in 1831, and in the summer of 1833 her trail-blazing voyage, which took about three weeks, was made from Pictou, N.S., to London. Perhaps the outstanding figure in the development of transatlantic steam shipping was Samuel Cunard, who was a native of Halifax and began his career as a ship-owner in that city. Canadian companies, moreover, have operated steam liners on the North Atlantic run from the beginning. On the west coast the first steam-driven vessel was the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Beaver. Launched in England in 1835 she arrived in the following year at the scene of her activities, which consisted in collecting furs and carrying supplies up and down the coast. The Beaver foreshadowed the extensive coasting trade that has since developed in those waters. Transpacific liner services from Vancouver and Victoria to Japan and China were inaugurated by the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1891.

In the days of wooden ships the eastern Provinces were the scene of a large shipbuilding industry. During the French régime the government encouraged shipbuilding in New France, with the result that many merchantmen, some of considerable size, and a few warships, were built by an industry which was centred at Quebec. After the American Revolution an extensive shipbuilding industry grew up in the Maritime Provinces. It was during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century that shipbuilding in Canada was reaching its greatest development; in 1852 the city of Quebec possessed no less than twenty-five shipyards. The ships were usually built of tama-
racks, the North American larch. They were able to compete against the longer-lived vessels built of English oak, because they were lighter in weight and much cheaper to construct. The great advantage which Canadian shipbuilders enjoyed in the period was their abundant supply of easily-accessible wood. With the coming of the steel ship, however, this industry declined and has never since recovered.

The waters off both coasts contain some of the richest fisheries in the world. On the east coast the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the inshore waters of the Atlantic, and the Banks south of Newfoundland, teem with fish of which the most important is the cod. Some of the early explorers mentioned this abundance of fish, and it is just possible that even before the voyage of Columbus vessels from the north of France fished on the Banks. The Maritime Provinces have almost from the beginning possessed a large fishing industry which has been one of their principal sources of wealth, and the story of this fishery is a distinctive chapter in Canadian history, in which economics and international diplomacy are combined. On the west coast the salmon, that return in immense runs from blue water to breed and die in the rivers where they were spawned, have supplied the foundation for a large fishery, and canned salmon from British Columbia are sold all over the world. The fishermen of British Columbia supplied a special naval reserve during the Second World War.

The area which forms the present Province of Ontario possesses four freshwater seas of its own, with ports along their seaboards, merchant shipping, and fisheries. The earliest sailing vessel to navigate the upper Great Lakes was built in 1679 by Cavelier de la Salle, who pioneered in so many ways. She was of about fifty tons burden, and was constructed on the Niagara River and named the Griffon. La Salle intended to use the ship for bringing furs down from the western posts. On her maiden voyage the Griffon, after loading a cargo of furs at Green Bay on Lake Michigan, set sail for Niagara and was never seen again. Shipping and shipbuilding on the lakes became important after the American Revolution, and during the season of navigation in 1793 twenty-six vessels cleared from Kingston at the foot of Lake Ontario. In 1809, two years after Fulton had demonstrated on the Hudson what a steamboat could do, the steam-driven vessel Accommodation was launched at Montreal to ply between that city and Quebec. By 1826 there were nine steamboats operating on Lake Ontario.
and the upper St. Lawrence. With the development of the west in the later nineteenth century, there was a great increase of tonnage on the lakes, which came to be among the most important shipping areas in the world. These saltless and tideless waters have called for and reared seamen as skillful as any that the oceans have known. The shipbuilding industry on the lakes retained its vitality in the age of steel construction, because large ships could not be sailed up to the Great Lakes from the ocean.

The St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes form a magnificent waterway running inland for a distance of more than two thousand miles. Over a century ago Canadians were hoping that this waterway might become the principal outlet for the whole centre of the continent, and to that end canals, which were later enlarged, were built round the rapids in the St. Lawrence. This dream in all its fullness was never realized. Yet the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes system, up to the dimensions of the canals, has been an extension of the Atlantic Ocean and a vitally important highway for all the lands which lie along it.

Before 1763 Canada was under the protection of the French navy, which was usually weaker than that of Britain, as France was primarily a land Power and its navy a secondary consideration. The way in which the superior British sea power could be used in war-time to obstruct the flow of supplies and reinforcements from France across the North Atlantic was strikingly illustrated in the spring of 1747 during the War of the Austrian Succession. The fortress and naval base of Louisbourg on Cape Breton having been seized by the British, twenty-five transports filled with troops and supplies sailed from France to retake it. The convoy was escorted by thirteen warships under the command of La Jonquière. A superior British fleet under Anson set upon them, and in a running fight forty leagues north of Cape Ortegal overcame the French escort and captured six of the transports, whereupon the survivors fled back to port. Under such conditions of naval inferiority it was not possible for France to bring to bear in the colonial wars her overwhelming land superiority. Until the Seven Years' War, nevertheless, New France was precariously kept in existence.

After the conquest British North America came under the protection of the Royal Navy, which throughout the next century-and-a-half was almost invariably the strongest naval force afloat. Against potential enemies in Europe the Royal
Navy on its stations in European waters was always in a position to protect Canadian trade and other interests. To deal with any threat from the United States, a squadron in the western Atlantic, which had the Halifax base at its disposal and which could be quickly reinforced from Britain, was in a strong strategic position. As important interests began to develop on the west coast of Canada in the later nineteenth century, the Admiralty's Pacific Squadron moved its base to Esquimalt, next door to Victoria.

From the point of view of naval strategy the primary feature of Canada's position has been that she is closer to Europe, and except for Alaska closer to Asia, than is any other part of the North American continent. Moreover her coasts reach out towards and flank the direct routes between this continent and northern Europe and Asia. Actual or potential naval bases on the Canadian coasts are therefore well situated to support either offensive or defensive action against an enemy on the opposite side of the North Atlantic or the North Pacific. For the same reason, in the War of the American Revolution and the War of 1812, Halifax was an effective base for naval Operations against the United States. The relative proximity of Canada to Europe and Asia has been given a greatly increased significance by the airplane.

In the course of its long history as a naval base, Halifax has played two distinctive roles. In the wars down to 1815 it faced westward, so to speak, and acted as an advanced base of the Royal Navy for Operations against enemies in North America. In the two world wars of the twentieth century, on the other hand, Halifax faced outward, and directed its power to sustain Operations, and the movements of merchant shipping, against enemies in Europe.

The presence of the Royal Navy at its two bases in Canada imparted a distinctly naval flavour to the nearby communities. The naval personnel as such had esoteric duties to perform, but their social life was partly that of Halifax and Victoria. To these communities the local squadrons were a source alike of profit and of pride, and the relations between dockyard and town were mutually friendly. When the Royal Navy withdrew from these bases early in the twentieth century many hearts were sad, while the two cities lost a distinction that they had greatly valued and which they did not forget.

In Canada at large the prestige of the most famous of sea Services had been very great, and continued to be so. The rich
traditions of that Service were accepted as an inspiring inheritance from the past. Of the history of the Royal Navy, moreover, one whole chapter had been enacted on the Great Lakes themselves, and there must have been few Canadians who had not heard the story.

The withdrawal of the Royal Navy from its bases in Canada by no means meant that its protection had been wholly withdrawn. The great fleets in British waters continued to cover Canada, and the weight of the Royal Navy in the scales of diplomacy was as great as before. Warships could steam to any threatened area; in August 1914, for example, the naval defences on the British Columbia coast being very weak, H.M.S. Newcastle was despatched from the China Station and reached Esquimalt twelve days later. Moreover the need for warships to be stationed near the Canadian coasts had been much diminished by improved Anglo-American relations. It is nevertheless true that the chance of limited and sporadic raids in Canadian waters was increased by the removal of the British squadrons.

It is probable that no single factor in Canada's development has been more important than the protection which the Royal Navy afforded during the youth and adolescence of the Dominion. Through all those years, by day and by night, the most powerful fleets in the world sailed, or steamed, or lay at anchor, a floating breastwork guarding Canada from serious assault or intimidation from across the sea. Moreover it is a most noteworthy fact that from start to finish this powerful protection was furnished free of charge.

The third of the great navies which have acted as a shield for Canada is that of the United States. The development of a good understanding between Britain and the United States was accompanied by the growth of the United States Navy into a fleet of the first rank. This fleet was a probable line of defence for Canada against any major attack; but its intervention could not be claimed as of right. In the course of the Second World War direct contacts with the United States Navy were established which seem likely to increase.

In the many ways which have been described Canadians through all their history have been influenced by the great waters to an unusual extent. Yet with so many interests dependent upon the sea, it was not until 1910, a century and a half after the Conquest and nearly fifty years after Confederation...
tion, that they began to take an active part in their own naval defence.

This striking fact had several causes. Most of the people in Canada lived in the heart of the continent, and were largely oblivious of the sea which they seldom or never saw. Moreover a navy in any case remains largely hidden from landmen. Accordingly, as the warships of the Royal Navy lay in readiness at their stations, to Canadians in general they were like the air—mysterious, invisible, gratuitous, and taken for granted. The people of Canada accepted security without much thought about how it had been contrived, and the incentives to act on their own behalf were very weak. The particular military traditions of Canada were chiefly associated with war on land, and in the later period its people derived an added sense of security from the strength and increasing friendliness of the United States. It should also be borne in mind that almost any positive Canadian naval policy was certain to raise most serious questions in the field of external relations.

These obstacles eventually gave way before the pressure of events, and in 1910 Parliament established a Canadian navy. From that time on Canadian governments bore the additional responsibility of keeping some positive and authorized naval policy in existence at all times. A policy of national defence is determined by the geography, external relations, economic and social conditions, history, and political components, of the country concerned. Canadian naval policy in the period from 1910 to 1939, therefore, is not fully intelligible apart from its general environment.

Geography has given Canada strong natural defences, in the past, against effective invasion by any enemy except the United States. An invading force coming from the east must first have crossed the Atlantic, and having reached the shores of Canada would still have been far from the principal centres of the country’s wealth and strength. These centres, including the greatest of the eastern seaports, lay hundreds of miles inland. Quebec and Montreal could only have been reached overland from any part of the coast by crossing a great stretch of undeveloped and difficult country. Only by way of the St. Lawrence River could easy access have been obtained, but the defenders would have had several effective means of closing that waterway to an invader. Moreover the great river is sealed by ice throughout the winter. The Maritime Provinces, however, might have been invaded fairly easily by an enemy.
who commanded the sea. The only naval base in Canada on the Atlantic was at Halifax which, considered as a base for Operations off the east coast, was as well situated as any single place could be; but it was inconveniently far away for small warships which might be employed to give direct protection to shipping in the Gulf. The strategic significance which Newfoundland had for the direct defence of Canada is evident from its position in relation to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Maritime Provinces. In all these waters fogs are frequent, and in winter the off-shore climate is severe.

The seven hundred miles of coast on the Pacific Ocean form an exceedingly strong defensive position. The immense stretch of the Pacific ends here at a mainland shore screened by islands, many of which offer positions of great strategic value for the defence of the waters and coasts within. Vancouver Island covers the southern half of the British Columbia coast like a shield. The island was for a long time largely unsettled on its seaward side. The approaches to the waters between it and the mainland are narrow and naturally easy to defend. They would also be difficult for hostile vessels to operate in without the help of pilots possessing intimate local knowledge. All the important ports and other settlements on the coast, except Prince Rupert, grew up in this protected area. The shore is almost everywhere very high and steep, and presents few landing places. Parallel to the coast, and between it and the Prairies, runs a broad belt of high mountain ranges, through which three main lines of communication lead to the interior. The mountainous terrain of British Columbia imposed settlement in isolated communities with few roads or railways connecting them. The natural difficulties with which the coast of that Province, and its hinterland, would have confronted an invader wishing to do more than occupy a few isolated areas near the shore, were therefore most formidable. The longer half of Canada's western boundary, lying north of Portland Canal, had an equally difficult terrain, and was covered by American territory to the westward. The naval base at Esquimalt was fairly well placed to support Operations off the southern and much the more important part of the coast; but it had the disadvantage of being situated at one end of British Columbia's long seaboard.

Three distinctive conditions most important to naval defence were present on both the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts. Since the days of sail it had not been possible for a fleet to
operate with the width of the Atlantic, or a fortiori of the Pacific, between it and its bases, except at a great disadvantage, and no potential overseas enemy possessed a naval base anywhere near the Canadian coasts. That Newfoundland and Bermuda were parts of the British Empire, and that Greenland was the possession of a small and peaceful State, were among the many blessings which Canada enjoyed. In the Pacific there were no islands that were not Canadian or United States territory, on which an enemy fleet could have been based within easy striking distance of the Dominion. Nor, incidentally, are there any islands well out to sea, on which the Canadian authorities could have established advanced naval or air defences for the west coast similar to those based by the United States on Oahu. Each of the two seaboards, considering its length and configuration, has surprisingly few harbours suitable for a good-sized naval base.

The Dominion was almost impregnable to serious attack by way of the immensely long line of coast which stretched around Labrador and Hudson Bay, and thence along the Arctic Ocean to Alaska. The natural defences in this great northern area were: a bare and often ice-rimmed shore, washed throughout most of its length by dangerous Arctic waters; the vast barren wilderness lying between the coasts and the vital parts of the country; and the stern climate. An enemy force could no doubt have entered Hudson Bay during the three months or so in the year when Hudson Strait is open. Throughout most of the period, however, this danger was negligible. In all parts of Canada except the comparatively small area west of the Coast Mountains in British Columbia, but to an increased extent in the more northern regions, the long and severe winter which seals up the rivers and hampers movement by land would have been a most useful ally against an invader.

With the fourth side of the quadrilateral the naval authorities were only indirectly concerned. On this side Canada had been provided by geography with relatively weak defences. Her southern boundary marched with the northern frontier of the United States for a distance of 3,987 miles. The settled areas of the Dominion lay chiefly in a narrow belt along the border, so that a large proportion of the towns and cities were within a hundred miles of United States territory. The main lines of transportation which tied the country together ran east and west, and in case of an attack from overseas this
orientation would have been a great asset. It would have been a most serious handicap, on the other hand, had the attack come from the south; for the principal railway lines and waterways lay both parallel to the international boundary and within easy striking distance from it. Parts of the area near that boundary provide topographical features helpful to defence; but generally speaking no very serious natural obstacles stand in the way of invasion from the south, and the people of the United States were always overwhelmingly superior to their northern neighbours in numbers and other physical resources. Before Confederation the two Canadas were considered very difficult to defend by land, and after railways had been developed throughout North America it is reasonably certain that the Dominion, even with the powerful support of Great Britain, could not have been successfully defended against a resolute invasion from the United States.

From the standpoint of direct naval defence Canada has suffered a pronounced disadvantage in facing the navigable ocean on two widely-separated seaboards. The United States has experienced the same difficulty in a less acute form, and that country built the Panama Canal chiefly in order to reduce as far as possible this strategic handicap. France also has two widely-separated coasts, and a canal joining the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean has sometimes been suggested. Russia has possessed no less than four such coasts. She has therefore felt obliged at various times to maintain two or three separate fleets which could not support each other, and the dispersion of her naval forces was a principal cause of her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. As far as the two Canadian coasts are concerned, the passage north about was impracticable, and the sea distance between Halifax and Esquimalt was 15,000 miles by Cape Horn before 1914, and after that date was 7,000 miles via the Panama Canal—a fortnight of fast steaming for a destroyer. Two seaboards remote from each other raise the dilemma that one of them must be deprived of naval protection or the fleet must be divided. The second alternative offers protection for both coasts, employment for all the dockyards, a wider popular interest in the navy, and an escape from an obvious political difficulty. On the other hand, such a dispersion, unless both fleets are large, makes training more difficult; and above all it may ensure weakness at the critical point, the immediate cause of almost every military failure or disaster.
There are also a number of geographical features that have been strategically significant because Canada was part of the British Empire. The largest of the Dominions, she was the closest to Europe, and was so situated that the forces of the Royal Navy based on Great Britain were at all times in a position to protect her against the fleet of any European Power. The enormous industrial and other resources of North America were indispensable to an allied victory during the First World War, in which conflict the Dominion played a new and momentous part by furnishing a terminus for the most important ocean trade route. In this connection the ancient functions of Halifax as an imperial naval base were radically changed. The shipping routes between the United States and northern Europe passed not far from Halifax. They also lay near to Cape Race, Newfoundland, and that island was a key position in the strategy of the north-western Atlantic.

The completion of the transcontinental line of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885 opened a new and rapid line of communication between Great Britain and the Far East via Halifax and Vancouver, a route which would be relatively safe in case of war with a European Power. This line of communication, however, lost some of its strategic importance after the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914. Throughout the period Esquimalt was the only eastern Pacific naval base in the British Empire. After the partial Europeanizing of Japan the Pacific acquired a new strategic significance, and like Australia and New Zealand, although to a less degree, Canada was directly affected by the distribution of power in that great ocean. Apart from whatever naval forces Canada might possess, it was a great advantage to the Royal Navy that its ships enjoyed the use of Halifax and Esquimalt after those bases had been handed over to the Canadian Government.

Canada lay within the magnetic fields of two of the most powerful nations in the world, and in matters of external affairs and defence the greater of these influences was that exercised by Great Britain. As a member of the British Empire or Commonwealth, Canada was vitally affected by British foreign policy, was near the main stream of international affairs, and probably had more influence in the world than she would have wielded as an independent republic. During the period from 1910 to 1939 the world was disordered and insecure, and the imperial connection, which possibly made Canada more likely to be involved in war, at the same time
ensured most powerful protection and support if war came. Many attempts had been made to organize participation by the Dominions in providing and controlling a single imperial navy; but the formidable difficulties which lay in the way had not been overcome. Nevertheless the question of Canadian participation, in some form, in imperial naval defence, was always present. The Royal Canadian Navy which was created in 1910 conformed closely to the Royal Navy in types of ship and equipment, training, doctrine, and other matters.

The chief instrument of imperial defence was the Royal Navy, until about 1930 the most powerful force afloat, and after that date equalled in strength only by the navy of the United States. In the twentieth century the Royal Navy was no longer dominant in the Pacific; but at all times it remained unlikely that the waters and shores of Canada would experience any hostile acts more formidable than small-scale raids or violations of neutrality.

The other great external influence was that of the United States. After 1910 the official relations between that country and Great Britain remained cordial; it was a cardinal principle of British foreign policy that no dispute with the United States should be allowed to get anywhere near the confines of war; and the temper of Canada’s big neighbour was unaggressive. The Monroe Doctrine was the foundation of American foreign policy, and any violation of its principle which had affected Canada would no doubt have been considered, for strategic reasons, to be exceptionally serious. It was therefore almost certain that the United States, although it had given no special undertaking to do so, would have intervened to prohibit or repel an all-out assault upon Canada, or even a much more limited use of force affecting Canadian waters or territory. These inferences must have been perceived everywhere; but what no one knew was the point on the scale of armed incursion at which the United States would decide to act.

It was also very important from the point of view of Canadian defence that in an emergency the immense industrial and other economic resources of its neighbour could probably be utilized by the Dominion. Moreover commodities obtained from the United States could all be transported overland in time of war. Such support from the adjacent economy, however, might be seriously restricted by the obligations of neutrality.
In short, Canada was well protected by geography from every possible enemy except one, and with that one relations were good. At all times the Dominion was protected by the Royal Navy, and less fully and certainly by the United States Navy as well. It is probable, therefore, that during the increasingly dangerous twentieth century Canada was safer from conquest or coercion than any other land. Geography had allotted to the Dominion, moreover, the ability to play an import rôle on the stage of world strategy, and in imperial defence.

Canada was in general so richly endowed with economic resources that during the twentieth century its people enjoyed a standard of living among the highest in the world. Though raw materials and foodstuffs were more abundant than varied, the country could feed itself, with a large surplus, except for some products that required a warmer climate and none of which were absolute necessaries of life. The primarily extractive economy was steadily becoming more industrialized, notably after 1910, but it remained for the most part confined to the less complicated types of manufacture. Many Canadian industrial units were connected with or similar to corresponding concerns in the United States.

There was virtually no armament industry in Canada, and many of the related industries were immature or lacking. There was shipbuilding on both coasts and on the Great Lakes, producing for the most part the smaller types of vessel. It would have been advantageous to build warships in Canada, as a help towards developing the industry and for other reasons. But the highly specialized designers and the necessary technical knowledge were both lacking, and it was decidedly cheaper and quicker to get warships from Great Britain. In addition, a considerable part of the industry was situated on the Great Lakes, where only ships small enough to pass through the St. Lawrence canals could be practicably built for use on salt water, and whence during freeze-up vessels could not proceed to the sea.

There were extensive fisheries in the Atlantic and the Gulf and off the coast of British Columbia, and the existence of a large body of fishermen on each coast was occasionally referred to as a potential naval asset. However, after the end of the nineteenth century the number of Japanese living in Canada steadily increased, until by 1931 there were more than 23,000, most of them living on the British Columbia coast, and many
of them fishermen. In the event of a war with Japan during which Japanese forces were to operate against the west coast, resident Japanese, especially fishermen, would have had various means of helping the enemy, and some of them might have wished to do so.

Among Canadian exports, raw or partly-processed products were dominant. The external trade of the Dominion was relatively very large, and by far the greater part of it was with the United States and Great Britain. Much the most important part of the export trade was with Britain. On the east coast it used the St. Lawrence ports when the river was free from ice, and of all the ports in Canada, Montreal was the largest and best equipped. In winter the Canadian termini were Saint John and Halifax with their ice-free harbours. The normal route was south of Newfoundland, but during a brief portion of each year the Strait of Belle Isle was used. The overseas trade of the west coast was principally with Great Britain and the Far East, and that with Britain greatly increased after the Panama Canal became available. Vancouver was the terminus of nearly all this shipping, and access to that port was through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, at the inner end of which the Esquimalt naval base was situated.

On both the eastern and western seaboardsthere was a large coasting trade, for roads and railways connecting points along the coasts were few or non-existent, especially round the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in British Columbia. Due to ice, the coasting trade in the Gulf was seasonal only. On the west coast the coasting trade followed the inside passage which runs behind Vancouver Island and other islands farther north, a route which was also used by ships running between Seattle and Alaska. These waters are deep, offer few anchorages, and discourage the laying of mines. Along the far northern coasts there was no trade, except for a single ship which visited the northern posts and missions once a year. Given peaceable relations with the United States, the very extensive shipping on the Great Lakes could cause no anxiety, for no hostile naval force could reach those lakes from the ocean.

The Canadian people lived throughout most of their early history in a secure land. The problem of developing their half of a new continent tended to absorb their interest and wealth. Although more closely connected to Europe than were the inhabitants of any other country in either of the Americas, they nevertheless lived in an isolated continent. The Dominion

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had no external interests or ambitions that were at all likely to produce serious international friction. The inhabitants had no martial tastes, and some of them possessed a good share of that democratic self-confidence which believes that a military emergency can be dealt with when it arises. In earlier days the country had experienced armed onsets; but since the Conquest these had always been by land, and to most of the people, who lived far from any coast, the sea and all naval matters probably seemed largely irrelevant.

The human resources of the country, however, included plenty of potentially good naval material. Canadians were for the most part accustomed to machines, and there was to be found among them a considerable wealth of technical skills. They were also adaptable, and their level of education on the whole was high. Throughout their later history their sense of nationality, and of self-reliance as a community, had steadily increased.

Naval policy was often a contentious subject in Canada, for it was intimately connected with external policy concerning which the people were seriously divided. Opinions about naval policy tended to fall into three groups. One body of opinion thought it unnecessary or inexpedient for Canada to take any measures for naval defence. A second group considered that such measures should be taken; that these should be very closely integrated with the Royal Navy; and that the naval defence of Canada should be sought chiefly by co-operating closely in the defence of the Empire as a whole. Those who held the third point of view, although they did not reject such co-operation, felt that to shape the naval policy of the Dominion principally as an arc in the circle of imperial naval policy, would be an undesirable subordination of Canadian interests. They therefore aimed primarily at the direct defence of the country, by a purely Canadian navy under the absolute control of the Dominion Government.
Chapter 2

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

When the French territories that were to form the nucleus of Canada passed under the British flag in 1763, they became part of an old-established imperial system. The old British Empire was an abnormal political structure in many ways, and particularly so in its method of providing for defence.

The primary function of the State, and at times almost its only one, is to protect the lives and property of its citizens and their interests as a community. The security provided is for the most part against injury by lawless fellow-citizens, or by the agents of some other community. In the modern State, defences against other nations or attacks upon them have increasingly called for elaborate and expensive preparations, in both peace and war, and the State has called upon its citizens to provide the necessary means by paying taxes and by rendering personal service.

In the normal State these obligations have presented no special problems to statesmen and administrators, even when they involved the defence of an overseas empire. Such an empire, under the absolute and accepted rule of the home government, like the former empire of Spain, was subject to overall taxation by the central government to pay for the general defence. The colonies were separated from Spain by an ocean, they were very different from the home land in many ways, and their interests were not always the same as hers. For centuries, nevertheless, the right of the Crown, with or without the advice of its ministers in Spain, to tax the colonists and spend the proceeds, was not seriously questioned. Spaniards in the colonies, like those in Spain, expected no parliamentary control over national finances. Similar conditions prevailed in the great overseas empires which were ruled by the absolute monarchies of France and Portugal.

A different condition was to be found in the numerous colonies of settlement founded by Britons after the beginning
of the seventeenth century. On the continent, weak feudal governments had almost everywhere evolved into highly centralized absolute monarchies, which were buttressed by the civil law. In England, on the other hand, the strong feudal monarchy established at the Norman Conquest had been subordinated little by little to Parliament, and the common law reflected this unusual allocation of power. The principal means whereby Parliament had established its authority over the Crown, and placed the King under the law like any of his subjects, was the control of the purse. In its mature form this meant that no taxes could be legally imposed without the consent of Parliament, which also had the sole right to ordain how such taxes were to be used, and to ensure that they were actually spent according to its instructions. Almost from the first the elected branch of Parliament was held to possess special interests, which later developed into rights, with regard to public finance, and the principle that there could be no legal taxation without representation came to be deeply imbedded in the constitutional fabric. It was held to express a right, not only of Parliament, but also of the citizen who paid the taxes. The supremacy of Parliament over the Crown was put to the decisive test of civil war during the fourth decade of the seventeenth century, an ordeal from which it emerged intact and strengthened.

Accordingly, at the time when English colonies of settlement began to be founded in unpeopled regions which were climatically suited to become permanent homes for men of European race, the inhabitants of England had long been accustomed to government controlled by a representative assembly which alone had the right to tax them. Those of them who became colonists, at that time and later, took their political ideas and traditions with them. This important fact was officially recognized; for the colonies, almost from the beginning, were equipped with local legislatures composed in part of representative assemblies. These legislatures were expected to deal only with local affairs, in which field, however, most taxes were held to lie. They were for long regarded as wielding a delegated rather than an inherent authority, and the laws which they passed were subject to disallowance; nevertheless, with the passage of time, many of the colonists came to regard them as little Parliaments, and to invoke on their behalf the long-established claims of the Parliament at Westminster.
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The imperial structure which gradually evolved was more logical in terms of political theory than well adapted to the hard facts of geography; nevertheless it worked tolerably well for a century and a half. The mother country accepted responsibility in a general way for the defence of the whole Empire. For defence by land, garrisons maintained by England were stationed at or within easy reach of the points most likely to be threatened. In time of war these were reinforced if necessary. Against a local enemy, native or white, the colonies were expected to supplement these garrisons or expeditionary forces by means of armed forces of their own. The extent of the co-operation actually afforded by a given colony depended on local conditions. A colony which was obviously exposed to danger was likely to devote a much larger proportion of its resources to defence than was one which enjoyed a more sheltered position. Navies of any importance were maintained only by the Powers possessing colonies, and the Royal Navy was at most times the strongest. To the English colonies this great Service, directly or indirectly, gave most powerful though not absolute protection, which was less visible than that afforded by the soldiers. The burden of naval defence rested wholly upon the shoulders of the English taxpayer, except occasionally in time of war.

Thus taxation for defence fell unevenly; but the old colonial system provided a quid pro quo which was generally assumed to be fair. The economic organization of the old Empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was based upon the mercantilist theory, which proclaimed among other things that a nation and its colonies should be complementary to each other, the one producing the manufactured goods while the others provided raw materials, particularly those which for climatic reasons could not be produced in the motherland. It was considered to be very desirable that the whole imperial economy should be as self-contained as possible, and particularly that only an irreducible minimum of goods should be imported from foreign countries and their colonies. To these ends manufactures in the colonies were discouraged or prohibited. A tariff barrier which encircled each empire was also maintained, which gave mother country and colonies a preference in each others' markets; and trade with the foreigner was either forbidden or controlled. In the interest of defence as well as of supposed economic advantage, navigation laws excluded foreign ships from the trade between the mother
country and its colonies, and also between one colony and another. The system as a whole, although it included the colonists among those for whom the benefits of monopoly were provided, gave the mother country disproportionate economic advantages. It was held that these were a compensation for bearing almost the whole burden of defence.

After the Seven Years’ War of 1756-63 the British Government attempted to levy direct taxes on the thirteen colonies of North America, in order that they should help to pay for their own defence. The theory that the colonial assemblies were little Parliaments in their own right, with exclusive rights to tax their respective areas, was thereupon asserted by colonists in arms, and the American Revolution which began in 1776 broke asunder an Empire which the Seven Years’ War had so greatly enlarged. That war had seen the conquest by Great Britain of most of the French possessions on the North American continent. After the American Revolution, areas that had formerly been French were the only part of the continent that remained under the British flag. In the course of time the settled portions of these areas were transformed into colonies of the usual British type, equipped with assemblies having the power to tax. They were accordingly able to participate, and in fact they took the leading part, in the application of liberal principles to colonial government, which resulted in ever-increasing autonomy and finally in Dominion status.

The year 1776, which witnessed the beginning of the American Revolution, saw also the publication of one of the most important books that has ever been written in the field of economics. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was a devastating attack over a wide front against the mercantilist philosophy on which the old colonial system rested. The Industrial Revolution—the substitution of production by power-driven machinery for production by hand—was already under way in Britain, and Adam Smith expressed ideas which were far more in keeping with the needs of the developing machine industry than were the restrictive doctrines of the mercantilists. In order that the wealth of nations might be increased, he advocated the abolition of practically all government restrictions on trade and industry, in the interest of private initiative and of efficiency through competition. He therefore condemned the old colonial system, lock, stock, and barrel. Of its great complex of restrictive measures he wished to retain the navigation laws alone,
on the ground that "defence...is of much more importance than opulence." Smith thought that for Britain the colonies were a source not of strength but of weakness, and that if they became separate States they would continue to trade with Britain at least as freely as before. While he did not advocate independence for the colonies, he looked upon the possibility of it without alarm. Imperial defence was treated bluntly:

Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only state which, as it has extended its empire, has only increased its expense without once augmenting its resources. Other states have generally disburdened themselves upon their subject and subordinate provinces of the most considerable part of the expense of defending the empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expense.¹

The Wealth of Nations was concerned with the whole area of economic life. The laissez-faire doctrines which it contained, as is the case with most brand-new ideas, made their way but slowly; yet gradually they acquired a momentum which carried almost everything before them in Great Britain, influenced opinion and policy among statesmen and business men alike, and became an armoury from which arguments have been drawn ever since.

The outstanding representative of the extreme free traders of nineteenth-century Britain was Richard Cobden, who organized the Anti-Corn-Law League, and had as much as any man to do with the triumph of free trade in his own country. Cobden went even further than his master, advocating the repeal of every form of economically restrictive legislation including the navigation acts. He also thought that the colonies should be cast adrift in the interest of retrenchment. In this matter sentiment had no weight at all with him, and he considered that Britain would be more prosperous if the colonies became independent, for she would thus avoid the cost of defending them. It is difficult in the present day to realize how general this feeling became, and how widespread in high places. In 1848 the Governor General of Canada, in a private letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote that:

...there is I am confident a growing indisposition among our masters the middle classes, to bear those charges which are indispensable to the maintenance of our Colonial Empire.

¹ Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. iv, ch. 7, pt. iii.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies referred to the same subject in a letter written the following year:

... unfortunately there begins to prevail in the H. of Commons & I am sorry to say in the highest quarters, an opinion (wh. I believe to be utterly erroneous) that we have no interest in preserving our Colonies & ought therefore to Make no sacrifice for that purpose, Peel, Graham & Gladstone if they do not avow this opinion as openly as Cobden & his friends, yet betray very clearly that they entertain it, nor do I find some Members of the Cabinet free from it, so that I am powerless to do anything wh. involves expense—It is the existence of this feeling here wh. is to me by far the most serious cause of apprehension for the future.²

Some free traders, while professing a preference for retaining the colonies, thought that separation was inevitable; and there were still others who advocated it in the interest of the colonies themselves.

Free trade eventually appealed with irresistible force to the British business man of that day. Britain had been the pioneer of the industrial revolution, and was still so far ahead of all other countries in the new techniques of production as to fear no purely economic rivalry. An industry that had so far outstripped all others in the cheapness and volume of its production, proved not immune to persuasion that what it needed was not a sheltered position in a limited market, but the maximum of freedom to compete in all the markets. To its converts, moreover, laissez faire was much more than a cold economic principle applicable to Britain alone. It was a gospel of universal prosperity and happiness, and of peace on earth. Any land which abolished economic restrictions would obtain rich rewards from its enlightened action; the resulting prosperity would confer far-reaching social benefits; and universal free trade would remove the causes of war. The eventual triumph of laissez faire everywhere was also regarded as inevitable. Meanwhile, the free traders of Britain were determined to set their own house in order, and they succeeded. In 1846 the duties on imported grain and flour were thrown overboard; in 1849 the navigation acts followed them; and in the course of a few years the whole mercantilist structure had disappeared. To the old colonial system, as it lay discredited on its deathbed, came the most flattering tribute which it had ever received. Almost unanimously the colonies protested against the removal of restrictions which had afforded to them an effective preference in the British market.

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Had the purely negative ideas of the extreme free traders dominated British colonial policy after about 1830, as they might easily have done, the ties which attached the white colonies to Britain would no doubt have rotted away or been broken. The policy actually followed, however, was greatly influenced by a group of careful students of the colonial problem who were not disciples of Cobden. The so-called Colonial Reformers, whose leader was Edward Gibbon Wakefield, were minor public figures whose zeal and knowledge of their subject enabled them to exercise a very powerful influence on an imperial policy which they never controlled. They believed in free trade, and agreed that expenditure on colonial defence ought to be reduced. On the other hand they thought that there was no need to lose the colonies and that it was exceedingly undesirable to do so. The Reformers considered that the political part of colonial policy should be based on a large extension of self-government in the colonies. In the economic field they advocated assisted emigration to the colonies, which would be subsidized from the proceeds derived from the sale of colonial crown lands to settlers. The cost of defending the colonies might be greatly lessened by reducing or withdrawing the colonial garrisons. Although some of their ideas proved to be impracticable, the Reformers are entitled to a high rank among creative statesmen. They invented a colonial status which was justifiable in terms of nineteenth-century liberalism, and enriched British colonial policy with an infusion of disinterested ideas which it has retained ever since. Wakefield and his collaborators are the fathers of Dominion status.

The policy of extending an enlarged measure of self-government to the colonies, devised and advocated by the Reformers, was put into effect by others. The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper and Lower Canada was followed by the mission of Lord Durham, who was sent to the Canadas for the purpose of conducting a thorough inquiry. Durham was a disciple of the Reformers, and he took Wakefield to the Canadas with him. His report, the most important document in the whole story of British colonial policy, recommended among other things that the two colonies should be united and that the principle of responsible government should be extended to the colony thus formed. This meant that the government of the colony should be responsible to the elected branch of the legislature, instead of holding office during the governor's pleasure as colonial governments had always done. The Canadas were
united, and in 1847 the Earl of Elgin was appointed governor with instructions to introduce responsible government. The reform was put into effect in Nova Scotia in 1848, and in Canada the following year. When Elgin's tenure of office ended, the old colonial system had been abolished, responsible government was a recognized ingredient in British colonial constitutions, and it could already be discerned that the colonies would not follow Great Britain along the path to free trade as the Reformers had assumed would be the case. Colonial defence, moreover, had become an outstanding problem. For with the disappearance of the British monopoly in the colonial markets, the expenses incurred for the purpose of defending the colonies had begun to arouse widespread criticism in Britain, on the ground that the British taxpayer no longer received any return for his outlay. With the granting of responsible government the discontent increased. The critics said that those who had the privilege of governing themselves should accept responsibility for their own defence.

Earlier in the century, while the old system was still in force, a Select Committee had inquired into expenditure for colonial defence, and reported in 1834 and 1835. The committee did not challenge the principle of expenditures by the British treasury for purely colonial defence, merely drawing attention to the desirability of effecting economies here and there. The following opinion, given in evidence before the committee by Sir James Kempt, a professional soldier and former Governor General of Canada, is quoted because it sets forth the special position of the Canadas from the point of view of defence:

Canada is very peculiarly circumstanced; it has a most extensive frontier to the United States of America, open in every point, and for six months in the year without any direct communication with England. I am of opinion, that even if a considerable portion of the militia were rendered efficient, the small regular force now in Canada would nevertheless be necessary to support and give confidence to the militia of the Colony. There are large depots of military stores to protect in Canada, and there ought to be at all times in the country a regular military force sufficient for the protection of the town and citadel of Quebec, the stronghold of Canada at present.

In 1849 William Molesworth, a rather unorthodox colonial reformer, moved in the House of Commons that a Royal Commission be appointed to inquire into the administration of the colonies. According to Molesworth:

2 Parl. Paps., 1834, vi, and 1835, vi.
In the course of the last fifteen years the colonies have directly cost Great Britain at least £60,000,000 in the shape of military, naval, civil, and extraordinary expenditure, exclusive of the £20,000,000 which were paid for the abolition of slavery. Therefore, the total direct cost of the colonies has been at least £80,000,000 in the last fifteen years.4

A second and much more important report on expenditure for colonial defence was made by another Select Committee in 1861.5 This committee divided the oversea possessions of Great Britain, exclusive of India, into two classes from the point of view of defence. One group consisted of dependencies such as Malta, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Bermuda, and the Falkland Islands. Because of their outstanding importance as military garrisons, or naval stations, or for some other reason, these were maintained chiefly for purposes of imperial policy, and none of them contained more than a small population of British birth or descent. The committee considered that the responsibility and main cost of the defence of this class of dependency properly devolved upon the British Government. The other class was made up of self-governing colonies of settlement. The committee felt that with due regard to the local resources and vulnerability to external attack of each of these, and also to the general needs of the Empire, the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such colonies ought to depend mainly upon the colonies themselves.

The committee also submitted the opinion:

...that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of Empire.

Giving evidence before the committee, W. E. Gladstone made the following statement:

Question: A great change has taken place in this respect since the application of steam to navigation. No sudden attack could be made upon any of these Colonies, by a foreign force making its appearance without notice, in any of these seas? Answer [by Gladstone]: I think the change is enormous, and that, in point of fact, our present system is one founded upon a state of things and a condition of this empire relatively to other powers which has entirely passed away. In former times, our communications with our colonies were rare, slow, and uncertain, and it would have been very dangerous indeed to trust to the principle of supporting them from the centre; but now, on the contrary, the communications with the world in

4 Egerton, Selected Speeches of Sir William Molesworth, p. 222.
5 Parl. Paps., 1861, xiii.
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general are constant, rapid and certain: and England is the very centre of those communications. We have enormous advantages for supporting them upon the principle of keeping our great mass of force at home, and supplying them as they may require.

These opinions in favour of concentrating the armed forces in Great Britain, applied to the disposition of naval instead of land forces, were to constitute the greater part of the arguments advanced in order to justify the naval concentration that was carried out more than forty years later.

Before the same committee the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Colonies, talked about the possibility of some of the colonies co-operating in the field of naval defence:

**Question:** . . . I think you say that Australia mainly depends upon the naval force? **Answer** [by the Duke]: Yes. **Question:** Do you think it possible for any arrangement to be made by which these colonies should contribute towards the cost of a naval force? **Answer:** I think that the only mode in which it is possible to accept from them a contribution towards their naval defences would be in the shape of a money vote to the Admiralty. I think it undesirable that they should have colonial ships, which would necessarily be much more under the local control of the government of the Colony, than under the Admiral on the station . . . . it would be impossible, either at their expense or ours, to defend the Colony by ships retained, if we may say so, for the service of each colony; it must be done on a larger scale. I have frequently had to state to the colonists that in truth our Channel fleet constitutes a defence to Australia, because any large fleets which could attack that Colony must come from Europe, and therefore it is much better to deal with a fleet by a concentrated force than to keep ships scattered over the world, with a view of defending any port which it may not be the intention perhaps, of the enemy to attack, and which, in these days of the electric telegraph, they would take care not to attack if ships were stationed there.

Robert Lowe, who had spent eight years in professional and public life in New South Wales, thought that the self-governing colonies ought in the main to undertake their own land defence but:

I do not think that England could ask the Colonies for any naval assistance; the contribution would be very small, and I think that they would very much repine at it. If England did not supply the naval force, I do not think the Colonies would fit out ships for themselves.

The report of 1861 laid down the general policy concerning the land defence of the self-governing colonies which the British Government was to follow thereafter. Ten years after the recommendations had been made, the imperial garrisons had been withdrawn from all such colonies, except in a few cases where very unusual conditions existed. The report had
comparatively little to say about naval defence; nevertheless it established the principles in the light of which the overseas naval bases were afterwards regarded. The position which the Admiralty was to take later in relation to co-operation by the Dominions and colonies in naval defence, moreover, was clearly foreshown in some of the evidence given before this committee.

In 1865 the British Parliament passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act,\(^6\) which authorized any colony to obtain and man warships, and maintain them in service, to raise bodies of Royal Naval Volunteers, and to procure the services of officers and men of the Royal Navy. The act authorized the British Government to accept naval volunteers offered by a colony for service in the Royal Navy, and also enacted that:

> It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the Admiralty to accept any Offer for the Time being made or to be made by the Government of a Colony, to place at Her Majesty’s Disposal any Vessel of War provided by that Government and the Men and Officers from Time to Time serving therein; and while any Vessel accepted by the Admiralty under such Authority is at the Disposal of Her Majesty, such Vessel shall be deemed to all Intents a Vessel of War of the Royal Navy, and the Men and Officers from Time to Time serving in such Vessel shall be deemed to all Intents Men and Officers of the Royal Navy, and shall accordingly be subject to all Enactments and Regulations for the Time being in force for the Discipline of the Royal Navy.

The problem of defending the British North American Provinces was one to which the British Government and its expert advisers naturally gave much attention, from the time of the American Revolution down to Confederation, and afterwards. Serious consideration of this question in time of peace, moreover, was practically confined to the authorities in the United Kingdom; for, except in actual war, the interest of the governments and people of the Provinces and of the later Dominion in any form of defence whether imperial or local, was exceedingly limited. The policy of the British Government and its advisers remained substantially unchanged until towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The Royal Navy was rightly held to afford a perfect protection against any possible oversea enemies, and until the eighteen-sixties no idea was expressed or even entertained in official quarters of a contribution by any of the dependencies, except India, towards the naval defence either of the Empire or

\(^6\) 28 Vic., c. 14, Apr. 7, 1865. See App. II.
of their own coasts. On the other hand, it was a principle of imperial defence at all times, before as well as after the American Revolution, that the colonies were partly responsible for their own defence by land, and that any colony occupying an exposed position should actually in time of peace take reasonable measures to provide such a defence. The practice nearly always lagged far behind the theory in this respect; but the theory was there.

Because of British supremacy at sea, the local defence of British North America meant defence against the United States. With every passing year the republic grew more populous and stronger, relatively as well as absolutely; while improving means of communication gave it a slowly increasing ability to concentrate its strength at any point on the perimeter of its vast territory. As far as the British Empire was concerned, Great Britain was the principal repository of power in every form, and was certain to intervene with all her strength in the event of an attack upon any of her dependencies. The marked superiority in speed of sea communications over land ones, before the coming of the railway, meant that practically all the colonies were either immune to serious attack, or less accessible from the centres of power of any likely enemy than they were from Britain herself. In British North America, Newfoundland was in the first-mentioned class, while the Maritime Provinces and the Pacific Coast were in the second. The two Canadas were the serious problem.

Up to Quebec the St. Lawrence was so wide that warships and transports could ascend it, at night if necessary, in spite of an enemy on its bank. As long as Britain retained control of the North Atlantic, consequently, she could count on an open line of communication to Quebec, except when the river was sealed by ice. Quebec was therefore necessarily the base from which the local defence of the Canadas must be conducted; and it was also a kind of Torres Vedras to which the regular troops to the westward might withdraw for the time being, if overwhelmingly outnumbered.

Montreal was also of great strategic importance because the principal military and commercial lines of communication converged at that place. There was some prospect that the river between Quebec and Montreal could be kept open during a war. If Upper Canada lying west of Montreal were also to be defended, however, British control of Lake Ontario and of a dependable line of supply up to that lake from Montreal, was
always regarded as being indispensable. For only by this means could troops operating west of Kingston be supplied and also covered on their otherwise wholly exposed flank. It was with these necessities in mind that Kingston, at the east end of Lake Ontario, had been developed as a naval base, and that the Rideau Canal had been built later as a poor alternative to the almost indefensible stretch of the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Lake Ontario.\footnote{The Rideau Canal, besides making a wide detour, was a barge-canal useful for carrying supplies, but unable to accommodate any but the smallest war-vessels.}

The two Provinces ran a considerable danger of being attacked, and by greatly superior forces. They lay intimately close along more than a thousand miles of boundary to a people immeasurably more powerful than themselves, and who were so energetic and expansive that even the richer half of a great continent proved to be scarcely enough for them. During most of the nineteenth century, moreover, Anglo-American relations were usually uneasy when they were not actually bad. If hostilities came, the Americans were almost certain to attack Britain by invading the Canadas—by far the most vulnerable objective accessible to them—as in fact they did in 1812, and as the Fenians did fifty years later.

The dependable contact of the Canadas with the sea at Quebec lay at one end of their long and narrow area of settlement. Their only internal line of communication coincided, except where the Rideau Canal made possible a detour between Montreal and Kingston, with the front that had to be defended. It followed that a comparatively shallow penetration by the enemy almost anywhere along the front would soon paralyze the whole defence westward of that point. The railways when they came afforded additional lines of communication; but they conferred even greater advantages upon the Americans. Another strategic peculiarity of the Canadas was that, although situated many hundreds of miles from the sea, because of their position in relation to the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes they might at any time have a naval threat at their own front door-step.

During the War of 1812 the urgent need to control the Great Lakes, and the extreme difficulty of doing so, had been very apparent to the British Government. Soon after the peace conference which ended the war had opened at Ghent in August 1814, the British commissioners proposed that the
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United States should undertake to maintain no armed forces on the Great Lakes. This suggestion was advanced on the ground that the United States had shown an aggressive spirit by its attempts to conquer Canada, and in other ways, and that the relatively weak Canadian Provinces would be in constant danger if the United States were allowed to control the Great Lakes. When the American representatives would not agree to this proposal, the British commissioners suggested that both British and American armaments on the lakes should be limited; but the Americans pointed out that they had received no instructions on this point. A few years later the subject was broached again, this time by the Government of the United States, and an agreement was embodied in an exchange of notes between the American Secretary of State, Richard Rush, and Sir Charles Bagot the British Minister in Washington. By the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 both nations undertook not to construct or maintain on the Great Lakes any armed vessels other than a few small and lightly-armed craft for police purposes.  

The Rush-Bagot agreement, one of the oldest of international covenants, has not at all times been strictly observed; but generally speaking it has kept the Great Lakes clear of warships, and has made it unnecessary to maintain naval bases on their shores. It has been highly beneficial to the United States, even more so to Great Britain, and to Canada most of all. The understanding has spared each of the parties to it a large expenditure on armaments, and almost certainly facilitated the belated development of friendly relations between the British Empire and the United States. The Rush-Bagot agreement and the unfortified land frontier between Canada and the United States are famous all over the world, and few articles or speeches on the advantages of peace and disarmament are considered complete without some reference to them.

The British Government's policy was to keep a considerable number of regular troops in the Canadas and to encourage the maintenance of a local militia for the purpose of supplementing the regulars. It was considered desirable that the weakness of these two forces, relative to what the Americans would probably be able to put into the field, should be offset by fortifications at the key points. The function of most of these fortifications was to enable the defence to be prolonged until adequate

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8 See App. I. In a recently-revised form the agreement is still in force.
reinforcements could arrive from Britain. Prior to 1817, in the event of war the essential naval superiority on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, particularly Ontario, would be sought, in spite of the superior local resources of the United States. Throughout the period the British Government assumed entire responsibility for the control of the North Atlantic, and for maintaining the regular troops, as well as an obligation of helping to provide the necessary fortifications and naval forces on the river and lakes. These responsibilities it performed; at the same time exhorting the Provinces to carry out the rest of the programme, a doctrine which more often than not was preached in vain.

The confederation of the British North American colonies, toward which the decisive step was taken in 1867, was preceded and followed by careful consideration of the means and responsibility for their defence. The American Civil War would by itself have sufficed to emphasize the problem of means; while a political change as radical as was Confederation obviously created a need to clarify the question of responsibility.

While Confederation was being worked out it was agreed that the details of defence policy should lie over for consideration by the government of the confederated Provinces. Regarding land defence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in a circular despatch in 1865, addressed to the British North American colonies concerned, referred to “the determination which this country has ever exhibited to regard the defence of the Colonies as a matter of Imperial concern”, and went on to say that:

The Colonies must recognize a right and even an obligation encumbent on the Home Government to urge with earnestness and just authority the measures which they consider to be most expedient on the part of the Colonies with a view to their own defence—nor can it be doubtful that the provinces of British North America are incapable when separate and divided from each other, of making those just and sufficient preparations for national defence which would be easily undertaken by a province uniting in itself all the population and all the resources of the whole.  

At this time the Canadian Ministers brought up the question of a naval armament on Lake Ontario, and the British Government took the position that:

... apart from any question of expediency, the Convention subsisting between this country and the United States rendered it impossible for either

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nation to place more than the specified number of armed vessels on the Lakes in time of peace. In case of War it would, as a matter of course, be the duty of any Government in this Country to apply its means of Naval Defence, according to the judgment it might form upon the exigencies of each particular time, and the Canadian Ministers might be assured that His Majesty's Government would not permit itself to be found in such a position as to be unable to discharge its duty in this respect. This was the only assurance the Canadian Ministers could expect or we could give.  

In the pre-confederation period it seems to have been taken for granted that Britain would continue to be responsible for the defence of Canada by sea.

In 1868 it became the fixed policy of the British Government to withdraw the regular troops at the earliest possible moment from all the self-governing colonies, except those in South Africa where the presence of very numerous and warlike native tribes made the retrenchment impracticable. The British Government had favoured and promoted the confederation of British North America, partly because it would strengthen those Provinces for local defence; and it therefore expected a confederated Canada to assume an increased responsibility in this respect. The Dominion did so. A year after Confederation the newly-constituted federal Parliament passed the Militia Act, the foundation upon which the land defences of the country have rested ever since; and in 1870 the regular troops were withdrawn. In 1865 the Parliament at Westminster had passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act which empowered colonial legislatures to establish and maintain naval forces; and after 1867 the British Government undoubtedly felt that the principal responsibility rested with Canada to provide any purely local naval defences that might be needed. On the other hand, the inclusive imperial responsibilities of the Royal Navy were not regarded as having been circumscribed by Confederation. Nor was the new Dominion officially considered to be under any obligation to share in the support of that Service. After its detachments in Canada had been withdrawn, the available forces of the British Army would certainly have been sent across the Atlantic, to the required extent, in order to reinforce the Canadian militia in the event of a serious invasion of the Dominion. Because of the nature of naval war, on the other hand, the Royal Navy on its customary stations was always throughout the nineteenth century in a position to cover the Canadian coasts and trade routes.

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10 Cardwell to Monck, June 17, 1865, ibid.
The later seventeenth century, and the eighteenth, saw a long series of wars between France and England. Both nations being great naval Powers with large oversea possessions and trade, and because of the military preponderance of France, these wars were largely fought on the sea. One of the fruits of naval superiority was the capture from the enemy of colonial possessions which might either be retained at the close of the war, or used for bargaining when the terms of peace were being arranged. France was primarily a continental and land Power for whom her navy was a secondary consideration only. England, on the other hand, had no important commitments or ambitions on the continent of Europe. The island kingdom was therefore in a position to reap the full advantage of its insularity, trusting for defence almost entirely to its navy upon which the greater part of the national effort aimed at defence was expended. For this reason mainly, Britain was usually stronger than France at sea, often decisively so, a fact which events in North America clearly reflected. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Quebec, the citadel of French power in North America, was four times attacked and twice taken, while New York was never directly threatened by French forces. In the War of the League of Augsburg the French lost Acadia, though it was restored at the peace in 1697. As a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-13, England obtained Nova Scotia together with the predominant position in the Hudson Bay region and in Newfoundland. Finally, the Seven Years’ War brought about the removal of the French power from the North American continent. These were principally triumphs of British sea power, for although the English colonies in North America greatly outweighed the French ones in population and wealth, this advantage was largely offset by the superior organization and the martial character of the French settlers. It was a continuing advantage to the English, however, that in all these wars their naval strength in the North Atlantic was greater than that of their opponents. They could therefore in time of war send supplies and men comparatively freely across the ocean; while France had only a restricted power, or none at all, to replenish and strengthen her colonies after the outbreak of a war.

The Seven Years’ War, 1756-63, was a world-wide conflict which had two distinct aspects. It was both a European war in which Great Britain supported Frederick the Great against his numerous enemies, and a naval and colonial war between
France and Great Britain. In North America the continental British colonies had never been open to attack from any source except the French settlements to the north, which, however, had been a serious danger to them for longer than anyone could remember. The capture of Quebec, the strongest fortress in North America, was made possible only by the ability of the Royal Navy to escort Wolfe’s army right up the St. Lawrence to the city, and to maintain an unchallenged control of the river and gulf, and of the open sea beyond. The campaign against Quebec, a masterpiece of amphibious warfare, was the decisive step towards the destruction of French power on this continent. In the earlier part of the war, when fortune was smiling upon him, the Marquis de Montcalm had warned his king that nothing could save the colony in the end if it failed to receive supplies from France, and as he had feared so it befell.

In the War of the American Revolution which lasted from 1775 to 1783, Great Britain found herself, without allies and with a navy suffering from neglect, pitted against a coalition of the leading naval Powers of Europe. The control of the North Atlantic slipped from her hands for a time, and she became subject to many of the disadvantages from which France had suffered in the previous war. Not only did it become exceedingly difficult to supply and reinforce the British armies in North America: the rebelling colonies also obtained a tremendous advantage from their comparative freedom to use the waters along their coast. Writing to the Marquis de Lafayette in 1781 George Washington stated the matter clearly:

As you expressed a desire to know my Sentiments respecting the operations of the next Campaign, before your departure for France, I will without a tedious display of reasoning declare in one word, that the advantages of it to America, and the honor and glory of it to the allied arms in these States must depend absolutely upon the naval force, which is employed in these seas, and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can more than negative advantages be expected without it. For proof of this, we have only to recur to the instances of the ease and facility with which the British shifted their ground, as advantages were to be obtained at either extremity of the continent, and to their late heavy loss the moment they failed in their naval superiority . . . It follows then as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it every thing honorable and glorious. A constant naval superiority would terminate the war speedily; without it I do not know that it will ever be terminated honorably.  

The American Revolutionary War throws into relief a very striking fact. Only once in modern history has Great Britain,

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almost always a very weak land Power, been decisively defeated in war. The effectiveness of superior sea power in the past when wielded by an island people could scarcely receive a more conclusive proof.

Thereafter British North America lay, a narrow fringe along the northern border of the far more populous and powerful United States, in the east at first and later all across the continent. For more than a century after the American Revolution the relations of Great Britain with the United States were uneasy or hostile, and the ability of Britain to defend British North America against the growing republic depended on the fact that the United States was never in this period, except briefly during its Civil War, a great military Power. During the most serious test between 1812 and 1815, the Royal Navy was able to maintain communications across the Atlantic and up the St. Lawrence; and the regular troops in the North American colonies, supplemented by local levies, were able to prevent an American conquest.

In all three of these wars—the Seven Years’ War, the War of the American Revolution, and the War of 1812—naval Operations of considerable importance were conducted on the interior lakes. At the time of the undeclared hostilities in North America which preceded the Seven Years’ War, the French, unlike the British, had for many years possessed warships on Lake Ontario and the river below it. In 1754 the British authorities began to consider the desirability of creating a naval force on those waters, so as to cut the communications between the French forces on the Mississippi and those on the St. Lawrence. Using Oswego as a shipbuilding site and later as a naval base also, a number of small warships were built. There were reported to be six of these ships in the harbour at Oswego in August 1756, of which two had been built the previous year. After having failed in its Operations against the French naval force on the lake, this flotilla was destroyed with the fall of Oswego in 1756. In 1758 the French naval power in those waters was in turn eliminated by the capture of the naval base at Fort Frontenac.

After the conquest of New France and the end of the Seven Years’ War, a naval organization known as the Provincial Marine was set up. It comprised the ships and shore establish-

13 An Account of Oswego ... in August, 1756, ibid., pp. 218-21.
ments on the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence River, and Lake Champlain. The organization was placed under the Governor of Canada; the Admiralty supplied officers and men, and the enrolment of local residents was authorized.  

In the French-English conflicts in North America before 1763, the passage between the St. Lawrence Valley and the colonies to the southward, by way of the Hudson, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu, had been a frequently-used invasion route in both directions; for it afforded easy transport by water through otherwise impassable country. At the beginning of the American Revolution, a small force of Americans advanced rapidly to Lake Champlain and seized or destroyed all the vessels which they found there. This timely act gave them control of the lake; and as long as they were able to maintain it, any advance southward of that point by British forces was impossible. That fall the Americans, having advanced northward by the same route, captured Montreal and unsuccessfully assaulted Quebec. The following spring the arrival of reinforcements from Britain compelled them to fall back on Lake Champlain, whither a British force followed them. The British then decided to launch a superior naval force on the lake, and drawing supplies from warships and transports in the St. Lawrence, they were able during the summer of 1776 to outbuild their American opponents. On October 11 and the two following days, in a series of engagements off Valcour Island and farther down the lake, a superior British flotilla wiped out the American naval force after an extraordinarily determined resistance. Nevertheless the American flotilla had succeeded in seriously delaying the British campaign. On the other hand, the British advance southward the following year under General Burgoyne, though it was to end in disaster, had been made possible by the naval victory on Lake Champlain.

The War of 1812, on its naval side, was fought partly on salt water and partly on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain. American attempts to invade the Canadas could be implemented very effectively by control of these waters, for the lack of usable roads left the British possessions almost wholly dependent upon the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes; and as in the previous war, control of Lake Champlain would open a very promising invasion route. The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence

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14 Cuthbertson, *Freshwater*, chs. 4, 5, 7, and 10.
waterway was highly vulnerable strategically, for it ran close and parallel to the front which the British forces had to defend. If the Americans could cut this line at any point they would thereby isolate the British territory and forces to the westward of that point. The importance of controlling the lakes was enunciated during this war by no less an authority than the Duke of Wellington. "I believe", he wrote, "that the defence of Canada, and the co-operation of the Indians, depends upon the navigation of the lakes. . . . Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by the establishment of a naval superiority on the lakes." 15

In 1812 the British enjoyed a slight naval superiority on both Ontario and the upper lakes, and the Americans on Lake Champlain; and throughout the war, in each of the areas concerned, both sides strove to achieve or maintain naval supremacy by means of new construction. In these building races the Americans had some advantage because the contiguous territories which supported them were the more highly developed. After the spring of 1813 the preparations and operations of the British on the lakes were directed by a distinguished young officer, Capt. Sir James Lucas Yeo, who also commanded the fleet on Lake Ontario.

By the summer of 1813 the American naval force on Lake Erie had achieved a marked superiority, and at the Battle of Lake Erie on September 10 at Put-in Bay they completely defeated the British squadron, and retained control of that lake for the rest of the war. On Lake Ontario throughout the three years of hostilities, superiority of force alternated between the two fleets, and several indecisive actions were fought. Late in 1814 Yeo's fleet, which was based at Kingston, was decisively strengthened by the addition of the St. Lawrence, a very large ship mounting no less than 102 guns, and thereafter the American fleet remained in its base at Sackett's Harbor. Naval superiority on Lake Champlain was wielded by an American flotilla, until a minor engagement in June 1813 reversed the balance for a time. The conclusive battle on this lake was fought between roughly equal forces in Plattsburg Bay on September 11, 1814. It ended in an American victory, and this enforced the retreat of a strong British force which had advanced as far as the lake with the intention of invading American territory. It is probable that the British Government

15 Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Feb. 22, 1814.
was influenced to some extent by this defeat on Lake Champlain when in the following year it decided to make peace.16

During the great struggle against Napoleon, of which the War of 1812 was one facet, British North America helped to maintain Britain's naval effort in an indirect but most important way. Before the Napoleonic Wars and during the earlier part of that conflict, the Royal Navy had depended upon native oak for the hulls of its ships and upon Baltic pine for their masts. After 1804 Napoleon was able to shut off almost entirely the export of timber to Britain from continental Europe. This was at a time when the supply from the United States was uncertain, because of the uneasy relations between the two countries and of President Jefferson's policy of peaceful coercion. English oak was becoming scarce, moreover, a difficulty which was aggravated by the activities of a timber monopoly:

The Navy was supported during the critical years by Britain's overseas possessions. Of these, Canada stood so far above the others that it can almost be said that Canadian pines and oaks sustained the Navy during its long struggle with the Napoleonic Empire . . . The Navy had turned to this new region for its masts . . . as a tardy measure during the American Revolution, when there had been such desperate need for the great pine sticks. The supply of masts from this source reached its maximum in 1811, a year in which, as against 3,319 masts received from Russia and Prussia, the North American colonies furnished 23,053. Of these 19,025 came from Quebec, 3,131 from New Brunswick, 842 from Nova Scotia, and 54 from Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island. During these years also, though on a smaller scale, supplies of sorely-needed oak timber reached Britain from Quebec.17 Thus it seems reasonable to say that small as the British North American colonies were at this time, their resources may have had a decisive influence upon the fortunes of the world.

After 1815 the United States and Great Britain did not again go to war, but for several decades the relations between the two countries remained uneasy, and on two occasions during this period naval events of some interest took place along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence frontier. Following upon the failure of the Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada, a number of the rebels escaped to the United States where many of the

16 Detailed accounts of the lake Operations during the War of the American Revolution and the War of 1812 will be found respectively in Clowes, *The Royal Navy*, iii, pp. 333-70, and Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812*, i, chs. 3, 7; ii, chs. 10, 11, 12, 15, 17.

people strongly sympathized with them. Sporadic threats and attacks ensued along the frontier from Windsor to Prescott, by bands led or instigated by escaped rebels and largely composed of the more lawless elements among the population south of the border. The most serious of these unofficial acts of hostility was the seizure of Navy Island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River by an armed band led by William Lyon Mackenzie. The unofficial invaders proclaimed a provisional government and began to fortify the island. A force of Canadian militia under Col. Allan MacNab was concentrated at Chippewa, opposite Navy Island, and preparations were begun to fit out armed vessels with a view to retaking the island. Capt. Andrew Drew, a retired officer of the Royal Navy, had settled at Woodstock, Upper Canada, in 1834, and at the time of the Rebellion he was the senior naval officer in the Canadas. In the emergency he was placed in charge of a company of naval militia which contained a number of experienced sailors including some former naval ratings. On December 28, 1837, the illegal occupants of Navy Island began to use the American steamer *Caroline* for the purpose of running supplies out to the island from Fort Schlosser, New York, and the following afternoon MacNab asked Capt. Drew to cut her out.

The Operation was planned for that night, December 29-30. Volunteers for a very risky task were called for and obtained, and at 11.30 p.m. they pushed off. Seven four-oared boats, some twelve feet in length, carried about sixty officers and men. They pulled a short distance up-stream, where they were assembled and told what was expected of them. They were then ordered to pull across the river independently, to a rendezvous close to the American shore a short distance above Fort Schlosser where the *Caroline* was known to be lying. A very unusual feature of this Operation was that to the normal danger from enemy action was added the risk of being carried by the rapid current over the falls a few hundred yards below. During the passage of the river two of the boats went astray and were not seen again until after the expedition had returned to the Canadian side. About half way across, a light appeared on the American shore, which afterwards proved to have been burning in the *Caroline*. Five boats turned up at the rendezvous, where, because of too bright moonlight, they waited for about half an hour 30 or 40 yards from the shore and not more than 200 yards from the steamer.
When it seemed to have become dark enough, they dropped silently down on their prey without moving an oar until they were close aboard. The *Caroline* was lying alongside a wharf to which she was secured by chains. Before actually touching her they were challenged from her deck, and immediately afterwards they boarded. After overcoming a brisk but brief resistance the boarders took possession of the steamer, aroused a considerable number of men who had been sleeping below, and sent them ashore. The *Caroline* was set on fire in several places and was soon well alight. It was difficult to cast off because one of the mooring-chains had to be chopped away from under thick ice. The chain was freed, however, and the vessel set adrift. All hands were now ordered to the boats, for musket-fire had been opened from shore and the drifting steamer was blazing fore and aft. One of Drew's officers was seriously or fatally injured during the action, and several of the men were slightly wounded. At least one of the *Caroline*’s defenders was killed, and a few were wounded.

As the boats rowed back across the river, keeping well clear of the falls, they saw a great blazing fire on the Canadian shore, which had been lighted by previous arrangement in order to guide them home. They landed between 2.00 and 3.00 a.m., and received an enthusiastic welcome:

By this time the burning vessel was fast approaching the Canadian shore, and not far distant . . . . When free from the wharf at Fort Schlosser, her natural course would have been to follow the stream, which would have taken her along the American shore and over the American falls; but she . . . navigated herself right across the river, clearing the rapids above Goat Island, and went as fairly over the centre of the British falls . . . as if she had been placed there on purpose.18

Preparations to clear Navy Island were continued, but before an assault could be delivered the island was evacuated.

The skilful and spirited little Operation which removed the *Caroline* from the scene so completely and permanently became a serious issue between the United States and Great Britain. The American Government had not seriously tried to prevent its territory from being used as a base for an invasion of the Province: British forces, on the other hand, had seized within the jurisdiction of the United States an American ship which they had afterwards destroyed, and in doing so they had

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killed an American citizen. The irritation on both sides was intense, and war might have resulted. Accordingly in February 1838 the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Provincial authorities that it might be expedient, early in the spring, to place a small flotilla of armed steamboats on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, and that Capt. Sandom of the Royal Navy would be sent to the Canadas to take charge of the project. A month later the Commander in Chief, West Indies, Halifax and Newfoundland Station, was warned to keep his fleet in readiness. The apparent need for naval defence on the lakes and river at this time led the British Government to consider the desirability of terminating or modifying the Rush-Bagot agreement so as to regularize any defensive measures that might prove necessary. The American authorities, however, eventually assisted in preventing further incursions. The prolonged and at times acute friction which the seizure of the Caroline had generated did not lead to war because both governments were just sufficiently conciliatory to prevent a catastrophe, and in the summer of 1842 the Caroline incident as an international bone of contention was officially buried.

Nearly thirty years later a renewed threat from across the border called for naval defensive measures in addition to those by land: as in 1837 the danger was that of invasion by unofficial armed bands. The Fenian Brotherhood was a by-product of Ireland’s tragic history. This organization, founded in New York in 1858, existed for the purpose of setting up an independent republic in Ireland, and many Irishmen in the United States became members. In 1865, immediately after the American Civil War, Fenian conventions were held in several American cities. From the United States the most obvious way of trying to free Ireland seemed to be to attack the British Provinces next door, and in the spring of 1866 well-armed and formidable bands of Fenians, intending invasion, gathered on the borders of New Brunswick and Canada. The United States authorities prevented the invasion of New Brunswick, but Canada was entered near Niagara and threatened elsewhere.

In these circumstances the Governor General asked for naval assistance, and the Commander in Chief, North American and West Indies Station, took appropriate action. The frigate Aurora and a smaller vessel, the Pylades, were sent up

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the St. Lawrence and stationed at Quebec and Montreal respectively, and later the *Rosario* was also stationed at Montreal. Three gunboats were provided by the British and four by the Provincial governments for service in the upper St. Lawrence and on the Great Lakes. All were manned and armed by the North American and West Indies Squadron, the complements being supplied by the *Aurora* and *Pylades*. The officers were instructed to intercept, if possible, any Fenians attempting to cross into Canada by water, and especially to cut off any who might have succeeded in getting across. All the vessels were under the orders of Capt. A. M. de Horsey of the *Aurora*, and their disposition for the season of 1866 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Headquarters Ships</th>
<th>Station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Aurora</em>.....</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>515²⁰</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>St. Lawrence River and Great Lakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pylades</em>....</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>275²⁰</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>St. Lawrence River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rosario</em>....</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>St. Lawrence River—Quebec to Montreal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gunboats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Royal</em>.....</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Cornwall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>St. Andrew</em></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Prescott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Heron</em>.....</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rescue</em>.....</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Port Colborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Britomart</em>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Port Stanley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Michigan</em>..</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Windsor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cherub</em>....</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Goderich</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the same year, 1866, bodies of naval volunteers were formed at Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, Dunnville, and Port Stanley,

²⁰ The numbers of men given for *Aurora* and *Pylades* are apparently their complements before detaching crews for the gunboats. The total for all the vessels is given as 1,040. Some of the gunboats may have had local volunteers on board. The number and identity of the vessels did not remain constant throughout; but the general scheme was not changed.
in Canada, and by May 1867 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland had asked the Commander in Chief to supply instructors for their naval brigades.

In the spring of 1868 the warship was withdrawn from Montreal, and H.M.S. Constance, stationed at Quebec, provided crews for two Dominion and three British gunboats on the lakes. When autumn came the danger seemed to be slight, and this improvised naval force was withdrawn. Its provision, mainly by the Admiralty, had been a practical application of the principle which British governments had often proclaimed, that Britain would afford naval protection to any threatened part of the Empire. During the emergency the four Provinces were confederated, and the Squadron continued to give to the new Dominion the direct protection which the separate Provinces had been receiving. The Commanders in Chief of the Station, nevertheless, felt uneasy about prolonging this commitment in the heart of the continent, because the ships that supplied the officers and men for the gunboats were thereby rendered largely useless. In a memorandum written for the information of his successor, shortly after the force had been withdrawn, Admiral Rodney Mundy wrote:

I am in hopes that if Naval protection is again required, arrangements will be made by which the Colonial Government will take upon themselves the charge of these inner waters. The attention of the Admiralty has frequently been called to the necessity of some permanent arrangement being made to provide for this service by the Dominion Government . . . 21

In matters such as these the mainland Provinces of British North America, and the Dominion which later included them, depended upon the assistance of Great Britain. On the other hand they made it possible to augment the resources available for general imperial defence in a way that was exceedingly valuable. The usable sea-coasts of that area, particularly the eastern one, were most favourably situated from the point of view of deep-sea strategy. The Royal Navy therefore developed a naval base on each of these coasts, at Halifax in Nova Scotia and much later at Esquimalt in British Columbia. Halifax at once became one of the most significant naval bases in the world, while Esquimalt met a serious deficiency in the structure of imperial sea power. In time, moreover, both were

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to play an additional rôle by serving the local defence of coastal waters.

Warships at sea are wholly dependent upon consumable material obtained on shore. Fuel, food, and other commodities, are continually being used up at a great rate, and frequent refits are also necessary. In action a warship may expend all her ammunition in a few hours, and may be more or less seriously damaged. She must therefore be at all times within reach of a suitable port that is stocked with whatever supplies she may need and equipped to provide her with routine and emergency repairs. Such ports are naval bases, and they may range all the way from minute harbours where small vessels can fuel, to ports where immense and complex naval establishments are able to build, repair, and maintain, ships of every size and type. Naval bases are prerequisite to any exercise of naval power, because warships cannot operate without them. The steam-driven ship, moreover, has been even more dependent on the shore than her sailing predecessor was, chiefly because of her inexorable need of fuel; and bases have had an increasing burden placed upon them by the mechanized warship, stuffed ever fuller from year to year with apparatus of progressively greater variety and complexity. No matter how imposing it may be, however, a naval base by itself can exercise no power at sea beyond the range of its fixed batteries. The harbour beside which a base lies is usually, though not necessarily, used by merchant ships as well as by warships.

A naval base should be conveniently situated with respect to the areas in which the warships using it may need to operate, and it is very advantageous if the fleet in its operative area is able to cover the base. The latter should be situated on a sheltered and sufficiently commodious harbour, which contains good anchorage and which can be entered at all times without difficulty. The local terrain and the approaches by sea should be suited to the defence of the base, which ought to be rendered possible, for a time, even in the absence of warships. A well-disposed and fairly numerous population in the neighbourhood, and access by land to supplies of food and fuel and to a suitable industrial area, are valuable assets.

During the Middle Ages English naval activity had been confined to waters close to the British coasts. Even towards

22 The methods of refitting and providing supplies at sea, so highly developed during the Second World War, particularly by the United States Navy in the Pacific, have considerably lengthened the leash that ties the steam-driven warship to her base. But if the warship is thus enabled to stay away from the base for longer periods, the supply ship must visit it in her stead.
the end of the sixteenth century, Sir Francis Drake had been considered daring or reckless when he wanted to forestall the expected sailing of the Armada by means of an offensive naval Operation against Cadiz. The gradual growth of colonial and trading interests overseas, from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards, came to involve, as far as the Royal Navy was concerned, both enormously increased responsibilities and greatly augmented means of discharging them. British territories and other interests, scattered more thickly and widely around the world as time went on, had all to be protected by the navy; and with a few exceptions, of which Canada was one, they were so situated as to have little need of other defence. The oversea territories, however, added greatly to the resources of the Royal Navy in a number of ways, and above all by providing it with conveniently-placed harbours and bases in almost all the areas where it might be called upon to operate. A number of the possessions overseas, in fact, were acquired expressly in order to provide bases for the fleet. The unique structure of British sea power rested in part upon an unrivalled appanage of seaports, a number of which occupied some of the choicest strategic positions in the world. The imperial annals are sprinkled with the names of Aden, Cape Town, Gibraltar, Halifax, Hong Kong, Malta, Minorca, and others only less renowned than these.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century this whole network of bases was controlled and maintained by the Admiralty. After that time, however, the status of some of them was affected by the evolution of the Dominions toward complete autonomy, and by the swift expansion after 1898 of the German Navy. Early in the twentieth century the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt passed from the Admiralty's ownership, and entered upon their career as Canadian establishments.

The naval base at Halifax has had an unusual history. The area which now constitutes the Maritime Provinces of Canada was originally settled, as far as white men are concerned, by the French in the seventeenth century, by whom it was known as Acadie. The first settlement in 1604, in Passamaquoddy Bay, was a failure and was transferred in 1605 to the Annapolis Basin; and this settlement, known at first as Port Royal and later as Annapolis Royal, was a centre of Acadian life during the whole of the French régime. Immigration was always on a very small scale, and by the end of the century the French population of Acadia did not much exceed a thousand. During
the War of the Spanish Succession which began in 1702, Acadia was occupied by New England forces supported by the Royal Navy. At the close of that war in 1713, by the Treaty of Utrecht between France and Great Britain, France retained in full sovereignty the islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, including Cape Breton; but Newfoundland, subject to French fishing rights on parts of her coast, and Acadia with its limits undefined, became British territory, the latter under the name of Nova Scotia.

During the reign of Louis XIV French engineers had come to lead the world in the science of fortification, and during the period of the wars in North America the French authorities put much trust in key positions strongly fortified. After the Treaty of Utrecht a settlement was established on Cape Breton at Louisbourg, which had a good harbour and an excellent strategic position in relation to the Gulf. This settlement seems to have been intended to become a centre for the fisheries and for trade, a strongly-garrisoned post, and a base for any naval forces of France in those waters. The French Government then constructed at Louisbourg, over a period of years, those great fortifications of stone masonry the remains of which can still be seen. During the summer of 1744, the opening year of the War of the Austrian Succession, twenty-five Boston vessels were captured by French privateers working out of Louisbourg. William Shirley, the Governor of Massachusetts, thereupon took the lead in preparing to remove what New England had come to regard as a major threat; and in June 1745 about four thousand New Englanders, supported by warships of the Royal Navy, succeeded in capturing the fortress. At the close of the war in 1748, however, as part of an overall settlement, the island of Cape Breton, and Louisbourg with it, was returned to France.

Yet the continuing rivalry of Britain and France in North America indicated that peace on that continent was unlikely to endure for long. If war should come again, its fortunes were certain to depend greatly upon sea power. The British authorities set a high value upon retaining, if war came, their hold on Nova Scotia, “the key of all the Eastern Colonies upon the Northern Continent on this side of Newfoundland”, as Governor Shirley called it. 23 Accordingly in July 1749, the year after the peace treaty and the return of Louisbourg to France, Col. the Honourable Edward Cornwallis, the recently-appoin-

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23 Lincoln, Correspondence of William Shirley, II, p. 149.
The Governor of Nova Scotia, arrived in Chebucto Bay with instructions to create a settlement and stronghold at that place. The new establishment was to do for British interests what Louisbourg had been designed to do for those of France.

For the purposes to be served the site was almost ideal. It was central in relation to Nova Scotia itself, and had a superbly commanding position with respect to all the neighbouring waters and trade routes. The western shore of the inlet offered a strong position for defence against attacks by land, and a suitable area for settlement. Chebucto Bay was already known to French and British mariners as an excellent harbour. The outer bay is very large, well protected, and easily entered; while the headlands, and the islands within the entrance, offer good positions for outlying fixed defences against attack by sea. Above the outer bay, and connected to it by a narrow but easily-navigated channel, lies the expanse of Bedford Basin, able by itself to accommodate a large fleet. The inlet is almost wholly free from ice the year round, and the anchorage is excellent both in the outer bay and all over the basin. These attributes have combined to make the place one of the finest natural harbours and naval bases in existence.

Unusually strong motives were needed to induce a British government in the eighteenth century to make itself fully responsible for establishing a plantation. On this occasion, Parliament had voted £40,000 to cover initial expenses. The government had undertaken to provide the emigrants free of charge with transportation to the settlement, subsistence for a year after arrival, arms, and implements, while land was to be granted to them on easy terms. As a result of this firm support, Cornwallis was accompanied to Chebucto Bay by an escorted fleet of thirteen transports bearing 2,576 settlers. The new arrivals landed, the plantation and military post were rapidly laid out, and a small garrison arrived soon afterwards. The clearing of land and the construction of buildings and of rough fortifications were pushed forward. The new establishment was named Halifax.

In 1750 Cornwallis’s settlement was made the capital of Nova Scotia, in place of Annapolis Royal, and Dartmouth on the east side of the harbour was founded. As has so often

24 The entrance, however, was rather wide for shore defence with eighteenth-century artillery.

25 In honour of the 2nd Earl of Halifax, President of the Board of Trade, 1748-61, who had been the most influential sponsor of the new establishment.
happened in the history of colonization, most of the original settlers at Halifax proved unfitted for the exacting life which they were called upon to lead. The venture was well managed, however, and numerous other settlers arrived from England, New England, and elsewhere. When the many difficulties which always beset the colonizers of a wilderness are considered, the plantation must be pronounced a success; and when the preliminary hostilities of the Seven Years’ War began in 1755, a firm settlement had been established. An Irish army officer has left the following description of Halifax in 1757:

The town of Halifax is large: the streets (which are not paved) are tolerably regular, and of a good breadth; but their houses, upon a nearer view, are mean, and do not display any great knowledge of architecture, much less of taste, in those who erected them; which in general, together with a capacious church, are of wood, and covered with the same materials. Great allowances must nevertheless be made for a settlement still in its infancy, and the inhabitants, together with the troops, have had incredible difficulties to struggle with. Their batteries, citadel, and other fortifications are of timber, these being thought sufficient to protect them against an Indian enemy; but the channel of the river is well defended by a respectable battery on the eastern shore, and by several others upon George’s island. They have here great variety of excellent fish, the staple commodity of this country and its dependent islands: as for the other necessaries and conveniences of life, they must be indebted for them to New-England, the other provinces to the southward, and to the mother-country; but I must not omit that Chebucto or Halifax harbour is one of the finest in the whole world, for depth of water, good anchorage and safety: they have a royal dock here, with all the conveniences for the largest first-rate ship to heave down and careen; moreover, it very rarely happens, that this harbour is frozen up in the winter; for which several reasons, it is the rendezvous of all his Majesty’s ships in America, and is frequently resorted to by others from the West-Indies, whenever they have occasion to undergo any repairs.26

The Halifax base was destined to play, during the first two centuries of its existence, a leading rôle in five wars: the Seven Years’ War, the War of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the two world conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. Of these wars, all except the third were among the most fateful that have ever been fought. The first three occurred in the days of sail, and in these three wars Halifax served as the main British advanced base for Operations against enemies on the North American continent. For this purpose its strategic position was almost ideal. Most map projections conceal a fact which a globe reveals, that a great circle from Boston to Brest passes within a few miles of Halifax. The base therefore lay close to or within convenient striking

distance of the important trade routes which connected northern North America with Europe and with the West Indies. After 1776 the ports south of Nova Scotia, and particularly those of New England, could be efficiently blockaded by ships based on Halifax, so as to close the American termini of the trade routes already mentioned, and disrupt coastwise shipping. The comparative nearness of Halifax to Britain was also advantageous.

The formal beginning of the Seven Years' War was preceded by a virtual certainty that it must come, and by actual hostilities between French and British forces. In the spring of 1755 a small British fleet was sent to cruise off Louisbourg so as to prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching the French possessions in North America; this blockade in peacetime, however, did not succeed. In May 1756, a sham peace changed to formal war, which was both a European war between two opposing alliances, and an imperial war between Great Britain and France, fought on and beyond the seas. French success in the early stages of hostilities brought William Pitt to power in Britain late in 1756. The policy of this great war Minister laid a primary emphasis upon the imperial conflict, and especially upon offensive measures against French North America, the decisive feature of which was to be an assault against the centre of New France delivered by way of the Gulf and the St. Lawrence. After one abortive campaign, the first step in these crucial Operations was completed when an amphibious Operation resulted in the surrender of Louisbourg in July 1758, and in the consequent uncovering of the entrance to the Gulf. The following year a British army supported by a fleet pushed up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. After overcoming a heroic and skilful resistance, one of the most famous amphibious Operations in history brought about, in September 1759, the fall of Quebec which had been the heart of the French power in North America. For the British armies and fleets that carried out these momentous Operations, Halifax had been the assembly point and base. In 1758, in the course of this war, the dockyard at Halifax had been established.

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27 Throughout the period considered here the West Indies possessed an outstanding economic importance which they afterwards lost.
28 This would now be called a “combined Operation”.
29 In the year 1759 James Cook the future explorer was stationed in Halifax. The original wall enclosing the dockyard at Halifax, and which forms part of the present wall, was begun in 1769.
The War of the American Revolution, 1775-83, from the naval point of view falls into two parts. During the first two years the Royal Navy dominated the Atlantic. British land forces near the coast could therefore be freely supplied, reinforced, or moved, by sea, and the seaborne trade of the revolted colonies was progressively throttled. The forces controlling the waters of northern New England were based on Halifax, and the British army which evacuated Boston in March 1776, fell back upon the Nova Scotia base, from which also sailed the army and fleet that captured New York in the summer of the same year. The second phase of the conflict began in 1778 with the entry of France into the war as an ally of the colonies, and in July of that year a strong French fleet arrived off the American coast, broke the British blockade, and released the bottled-up colonial trade. Thereafter the British naval forces engaged in the decisive Operations in western Atlantic waters were based for the most part on New York and Newport and in the West Indies; in this phase of the conflict, however, a number of privateers were fitted out in Halifax to prey upon the trade of New England. As the struggle progressed Great Britain found herself outmatched by a coalition which contained all the other important naval Powers, lost control of the North Atlantic during a considerable period, and lost the war. In the course of this conflict Halifax played a much smaller rôle than it had in the previous war.30

Throughout the long period which extended from 1793 to 1815, Great Britain was engaged, except for one very brief interval, in war with a revolutionary France which transformed itself in the course of the conflict into the vast empire of Napoleon. In June 1812 the United States declared war on Great Britain, and this Anglo-American offshoot of the struggle against Napoleon lasted until shortly after the Treaty of Ghent of December 1814 had proclaimed peace between the two nations on the basis of the status quo. During this war the Royal Navy directed its principal effort against the enemy in Europe; yet it was also able at all times to maintain forces in the Western Atlantic which were overwhelmingly superior in strength to the efficient but very small navy of the United States. In 1812 the effective warships of the United States Navy consisted of seven frigates and nine smaller warships, while the Royal Navy had eighty-five warships on the Ameri-

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30 In a long paragraph on operational bases on the North American continent during the second phase of the War of the American Revolution, Capt. Mahan does not mention Halifax. See Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 515-16.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

can station when hostilities began. Early in the war the unusually powerful 44-gun frigates and some other warships of the United States Navy were victorious in a series of single-ship actions, which were humiliating to the older Service but had no significant effect upon the course of the conflict. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, maintained an adequate blockade along the whole coast of the United States:

The pressure brought to bear on America by the British blockade was exceedingly effective... Its [the blockade's] mere existence inflicted a direct material loss to the American people a hundredfold greater than the entire American navy was able to inflict on Great Britain... It told heavily against the coasting trade, though less heavily than against foreign commerce... Exports practically ceased by the close of 1813.31

During the War of 1812 the mainland bases south of Nova Scotia which had maintained the Royal Navy during the War of the American Revolution were no longer available. Halifax therefore served once again as the principal British base in the western hemisphere, and was never threatened by land. In spite of the blockade not a few American merchant ships ventured to leave port, and many of these were captured by ships of the Royal Navy, and by privateers for a considerable number of which Halifax was the home port. On March 17, 1813, an auctioneer in the town advertised the sale of twenty-three vessels by order of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, and a judge of that court is reported to have received £10,000 in fees during the war. Of all the prizes brought into the Nova Scotia base at this period the most famous was the American 38-gun frigate Chesapeake. In May 1813, this ship had been in Boston harbour while H.M.S. Shannon, a frigate of about the same force, was cruising outside. On June 1 the Chesapeake sailed out to engage the British ship, and after a hot and extraordinarily brief encounter, one of the most celebrated single-ship actions in history, the Chesapeake was captured by boarding. She was taken to Halifax, where her commanding officer who had been killed during the action was buried with naval honours, six British post captains acting as pall-bearers.32

The War of 1812 was the last of those waged by Great Britain against an enemy in North America. The rest of the century was comparatively peaceful, and such wars as Britain fought in that period were restricted ones in which the Halifax

32 A memorial of this victory in the grounds of Admiralty House, Halifax, was unveiled in 1927.
base had no part. Nevertheless the swords were not beaten into ploughshares, and the principle was maintained that the British Government was fully responsible for developing and maintaining naval bases and other positions considered essential to general imperial defence; and that the principal instrument of imperial defence was sea power. Of the bases believed to be necessary for imperial purposes Halifax was one, and accordingly it continued to be maintained and garrisoned by the British Government until early in the following century. Testifying before the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure of 1861, a senior naval officer said that "Halifax is a very important part of the naval strength of this country." Another witness before this committee, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had recently visited Canada, expressed the following opinion:

I look upon Halifax as an Imperial post, quite as much as I do upon Gibraltar or Malta . . . . It is an important military post; it is still more important as a naval station, inasmuch as by its natural capabilities it is certainly one of the finest, and in all probability the finest harbour in the world . . . . In Halifax all the navies in the world can be sheltered. In that magnificent harbour called the 'Bedford Basin' you might fight a naval engagement, and in the other two harbours any number of vessels might ride in safety.  

The Admiralty's North America and West Indies Station had bases or coaling stations at Halifax and Bermuda, and in the West Indies, and its headquarters were often, though not always, situated at Halifax. The station was subdivided in different ways at various times. In 1867, for example, it had four more or less permanent divisions: Barbados, which included the Windward Islands; the Jamaica division, which comprised the remaining West Indies area and the Bahamas, the coasts of Central America, British Honduras, and Mexico; the Bermuda division; and the Halifax division, which included the remainder of the station to the northward of Bermuda. In addition, at this time, in view of threatened Fenian raids from the United States, a fifth division had been temporarily set up to take care of all the navigable waters above Cap Chat in the St. Lawrence estuary. In 1863 when the American Civil War was at its height, there were twenty-four warships on the station; in 1870 there were twenty. In addition to performing the usual duties of warships in peace-time, protection was

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33 Parl. Paps., 1861, xiii. The naval officer quoted was Rear Admiral Sir C. Elliot, and the Secretary of State was the Duke of Newcastle.

34 The official name of this station varied at different times.
provided for the Canadian and Newfoundland fisheries. For climatic reasons the warships were as far as possible assigned to the northern part of the station in the summer, and were moved southward for the winter. Many of the provisions needed by the squadron were purchased in the Maritime Provinces, and after the introduction of steam some of the coal required for fuel was obtained from the Nova Scotia mines. The close proximity of the United States was a problem in that it tempted ratings to desert, but not to the same extent as at Esquimalt.34

If during the long period of the Pax Britannica Halifax was never a war base, it was a valuable diplomatic asset. The United States, which had begun the century as a minor Power and was to end it a giant, had many controversies after 1815 with governments in Europe; and most of all with Britain, whose interests in the Americas far exceeded those of any wholly extra-American state. Most of these British interests were territorial or other claims, principally and often momentarily important to British North America and the later Dominion of Canada. In the numerous negotiations which accordingly took place, Great Britain was the most formidable principal with whom the United States had to deal, for if it came to war, she alone could have used superior sea power to throttle American seaborne trade, and to deploy, if necessary, her available land forces upon the North American continent. Such arguments as these, even if unspoken, have been the strongest ones when diplomats have sought agreement concerning any question that might lead to hostilities. In many of the Anglo-American negotiations from the Convention of 1818 to the Venezuela Boundary Award of 1899, the naval base at Halifax was an important weight upon the British side of the scales.

The eastern Pacific and the west coast of North America were very late arrivals on the stage of world strategy; consequently the creation of Esquimalt as a naval base post-dated that of Halifax by more than a century. Sustained British interest in what is now the coast of British Columbia began with Capt. Cook’s third voyage, 1776-79, which was followed in 1792 by the visit of Capt. Vancouver to those waters. The Hudson’s Bay Company later extended its activities to the Pacific Coast, and in 1843 founded Fort Camosun, which was soon to be re-named Victoria. In 1849 the Company received

34 From material preserved in the Admiralty Record Office. Most of the records of this station, however, have not been found.
the grant of Vancouver Island to which it undertook to bring settlers, and in the same year Victoria became its western headquarters. This small fortified trading-post on the southern tip of the island proved to be the beginning of a prosperous settlement with a promising future.

The founding of Victoria and the subsequent development on the island of a colony which soon afterwards extended to the mainland, imposed a new responsibility upon the Royal Navy. From the settlement of the Nootka dispute between Spain and Great Britain in 1795 down to the establishing of Victoria, there had been no need for British frigates to cruise as far north as Vancouver Island. The Pacific Station as a separate entity had been created in 1837, with its headquarters at Valparaiso. In 1846, three years after the planting of Victoria, the survey vessel H.M.S. *Pandora* came north and began to chart the harbour of Victoria and that of Esquimalt nearby; and in July 1848, H.M. frigate *Constance* used Esquimalt harbour as an anchorage, this being the first occasion on which a ship of the Royal Navy ever did so.36

The harbour at Victoria is very restricted, and the site of the fort there had been chosen by the Hudson's Bay Company officials chiefly on account of the good agricultural land in the vicinity. Esquimalt, which is three miles from Victoria, is a first-rate harbour of medium size, and the ships of the Pacific Squadron used it after 1848 whenever they were in that neighbourhood. The Spanish had named the harbour, in 1790, Puerto de Córdova; the British adopted the Indian name, which may mean "a place gradually shoaling."37 In the very early days this name was often spelled "Is-whoy-malth" or "Squirnal".

A naval officer presents the following picture of Esquimalt as it appeared in the year 1849:

In that year, when we spent some weeks in Esquimalt Harbour on board H.M.S. *Inconstant*, there was not a house to be seen on its shores; we used to fire shot and shell as we liked about the harbour, and might send parties ashore and cut as much wood as we needed without the least chance of interruption.38

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37 Walbran, *British Columbia Coast Names*, p. 171.
38 Mayne, *Four Years in British Columbia*, p. 25.
Another officer describes how they made the road from Esquimalt to Victoria in 1852:

It did not take us long to realise that in bad weather communication with the fort [Victoria] was risky by water, for an officer and two men lost their lives in a rough sea and the floating kelp which entangles swimmers along the shore. It was, therefore, resolved to break a road through the forest, and the novel task was tackled with enthusiasm. Axes sent their echoes ringing down the glades; mighty trees fell. We macadamised the track after a fashion, and from henceforth by this road (now traversed by electric cars) we had easy access to Victoria.49

In 1851 Rear Admiral Fairfax Moresby, the Commander in Chief of the Station, stated in a report to the Admiralty:

Victoria has been too hastily preferred to Esquimalt, it happily leaves this beautiful Harbour and its shores in their primitive state—I earnestly recommend the Government to reserve for 'Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors' this Harbour of Esquimalt and its shores; the only place where a Naval Establishment can be formed, and admirably adapted for all its operations.40

The beginning of a naval establishment at Esquimalt resulted from the Crimean War which began in the spring of 1854. In September an Anglo-French squadron suffered heavy casualties during an unsuccessful attack upon Petropavlovsk—an action marked by a probably unique incident when the Admiral in command, having committed his ships to the attack, retired to his cabin and committed suicide.41 Serious suffering was occasioned to the wounded because there was no base in the North Pacific where they could be given adequate attention. In February 1855 Rear Admiral Bruce, the Commander in Chief, in a letter from Valparaiso, informed the Governor of Vancouver Island, Sir James Douglas, that a number of warships would be visiting the island the following July, and asked him to obtain a supply of coal and of fresh meat and vegetables for their use. The letter concluded with the suggestion: “Your Excellency will probably be able to provide a building upon the arrival of the Squadron, that may serve as a temporary Hospital for the sick and wounded: the want of which was seriously felt last year.”42

49 Moresby, Two Admirals, p. 103.
40 Moresby to Sec. Admiralty, July 3, 1851, “Correspondence Relating to the Establishment of a Naval Base at Esquimalt, 1851-57”, in British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vi, No. 4.
41 Clowes, The Royal Navy, vi, p. 430.
42 Bruce to Douglas, Feb. 14, 1855, “Correspondence Relating to the Establishment of a Naval Base at Esquimalt.”
Douglas replied that everything possible would be done to meet these requests. Concerning the last of them he said that, as no suitable building was available, “I resolved with the advice of a majority of the Members of my Council, to take immediate steps for the erection of decent and comfortable buildings, to serve as a naval hospital; and the work is now in progress, and will probably be sufficiently advanced, on the arrival of the Fleet, to receive the sick.” In August Douglas reported that the buildings were ready. He mentioned the fact that they had cost about £1,000, and raised the question of who would pay for them. Soon afterwards a part of the Squadron arrived at Esquimalt and received the provisions that had been collected there for them: the hospital accommodation, however, was not needed. These hospital buildings were three in number, each fifty feet long by thirty feet wide, and the Admiralty willingly paid for them. They were the pioneer naval buildings at Esquimalt, and one of them lasted until the summer of 1939. In a letter to the Commander in Chief the Governor had suggested: “I think you would find it convenient to make this place a sick Depot, or what is better a general naval Depot for the Pacific Fleet.” In November 1856, Bruce reported to the Admiralty:

I am of opinion that it would be an advantage to the Service, if a Provision Depot were established at Vancouver [Island] for the Ships employed in the North Pacific. At present a Ship stationed at that Island, for the protection of the Colony, has to sail over a space of seven thousand miles to get to her Depot: so that in point of fact, when a vessel arrives at that distant part of the Station, it is time to think of returning again for supplies.\(^43\)

At the beginning of the Crimean War the Russian and British Governments had reached an agreement which in practice made the eastern Pacific a neutral area. The colony of Vancouver Island, however, remained in ignorance of this fact for several months, and the colonists were consequently alarmed by their apparently exposed and defenceless position. A proposal to draft the able-bodied settlers and to arm some of the Indians was brought before the Council, only to be rejected. Instead the colony chartered the Hudson’s Bay Company’s steamer Otter, and employed her as a patrol vessel for a short time, at a cost of £400 which the British Government eventually paid. During this war the colony was never, in fact, in any appreciable danger of Russian attack.\(^44\)

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\(^{43}\) Introduction and correspondence, ibid.

\(^{44}\) Davidson, “The War Scare of 1854” in British Columbia Historical Quarterly, v, No. 4.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The harbour continued to be used by ships of the squadron after the Crimean War, and store ships brought supplies there from England. In various places along the shore houses built by colonists began to appear. By 1856 the colony was considered sufficiently mature to receive a representative Assembly. Two years later the discovery of gold up the Fraser River caused a gold rush and the creation of a government for the mainland.

In March 1859, the Admiralty asked the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Station, Rear Admiral Baynes, for his opinion concerning the best position for the headquarters of the Station. Baynes replied that should the Admiralty decide to move the headquarters from Valparaiso, Esquimalt would be found to have many advantages. He considered that the duties of a Commander in Chief could be carried out as efficiently at Esquimalt as at Valparaiso. As far as was known no harbour in those waters was better suited than Esquimalt for a naval yard and hospital; moreover the seventeen acres which, in addition to the hospital site, the Admiralty owned there, would afford ample space for all purposes. The climate was very healthy. Stores and provisions kept well, and were, except for fresh beef, at least as cheap at Victoria as at Valparaiso. The Admiral suggested that the money put into circulation by such a naval establishment would greatly help the infant colony.

On the other hand, Baynes thought that the granting of leave to ships’ companies at Esquimalt would present a difficulty, because of the strong temptation to desert to the United States nearby. He also pointed out how easy the place would be to attack from the United States, and that the tongue of land on which the naval property stood was seriously exposed to shell-fire from ships at a considerable range. He felt that a decision on the permanent establishment of a naval yard and hospital at Esquimalt should be postponed. H.M.S. Plumper was surveying on that coast, and Baynes thought that the Admiralty ought not to commit itself to Esquimalt until she should have carried out a further year’s work, on the chance that she might find a more suitable harbour.45

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45 Baynes to Sec. Admiralty, May 12 and Nov. 14, 1859, “Vancouver’s and Queen Charlotte’s Islands,” II, Pacific Station Records, Provincial Archives of British Columbia. The records of the Pacific Station were left in Esquimalt when that base was transferred to Canada. The Admiralty later consented to their remaining permanently in Canada, and they were divided between the British Columbia and Dominion Archives.
By the following summer Admiral Baynes, whose cautiousness makes it difficult to feel sure what his opinions really were, seems to have favoured a commitment:

The necessity of having a depot at Vancouver Island for Provisions and Stores is becoming every day more apparent, and as these Colonies become developed, if their Lordships should decide on making it the Head Quarters of the Station, will be indispensable. It then becomes a question which I wish to submit for their Lordships consideration whether it might not be more advisable, and in the end less expensive to erect buildings suited to our present requirements instead of sending ships from England as Floating Depôts.46

Admiral Baynes had recommended in 1858 that a light should be placed at the entrance to the harbour, and another on Race Rocks outside. The suggestion was carried out, and both the lights went into operation in 1860. In 1865 Esquimalt was created a permanent naval base by imperial Order in Council.

The following is a description of Esquimalt in 1870 as it appeared to one of the officers of H.M.S. Zealous:

It would be difficult to find a snugger harbour than Esquimalt; completely land-locked, surrounded on all sides by dense forests. There are few houses outside of a diminutive dockyard, but through the trees appears a larger building than usual, which serves as a naval hospital. At the head of a shaky pier is another building, designated the Naval Club. Though on a small scale, it supplies a want which was long felt. Altogether, there is a charming abandon about this spot; a short plunge into the dense forest, and all signs of civilization cease—birds and insects are your sole companions.47

46 Same to same, Aug. 2, 1860, ibid.
WITH the year 1870 the curtain rose upon a new scene in the international drama. During the last third of the nineteenth century Germany, Japan, the United States, and Italy, made their appearance as great Powers. These new large masses of organized strength, particularly the first, overset the existing balance of power all over the world. In the same period, moreover, nationalism increased in strength, while international diplomacy became tenser and less scrupulous. Among the great Powers the advance of the industrial revolution combined with a desire for national aggrandizement to produce a dynamic imperialism and highly competitive policies of colonial expansion. Accordingly the nations lived in a world that had lost much of its former stability and security.

The new era in international affairs began with the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and the unification of Germany in the following year. The German Empire which was then created proved to be the most dynamic State in Europe, and inherited the military traditions of Prussia. In 1879 it entered into a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary, and soon afterwards Italy established defensive alliances with both of these Powers. The Triple Alliance occasioned great uneasiness in France and Russia, who in 1894 sought to counter it by entering into a defensive alliance of their own. These alliances were created and maintained by fear, and they increasingly competed against each other in amassing armaments.

At the other side of the world the ancient empire of Japan, having learned the bitter lesson that its industrial and military techniques were obsolete, rapidly assimilated those of the west. By the end of the century Japan had become a western-type State, a fact which altered the whole structure of international relations in the Pacific. As for the United
States, following upon its Civil War it assumed the unques-
tioned status of a first-rate Power.

The growth of nationalism and imperialism in this period
placed a premium upon the ownership of fleets. In 1890 and
1892 Capt. Mahan published his two most famous works, in
which, among other things, he almost equated superiority at
sea with prosperity in peace and victory in war, and exalted
sea power in general. Mahan’s books were read almost every-
where, and their influence was very great. Accordingly four
new great-Power navies appeared on the scene, and the fleets
of the smaller nations were expanded and multiplied.

After Trafalgar the Royal Navy had remained the strong-
est upon the seas except for one brief moment,¹ and until
towards the end of the century the only other navy of conse-
quence was that of France, over which the British Admiralty
was content to maintain a superiority of about a third. Later,
however, the navies of Russia and the United States reached
a significant strength. In 1889 the “two-Power standard”
was officially set up as a measure of British naval requirements;
the Royal Navy must be at least as strong as the second and
third navies combined. In practice a good margin of superi-
ority was maintained over the French and Russian navies,
counted as one, because the device of a close blockade had
not yet been abandoned.² The United States Navy, though
it supplied food for thought at times, was never included in
the calculations.

Although after 1815 the nineteenth century saw little of
naval war, it witnessed the greatest technical revolution in
naval history. The mechanics of the industrial age, applied
to warships, altered these almost beyond recognition. The
wooden ship, propelled by sails, and firing solid or hollow
shot from muzzle-loading cannon, gave place to the steel
ship, protected where necessary by steel armour, driven by
propellers which were turned by steam-engines, and firing
explosive shells from breech-loading guns. The submarine,
the mine, and the torpedo, were also developed in a practical
form within the century, although the revolutionary effects
which they were to work upon naval warfare were not known
until later. A far larger vessel could be built of steel than of

¹ In 1858 and for a short time thereafter the French Navy achieved an approximate
equality by launching a number of ironclads before the Royal Navy was ready to do the same.
² Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 106; Woodward, Britain and the German Navy, p. 12.
wood, and the mechanized ship steadily increased in size and cost. Her life was shorter than that of her wooden predecessor, for so quickly were improvements in design evolved in the machine age that whereas a wooden ship might be good for fifty years or more, many warships built during the latter part of the nineteenth century were obsolescent before they struck the water. The ever-present danger of being suddenly outclassed by some decisive improvement in design created a feeling of nervousness and insecurity among admiralties and peoples; and this feeling may have been one cause of the increasing naval construction after about 1880.

The upsetting of the existing balance of power after 1870, the extension of the industrial revolution to other countries, and the growth of navies everywhere, weakened the position of Great Britain and the Empire, and in this period the question of Canadian participation in naval defence outside the Great Lakes was officially raised for the first time. The changes which were taking place in the international sphere were destined to exercise the most profound effects upon Canada; but of this fact the people of the Dominion remained almost wholly unaware.

Between 1877 and 1882 certain events took place which, though of minor importance in themselves, foreshadowed the future in a very interesting way. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 brought Russia and Great Britain to the verge of hostilities, at a time when the depredations of the Confederate cruiser Alabama were still fresh in everyone’s mind. In these circumstances the Canadian Government, after having considered a memorandum from the Minister of Militia and Defence, asked Lord Dufferin, the Governor General:

To communicate by cable, with the Imperial Government drawing attention to the defenceless condition of our Atlantic Sea-Board and the danger to the shipping interest of the Empire, should War be declared, without ample provision being made for defence—and submitting that a fleet of fast Cruisers would be absolutely necessary for protection.

The idea was that swift and lightly-armed auxiliary cruisers should be stationed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay

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3 Displacement tonnage of certain British battleships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battleship</th>
<th>Date of Completion</th>
<th>Displacement (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bellerophon</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>7,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renown</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>12,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreadnought</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>17,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Elizabeth</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 “The outstanding example of real longevity was the Royal William 90, built in 1719, which participated in a campaign in 1780 and lasted altogether nearly a century without extensive repairs.” Albion, Forests and Sea Power, pp. 84-5.
of Fundy in order to deal with any similar ships which the Russians might be able to obtain in the ports of the United States. Lord Dufferin transmitted the Canadian Government's message the same day to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach. The request was, of course, referred to the Admiralty by the Colonial Office. Replying the Admiralty stated that they had made such arrangements as means permitted to check depredations by enemy cruisers at the outbreak of a war; that the events of the American Civil War indicated how difficult, if not impossible, it would probably be to prevent much mischief being done by a single fast raider; and that a large additional expenditure would be needed if this danger were to be met at all adequately. The Admiralty then raised the question of action by the Dominion Government:

Looking at the very large mercantile marine possessed by the Dominion, it is only reasonable to assume that the Canadian Government will avail themselves of their own resources for the protection of Canadian ports and shipping, and My Lords trust that Her Majesty's Government will readily aid any such efforts by the loan of guns (which the Dominion does not appear to possess), to arm their vessels, which would certainly exceed in number and speed any force an European power at War with England could readily acquire on the Atlantic Seaboard.

Writing to the Governor General the Colonial Secretary enclosed a copy of the Admiralty's reply, and referred to the possibility that the Canadian Government might help to meet the danger, should it occur, by taking up and arming some fast merchant ships. He asked Dufferin to invite the careful attention of his Ministers to the subject:

... which appears to me to be of great importance, not only in view of the present unsettled condition of European affairs, but with reference to any contingencies which may arise in the future. In connection with it I would suggest that they should consider the expediency of passing an Act through the Dominion Legislature, if this has not been already done, in pursuance of the third Section of the 'Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865,' of which I annex a copy.⁵

Great emphasis had been placed upon the armed merchant cruiser with the development of the fast steam passenger ship. The earliest of these were faster than the contemporary cruisers and consequently embodied a formidable threat, as they might be armed and sent raiding in time of war. In these

⁵ Report of a Committee of the Privy Council, May 4, 1878; Dufferin to Hicks Beach, May 4, 1878; Colonial Office to Admiralty, May 31, 1878; Admiralty to Colonial Office, June 10, 1878; Hicks Beach to Dufferin, July 8, 1878; copies in Macdonald Papers—Militia Defence, vol. 2 (Pub. Arch.).
circumstances the best reply to an auxiliary cruiser was another auxiliary cruiser. Regular cruisers later came to surpass passenger ships in speed; and the armed merchant cruiser then became merely a useful addition to the cruiser fleet, and an economical instrument of naval war like the privateer before her. This earliest suggestion that Canada should prepare in time of peace to use auxiliary cruisers in war was to be repeated later at various times.

The international crises of 1878 did not lead to war, but the idea that the Canadian Government should make some preparation for naval defence was not immediately dropped. The following year the officer commanding the Canadian Militia suggested that on account of the long seaboard and great inland lakes and rivers of the Dominion, it would be most prudent that a naval reserve should be created which would be available as a powerful support to the land forces in time of war. He added that there were probably about ninety thousand fishermen and other seafaring men in the country, and suggested that an attempt be made to enrol a considerable number of them in such a reserve, which would be administered by the Department of Marine and Fisheries. He also suggested that it would be of mutual benefit for the British Government to give or lend to the Dominion an iron-clad or a wooden frigate which could be used for coast defence in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and also for training naval volunteers and boys.

On October 8, 1880, therefore, the Governor General stated in a despatch to the Colonial Secretary that his government “would not be averse to instituting a ship for training purposes if the Imperial Government would provide the ship.” The Admiralty said that H.M.S. Charybdis, an old-type steam corvette which was not worth the heavy expense of refitting for another commission, would serve the purpose. She was expected home at any moment from the China Station, after more than seven years’ absence; and the Admiralty offered her, as a loan at first and shortly afterwards as a gift. The Canadian Government cabled its acceptance, and Capt. Scott, a retired officer of the Royal Navy, was sent to England to bring the Charybdis over. Soon after his arrival Scott reported to the Canadian High Commissioner that he

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6 The corvette was "a flush-decked war-vessel, ship-, bark-, or brig-rigged, having one tier of guns" (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). The name was to be revived during the Second World War and applied to a considerably different type of vessel.
thought her suitable for a training ship. The disappointment began when the chief engineer reported that the ship's boilers were practically worn out and would not stand a winter voyage across the Atlantic. The corvette was therefore repaired at the expense of the Canadian Government, and early in 1881 Scott sailed her safely to Saint John, N.B.

While there she broke loose in a gale and damaged shipping in the harbour; and on another occasion two citizens of Saint John, who were trying to go on board, broke a rotten gang-plank and were drowned. The Canadian Government was severely criticized by the House of Commons in Ottawa, and the Admiralty was asked to take back their gift. The Minister of Marine and Fisheries stated that during the voyage across the Atlantic the ship had proved heavy to handle, and that she would require a larger crew and consequently a greater annual expenditure than had been contemplated "in view of the sparse and employed population of this young country." A heavy outlay would also be necessary in order to prepare her for training purposes. The Admiralty having agreed to take the Charybdis back, she was towed to Halifax in August 1882 and delivered to the naval authorities at that base.\(^7\)

From the point of view of Canadian naval development the Charybdis incident was unfortunate, inasmuch as it was often afterwards referred to in Canada as a warning to those desirous that some Canadian naval effort should be undertaken. The episode is interesting because of the expressions of opinion and policy which it called forth. The Charybdis was the first warship that was ever owned by the Dominion Government.

During the last two decades of the century the problem of general imperial defence became very insistent, especially in the field of naval defence. For almost the whole of the British Empire sea power was more vital than defence by land, because a military disaster on land in any of the dependencies except India and Canada would probably not be irreparable. A decisive naval defeat, on the other hand, would have enabled the enemy to attack with overwhelming land forces almost any part of the overseas Empire, to which no supporting forces could then be sent from Britain; or to invade

\(^7\) Material on the gift and return of the Charybdis is to be found in Sess. Paps., 1879, No. 5; 1880, No. 8; 1881, No. 66; House of Commons Debates, 1882, xii, p. 124; A.R.O., S6199/82.
and conquer, or blockade and starve, the British Isles themselves, the principal source of the Empire's military power.

The hazards of the new age, and the unequalled splendour of the British imperial heritage, produced a rising tide of imperial sentiment both in Britain itself and among those of British descent in the dependencies overseas. The British imperialist embraced a nationalism which had been expanded so as to include the whole vast extent of the lands over which the Queen-Empress ruled. He rejected the Cobdenite belief that the colonies were irrevocably destined to fall away into independence. Yet he feared that the ever-expanding autonomy of the self-governing dependencies, if it were not offset by powerful centripetal forces, would probably end in the dissolution of the Empire. The imperialist therefore sought to strengthen the existing bonds of union and to fashion new ones. Imperialist sentiment reached its greatest strength on the eve of the Boer War: thereafter it declined. At its worst it was an intolerant chauvinism, based on racial pride or investments in Rhodesia. At its best it was the most inclusive patriotism that the world had seen, and may even have been the prototype of some unanimity of the future which will transcend all the frontiers of nationality and race.

For some years after their point of view had begun to be important, the imperialists confined themselves to advocating a stronger imperial sentiment and closer ties between the various parts of the Empire, without envisaging any new constitutional machinery:

The 'eighties witnessed a boom in Imperialism. The race between the Great Powers for the acquisition of colonies, the growing militarism on the Continent, and the defeat of Free Trade in almost all foreign countries had placed the value of colonies beyond all doubt. Prominent statesmen of all parties were vying with each other in declaring their attachment to the colonial Empire. Public attention was directed to the problem of the relations between England and her colonies by a stream of publications, by far the most important of which were Seeley's Expansion of England and Froude's Oceana, and by spectacular events like the Colonial and Indian Exhibition in 1886 and the Jubilee in 1887.  

At any time since the demise of the old colonial system, a consideration of imperial problems had usually led the inquirer to decide that the principal one was defence, and to this conclusion the imperialists quickly came. For the purpose of preparing for or making war, although it possessed

8 Bodelsen, Studies in Imperialism, p. 205.
immense potential resources the Empire as a whole was ill organized. Moreover the existing distribution of responsibility for imperial defence, with its financial implications, was still the aspect of the imperial connection that it was easiest to criticize. Since defence was probably the most fundamental and important of all the interests which the various parts of the Empire held in common, it might appear that if the imperialists failed to solve the problem of common defence they would fail all along the line.

This and similar considerations eventually led many of them to advocate what was called "imperial federation." In the words of one of the early converts to this belief:

Common defence involves common expense; common expense and danger confer the right of common control of foreign affairs, from which danger may arise, and of the forces required for defence; common control must be by common representation; common representation is Imperial Federation.\(^9\)

In 1884 the Imperial Federation League was founded in order to work for some form of union or federation, and in 1886 the League began to publish its own journal. The gospel was vigorously preached, and the movement succeeded in obtaining the support of a large number of prominent men.

The imperial federationists never agreed upon and supported any one detailed scheme of federation; but various proposed imperial constitutions were put forward by individuals. The general aim upon which most of the federationists were agreed, however, is expressed in the following statement by one of them:

The ideal of Federation which naturally presents itself to the mind is one which provides a supreme Parliament or Council, national not merely in name but in reality, because containing in just proportion representatives of all the self-governing communities of the Empire. Such a body, relegating the management of local affairs to local Governments, and devoting its attention to a clearly defined range of purely Imperial concerns, would seem to satisfy a great national necessity.\(^10\)

The Imperial Federation League dissolved in 1893; but the creed was widely and actively professed thereafter. The League's greatest achievement, during its short life, was the major part that it played in bringing about the meeting of the first colonial conference in 1887.

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\(^9\) Quoted in Burt, Imperial Architects, p. 162.

\(^10\) Parkin, Imperial Federation, p. 303.
In seeking a closer political and military integration of the Empire, imperialism was to find its most serious obstacle in the local national sentiment which was slowly developing in the self-governing dependencies. In general the descendant of settlers did not think of himself as an exile from the land of his fathers, but was contentedly indigenous to the country of his birth. At a later stage, in the Dominions and larger colonies at least, he began to feel a new pride in and enthusiasm for his political unit. Among the inhabitants of the overseas dependencies who were of British descent, this sentiment might conceivably have identified itself primarily with the larger imperial structure; but for the most part it did not do so. The growing nationalism of the self-governing colonies was friendly to the British connection. That which it cherished more dearly than anything else, however, was political autonomy, which was in harmony with the prevailing political ideal of the age and a symbol of the national individuality and status.

The idea that the governments of the United Kingdom and of the self-governing colonies should confer from time to time regarding their mutual problems, was one that in the circumstances was certain to have been suggested and acted upon sooner or later. It was put forward in unconventional form in the year 1869, by a group of colonists in London who strongly resented the recent policy of the British Government with respect to New Zealand. In the late eighteen-sixties the British Army garrisons were being withdrawn from most of the self-governing parts of the Empire, including New Zealand where the long and indecisive Maori Wars were still in progress. This policy of leaving them to face the Maoris without the support of regular troops had aroused widespread dissatisfaction among the colonists, a feeling which produced in the year 1869—in New Zealand of all places—an agitation on behalf of annexation to the United States.

A meeting of colonists was held in London, apparently for the purpose of considering the government’s policy. The meeting set up a committee in whose name a circular letter was sent to the colonial secretaries of the self-governing colonies, expressing the view that the policy of withdrawing the troops from New Zealand:

... seems to point, as an ulterior result, to a severance of the connection ... disastrous alike to the Mother Country and the Colonies ... Our object is, if possible, to make arrangements by which the Colonies themselves,
through properly authorized Representatives, may meet and confer . . . with the view of urging on the Imperial Government, with the weight due to the combined opinion, such changes in the present administration of Colonial affairs as may appear desirable.\textsuperscript{11}

The obscure origins of this letter, its outspoken criticism of the existing government and system, and the unorthodox use that was made of it, commended it neither to the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor to the colonial governments. Accordingly the suggestion which it contained came to nothing.

On August 11, 1886, the Imperial Federation League asked the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, to summon an official conference of colonies with a view to the creation of an imperial council, a suggestion which Salisbury received sympathetically. At a Mansion House dinner the same evening Sir Adolphe Caron, the Canadian Minister of Militia, spoke approvingly of united action for defence.\textsuperscript{12} In November, the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed a despatch to the self-governing colonies, inviting them to send representatives to a conference for the discussion of certain mutual problems, especially that of defence.\textsuperscript{13} The First Colonial Conference was a product of imperialist sentiment, of anxiety, and of a feeling on the part of the imperial authorities that an unreasonable proportion of the weight of the Empire's defence—particularly naval defence—rested upon the shoulders of the taxpayers in the United Kingdom.

The conference sat in London from April 4 until May 9, 1887—the year of the Queen's first jubilee. In his opening address Lord Salisbury disavowed any wish to raise at that conference the question of imperial federation.\textsuperscript{14} The British Government reiterated its earlier-established position that land defences, generally speaking, were the responsibility of the colony concerned. Nearly half the meetings of the conference were devoted to the subject of naval defence, especially that of the Australian colonies. The British Government postulated a strong navy, free to operate anywhere. In order that the Royal Navy might in practice be ubiquitous, it was essential that certain bases and coaling stations should be

\textsuperscript{11} C. 24, "Correspondence respecting a Proposed Conference of Colonial Representatives in London", enclosure in No. 1, \textit{Parl. Paps.}, 1870, xlvi.

\textsuperscript{12} Jebb, \textit{Imperial Conference}, i, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.

69
provided with shore defences. "In addition to the Imperial fortresses Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Halifax, it would seem necessary to defend on an adequate scale, Cape Town and Simon’s Bay, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, Port Louis (Mauritius), Aden, Colombo (Ceylon), Singapore, Hong Kong, Port Royal (Jamaica), Port Castries (St. Lucia), and Esquimalt, in addition to minor coaling stations ..." The imperial fortresses would remain a responsibility of the United Kingdom; but in the case of certain colonies in which local as well as imperial interests seemed to require that naval bases be maintained, the government of the United Kingdom thought that the cost should be shared, and to this arrangement the governments of Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore, and Ceylon, had already agreed. 15 The British Government also announced that arrangements had been made to facilitate the employment of British officers by the various colonial governments.

The negotiations with the Australian colonies led to an agreement whereby Britain would build and provide five third-class cruisers and two torpedo gunboats. The colonial governments would pay £350,000 over a period of ten years toward the cost of these ships, and £91,000 a year for their upkeep. The amount of this contribution was not based upon any principle, although attempts to find a fair and acceptable one had been made. Probably the best one that could have been found was that suggested by Jan Hofmeyr, representing Cape Colony, whose proposal was: "To discuss the feasibility of promoting a closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an Imperial Tariff of Customs, to be levied independently of the duties payable under existing tariffs, on goods entering the Empire from abroad, the revenue derived from such tariff to be devoted to the general defence of the Empire." 16 Hofmeyr suggested that the amount of the imperial tariff might be two per cent; or more, or less. This scheme, avowedly aimed at both unification and defence, called for the imposition of a reasonably fair and painless levy, and included all the colonies rather than the Australian ones only. The contribution of each colony would have been proportioned to the value of its imports from foreign sources. This amount would in turn have afforded a rough indication of a colony’s individual stake in the protection of the sea-

15 See, of State for the Colonies (Sir Henry Holland), who was president and chairman of the conference. (Ibid., p. 11).
16 Ibid., p. 463.
routes in time of war, in most cases though not in all. Under this plan, for example, Canada would have owed a relatively heavy contribution, because of its very large imports overland from the United States. Hofmeyr’s suggestion obtained a warm welcome from the colonial delegates who, besides sincerely wishing to do something for imperial defence, welcomed even so embryonic a preference in the British market. From the Secretary of State for the Colonies, however, the proposed imperial tariff received a reception so cold as to freeze it in its tracks; for by the canon of free trade it was a damnable heresy. “The question,” said Alfred Deakin of Victoria, “... appears to me ... to be one really for the English people, and not for the Colonies; and so far as I can judge, until a very great change indeed comes over the manner of regarding fiscal questions in this country (a change which may come sooner than we anticipate), it is almost idle for us to raise the issue.” 17

Three expressions of the local rather than the Imperial point of view were voiced during the conference. “I feel perfectly satisfied,” said Robert Wisdom, “that New South Wales would not be willing for them [warships] to go out of Australian waters; and if I estimate public opinion rightly, I think if we proposed any scheme which put it in the power of the Admiral on the station to remove the vessels paid for by the Colony, such a proposition would not be accepted.” 18

On this point the local is also the layman’s view, that adequate naval protection of a given area can only be afforded by warships which are actually in that area. This recurring argument, which had great political validity, was, of course, contrary to the Admiralty’s doctrine that “the seas are one.”

The second of the arguments which reflected the local point of view was that the defence of shipping was by no means the primary consideration for any of the colonies that it was for the United Kingdom. James Lorimer of Victoria stated that the interest in ships and cargoes of the colony which he represented was very small, and that it would be much cheaper for Victoria to pay the war-time insurance rates on her part of the cargoes than to pay her share of the proposed contribution to the Royal Navy. 19 “The ships that

17 Ibid., p. 473. Deakin, who was later to be three times Prime Minister of the Commonwealth and who strongly supported imperial preference, was probably the ablest of all the delegates.
18 Ibid., pp. 41 and 44.
19 Ibid., p. 45.
trade between England and the Colonies are undoubtedly more English than Colonial bottoms,” said the Premier of South Australia.20 “We are desirous, of course,” said Alfred Deakin, “of falling in, as far as may be possible, with the proposals of the Imperial Government for federal reasons. But we have always held that in the protection of shipping we had only a proportional interest.”21 Deakin also put the third of the local arguments before the conference: “Again, as we have often been promised some additions to the fleet in Australian waters, probably, the very squadron which is now proposed, or some portion of it, might have been obtained if this Conference had not been held, and if the Colonies had remained quiescent, and would then have been obtained at the sole cost of the Imperial Government.”22

Canada was represented at the conference by Sir Alexander Campbell the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario, and by Sandford Fleming. A largely negative policy, so far as direct naval defence was concerned, was presented by Campbell in a speech longer than its content demanded. He said that responsibility for the naval defence of the Empire had formerly been undertaken by the British Government. “It was not at that time a very burdensome undertaking upon them; I do not think it is so now. They maintain for Imperial purposes, as for other purposes, the North American Squadron, and so long as that Squadron is at our doors, Canada does not need any other naval defence.” He went on to say that Canada had acquired a coast on the Pacific which was also defended for the present by a squadron of the Royal Navy. He thought that it might be possible for Canada to afford some help. She had a large body of fishermen, estimated to number 80,000, and a school might be established in order to give them some naval training.23

Sandford Fleming had explained earlier in the conference, with great conviction and effectiveness, the strategic benefits conferred upon the British Empire by the Canadian Pacific Railway which had been opened for public use the year before. His intimate connection with that railway, particularly during its earliest years, lent additional interest to his remarks. Canada, he said, was generally thought of as being at one
extreme of the Empire, with Australia at the other; whereas, in fact, by way of the Pacific Ocean the two countries were relatively close to each other. Canada also lay between Great Britain and her rich colonies and dependencies in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Canadian Pacific was therefore a great imperial line of communication. It had been achieved by the Canadian people, at large expense to their government and without having cost the government of Great Britain anything at all. Fleming emphasized its usefulness as a postal, passenger, and telegraph route, between the United Kingdom on the one side and Australasia and Asia on the other. He pointed out that any fast mail steamers which the Canadian Pacific might in future operate across the Pacific would be available for use as armed merchant cruisers in time of war: 24

There is now a continuous line of railway from Halifax to the Pacific entirely on British soil. The Pacific Railway was opened for public use last year. Eight months before it was opened for public traffic the last rail was laid; but the last rail had not been laid many days when a consignment of naval stores passed through to the station of the North Pacific Fleet from Halifax. The time occupied on the then unfinished railway was seven days and a few hours from tide water of the Atlantic to Esquimalt. Without the railway it would have taken some three months to have sent the same stores in a British bottom to their destination. This one fact must be recognized as of striking significance, as it clearly shows the immense political value of the Canadian Railway. This new line practically brings what was once the most remote naval station, in the most distant Colony of the Empire, within about two weeks of Portsmouth. 25

The Canadian representatives at the conference circulated a memorandum which contained an offer by the Canadian Pacific Railway to undertake a fortnightly mail and passenger service to Australia, which would touch at Suva and terminate at Sydney. These liners would supplement the Canadian Pacific’s projected fast transatlantic service, and it was thought that the through time from Great Britain to Australia would be about thirty-four days. The Pacific service would require five new vessels, which would be designed to meet the Admiralty’s requirements for potential auxiliary cruisers. 26

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24 At the beginning of the First World War three Canadian Pacific liners, the Empress of Asia, Empress of Japan, and Empress of Russia, were armed as auxiliary cruisers and added to the Eastern Fleet.
26 Ibid., ii, pp. 87-8.
From the contemporary imperialist's point of view, this conference of 1887 was a major achievement. It established a precedent for similar meetings which were destined to become a permanent and notable imperial institution. The whole question of general imperial defence as a joint responsibility was squarely faced for the first time since the eighteenth century. The conference also originated, though not generally, the practice of small colonial contributions toward the cost of the Royal Navy. On the other hand, the discussions revealed very clearly the difficulties which were to beset every attempt to introduce the most effective measures of co-operation in time of peace. The colonies were eager to build an ambitious framework for economic collaboration; but Britain's predilection for free trade proved to be an insuperable obstacle. Britain herself was equally desirous that the colonies should co-operate fully, or at least generally, in centrally-controlled measures of defence: the reluctance of the colonies to give up any part of their autonomy, however, stood solidly in the way. The positive achievements of the conference were consequently limited; and in this respect all the later ones were destined to resemble it. In 1887 Canada showed that the problem of naval defence, local or imperial, had no place at all in the minds of her people, and her representatives revealed their unwillingness to commit her to a naval policy of any kind. Their successors were to take a similar stand at subsequent conferences during the next twenty years.

The Second Colonial Conference was held in Ottawa from June 28 to July 9, 1894, on the initiative of the Canadian Government. Its avowed purpose was to find means to increase trade between the colonies and to establish telegraphic and steam communication between certain of them, and the question of defence was not raised. Jan Hofmeyr referred to his proposal at the previous conference of a tariff over and above the local tariffs, the proceeds to be used for defence; but he did not renew the suggestion.  

The Third Colonial Conference assembled in 1897, the year of the Diamond Jubilee. The old Queen had come to be regarded as the majesty of Empire incarnate, and imperialist sentiment had reached its zenith. Joseph Chamberlain was at the Colonial Office; the Jameson Raid was a recent memory; and the Laurier Government, just come to power in

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Canada, had proposed a gratuitous preference on British goods. Capt. Mahan’s *Influence of Sea Power* had been published in 1890. In February 1895 the big-navy movement in Germany had been initiated by the Kaiser, and the Kiel Canal had been opened a few months later; while in Great Britain in the same year the naval estimates had exceeded those of the army for the first time in the century. During the jubilee celebrations an awe-inspiring spectacle was seen at Spithead, where thirty miles of warships, the flower of the Royal Navy and the greatest concentration of force which the world had ever seen, passed in stately procession before the Queen and her colonial and foreign guests.

It was in this atmosphere that the third conference was opened on June 24 by Chamberlain, who stated clearly his conception of what effective collaboration involved:

> It may be that the time has come, and if not I believe it will come, when the Colonies will desire to substitute for the slight relationship which at present exists a true partnership, and in that case they will want their share in the management of the Empire which we like to think is as much theirs as it is ours. But, of course, with the privilege of management and of control will also come the obligation and the responsibility. There will come some form of contribution towards the expense for objects which we shall have in common . . . . I think the charge upon the Exchequer [for land and naval defence] . . . constitutes more than one-third of the total income of the country. Now, these fleets, and this military armament, are not maintained exclusively, or even mainly, for the benefit of the United Kingdom, or for the defence of home interests. They are still more maintained as a necessity of empire . . . and if you will for a moment consider the history of this country . . . during the present reign, you will find that every war, great or small, in which we have been engaged, has had at the bottom a colonial interest . . . . If we had no Empire, there is no doubt whatever that our military and our naval resources would not require to be maintained at anything like their present level . . . . if Canada had not behind her to-day, and does not continue to have behind her this great military and naval power of Great Britain, she would have to make concessions to her neighbours, and to accept views which might be extremely distasteful to her in order to remain permanently on good terms with them.

He expressed pleasure and pride that several of the colonies had offered voluntary contributions. “The amount, of course, is at the present time absolutely trifling, but that is not the point. We are looking to the Colonies as still children, but rapidly approaching manhood.”

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Goschen, stated that the Admiralty was quite content with the existing ar-

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rangement with the Australian colonies, and he added that: “We should be very glad to open up negotiations with Canada, if not precisely on the same lines, because its situation is somewhat different, yet on other lines.” Referring to the doctrine of unrestricted Admiralty control, he said that:

... the object for which we want a free hand is to be able to conduct the defence of Australia on the same principles as those which we should follow in the defence of our English, Scotch and Irish ports, principles which exclude our undertaking to detach ships to particular ports .... We must rely upon the localities themselves for the defence of those ports, while, on our part, we undertake that no organized expedition should be directed against any part of Australia .... But I cannot conceive of any case, unless we lost actually our sea power, when we should think it our duty not to defend so valuable a portion of our Empire as Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania, for the safety of which we hold ourselves responsible in the same way as we hold ourselves responsible for the safety of the British Islands .... In all our strategical combinations we have never conceived the possibility that we should expose such possessions as the Australian Colonies.\(^{29}\)

The discussions which followed have never been published; but their results are known. The Australian naval subsidy was to be continued. The Prime Minister of Cape Colony announced to the conference that in accordance with a resolution of the Cape legislature favouring a contribution to the Royal Navy, he was prepared to offer on behalf of the colony an unconditional contribution of the cost of a first-class battleship.\(^{30}\) Canada was represented by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The leading exponent of British preference, he had, since his arrival in Britain, publicly expressed sentiments which seemed to stamp him as a whole-hearted imperial federalist:

It was, therefore, not without apparent reason that the imperialists thought that they had captured for their own this new romantic and appealing figure from the premier British dominion. But when the imperial conference met, Mr. Chamberlain, as colonial secretary, encountered not the orator intent on captivating his audience, but the cool, cautious statesman thinking of the folks at home.\(^{31}\)

Laurier firmly declined to commit Canada to any form of naval collaboration. The conference of 1897 agreed that it would be desirable in the future to hold periodical conferences of representatives of the colonies and Great Britain in order to discuss matters of common interest, and such conferences

\(^{29}\) Ibid., pp. 16-17.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 18.
\(^{31}\) Dafoe, Laurier, p. 63.
continued to be the principal forum for the discussion of imperial naval defence down to the outbreak of the First World War.

At these conferences the British Government, expressing the point of view of the professional sailors, strongly favoured a single and therefore uniform navy under one unfettered control. If this principle were accepted, unless some form of federation should place a new apex upon the imperial structure, the only way in which the colonies and Dominions could co-operate, other than by maintaining shore facilities, would be by contributing ships and men, or money, to the Royal Navy under Admiralty control. The case for a centralized authority was much stronger when applied to naval than to land forces, owing to the far greater mobility of warships than of soldiers, taken in conjunction with the ability of ships and fleets, if properly supplied, to reach almost any part of any ocean. Hostile warships, in a fleet or operating as raiders, might proceed to any part of the British Empire or its trade-routes in the event of war or the threat of war. A menace of this sort would have to be met wherever the enemy might be. The naval experts were therefore united in asking for authority to move every ship, without restriction, as freely as a chess-player moves any of his pieces over the whole board. Accordingly, the Admiralty advocated time and again, at the colonial and imperial conferences and elsewhere, the principle of undivided authority. The same is true of the strategic doctrine that the naval defence of scattered areas far removed from the source of the enemy's strength is not necessarily, or even usually, best afforded by warships permanently stationed in waters adjacent to the areas which need to be defended. This concept—which is one way of regarding the principle of the concentration of force—as applied to the naval defence of the British Empire, so often affirmed by the Admiralty, has perhaps received its clearest exposition from the pen of Capt. A. T. Mahan:

The question of the Eastern seas introduces naturally the consideration of what the great self-governing colonies can do, not only for their own immediate security, and that of their trade, but for the general fabric of Imperial naval action, in the coherence of which they will find far greater assurance than in merely local effort. The prime naval considerations for them are that the British Channel Fleet should adequately protect the commerce and shores of the British Islands, and that the Mediterranean Fleet should insure uninterrupted transit for trade and for reinforcements. These effected and maintained, there will be no danger to their territory; and little to their trade except from single cruisers, which
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will have a precarious subsistence as compared with their own, based upon large self-supporting political communities. Australasia, however, can undoubtedly supply a very important factor, that will go far to fortify the whole British position in the Far East. A continent in itself, with a thriving population, and willing, apparently, to contribute to the general naval welfare, let it frame its schemes and base its estimates on sound lines, both naval and imperial; naval, by allowing due weight to battle force; imperial, by contemplating the whole, and recognizing that local safety is not always best found in local precaution. There is a military sense, in which it is true that he who loses his life shall save it . . . .

Non-professional—and even military—minds need the habit of regarding local and general interests in their true relations and proportions. Unless such correct appreciation exist, it is hard to silence the clamor for a simple local security, which is apparent but not real, because founded on a subdivision and dissemination of force essentially contrary to sound military principle. What Australasia needs is not her petty fraction of the Imperial Navy, a squadron assigned to her in perpetual presence, but an organization of naval force which constitutes a firm grasp of the universal naval situation. Thus danger is kept remote; but, if it should approach, there is insured within reaching distance an adequate force to repel it betimes. There may, however, be fairly demanded the guarantee for the fleet's action, in a development of local dock-yard facilities and other resources which shall insure its maintenance in full efficiency if it have to come.

In this essential principle other colonies should acquiesce. The essence of the matter is that local security does not necessarily, nor usually, depend upon the constant local presence of a protector, ship or squadron, but upon general dispositions. As was said to and of Rodney, 'Unless men take the great line, as you do, and consider the King's whole dominions as under their care, the enemy must find us unprepared somewhere. It is impossible to have a superior fleet in every part.'

A policy for the naval defence of the Empire, however, could not be decided upon solely, or even mainly, by the rules of naval organization and strategy. In actual fact such a policy had to be framed, to a very large extent, in accordance with political considerations. The determining political factor obviously was the attitude of the self-governing dependencies; for Great Britain already had a naval policy and was not required to make any new decisions. It was in the power of these dependencies to contribute to a single navy, to create naval forces of their own, or to do nothing. It was realistic that in this matter political considerations should be allowed to override purely naval ones; for it seems almost certain that in the long run the issue actually lay, not between contributions and Dominion navies, but between the latter and no Dominion naval effort at all. A single control in the hands of the Admiralty was never popular in the dependencies, for

23 Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, pp. 199-204.
a number of reasons. Except in New Zealand, such a centralized authority was regarded by a majority of the people as an unacceptable curtailment of their sovereignty, as committing them in advance to active participation in every future British war, and as involving them in European militarism from which geography had striven so hard to free them. Naval defence was also thought of in some quarters as being a local rather than an imperial concern, which had best be achieved by means of strictly local force. The feeling persisted, moreover, and was particularly marked in Australia, that effective defence required ships that would be permanently stationed off the coasts to be defended, and that an unfettered Admiralty might withdraw such ships for larger or merely different purposes at the moment when the need for their presence was greatest.33

Although Canada did not make any direct contribution towards the Royal Navy, she was indirectly helping to increase its effectiveness by means of the two naval bases within her territory. In 1886 the newly-formed Halifax Graving Dock Co., Ltd., undertook to build at Halifax a dry dock of specified dimensions; in return for which the city of Halifax, the Canadian Government, and the Admiralty, each undertook to pay the company a subsidy of $10,000 a year for twenty years. In return for its subsidy the Admiralty obtained an undertaking that its warships were to be docked at the prevailing rates and with a priority over other ships. The dock was built by S. Pearson and Son of London, in association with S. M. Brookfield of Halifax. This very important addition to the base was opened in 1889, and the first ship to enter it was H.M.S. Canada, a composite steel, iron, and wooden warship of 2,770 tons.34 The importance of Halifax for the land defence of Canada in winter was multiplied when the Intercolonial Railway was completed in 1876. This line, the whole length of which lay on Canadian soil, started from Halifax and connected with the railways of central Canada at a point near Lévis in Quebec.

In the long period during which it occupied the base, the Royal Navy was an important ingredient in the economic

33 "Experience has taught that free nations, popular governments, will seldom dare wholly to remove the force that lies between an invader and its shores or capital." Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, p. 394.

34 Correspondence in N.S. 51-4-3 (1); information obtained from Halifax Shipyards Ltd. The dimensions of this dock were: average length, 570'; top width, 102'; bottom width, 70'; width of entrance, 85'; depth over sill at high water, 30'. In 1918 the dock was taken over by Halifax Shipyards Ltd.
and social life of the town or city of Halifax. As was natural in the circumstances, many young Nova Scotians entered the Royal Navy, of whom no less than seven advanced to flag rank. The best known of these admirals from Nova Scotia were Sir Provo William Parry Wallis, and George Augustus Westphal. Wallis was born in Halifax in 1791, and distinguished himself in the action between the Chesapeake and the Shannon, after which he brought both ships into Halifax. In 1877 he was advanced to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, and died in 1892 at the phenomenal age of a hundred and one. Westphal was born at Preston, N.S., in 1785, and entered the Royal Navy at the age of thirteen. He was present in the Victory at Trafalgar, where he was wounded. He reached the rank of Admiral and died in 1875.35

Soon after British Columbia had entered Confederation the government of that Province began to construct a dry dock adjoining the naval yard at Esquimalt. The Admiralty agreed to contribute £30,000 towards the cost, an amount which was later raised to £50,000, and the Dominion also contributed. The actual costs were soon leaving the estimates far behind, and the project became a serious political issue in the Province. The Dominion took over the ownership of the enterprise, and the dry dock, a large part of which had been cut out of solid rock, was opened on July 20, 1887.36 By agreement with the Canadian Government, for a period of fifteen years from January 1888, ships of the Royal Navy were to have priority in the use of this dock, and its services at cost. Before its completion, warships at Esquimalt requiring a dry dock had been sent to San Francisco.37

The existence of coal on Vancouver Island had been known at an early date, and in 1851 a coal mine was opened at Nanaimo within easy reach of Esquimalt. The Nanaimo coal was of good quality, though considered inferior for steaming purposes to the best Welsh product, and the presence of the mines so near at hand became an important asset as warships came to rely primarily or entirely on engines instead of sails. A coal depot was established on Thetis Island in 1860. In the same year Cole Island at the head of the harbour was placed at the disposal of the naval authorities and a magazine

35 Biographical sketches of these and other distinguished sailors from Nova Scotia who served in the Royal Navy are to be found in D.C. Harvey, “Nova Scotia and the Canadian Naval Tradition,” in The Canadian Historical Review, Sept. 1942.
36 Overall length, 450'; width of entrance, 65'; minimum depth over sill, 26 1/2'.
37 Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.), passim.
was established there. The first rifle range was situated on Coburg Peninsula, a spit outside the harbour: many years later, because of the increased range of service rifles, a new range was developed on Goose Spit near Comox. In 1889, after a dispute occasioned by the harbour-master’s having assigned a merchantman to an anchorage which the naval authorities had reserved for a warship, Constance Cove was set aside by Dominion Order in Council as a man-of-war anchorage.

The problem of desertion, common to many naval stations, always faced the Royal Navy to an unusual degree at Esquimalt, chiefly because American territory lay so near at hand. The proverbially high wages and pleasant conditions of life in the United States were a constant temptation to discontented sailors. In 1874 H.M.S. Myrmidon at Esquimalt had an abnormally unfortunate experience. On March 8, six of her crew, having tampered with the gear of the other boats so as to ensure delay in lowering them, pulled off in a whaler. The deserters were pursued, but with a good start, and darkness coming on, they succeeded in escaping. Three days later one of Myrmidon’s cutters, in charge of the gunner and a petty officer, was sent in search of the missing whaler. While the gunner was making enquiries on shore, the eight men who formed the crew threw the petty officer out of the boat, shoved off, and deserted.\(^{38}\) During the Fraser River gold rush many years earlier, H.M.S. Satellite was being employed in the river keeping order and enforcing the customs regulations. More than twenty of her men having deserted, the Colonial Government agreed to provide the crew with a special allowance additional and equal to their naval pay.\(^{39}\)

In the year 1885, after long delay during which all the resources of the engineers and financiers alike were called into play, the transcontinental line of the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed, connecting at one end with the railway lines of eastern Canada, and having its western terminus at Vancouver. One of the many results of this great achievement was that Esquimalt was in effect brought much nearer to Great Britain. Thenceforth it also offered close protection to a key point on a new, rapid, and relatively safe route between

\(^{38}\) Cdr. Richard Hare to Sec. Admiralty, Mar. 12, 1874, British Columbia—Records of the Senior Naval Officer Stationed at Esquimalt, 1 (B.C. Archives).

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Great Britain and the Far East. The line of the Canadian Pacific was likened by a distinguished naval writer, in 1886, to an artificial north-west passage which would take the place of the one that nature had failed to provide.\(^4\) Naval opinion was by this time becoming doubtful that Great Britain would be able to use the Mediterranean in time of war, in which case shipping would be obliged to resort either to the Cape route or to the new one which the Canadian Pacific had provided.\(^4\)

The publicity which the British Columbia base received at this time was reflected in the United States Senate on one occasion, when a certain Senator who was eloquently demanding stronger coast defences pointed to Esquimalt and the warships stationed there as being a potential threat:

... at Victoria on Vancouver Island she [Great Britain] keeps constantly from one to three war ships convenient to the commercial cities along the Sound and upon the Columbia River, and within forty-eight hours to [sic] the wealthy and populous city of San Francisco. She has recently ordered ... twenty Armstrong 80-ton guns for her fortifications at Vancouver Island, to frown on our defenceless coast just across the straits of Juan de Fuca, and she has notified the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company to be ready to transport them with other war material across the continent in April next.\(^4\)

By 1893 and probably earlier, naval personnel and the less bulky stores were being transported to and from Esquimalt across the North Atlantic and the line of the Canadian Pacific, a very much quicker though more expensive route than the old one around Cape Horn.\(^4\) In 1895 the Admiralty approved that invalids from the China Station should be returned to Britain across Canada.\(^4\)

The results of the Bering Sea controversy were of considerable importance for the Esquimalt base. The fur seals of the Pacific range widely over the ocean, but return each year to their home islands to bear their young and to breed. Their habits made them an easy prey for numerous sealers who were induced to pursue them by the great value of the skins. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the principal remaining herd was the one frequenting the Pribilof Islands, and these had become an American possession with

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\(^4\) See Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, pp. 225-6.

\(^4\) Senate debate, Feb. 16, 1887, Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., xviii, p. 1810.

\(^4\) Correspondence in Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.), i.

\(^4\) Admiralty to Vice Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle, Apr. 8, 1895, ibid., viii.
the purchase of Alaska in 1867. In 1869 and 1870 the Congress of the United States passed laws to protect the fur seals upon the islands and in adjacent waters. Sealers of other nationalities therefore resorted to hunting on the high seas, a method which necessarily resulted in the destruction of large numbers of females and pups, and even threatened to extinguish the species. In 1886 and subsequent years certain British Columbia vessels were seized and condemned by the United States authorities for taking seals, contrary to laws of the United States, in waters over which that country claimed jurisdiction. The British Government protested against these seizures, and after prolonged negotiations it was agreed in 1892 that the question should be arbitrated.

A tribunal was accordingly set up, on which each of the parties to the dispute was represented by two nominees, the other members being appointed by disinterested European governments. The decision was against the American claim. The tribunal then prescribed certain regulations designed to protect the seals outside the three-mile limit, and these rules were put into effect by the two governments. They proved to be inadequate, however, owing to the fact that sealing on the high seas was continued by hunters who were neither British subjects nor American citizens. In July 1911, therefore, a convention was signed by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan, which prohibited such sealing in the North Pacific, and awarded to each of the interested nations a fixed percentage of all the skins that should be taken thenceforth.

In 1894, no doubt as a result of the need for enforcing the regulations laid down by the arbitrators, the Pacific Station was extended so as to include the Hawaiian Islands and the more important of the American islands in the Bering Sea. For many years the sealing patrols carried out for the purpose of helping to implement the fur-seal agreements were an important function of warships based on Esquimalt. In addition to their obvious general usefulness, these patrols provided excellent naval training for the ships concerned.

45 As a result of separate arbitration proceedings the United States paid $473,151.26 as reparation for the seizing and condemning of the Canadian sealers.

46 Latané, History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 461-72; Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, pp. 418-18; Ward and Gooch, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, iii, p. 226.

47 See Admiralty to C. in C. Pac. Station, Jan. 1, 1894, Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.), iii.
By the end of the century, owing to the creation or expansion of other navies, the relative strength of the Royal Navy on its stations abroad had changed very much for the worse, and the former superiority of the squadron on the Pacific Station had passed away. In 1893 the Commander in Chief was told that the Mediterranean Fleet was to be strengthened by a ship which would be taken from his command, and a few years later his successor asked that the squadron should be strengthened. Rear Admiral Bickford called the Admiralty's attention in 1901 to "the (in my opinion) dangerously weak state of the Squadron on the Pacific Coast." In support of this opinion he contrasted the ten warships of all sorts which were at his disposal against the nineteen which the United States maintained on that coast. When he brought up the subject again the following year, Bickford chose his words clumsily and was told that:

Their Lordships do not consider it becoming in you to apply the remark 'ridiculously small' to the dimensions of the Squadron which they have thought it right to place under your orders.

These incidents and opinions foreshadowed the radical change in policy which the Admiralty was to announce in 1904.

Throughout the period covered by this chapter the official attitude of Canada in regard to naval defence remained wholly negative, and at the colonial conferences the weight of the senior British dependency was heavy in the scales on which policy was weighed. To most Canadians the world of international power politics seemed too remote to call forth action, and only when an unusually obvious and apparently imminent threat appeared, early in the twentieth century, was positive action taken.

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48 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 351.
49 Warspite (flag-ship), Phaeton, Amphion, Icarus, Condor, Egeria (surveying ship), Virago, Sparrowhawk, and Torpedo Boats Nos. 39 and 40.
Chapter 4

THE GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

The last three decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a revolution in international affairs. Technological progress and mutual distrust encouraged a competition which was to lead Mr. Winston Churchill to declare on March 18, 1912: "The spectacle which the naval armaments of Christendom afford at the present time will no doubt excite the curiosity and the wonder of future generations."

As the century drew to its close Great Britain's naval position had deteriorated to a point where she no longer felt safe in continuing the policy of "splendid isolation," a policy of no commitments, which she had pursued since the Napoleonic Wars. The appearance on the stage of three new Powers of the first rank—Germany, Japan, and the United States, all with strong navies, and two of them outside Europe, was, from the British point of view, of the greatest significance.

Against the navies of Japan and the United States the traditional blockading cordon, drawn around part of western Europe and based on ports in the British Isles, could not be used. Moreover the important navies became so numerous that British naval forces could no longer hope to match any possible combination of them.

British foreign policy gradually adjusted itself to these great changes in its environment. Relations with the United States were progressively improved until, in the twentieth century, the possibility of war with that country was practically eliminated. To offset her growing naval inferiority in the Pacific, Britain formed with Japan in 1902 a defensive alliance which applied to that ocean. With the young and aggressive German Empire Great Britain sought more than once in the closing years of the nineteenth century to establish some kind of alliance or understanding, but none of these attempts succeeded. Britain therefore looked elsewhere, and in 1904, after careful diplomatic preparation, entered into an entente with France. In 1907 she established a similar agreement with France's ally Russia.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Germany proved to be by far the most disturbing of the new factors in the international balance of power. After 1890 her policy appeared to be aggressive and expansionist, and her army was so strong that it seemed doubtful whether any land forces in Europe could contain it. More immediately disquieting, from the British point of view, was the fact that, beginning in 1898, the German Reichstag passed a series of navy laws, under the authority of which a very powerful navy was developed. The moulder of the new German Navy, and the principal driving force behind its development, was a naval officer, Alfred von Tirpitz.

The rapid growth, and apparent purpose, of Tirpitz’s navy which lay at Britain’s own back door, aroused the minds of the British Government and people to an anxiety which at times was tightened to the pitch of alarm, and to a firm determination to provide adequate shelter against the possible or probable storm. So far-reaching were the results of the German naval threat, and so decisively did it affect Canadian policy, that some attention must be given to its background and significance.

From 1858 until early in the eighteen-nineties, British naval expenditures had not shown any very striking increase. Thereafter, however, the expansion of naval shipbuilding throughout the world began to be clearly reflected in the British naval Estimates. In 1895 these had exceeded the army Estimates for the first time in the century.1 It is a mistake to suppose that the general public in Britain, all through the nineteenth century, had been keenly aware of the navy and its importance; nevertheless the island people, in contrast to the Germans, almost instinctively thought of the navy first when they thought of defence at all. Before the end of the century the navy was in the forefront of public consciousness, and no organized propaganda was necessary in order to obtain increased appropriations.2 Between the passage of the two first German navy laws and the establishment of the entente with France, the German Navy bulked ever larger in the mind of the Admiralty whenever plans for building ships were being considered.

As compared with other continental navies, Tirpitz’s young fleet was increasing at an unequalled rate and in

1 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 235.
2 In 1901 the German Navy League claimed 600,000 and the British Navy League 15,000 members.
quality was rightly judged to be in a class by itself. The German ships, built for strength rather than speed, later proved to be almost indestructible, and their armament and equipment were excellent. The organization was very good, as was the quality of the officers and men. The cardinal feature of Tirpitz’s navy was the line of battle, and for this reason the Anglo-German naval rivalry which continued down to the outbreak of the First World War was to a considerable extent a competition in the building of capital ships. It was this feature which received almost all the attention of the general public, especially after the launching of the Dreadnought.

The technical improvements which characterized the nineteenth century had included a very large increase in the range of guns, which in turn, together with the greater speed of ships, had presented the naval gunner with a whole series of pretty problems. These difficulties were largely overcome by a radical change in the theory and practice of gunnery, a change which is closely associated with the name of Sir Percy Scott.\(^3\) One thing leads to another, and it was not long before a new ship had been produced to meet the needs of the new gunnery. Throughout the nineteenth century the Admiralty had always refrained from introducing novelties which seemed likely to make obsolescent existing ships or armament, on the ground that any such innovation would penalize the stronger navy. In December 1905, however, the keel of H.M.S. Dreadnought was laid in Portsmouth Dockyard, and she was completed the following year. For her time she was a very large ship, and her extra size was used to provide a high rate of speed; but these were conventional improvements. The peculiar feature of the Dreadnought was her armament, which consisted almost wholly of very large guns of the same calibre.\(^4\) Because of this, her striking power was far greater than that of any previous ship at the medium and long ranges which her superior speed would enable her to maintain. Her uniform armament was ideal for the practitioners of the new gunnery. A limited number of medium-calibre guns were later introduced into ships of the Dreadnought type; but emphasis on large guns of uniform calibre has been the general rule ever since.

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\(^3\) See Clowes, The Royal Navy, vii, p. 52; Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, passim.

\(^4\) Length of the Dreadnought, 526'; displacement, 17,900 tons; speed, 21 k.; complement, 800; cost, £1,797,497.
The *Dreadnought* completely outclassed every other ship afloat; nevertheless the Admiralty’s wisdom in building her was questioned at once in many quarters. According to the Kaiser:

At the first conference regarding the introduction of the ‘dreadnought’ type of big fighting ship by England... Admiral von Tirpitz remarked... that England had robbed her enormous pre-dreadnought force, upon which her great superiority rested, of its fighting value.5

Lloyd George states that: “The laying down of the Dreadnought seemed to many of us a piece of wanton and profligate ostentation.”6 On the other hand, the *Dreadnought* forced Germany, at great expense, to enlarge the Kiel Canal which was too small for ships of her type. The essential features of the Dreadnought design had already been thought of, moreover, both in Italy and the United States. A ship of that type, therefore, would almost certainly have been built before long; and the Admiralty would have been running a small but unnecessary risk by not taking the lead. It is suggested, not very confidently, that the Admiralty was probably right.7

In October 1904, Tirpitz’s British equivalent, Sir John Fisher, became First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. This fearless, tactless, immensely energetic genius, “the most distinguished British Naval officer since Nelson”,8 proceeded without delay to bring about a number of sweeping changes in the Royal Navy. These were to result in placing the existing ships in a more effective condition in face of the apparent German threat. They also achieved a considerable saving of expense, which was particularly important at this time. The radical wing of the Liberal Party had for many years been of the opinion that the navy Estimates exceeded what was required for defence pure and simple, and that the needlessly large navy was dangerous to peace and a consumer of money which was urgently needed for social reform. The naval Estimates had expanded from £27,522,000 in the year 1900, to £36,889,000 in 1904, and in 1903 and 1904 they were widely criticized as being excessive.9

In December 1904 the Admiralty issued a memorandum which expressed the opinion that the principles governing the

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6 Lloyd George Memoirs, 1, p. 9.
7 For fuller accounts of the *Dreadnought* and her importance, see Marder, *Anatomy of Sea Power*, ch. 27; Woodward, *Britain and the German Navy*, ch. 5.
existing distribution of the Royal Navy had been invalidated by the development of foreign navies, and pointed out that:

The new German navy has come into existence; it is a navy of the most efficient type and is so fortunately circumstanced that it is able to concentrate almost the whole of its fleet in its home waters.

The memorandum stated in addition that:

The principles on which peace distribution of His Majesty's ships and the arrangement of their stations are based, date from a period when the electric telegraph did not exist and when wind was the motive power. ... In the opinion of the Board of Admiralty ... the new conditions described above have necessitated a review and readjustment of this distribution of ships and arrangement of stations.

A new disposition of the fleets and squadrons was therefore proposed in the interest of fighting efficiency and of economy. 10

The redistribution was carried out. The squadrons on several of the outlying stations were abolished, while others were diminished, and a number of bases were closed. Among those which were withdrawn was the Pacific Squadron, based on Esquimalt; and the sloop H.M.S. Shearwater was stationed there for any services that might be required on the Pacific coast, particularly for duties connected with the Bering Sea fisheries. The essence of the redistribution was that a larger proportion of the whole Royal Navy would be stationed in home waters, facing the German Navy. The fleets and squadrons everywhere were as far as possible to be kept concentrated, and thus ready for instant action at all times. Warships of the reserve were to be kept in commission, with nucleus crews, ready to proceed to sea at a few hours' notice. 11 Nearly a hundred and fifty of the oldest ships of all descriptions were put on the scrap heap, and their former crews were used to form the nucleus crews of the reserve ships. 12 The strain which the battleships would have to bear in time of war had been reduced to some extent when the policy of a close blockade had been finally abandoned a short time before. 13

After 1905 a series of incidents underlined the growing seriousness of the situation. In 1906 a third German navy law was passed, which authorized an increased building programme. Early in 1908 the fourth of these laws was en-

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11 Ibid. Cd. 2430.
13 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 368.
acted, a measure that reduced the age of warships in commission and increased the rate at which the old ships would be replaced by new ones. During the Anglo-German race in naval armaments, which was to continue as long as peace lasted, the pace was necessarily set by the weaker naval Power. The British Government made many attempts, at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 and through direct diplomatic approaches, to arrange that the competitive building for both navies should be stopped, or delayed, or limited. But the German Government consistently either refused to consider any of these suggestions, or would consider them only if they were sweetened by a political *quid pro quo* which Britain could not concede. The tenacity of the Germans in this matter made the Anglo-German naval problem insoluble.

An incident which for a few weeks seemed to threaten the peace of Europe, occurred in September 1908, when French officials at Casablanca caught the local German consul in the act of helping six men of the Foreign Legion to desert by escaping to a German steamer which was lying off the port. The following month Austria-Hungary suddenly announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which caused both anxiety and ill-feeling in Russia, the Balkans, and Italy. During 1908 also, the advisability of resorting to conscription in England was raised in very responsible quarters, and in November, in the House of Lords, Lord Roberts laid the question squarely before the whole country:

Across the narrow seas, opposite our shores, within a few hours' steaming of our coasts, there is a people numbering over 60,000,000; our most active rivals in commerce and the greatest military Power in the world, no longer depending upon her supremacy in one arm, but adding to an overwhelming military strength a naval force which she is resolutely and rapidly increasing; while we, on our side, are not attempting to take any military precautions in response .... and it is my absolute belief that, without a military organization more adequate to the certain perils of the future, our Empire will fall from us and our power will pass away.\(^{14}\)

Lord Fisher states that at some time in 1908 he suggested to King Edward that it would be "a sagacious act on England's part to seize the German Fleet when it was so very easy of accomplishment", and thus "to repeat Nelson's Copenhagen."\(^{15}\) This unregenerate idea, however, was never seriously considered by anyone in authority, and possibly not

\(^{14}\) *Hansard*, 4th Series, cxcvi, pp. 1693-5.

even by Fisher himself. The events of this overclouded year had given rise to a vigorous campaign in the press of each country, and these verbal hostilities had stimulated ill-feeling on both sides. It is easy to see why, during the year 1908, Great Britain cast anxious glances to seaward, fearful of what the future might hold in store.

In the middle of the summer Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, stated in a memorandum to King Edward:

If the Germans continue to execute their Naval programme at a rapid speed, we shall certainly have to ask Parliament to vote a considerable increase to our expenditure: no Government of either party could avoid doing so. The justification and necessity for this increase, which would have to be openly avowed, would be the German expenditure . . . If the German fleet ever becomes superior to ours, the German Army can conquer this country. There is no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany: for however superior our Fleet was, no naval victory would bring us any nearer to Berlin. It is certain that if we have to propose a greater Naval expenditure next year the effect on the Press here and on public feeling in both England and Germany will be adverse to good relations. If, on the other hand, the Germans are willing to arrest the increase of their Naval expenditure, we should do the same.16

These words express a point of view which, with minor variations, the British Government was to maintain to the very end. In the last days of 1908, Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, reported to Bülow, the Imperial Chancellor, that:

Last summer was the psychological moment. At that time a little yielding might have achieved much. At present this is scarcely the case. Then the English Government was irresolute and uncertain. Now they are determined to compete with us in Dreadnoughts on the basis of the Two-Power Standard.17

Early in January 1909 the Chancellor restated the German Government’s view, with a qualification attached, in a private letter:

It is all the same to us how many ships England wants to build. We are building our fleet solely for defence according to our general economic and political needs, and not in competition with England ... we can depart from our statutory, fixed, naval programme, only if England is ready to satisfy us in other parts of the world . . .18

Meanwhile the German naval threat, as seen in Britain, appeared to have taken on a new and menacing feature. In

16 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi, App. iii.
December 1908 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, told Metternich that he believed that the German facilities for building warships had become more highly developed than those in Britain. Early in January, Grey had a conversation with the German Ambassador:

I told Count Metternich to-day that we had been considering our Naval Estimates for the forthcoming year: they would have to be very serious . . . I then told . . . Metternich that, according to our information, if the German shipbuilding proceeded at its normal rate, Germany would have 13 'Dreadnoughts' completed by February 1912; if materials were collected in advance for the four next 'Dreadnoughts', as had been done in the case of four vessels already, Germany would have 17 'Dreadnoughts' completed by February 1912; and if the full German shipbuilding capacity was used without financial restriction, Germany might have 21 'Dreadnoughts' ready by April 1912 . . . Therefore, if we did not take due precautions, there might come a time when, in spite of all the efforts we might subsequently make, there would be a period of some six months during which Germany's force of 'Dreadnoughts' would be superior to ours.

Metternich replied that Germany's naval programme was fixed by law, and that she would not exceed it. Two months later he told Grey that he had heard considerable comment in London, both in political circles and in society, on the supposed quickening of the German programme of construction. He explained that materials had been collected in advance for four of the earlier ships of the programme, because, although the building of the vessels had been decided upon, the designs had not been finally settled. As the contracts had been awarded, however, the contractors were in a position to collect and prepare materials for building these ships. Grey then suggested that the British naval attaché in Berlin should be allowed to see, without examining in detail, all the ships which the German Government was actually constructing, and that in that case reciprocal advantages would be given to the German attaché in London. To this suggestion Metternich gave a non-committal answer. His not entirely satisfactory denials put the British Government in an awkward position. To act as though the German assurances were valueless would be rude; yet for various reasons they did not feel safe in assuming that there had been, and would be, no acceleration of building in Germany. They therefore chose to be safe rather than polite.

20 Grey to Goschen, Jan. 4, 1909, Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents*, vi, pp. 237-8. Sir Edward Goschen was British Ambassador in Berlin. The Admiralty's evidence which indicated that German construction was being accelerated has never been published.
The exceptionally strong Liberal government which was in power from 1905 onwards was always at a double disadvantage in dealing with the threat which the German naval programmes implied. The Liberal Party had the reputation of laying less emphasis upon national defence than did the Opposition. This fact increased their vulnerability to attacks delivered by those who claimed that the Royal Navy was not being increased fast enough. On this question, moreover, the Liberal Party was itself divided. The social-reform wing, led by Lloyd George and which Mr. Churchill usually supported, while it favoured adequate naval defence, was apt to feel that the actual naval expenditures were extravagant. The "imperialist" wing was led by Asquith, Grey, and Haldane, the Secretary of State for War. The naval policy which was actually pursued was generally in accord with the views of this group, to which, whenever the naval situation seemed unusually grave, the decisive influence of Lloyd George was always given.

When building requirements were being considered in the spring of 1909, the possibility that the Germans were going ahead of their schedule caused the Admiralty to ask for no less than eight Dreadnoughts:

For some days there was a Cabinet crisis. Eventually it was observed that all eight ships could not be laid down at once, and it was agreed that the construction should proceed in a manner that would not delay the completion of the eight ships if reflection and further knowledge proved them to be necessary, but on the understanding that reduction of the number could be made, if it became apparent that the need for them had been overestimated. To the public and the Press at this time 'eight ships' became a formula, but in the Cabinet the difference was about substance and not formula. No one of us wanted eight ships, unless they were really required; every one of us was prepared to agree to them, if they were proved necessary to secure national safety.22

The naval Estimates for the ensuing year were introduced in the House of Commons on March 16, 1909.23 The First Lord of the Admiralty asked for four Dreadnoughts; but he said that there were certain circumstances which might make it necessary for the government, later in the year, to order the laying down of four additional ones, a contingent action which he desired the House to authorize. The government's

22 Grey, Twenty-five Years, 1, p. 193.
23 Debate of Mar. 16, 1909, in Hansard, New Series, ii, pp. 980-95. This debate was the immediate cause of the adoption by Canada, for the first time, of a positive naval policy. The Foster resolution was introduced in the House of Commons in Ottawa, on Mar. 29, 1909, and the Royal Canadian Navy was established the following year.
strong desire to economize was overborne by the necessity of safeguarding the Empire at any cost. Several Powers were rapidly developing their naval strength, but none as fast as Germany. McKenna said that the Admiralty no longer knew the rate at which the Germans were building, and had been informed of materials collected in advance for four Dreadnoughts, or even eight. It was possible, therefore, that instead of having nine ships completed in 1911, Germany might have thirteen in that year, and seventeen by April 1912. Reference was made to the extraordinary growth of facilities in Germany for building warships of the largest size. McKenna also justified the maintaining of a large superiority in cruisers.

Arthur Balfour, Leader of the Opposition, took an even more serious view of the situation than the First Lord had done. He said that this particular matter, unlike almost all of those with which Parliament usually had to deal, if decided wrongly, could never in the future be set right. The German shipyards had come to equal those of Britain in speed of building: the Admiralty, therefore, could no longer wait to see what rivals might project, and then lay down an answer which would be finished first. According to Balfour’s calculations, by the end of 1910 the Germans would possess thirteen Dreadnoughts as against ten British ones. By April 1912 they might have twenty-one, or even twenty-five: while Britain would only possess twenty. A situation had arisen so new and dangerous that its full meaning was hard to realize. The proposed programme of construction, in Balfour’s opinion, was utterly insufficient. He implored the government to make use, without delay, of every means to preserve, not the two-Power standard which had already broken down entirely, but a mere one-Power standard which seemed to be slipping from Britain’s grasp.

The Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, pointed out that the Germans had hitherto firmly refused even to consider any suggestion to reduce naval armaments on both sides, and that Great Britain must therefore build against them. He estimated that by April 1912 Britain would have twenty Dreadnoughts, if the four contingent ones were included; while the Germans might dispose of seventeen. Asquith acknowledged that the German Government had distinctly disavowed any intention to accelerate their programme of construction; but he added that they had not pledged them-
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selves. This statement was a tactful attempt to escape from the dilemma mentioned above. The Prime Minister admitted that Britain had lost her monopoly of rapid construction, adding that: "This is a fatal and most serious fact."

The three speakers were obviously trying hard to meet in advance the arguments of those who were likely to oppose the government on grounds of economy. Later in the debate the advocates of reduced expenditures on armaments had much to say; but it was generally agreed that the country must be sufficiently protected. What constituted adequate protection was the only point of controversy. Metternich reported to his chief the following day:

The earnestness with which yesterday's debate in the House of Commons on the state of the navy was conducted, shows the enormous importance attributed to this question by the members of both Parties.... In the speeches of Mr. McKenna and Mr. Asquith, as well as in that of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Balfour, there was an evident attempt to raise the question of naval armaments above the level of party controversy.24

After several days of discussion the Estimates were passed. The first four Dreadnoughts were laid down, as also were the four contingent ones at a later date. The alarm which this debate had sounded brought an immediate response from the Dominions and self-governing colonies, and on April 30, 1909, the British Government suggested the holding of a special Imperial Conference to consider what was to be done, and the conference was duly held that summer.

The day after the Estimates had been introduced, Metternich called on Grey in order to express his "surprise and regret" that his previous denial of any German intention to accelerate building had been disregarded. The Ambassador had, in fact, been telling the truth, and the British Government's policy of construction, following on the heels of his assurances, had naturally annoyed not only Metternich himself, but the Kaiser and Tirpitz as well.25 The German Government at this time was considering some concession in warship-building, in exchange for territorial compensation or a guarantee of British neutrality in the event of war. Even the rigid Tirpitz was now willing to think of this, and

25 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi, pp. 242-3, 255, 275. The British Government did not know until later that the information which had caused them to suspect the Germans of accelerating their building was incorrect, and the form of the German denials had aroused suspicion.
the Kaiser followed him as usual. Bethmann Hollweg replaced Bülow as Chancellor in July, and for a time it looked as though some agreement might be reached; but all the negotiations ended in failure.26

In 1911 there occurred another of the violent international crises which characterized those years, and the last of which ended in war. In Morocco, where France had a special position, discontent had led to a revolt, and French troops were sent to occupy the capital. Germany regarded this as a violation of the existing agreement regarding Morocco, and she also seems to have wanted to use the situation as a means of obtaining concessions from France. On July 1 a German warship steamed into Agadir, ostensibly to protect German nationals. Three days later Grey warned Germany that Great Britain would expect to be consulted as to any new arrangement concerning Morocco. The definite, but negative, British interest in that country was to prevent any potentially unfriendly naval power from obtaining a base so close to three important British trade routes. More than two weeks passed without a reply from the German Government.

On July 21, at the bankers' annual banquet in his honour as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George plainly warned Germany that if Britain were to be forced into a position where she had to choose between peace and the maintenance of her vital interests, she would choose the latter.27 Germany backed down, and peace was preserved for a while longer; but the distrust and ill-feeling on both sides had been stirred up once more. The vicious circle in which the nations of Europe were constrained to move during these years is admirably illustrated by an entry in Tirpitz's memoirs, which mentioned a by-product of the Agadir incident:

With these ideas in my mind I went to Berlin in the autumn [1911], and represented to the Chancellor that we had suffered a diplomatic check, and must salve it by a Supplementary Naval Bill.28

Early in 1912, with Tirpitz's supplementary law in the offing and no agreement in sight, the British Government decided to try a new method. The idea of direct conversations between German and British statesmen seems to have been suggested by Albert Ballin of the Hamburg-Amerika Line,

26 See ibid., especially pp. 283-324.
27 Lloyd George Memoirs, i, p. 44n.
28 Tirpitz, Memoirs, i, p. 211.
through his friend Sir Ernest Cassel, a German who had become a British subject. The ground was prepared as carefully as possible, and the British Government then sent Haldane to Berlin, not as a plenipotentiary, but with instructions to discuss fully with the Germans the difficulties between the two countries, to try to find a basis for an agreement to limit the construction of new warships, and to report to the Cabinet. The Secretary of State for War was chosen for this mission partly because he knew Germany and spoke the language. On February 8, 1912, Haldane arrived in Berlin. He had a long conversation with the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, who was anxious for an understanding, but told Haldane that "my admirals are very difficult." The next day he had a meeting with the Kaiser and Tirpitz. The latter was no compromiser, but he seemed willing to consider some of Haldane's proposals. The immediate result of these conversations was a proposed agreement which both governments were to consider further. Very briefly, neither country would attack the other, and in any war in which one was not an aggressor, the other would remain neutral, subject to the obligations of existing treaties. The possibility of certain colonial concessions to Germany was also to be explored. The Germans would consider slowing up the building of the Dreadnoughts provided for in their intended new navy law, which Tirpitz would not give up. This last suggestion fell far short of what Britain wanted, for it was even less than a subtraction from an addition. The French and Russian governments had been very uneasy while these negotiations were under way, even though they had been kept fully informed throughout, because they feared that Britain might commit herself to unconditional neutrality.

The Haldane Mission was a flat failure, and nothing came of it except more ill-feeling. According to the German Chancellor:

I, personally, had made up my mind to work for the limit of concession in the question of the Naval Bill, provided that I could find a compensating counterweight in a political agreement. But this England would not give us.

In Grey's version:

The upshot was that the Germans were not really willing to give up the naval competition, and that they wanted a political formula that would

29 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi, pp. 666-700; Grosse Politik, xxxi.
30 Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections, i, p. 54.
in effect compromise our freedom of action. We could not fetter ourselves by a promise to be neutral in a European war.\(^3^1\)

What the Germans feared was a war in which France and Russia would be combined against them, and they wanted a promise, in advance, of British neutrality in such a war. Britain was willing to give this undertaking, provided that it should not apply to a war in which Germany was the aggressor. For an unconditional promise of neutrality would have made the *ententes* worthless to France and Russia, and would have prevented Great Britain from pursuing her traditional and basic policy of trying to prevent any single State from dominating the continent. It would also have been in conflict with the terms of certain treaties, including one with Belgium which later became famous. To the Germans, on the other hand, a conditional promise was of little use. They knew that in any case they would probably appear to be the aggressors, because their army would be mobilized at unequalled speed and their strategic plans called for a swiftly-moving offensive against France.

On March 18, 1912, before the Haldane negotiations had quite reached their futile end, the British naval Estimates for 1912-13 were introduced by Mr. Winston Churchill, who had relieved McKenna at the Admiralty the previous year. The new First Lord spoke at some length on the financial aspects of the competition in warships. He concluded that the only safe rule was for the Admiralty to maintain the smallest navy consistent with full security. Though it might become necessary later, he was not then prepared to recommend the laying of two keels to one against Germany. A two-Power standard had served as long as France and Russia were at the same time the two next strongest naval Powers, and also "what one might call the most probable adverse diplomatic combination." The actual standard for new construction which the Admiralty had used during recent years had been a 60\% superiority over Germany alone, in Dreadnoughts, with other and higher standards for the smaller vessels. This moderate yardstick would not serve for ever, because it took into account the great British superiority in pre-Dreadnoughts, which would gradually disappear; but it would do for a time. Mr. Churchill asked that four Dreadnoughts be laid down in the coming year:

\(^3^1\) Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, 1, pp. 243-4.
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The Admiralty are prepared to guarantee absolutely the main security of the country and of the Empire, day by day for the next few years, and if the House will grant us what we ask for the future, that prospect may be indefinitely extended.

The First Lord went on to assert that if the Germans should add to their existing programme, Britain would lay two keels to one in respect to any such additional ships. "Let me make clear, however, that any retardation or reduction in German construction will, within certain limits, be promptly followed here, as soon as it is apparent, by large and fully proportional reductions." In 1913, for example, Germany was apparently planning to lay down three capital ships, and Britain would accordingly have to lay down five. If both countries were to take a holiday from building Dreadnoughts in that year, Germany would save herself between £6,000,000 and £7,000,000:

We should not in ordinary circumstances begin our ships until she has started hers. The three ships that she did not build would therefore automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential super-Dreadnoughts, and that is more than I expect them to hope to do in a brilliant naval action.

The indirect results for the whole world, of such an act, would be "immeasurable in their hope and brightness."

Mr. Churchill expressed the opinion that Britain's facilities for building warships were entirely adequate. "The House may take it for certain, therefore, that there is absolutely no danger of our being overtaken unless we decide as a matter of policy to be so." Speaking of the Estimates in general he asked for large margins of safety. An attack on Germany was out of the question: the Royal Navy was therefore obliged to stand on the defensive, and must have such a preponderance as would enable it to meet at its average moment, the naval forces of an attacking Power at their selected time. Britain was fed from the sea, he continued, and was the only Power in Europe which did not possess a large army. He said that reference was often made to the proportion which the navies of different countries should bear to the commercial interests of those countries: "but when we consider our naval strength we are not thinking of our commerce, but of our freedom." In the course of the debate which followed, Sir Gilbert Parker said that his interest in imperial affairs led him to deplore the fact that the First Lord had not once alluded to the very great importance
of the Dominions in naval defence. He thought that contributions to the Royal Navy would never satisfy the Parliaments or people of the Dominions, and therefore preferred individual navies co-ordinated with the general policy of the Admiralty; and he also asked what the Canadian Government intended to do.  

Tirpitz’s request of the previous fall for a supplementary navy bill wherewith to salve the wound of Agadir, had been granted, and shortly after the debate outlined above his bill was passed by the Reichstag. On July 22, 1912, Mr. Churchill asked the House of Commons for more money. “The direct cause of the Supplementary Estimates which I am now going to submit to the House is to be found in the new German Navy Law.” He said that the main feature of this law was not the rise in new construction of capital ships, but the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which would be immediately available at all seasons of the year. A third squadron of eight battleships would be created, and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet, which would thus be enlarged in the near future from 17 to 25 battleships; while there would be similar increases in other types. Seventy-two submarines would be built within the currency of the law. Nearly four-fifths of the entire German Navy was to be maintained in full, permanent commission, an unprecedentedly large proportion. The new law would add 15,000 officers and men to the strength of that navy. Three additional battleships were to be built, one in 1913, one in 1916, and one at a date which had not yet been fixed. These additions were a cumulative increase.

Mr. Churchill went on to state that the number of Dreadnoughts which Britain would need to build in the next five years, in order to maintain the 60% standard of superiority, would have to be raised from the 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, in successive years, of the existing plan, to 5, 4, 4, 4, 4. He said that this proposed increase in building did not affect the Estimates then before the House, but that it would be reflected in those of the following year, and he asked for the modest sum of £999,000 to cover immediate needs. The First Lord announced that a further concentration of naval strength in the waters of the United Kingdom was already under way. The

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22 The debate of Mar. 18 is in Hansard, 5th Series, xxxv, pp. 1549-1654. This debate, and the one of July 22, are presented at some length because they depict the situation which gave rise to Borden’s navy bill of 1912, insofar as the picture could be shown to the public at that time.
six battleships of the Atlantic Fleet at Gibraltar, and two from the Mediterranean, had been brought home, and the four remaining Mediterranean battleships had been stationed at Gibraltar to take the place of the old Atlantic Fleet. The force of fully-commissioned battleships available in home waters had thus been raised from sixteen to twenty-four, and further steps along the same line would be taken as needed. He said that neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy had any Dreadnoughts in commission, but that they were supposed to be building nine or ten between them and that four British battle cruisers would be stationed at Malta. New Zealand's battle cruiser, which was to have gone to the China Station, was being retained in the waters of the United Kingdom with the consent of the New Zealand Government. The First Lord acknowledged the comfort and encouragement which had been afforded during the last few weeks by the presence in London of the Prime Minister of Canada and some of his colleagues.  

It will have been noted that at the time of the debate in March, the future seemed to the British Government to hold out the prospect of an expensive, but stabilized and manageable, competition with Germany in naval armaments. This debate, generally speaking, had accordingly been calm and confident in tone. The subsequent action of Germany in screwing the naval competition up to a higher pitch, however, had altered the situation considerably; a fact which was strongly reflected in the debate of July. In the course of his speech on this latter occasion, Mr. Churchill appealed for the support of the Dominions in meeting the renewed German challenge, and accepted the principle that if the burden of naval defence were to be shared, the responsibility for directing policy should be shared also. Whereas in the earlier debate the possible co-operation of the Dominions was barely mentioned, in the later one several of the speakers not only thanked the Dominions for what they were doing, or seemed about to do, but also expressed the opinion that a sharing of the common burden was no more than just. Sir Robert Borden's bill calling for the contribution of three Dreadnoughts was laid before the Canadian Parliament in December 1912; and during the long controversy that followed, the two debates of March and July at Westminster were frequently cited.

33 Debate of July 22 in Hansard, 5th Series, xliv, pp. 835-946. Sir Robert Borden heard Mr. Churchill’s speech from the gallery.
In his speech on the naval Estimates in the spring of 1913, the First Lord predicted a steadily increasing burden. "I think," he said, "... that there is no prospect in the future of avoiding increases of the Navy Estimates unless the period of acute naval rivalries and rapid scientific expansion through which we are passing comes to an end." He renewed his suggestion for a one-year holiday from laying down warships. The battleship which the Federated Malay States had provided for the Royal Navy, and any which Canada might give, would, he stated, be additional to the 60% margin of superiority, as they had been presented and accepted on that condition. "They are additional to the requirements of the 60 per cent. standard; they are not additional to the worldwide requirements of the British Empire."34

As the prolonged proceeding of matching keels drew to its close, there were signs of a deeper dissatisfaction than ever before among important sections of the British public:

It was not without difficulty that Parliament was persuaded to assent to the large naval increases which were submitted to it both by Mr. McKenna and Mr. Churchill. Economists, lovers of peace, promoters of social reform, advocates of reduced taxation, not unnaturally chafed at the alarming and continuous growth in the expenditure on naval armaments. It is no secret now that there were from time to time serious controversies on the subject in the Cabinet, particularly in the autumn and winter of 1913-14, when it was only after protracted discussion that sanction was given to the Estimates for the year 1914-15. They amounted to £52,500,000—an increase of some £20,000,000 on the annual expenditure on the navy only a few years before.35

The war of Estimates and shipyards was soon to be merged in a much broader contest as the evil year of 1914 came around at last. Yet just before the storm clouds broke, the sky seemed for a moment to be clearing. In May the German Ambassador in London assured his government that:

Our relations with England are as good, on the whole, as they could possibly be. To desire more would be foolish and fruitless. They are willing to meet us on every point.36

The naval rivalry between Germany and Great Britain before 1914 was only a limited part of the whole chaotic picture of international relations at that time. Germany's navy was an expression of her abounding vitality and ambition, and perhaps it was also the ostentation of a nouveau riche. Tir-

34 Hansard, 5th Series, 1, pp. 1750-91.
35 Asquith, Genesis of the War, p. 86.
36 Lichnowsky to Jagow, May 10, 1914, Grosse Politik, xxxix, pp. 101-103. See also Grey, Twenty-five Years, 1, p. 209.
Germant Naval Threat

Tirpitz's implacable policy of rapid and unlimited expansion was ill-conceived. The great fleet which Germany built was paid for, as the French and Russian governments were quick to realize, with money which she might otherwise have spent on her army. Britain was the only European State of the first magnitude which was at all likely to remain neutral in a general European war, and a navy which helped to drive her into the arms of France and Russia was an apparatus that Germany could ill afford. Both Bismarck and his far more venturesome successor Hitler were wiser in this respect.

The Germany of that day, though fully conscious of her gigantic strength, was afraid. After Bismarck's fall the Triple Alliance gradually grew weaker, while the other Powers became more closely integrated with each other. Neither Britain nor Germany at any time seriously considered attacking the other; yet each of them at times feared that the other might start a preventive war. To Britain, Germany was the potential enemy; while Germany was always thinking in terms of a continental war in which Britain might support France and Russia. The naval rivalry was disliked in Britain chiefly because it involved an immense expenditure, which only German unreasonableness seemed to make necessary, and which statesmen and citizens alike tended to think of as nearing the economic or financial breaking-point. Actually, however, the burden was lightened by the fact that the whole period of the acute naval rivalry was one of rising prices and world-wide prosperity. Moreover the ability of the twentieth-century industrial State to tax and spend was enormously greater than anyone at that time supposed. In terms of what was economically possible, it is almost certain that Great Britain could have borne indefinitely much greater financial burdens than she actually did. The political problem, however, was a very real one for the Asquith government, and would probably have been more difficult still had the Opposition been in power. The Anglo-German naval rivalry stimulated the feeling in Great Britain that the Dominions ought to take a larger part in naval defence, especially in the difficult circumstances which existed. It likewise strengthened the body of opinion in the Dominions which favoured increased co-operation in this respect. The threat which was latent in Tirpitz's ships was strong enough to overcome, for a time, the ingrained reluctance of Canadians to put forth any serious naval effort in time of peace, and was the immediate reason for the creation of the Canadian Naval Service.
THE danger with which the expanding German Navy seemed to threaten British sea power transformed imperial naval defence into an immediate and pressing problem. Accordingly, as far as the Dominions were concerned, the evolution of naval policy was greatly accelerated, and in the years from 1902 to 1909 the structure of imperial naval defence was fundamentally altered. The Admiralty’s policy of concentrating its forces more fully in one part of the Empire produced a decentralizing of responsibility. In this situation the part to be played by the Dominions was agreed upon in principle. In assigning this part Dominion autonomy was given priority over purely naval considerations, and the policy of separate Dominion naval forces was established. As far as Canada was concerned these changes were to result in the transfer to Canadian ownership of the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt, and in the creation of a separate naval organization. The decision of the Admiralty to face the growing German Navy by concentrating a larger proportion of the Royal Navy in home waters involved the reduction or abolition of the squadrons on some of the outlying stations. In accord with this policy almost the whole of the Pacific Squadron was withdrawn from that station. On February 28, 1905, Commodore J. E. C. Goodrich lowered his flag in H.M.S. Bonaventure, and on March 4 the former flag-ship sailed from Esquimalt for duty with the China Squadron, leaving on the station only H.M.S. Shearwater and the surveying ship Egeria.1

The bases at Halifax and Esquimalt had ceased to be more than potentially useful to the Royal Navy, and the Admiralty was willing to transfer them to the Canadian Government, subject to certain conditions. These were intended to safeguard the Admiralty’s future interests by ensuring as far as possible that the naval facilities at the two ports would neither be allowed to deteriorate beyond usefulness nor be employed for

1 Longstaff, Esquimalt Naval Base, p. 146.
other purposes; and that ships of the Royal Navy would always be able to use them, particularly in time of war. In a broad form which left the details to be discussed later, the Admiralty’s conditions were transmitted to the Canadian Government early in 1906,² and accepted.³ It was subsequently arranged that the dockyard at Halifax should be physically handed over to the Dominion authorities on January 1, 1907, and this was carried out.⁴ On later consideration, however, the Dominion Government disliked some of the Admiralty’s conditions: these were therefore reconsidered, and less exacting ones were substituted for them.⁵ The revised conditions were essentially the same as those on which the formal transfer later took place.

In March 1908, the Canadian Government announced that the revised terms were “quite satisfactory in every respect”, and accepted them. Authority was provided at the same time for taking over immediately the naval properties at Esquimalt, subject to the revised conditions.⁶ In Britain, however, the Law Officers of the Crown advised that the formal transfer of the bases would need to be covered by a detailed memorandum setting forth the conditions and agreed to by both governments, and also by special legislation. Such a memorandum was accordingly submitted to the Canadian Government, which assented to its terms.⁷ The Parliament at Westminster took the step required of it by passing the “Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act”, which became law in October 1909⁸. The Act authorized His Majesty, on the advice of the Admiralty and the Treasury, to vest any property situated in a British possession and held in trust for naval purposes, in the Governor of the possession concerned. Transfer of custody would be effected by Order in Council, and would be subject to any conditions that such an Order might lay down. It was under the authority of this Act that the bases at Halifax and Esquimalt were transferred to the Dominion the following year.

The policy of Dominion navies was evolved at a series of colonial and imperial conferences. The first of these conferen-
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ces was held in 1902, at the time of King Edward's coronation. To British naval strategists the world at that moment presented a disquieting scene. The South African War which had just been won, if it had demonstrated the force of imperial sentiment in the Dominions, had also shown that the British Empire stood alone in a panoplied world, and that its security depended on the strength of the Royal Navy. The German Reichstag had passed its first two navy laws, while all the great Powers and many small ones were providing themselves with navies. Two of the new great-Power navies had their roots in North America and Asia, and in order to act decisively against them the Royal Navy would be obliged to operate far from its home bases, and while doing so to leave the source of its strength exposed. The conditions that had governed the strategy and size of the Royal Navy for three hundred years were undergoing a revolutionary change. It was with this disturbing picture in their minds that the British delegates came to the colonial conference of 1902.

At that conference Joseph Chamberlain urged, as he had in 1897, that the colonies should bear a larger proportion of the weight of naval preparedness, and that even though it might be impossible to eliminate immediately the existing disproportion in naval expenditure for the common defence, it ought to be reduced.9 The representatives of the colonies were invited to discuss the matter with the Admiralty; and this they did, most of them undertaking to contribute or to increase the existing contributions. The First Lord10 then laid a memorandum before the conference. It showed that the naval Estimates for the year 1902-3 amounted to over £31,000,000, of which the self-governing colonies would only be paying £328,000, a figure which was the total of the increased contributions which had just been agreed upon. The cost of the Royal Navy to the United Kingdom and the self-governing colonies respectively, per head of white population, was given as: United Kingdom, 15s. 2d.; Australia, 1s. 3½d.; New Zealand, 1s. ½d.; Canada, nil; Newfoundland, 3½d.; Cape Colony, 1s. 10½d.; Natal, 10s. 9½d.11 The memorandum stated that a larger sum of money provided by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom for the

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10 Lord Selborne.
11 Cd. 1299, p. 18. These figures take no account of income or wealth per head, nor of relative interests in shipping and seaborne trade.
Royal Navy was spent in the Dominions than these last contributed towards the cost of the navy; that about a quarter of the seaborne trade of the Empire was trade between a colony at one end and another colony or a foreign country at the other, in which the taxpayer in the United Kingdom had no interest either as buyer or seller; and that in a state of independence the self-governing colonies would have had to spend far more on naval defence than they were in fact doing, in support of which statement the naval expenditures of Holland and Argentina were cited.

The First Lord’s memorandum continued:

... the danger to the Empire which I fear is that Canada, South Africa, and Australia, being in fact continents, should become too much continental and too little maritime in their aspirations and ideas. The British Empire owes its existence to the sea, and it can only continue to exist if all parts of it regard the sea as their material source of existence and strength. It is therefore desirable that our fellow subjects in the Dominions beyond the seas should appreciate the importance of Naval questions. If they will undertake a larger share of the Naval burden, well and good. But I regard it as of even more importance that they should cultivate the maritime spirit; that their populations should become maritime as ours are, and that they should become convinced of the truth of the proposition that there is no possibility of the localisation of Naval force, and that the problem of the British Empire is in no sense one of local defence.

The sea is all one, and the British Navy therefore must be all one; and its solitary task in war must be to seek out the ships of the enemy, wherever they are to be found, and destroy them. At whatever spot, in whatever sea, these ships are found and destroyed, there the whole Empire will be simultaneously defended in its territory, its trade, and its interests. If, on the contrary, the idea should unfortunately prevail that the problem is one of local defence, and that each part of the Empire can be content to have its allotment of ships for the purpose of the separate protection of an individual spot, the only possible result would be that an enemy who had discarded this heresy, and combined his fleets, will attack in detail and destroy those separated British squadrons which, united, could have defied defeat.

This memorandum, which of course embodied the ideas of the Admiralty, might have come from the pen of Capt. Mahan. The Admiralty point of view, which was also that of the British government of the day, was more plainly and persuasively presented to this conference than to any other before or afterwards. The imperialists, many of whom were federationists, were very numerous and influential, and this British govern-

12 Overseas bases of the Royal Navy put considerable money into the pockets of the local inhabitants through such means as pay spent on shore, the construction of buildings with local labour and materials, and the purchase of fresh meat and vegetables.

13 Cd. 1299, p. 20.
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ment on the whole subscribed to their ideas. There is no doubt that imperialists felt the time to be ripe for a long step in the direction of co-operation for defence, which they regarded not only as good in itself, but also as a logical preliminary to combined direction of foreign policy and some form of federation. What was said in discussion is not known, as the proceedings, in accord with a request from the Canadian delegates, were not published.

An agreement was reached between the Admiralty and the governments of a now federated Australia, and of New Zealand. The naval force on the Australian Station was to consist of an armoured cruiser, two second-class and four third-class cruisers, four sloops, and a naval reserve consisting of 25 officers and 700 seamen and stokers. This force was to be based on Australian and New Zealand ports, and its sphere of Operations was to be the waters of the Australian, China, and East Indies stations. The agreement would run for ten years, and it was arranged that: “In consideration of the service afore-mentioned the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand shall pay the Imperial Government five-twelfths and one-twelfth respectively of the total annual cost of maintaining the Naval force on the Australian Station, provided that the total amount so paid shall in no case exceed £200,000 and £40,000 respectively in any one year . . .” Cape Colony and Natal also undertook to increase their unconditional annual contributions, the former from £30,000 to £50,000, and Natal from £12,000 to £35,000. Newfoundland agreed to provide £3,000 a year toward the expenses of the branch of the Royal Naval Reserve which had been established in that colony two years earlier. The total amount of the colonial naval contributions had been almost doubled.

Canada was represented by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Frederick Borden,13 W. S. Fielding, Minister of Finance, Sir William Mulock, and W. B. Paterson.

The conception of Canada’s status which Sir Wilfrid developed in his later years of office was that of a nation within the Empire. He became convinced that it was possible to reconcile what was sanest and most practicable in the ideals of independence and imperialism. Canada might attain virtual independence, secure control of her own destinies at home and abroad, and yet retain allegiance to a common sovereign. As for the Empire, its strength and its only hope of permanence lay in the freedom of the com-

14 Ibid., pp. 24-6. Australia and New Zealand together had been contributing at the rate of £126,000 a year.
13 Laurier’s Minister of Militia and Defence, and a cousin of Sir Robert Borden.
ponent parts; centralization would prove unwieldy and provoke revolt. He did not believe that this nicely balanced compromise would prove an eternal solution. That Canada's eventual goal would be independence, remained his conviction. But that was not for his time, and sufficient for the day was the principle thereof.¹⁶

Laurier and his colleagues at the conference were very willing to co-operate in the economic field; but with respect to naval defence their policy was almost wholly negative. They answered the requests which the representatives of the British Government had made, in a memorandum¹⁷ in which they regretted that they had been unable to assent to the suggestions made by the First Lord and to similar ones from the War Office. They stated that their objections arose, not so much because of the expenditure involved, "as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of Colonial self-government." As Canada increased in wealth and population it should undoubtedly spend more for self-defence:

At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On the sea-coasts of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve, and it is hoped that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men, and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.

It may be that during this conference Laurier went a long step beyond the formula which has just been quoted, for the First Lord stated in a memorandum that although the Canadian Government felt unable to make any offer of assistance along the lines which had been suggested, Sir Wilfrid had told him that he and his colleagues were contemplating the creation of "a local Naval force" in the waters of the Dominion.¹⁸ Yet the fact that the memorandum is dated four days earlier than that of the Canadian delegation makes it likely, or at least possible, either that by "Naval force" the First Lord merely meant a naval reserve, or that he had misinterpreted what Laurier said to him. For the first time at any conference a Canadian Government had been willing to consider taking some direct measures for naval defence; but the evidence invalidates any statement that in 1902 the idea of forming a Canadian navy entered the field of practical politics.

¹⁷ Cd. 1299, App. vi.
¹⁸ Ibid. p. 18.

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The members resolved that it would be to the advantage of
the Empire to hold similar conferences, if practicable, at inter-
vals not exceeding four years, and that, consistent with the
confidential negotiation of treaties with foreign Powers, the
views of the colonies affected should be obtained so as to put
them in a better position to adhere to such treaties. Though
the colonies which were already making contributions increased
these, no general basis for contributions nor common accep-
tance of them as a policy had been reached. The Admiralty
agreed that a certain number of suitable candidates from the
Dominions would be accepted annually as naval cadets. All
in all the imperialists, who had expected great things from this
conference, had small reason to rejoice over its results.

Before the next conference met, the Committee of Imperial
Defence, which was to be so closely associated with the defence
aspects of later conferences, had been formed. The Boer War
had revealed the ineffectiveness of the existing machinery for
the purpose of co-ordinating a war effort, and the whole ques-
tion of army reform had been a live one for many years. Soon
after he became Prime Minister in 1902, Arthur Balfour
arranged for the creation of this committee, which held its first
meeting on December 18, 1902. It was an unorthodox body,
composed at each meeting of those persons whom the Prime
Minister had invited to attend, and possessing very general
terms of reference. “As a consequence”, wrote Balfour, “it
becomes far easier to make the Committee a truly Imperial
body, in which the Colonies as well as the Mother Country may
find an appropriate machinery for considering together the
greatest of their common interests—the interests of Imperial
Defence.” 19 The first representative of a Dominion to attend
a meeting of the committee was Sir Frederick Borden, who did
so in December 1903 while visiting London. The Colonial
Conference of 1907 was later to pass resolutions to the effect
that the colonies should be authorized to refer any local
military questions to the Committee of Imperial Defence, for
its advice, and that a representative of any colony which might
have asked for the committee’s opinion should attend as a
member during the discussion of the questions which had been
raised. 20 The committee was there to advise on every aspect
of imperial preparations for war, and the defence plans of the

19 Quoted from a Cabinet memo. of 1904 in Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, 1, p. 306.
1907, lv.
Dominions were to owe much to the advice received from this source.

Chamberlain’s campaign for protection, waged because he had come to feel not only that industry in the United Kingdom required it, but also that only by this means could the closely integrated Empire of his dreams be realized, had placed an almost intolerable strain upon the Conservative Party, of which, after the death of Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour had proved to be an ineffective chief. It was no surprise, therefore, that in the election of 1906 the Liberals under the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman were returned by an overwhelming majority. The country stood on the threshold of one of those comparatively rare periods during which a great mass of reform legislation is crammed into the statute books in the course of a few years, and the triumphant Liberals were much more anxious to spend money on social reforms than on warships. The new Prime Minister had suggested a method for resolving this dilemma, in an article which he had contributed to The Nation in March 1907, advocating a limitation of armaments by international agreement. But the public was very sensitive on the subject of the German Navy, which continued to expand at an alarming rate; accordingly the Royal Navy likewise received great accretions of strength, including the Dreadnought, launched in 1906, the most famous warship of her time.

At the conference of 1907 Great Britain was represented by Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Elgin the Colonial Secretary, and Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty. Australia was represented by Alfred Deakin, the Transvaal by Louis Botha, Cape Colony by Dr. L. S. Jameson and Dr. Thomas Smartt, and Canada by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Frederick Borden, and L. P. Brodeur. In his opening address Campbell-Bannerman stated that: "We do not meet you to-day as claimants for money, although we cordially recognize the spirit in which contributions have been made in the past, and will, no doubt, be made in the future." He added that the cost of naval defence and the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs went hand in hand. Lord Tweedmouth expressed the Admir-

21 Jebb, Imperial Conference, 1, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.
22 The most dramatic feature of this conference was the presence together at the same council table of the most eminent of the Boer commanders in the South African War and the leader of the Jameson Raid.
ally’s opinion: “There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one Navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint.” This was old doctrine; but he broke new ground as far as the Admiralty was concerned by saying that it would be a great help if the colonies were to provide local squadrons of small ships to operate against raiders and to co-operate with larger units of the Royal Navy. Torpedo boats and submarines were considered to be the most suitable types, submarines being thought the most effective weapon against raiders. It would be advantageous if the colonies, particularly Australia and New Zealand, could arrange to provide these small craft locally, because such vessels were too small for long ocean cruises. The former objection against local navies was withdrawn, provided that such forces were under the Admiralty’s control. Lord Tweedmouth also pointed out that it would help greatly if the colonies would furnish docks and coaling facilities. 24

Speaking for Canada, Brodeur objected to the statement frequently made that the Dominion spent nothing whatever on naval defence. He pointed out that a considerable sum was spent annually for fishery protection on the seas and the Great Lakes—a duty which had been taken over from the Admiralty—as well as on wireless stations and the hydrographic survey. Responsibility for the upkeep of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, moreover, was in course of being transferred by the British Government. 25 The proposal for a fast mail and passenger service from the United Kingdom to Australia and New Zealand across Canada, a utility which would involve heavy subsidies, came up again at this conference. To this proposal Laurier was very friendly, and a resolution favouring it was passed unanimously.

Speaking to a resolution introduced by Smartt of Cape Colony, that the colonies ought to help in naval defence by means of contributions, or of local naval defence, or in some other way, the Canadian Prime Minister stated his case as follows:

Laurier: I am sorry to say, so far as Canada is concerned, we cannot agree to the resolution. We took the ground many years ago that we had enough to do in that respect in our country before committing ourselves to a general claim. The Government of Canada has done a great deal in that

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24 Ibid., pp. 129-30.
25 Ibid., pp. 139-41.
DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

respect. Our action was not understood, but I was glad to see that the First Lord of the Admiralty admitted we had done much more than he was aware of. It is impossible, in my humble opinion, to have a uniform policy on this matter: the disproportion is too great between the Mother Country and the Colonies. We have too much to do otherwise; in the Mother Country, you must remember, they have no expenses to incur with regard to public works; whereas, in most of the Colonies, certainly in Canada, we have to tax ourselves to the utmost of our resources in the development of our country, and we could not contribute, or undertake to do more than we are doing in that way. For my part, if the motion were pressed to a conclusion, I should have to vote against it.

Dr. Smartt: But the public works to which you refer are of a reproductive character which are vital to the interests of your Dominion.

Laurier: Some of our railways have never paid a cent of interest or expenses.

Dr. Smartt: Still, it is developing and opening up the country to an enormous extent. All the colonies are building developing railways of a character which may not be revenue-producing for years. I thought the wording of this resolution would have specially met your views because you will find to make such a contribution towards the upkeep of the Navy it may take the form either of a grant of money, or the establishment of a local defence force or other services. I understand Canada suggested strongly the other day that some of their other services were in the nature of local defence.

Laurier: I have said all I have to say on the subject.26

Three years later, in Montreal, Laurier explained his stand regarding Smartt’s resolution and questions:

Or, messieurs, pour ma part, je m’opposai de toutes mes forces à cette proposition. Et pourquoi? Parce qu’on faisait une obligation et un devoir de ce qui à mes yeux devait être facultatif. Sur mon opposition, la proposition n’allait pas plus loin. Et pourquoi cela? Parce que je voyais là le salut de notre pays, de notre autonomie . . . 27

A variant of Hofmeyr’s earlier suggestion of a two per cent duty was strongly advocated at the conference by Alfred Deakin. His eloquence was in vain, however, and at a later stage, during discussions which they had with the Admiralty, the Australian delegates expressed the opinion that it would be desirable for their Dominion to start something in the way of a local naval defence force, and the New Zealand representatives asked for figures stating the probable cost of a similar force, to be composed of submarines. Still later Deakin voiced an opinion which he had arrived at some years previously: “In Australia . . . the existing contribution has not proved generally

26 Ibid., p. 542.
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popular.” 28 Newfoundland expressed a willingness to increase its annual grant towards the local naval reserve. By a unanimous vote the conference resolved that a similar meeting, to be known as the Imperial Conference, should be held every four years; and the word “Dominion” was officially adopted in place of “Colony”, as far as the self-governing units were concerned.

On March 16, 1909, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the First Lord of the Admiralty announced in the House of Commons that the tremendous expansion of the German Navy had placed Great Britain in an exceedingly critical situation. Six days later a cablegram arrived in London from the government of New Zealand, offering a battleship of the latest type, and two of them if necessary, to the Royal Navy. On March 29 a resolution approving the establishment of a Canadian naval Service was passed by the House of Commons in Ottawa. A message from New South Wales and Victoria arrived on April 4, offering to share, on the basis of population, in the cost of a Dreadnought, unless the government of the Commonwealth were to provide one. In view of all these circumstances the British Government suggested that a special imperial conference be held in order to discuss general questions connected with the military and naval defence of the Empire. Before the conference met, a change of government in Australia brought Deakin to power for the third time, and his government promptly offered to provide for the Royal Navy a Dreadnought “or such addition to its naval strength as may be determined” at the conference. 29

Among the members present at this conference were the British Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith; the Earl of Crewe, Colonial Secretary; Reginald McKenna, the First Lord; Sir J. G. Ward, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister of New Zealand; J. C. Smuts for the Transvaal; and J. B. M. Hertzog, Attorney General of the Orange River Colony. Canada was represented by Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, and L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries. Major General Lake and Rear Admiral Kingsmill accompanied the Canadian delegation as advisers.

A memorandum prepared by the Admiralty formed the basis of the preliminary discussions. The Admiralty’s opinion

28 Minutes of Proceedings, p. 473. He gave his reasons at some length. The Australian contributions came to an end with the founding of the Royal Australian Navy two years later.

was that if imperial defence were considered simply as a problem of naval strategy "it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command." Nevertheless, "it has long been recognized . . . that other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account." The various circumstances of Dominions which were dissimilar in maturity, geographical environment, and historical background, might understandably lead one Dominion to prefer a contribution of "money or matériau" to the Royal Navy, while another might wish to maintain a local naval force, which would be at the disposal of the Crown in war, but would also be a basis for a future Dominion navy. A third might prefer to perform other local services in place of naval expenditure of direct imperial value. The conference would therefore try to determine the form of naval defence best suited to the naval circumstances of each Dominion, not seeking a final scheme of defence, but hoping "to formulate the broad principles upon which the growth of Colonial naval forces should be fostered."

"In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct Fleet unit, and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war." Since torpedo boats and submarines would not be able to co-operate with larger ships on the high seas, a scheme limited to these types would not result in a self-contained fleet capable of offensive action. Such a flotilla, moreover, would afford a restricted future to its personnel, and inadequate training for the senior officers. The smallest fleet unit which was recommended would consist of an armoured cruiser of the Indomitable class, three unarmoured cruisers of the Bristol class, six river-class destroyers, three C-class submarines, and certain auxiliaries.⁴⁰

Such a unit would be able to defend trade routes as well as coasts, and to deal with a hostile squadron in its waters, and could moreover be easily combined with a squadron of the Royal Navy. It would require 2,300 officers and men, its initial cost would be £3,700,000, and the annual cost of its

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⁴⁰ The Indomitable were early battle cruisers and were classed as Dreadnoughts. H.M.A.S. Australia, mentioned elsewhere, was an Indefatigable—an improved Indomitable. Four Bristol-class cruisers were the backbone of the projected Canadian shipbuilding programme which followed on the heels of the Naval Service Act of 1910.
maintenance would be £600,000. As far as possible it should be manned from the shore in the Dominion concerned, and if necessary the Royal Navy would lend officers and men: the pay would be a question for the Dominion. The essential component of the unit would be the Indomitable, which ought to be laid down in advance of the other ships. In the cases of Australia and New Zealand the cost of the Indomitable would be cancelled off by that of the Dreadnoughts already offered to the Royal Navy. Establishments for shipbuilding, supply, and training, would have to be developed in the Dominions. For the sake of effective co-operation between the navies of the Dominions and the Royal Navy, there should be a common standard for building, armaments, discipline, and base facilities; especially as “it is a sine qua non that successful action in time of war depends upon unity of command and direction . . . it has been recognized by the Colonial Governments that in time of war the local naval forces should come under the general directions of the Admiralty.”

In a statement to the conference, which was necessarily based on the Admiralty memorandum, the First Lord said that:

Nobody recognizes more fully than we do at the Admiralty that you have to take other things into account besides strategy, and that the representatives of some of the Dominions may naturally . . wish to have some regard to a future . . . when they would have a navy of their own, not a navy separate from the British Navy . . . but [one] which, in time of peace, would be developed by themselves, manned by themselves, and controlled by themselves.

McKenna emphasized the fact that the Admiralty’s proposals were tentative only, as the wishes of the Dominions were not known, and their permanent naval forces could only be built up on lines acceptable to themselves, and he offered them the willing co-operation of the Admiralty. He suggested that Canada should establish a fleet unit on her Pacific coast, which would raise to four the number of units stationed in that ocean. There was not the same urgency in regard to the east coast of Canada, because those waters were within the operating area of the great fleets based on the United Kingdom.

In his principal speech at the conference, Sir Frederick Borden read the revised Foster Resolution of March 29, 1909:

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31 Memo. in “Imperial Conference . . 1909”, pp. 20-23.
which he considered to be a mandate. The three principles contained in the resolution were, according to Borden, that Canada wished to do whatever was needed herself, in direct connection with the British authorities and under their guidance; that she wanted to act along the lines laid down by Lord Tweedmouth at the conference of 1907; and that in an emergency the Dominion might go beyond the "expenditure of her own money herself" to help the United Kingdom to meet the crisis. Borden said that he would view the Admiralty memorandum in this light. Canada's national ambitions would not be satisfied by having a naval unit on one ocean only, relying on the Royal Navy for protection in the other, and the more so since seven-eighths of the population lived in the Atlantic region. Canada should therefore establish a unit on each coast. Borden asked for a full discussion of the subject under three headings which the Admiralty had suggested: the means of reconciling local control by the Canadian Government over its naval forces with the principle of unity of command in time of war; the best means of interchanging ships and personnel between the British and the Dominions' navies; and plans for the transitional period while the creation of complete Dominion fleet units was taking place.34

Brodeur expressed appreciation of the fact that the United Kingdom authorities had recognized the principle of Dominion autonomy in naval defence. He said that the resolution of March 29 went beyond mere coastal defence to co-operation in imperial defence. He pointed to Canada's river, canal, and port facilities as a contribution to that end. Brodeur also suggested that merchant ships which could be converted in time of war into auxiliary cruisers might be a useful naval asset, and asked for the Admiralty's opinion on the subject.35

The smaller units, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and the South African colonies, supported the policy of contributions against that of Dominion navies which was advocated by Australia and Canada. McKenna supported the two big Dominions. Borden expressed the opinion that small countries such as Newfoundland or New Zealand could not be expected to maintain navies of their own; but that Australia and Canada were in a different position:

33 See pp. 127-8 above.
34 Conference on ... Defence of the Empire, 4th Day, pp. 2-4.
35 Ibid., 4th Day, pp. 4-6. The Admiralty subsequently rejected this idea.
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We are a young nation, and we take pleasure—and it pleases our people in their national pride and aspirations—in calling ourselves a young nation. Well, it seems to me one of the first duties of a young nation is to defend itself. My country, at any rate, do not feel that we are going to pay anybody or hire anybody to do that which we ought to do ourselves, so long as we are able to do it. We are told here that strategy is against the idea of local navies. I have no doubt it is, and I would add that convenience is against it. But it is the business of statesmen and, the business of admirals and generals, to overcome difficulties of this kind, and strategy must take a second place to Constitutional Government. I do not believe there is any insuperable difficulty. You might say the same thing with reference to our land forces; why should not we employ the British Government, the War Office, to do all our work of defence? Why have any local militia or local forces? We have local militia and local forces, and we have developed them until today the War Office has evolved a scheme by which we are on the threshold, at any rate, of the establishment of an Imperial Army—a method by which the forces of the armies of the different Dominions can absolutely co-operate and form a whole.36

Later, defending the principle of local navies, Borden stated that: "One objection put forward was that if a serious war came, forsooth, some particular navy, Australian or Canadian, might refuse to act. Surely it is only necessary to present that view in order to see how absolutely necessary it is that there should be individual navies."37

Merriman of Cape Colony said that "twopenny-halfpenny navies" had no military usefulness, and that separate Dominion naval forces would possess only a sentimental value. To this Brodeur replied that the advocates of Dominion navies were taking not a sentimental but a long-term view. "We are growing fast." The British Empire would be strengthened in the eyes of the world by having, not one navy only, but "four or five nations with their own navies." A policy of contributions, on the other hand, might cause friction at a later time when the conditions of to-day are forgotten; and the refusal of a contribution would diminish the prestige of the British Empire in the eyes of the world. Fears had been expressed lest the granting of local autonomy in naval affairs might weaken the imperial tie; yet the self-same fears had been aroused by the granting of responsible government.38

The Colonial Secretary in closing the conference repeated that strategy must take second place to the wishes of the Dominions. He said that with respect to naval policy the

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36 Ibid., 5th Day, pp. 2-7.
37 Ibid., p. 8.

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relations between Great Britain and the Dominions were similar to those between allies who "have to bear the disabilities which belong to their respective forces not being under identical control." The Colonial Secretary emphasized that it is a grave responsibility to start a navy, an organization in which inefficiency could not be tolerated. If criticism of local navies was to be proved false, therefore, the Dominions must create good ones and be willing to spend £600,000 or £700,000 a year upon them.  

The Canadian delegates took the position that while a fleet unit on the Pacific might form an acceptable part of future policy, it was out of the question for the present. They suggested that two plans should be presented to them, which would cost £400,000 and £600,000 a year respectively, and both of which should omit the cost of the fishery and hydrographic surveys, but include the maintenance of the two dockyards and of the wireless telegraph service. The Admiralty's opinion was that for £400,000 the most desirable unit would consist of three improved Bristsols and four destroyers, manned by 1,408 officers and men. Two of the Bristsols should be stationed in the Pacific, and the third, together with the four destroyers, in the Atlantic. The components of the £600,000 unit which the Admiralty recommended were four Bristsols and one cruiser of the Boadicea class, with six improved river-class destroyers, the whole manned by 2,194 officers and men:

Plan I: Summary of expenditure at British rates for £600,000 plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>4 Bristols</th>
<th>1 Boadicea</th>
<th>6 Destroyers</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>£1,508,000</td>
<td>£350,000</td>
<td>£480,000</td>
<td>£2,338,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>£ 79,600</td>
<td>£ 16,500</td>
<td>£ 64,200</td>
<td>£ 160,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation &amp; Interest</td>
<td>£ 101,200</td>
<td>£ 23,500</td>
<td>£ 40,200</td>
<td>£ 164,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>£ 107,200</td>
<td>£ 19,900</td>
<td>£ 33,000</td>
<td>£ 160,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Cost</td>
<td>£ 288,000</td>
<td>£ 59,900</td>
<td>£137,400</td>
<td>£ 485,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plan II: Summary of expenditure at British rates for £400,000 plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>3 Bristols</th>
<th>4 Destroyers</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>£1,131,000</td>
<td>£320,000</td>
<td>£1,451,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>£ 59,700</td>
<td>£ 42,800</td>
<td>£ 102,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation &amp; Interest</td>
<td>£ 75,900</td>
<td>£ 26,800</td>
<td>£ 102,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>£ 80,400</td>
<td>£ 22,000</td>
<td>£ 102,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Cost</td>
<td>£ 216,000</td>
<td>£ 91,600</td>
<td>£ 307,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was recommended that any submarine construction should be deferred for the present, owing to the exceptionally high standard of training required for the complements of these boats. Pending the completion of the ships which it was recommending, the Admiralty would lend the Canadian Government two old cruisers of the Apollo class, so that the training of naval personnel might be begun without delay. The Canadian Government was to meet the cost of fitting out and maintaining these cruisers, and of paying the volunteers from the Royal Navy who would man them until trained Canadians could be made available. The Admiralty offered to lend officers as instructors, and to receive Canadian cadets at Dartmouth and Osborne. It was also suggested that the Parliament of Canada should, by statute, assimilate the discipline of the new Service to that of the Royal Navy, and provide for the creation of a naval reserve and a naval volunteer force. A further recommendation was that the Canadian Government should provide strategically situated docks, adequate for the largest warships or liners, to serve the Pacific, Atlantic, and St. Lawrence areas. The question of a flag was allowed to rest for the time being for further consideration by the Admiralty.

With a few modifications and changes the suggestions outlined above were soon afterwards adopted by the Canadian Government and Parliament, although some of them were never carried out. The fact that the majority of these recommendations were afterwards accepted, and that a number of them were implemented, means that they will appear very frequently later on in the story as components of policy or as accomplished facts. Parts of the programme outlined above formed the mould in which the Royal Canadian Navy was cast and of which it bears imprints to this day. An undertaking along similar lines was also reached between the Admiralty and the Australian delegation, and so it came about that in a sense the navies of both the principal Dominions were born at the conference of 1909.

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40 "Imperial Conference ... 1909", pp. 23-4.
THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

The grave warnings of danger which were voiced in the British House of Commons on March 16, 1909, had wide repercussions. Large sections of the public in the Dominions and colonies accepted these warnings at their face value, and the traditional reluctance of Canadians to spend money upon naval defence gave way before this strong wind from the outer world. The Canadian press reflected various points of view concerning the lesson to be drawn from the speeches in London; but the majority of the newspapers which have been consulted felt that some positive action should be taken. For example, some of them did not allude to what the British Ministers had said, while L’Action Sociale, and Le Nationaliste of Montreal, were strongly against the adoption of any naval policy. Le Temps of Ottawa considered it unnecessary for Canada to contribute Dreadnoughts in order to prove its loyalty to Great Britain, or to convince Germany of that loyalty, and favoured the creation of a Canadian navy. The Halifax Chronicle felt that while Canada was willing to assist the Mother Country to the full extent of her resources, consistent with her autonomous status, “the sober people of the Dominion are not going to be swept off their feet by the clamor and hysteria of the Toronto crowd of warriors.” Both the Victoria Colonist and the Vancouver Daily News Advertiser, while making no specific suggestions felt that the Dominion should do something to help. The Toronto Globe stated on March 23 that the time had arrived when every member of the British family should aid in dissipating any doubts concerning Britain’s position as mistress of the seas, and claimed that the danger was real. The next day it expressed the opinion that Canada should provide herself with Dreadnoughts, and that these should remain under Canadian control. The Manitoba

1 It is probable, however, that had Canada been an independent republic she would have furnished herself with a naval force of some kind during the opening years of this century. Naval reference books published in that period have much to say of the policies and programmes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Norway, and other small States. In 1911 even Cuba was planning to have some cruisers and a gunboat built.
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_Free Press_ reported the First Lord's speech in a detached manner; but on March 27, in a front-page editorial, it urged that as an exceptional act to meet an exceptional situation, and not as a permanent policy, some Dreadnoughts should be given to Great Britain.

The views expressed in Parliament were similar on the whole to those of the press. Earlier in the session at Ottawa, before the debate on the naval Estimates had taken place in London, the Hon. George Foster, Member for North Toronto and one of the most prominent Conservatives in public life, had given notice of a resolution calling for measures by Canada to defend her coasts. He had been obliged to delay its introduction for two months, because of opposition from F. D. Monk and others within his own Party. On March 29, 1909, however, a fortnight after the speeches had been delivered at Westminster, Foster introduced his resolution:

That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports.

In support of the resolution Foster said that it was not conceived in any party spirit, and hoped that "those questions that concern national defence and Imperial obligations may be kept as far outside of party politics and party contention as they are in Great Britain." He assured the House that for a good many years he had been impressed with the need of facing the question involved in his resolution, that difficulties are not mitigated by avoiding them, and that the time had now come when the Parliament and people of Canada should consider whether or not they had any duties, and if so what those duties were, in regard to the defence of their common heritage. He sympathized with those who declared war and its burdens to be almost intolerable; nevertheless physical force lay at the foundation of all our progress and civilization. Canada had come to occupy an important position in the world; she could neither escape the common burden, nor ignore the common responsibility, and he did not think that she wished to do either. She had immense resources and interests to defend in an insecure world. Her great seaports had no defence, even

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2 Skelton, _Life of Laurier_, ii, p. 321.

3 It will be noted that the Foster resolution did not go beyond the idea of coast defence.

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against a third-class cruiser, and when compared with other overseas possessions in naval matters, the Dominion stood silent and ashamed. Reliance upon the Monroe Doctrine would be degrading and unworthy. Canadians must prepare to defend themselves, either by themselves or in co-operation with Great Britain.

In Foster's opinion, two possible policies presented themselves—a contribution of money or ships to the Admiralty, or assumption by Canadians of the defence of their own ports and coasts in constant and free co-operation with the forces of the United Kingdom. The first of these policies would in any case amount to a contribution of money, because even if one or two Dreadnoughts were given, they could not be built in Canada. He felt that this policy was open to the objections that the fixing and occasional revision of the amount of a contribution might lead to disagreement and unpleasantness; that it looked too much like hiring someone else to do what Canadians themselves ought to do; and that a defence of that sort would provide no inspiration, and strike no roots in the soil of Canada. The Dominion would have its own naval force sooner or later, and it might well be the greater wisdom to sow the seed at once and cultivate its growth. Foster therefore preferred the second policy, the creation of a naval force owned by the Dominion, and gradually Canadianized to the point where there might some day be "a Canadian admiral on the Canadian coast."

The final result would be an imperial adjunct to the Royal Navy for the defence of the Dominion and of the Empire, in which Canada would have "some of her body, her bones, her blood, and her mental power, her national pride." The destiny of the Dominion might well be as great on the sea as on the land, and its resources for the support of sea power were large and varied. Foster also pointed out that Australia, after having tried the contributory method, had adopted the policy which he was advocating. "I do not know which of these forms our aid will take after due care and consideration but whichever form is chosen, one thing is certain, that something ought to be done—and done now." He added that some extraordinary and pressing danger might arise, or might even have already arisen, which would require to be met by special means that would lie outside the normal and settled policy:

Let me say to my right honourable friend that if, after careful consideration, he proposes to this parliament a means for meeting that emergency adequately, by the gift of Dreadnoughts or the gift of money, this side of
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the House will stand beside him in thus vindicating Canada's honour and strengthening the empire's defence.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Prime Minister, replying, began by saying that: "to the eloquent and able observations with which the House has just been favoured . . . very little exception, if any, can be taken by anyone and certainly not by myself." He objected that Foster's policy had not been stated explicitly enough, and denied the truth of any implication in the resolution that Canada had been remiss in the duty of providing for her own defence or for that of the Empire. The country would not be stampeded by any hasty or feverish action, however spectacular, but would calmly and deliberately consider its position. He agreed with Foster that the problem should be approached not only from the Canadian point of view, but also from that of the Empire at large. "Today the British Empire is composed of a galaxy of young nations proud of their allegiance to the British Crown and proud also of their own local independence." The question of contribution was as old as Confederation, and had presented itself in a concrete form at the Imperial Conference of 1902. The Canadian policy, however, had always been not to undertake to contribute. Laurier went on to say that: "at present there is a passing wave in which we can trace anger, enthusiasm and fear, and which directed and pushed us to depart from our policy and contribute at once to the British Navy." He wished them to understand that this was not the way in which, in the past, they had understood their duty:

The real question is one of control. The problem before us is the association of our small naval strength with the great organization of fleets of the mother country, so as to secure the highest efficiency and unity without sacrificing our right to the constitutional control of our own funds, and of any flotilla built and maintained at our own cost. Laurier quoted Lord Milner and Sir Charles Tupper in opposition to contributions for naval purposes, and claimed that a great deal had already been done for defence.

In the development of naval defences, however, he admitted that the country had fallen behind. "Engaged as we have been in the works of peace, we have delayed and put off the development of our navy." This task, he said, would be undertaken without delay:

We should consult with the naval authorities of the British Government, as my honourable colleague the Minister of Militia has done with the council of defence in London; and after having organized a plan, we should carry it out in Canada with our own resources and out of our own money. This is the policy which commends itself to the government.
As to an emergency contribution of a Dreadnought, Laurier said that he did not consider the danger to be imminent, and that the British nation, at all events, was not greatly alarmed. He added:

... that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the high seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughters of the nation to close around the old mother land and make a rampart around her to ward off any attack. I hope that day will never come, but should it come, I would deem it my duty to devote what might be left of my life and energy to stumps the country and endeavour to impress upon my fellow-countrymen, especially my compatriots in the province of Quebec, the conviction that the salvation of England is the salvation of our own country that therein lies the guarantee of our civil and religious freedom and everything we value in this life. Those are the sentiments which animate the government on this occasion.

In place of the Foster resolution Laurier offered one of his own, which began by stating that: "This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence." It stated further that under the present constitutional relations between Great Britain and the Dominions, any contribution to the British treasury for naval and military purposes would not, as far as Canada was concerned, satisfactorily solve the problem of defence. The core of the resolution was contained in the following paragraph:

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world.

The resolution ended by expressing a firm conviction that should the need arise the Canadian people would be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice required in order to give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in maintaining the integrity and honour of the Empire.

R. L. Borden, the Leader of the Opposition, claimed to be as strong a champion of Canadian autonomy as anyone in the House, adding that national status implied national responsibility. He considered that too large a proportion of Canada's national expenditure for defence in the past had been for land defence; and that not less than half the total should be devoted to naval purposes, inasmuch as the great external markets of
the Dominion lay overseas and access to them could be assured only by naval forces. Also at least fifty Canadian cities, according to Borden, would be open to attack in time of war by a hostile light cruiser. He went on to say that:

In so far as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister to-day outlined the lines of naval defence of this country I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that.

Borden said that Australia had given up contributing to an Australian squadron of the Royal Navy because Great Britain had wanted the field of operations of that squadron extended to the China and Indian seas. The new Australian policy of acquiring a flotilla of small vessels would provide a force which it would be difficult or impossible to send across the seas. In thus protecting themselves, however, the Australians were providing the best possible force for the protection of the Empire as well. Borden said that he accordingly agreed with the Prime Minister in opposing a policy of contributions, and that Parliament should control, in the main at least, the expenditure of any money which it might vote for naval purposes.

The people of Canada, Borden went on, unanimously wish to be in and of the Empire, a status which bore with it an obligation to assume a fair share in defending by sea the Empire and particularly their own coasts. He expressed a strong desire that the policy of Canada on that great question should be unanimously approved by Parliament and the country. Laurier's resolution was criticized on the ground that it told Great Britain and the world what Canada was not prepared to do, instead of confining itself to stating what she would willingly do. Borden also objected to the statement in the resolution that any naval contribution was out of the question, expressing the opinion, as Foster had done, that the day might come, perhaps very soon, "when the only thing we could do in the absence of preparation in this country would be to make some kind of contribution." The inclusion of some word which would indicate an intention to act promptly was also urged.¹

¹According to Borden, in the original phrase "the organization of a Canadian naval service", he wanted to insert the word "immediate" before the word "organization". After a private discussion with Laurier the word "speedy" was agreed upon. (Borden to J. J. Maxse, May 10, 1909, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes No. 8).
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During the rest of the debate, those who opposed any naval policy and those who were hesitant suggested that Canada had already done much for Great Britain, by providing homes for her surplus people, by supporting her in the South African War, and in other ways. It was stated also that the Royal Navy was far ahead of its rivals, and likely to remain so. A fear of becoming involved in militarism was also expressed. One speaker said that the Dominion was far too busily engaged in doing other things to spend millions on naval defence, and wanted money spent instead on a canal to the Georgian Bay. The army was described as Canada’s best protection. One speaker called Foster a high priest of pessimism, wondered why Germany and Great Britain, the two most advanced nations on earth, should fight each other, and thought that any possible danger to Canada could best be met by training young men in discipline, physical exercise, and the use of the rifle.

As the attitude of the leaders had foreshadowed, a large majority of those who spoke in this debate favoured the adoption of a naval policy and wanted a Canadian navy; though some of them, following Foster and Borden, were willing to consider a contribution should a serious emergency arise. The existing position of the country with regard to naval defence was described as humiliating. It was also suggested that any naval policy which might be adopted should be carried out in such a way as to develop the iron, steel, and shipbuilding industries of the Dominion, and one Member said that dry docks were badly needed. Another Member thought that Great Britain should dispose of some dry docks to Canada. No one suggested an immediate contribution either of money or of Dreadnoughts.

Laurier concluded the debate by reintroducing his resolution, amended so as to meet all of Borden’s objections, and thus revised it was passed unanimously. The revised resolution was as follows:

That this House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in
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cooperation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the admiralty at the last imperial conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world.

The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the empire. 5

Throughout the most important debate in the whole story of Canadian naval policy, a remarkable degree of harmony had prevailed, because public opinion was on the whole ready to accept a naval policy, and also because, the issue being in a sense brand new, Party commitments binding the faithful were few and weak. The Foster resolution, moreover, merely stated a general principle, and Laurier's, in both its forms, contained much that appealed to imperialists and autonomists alike. Moreover there seems to have been a genuine and widespread desire to keep the country's naval policy clear of controversy as far as possible. When the Members left the House that night, Canada had abandoned the practice which she had followed ever since Confederation of having no naval policy at all. Both Parties had accepted in the most general form a naval policy which proved to be permanent. That it had received from the House of Commons a unanimous endorsement, moreover, promised well for its future.

In Parliament Laurier had achieved a really extraordinary success, with Borden's help, in obtaining acceptance for his policy of compromise on this question so heavily charged with political explosives. In the country at large also, the amended resolution had the support of the greater part of the press, and probably of a majority among the people; but many were opposed, and their attitude was revealed without delay. As is usual with compromises, this one received its support from a large and composite middle group, while it was attacked from both the extremes. It was too imperialist for some, while for others it was not imperialist enough. There were also those who objected to it on the ground that it would mean unnecessary expense, and still others who did so on pacifist grounds. Coming events immediately began to cast their shadows. The Mail and Empire of Toronto asked whether a moment when there was great and immediate need to uphold

5 Debate in House of Commons Debates, 1909, ii, pp. 3484-564.
Britain’s hands was the time to choose for “prating about Canada’s autonomy”? The Globe reported that the governments of Manitoba and Ontario had practically agreed to contribute a Dreadnought to the Royal Navy, and that the governments of New Brunswick and British Columbia were interested as well.:

At the opposite side of the sky two clouds appeared at this time. Quebec Conservatives, following the lead of Monk, refused to march with the Party on this question. At the same time Mr. Bourassa began a violent campaign in the same Province against the resolution, and against Laurier for having sponsored it. Monk and Mr. Bourassa, largely on the same grounds, attacked the agreement of 1909, and were later to attack the Naval Service Bill and the emergency contribution policy.

Frederick Debartzch Monk, born in Montreal in 1856, had formerly led the Conservative Party in Quebec. He was by nature exceedingly reserved, and his acquaintances seem to have found him difficult to understand. A scrupulous integrity, which found even the necessary and justifiable compromises of public life difficult to accept, was combined in Monk with considerable ability. His political ideals included a strong sense of nationalism.

Mr. Henri Bourassa was born in Montreal in 1868. A descendant of Louis-Joseph Papineau, he spent some years at his ancestor’s seigniory of Montebello, and became mayor of Montebello at the age of twenty-two. Six years later he entered the federal Parliament as a Liberal. He resigned his seat in protest against the participation of Canada in the South African War, which, he contended, involved a fundamental change in the relation of the Dominion with Great Britain, upon which the people of Canada should be thoroughly enlightened and directly consulted. He was re-elected by acclamation. Mr. Bourassa broke with Laurier again in 1905 and became the leader of the Nationaliste group in Quebec. When the naval question came to the fore in 1909 and 1910, he resolutely opposed the adopting of any positive naval policy, unless the people should have first been consulted. An original thinker, and a brilliant orator and writer, fiery, full of courage, and uncompromising, he always travelled the road of his own individual choice.

Mail and Empire, Mar. 31, 1909.
Globe, Mar. 31, 1909.
Among the Laurier Papers in the Dominion Archives there are a large number of letters and resolutions on the subject of naval policy which were addressed to Laurier during the spring and summer of 1909. Those written in March and April almost unanimously advocated some form of contribution—one or more battleships, or less specifically some sort of immediate and effective support for the Royal Navy. Later the sense of these communications changed, and the Prime Minister began to receive a stream of letters which opposed any contribution, and most of which also ran counter to any naval expenditure at all. Two or three of them even said that rebellion would result if money were squandered on a navy. A number of these later letters suggested that before anything more was done a plebiscite should be held. In July Laurier received a collect cable suggesting that the Dominion should pay the interest on a loan raised for the purpose of building ships for the Royal Navy. To many of the later letters Laurier sent the same reply, of which the following is an extract:

I can assure you that I am no more in sympathy than you are with militarism in any form, but the question of defence is one which cannot be altogether overlooked. It is the penalty of becoming a nation and which all nations have to bear and which, in course of time, I hope they may dispense with.

Unfortunately our standard of civilization is not yet high enough for that ideal. I have no more intention today than I ever had of being drawn into what I once defined as 'the vortex of European militarism'. The nations of Europe are spending at least fifty per cent of their revenue on military armaments, both on land and sea; it would be a crime for us to attempt anything of the kind, but if our revenue this year is ninety millions, and it will be above that figure, an expenditure of two or three millions, which would mean two or three per cent, seems to me a very light burden.  

The aroused interest in naval defence in the Dominions and self-governing colonies led the British Government to suggest, at the end of April 1909, that a subsidiary imperial conference should be held. In June the Australian Government offered to contribute a Dreadnought or its equivalent to the Royal Navy. New Zealand had already offered one and if necessary two Dreadnoughts, and the governments of New South Wales and Victoria had undertaken to share the cost of contributing one should the Commonwealth Government not do so. At the

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8 The correspondence referred to in this paragraph is in the Laurier Papers, Contribution by Canada to British Navy" Dreadnought", Pub. Arch., EE2, No. 4003. The cable suggesting payment of interest on a loan is dated July 29, 1909, and marked "Collect 210 words. Cost $26.25 if accepted." It has not been possible to obtain access to the relevant Laurier Papers, except for the rather unrewarding collection in the Public Archives.
conference, which was held from July 29 to August 19, the Admiralty accepted the principle of Dominion naval forces.

In the fall, as the new session of Parliament approached, naval policy attracted more attention, and it became evident that the Conservative Party was seriously divided on the question. Among the outstanding leaders, Roblin, McBride, Rogers, Hazen, Haultain and others, were opposing a "tin pot navy", and wanted some form of contribution, permanent or otherwise, and a large section of the press supported them. On the other hand, Monk and the Conservative newspapers in Quebec were openly attacking both any sort of contribution and any form of Canadian navy, and were demanding that before so grave a decision was taken the people should be consulted. From Sir Charles Tupper in England came an elder statesman's blessing on the policy of the March resolution:

Regarding as I do British Institutions as giving greater security to life, property and liberty than any other form of government I have devoted more than half a century to unceasing efforts to preserve the connection of Canada and the Crown. When Great Britain was involved in the struggle in the Transvaal I led the van in forcing the Canadian Government to send aid. But I did not believe then and I do not believe now in taxation without representation. The demand which will soon be made by some that Canada should contribute to the Imperial Navy in proportion to population I regard as preposterous, and dangerous.

I read with pleasure the resolution passed unanimously by the House of Commons which pledged Parliament to proceed vigorously with the construction of the Canadian Navy and to support England in every emergency, and all that in my opinion is required is to hold the Government of the day bound to carry that out honestly . . .

Under existing circumstances it was of immense importance to have Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his party committed to the policy which secured the unanimous consent of the House of Commons on a question of such vital importance and a great responsibility will rest upon those who disturb that compact.  

In each of two Ontario villages at this time a letter was written to the Prime Minister. One, addressed to "Premier Laurie", ended with the words: "I know that there will be great pressure brought to bear, but sir, in the name of God, I pray You to protect our homes from the taxes, needed for such useless ornamants." The second was:

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9 Skelton, Life of Laurier, ii, p. 324; Borden Memoirs, i, p. 240.
10 Sir Charles Tupper to Borden, Nov. 20, 1909, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes No. 3.
Dear Sir:

I thought I would write you a few lines in regard to the proposed Navy.

I have been a supporter of your party all my life time; and if you allow this thing to go through without taking a vote of the people you will certainly lose your head.

Yours truly

Earlier in the year Laurier had received a note warning him not to let the naval bill pass, and signed "La Main Noire."\footnote{Letters dated Nov. 17 and 18, 1909, and Mar. 14, 1910, Laurier Papers, Pub. Arch., EE2, No. 4663.}

The session of 1909-10 opened on November 11, and the Address proposed, among other things, to establish a Canadian naval Service. Many Conservatives still favoured a contribution, while Monk and Mr. Bourassa continued to campaign in Quebec against contribution and Canadian navy alike. Both Parties had split themselves on this adamant issue; the Conservatives, however, much more seriously than their opponents. The Naval Service Bill was introduced by Laurier, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries\footnote{Louis Philippe Brodeur (1862-1924), Member for Rouville, P.Q., Minister of Marine and Fisheries who had been at the head of that Department since 1906.} being ill, on January 12, 1910. The Prime Minister mentioned the two programmes that the Admiralty had furnished, by request, at the imperial conference of the previous summer. The cheaper one, to cost $2,000,000 a year, would consist of seven warships; the other, involving an expenditure of $3,000,000 annually, called for eleven ships—four Bristols, a Boadicea, and six destroyers. "We have determined", Laurier said, "to accept the second proposition, that is to say, the larger one of 11 ships." He stated that the Admiralty had suggested destroyers of the river class on account of their sea-keeping qualities, and that the ships would be built in Canada, if possible, in spite of the fact that the cost of local construction would be at least a third greater.

Borden agreed that it was desirable to establish a naval force, which he preferred to speak of as a Canadian unit of the British or imperial navy. It had been urged, with some force, that Canada could not properly take a permanent part in the naval defence of the Empire without having some voice as to the wars which Great Britain might undertake; but he did not believe that Britain would engage in any great war without having first consulted the Dominions. This would provide the necessary share in directing policy. A Dominion navy he considered as no more likely than was the militia to erode the
imperial connection. Concerning annual contributions Borden said:

... from the strategical point of view, I would be inclined to agree with the view of the admiralty that this would be the best way for the great self-governing dominions of the empire to make the contributions. But, Sir, from a constitutional and political standpoint, I am opposed to it, for many reasons. In the first place, I do not believe that it would endure. In the second place, it would be a source of friction... Permanent co-operation in defence, in my opinion, can only be accomplished by the use of our own material, the employment of our own people, the development and utilization of our own skill and resourcefulness, and above all by impressing upon the people a sense of responsibility for their share in international affairs.

Borden went on to say, however, that a contribution for the purpose of meeting an emergency would be fully justified and desirable. The government's proposals were entirely inadequate, being either too much or too little. They were too much for carrying on experiments in the organization of a Canadian naval Service, and too little for immediate and effective aid. The speediest organization would not make a Canadian Service effective in less than ten years. Indeed fifteen or twenty years would probably be required; "and the crisis, if a crisis is to be apprehended, will come and probably within three years." Borden had visited Great Britain the previous summer, where he had seen the fleet gathered for review by the King. He described the scene, adding that:

... it was not a proud thought for a Canadian surveying that mighty fleet to remember that all the protecting power which it embodied was paid for without the contribution of a single dollar by the Canadian people, although Canada and every Canadian throughout the world had the right to invoke the just expectation to receive the protection afforded by that great armament.

The rapid growth of the German Navy, in Borden's opinion, was a most serious threat to the naval supremacy of Great Britain, which in turn was "absolutely essential to the integrity of the empire..." The moment of imminent danger had not actually arrived, but was fast approaching. "No one pretends that the British navy is not supreme to-day, but the continuance of that supremacy will cease within the next two or three years at least, unless extraordinary efforts are made by the mother country and all the great dominions." Borden ended by advocating the provision of a fleet unit, or else of one Dreadnought; or, what would be the best course of all, "the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the Admiralty to be used for naval defence under such conditions as we may prescribe." He moved an amendment in this sense.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The bill came up for its second reading on February 3, 1910, and the debate was continued on a number of later days between that date and April 20. In the Minister’s continued absence the Prime Minister led off again. He criticized:

... those who within the [Conservative] party boast of their imperialism, who carry abroad upon their foreheads the imperial phylacteries, who boldly walk into the temple and there loudly thank the Lord that they are not like other British subjects, that they give tithes of everything they possess, and that in them alone is to be found the true incense of loyalty.

He twitted the Conservatives with their disunity in regard to naval policy, and claimed that he himself was “a Canadian, first, last and all the time.” Laurier went on to say that “this idea of contribution seems to me repugnant to the genius of our British institutions; it smacks too much of tribute to be acceptable by British communities.” He quoted Lord Milner to the effect that local navies would be the best solution from the imperial point of view. It was in the course of this speech that Laurier used the following words, which were very often quoted or referred to afterwards:

If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say that we shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be determined by circumstances, upon which the Canadian parliament will have to pronounce and will have to decide in its own best judgment.

The next speaker was Borden, who objected to the authority which the bill would confer by implication on the government to withhold Canadian warships from imperial service in time of war. He wanted unity of organization and of action specified, and protested that neither immediate and effective aid for the Empire, nor satisfactory results for Canada, were promised by the bill. No permanent policy should be adopted without consulting the people. Meanwhile he asked for a contribution of money “to purchase or construct two battleships or armoured cruisers of the latest Dreadnought type”, and that these ships should be placed at the disposal of the

13 Milner, the chief of the contemporary apostles of imperialism, in a speech given before the Canadian Club in Toronto on Oct. 27, 1908, had favoured Dominion navies rather than contributions to the Royal Navy, provided that whatever the Dominions did was done for the Empire as a whole and not for themselves only.

14 Laurier later explained his position on this point more fully in the course of a speech in Montreal on Oct 10, 1910; When Britain was at war, Canada was at war because of her relation to the British Crown. Canada would defend her territory if it were attacked. If Britain were at war Canada, if not attacked, would not take part unless she should judge it advisable to do so. If there should be a war endangering the naval supremacy of the Empire, he believed that it would be Canada’s duty to aid Great Britain with all her strength. (Pub. Arch. Pamph. Cat., 11, No. 3712, pp. 35 and 44).
British Government. Monk followed Borden with a very able speech in which he said that a contribution and a local navy would amount to the same thing. Pure and simple defence of Canada would be all right; but the government's policy would tie the Dominion tightly to the foreign policy of the British Government, and create a commitment to fight in all Britain's wars. "Most important of all, we have no voice of any kind in the conduct of imperial affairs, while being bound by imperial obligations towards foreign countries." The policy embodied in the bill would tend to destroy Canadian self-government. Monk moved an amendment to the effect that the House, declaring its unalterable devotion to the Crown, considered that the bill would alter the relations of Canada with the rest of the Empire, and ought therefore to be submitted to the Canadian people by means of a plebiscite.

Later speakers on behalf of the Naval Service Bill argued that Canada should cease to depend on the Royal Navy and the Monroe Doctrine, and that the proposed navy would increase Canada's prestige among the nations, and would tend to stimulate business at home and create new openings for trade abroad. It was also urged that the projected outlay was much smaller than it would have had to be if Canada had been an independent State. The Leader of the Opposition was accused of having agreed with the resolution of March 1909, and then turned around and advocated a different policy. From the Opposition back benches it was claimed that the fate of Canada would not be decided off the east coast but in the North Sea. Cruisers and destroyers were too small and weak, and a dismaying picture was drawn of little Canadian cruisers sailing out against the German Dreadnoughts while the whole world laughed. It was also asserted that a contribution to the Royal Navy would provide the most fighting power for the least money, and that most of the arguments against an emergency contribution were only applicable to a policy of permanent contributions. A third group of speakers were more or less opposed to any positive naval policy. From among these came the arguments that the best preparation for war was to husband one's resources in time of peace, and that the people of Great Britain were accustomed to having a scare every few years. The "frontier" point of view that a sturdy and resourceful citizenry would look after an enemy when the time came, was also expressed, as was the pacifist opinion that any naval expenditure would result in a tendency towards militarism.
One speaker thought that the possibilities of "air-ships" should be investigated, and that Canadians ought to be encouraged in air activities which might mean more to the country in the near future than a whole fleet of small cruisers or even of Dreadnoughts.\(^{15}\)

The point of view concerning the bill which Mr. Bourassa had been putting before the people of Quebec, was expounded in a speech that he had made on January 20, 1910, in Montreal:

Comme toutes les lois organiques ce projet affecte à la fois le budget et la constitution. D'une part, il sera la source de dépenses considérables; de l'autre, il modifie profondément notre situation politique dans nos rapports avec la mère-patrie, et plus tard nos relations avec les pays étrangers . . . .

S'imagine-t-on le gouvernement belge soumettant au parlement de Bruxelles un texte de loi qui l'autorise, en cas de guerre, d'insurrection dans toutes les possessions françaises, à mettre l'armée belge au service de la république française et qui donne au ministre de la guerre, à Paris, à compter du moment de la mobilization, le commandement des forces belges.

He said that between 1812 and 1907 Great Britain had been engaged in twenty-four wars, but that Canada was not likely to be attacked by any foreign country.

Referring to the proposed naval force, Mr. Bourassa complained that:

Au lieu d'une marine canadienne, sous l'autorité du gouvernement canadien, pour la défense du Canada, il [Laurier] nous gratifiait de deux escadres, organisées et payées par le peuple du Canada; mises en cas de guerre sous l'autorité exclusive de l'amirauté anglaise, pour prendre part à toutes les guerres de l'Angleterre.

Co-operation with the Royal Navy, he charged, had been implied by Laurier when he had stated in Parliament that the river-type destroyers had been chosen on account of their sea-keeping qualities, and that the Bristols had been selected partly for the same reason. The purpose of this proposed naval force, therefore, was not to defend the ports, commerce, and coasts of Canada, but to replace the squadrons which the Admiralty had withdrawn a few years before. He did not want control by the Admiralty in time of war:

Sans doute, en temps de paix le Canada garde la direction de sa flotte; mais, je vous le demande, une marine de guerre est-elle faite pour la paix ou pour la guerre?

\(^{15}\) The debates on the Naval Service Bill are to be found scattered through the following pages of House of Commons Debates 1909-10: i, pp. 1732-76; ii, pp. 2952-4098; iii, pp.4848-5196; iv, pp. 6509-7294; v, pp. 7393-392.
In spite of what Borden had said, Mr. Bourassa went on, Britain would not in any predictable future consult the larger colonies concerning foreign policy. He considered the so-called German peril to be largely a bugbear. Imperial unification was undesirable from every point of view, and Canada was not responsible for the international mess in which Great Britain had got herself involved. To the argument that Britain was heavily taxed in order to provide naval defence for the Empire, including Canada, his reply was that "l’Angleterre doit conserver les mers ouvertes pour recevoir son pain quotidien." British protection was an illusion; the only possible enemy being the United States, against whom Great Britain could not protect Canada. Britain would not fight the United States in order to protect Canada, nor did he blame her. The Monroe Doctrine was Canada’s defence against external enemies. In time of war Canadian trade, contraband excepted, could be carried in neutral ships.

The imperialists, Mr. Bourassa continued, were accustomed to say that if nothing was done, the Empire would fall to pieces. It was possible; yet if Canada and the rest of the Empire were left free to develop in their own national and ethnic traditions, the separation would be a long way off, and harmonious. The consequence of the imperialist policy would be an early rupture in conflict and hatred:

Je dis aux impérialistes sincères: Revenez sur la terre, voyez les hommes comme ils sont: Vous ne pouvez pas du Canadien faire un Anglais, vous ne pouvez pas de l’Australien faire un Néo-Zélandais.

These arguments, he said, applied equally to all Canadians. "Il n’y a pas ici de querelle de races." Mr. Bourassa concluded by saying that no one there had loved Laurier more than he had; but that his country came first. He offered a resolution that Parliament had no right to commit the Dominion to an entirely new naval policy without the previous consent of the people, and ought not to enact the bill until after a plebiscite should have been held.16

When the House of Commons divided, Monk’s amendment to the amendment was defeated, 175 to 18; and Borden’s amendment by 129 to 74. W. B. Northrup (East Hastings) then moved that the second reading of the bill should be postponed for six months; but this amendment was defeated by 119

to 78. On its third reading the Naval Service Bill was passed by 111 to 70, with eighteen Members pairing.

This important debate had contrasted markedly with the one of the previous year, in that before it began definite Party lines had been drawn concerning the question at issue. Both Parties were seriously divided, and each of the principal policies was a compromise. The unity of the Conservatives, however, was much the more seriously affected; and it should be noted that Borden at this time lacked his rival's tremendous prestige, and that his control over his Party was much weaker than that which Laurier exercised over his own followers. The naval policy of a Dominion involved the whole question of imperial relations: it is not surprising, therefore, that debate ranged much more widely than the title of the bill would imply. Quotations from eminent statesmen or seamen had been carefully collected, like pearls of great price, by many Members on both sides. The results of these researches were usually to the effect that there was, or was not, an emergency; or that contributions by the Dominions were, or were not, the best solution. From time to time throughout the debate, salvoes of these excerpts were fired off in the House. The Monroe Doctrine was seldom mentioned, and then usually in order to minimize its importance or relevance; the reason being, no doubt, that it seemed in those days to weigh against the need for any naval commitment. The annexation argument also appeared but seldom, and was used to support both the bill and the emergency contribution.

The division in public opinion on the naval question at this time was illustrated by certain events which took place in the city of Ottawa. When the debate which has just been described began on the summit of Parliament Hill, another verbal conflict was raging in the city below; and the issue in both cases was the same. The intensity of the municipal contest was at least equal to that displayed at the top of the hill, and the casualties suffered in it were much heavier. It was due to the Prime Minister, in the first instance, that these minor hostilities occurred. Laurier had been representing both Quebec East and an Ottawa constituency: on December 17, 1909, he resigned his seat in Ottawa, and a by-election to fill the vacancy was called for January. A former Mayor of Ottawa, a Conservative in politics, immediately came forward as an independent candidate. He was opposed to the creation of a Canadian navy, feeling strongly that a Dreadnought should be contribu-
ted without delay; accordingly he wished to bring the government's naval policy to a test. The Ottawa Citizen supported his candidacy, while the Journal and Free Press opposed him. Of the two Ottawa constituencies it was customary for one to be represented by a French-speaking Member, and the uncontested seat already had an English-speaking occupant. The local Liberals therefore put up a French-speaking candidate for the vacant constituency, and the Conservatives followed suit. The Liberal candidate, however, was repudiated by the leaders and press of his Party. For a while it was a three-cornered contest, as the former Mayor refused to withdraw. Nevertheless the Citizen ceased to support him, and he gave up the fight soon afterwards. Meanwhile the irregular Liberal candidate had also withdrawn, and had been replaced by another contender who enjoyed the support of the government and of the Liberal press. This curiously confused by-election was fought almost exclusively on the naval issue, and as on the hilltop so in the plain below the government won a victory. On January 29, 1910, the Liberal candidate obtained 5,779 votes to 5,121 for his opponent.  

On this by-election see the following Ottawa newspapers: Citizen, Evening Journal, Free Press, and Le Temps, for the period Dec. 17, 1909 to Jan. 31, 1910 inclusive.
IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

The Naval Service Act created a Department of the Naval Service under the Minister of Marine and Fisheries who would also be the Minister of the Naval Service, and authorized the appointment of a Deputy Minister. The Command in Chief of the naval forces was declared "to continue and be vested in the King." A Director of the Naval Service was provided for, to be the professional head of the Service, preferably with a rank not lower than that of Rear Admiral. The Governor in Council was authorized to organize and maintain a permanent naval force, to appoint a Naval Board to advise the Minister, and from time to time to authorize complements of officers and men. Conditions of service were also briefly laid down. Section 23 of the Act read:

In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

A Naval Reserve Force and a Naval Volunteer Force were authorized, and both forces were to be liable for active service in an emergency. A naval college was provided for in order to train prospective officers in all branches of naval science, tactics, and strategy. The Naval Discipline Act of 1866, and the King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, where applicable and except to the extent that they might be inconsistent with the Naval Service Act or with regulations made under it, were to apply to the Service. The Governor in Council was authorized to make regulations for carrying out the Act, and for the organization, training, and discipline of the Naval Service.

The Naval Service Act was assented to on May 4, 1910: it remained to carry out its provisions by establishing a naval Service. The latter was placed, as laid down in the Act, with

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1 9-10 Edw. VII, c. 43. For the text of this Act, as originally passed, see App. v.
the Department of Marine and Fisheries. The Hon. Louis Philippe Brodeur, who had headed that Department since 1906, became also Minister of the Naval Service. Unlike the First Lord of the Admiralty, who shares his responsibility to some extent with the Sea Lords, the Canadian Minister was vested with complete authority and responsibility, his professional colleagues being advisers only. George J. Desbarats, who had been Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries since 1907 became the first Deputy Minister of the Naval Service, and Rear Admiral Kingsmill its first Director, an appointment which he was to hold until 1921. Seven other officers of the Royal Navy who were already on loan to the Canadian Government were also transferred to the new Department.

This Department was divided into five branches: Naval, Fishery Protection, Tidal and Current Survey, Hydrographic Survey, and Wireless Telegraph. All except the first of these had been detached from the Department of Marine and Fisheries, and transferred in accord with Section 2 of the Act. The Wireless Telegraph Service at that time comprised 21 government-owned stations. Of these, 13 were on the east coast, most of them situated on the St. Lawrence River or the Gulf; 2 were in Newfoundland; and 6 were in British Columbia. Regulations for the entry of officers and men into the Naval Service, and rates of pay and allowances, were authorized. The old cruisers Niobe and Rainbow were bought from the Admiralty and brought to Canada to be used as training ships, and a naval college was established in Halifax.

The smaller of the two cruisers, the Rainbow, was intended for the west coast; the other, H.M.S. Niobe, was to be based on Halifax, and for her the Admiralty received £215,000. The Niobe was a protected cruiser of the Diadem class, launched in 1899 at a cost of £600,000. Contrary to a general impression, she was a very big cruiser. Her displacement was more than three-fifths that of the famous Dreadnought, which at her launch, seven years after than of Niobe, was a battle-

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3 Naval Service Act, Secs. 7-10 inclusive.
5 A "protected" cruiser had no side or deck armour, but over her vital installations amidships lay a shield of armour, convex on top and lying below the upper deck. Niobe was one of the last protected cruisers to be built for the Royal Navy.
ship of the largest size. The *Niobe* also mounted a tremendous armament.⁵

In July 1910 the Director of the Naval Service went to England to attend the trials of the two cruisers and to take them over from the Admiralty. Before they were transferred a number of alterations were carried out, to make them more suitable as training ships.⁶ The *Niobe* was commissioned in the Canadian Service at Devonport on September 6, 1910, with Cdr. W. B. Macdonald, R.N., a native of British Columbia, as her captain, and on this occasion a silk ensign was presented to the ship on behalf of the Queen. On a full-power trial two days later the *Niobe* made seventeen knots. On September 27 some Canadian journalists visited the ship, and on October 10 she left Devonport bound for Halifax.⁷ On her way over she received the following signal from N.S.H.Q., via Cape Race: “Keep look out for Wellman’s airship America . . . sailed from Atlantic City . . . for England, last heard of 12.45 p.m. Sunday abreast of Nantucket, report if seen.”⁸ *Niobe*, however, saw nothing of Walter Wellman’s dirigible, which had lost buoyancy and landed in the sea far to the southward of the cruiser’s course, the crew being rescued by a passing steamer.

The *Niobe* reached Halifax on October 21, 1910—the hundred-and-fifth anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar. At the harbour entrance she was met by the fishery protection cruiser *Canada*. After sending a message of welcome the *Canada* turned and steamed up the harbour, followed by the *Niobe* which came to anchor at 12.45 p.m. off the dockyard.⁹ The Royal Canadian Navy was a fact. Perhaps because the years between have been so replete with tumults and the upsetting of once certain things, that day seems long ago. Whether Home Rule could be given to Ireland despite the House of Lords was then an urgent question. South Africa was a Union at last, but its first Parliament had yet to meet. King Manoel of Portugal had been driven from his throne, and the dancer Gaby Deslys was offering to help him back on to it again, though how this was to be done she did not

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⁵ Statistics of *Niobe*: displacement, 11,000 tons; length, 435'; beam, 69'; draught, 26'; shaft h.p., 16,500; designed speed, 20.5 k.; bunker capacity, 1,000 tons; armament, 16 6", 12 12-pdr., 5 3-pdr. guns; 2 18" torpedo tubes; complement, about 700.
⁶ Annual Report, 1911, p. 16.
⁷ *Niobe’s Log*.
⁸ Naval to *Niobe*, Oct. 18, 1910, N.S. 18-1-1.
IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

say, nor why. Dr. Hawley Harvey Crippen was being tried for his life in London.

After Niobe had fired a salute of twenty-one guns and dressed ship, she was visited by the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, and other notables. The Minister, Hon. Louis Philippe Brodeur, welcomed the ship and her complement on behalf of the government. In the course of his speech he said that:

This event tells the story of a dawning epoch of self-reliance. It proclaims to the whole British Empire that Canada is willing and proud to provide as rapidly as circumstances will permit for her local naval defence and to safeguard her share in the commerce and trade of the Empire...in whose world-girding belt Canada is the bright and precious buckle.

As did many speakers and editors at this time, he emphasized the idea that an enlargement of self-government involves increased responsibilities.10

A country is unfortunate when the basic principles of its defence policy are included in the field of party strife. From this misfortune Canada had suffered in respect to her naval policy, and when the Niobe arrived the Naval Service Act was still highly controversial. On the very evening before she reached Halifax, Mr. Henri Bourassa had presided at a huge Nationalist meeting in Montreal at which he, Monk, and Armand Lavergne, had ridden full tilt against Laurier’s whole naval policy. Nor could the Conservative newspapers entirely and at once forget that Niobe was part of Laurier’s policy made flesh. The welcome which the press accorded to the cruiser, consequently, though widespread was not unanimous, and comment ranged all the way down the scale from enthusiasm to hostility and mockery. According to La Patrie:

L’arrivée du ‘Niobé’ à Halifax, hier, marque en quelque sorte la naissance de la marine canadienne. C’est le premier navire de guerre canadien, et chacun sait qu’on en veut faire un navire-école. Le ministre de la marine a souhaité la bienvenue aux marins du ‘Niobé’, et il a eu des mots bien trouvés pour souligner l’importance historique de cette arrivée du croiseur dans les eaux canadiennes.11

“This splendid ship”, stated the Charlottetown Patriot, another Liberal newspaper, “is the first real warship of the Canadian Navy and is but the beginning of that naval defence

which ranks Canada in the sisterhood of nations." The Halifax Chronicle held nothing in reserve: "Here where we have been bred to the ocean, and have for a century and more been associated with the fleet which keeps and guards the sea, we welcome the Niobe in no perfunctory way."

The Halifax Herald, to whom Laurier and all his works were anathema, had this to say:

H.M.C.S. Niobe is in port, and once more Halifax becomes a naval headquarters. The four letters look strange, but we may get accustomed to the change from the old fashioned 'H.M.S.', which Halifax once knew. The newcomer among the initials stands for 'Canadian', so that now it all means 'His Majesty's Canadian Ship Niobe'.

Some other Conservative organs were moderately friendly, among them being the Montreal Gazette:

The Niobe, the first ship of the new Canadian navy to reach Halifax, has been welcomed with addresses and gifts and loyal acclaim. This is good and wholesome. Perhaps it indicates that in a little while there will be found a complement of Canadians, enlisted men, qualified to work the ship. So long as volunteers from England are needed to keep the crews of Canadian war craft up to the standard, the new organization may be a drain on rather than a help to the British fighting fleet.

Le Canada, in the same city, rebutted a charge frequently made by the Nationalists that the Niobe would soon be too old for fighting, stating that she was only intended for training, and that the Admiralty had given Canada a very good bargain.

The Toronto Mail and Empire was openly scornful:

The coming of the Niobe means that we now have our first warship. The Niobe is a cruiser which the Royal Navy has discarded. She was on her way to the scrap heap when the Ottawa Government determined that we should have a navy of our own. That decision necessitated the buying of ships, and the Niobe is our first purchase. Her cost is $1,075,000, and she is to be employed in protecting the Atlantic coast from the enemy. The first defence work assigned to the Niobe will partake of the nature of a holiday trip to the West Indies, with the Governor-General on board. After that she will be at the disposal of the Ministers for other defence work of a similar character.

While the Conservative press had been opposing a separate Canadian navy, the Nationalists in Quebec could not abide
the idea of a Canadian naval policy of any sort. Expressing
their point of view, Mr. Bourassa’s newspaper Le Devoir,
perhaps the Wittiest Periodical in the country, announced the
Niobe’s arrival in this way, in a news column: “Le croiseur
‘Niobé’, le noyau de la flotte canadienne (canadienne en temps
de paix, impériale en temps de guerre), est arrivé hier à
Halifax.”

The Niobe had been manned in England by a skeleton
crew consisting of officers and active and reserve ratings of
the Royal Navy, and after her arrival in Canada recruits were
obtained from shore to be trained on board. Since Halifax
had then neither naval college nor barracks, the Niobe’s
great size had recommended her strongly at the time when she
was chosen. The plan was to use her for training until the
projected warships should have been completed, and after
that she was to be employed both for training and as a depot
ship for destroyers. During the first winter no cruising was
done, since the complement had not been filled by recruits
and also because Niobe’s officers were needed to help in or-
organizing the Halifax dockyard.

In the summer of 1911 the Niobe was nearly lost by mis-
adventure. While on her way from Yarmouth to Shelburne,
shortly after midnight of July 30-31, in thick weather and
with a strong tide running, the cruiser struck a rock on the
Southwest Ledge off Cape Sable. She pounded heavily as the
crew went to their stations, and the boats were swung out
and provisioned, wireless calls were sent out, and other neces-
sary measures taken. About two hours after striking the ship
floated clear. An anchor was promptly lowered, but it dragged,
while with the starboard engine-room flooded and the rudder
and port propeller damaged the Niobe was in danger of
going aground again. Soon after dawn some fishermen and
pilots arrived who were able to tell the captain where he was.
In the course of the next few hours tugs and a large number
of fishing boats arrived on the scene. By that time the cruiser
was settling by the stern, and accordingly all of the crew who
could be spared were transferred to fishing boats. The car-
penters worked at shoring up bulkheads and water-tight
doors until water swept them off their feet. As steering proved
difficult a tug took the ship in tow, and she arrived safely at
Clark’s Harbour, where she remained until on August 5

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H.M.S. Cornwall came to her assistance. In a dense fog, however, the Cornwall damaged herself on an uncharted rock while feeling her way in towards Niobe: nevertheless she was able to tow the latter to Halifax where both ships were repaired. Niobe's navigating officer was severely reprimanded and dismissed his ship by a Court Martial, and the officer of the watch was reprimanded. 19

The repair work on Niobe was not completed until December 1912. Meanwhile the personnel from the Royal Navy who formed the framework of her crew had been returned to England and not replaced. The Naval Service at this time, indeed, was like a clock that is being allowed to run down. No new ships were being built, the Service had only the most meagre prospects to offer to either officers or ratings, and desertions were frequent. Until the First World War Niobe stayed in port, training the remaining men in an atmosphere of discouragement and futility.

The Rainbow was a light cruiser of the Apollo class, and the Canadian Government paid £50,000 for her and assigned her to the west coast. A ship of the Royal Navy often has many predecessors of the same name, and on the Rainbow's hand steering-wheels were inscribed the names and dates of actions in which earlier Rainbows had taken part: "Spanish Armada 1588—Cadiz 1596—Brest 1599—Lowestoft 1665—North Foreland 1666—Lagos Bay 1759—Frigate Hancock 1777—Frigate Hebe 1777." 20

The Rainbow was commissioned as an H.M.C. ship at Portsmouth on August 4, 1910, and was manned by a nucleus crew supplied by the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Reserve. The personnel were entered on loan for a period of two years, while the fleet reservists were enrolled in the Royal Canadian Navy under special service engagements of from two to five years. On August 8 the Rainbow, commanded by Cdr. J. D. D. Stewart, received her sailing orders, the first instructions ever given to a warship by the Canadian naval authorities. 21 She left Portsmouth on August 20 for Esquimalt, sailing around South America by way of the Strait of

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20 See F. V. Longstaff, "The Eight 'Rainbows'," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, viii, No. 2.
21 N.S. 2-5-2. The account of Rainbow's cruise to Esquimalt is based, except where otherwise indicated, on material contained in this folder and in the cruiser's log.
Magellan, a distance of about 15,000 nautical miles. At the equator "Father Neptune" came aboard wearing a crown of gilded papier-mâché, attended by his courtiers and his bears, and performed his judicial duties in the time-honoured way.

Near Callao the German cruiser Bremen was seen carrying out heavy-gun firing practice at a moored target, and at the end of the cruise Cdr. Stewart reported on what had been observed of this practice firing. The Admiralty knew very little at this time about the German Navy's gunnery. Naval Headquarters in Ottawa immediately asked Cdr. Stewart for further particulars; but these he was unable to supply. On the morning of November 7, 1910, the Rainbow arrived at Esquimalt which was to be her home thenceforth. Among the ships in port when she arrived were two, H.M.S. Shearwater and the Grand Trunk Pacific steamer Prince George, with whom she was to be closely associated four years later. Having saluted the country with twenty-one guns the Rainbow dressed ship and prepared to receive distinguished visitors.

The following day the Victoria Colonist announced that:

History was made at Esquimalt yesterday. H.M.C.S. Rainbow came; and a new navy was born. Canada's blue ensign flies for the first time on the Dominion's own fighting ship in the Pacific—the ocean of the future where some of the world's greatest problems will have to be worked out. Esquimalt began its recrudescence, the revival of its former glories.

The Victoria Times reported that "nothing but the most favorable comment was heard on the trim little cruiser." The same newspaper stated in an editorial that:

We are pleased to welcome His Majesty's Canadian ship Rainbow to our port to-day. We are told in ancient literature that the first rainbow was set in the sky as a promise of things to come. So may it be with His Majesty's ship. She is a training craft only, but she is the first fruits on this coast of the Canadian naval policy, the necessary forerunner of the larger vessels which will add dignity to our name and prestige to our actions.

According to the Colonist:

The event was one calculated to awaken thought in the minds of all who endeavored to grasp its true significance. The Rainbow is not a fighting ship, but she is manned by fighting men, and her mission is to train

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24 Daily Colonist, Victoria, B.C., Nov. 8, 1910.
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men so as to make them fit to defend our country from invasion, protect our commerce on the seas and maintain the dignity of the Empire everywhere. Her coming is a proof that Canada has accepted a new responsibility in the discharge of which new burdens will have to be assumed. On this Western Frontier of Empire it is all important that there shall be a naval establishment that will count for something in an hour of stress.26

Early in the following month the Rainbow visited Vancouver, where the mayor and citizens extended a warm welcome. Soon after her arrival on the coast the cruiser was placed on training duty and recruits were sought and obtained, twenty-three joining up during the ship’s first visit to Vancouver.27 On March 13, 1911, the Lieutenant Governor and the Premier of British Columbia presented the ship with a set of plate, the gift of the Province. During the next year-and-a-half Rainbow made cruises up the coast, calling at various ports where she was in great request for ceremonies of all sorts. On some of these cruises training was combined with fishery patrol work, which chiefly consisted in seeing that American fishermen did not fish inside the three-mile limit.

Meanwhile the policy of developing a Canadian navy had been allowed to lapse. Accordingly, during the two years immediately preceding the First World War, the Rainbow lay at Esquimalt with a shrunken complement, engaged in harbour training, except when an occasional short cruise was undertaken for the sake of her engines.

British warships had long been helping to enforce certain sealing agreements covering the North Pacific, and for several years prior to the First World War this work had been done by the sloops Algerine and Shearwater. During the summer of 1914 these vessels were performing duties on the Mexican coast: the Canadian Government had therefore decided to send the Rainbow on sealing patrol, and on July 9 she was ordered to prepare for a three-months’ cruise. Her extremely slender crew was strengthened by a detachment from England, another from the Niobe, and by volunteers from Vancouver and Victoria. She was dry-docked for cleaning and replenished with stores and fuel.

In May 1914, the steamer Komagata Maru had reached Canada, carrying nearly 400 passengers, natives of India who were would-be immigrants. When they found their entry barred by certain Dominion regulations the Indians refused

26 Colonist, Victoria, Nov. 8, 1910.
to leave Vancouver harbour, staying on and on, though their food supplies ran low. On July 18, 175 local police and other officials tried to board the Komagata Maru, so as to take the Indians off by force and put them aboard the Empress of India for passage to Hong Kong. A storm of missiles which included lumps of coal greeted the police, who thereupon steamed away without having used their firearms.28

By this time the Rainbow was in a condition to intervene. The Naval Service Act contained no provision for naval aid to the civil power; nevertheless, on July 19 the Rainbow’s commander was instructed to ask the authorities in Vancouver whether or not they wanted his assistance, and the next day he reported that: “Rainbow can be ready to leave for Vancouver ten o’clock tonight . . . immigration agent Vancouver and crown law officers very anxious for Rainbow . . .”29 The cruiser was ordered to proceed to Vancouver and to render all possible assistance, while the militia authorities were instructed to co-operate with her in every way. She left Esquimalt that night taking a detachment of artillery with her, and reached Vancouver next morning.

As H.M.C.S. RAINBOW steamed in through the Narrows on the bright summer’s morning and the Harbour and City opened up it was a wonderful sight. Every street end, every window, every possible vantage ground was thronged with expectant crowds, the waters of the harbour were like a regatta day, and all deadly still.

As RAINBOW steamed round the ‘Komagata Maru’, the latter’s decks crowded with the recalcitrant Indians, one grizzled veteran, late of the Indian Army, put the relieving touch of humour on the otherwise serious outlook by standing on the upper bridge of the ‘Komagata’ and semaphoring to the RAINBOW—‘Our only ammunition is coal’.30

The Indians had laid hands on the Japanese captain of the Komagata Maru in an attempt to seize his vessel. The warship’s presence had the desired effect, however, without the use of violence; the Indians agreed to leave, and were given a large consignment of food, a pilot was supplied from the Rainbow, and on July 23 the Komagata Maru sailed for Hong Kong. The cruiser saw her safely off the premises, accompanying her out through the Strait of Juan de Fuca as far as the open sea, and then returned to Esquimalt.

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28 For a full account see Robie L. Reid, “The Inside Story of the Komagata Maru,” British Columbia Historical Quarterly, v (1941), pp. 1-23.
29 Hose to N.S.H.Q., July 20, 1914, N.S. 1048-3-9 (2).
30 Account by Capt. Walter Hose enclosed in idem to S. Brent, Esq., Feb. 19, 1919, N.S. 1000-5-5 (1).
The personnel for the newly-created Service were obtained partly in Canada and partly by borrowing from the Admiralty. The first Director of the Naval Service was Rear Admiral Charles Edmund Kingsmill, who was born in 1855 at Guelph, Ontario, and in 1870 became a midshipman in the Royal Navy. He was promoted sub-lieutenant in 1875, lieutenant in 1877, commander in 1891, and captain in 1898. In 1908 he retired with the rank of Rear Admiral, and came to Canada to command the Marine Service of the Department of Marine and Fisheries. Kingsmill had served on stations all over the world, and had commanded the Goldfinch, Blenheim, Archer, Gibraltar, Mildura, Resolution, Majestic, and Dominion. He had seen service in Somaliland in 1884 and received the bronze medal and Khedive’s Star for service in Egypt in 1892, and was to be knighted in 1918. On April 19, 1909, three weeks after the Foster resolution had been moved in the House of Commons, Kingsmill addressed to the Minister of Marine and Fisheries a memorandum, with enclosures, containing his professional advice as to setting up a Canadian naval organization.\(^{31}\) The memorandum recommended that Halifax and Esquimalt should have their defences and equipment put into good order and modernized. The suggested building programme was as follows:

We should at once commence building destroyers and cruisers. What we should build, that is lay down, now as soon as possible, would be: Two ocean going destroyers, vessels of 700 to 900 tons displacement, for the Atlantic; two coastal destroyers, vessels of 270 tons displacement, for the Pacific coast; four torpedo boats; the torpedo boats could be built, after a model has been obtained, in Canada, to save sending them round Cape Horn to British Columbia.

The greater part of this memorandum was devoted to the salient and difficult question of training officers and ratings for a naval organization which would have to start from scratch.

Several other active or retired naval officers were also employed by the Department of Marine and Fisheries, and three of them who were on loan from the Royal Navy were transferred to the Naval Service at its inception, along with Kingsmill. Of these, Cdr. J. D. D. Stewart was assigned to command H.M.C.S. Rainbow, Lieut. R. M. Stephens was appointed Director of Gunnery, and Fleet Paymaster P. J. Ling became Secretary to the Naval Staff. Shortly afterwards

Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill
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the Admiralty lent Cdr. W. B. Macdonald to command the Niobe, and Cdr. C. D. Roper who became Chief of Staff. The following civilian directors were also transferred at this time from Marine and Fisheries to the Naval Service: Messrs. L. J. Beausoleil, Chief Accountant; J. A. Wilson, Director of Stores; C. P. Edwards, Director of the Radiotelegraph Branch; W. J. Stewart, Chief Hydrographer; and Dr. W. B. Dawson, Director of the Tidal and Current Survey. These officers and civilians were the first stones in the foundation of the new organization. In November, 1911, a civilian complement of 66 was authorized for the Naval Service, consisting of a Deputy Minister, 61 clerks of various grades, and 4 messengers.12

The first Deputy Minister was George J. Desbarats. Born in Quebec, P.Q., in 1861, he became a civil engineer, obtained a wide experience in engineering work connected with canals and railways, and was later responsible for a hydrographic survey of the St. Lawrence River. In 1901 Desbarats became director of the government shipyard at Sorel, and in 1908 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries. He was Deputy Minister and Controller of the Naval Service from May 5, 1910, until the consolidation of 1922, and in 1924 he became Deputy Minister of National Defence. He retired in 1932 and died in 1944. Throughout the first twelve years of his long tenure of office, the Naval Service having no Minister whose main concern it was, Desbarats’ authority and influence considerably exceeded those of most Deputy Ministers; and during the first two decades of its existence he probably had more to do with moulding the Service than any other man.

In the spring of 1909 Cdr. Walter Hose, R.N., executive officer of the armoured cruiser H.M.S. Cochrane, was corresponding with Admiral Kingsmill concerning employment as a naval officer in Canada. Born at sea in 1875, he had entered the Royal Navy in 1890. He served in many parts of the world, including Newfoundland waters, and his wife whom he married in 1905 was a native of St. John’s. He took the War Staff course at Greenwich, and a course in amphibious Operations at the Military Staff College, Camberley. Promoted to commander in 1908, his commands in the Royal Navy were H.M. ships Tweed, Ringdove, Kale, Redbreast, and Jason. In 1911 the Admiralty lent Cdr. Hose to the Naval Service,

12 P.C. 45/2613, Nov. 18, 1911.
and in June of that year he was appointed to succeed Cdr. Stewart in command of the Rainbow. The following year he voluntarily retired from the Royal Navy to throw in his lot permanently with the Naval Service. He was in command of the Rainbow until early in 1917, when he was transferred to Ottawa to organize the east coast patrols, and in the summer of that year was appointed Captain of Patrols, a post which he held for the remainder of the war. After a year as Senior Naval Officer at Halifax, he was appointed to duty at N.S.H.Q. in December, 1918; in 1920 he became Assistant Director of the Naval Service; and in January, 1921, he succeeded Kingsmill as Director.

It was intended from the beginning to man the Service with Canadian officers and ratings, but at the start and for many years afterwards there were practically none with the necessary training. The newly-founded naval college was expected as time went on to provide enough officers; but at first the Admiralty had to be relied upon to supply all those required, and for many years the senior officers continued to be lent by the Royal Navy. In order not to block the promotion of young Canadian officers who were advancing in seniority, officers of the Royal Navy on loan to the Naval Service were almost always given temporary appointments, usually for four years. They were paid by the Dominion Government at Canadian rates, and while the Admiralty gave them no pay while employed by the Canadian Government, the time so spent counted as service in the Royal Navy. During the early years, also, the Royal Navy supplied a considerable proportion of the ratings required by the Naval Service. Assistance of this sort was an old story to the Admiralty, which was helping the young Australian Service in a similar way and had in the past acted as mentor and exemplar to half the navies in the world.

For several months after the arrival in Canada of the Niobe and Rainbow, such recruits as offered themselves on board either of the cruisers were accepted if they met the physical and educational requirements. In February 1911, posters calling for recruits for the Naval Service were exhibited in all the principal cities and towns of the Dominion, a recruiting pamphlet was widely distributed, and local postmasters were authorized to act as recruiting agents. Local doctors examined the prospective recruits, subject to final acceptance by a naval medical officer. Seamen were entered
between the ages of 15 and 23, stokers from 18 to 23, and boys from 14 to 16 years. All had to engage to serve for 7 years from the age of 18, with the option of re-engaging, if recommended, for one or two further periods of 7 years each. The number of recruits obtained in Canada during the first two years, and the Provinces from which they came, were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1911-1912 Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niobe Rainbow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prince Edw. I</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pensioners and Fleet Reserve men of the Royal Navy were allowed by the Admiralty to enlist in the Canadian Service; and many did so, being entered for a period of five years under special service engagements which carried gratuities not payable to general service personnel.

Conditions in the Royal Canadian Navy required to be unusually good if enough recruits were to be obtained. It was not customary for young Canadians to take up a naval career; the wages and standard of living in Canada were high; and most of the recruits would come from that half of the population which was of British origin. To conform to these special circumstances the rates of pay, especially for ratings, were set at a much higher level than those which prevailed in the Royal Navy, and most of the ships which the Royal Canadian Navy acquired from time to time were made more comfortable by the addition of fittings not usually provided in warships. Another problem, which resulted from the immense size of the country and the distribution of its inhabitants, was that of affording adequate home leave to men from far inland. On

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33 Annual Report, 1911, p. 18.
34 Annual Reports, 1911, 1912.
the other hand, there was reason to think that the men of the hinterlands, if they joined the navy at all, would develop into sailors as good as any others. The German Navy was finding this to be true, and Admiral Tirpitz has stated that when the supply of recruits from the coast regions proved insufficient:

...we went inland for recruits; service in modern ships did not make the same demands on seamanship as in the old days of sailing vessels. The South Germans, and among them the Alsatians, distinguished themselves in the navy.  

In the event, the German experience was duplicated in Canada.

The Royal Canadian Navy was patterned on the Royal Navy and remained so throughout the period. Only when Canadian conditions dictated it, notably in the case of pay and allowances, were innovations made. Titles of ranks were the same, and of ratings almost the same, as in the Royal Navy. The regulations governing examinations, advancement and promotions, and the uniforms of all ranks and ratings, were identical in the two Services. Almost all of the Naval Discipline Act and of the King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions applied to the Canadian Service. The professional idiom and to a less extent the colloquialisms were the same, while the customs and etiquette of the Royal Navy as well as its incomparably rich traditions, were accepted by the younger Service. Although living as it were under the shadow of the larger organization may have tended to discourage originality and initiative, it can scarcely be doubted that the Canadian navy profited immensely from its close and continuous association with the greatest Service that the seas have known. Moreover a close conformity between the two navies offered a further advantage; for they were likely to act closely together in war, and such co-operation is much easier when the partners are almost identical in organization, training, and doctrine.

In June 1911 a party consisting of a lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 35 ratings, represented the Royal Canadian Navy at the coronation of King George V. The midshipmen were Percy W. Nelles, a future Chief of the Naval Staff, and Victor Brodeur, who later became a Rear Admiral, while one of the ratings is now Rear Admiral (S) J. O. Cossette, R.C.N.
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(Ret'd). By the end of that year the fact that no contract for new ships had been awarded, together with the several-times expressed intention of the Borden government to ask for the repeal of the Naval Service Act, made it impossible for the Service to offer much inducement for young men to seek a career in it. In his annual report for the year ending March 31, 1912, the Deputy Minister stated that no special efforts had been made to obtain recruits. During that year 126 recruits had been entered and there had been 149 desertions. In February 1913, the Deputy Minister reported that the training cruisers had only about half their full complements on board and were confined to harbour and almost reduced to the condition of hulks, and he added that the Department did not know what to do. In the year preceding March 31, 1914, no recruiting was done, and most of the ranks and ratings on loan from the Admiralty, having completed their service, were returned to Great Britain without being replaced.

Equally acute was the problem of the young officers and cadets. In the fall of 1913 five officers, Sub-Lieuts. German, Nelles, Beard, Bate, and Brodeur, who had started their careers before the Naval Service Act was passed and begun their training in C.G.S. Canada, were finishing their preparation for the rank of lieutenant. Nineteen cadets were completing their training in H.M.S. Berwick, and by the end of the year would need to begin two years' training in a sea-going cruiser. It was necessary either to train them for the Canadian Service if this was to be continued, or for them to be absorbed by the Royal Navy. A year later, however, the coming of the First World War solved these particular personnel problems for the time being.

The Naval Service Act provided for the creation of a naval college "for the purpose of imparting a complete education in all branches of naval science, tactics and strategy." Even before the Act had been passed steps were taken to implement this provision. Halifax was selected as the best site for the college, and the old naval hospital in the dockyard was set aside for that purpose. The college, which was opened on January 11, 1910, had accommodation for forty-five cadets. The cadets lived and studied in the college proper, while separate buildings which formed part of the establishment included a small electrical laboratory, engineering work-

37 Memos. in Borden Papers, O'C. No. 659.
38 Secs. 32-36.
shops and drawing office, a gymnasium, sick quarters, and a boathouse. A playing field was provided in the Admiralty House grounds. The original constitution of the college provided that candidates for entry should be British subjects between 14 and 16 years of age, and that entry should be by a competitive examination set and graded by the Civil Service Commission. In November 1910, the Commission held an examination for entry: there were 30 vacancies, and 34 boys took the examination, of whom 21 passed. During the early years Cdr. A. E. Nixon, R.N., commanded the college, and was assisted by a Director of Studies. The naval instructional staff was lent by the Admiralty; and three civilian schoolmasters, who had been appointed on the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, taught mathematics, science, and languages. A two-year course was provided, and within the limits set by mediocre facilities and a much shorter course, the curriculum was approximated to that of the naval colleges in Britain. The cadet’s two years at the college were to be followed by a year’s training in one of H.M. cruisers. In October 1910 the King’s permission was obtained to add the prefix “Royal” to the title of the college, a privilege which the Royal Naval College of Canada received before the Royal Canadian Navy itself did.

The change in naval policy announced by the Borden government seemed to have expunged the original purpose of the college to train officers for the R.C.N.; but the government did not wish to close the institution. The curriculum was therefore broadened so as to include preparation for other careers, while the course was lengthened to three years; the obligation which cadets had assumed to follow a naval career was removed; and arrangements to receive cadets were made with the Admiralty and with certain universities. In 1915 the subjects taught were mathematics, navigation, mechanics, physics, chemistry, engineering, seamanship, piloting, geo-

39 In 1919 the staff consisted of: a commander, an instructor commander, an engineer commander, 2 instructor lieutenant-commanders, a paymaster lieutenant-commander, a lieutenant, an engineer lieutenant, 3 civilian masters, a chief boatswain, a boatswain, and a warrant writer.

40 In answer to a request made in Jan. 1911, the Naval Service was notified on Aug. 29 that: “His Majesty having been graciously pleased to authorize that the Canadian Naval Forces shall be designated the ‘Royal Canadian Navy’, this title is to be officially adopted, the abbreviation thereof being ‘R.C.N.’” D. Min. to Under-Sec. of State (Exr. Aff.), Jan. 30, 1911; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Aug. 16, 1911: N.S. 15-1-4.

The purely naval purpose of maintaining a reserve force is in order to provide economically a reinforcement of predictable size, consisting of partly-trained personnel, to meet the greatly increased needs which would be occasioned by a future war. In sailing days the Admiralty had been accustomed to take what extra men were required, as they were needed, from the merchant marine; but the technical revolution of the nineteenth century introduced a marked and increasing difference between the respective functions of the naval and the merchant sailor. Soon after the middle of that century it came to be realized that effective service in the navy demanded a considerable amount of special training even for merchant seamen. In 1853, accordingly, continuous service was introduced in the Royal Navy. A few years later the Royal Naval Volunteers were authorized: this body was composed of merchant sailors, and ultimately developed into the Royal Naval Reserve. The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was a later extension of the reserve system so as to include men who were not professional seamen. At the turn of the century it was decided to create the Royal Fleet Reserve, to consist of former naval seamen and marines, and steps were taken towards establishing naval reserves in the oversea possessions.4^5

In Canada the creating of a naval reserve waited upon the forming of a navy. The Naval Service Act authorized the setting up of a Naval Reserve Force, which would have been a modified Fleet Reserve, and of a Naval Volunteer Force to be "raised by voluntary engagement from among seafaring men and others who may be deemed suitable for the service in which such volunteers are to be employed."4^5 For some time no steps were taken to implement these sections of the Act; but in February 1912 it was suggested to the Prime Minister that the best way in which Canada could support the Royal Navy in the face of the German danger would be neither by contributing money nor by maintaining local fleet units, but by training an auxiliary naval force composed of fishermen. "They will be entirely under the Dominion Gov-

4^5 Secs. 19-21 and 26-31.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

gernment, simply passing by mutual agreement in the time of peace under the Admiralty for Man of War training in all details, and in time of war the Government will as may be desirable by Order in Council place them for active service in the Navy." The following September the Dominion Government received a proposal from the west coast that a naval reserve should be formed from officers and seamen employed in those waters. The idea was in the air, for other suggestions along similar lines were received by the government at this time.

In July 1913 a body of young men in Victoria, B.C., among whom Messrs. Stanley Geary, Lifton, and Ponder, Dr. Harper, and Lieut. Jarvis R.N.R., were moving spirits, decided that they would try to establish a naval volunteer force similar to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in Great Britain. Having obtained the support of a number of the leading professional and business men in the city, they then approached the Hon. J. D. Hazen, Minister of the Naval Service, who had come to Victoria in connection with the expected visit of H.M.S. New Zealand. The Minister encouraged them, and they received permission to use the facilities at Esquimalt for drill. On the arrival of the New Zealand some twenty of these pioneers were invited on board where the commanding officer, Capt. Lionel Halsey, went out of his way to emphasize the importance of what they were trying to do. They drilled periodically at the dockyard, and it was a great advantage to them that several officers and petty officers of the Rainbow had volunteered to act as instructors. This small body of enthusiasts, who had no official status, no meeting-place of their own, and no pay-days, blazed the trail for all the official Canadian reserve organizations that were to follow.

In May 1914 the government established a Naval Volunteer Force by Order in Council under the provisions of the Naval Service Act. The new organization received considerable criticism in Parliament from the Opposition, prin-

48 Enclosure in Capt. Hose to S. Brent, Feb. 19, 1919, N.S. 1000-5-5 (1); House of Commons Debates, 1914, ii, p. 1914. For a more detailed and largely first-hand account of the Victoria volunteers during their unofficial period, see Longstaff, Esquimalt Naval Base, pp. 69-71.
49 P.C. 1913, May 18, 1914.
cipated on the ground that instead of strengthening the Canadian Naval Service, it would merely serve as an intake-pipe for the Royal Navy. The force was to consist of officers and ratings, enrolled as volunteers but engaging to serve in time of war. Enrolment was to be open to seafaring men and others who might be deemed suitable. The term of engagement was to be three years, with re-engagement for successive periods of three years up to the age of forty-five years. The authorized strength was twelve hundred men to be organized in three subdivisions. The Atlantic Subdivision included the area from the Atlantic coast inland to a line just west of the city of Quebec; from there the Lake Subdivision extended to beyond Brandon, Manitoba; while the whole area farther to the west formed the Pacific Subdivision. The force was to be organized in companies of a hundred men each. It was proposed to organize such companies in some of the large cities at first, and later in a number of the smaller centres as well. The already-existing unofficial unit in Victoria was, of course, to be taken into the new organization. Training was to include, as far as might be practicable, seamanship, company and field drill, torpedo and electrical instruction, engineering and stokehold work, signalling, wireless telegraphy, and first aid. Those volunteers who were seamen or fishermen in civil life were to receive all their training on shipboard. Of the others, those whose place of residence was such that they could easily receive part of their training on shipboard would do so, and the rest would be given only those types of training which could be given to them at their respective headquarters. The Admiralty was to be asked to provide instructional officers. Members of the force might be required in time of war to serve in ships of the Royal Canadian Navy or of the Royal Navy; as personnel for the examination, minesweeping, and other services at the defended ports; as signallers or wireless telegraphers in shore establishments; or as Intelligence officers. There were to be twenty-one days of training a year, or the equivalent in drills. The rates of pay for the officers would be the same as in the Royal Canadian Navy; those of the men were to be slightly higher so as to raise them approximately to the level of the rates offered by the militia. The initial annual expenditure required was estimated to be $200,000.\(^6\)

Almost from the first the new organization was called the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve.

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\(^6\) _Ibid._; and explanation by Min. in House of Commons Debates, 1914, v, pp. 5148-9.
The initiative in the forming of companies of the R.N.C.V.R. was left to those individuals who might wish to belong to that organization, no steps being taken by the Department to recruit, or to create company organizations in advance of an effective demand. In the summer of 1914 fifty members of the unofficial body of reservists in Victoria were embarked in the *Rainbow* for training, just in time to sail for Vancouver to support the civil power at the time of the *Komagata Maru* incident.

The transfer to Canadian ownership of the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt took place soon after the Naval Service Act had been passed. In March 1910, the Colonial Office forwarded a letter from the Admiralty, submitting draft Orders in Council to authorize the transfer of the two bases. It was suggested that the Order relating to Halifax should be submitted to Council as soon as possible. A wish had been expressed from Canada, however, to postpone the transfer of Esquimalt until after the anticipated passing of the Naval Service Bill: the Admiralty therefore proposed to submit the Order concerning the Pacific base as soon as the bill should have become law. The Canadian authorities later proposed that the transfer of the Esquimalt base should await the arrival of the newly-acquired H.M.C.S. *Rainbow* at that port, and take place immediately thereafter; and the Commander in Charge at Esquimalt was instructed accordingly by the Admiralty. The physical transfer of the properties at Esquimalt was made on November 9, 1910, two days after the arrival of the *Rainbow*. The sloops H.M.S. *Algerine* and H.M.S. *Shearwater* continued to be based at Esquimalt in order to discharge certain Admiralty commitments in the eastern Pacific.

The final authority for the transfer of Halifax and Esquimalt to the Canadian Government was embodied in two British Orders in Council. The specified properties at the two ports were to be:

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82 Enclosure in H.e. to Brent, cited above.
83 Admiral Kingsmill to Sec. of the Admiralty, Jan. 24, 1910, A.R.O. Council Office 13/10/10; Admiralty to C.O., Feb. 25, 1910, enclosed in Crewe to Grey, Mar. 9, 1910, N.S. 51-1-1 (1).
84 D. Min. to Undersec. of State for Ext. Aff., July 5, 1910, N.S. 51-2-1 (1); P.C. 1613, Aug. 6, 1910.
85 "The Canadian Naval Establishments (Halifax Dockyard) Order, 1910" and "The Canadian Naval Establishments (Esquimalt Dockyard) Order, 1911." These almost identical instruments were dated respectively Oct. 13, 1910, and May 4, 1911. The text of the first is given in App. vii.
IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

... vested in the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada for all such estate and interest as is at the date of this Order vested in or held in trust for His Majesty or the Admiralty and for the public purposes of the Dominion...

The conditions, summarized, were that the Canadian Government should maintain the existing naval facilities in usable condition, or provide others; be responsible for storing fuel and some other stores for the use of ships of the Royal Navy; permit the Royal Navy to use the workshops and appliances, subject to payment for labour and materials only; inform the Admiralty before devoting any of the properties to other than naval or army uses; be responsible for all existing liabilities, and enjoy any rent due from tenants and other incidental benefits; and be free, subject to the above conditions, to make such use of the properties as might seem desirable. Among the special commitments that went with the bases was the agreement with the Halifax Graving Dock Co., Ltd., dealt with earlier; and when the Canadian Government acquired the bases, four of the annual payments remained to be made. 56

The properties which were finally transferred by these Orders in Council were, as far as Halifax was concerned, the Royal Naval Dockyard and Hospital, the Commander in Chief's house and grounds, the recreation ground, and the cemetery. The corresponding properties at Esquimalt consisted of the Royal Naval Dockyard and Hospital, the naval coal stores and magazine, the recreation and drill ground, and the cemetery. Certain naval reserve lands on both coasts were transferred to Dominion authority by Order in Council on December 16, 1911. The assumption of Canadian custody over the bases and reserve lands was officially announced in the Canada Gazette of January 30, 1912.

The extraordinary delay which took place before the bases were actually transferred is curious in view of the willingness of both the parties, which sometimes amounted to eagerness, to effect the transfer of custody. It is probable that the long delays were largely due to the fact that, though the principals were thus agreed, the completion of the affair was never really urgent. As it was, the Admiralty merely paid maintenance charges throughout the period of delay, while the Dominion Government had a base on each coast by the time that the first two warships obtained to implement the Naval Service Act had reached their Canadian stations. The establishments

56 Correspondence in N.S. 51-4-3 (1).
which had been taken over were small repair and fuelling bases, somewhat run down and with part of their equipment obsolescent; yet they were most valuable properties obtained by Canada free of charge.

It was a matter of consequence that Canada, at the time when she was embarking upon a naval policy of her own, came into possession of a naval base on each of the oceans toward which she faced. The acquisition of the Halifax and Esquimalt bases placed the Dominion in a position where her government, asking for money with which to create or maintain a naval force, was able to propose that nearly all the expenditure should be devoted to the most obviously relevant purpose—ships and men. The existence of the bases at Halifax and Esquimalt also relieved the government of the embarrassment of having to favour one among several rival interests in choosing a site. The two establishments had been acquired from the British Government on condition that they should be maintained as naval bases, and that ships of the Royal Navy might use them at all times. In accepting them on these terms Canada committed itself to a considerable extent in two important ways. The ownership of bases suggests the advisability of owning warships as well; consequently the possession of these establishments by the Dominion made it more likely than it would otherwise have been that a Canadian naval force, no matter how small, would continue to be maintained. The special status of the two bases after their acquisition, moreover, apart from all other considerations, would make it very difficult, as long as the agreement stood, for Canada to remain neutral in a subsequent imperial war against an important naval power.

The dockyard at Halifax which the Canadian authorities had taken over was a reasonably complete and well-constructed plant, whose equipment, however, was largely obsolescent. A committee was set up to consider what steps should be taken by the Naval Service for the defence of Halifax in time of war or strained relations. On November 25, 1911, this defence committee recommended the blocking of the eastern channel by sinking about six local schooners across it; the installing of certain net and boom defences; a guard for the dockyard; a harbour patrol by naval steamboats on each side of George Island; and the establishing of an examination service. In May 1912 the Overseas Defence Committee concurred in

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57 Report in N.S. 1001-1-2 (1).
these recommendations. Details connected with the defence of the port were still being reviewed in 1914, and when war came, although much thought had been bestowed upon the defence of Halifax, no complete arrangements to that end had been made.

The cruiser-destroyer shipbuilding programme was an essential part of the general policy. An unsigned, undated memorandum among Laurier's papers, obviously written by well-informed persons, pointed out the great difficulties which were inherent in any attempt to do the building in Canada, inasmuch as the Dominion possessed no suitable shipbuilding or marine-engineering establishments. To meet the views of the government it was suggested that the construction of a shipyard in Canada should be begun. At the same time two cruisers and two destroyers should be laid down in Great Britain, while skilled Canadian workers would be sent to help in building them. As a further means towards increasing the supply of skilled shipyard workers available in Canada, a number of such workers should be encouraged to come from Britain. As soon as the Canadian yard should be ready the succeeding four ships would be laid down there, certain of their important parts being imported ready-made. It was hoped that the last three units of the programme could be wholly constructed and equipped in Canada.58

The government decided, nevertheless, to build all the ships in Canada, accepting the disadvantages which would result. This policy was defended principally on the ground that it would encourage the development of a shipbuilding industry. The disadvantages were that the ships would be built much more slowly, and cost considerably more, than if they had been constructed in British yards. These drawbacks resulted from the lack of shipbuilding plants and subsidiary industries as well as of specialized engineers and workers, and from the relatively high level of wages in the Dominion.

The Admiralty's specifications would have to be used. Accordingly the first step to be taken was to ascertain whether or not the Admiralty would object to firms not on its approved list having access to these specifications. To this question which was put on March 4, 1910, the Admiralty replied that they were anxious to help in every possible way; but that as the specifications of the latest types of warship were highly

confidential, they would wish to know the names of any firms in Canada to which it was proposed to give this information. The Admiralty also wanted to have one of their own overseers present in any yard where the specifications were being used, and to be assured that the Dominion authorities would rigidly enforce the law against any breach of secrecy. To these conditions the Canadian Government agreed.59

The terms required the construction of four Bristol-class cruisers of the improved Weymouth type, and of six river-class destroyers of the improved Acorn type. It had been decided to substitute the Niobe for the Boadicea of the original programme.60 The first cruiser was to be finished within three years of the signing of the contract, and another one each following year. The first two destroyers were to be delivered within three years, and additional ones at nine-month intervals thereafter. The programme was to be completed within six years, and all the ships were to be built in the Dominion. Certain rules were to be complied with, which covered the conditions of labour. The ships might be built on either coast; but it was pointed out that the Rush-Bagot agreement prohibited the construction of warships on the Great Lakes. For obvious reasons it was intended that one firm should build all the ships. After considerable delay the deadline for tenders was set at May 1, 1911.

A shipbuilding firm considering the advisability of tendering for this contract had to reckon with the difficulty and initial expense of establishing a new yard under imperfectly-known conditions. On the other hand the contract was a fairly large one, and the prospect of subsequent orders, which would serve to keep the new yard busy after this one had been filled, while it was uncertain, may well have seemed good. It was doubtless a consideration also that the Canadian Parliament, with the needs of the Naval Service in mind, had recently passed a law to encourage the construction of dry docks. This Act empowered the government to grant a generous subsidy to any suitable firm willing to build a dry dock in Canada which would serve the public interest. The maximum subsidy provided for was 3½% annually of the

59 Correspondence in A.R.O., S.6675/1912, "Canadian Shipbuilding Programme."
60 The Boadiceas were small, very fast cruisers, intended to act as parent ships for destroyers. They drew criticism as representing too great a sacrifice of armament to speed. See Brasseys Naval Annual: 1908, p. 4; 1911, p. 6; 1912, p. 27.
cost of the work for a period of thirty-five years. By the beginning of 1911 nineteen firms had corresponded with the Department with a view to tendering for the ships. Three of these firms, the Collingwood Shipbuilding Company, the Polson Iron Works, and the British Columbia Marine Railway Company, were Canadian firms. The others were concerns in Great Britain, some of which bore names which were among the most famous in shipbuilding. Seven tenders were actually received. Six of these undertook to build the ships in Canada, which meant, of course, that they were prepared to establish plants in the Dominion. One firm, the Thames Iron Works, tendered by mistake on the assumption that the ships would be built at its yard in England. One Canadian firm offered a tender; it planned to establish and equip the necessary works, in which the ships would be built under the direction and control of two distinguished British firms.

The highest tender was for $13,055,804; the lowest for ships to be built in Canada was $11,280,000. Of all the tenders the median came from the association of Canadian and British companies. The Thames Iron Works’ tender was for $8,532,504: the average of the other six was $12,421,412. These two last figures, no doubt, measure approximately the extra cost at that time of doing the work in the Dominion, and confirm the prediction on this point which Laurier had made in the House of Commons. In the difficulties inherent in planning for a construction programme which involved the establishing of an industry as well as the building of ships, the Canadian Government had the benefit of the Admiralty’s unrivalled experience in these matters, which was freely placed at their disposal. The numerous negotiations which had to be completed before a contract could be signed, however, consumed much time. In the general election of September 1911 the government was defeated, and in October an Order in Council decreed “that in view of the magnitude of the transaction the question of awarding the contract be left to the incoming administration.”

In the spring of 1911, while the Laurier government was still in power, was held the last imperial conference to meet

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61 9-10 Edw. VII, c. 17. Like the Naval Service Act this was assented to on May 4, 1910. Canadian warships and those of the Royal Navy were to enjoy priority, when necessary, in the use of such subsidized dry docks.

62 The tenders did not include armour plate, armament, and certain fittings usually supplied by the Admiralty, but included the fitting of these on board the vessels.

63 P.C. 2414, Oct. 6, 1911.
before the First World War. Two naval subjects were discussed, a project for a centrally-controlled imperial navy, and policy for co-ordinating the methods and status of the navies in the Empire. At this conference Asquith and Harcourt, the latter being Colonial Secretary, represented Great Britain, while Laurier, Sir Frederick Borden, and Brodeur, were the Canadian members.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand advocated an imperial parliament of defence, on which Britain and the Dominions would be represented according to population. This body would determine the naval needs of the Empire, and levy annual contributions for that purpose upon the member States. This scheme received practically no support from the conference, however, and was withdrawn.64

While the agenda for the conference was being worked out, the Australian Government had asked for a discussion on the related subjects of the status of the Dominion navies and cooperation between the naval and land forces of the Empire. During the conference a meeting composed of Admiralty officials and Australian and Canadian representatives was accordingly held. The agreement which was reached, and which affected the navies of both Dominions, was as follows. The naval Services and forces of both Dominions were to be controlled exclusively by their respective governments. Their training and discipline were to be generally the same as, and personnel interchangeable with, those of the Royal Navy. The Dominions, having already adopted the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and the Naval Discipline Act, would communicate with the British Government should they desire any changes in the regulations or in the Act. The Admiralty agreed to lend to the younger Services, during their infancy, whatever flag officers and other officers and men might be needed, such personnel to be, as far as possible, from or connected with the Dominion concerned, and in any case to be volunteers. The service of any officer of the Royal Navy in a Dominion ship, or the converse, was to count for the purposes of retirement, pay, and promotion, as if it had been performed in that officer's own force. Canadian and Australian naval stations were created and defined: the Canadian Atlantic Station covered the waters north of 30° N. and west of 40° W., except for certain waters off Newfoundland, and

CANADIAN NAVAL STATIONS

As formulated at the Imperial Conference of 1911

(Part. P.P.P., 1911, L.V. Cd. 5746.2)
the Canadian Pacific Station included the part of that ocean north of 30° N. and east of the 180th meridian. The Admiralty would be notified whenever it was intended to send Dominion warships outside their own stations, and a Dominion government, before sending one of its ships to a foreign port, would obtain the concurrence of the British Government. The commanding officer of a Dominion warship in a foreign port would carry out the instructions of the British Government in the event of any international question arising, in which case the government of the Dominion concerned would be informed. A Dominion warship entering a foreign port without a previous arrangement, because of an emergency, would report her reasons for having put in, to the Commander in Chief of that station or to the Admiralty. It was agreed that in the case of a ship of the Royal Navy meeting a Dominion warship, the senior officer should command in any ceremony or intercourse or where united action should have been decided upon; but not so as to interfere with the execution of any orders which the junior might have received from his own government. In order to remove any uncertainty about seniority, Dominion officers would be shown in the Navy List. In the event of there being too few officers of the necessary rank belonging to a Dominion Service to complete a court martial ordered by that Service, the Admiralty undertook to make the necessary arrangements if requested to do so. In the interest of efficiency Dominion warships were to take part from time to time in fleet exercises with ships of the Royal Navy, under the command of the senior officer, who was not, however, to interfere further than necessary with the internal economy of the Dominion ships concerned. Australian and Canadian warships would fly the white ensign at the stern and the flag of the Dominion at the jack-staff. “In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion, or any part thereof, has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British fleet, and will remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war.”

These arrangements were put into effect, and governed thenceforth, within the period covered by this volume, the status of the Australian and Canadian navies and the relationship of these Services to the Royal Navy.

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The attempts at the colonial and imperial conferences to achieve a jointly-financed programme for Imperial defence, drawn in terms of central military control and a general imperial convergence, were made in vain. The obstacles which this policy failed to surmount were: the growing sense of local nationalism in the larger Dominions; a feeling of care-free dependence in the smaller ones; and the fact that the possible external threats, to meet which armed forces are usually provided, were or seemed to be far less menacing in some parts of the Empire than in others. The naval arguments for undivided control, and the view that the financial burden should be distributed approximately according to the strength of the various shoulders concerned, did not prevail against arguments which took more account of the special environment, outlook, and immediate needs, of each part of the Empire. It is an exceedingly significant fact that Australia, highly sensitive to the need of preparations for defence, almost all of whose people were of British origin, and whose financial contributions to the Royal Navy had never constituted a heavy burden, should have abandoned contributions after more than twenty years' experience with them, and turned to the development of a local navy.

The point of view which Canada had expressed so unwaveringly at all the conferences was the Australian way of thinking modified by three special circumstances. One of these was the proximity of the United States with its decisive military superiority in North America and its Monroe Doctrine. Another was the fact that any concentration of the Royal Navy, adequate in size and disposition to protect the British Isles from invasion or blockade, was ipso facto capable of covering the routes by which alone any European enemy could reach the shores of Canada. The third was the diversity of opinion among Canadians regarding almost all aspects of external policy. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's course throughout was the greatest common factor of Canadian opinions.

The solution which was eventually found for the problem was a compromise. Like most compromises it fell short of perfection from any theoretical point of view. It had, however, the sterling merit of meeting very largely the demands of those who wanted specifically Dominion navies, of the advocates of imperial fleets which would act as one, and of those who had protested that the Dominions were doing almost nothing for their own or imperial naval defence. Perhaps the most
striking features of the conferences, as far as naval defence is concerned, were the seriousness of the difficulties which the problem presented, and the combination of good will and persistence with which an answer was sought. The solution itself was a masterpiece of resourceful statecraft.
A NEW GOVERNMENT AND A NEW POLICY

THE Liberal Government was, in 1910, spending its fourteenth year in office. Laurier's prestige was undimmed by the passing years, and his government seemed on the surface to be as strong as ever. The naval bill, although potentially dangerous, had not created any serious difficulties for Laurier in his relations either with his party or with the people as a whole. It had, however, occasioned a threat to his long ascendancy in his native Province, in whose soil his power had always been chiefly rooted.

On October 13, 1910, the Hon. Louis Lavergne, federal Member for Drummond-Arthabaska, was appointed to the Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Sir George Drummond. This appointment necessitated a by-election in Sir Wilfrid's old constituency, and the Nationalists determined to pit their strength against him there where his influence was presumably at its very peak. They therefore supported a local farmer, Arthur Gilbert, who claimed to be a Liberal opposed to the government's naval policy. With the greatest courage and enthusiasm the Nationalists entered the battle, concentrating their attack chiefly upon the Naval Service Act and the British connection. Denouncing the naval policy as a result of imperialist machinations, they said that the navy was a herald of conscription, pictured the future fate of Canada's sons fighting Britain's wars in distant lands and on far-off seas, and reiterated their demands for a plebiscite on the naval question. Monk and Mr. Bourassa joined forces; while the Liberals brought into the field many of their most stalwart chieftains including Sir Wilfrid himself. Yet their candidate, J. E. Perrault, lost the election by 207 votes.¹ Their defeat in Drummond-Arthabaska was a heavy blow to the government; the Conservatives, however, could not endorse the victory unconditionally, in view of the special circumstances of the election and the hostility to the British connection which the victors had expressed.

¹ Skelton, Life of Laurier, ii, pp. 337-40.
The government's last general campaign was to be principally fought, however, not on the issue of naval policy, but over the question of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States. When President Taft, early in 1910, showed an interest in establishing tariff preferences between the two countries, the Canadian Government responded cordially. On July 29, 1911, Parliament was dissolved, and Laurier appealed to the country to endorse reciprocity. Yet elections are seldom or never simple decisions on single issues, and this one was complicated by the situation in Quebec. The Conservatives in that Province, led by Monk, opposed reciprocity; the Quebec Nationalists, following Mr. Bourassa, detested the Naval Service Act while they were relatively unconcerned about reciprocity. Both Monk and Mr. Bourassa were opposed to Laurier, and had insisted upon the need for a plebiscite on the naval question. It is evident that upon this common ground a rapprochement took place: it is not clear, however, what its exact terms were or to what extent Borden was directly involved. Whatever the understanding was, the Nationalists undertook to support those candidates, irrespective of their political affiliations, who should embody the demand for a plebiscite in their respective platforms. The Nationalists did not support Borden except in this incidental way. They accused him along with Laurier of subordinating the naval question to reciprocity, and expressed the opinion that he would have liked, had it been politically possible, to inaugurate a policy of contributions to the Royal Navy. They anticipated that he would cease his appeals to imperialist sentiment, and would recommend that the people should be consulted.

Except in Quebec, the Conservative Party and press were almost silent on the naval question during the election. Borden's statement at the time of the dissolution, and his final general appeal to the electorate on September 19, contained no reference to it. Nor did he mention it when addressing a Montreal audience on August 29. La Presse noted the omission, and explained it by saying that Borden had no wish to disturb those who were helping to pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him in Quebec. On the other hand, Borden's election

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2 The reciprocity issue and the election of 1911 are fully dealt with in Ellis, Reciprocity 1911.
3 Ibid., p. 171.
4 Le Devoir, Aug. 16, 1911.
5 Gazette, Montreal, Aug. 30, 1911.
6 La Presse, Montreal, Aug. 31, 1911.
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manifesto, issued on August 14, referred briefly to the naval question:

Since the last general election the Government has entered upon a new line of policy in regard to naval affairs, which is of far-reaching importance. The policy adopted was not debated before the people during that election and it bears all the earmarks of a hasty and ill-considered scheme. In my judgment our duty to the Empire cannot be properly or effectively fulfilled by such a measure. I hold that the plan of the Government contemplates the creation of a naval force that will be absolutely useless in time of war, and, therefore, of no practical benefit to Canada or to the Empire. It will cost immense sums of money to build, equip and maintain. It will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many valuable lives and it will not add one iota to the fighting strength of the Empire. The more it is considered, the more does it become evident that the whole naval plan of the Government is an unfortunate blunder. 7

Borden’s opening speech in the campaign, given on August 15 in London, Ontario, ended with a further statement on this subject. He explained that at the time when the naval Bill was passed the Conservatives had believed that an emergency existed. Then he spoke of the future:

The question of Canada’s permanent co-operation in Imperial Naval Defence involves far-reaching consideration. The Government proposals were clearly a political makeshift and not a serious attempt to deal with a difficult question. Responsibility for Empire defence clearly involves some voice in Empire policy. Canada’s permanent and effective co-operation in naval defence can only be accomplished by proposals which take account of this consideration and any such proposals should be submitted to the people for their approval.

He also said that the projected navy would be useless, and that the government’s policy meant dismemberment of the Empire if it meant anything. 8 *Le Devoir* commented on this statement next day: “On sentait l’homme politique qui divine l’impopularité de la loi, qui veut en bénéficier sans trop se compromettre.” 9

As the election drew near the fears of the government and the hopes of the Opposition progressively increased. The patriotic appeal made by the Opposition strongly affected the electors, many of whom, especially in Ontario, saw in reciprocity the spectre of American domination. The elections, which were held on September 21, 1911, more than confirmed the fears of the government and the hopes of its opponents. The respective positions of the two Parties were reversed. The

7 *Gazette*, Aug. 15, 1911.
Liberal representation was reduced, as compared with the results of the previous election, from 133 to 86; the Conservatives increased theirs from 85 to 133; the number of independent Members was reduced from 3 to 2. Seven Cabinet Ministers were defeated, while in Ontario the Conservatives won their greatest victory in the history of that Province by winning 72 seats to 13 for the Liberals. In Quebec the Liberals kept a majority, but it had fallen from 42 to 10; 27 Conservatives and Nationalists were returned as against 37 Liberals. British Columbia went solidly Conservative, while the Maritimes returned 16 Conservatives to 19 Liberals. The Prairie Provinces, with the exception of Manitoba, went strongly Liberal. The Laurier government resigned on October 6, and Borden formed an administration, in which the Minister of Marine and Fisheries and of the Naval Service was John Douglas Hazen who had previously been Premier of New Brunswick.

The Conservatives had taken such a firm stand against the Naval Service Act while they were in opposition, that it was difficult for them to carry out its provisions after they came to power. An added deterrent was the election stand of many Conservative Members from Quebec, who had stressed their opposition to Laurier's naval policy almost to the exclusion of all else. As far as naval policy was concerned, English- and French-speaking Conservatives were united in their condemnation of the Naval Service Act, and in nothing else. A new and inexperienced Prime Minister, whose hold over his Party was as yet tenuous, had to deal cautiously with this combustible question.

Shortly after the new Parliament met, Laurier caustically noted that the Speech from the Throne failed to mention the naval question. He went on to accuse the government of having formed a Cabinet whose members held diametrically opposite views on a question of the highest importance to the Dominion and Empire, and maintained that such a situation was contrary to the accepted principles of responsible government. Borden replied with a guarded statement which criticized the Laurier policy as being ineffective, expensive, and ill-considered. He also said that the Naval Service Act established the principle of disunited navies, and that the proposed navy would be obsolete before it was completed:

11 See Borden Memoirs, i, pp. 309-311.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

I say there is only one thing to be done, and that is to stop such a system of wasteful expenditure—and we propose to do it. Further . . . the whole policy must be reconsidered, and we shall reconsider it. In so grave and important a determination affecting for all time the relations of this Dominion to the rest of the empire, it is infinitely better to be right than to be in a hurry. The question of permanent co-operation between this Dominion, and the rest of the empire ought to be threshed out and debated before the people, and they should be given an opportunity of pronouncing upon it. I say further that we shall take pains to ascertain in the meantime what are the conditions that confront the empire, and honourable gentlemen on this side of the House without exception, will be prepared to do their duty as representatives of the people of this Dominion, and as citizens of this great empire.12

Despite various attempts by the Opposition to obtain a more specific statement from the government, none was forthcoming. On November 29, 1911, the Minister stated in reply to a question, that the government did not intend to accept any of the tenders for the projected warships, and that all the deposits which had been made in connection with them had been returned.13 A few months later he said that the Naval Service Act would be repealed, but not until the government had presented its alternative policy to Parliament and the people. 'In the meantime the Act would remain on the statute book “for purposes in connection with the Fishery Protection Service and otherwise.”'14 At this time the Naval Service was being fashioned, as described in the preceding chapter, and the Prime Minister stated that, as the government could not very well sink the ships and burn the buildings, the existing establishment would be continued until a new policy had been formulated.15

Both the Minister and Borden reiterated the government’s decision to retain the existing Service until a new policy should have been formulated after consultation with the Admiralty. When pressed by the Opposition to give his reasons for consulting the Admiralty, the Prime Minister replied that a delegation would go to London, prepared to discuss the details of a policy which would subsequently be submitted to Parliament and to the people as well. The Admiralty would be told that in the opinion of the Canadian Government and people, the Naval Service as then constituted was of no advantage

12 House of Commons Debates, 1911-12, 1, pp. 41 and 58-61, Nov. 30, 1911.
13 Ibid., 1, p. 526.
14 Ibid., 111, p. 4242, Mar. 4, 1912.
15 Ibid., 111, p. 5356.
NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

either to Canada or to the Empire. The question was not further discussed during that Session.

Meanwhile the Naval Service was living precariously. No arrangements had been made or projected to provide effective warships. Not many young Canadians wished to enter a Service whose roots seemed fixed in such stony ground, and in the summer of 1912 most of the borrowed R.N. ratings returned to Britain and were not replaced. The following table, giving the number of youths entering as cadets, the number of R.C.N. officers and ratings on the strength, and the naval expenditures, in each of four years, tells the story:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Cadets entering</th>
<th>No. of R.C.N. Officers &amp; Ratings</th>
<th>Naval Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>$1,790,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>1,233,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>1,085,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>597,566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be remembered that during the debate of 1909 on the Foster resolution, Borden had favoured the establishing of a Canadian navy. He had opposed a policy of contributions, adding, however, that if a serious emergency arose some sort of contribution would be necessary. In the course of the debate on the Naval Service Bill he had confirmed his previous position; with the important qualification that he had come to feel that a threatening emergency was near at hand, on account of which he advocated a contribution in kind or in cash. Over a year was to elapse after he had taken office, however, before the new government’s naval policy was presented to the public.

Among Borden’s papers there is a memorandum summarizing his naval policy in the fall of 1910. It was drawn up by someone else, but Borden’s secretary minuted that “I submitted it to him and he said it was correct.” According to this summary Borden considered that British naval supremacy was threatened and might in the near future be overthrown. Accordingly an immediate cash contribution from Canada, sufficient to add two Dreadnoughts to the Royal Navy, was needed. After the immediate emergency had been provided for in this way, Canada’s future course of action should be

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16 Ibid., III, pp. 5350-55.
17 See pp. 122-8 above.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

carefully considered. A Canadian navy could not be made effective in less than ten or fifteen years. Before embarking upon a permanent policy the people of Canada should be consulted, and only if the verdict were favourable should the development of a Canadian navy be proceeded with. The force proposed by the government was inadequate for effective defence. Purely for naval reasons a Canadian navy should immediately and automatically become part of the Royal Navy on the outbreak of war.¹⁸

Speaking in the House on November 17, 1910, Borden expressed the opinion which was the keystone of his policy:

When Canada, with the other great Dominions within the empire, embarks upon a policy of permanent co-operation in the naval defence of the empire, it ought, from every constitutional standpoint, from every reasonable standpoint as well, to have some voice as to the issues of peace and war within the empire.¹⁹

The idea that co-operation in imperial naval defence ought to carry with it the right to an effective voice in determining the foreign policy of the Empire, was to occupy a prominent place in Borden’s mind for a long time thereafter.

It was in the mid-winter of 1911-12 that the first steps were taken which led to Borden’s direct relations with Mr. Winston Churchill, who was then the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Asquith government. It happened that Richard McBride, Premier of British Columbia, had for many years been a friend of Mr. Churchill’s. On January 31, 1912, McBride wrote to Hazen enclosing an extract of a letter which he had received from Mr. Churchill. The First Lord offered his own help and that of the Admiralty in connection with the naval policy of the Canadian Government:

They can consult the Admiralty in perfect confidence that we will do all in our power to make their naval policy a brilliant success; and will not be hidebound or shrink from new departures provided that whatever moneys they think fit to employ shall be well spent according to the true principles by which sea power is maintained.

McBride suggested that Hazen should drop Mr. Churchill a line; the Minister wrote to Borden instead, enclosing McBride’s letter, with the extract, and stating that:

I think we will soon have to make up our minds as to what course we intend to pursue with regard to consulting the Admiralty, and I will not

¹⁸ Memo. enclosed in Sir Herbert Ames to A. E. Blount, Sept. 27, 1910, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes No. 3.
¹⁹ House of Commons Debates, 1910-11, 1, p. 34.
act upon Mr. McBride’s suggestion to drop a line to Mr. Churchill until I have a talk with you with regard to the subject.\(^{20}\)

Some time afterwards, on his way home from a visit to England McBride saw Borden, after which the following letter was written by Borden to Mr. Churchill:

Mr. McBride spent some hours in Ottawa on his way to British Columbia, and I had the pleasure of conversing with him on some matters which he had discussed with you while in England. He conveyed to me your message which I greatly appreciate and for which I thank you.

It is practically arranged that Mr. Hazen and I with one or two other members of the Government will sail for England about the 26th or 28th of June, arriving in London early in July. There are several questions which we shall find it necessary to discuss with the members of the Imperial Government; and not the least important is the naval question which I hope to take up with you immediately after our arrival.\(^{21}\)

It seems clear that pending the projected visit to Great Britain the government made no decision, even of a tentative nature, regarding naval policy. Borden says in his Memoirs that: “So far as I remember there was no advance discussion on policy, as that was postponed until after my colleagues had been made acquainted with the results of our visit.”\(^{22}\) Nor is there in the documents which bear on the discussions in England any indication that such a decision had been previously made. The lines of policy more or less definitely laid down prior to the journey to London seem to have included only the scrapping of the Naval Service, at least in the form in which it then existed, and the need for some form of Canadian participation in imperial foreign policy as a prerequisite to co-operation in the defence of the Empire.

A few weeks before sailing Borden asked for advice from Sir James Whitney, the Conservative Premier of Ontario:

I would like to have from you as soon as convenient any suggestions which you might be good enough to give me as to our course upon the Naval question. We expect to leave for England about the end of this month. Two questions will arise, first as to the necessity or expediency of an effective contribution for the temporary purpose of meeting conditions which undoubtedly confront the Mother Country at the present time, secondly the larger and even more important question of co-operation on a permanent basis.\(^{23}\)

\(^{20}\) Hazen to Borden, Feb. 6, 1912, with enclosures, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.

\(^{21}\) Borden to Churchill, May 30, 1912, ibid.

\(^{22}\) Borden Memoirs, 1, p. 355.

\(^{23}\) Borden to Whitney, June 1, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.
Whitney replied that:

I am in favour of placing at the disposal of the Imperial Authorities a sum of money sufficient to build two battleships or armoured cruisers of the Dreadnought type to be known as Canadian battleships, but to be absolutely under the control and management of the Admirality subject to any conditions that may be deemed reasonable.

A permanent policy, in Whitney's view, was a large problem which would involve the whole question of intra-imperial relations and responsibilities; and the views of the other Dominions would have to be ascertained and considered before a decision could properly be made. At this time also, from other sources, Borden received similar suggestions and he may have been given advice in different or contrary terms as well.

The Prime Minister sailed for England on June 26, 1912. Three of his colleagues went with him—Hazen, C. J. Doherty the Minister of Justice, and the Postmaster General, L. P. Pelletier. Admiral Kingsmill and Sir Joseph Pope accompanied Borden and his Ministers as expert advisers. The party landed on July 4, and went on to London. They found, as members of missions have often done, that physical stamina was almost as important as statesmanship:

The strain of official duties, as well as the more tremendous strain of social functions, was greater than I had hitherto experienced. Our responsibilities with regard to co-operation in Empire defence weighed heavily upon us.

On his first day in London Borden opened discussions with Mr. Churchill, and immediately afterwards went to Spithead to see the fleet, where he met the First Lord again, and Asquith, the Prime Minister.

On July 11 Borden and his Ministers attended a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence at which Asquith presided. Sir Edward Grey talked briefly on foreign policy. Mr. Churchill spoke at much greater length, stopping occasionally to answer a question. He said that the principal feature of the naval situation was the growth of the German Navy; a problem which was complicated, however, by the expansion of other navies. The German Navy was always kept concentrated, and with an unprecedentedly high proportion of ships in full commission, the structural details of which suggested that they had been constructed expressly for offensive action in or near the North Sea. As both Austria-Hungary and Italy were

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24 Memo. enclosed in Whitney to Borden, June 14, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 654.
building Dreadnoughts, the Royal Navy would need, by the year 1915, to have eight ships of that type in the Mediterranean. This would leave a deficiency of three or four Dreadnoughts in home waters. "It comes to this, that really we ought to lay down now three more ships over and above the four we are building." The considerable financial inconvenience of laying down these extra ships could be got over; the real difficulty was that the existing year-by-year programme was proportioned to that of the Germans. The sudden laying down by Great Britain of three extra Dreadnoughts might stimulate naval competition, and would cause the Germans to ask what new fact existed to justify the building of these additional ships:

If we could say that the new fact was that Canada had decided to take part in the defence of the British Empire, that would be an answer which would involve no invidious comparisons, and which would absolve us from going into detailed calculations as to the number of Austrian and German vessels available at any particular moment.

Such a decision on Canada's part, Mr. Churchill continued, could not offend any Power, and nothing could possibly contribute more effectively to the prestige and security of the British Empire. "The need, I say, is a serious one, and it is an immediate need." He hoped that during the visit of the Canadian Ministers there would be long consultations on the details of a permanent naval policy. What he had been talking about was not a permanent policy, which would require careful and unhurried consideration. "But the other need is urgent, and if it is the intention of Canada to render assistance to the naval forces of the British Empire, now is the time when that aid would be most welcome and most timely." When Mr. Churchill had finished, Borden said that he and his colleagues would welcome an opportunity to talk the matter over with him and his officials, and the First Lord replied that he would make all the necessary arrangements. Asquith suggested that after these consultations should have taken place a second meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence should be held, and Borden said that he would be very glad to attend such a meeting.26

On July 13, the Canadian Ministers conferred with Mr. Churchill and other Admiralty officials. Three days later Borden had a private interview with the First Lord:

26 Cttee. of Imperial Defence, Minutes of 118th Meeting, July 11, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 643.
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... our conversation was very frank and intimate. Mr. Churchill was fair and reasonable and was entirely disposed to give us assurance in writing as to the peril which seemed everywhere to be apprehended in Great Britain and as to the necessity for strong co-operation in naval defence by the Dominions. He spoke of coming to Canada with the Prime Minister.27

On July 19, the First Lord consulted Borden regarding the speech with which he was to introduce in the House of Commons, three days later, supplementary naval Estimates to meet the provisions of the latest German navy law. The First Lord’s speech on that occasion was the first public statement on the conferences between the Canadian Ministers and British officials. He assured the House that Borden and his colleagues had been placed in possession of all the facts, "... and we have discussed, with the utmost freedom and confidence, the action which should be taken and the way of surmounting the difficulties which obstruct such action." Mr. Churchill said that a clear distinction had been made between the needs of the immediate future and the elaboration of a permanent long-term naval policy, the latter requiring further consideration. He added that the Canadian representatives had authorized him to say that they shared this view and that any special action which the immediate future might require would not be delayed pending the settlement of a permanent naval arrangement:

They wish that the aid of Canada shall be an addition to the existing British programme, and that any step which Canada may take may directly strengthen the naval forces of the Empire and the margin available for its security. And they tell me that the action of the Dominion will not be unworthy of the dignity and power of Canada.

Finally he said that the Canadian Government’s decision would be announced after the Canadian Ministers had returned home and laid before their colleagues the results of their conferences in London. Later in the debate Asquith acknowledged the co-operativeness of Borden and his colleagues, and stated that it was the duty of the British Government to respond as far as possible to their obviously reasonable request for a voice in determining policy. Arrangements of that sort could not be made in a day, and he could not say what machinery might be used; but a conscious partnership was desired. Borden was present in the gallery during these speeches.28

The following week Borden had discussions with Asquith, Grey, Harcourt, and Walter Long, on various topics including

27 Borden Memoirs, 1, p. 359.
28 Hansard, 5th Series, xl1, pp. 857-8, 872. Churchill’s speech of July 22 is summarized on pp. 100-101 above.
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the means of according to the Dominions a voice in determining imperial foreign policy. He left for Paris on July 27, and while there he wrote to the Governor General a letter which is probably an inclusive summary of the discussions up to that time:

The conferences with the Home Government have on the whole proceeded satisfactorily. A great deal of discussion has been upon the very difficult question of representation. It may be that one of our Ministers without portfolio will become a member of the Imperial Defence Committee and will live in London part of the year in close touch with the Foreign office and with the Colonial Secretary. This of course would only be a temporary expedient until a more carefully prepared system of Empire organization could be discussed after consultation with all the Dominions. In the matter of cooperation in defence by active aid we have sharply distinguished between present grave conditions demanding temporary assistance and permanent policy. We have been promised a statement which will present ‘an unanswerable case’ as to immediate temporary assistance.

We expect to sail on the 23rd or 30th August. It depends to some extent on the question of a visit by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill which has been discussed to some extent. If they should come the negotiations and discussions will be completed in Canada. 29

Borden returned from Paris in time to attend the second meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to which he was accompanied by Hazen and Doherty. The principal subject of discussion was Dominion representation. It was pointed out that the Dominion delegates who had attended the 113th meeting of the committee during the imperial conference of 1911, had unanimously accepted the principles that representatives of the Dominions should be invited to attend meetings of that committee whenever questions affecting them were being considered, and that a defence committee should be set up in each Dominion. Asquith’s suggestion now was either that the High Commissioners should attend meetings whenever questions concerning the Dominions were discussed, or that Dominion representatives of ministerial rank should come to London from time to time in order to be present at such meetings.

Borden replied that either suggestion was good enough in itself, but that neither went far enough. He pointed out that Canada was growing in population and in its conception of what a national spirit demanded. In the very near future, therefore, it would be necessary that the Dominion should have a direct and immediate voice in foreign policy. Later in the

29 Borden to Duke of Connaught, July 30, 1912, Borden Papers, O’C. No. 656.
meeting Doherty strongly supported this point of view. As to naval policy, Borden stated that two questions were being considered which in Canada had been kept sharply separate. The first was whether conditions currently affecting the Empire were of such a character as to justify the Canadian Government in taking some immediate and effective action. The other was the problem of a permanent policy. He was anxious that the Royal Navy should show the flag on both the Canadian coasts more often than it had been doing recently, and the First Lord replied that this could be done. Borden did not commit himself at this meeting concerning future Canadian naval policy.  

The discussions with the British Ministers were continued a week later. On August 7:

... I had a long interview with Churchill with respect to the method and extent of our co-operation in naval defence; and I told him that everything depended upon the cogency of the statement which he would put forward as to the emergency. He promised to give the subject his closest personal attention. The discussion was renewed on the following day ... with Mr. Asquith to whom I communicated the substance of my conversation with Mr. Churchill. Asquith observed that Mr. Churchill was extremely capable and would be forceful in the preparation of such a statement as we desired.  

On August 13 Borden left London for the north, and on the following day he and his Ministers inspected Vickers' shipbuilding yard at Barrow where they saw the battle cruiser Princess Royal which had just been completed there. He also visited the Elswick works at Newcastle and John Brown's at Clydebank. The desirability of encouraging naval and other kinds of shipbuilding in Canada as part of any permanent naval policy was prominent in Borden's mind, and the visits to these great shipyards were undoubtedly undertaken with this in view.

The First Lord had assured Borden on July 16, that the Admiralty would make an unanswerable case for an immediate emergency contribution by Canada. This case would be made in two separate memoranda, one of which could be published while the other would be secret. During Borden's visit to Scotland he received from the Admiralty a draft of the publishable memorandum which seemed to him so inadequate that he sent it back to the First Lord. "In returning it, I wrote to him that if this contribution was the best we could expect it

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20 Minutes of 119th Meeting, July 31, 1912, Borden Papers, ibid.
21 Borden Memoirs, 1, p. 364.
22 Corrected draft of Borden to Churchill, Aug. 28, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.
would be idle for him to anticipate any results whatever from the Government or the people of Canada.”

On August 26 Mr. Churchill sent the secret memorandum, which had been prepared from data supplied by the War Staff. Borden was asked to return it with suggestions for any changes which he might think desirable:

I wish to check it in its final form, to show it to the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey, and to hold a formal meeting of the Board of Admiralty upon it, so that it can be in the highest degree authoritative. I will then have it printed together with some useful appendices and will send you a dozen copies for use in your Cabinet and among confidential persons.... If I could be of any use by coming over you have only to send for me and, if it rests with me, I will come at once. If there is any matter in which the Admiralty can assist you we are at your service.

In acknowledging, on August 28, receipt of the secret memorandum, Borden wrote that:

No doubt you will deal in subsequent memoranda with the other questions raised such as the importance and value of docks and harbour fortifications from the Admiralty standpoint, the best methods of harbour and coast defence, the arming of merchant steamships, the practicability of aiding the establishment of shipbuilding in Canada by the method suggested. These matters more particularly concern the question of permanent policy which we hope to take up without much delay but which is not so pressing as the other.

Immediately before leaving for Canada Borden returned the draft of the secret memorandum with his suggestions noted on it, and with the comment that: “The Memorandum seems to be very thorough and covers the points which were brought up at our interviews, so far as I can recall them at the moment, except as suggested in my letter of yesterday.”

On August 29 Borden and his party started on their return journey, and on September 8 they arrived in Ottawa. Thereafter matters went forward without delay. Borden reported on his visit to Britain in a speech given in Montreal on September 21. The impression of the general naval situation which that visit had left on his mind is probably revealed in a letter which he wrote to Sir Charles Tupper on September 25:

We are calling Parliament about the middle of November and doubtless there will be keen debate on this great question. Undoubtedly the conditions confronting the Empire are very grave. Twelve years ago our

33 Borden Memoirs, 1, p. 365.
34 Churchill to Borden, Aug. 26, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.
35 Corrected draft of Borden to Churchill, Aug. 28, 1912, ibid.
36 Borden to Churchill, Aug. 29, 1912, ibid.

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flag was dominant on every sea and in every ocean; today in the North Sea only. The further development of existing conditions might lead to such an issue that the British Empire would in effect be manoeuvred out of existence without the firing of a gun. The action of Canada will be watched with great interest throughout Europe. Lord Northcliffe told me that our visit attracted almost as much attention from the Continental as from the British press.37

About September 28, the Department of the Naval Service cabled the following enquiry to the Admiralty: “Request you will report confidentially by telegraph entire cost of latest type of Battleship and Battle Cruiser built by contract complete except sea stores.” The reply was: “... approximate cost of both battleship and cruiser each £2,350,000 including armament and first outfit of ordnance stores and ammunition.”38 A similar request for information was sent through the Governor General about two weeks later, the reply to which included the statement that prices were rising, a fact which might cause the quoted figure to be slightly exceeded.39 On October 5 Borden requested Mr. Churchill to supply him, if possible before November 7, with specific details regarding the current and recent naval expenditures, establishments, and programmes of certain countries. It had not been possible to obtain the desired information from sources available in Canada.40

Copies of the two memoranda which Mr. Churchill had prepared were forwarded, along with a letter from him dated September 17. The First Lord said that he had had his Prime Minister’s help in revising the publishable one, and that Borden might make any use he liked of this memorandum. Ten printed copies of the secret one were also being sent, and it was hoped that there would be no need to reprint in Canada. “The document is one which, as you will realize, might do harm to international relations if it were to leak out or to get mislaid.”41 Borden replied on October 1 that all the copies had arrived, and added: “The secret document which I have read very carefully seems an admirable presentation of the case.”42 Borden lent a copy of the secret memorandum to

37 Borden to Tupper, Sept. 25, 1912, Borden Papers, “Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921”.
40 Borden to Churchill, Oct. 5, 1912, Borden Papers, “Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921”.
41 The countries in question were Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Chile, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Spain.
42 Churchill to Borden, Sept. 17, 1912, Borden Papers, O’C. No. 656.
Laurier, with permission to communicate its contents to those of his supporters who were Privy Councillors; and this copy the Leader of the Opposition subsequently returned. It was agreed between the authorities in Ottawa and those in London that some of the matter contained in this memorandum might be publicly used, and a series of letters and cables defined the extent of such disclosures and settled the form in which they might be made.

The secret memorandum\(^4\) presented a clear and detailed picture of the apparent threat constituted by the rapidly growing German Navy and the subsidiary naval forces of the Triple Alliance, and the resulting concentration of the Royal Navy in European waters. It had also embodied the Admiralty's answer to the question of how, in the circumstances, Canada could best help:

Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present serious juncture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the Oversea Dominions of the Crown. She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and the greatest military Powers: and she has not lost her capacity, even if left wholly unsupported, of being able by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire. The Admiralty will not hesitate if necessary to ask next year for a further substantial increase beyond anything that has at present been announced, with consequent extra additions to the burden of the British taxpayer. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. It will have a moral value out of all proportion to the material assistance afforded. The failure of Canada at this moment, after all that has been said, to take any effective step would produce the worst impression abroad and expose us all to much derision. But any action on the part of Canada to increase the power of the Imperial Navy, and thus widen the margins of our common safety, would, on the other hand, be recognized everywhere as the proof and sign that those who may at any time be minded to menace any part of the Empire will have to contend with the united strength of the whole.

On these grounds, not less than from purely naval reasons, it is desirable that any aid given by Canada at this time should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply.

From the point of view of the British Government and of the Admiralty there were several good reasons for preferring a contribution to any other form of naval assistance at that time. The contributed ships would have constituted the most quickly

\(^4\) For the text of this hitherto unpublished secret memorandum and the titles of the appendices which were attached to it, see App. viii. Most, if not all, of the copies which were sent to Canada are among the Borden Papers, three of them being in O'C. No. 636. The "publishable" memorandum is Cd. 6513, Parl. Paps., 1912-13, liii.
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and certainly available form of help towards meeting a genuine threat. They would have strengthened the British Government's position in relation to the left-wing members of its own Party, who were restless in the face of ever-increasing naval Estimates. The Admiralty had always favoured contributions as opposed to local navies, and would no doubt have been pleased to see the principle acted upon even as a temporary measure. The point which the First Lord had made at the first meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence which the Canadian Ministers had attended, that a contribution of battleships from Canada would enable the battle fleet to receive a needed addition to its strength without muddying the diplomatic waters, must also have been an important consideration with the British Government. The principal argument advanced in the secret memorandum, however, was probably the one that weighed more heavily than any other. Although the British and German admiralties were building against each other in warships of almost every kind, the most decisive type, and the one which the public everywhere heard about almost to the exclusion of any other, was the Dreadnought. The willingly-proffered addition to the Royal Navy of three of these compelling monsters would probably have achieved a moral effect which the Admiralty did not exaggerate.

Shortly after the Canadian delegation had returned to Canada, Borden began discussions with his colleagues on naval policy. The two Admiralty memoranda were read in Cabinet immediately after their arrival:

The secret memorandum was most impressive but the publishable document had not been so well prepared, and it omitted the important statement that capital ships were required. Following perusal of the documents, discussion arose as to the advisability of consulting the people by plebiscite. Monk admitted that the situation was grave and emergent but was very strong in his opinion that this course should be followed and Nantel was his echo. The Ontario Ministers, as well as Hazen, Rogers, Burrell and Roche, were strongly opposed to an appeal to the people.

Although Borden was very anxious to retain him in the Cabinet, Monk, who was Minister of Public Works, had formerly taken such a definite stand on the very subject of a plebiscite that he could not give way. Borden reports that:

On October 14th, I presented to Council a draft of the Naval Aid Bill which I had previously submitted to White and to Perley. There was about an hour's discussion which resulted in unanimous approval. Monk, however, did not utter a word.
Four days later Borden received Monk’s resignation: the former Minister said; however, that he would not oppose the government except on the naval issue.\footnote{Borden Memoirs, i, pp. 399-400.}

On November 2 the British Government was asked for an assurance that, if Parliament should vote the money for a contribution, and if the time should come when Canada was prepared to maintain the contributed ships, these would be transferred to the Canadian Government. Before the assurance was given the Admiralty asked for and received a promise that if such a request to transfer the ships were made, sufficient notice would be given to permit of their place being taken by new construction.\footnote{Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., Nov. 2, and Nov. 7, 1912; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Nov. 6, 1912 (cables): Borden Papers, O’C. No. 657.} At the beginning of November also, Borden told Mr. Churchill that the Canadian Government would wish any contributed ships to receive names related to Canada, and suggested that should three battleships be provided they might be called respectively Acadia, Quebec, and Ontario. He also asked that the Admiralty should consider granting special opportunities for serving in such ships to Canadian cadets and seamen. The answers were that no difficulty regarding the names was anticipated; that eight cadetships annually would be placed at Canada’s disposal, and opportunities afforded as far as possible to serve in the contributed ships; and that something might also be done about the more difficult question of seamen.\footnote{Borden to Churchill, Nov. 2, 1912; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Nov. 15, 1912; Churchill to Borden (cable), Nov. 16, 1912; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Nov. 20, 1912: ibid.}

The idea of a generous emergency contribution of ships to the Royal Navy had won the approval of the delegates who had gone to London, of the Cabinet, and of the Party leaders in general. Embodied in the Naval Aid Bill, it was now to be submitted to the wider and final judgment of Parliament.
Chapter 9

THE NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

The second Session of the twelfth Parliament opened on November 21, 1912. The most important single item in the Speech from the Throne was the following:

During the past summer four members of my government conferred in London with His Majesty’s government on the question of Naval Defence. Important discussions took place and conditions have been disclosed which in the opinion of my advisers render it imperative that the effective naval forces of the Empire should be strengthened without delay. My advisers are convinced that it is the duty of Canada at this juncture to afford reasonable and necessary aid for that purpose. A Bill will be introduced accordingly.¹

Replying to the Speech, Laurier expressed the opinion that Britain was far from being as defenceless as the government was making out, and alluded to dissension in the Cabinet over the naval question.² Borden has written that:

Shortly after the opening of Parliament ... I learned that some of the Quebec members were restless with regard to the naval question and would probably bolt. Thus, on Wednesday, November 27th, I had a meeting of the French members and explained to them that we proposed to repeal the Laurier Navy Bill; and I gave them an outline of our permanent policy. Several of them ... agreed that the proposals were wise but declared that they were bound by promises to vote against them. [Six] promised to support us.³

On December 5, the Prime Minister introduced the Naval Aid Bill⁴ in the House of Commons, and set in motion one of the longest, most implacable, and most famous debates since Confederation. Promising to avoid a controversial tone, Borden referred to the increasing power and influence of Canada in the Empire, and to the marked evolution of intra-imperial constitutional relations during the preceding half-

¹ House of Commons Debates, 1912-13, i, pp. 2-3.
² Ibid., p. 28.
³ Borden Memoirs, i, p. 403.
The problem was to combine co-operation with autonomy. Responsibility for imperial defence on the high seas, hitherto assumed by Great Britain, had necessarily carried with it responsibility for and control of foreign policy. The enormous increase in the naval strength of the Powers had imposed a crushing burden upon the British people. "That burden is so great that the day has come when either the existence of this Empire will be imperilled or the young and mighty dominions must join with the Motherland to make secure the common safety and the common heritage of all." When Great Britain no longer assumed the sole responsibility for naval defence, Borden continued, she could no longer exercise the entire control of foreign policy; and the leaders of both government and Opposition in Britain had explicitly accepted this principle. Two years before, he said, he had announced that if the situation should become grave, and if he were in power, he would appeal to Parliament and if necessary to the people to afford aid in the emergency.

Borden explained that he had gone to England after the last Session to consult the British Government and the Admiralty: some of the information thus obtained was very confidential, but an important part of it would be communicated to the House. At this point Borden tabled the Admiralty's publishable memorandum. Continuing, he said that the British Empire, which was not a great military Power, rested its defence almost entirely on its navy, the defeat of which would lay Britain and the Dominions open to invasion by any great military State. The Royal Navy, which twelve years before had been predominant in every ocean, was now superior only in the North Sea; while 160 ships on foreign and colonial stations had been reduced to 76 since the year 1902. "It should never be forgotten that without war, without the firing of a shot or the striking of a blow, our naval supremacy may disappear; and with it the sole guarantee of the Empire's continued existence." It was the general guarantee of the Empire that primarily safeguarded the Dominions.

The government, said the Prime Minister, was not proposing to undertake or begin a system of regular or periodic contributions. The situation was sufficiently grave, nevertheless, to demand immediate action, and the Admiralty's advice was that the most effective emergency aid would take the form of Dreadnoughts of the latest type. The cost of these would be approximately £2,350,000 each, and he pro-
posed to ask Parliament for $35,000,000 with which to provide three of them. They would be maintained by the British Government as part of the Royal Navy; they would be at the disposal of the Admiralty for the common defence of the Empire; and they could later be recalled to form part of a Canadian unit of the Royal Navy, in which case they would of course be maintained by Canada. Special arrangements would be made to give Canadians the opportunity of serving as officers in these ships.

Borden went on to ask:

Is there really any need that we should undertake the hazardous and costly experiment of building up a naval organization especially restricted to this Dominion when upon just and self-respecting terms we can take such part as we desire in naval defence through the existing naval organization of the Empire, and in that way fully and effectively avail ourselves of the men and the resources at the command of Canada.

The ships would be constructed in Britain, because no adequate facilities for building Dreadnoughts existed in Canada—the additional cost of building them in Canada would be $12,000,000.

According to my conception, the effective development of shipbuilding industries in Canada must commence with small beginnings and in a businesslike way. I have discussed this subject with the Admiralty, and they thoroughly realize that it is not to the Empire’s advantage that all shipbuilding facilities should be concentrated in the United Kingdom. I am assured therefore that the Admiralty are prepared in the early future to give orders for the construction in Canada of small cruisers, oil-tank vessels, and auxiliary craft of various kinds . . . . For the purpose of stimulating so important and necessary an industry, we have expressed our willingness to bear a portion of the increased cost for a time at least.

Toward the close of his speech the Prime Minister referred once more to the need for finding an acceptable basis for cooperation in the moulding of foreign policy:

I am assured by His Majesty’s Government that, pending a final solution of the question of voice and influence, they would welcome the presence in London of a Canadian minister during the whole or a portion of each year. Such minister would be regularly summoned to all meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and would be regarded as one of its permanent members. No important step in foreign policy would be undertaken without consultation with such a representative of Canada. This seems a very marked advance, both from our standpoint and from that of the United Kingdom.

Borden emphasized the complexity of this problem, and the difficulty of finding a final solution for it. He thought that it could be solved, and that it was not wise to evade it. “And
so we invite the statesmen of Great Britain to study with us this, the real problem of Imperial existence.” Meanwhile, however, the skies were filled with clouds and distant thunder, “and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster.”

At a Liberal caucus held the following day it was decided without dissent to fight the proposed contribution and to stand out for a Canadian navy and for a larger one than had been planned in 1910, and when the debate was resumed on December 12, Laurier led off for the Opposition. He began by saying that it was the Conservatives who had dragged the Dominion’s naval policy into the zone of contentious politics, and alluded in passing to the divergent views held by members of the government. If the Opposition disagreed with Borden’s policy, it was because they believed that their own would better serve the end which the Prime Minister claimed to have in view. The Admiralty memorandum had dispelled any fear that England was in imminent danger, and had officially revealed that she had been compelled to withdraw her ships from distant seas in order to concentrate them at home:

In our humble judgment the remedy is this, that wherever, in the distant seas, or in the distant countries—in Australia, Canada or elsewhere—a British ship has been removed to allow of concentration in European waters, that ship should be replaced by a ship built, maintained, equipped and manned by the young nation immediately concerned. This is the Australian policy; this ought to be the Canadian policy.

He deprecated any reliance on the protection of the Monroe Doctrine, claiming that Cuba had paid a heavy price for American help. If Britain were really in danger the Prime Minister might ask for thrice the amount mentioned in the bill, and they would give it to him; but the Admiralty memorandum had revealed nothing new.

Laurier said that the Conservatives had turned against the Foster policy because of the unholy alliance which they had formed. The proposed contribution would be large in money but in nothing else:

You say that these ships will bear Canadian names. That will be the only thing Canadian about them. You hire somebody to do your work; in other words, you are ready to do anything except the fighting.

The policy in question, Laurier claimed, was a cross between jingoism and nationalism, designed to meet the diver-

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5 Skelton, Life of Laurier, ii, p. 308.
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gent views of those who had supported the government. He said that Borden had given up the policy of a Canadian navy before he went to England, and had then asked the Admiralty what form of immediate contribution they would recommend. The Prime Minister could not properly argue, therefore, that his policy was what the Admiralty, without restriction, had recommended. The government had decided against a Canadian navy, and nobody could suppose that only one contribution would be made. Laurier affirmed that the existing Canadian naval organization was not separatist in tendency; that Borden's proposal would settle nothing; and that, there being no emergency, the problem facing them was one which demanded a permanent policy. He understood the Prime Minister to feel that the adoption of a permanent policy ought to be postponed until Canada should have a voice in all questions of peace and war. Joint direction of imperial foreign policy, however, was a large and difficult question, and action along permanent lines ought not to await its settlement. Laurier concluded by moving an amendment, the gist of which was that any measure of Canadian aid in imperial naval defence which did not carry out a permanent policy of participation by ships owned, manned, and maintained by Canada, and built in the Dominion, would not properly express the aspirations of the Canadian people; that adequate measures should be taken as soon as possible to realize the permanent policy embodied in the Naval Service Act; and that accordingly, in place of a contribution, two fleet units should be provided, one for each coast.

The Minister of the Naval Service, the Hon. J. D. Hazen, claimed that Borden was being perfectly consistent in wishing to carry out the policy which he had enunciated before coming to power. He said that inasmuch as the proposed contribution was not a permanent policy, the crux of the matter was whether or not an emergency existed; and he argued at length that it did. Spending some time in the field of naval strategy, he said that the Royal Navy required a large margin of superiority because an aggressor would strike at the moment most favourable to himself, and that the German fleet was obviously being built for the purpose of challenging the naval supremacy of Britain. The latter country could not survive defeat at sea; but a defeat of the German Navy would not be decisive, inasmuch as in that event Germany would still have the most powerful army in Europe. Claiming that the pro-
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posed contribution would have the character of a quid pro quo, the Minister stated that between 1851 and 1901 the Admiralty had spent $110,000,000 on maintaining warships at Esquimalt and Halifax. As a Maritimer he expressed particular pleasure at the government's intention to provide for the revival of a shipbuilding industry in Canada upon what he considered to be a sound basis. Throughout his speech Hazen drew heavily upon material contained in the two Admiralty memoranda.

In the course of this debate, which from beginning to end was to cover a period of twenty-three weeks, many other arguments were used. On the government side the core of the contention was that a real and pressing emergency existed which ought to be met in the most effective way. Autonomy had been the watchword of the nineteenth century; partnership should be that of the twentieth. One Member asked, moreover, whether the Australasian colonies had lost any part of their autonomy as a result of having contributed to the Royal Navy. It was said that a separate Canadian navy meant independence. The Leader of the Opposition was accused of "sitting on both sides of the fence," and it was suggested that the proposed fleet units were merely a device for postponing indefinitely any effective help towards imperial defence. The British taxpayer was heavily overburdened and needed help. A single navy could defend the Empire more effectively and economically than several. The contribution money would be spent outside the country, but the Liberals were free traders and should be glad to buy in the cheapest market. As Canadians were habitually reluctant to go to sea, it would be impossible to man Canadian warships without greatly increasing the rate of pay or introducing conscription. It was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite, as was frequently being suggested from the Opposition benches, since the public had rendered its verdict on the issue at the last election. Some of the arguments from both sides of the House were only relevant to a programme of recurring contributions, and several Conservative speakers insisted that their temporary and permanent policies should be kept separate.

Opposition speakers tended to deny that an emergency existed, or to minimize its seriousness. It was urged against the bill that a contribution would subvert the principle of Dominion autonomy, and be equivalent to paying tribute. Representation on the Committee of Imperial Defence conferred no real voice in determining imperial foreign policy.
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Britain was much wealthier than Canada, and the $35,000,000 in question should be used to develop the Dominion, and ought not in any case to be spent outside the country. The suggested contribution would afford no relief to the British taxpayer, for the three ships would supplement the Admiralty's long-term programme rather than form part of it. The undefended coasts of Canada constituted the emergency which Borden ought to have found, and a fleet of cruisers and destroyers would be exceedingly useful, even though such ships could not stand in the line of battle. The Conservatives were accused of flag-waving and of claiming a monopoly of patriotism, and Borden was charged with inconsistency because he had favoured a Canadian navy in 1909. The pacifist argument was used that by making a contribution the Dominion would be joining in the march towards the ruin of civilization through armaments. It was frequently urged from the Opposition benches that a plebiscite should be held. One Member opposed the contribution, and added that he was in no hurry to start a Canadian naval Service either. Hugh Guthrie, Liberal Member for South Wellington, made the interesting suggestion that a compromise policy should be adopted, on which both Parties might unite. He proposed that two Dreadnoughts, instead of three, should be built in Great Britain, and that the balance of two fleet units should be constructed in Canada.

On December 18, 1912, Parliament adjourned until January 14, 1913, when the debate on the Naval Aid Bill was resumed. On February 11 a sub-amendment was introduced to the effect that Parliamentary consent be postponed until the question should have been submitted to the electors and approved by them. Two days later this sub-amendment was defeated by 122 votes to 75. The House then divided on Laurier's proposed amendment, which was defeated, also by 122 to 75. Shortly afterwards Borden's motion was carried by 115 to 83. Several of the Quebec Conservatives who had divided against Laurier's amendment voted against Borden's motion also. On February 27, an amendment which called for a redistribution of seats and a general election prior to proceeding further with the bill, and another to the effect that a verdict should be sought through a plebiscite, were defeated by 36 and 176 votes respectively. The bill then passed its second reading by 114 to 84, and on February 28 the House went into committee.
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Up to this time the discussion on the Naval Aid Bill, although uncommonly prolonged and taken part in by an unusually large number of Members, had been a normal Parliamentary debate in the sense that the speeches had been principally motivated by a desire to support or to discredit the measure in hand by means of relevant and convincing argument. Soon after the bill went into committee, however, the Opposition resorted to the tactics of obstruction which are even older than Parliaments, and by March 3 the whole effort of the Opposition was being devoted to taking up time.

We then entered upon a discussion which involved practically continuous sitting for two weeks. The debate went on, night and day, until Saturday, March 8th, at two o'clock in the morning. Members on each side were divided into three relays or shifts and were on duty for eight hours at a time. We had to adopt unusual precautions because we did not know at what hour the Opposition might spring division and have a majority concealed and available. On Monday, March 10th, the debate was resumed and it continued at great length throughout the week. On Friday, March 14th, and again on the following day the debate became so violent as to occasion apprehension of personal conflict. As midnight [Friday] approached the Speaker twice had to take the Chair amid scenes of great disorder.

The policy of the Opposition during this last and obstructionist stage of the debate was to discuss every point which arose or could be introduced, and to discuss each for as long as possible. Accordingly, the area of strict relevance at this stage being comparatively narrow, the Chairman’s most frequently recurring task was that of calling speakers to order for breaking away from the subject. All the familiar methods of parliamentary obstruction were used, and the strain grew more and more prolonged. The Conservatives said as little as possible, and hoped as they waited that the physical exhaustion of their opponents would open a way for the bill before too long.

Soon after the bill had reached the committee stage the Prime Minister had consulted several of his colleagues about “the probable necessity of introducing closure.” On March 15 he asked in the House that a reasonable time should be fixed for the passage of the bill through committee. Borden

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6 An instance of one-man obstruction in a debate is cited in Plutarch’s life of Caesar. Another is described in one of Cicero’s letters: “When it came to Clodius’s turn, he wished to talk out the day, and he went on endlessly; however, after he had spoken for nearly three hours, he was forced by the loud expression of the senate’s disgust to finish his speech at last.” (Ad Atticum, iv. 2, tr. Shuckburgh).

7 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 413.

8 Ibid.
states that on April 3 he conferred with Laurier, who admitted that obstruction was being practised, but was unwilling to set a time-limit. On April 7 Borden again asked for a time-limit and on April 9 moved that rules of closure be adopted.

In deciding to introduce closure the government had foreseen that the Opposition might seek to impose further delay by offering and debating amendments to the proposed rules. It was therefore decided in advance to drive these rules through to an early vote by using the procedure known as the "previous question." This form of motion precludes, until it has been decided, all amendment of the main question; and if the previous question is passed, the original question must be put to the vote immediately. If the previous question were to be moved without delay, however, the field would have to be kept clear of Opposition amendments to the motion for closure. In order to achieve this second object the Conservatives planned to invoke Rule 17, which read:

When two or more Members rise to speak, Mr. Speaker calls upon the Member who first rose in his place; but a motion may be made that any Member who has risen 'be now heard', or 'do now speak', which motion shall be forthwith put without debate.

As soon as Borden had introduced his closure motion, Laurier and Hazen both stood up, and the Speaker recognized Laurier. Thereupon a Conservative Member moved under Rule 17 that the Minister of Marine and Fisheries "be now heard", and the Speaker put the motion which was agreed to by 105 to 67. Hazen then moved the previous question. Although the end of this extraordinary debate was more than a month away, it was now in sight. On April 23 both Hazen's and Borden's motions were passed, each by 108 to 73. The debate was resumed on May 6; on May 9 closure was introduced; the bill went through committee next day; and on May 15, by a majority of 101 to 68, the Naval Aid Bill passed its third reading.10

Senators in Canada are appointed for life by the Governor General in Council, and in practice new appointments are always made from among the supporters of the Party in power at the moment. It was therefore inevitable, in view of the long Liberal tenure of office from 1896 to 1911, that in the spring of 1913 the Senate should contain a large Opposition.

9 Ibid., p. 415.
10 This prolonged debate is contained in House of Commons Debates, 1912-13, i-v incl.
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majority. The Naval Aid Bill was introduced in the Upper House on May 20 by Senator J. A. Lougheed, the government leader. In the course of a long speech Lougheed reviewed the whole story of Canadian naval policy since 1909, and presented his arguments in support of the bill. Sir George Ross, the Liberal leader, followed Lougheed. Ross claimed that both Parties had the same object and differed only as to the best means of reaching it. He said that the Naval Service Act of 1910, if properly used, would achieve all that the bill before them would do for the defence of the Empire, and much more. He suggested that the government should withdraw the Naval Aid Bill, and that a supplementary Estimate should be submitted calling for ten or fifteen millions to be devoted to the speedy construction of battleships wherever they could be built. These ships could be completed by yearly grants under the Naval Service Act, in the customary way. A separate bill was not required. Ross listed his objections to the bill, including the opinion that the three proposed Dreadnoughts would be dead armour plate, “as inanimate as the dry bones that Ezekiel saw in which no breath of life existed.” As might be expected, the arguments used during the Senate debate had already, in nearly all cases, seen service in the House of Commons. On May 29, by a vote of 51 to 27, the Naval Aid Bill was defeated in the Senate.11

Had the proposed Canadian Dreadnoughts been authorized late in 1912, or in the spring of 1913, they would have been fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class. The five ships of this extraordinarily successful class which were actually built were the Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Malaya, Barham, and Valiant. The Malaya was a gift from the Federated Malay States. They served throughout the First World War, and four of them were present at Jutland where they stood head and shoulders above the multitude like Saul the son of Kish. All of them likewise served in the Second World War, the Warspite with unusual distinction.

While the Canadian debate was going on, the use which the Admiralty intended to make of the proposed Canadian battleships was made public by the First Lord. Borden had been consulted in advance, and had strongly approved of the “inspiring proposal.” Mr. Churchill accordingly included the following passage in a speech in the House of Commons on

March 26, 1913. He said that Canada would always retain the right to recall the ships after giving reasonable notice, and continued:

We propose to form them with the ‘Malaya’, and if agreeable to the Dominions concerned with the ‘New Zealand’, into a new squadron of five ships of high uniform speed, to be called the Imperial squadron, which would be based on Gibraltar, and from that station could easily reach any portion of the British Empire in a shorter time than any European force of equal power could move. From that station it would be possible for such a squadron to reach Halifax in five days, Quebec in six, Jamaica in nine, the South American coast in twelve, Cape Town in thirteen, Alexandria in three, Sydney in twenty-eight, New Zealand in thirty-two, Hong Kong in twenty-two, and Vancouver in twenty-three days, and the Channel in a very much shorter time. Our intention is that this squadron should, as opportunity offers, cruise freely about the British Empire, visiting the various Dominions, and showing itself ready to operate at any threatened point at home or abroad. The Dominions will be consulted by the Admiralty on all movements of this squadron not dominated by military considerations, and special facilities will be given to Canadians, Australians, South Africans, and New Zealanders to serve as men and officers in the squadron. In this way, a true idea will be given of a mobile Imperial squadron of the greatest strength and speed patrolling the Empire, showing the flag, and bringing really effective aid wherever it may be needed. The squadron could, of course, be strengthened from time to time by further capital ships, or by fast cruisers, if any of the Dominions thought fit.

Side by side with this the Dominions will be encouraged by the Admiralty to develop the necessary naval bases, dockyards, cruisers, local flotillas, or other ancillary craft, which would enable the Imperial squadron to operate for a prolonged period in any particular threatened theatre to which it might be sent.  

That the proposed contribution by Canada had attracted considerable attention in German official circles is attested by numerous references to it in the published records of the German Foreign Office. In August, 1912, the German Ambassador in London wrote as follows to the Chancellor in Berlin:

In addition to domestic politics, the attitude of the ‘Dominions’ is a factor in the naval question. Using the rallying-cry ‘the Motherland is in peril’, they wish to consolidate those huge territories which at present are united so loosely with England, and to persuade them to contribute towards building ships. Mr. Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, has been here for weeks with various members of his Cabinet. He is accorded the honours of a great personage. /He has already promised to provide ships; but he makes stipulations. Membership in the Committee of Imperial Defence, a body which has existed for some years and on which the representatives of the Dominions sit in an advisory capacity, no longer satisfies him. He wants the Dominion to have a decisive voice in

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12 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Mar. 19, 1913; Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (draft cable), Mar. 22, 1913; Borden Papers, “Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921”; Hansard, 5th Series, 1., p. 1762.
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the deliberations which decide peace and war. It is not certain whether an imperial Parliament or some other arrangement is contemplated. To such terms the English Government will hardly agree. 13

Some months later, when Borden had announced his policy in the House of Commons, the German naval attaché in London reported:

It must be assumed that Mr. Borden’s bill to place three warships of the newest and largest type at the disposal of the Motherland, will be passed in the Canadian Parliament . . . . It will now have to be reckoned that the three Canadian ships, and the Malay ship, are a net addition to the programme of construction which was announced in March . . . . Assuming that the Canadian funds are made available at once, it is possible that the Estimates for 1913-14 will provide for more than five new ships, so as to strengthen the fleet as quickly as possible. 14

A few days later Zimmermann, the Undersecretary of State at the Wilhelmstrasse, suggested in a memorandum that: “The impending grant of three Dreadnoughts by Canada—a consequence of our latest navy law—seems to be excellent material for agitation.” 15 After the defeat of Borden’s project in the Senate, the attaché said in his next report that “. . . . the British Admiralty have been deprived indefinitely of the windfall of three battleships which they had hoped for.” 16

In October 1913, the German chargé d’affaires in London reported:

In Canada the Party warfare still rages over the question of whether a Canadian fleet should be built and stationed in the coast waters on the Atlantic and Pacific, or whether the fleet of the Motherland should be strengthened by means of single ships . . . . It has been noted here that Sir Wilfrid Laurier was able to argue against his opponent Borden at an election meeting, that the serious emergency which Borden had advanced as the principal reason why Canada ought to bear part of the cost of the English fleet, simply did not exist. In fact, considering the relatively small amount of new German naval construction, and the steady improvement in the relations between the two countries, it is difficult even for a Winston Churchill to persuade the colonies to believe in his fiction of a seriously threatened English World Empire. 17

A month later the naval attaché wrote:

It is doubtful whether there will be any more gifts like the Malaya. The naval policy of the self-governing colonies tends . . . more and more in the direction of establishing small fleets for themselves. This develop-

14 Report by Capt. von Müller, Dec. 8, 1912, ibid., xxxix, p. 3.
16 Report by von Müller, June 20, 1913, ibid., p. 39.
17 Kuhlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Oct. 21, 1913, ibid., p. 58.
ment is a very slow one which takes place outside European waters, and in comparing England’s naval strength in Europe with that of Germany it may be ignored.\(^{18}\)

Borden had kept on resolutely in his attempt to obtain the enactment of the Naval Aid Bill, until the defeat of that measure in the Senate. To a suggestion privately made late in March 1913, that he withdraw the bill and announce forthwith a permanent policy calling for a Canadian navy, together with the development of bases and shipyards, Borden replied that the government could not withdraw the bill in face of “the unworthy obstruction which is being practised by the Opposition.”\(^{19}\) The eventual defeat of the bill did not cause the Prime Minister to give up hope for the success of his project. On June 1 he asked Mr. Churchill to consider the practicability of having the three ships laid down immediately by the British Government, on the Canadian Government’s assurance that before their completion it would introduce into the Dominion Parliament a bill to provide the means of paying for them. The British Government, however, felt that such an arrangement “would be open to criticism in both countries as seeming to go behind the formal decision of the Canadian Parliament and that we have no right at present to assume that Senate’s vote could be reversed.” Both parties must feel perfectly free to deal with the future. The First Lord added that the Canadian ships would have been ready for battle in the third quarter of 1915, and that in order to maintain the battle fleet at the required strength, orders would be given to lay down the last three ships of the 1914-15 programme at once instead of in the following March as had been prescribed. This acceleration would effectively safeguard the imperial naval position for another six months, during which time some further discussions could, if desired, take place.\(^{20}\)

During his speech introducing the naval Estimates on March 26, 1913, the First Lord had set up a theoretically separate strategic function for contributed battleships. According to this definition they would meet the world-wide requirements of the British Empire, while the battle fleet

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18 Report by von Müller, Nov. 30, 1913, *ibid.*, p. 65. Other references to Borden’s policy will be found in *Grosse Politik*, xxxix, pp. 6n., 13, 33, 34, 66, 81, 82, 91.

19 V. E. Mitchell to Borden (telegram), Mar. 24, 1913; reply (letter), same date: Borden Papers, O’C. No. 658.

20 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (draft cable), June 1, 1913; reply, June 4, 1913: Borden Papers, “Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921”.

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provided by the United Kingdom would be more particularly concerned with the defence of that country.\textsuperscript{21} This strategically unconvincing formula was advanced to meet the objection that if the Admiralty’s sixty per cent margin was adequate the Dominion ships would be redundant. It was also an argument that could be used to meet the German claim that they would be obliged to build to offset any Dominion contributions, and Canadian expressions of a preference that any contributions should actually strengthen imperial defence rather than merely relieve the British taxpayer. Because of this doctrinal commitment, the last-cited and subsequent communications referred to a possible Canadian contribution as being earmarked for special imperial requirements.

On June 25, Borden gave Mr. Churchill some reasons why the obstructive tactics of the Opposition had not been countered by dissolving Parliament, and said that the failure to reach any compromise with the Liberals in the Senate had been due to Laurier’s insistence, backed by a threat to resign, on complete rejection of the bill. Borden added that if three ships were laid down in place of the unordered Canadian ones it would be desirable that they should be of the same character, class, and fighting value, as those which his government had proposed to build. He himself could not visit Britain; but W. T. White, the Minister of Finance, was planning to go there shortly, and would be authorized to discuss the whole situation informally and confidentially, in order to facilitate future developments along the lines that had been suggested.\textsuperscript{22}

In the middle of the summer he cabled Mr. Churchill:

We firmly adhere to our intention of providing three capital ships. I cannot at present definitely state method we shall pursue. My own opinion strongly inclines to insertion of substantial sum in estimates but there are political difficulties which I hope to overcome but which render consultation with colleagues imperative before final conclusion is reached.\textsuperscript{23}

Two months later the Canadian Government’s intentions had assumed the following form:

After discussion with my colleagues we are unanimous in opinion that proposals of last session should be pressed to conclusion by methods most likely to ensure successful result. Unless more satisfactory and effective method can be devised before our session opens on eighth January we

\textsuperscript{21} Hansard, 5th Series, 4, p. 1761.
\textsuperscript{22} Borden to Churchill, June 25, 1913, Borden Papers, “Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921.”
\textsuperscript{23} Confirmed in Borden to Churchill, Aug. 4, 1913, ibid.
propose to include in general estimates, or to present in a separate estimate, an item of ten or fifteen million dollars for increasing effective forces of empire. We shall explain to Parliament that this item will be appropriated to construction of three battleships or battle cruisers which will be commenced immediately but which cannot be completed until after general election. We shall further point out that if present government is again returned to power at that election the three ships will be placed at the disposal of His Majesty for common defence of Empire until recalled upon notice and that if we go out of office after election the new government can utilize them for the purpose of its policy announced by Laurier last session. I am hopeful but not absolutely confident that Senate will pass such an estimate. If necessary to secure passage we would agree to reduce number of ships to two and appropriate one third of proposed total expenditure to harbour and coast defence. Meantime I shall be very glad to have your observations and suggestions.24

By the end of the year, however, and with the beginning of the Session close at hand, the government had decided not to proceed with the contribution project in the immediate future. Two communications to the First Lord, dated December 30 and 31 respectively, suggest that for some reason Borden and his colleagues were less confident than formerly that the Senate could be induced to pass any measure which would satisfy them. Negotiations with Senator Ross were being conducted at this time, but according to Borden the government doubted the Senator's ability to make his wishes effective. The two messages also indicate that the Canadian Government was disturbed by the reduced emphasis which the Admiralty was apparently placing on battleships. These considerations, and there may have been others as well, had undermined the government's earlier purpose to introduce a contribution measure in the coming Session of Parliament.25

Soon afterwards Borden gave expression to an idea which was to remain in his mind thereafter as containing perhaps the only practicable solution for his difficulty until the moment when the First World War lowered the curtain upon the whole episode. On January 10, 1914, he ended a cablegram to Mr. Churchill with the sentence: "It is just possible that before end of Session we may secure majority in Senate."26 This statement derived its meaning from three facts. Most Canadian Senators are elderly men, and the death-rate of the Senate is therefore high. The Borden government would

24 Administrator to Col. Sec. (cable), Oct. 16, 1913, ibid.
26 Borden to Churchill (cable), Jan. 10, 1914, ibid.
follow the unbroken precedent by having members of its own
Party appointed to fill all vacancies that might occur in the
Upper House. Section 26 of the British North America Act
provided that on the recommendation of the Governor
General three or six additional senatorships might be created
and filled.\textsuperscript{27} At this time a redistribution bill was being con-
sidered, and in connection with it a few months later the
House approved an Address to His Majesty praying for an
amendment to the British North America Act which would
create twenty-four additional seats in the Senate.\textsuperscript{28} The
redistribution, however, was not carried out during this period,
and at no time does Borden appear to have thought of it as a
means of removing the obstacle in the way of his immediate
naval policy.

When the naval Estimates for 1914-15 were being compiled
in London, the First Lord cabled to Borden that the Ad-
miralty was proposing to antedate the construction of two
more battleships "to strengthen margin for defence Empire
apart from United Kingdom thus securing year more for
Canada to act." He explained that in the Cabinet, however,
there was considerable opposition to taking this course, and
added:

I should welcome telegram restating intention of your Government
and prospect of effective action being taken within twelve months to provide
either three ships or alternatively two ships and other smaller vessels.
Deeply anxious no step here should hamper your policy and chance of
success. Conditions stated Admiralty Memorandum unchanged and
British declared programme will be regularly executed.\textsuperscript{29}

Borden replied as follows:

From our point of view further acceleration as suggested seems much
the best course. As repeatedly declared we are determined to provide the
three ships and we confidently believe that at the latest we can do so next
session. Any new departure which might neutralize declarations in Ad-
miralty Memorandum would of course strongly influence public opinion
here and might seriously hamper our action. Liberal majority of forty

\textsuperscript{27} "On August 31st [1913], I [conferred] with Lord Haldane . . . . [with whom] I discussed
the naval question, and the possibility of making appointments to the Senate under Section
26 of the British North America Act. This had previously been the subject of a conference
with Mr. Asquith while we were in London." (Borden Memoirs, i, 379).

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., pp. 433-4.

\textsuperscript{29} Churchill to Borden (cable), Jan. 30, 1914, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-
1921", Mr. Churchill has recorded his difficulties at this time, which were occasioned by strong
opposition to increased naval expenditure: "There followed [after the end of November 1913]
nearly five months of extreme dispute and tension, during which Naval Estimates formed the
main and often the sole topic of conversation at no less than fourteen full and prolonged
meetings of the Cabinet . . . . By the middle of December it seemed to me certain that I
should have to resign." (Churchill, World Crisis, pp. 181-187.) See also p. 102 above.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

nine in senate when we assumed office has already been reduced to twenty one by subsequent vacancies and new appointments. Some Liberal senators openly deplore Senate's action in defeating so many of our important measures and all of them are becoming alarmed at evidence of popular agitation for elective senate.30

An appreciation of the naval situation at that moment was sent to Borden by Mr. Churchill in March:

The Navy Estimates have been, as I telegraphed to you, satisfactorily settled. They reach the enormous total of 51½ millions.31 Approximately half a million of this charge is due to the acceleration of two battleships to cover the position in the Mediterranean and generally, pending the settlement of a Canadian naval policy. This will secure a year's more breathing space in which Canada could renew her proposals. Meanwhile, however, time is passing and naval science developing. It is possible that it may be more convenient to you, should you be able to act next year, to build two capital ships and convert the third into cruisers or other craft. If so, the Admiralty would certainly approve such a decision. The dangers to which the capital ship is exposed increase continually. Our strength in the line of battle as against Germany, thanks to our exertions, is very great. We could certainly furnish you with good reasons for making such a change in respect of one of the capital ships, if such ideas commended themselves to you.32

Borden continued to await the time when control of the Senate would pass to his Party, and in the meanwhile he took a tentative step towards hastening that day. On July 13, 1914, he wrote the following letter to the High Commissioner for Canada in London:

'In reply to your letter of the 24th June respecting the question of a naval conference, I entirely agree with you that it would be best to postpone further consideration of the subject until the next Imperial Conference. If a naval conference should be held before we obtain control of the Senate our position would be unsafe and unsatisfactory. It may be that we shall have control of the Upper Chamber by the end of next session, but that, of course, is quite uncertain.

At present our representation in the Senate consists of 37 Conservatives, including vacancies, as compared with 50 Liberals. When the number stands 42 to 45 we may find it desirable to forward a recommendation under section 26 of the British North America Act. You might informally sound Mr. Harcourt as to what their probable action would be upon such a recommendation.

During Mackenzie's administration the Imperial Government declined to act for the reason that the appointment of six Senators would not give

30 Borden to Churchill (cable), Feb. 2, 1914, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921."
31 See App. iv.
32 Churchill to Borden, Mar. 6, 1914, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921."
control, but that reason would disappear under the conditions which I have mentioned. 33

This initiative was extinguished a very short time afterwards, together with the whole emergency contribution project; for three weeks later the warships of the Royal Navy were steaming to their war stations.

It has already been pointed out that Borden had had two naval policies. One of these had been designed to meet a specific emergency and was therefore both urgent and temporary in character. The second policy was intended to provide a permanent instrument of Canadian and imperial defence. It would necessarily take considerably longer to mature than the other, and was regarded by Borden as being less pressing. To find the origin of this policy for the long future, and a possible source of the contribution project also, it is necessary to go back to the earliest weeks of the Borden administration.

In the fall of 1911 Sir William White, who had been Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty from 1885 to 1902 and the most widely-known naval architect of his day, visited Canada for the purpose of inspecting the Grand Trunk Railway of which he was a director. 34 While in Ottawa on November 7 he called on Borden, and the two men discussed the question of Canadian naval policy, the Prime Minister asking the naval expert for his advice. Several weeks later White sent Borden a memorandum which recapitulated and possibly amplified the elements of their previous conversation. White advised that help afforded by Canada in the naval defence of the Empire should be given in four ways. He suggested that the Canadian Government arrange for the subvention and arming as auxiliary cruisers of the great steamships that carried mail and passengers to and from the ports of the Dominion on both coasts. Only ships with a speed of eighteen knots or more should be subsidized, and the plans of all new ships should be approved by the naval advisers of the government. These armed merchant cruisers would be used to protect commerce on the trade routes leading to and from the principal Canadian seaports. They would operate for the most part in the approaches to the terminal ports on both the Canadian coasts, and if it were thought desirable they

33 Borden to Perley, July 13, 1914, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 660.
34 For an account of White's career see Manning, Life of Sir William White.
might also be employed further afield. White considered that a Canadian naval force should have some protected cruisers, and that the construction of these might well be associated with a general scheme for developing a modern shipbuilding industry in the Dominion. He added, however, that it would take a considerable time before Canada could build warships both rapidly and cheaply. In making plans White thought that war with the United States need not be considered. He did not agree that Dominion naval forces ought to include battleships:

In my judgment the construction of battle-ships may well remain in the hands of the mother country for a long time to come. Any assistance in that direction which may be rendered by Dominions beyond the Seas will best take the form of financial contributions to necessary expenditure on building and maintaining such a fleet.

This excerpt may conceivably contain the origin of Borden’s contribution project.

On August 26, 1912, during his visit to England for the purpose of consulting the Admiralty, Borden saw White again and asked him for a second memorandum which would reflect the situation as it then existed. This memorandum, which was dated September 4, was intended to be read in conjunction with the first. At Borden’s suggestion, no doubt, it drew a distinction between permanent and temporary or emergency programmes. For a permanent policy, the products of which the Canadian Government would own and control, retaining at the same time complete freedom of action, White again made four recommendations. The feature of his scheme which he represented as being the most important and urgent, was the provision of armed merchant cruisers as suggested in the earlier paper. Naval bases well equipped to supply vessels of the Royal Navy should be maintained on the Atlantic and Pacific. Means for defending these bases should also be provided. The fourth suggestion was that arrangements be made for training officers and men. If it were desired in addition to make some special and temporary provision in order to help in meeting the German naval threat, White suggested that it could best take the form of a gift to Great Britain of four to six million pounds, representing the cost of two or three battleships. The moral effect of such evidence of imperial solidarity would be very great.²⁵

²⁵ White to Borden with enclosure, Dec. 28, 1911, and Sept. 4, 1912, Borden Papers, O’C. No. 634.
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The need to have a permanent programme ready when the time came was present in Borden's mind from the moment when the government had decided to commit itself to a non-recurring contribution. The Prime Minister had no knowledge of naval affairs, and he probably trusted White and was glad to have had the advice, independently of the Admiralty, of a very outstanding naval expert. He also documented himself by obtaining memoranda on various aspects of the problem from the Admiralty and the Naval Service. His permanent policy had not been developed in detail when the First World War began. Nor, in view of Borden's concept of imperial relations, could it have achieved finality until the question of according to the Dominion a satisfactory share in the control of imperial policy should have been settled in one way or another. The direction in which he intended to set out, however, is clear enough. In March 1913 he formulated his ideas on the subject for Mr. Churchill's information:

As Canada may eventually desire to establish and maintain one or more fleet units in co-operation with and in close relation to an Imperial navy and as the three ships [Canada's proposed contribution] might be required to form part of such unit or units I would suggest that you should allude to their possible recall upon reasonable notice. We shall probably announce later in this session that, pending consideration of the great and difficult problems attending the thorough co-operation of the Dominion in matters affecting Imperial defence and foreign policy, Canada proposes to undertake certain measures of defence which while primarily designed for the protection of her own shores and of her interests in contiguous waters will nevertheless be of importance from an Imperial standpoint. It is anticipated that this will be undertaken upon following lines. First, provision of dry docks useful for commercial purposes as well as for those of Admiralty. Second, establishment of naval bases and fortification of ports and harbours where they are situate, also defence of such ports and harbours by submarines, torpedo craft, etc. Third, establishment and gradual extension of shipbuilding and repair plants. Fourth, training of officers in naval college and of seamen in training ships. Fifth, subsidizing of swift and modern merchant steamships useful for scouting and other purposes, equipment of such ships with necessary guns and fittings and manning thereof by trained seamen. Sixth, gradual extension of Fishery Protection Service by addition of light cruisers manned by trained men and under naval discipline which while specially useful for primary purpose of protecting Fisheries will also be effective and available in time of war.36

An important ingredient in Borden's whole concept of naval policy was the idea that that policy should be so directed as to encourage the growth of a shipbuilding industry in Canada. He had discussed the question with Mr. Churchill

36 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (draft cable), Mar. 22, 1913, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921".
in 1912 in London. Shortly after his return to Canada he reminded the First Lord of the earlier conversations, and pointed to the dilemma that while a great weakness in the contribution plan was that all the money would be spent outside Canada, on the other hand battleships could not within a reasonable time be built in the Dominion. He reminded the First Lord of the possibility, which they had discussed in London, that the Admiralty might build some small warships in Canada, the additional cost being divided between the two governments. The First Lord replying recognized the importance of Borden’s idea, and said that any practical scheme for the co-operation of the Admiralty in carrying it out would command his support. The main difficulty lay in the high degree of expert knowledge and experience required for the efficient building of modern warships. He assured Borden that if the prices were reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances including the willingness of the Canadian Government to share the extra cost, and if the time required for construction was not excessive, the Admiralty would be willing to place some orders in Canada. The most suitable types of vessel with which to inaugurate the scheme would be light cruisers, tankers, and small auxiliary craft. The Admiralty would remain wholly responsible for design and for supervising construction. The details could be worked out later and should not present any difficulty.37 This understanding lapsed with the demise of the Naval Aid Bill of which it had been a corollary.

One more plan which was destined to end abortively was set on foot before the final curtain descended. On March 6, 1914, Mr. Churchill wrote suggesting that a naval officer of high rank should be sent to Canada to discuss with the government matters relating to emergency and permanent naval policies. He thought that such a conference would strengthen the government’s hand for future action. The First Lord said that if Borden favoured the idea he would select for the mission Sir John Jellicoe, whom he described as “the first of British sailors at the present time.” Jellicoe was Second Sea Lord, and had been chosen to take command of the Home Fleets at the end of the year. After several months’ delay Borden replied that Jellicoe’s proposed visit would be very welcome; and twelve days before war began he cabled a formal

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37 Borden to Churchill, Oct. 3, 1912, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921"; Borden to Churchill, Oct. 5, 1912, O'C. No. 657; Churchill to Borden, Nov. 4, 1912, O'C. No. 653.

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request that a naval officer “of adequate experience and capacity” should be sent. Jellicoe’s experience was destined to become considerably more adequate before he actually came on his well-known mission to Canada more than five years afterwards.\(^{38}\)

With the declaration of war on Germany the Admiralty’s objections to publishing the secret memorandum disappeared. A week after that declaration Mr. Churchill cabled to Borden asking for his consent to the publication of the document with a few omissions. For obvious reasons Borden strongly favoured the idea; but Asquith and the Colonial Secretary were opposed, and the memorandum was not published.\(^{39}\)

The discussions and debates which took place from 1909 were of basic importance in the history of Canadian naval policy. In the deliberations on the Foster resolution, and Laurier’s amendment to it, in the spring of 1909, it had quickly become apparent that the leaders on both sides were anxious to avoid party conflict in the field of naval policy. This they found it comparatively easy to do, for few Members had any preconceived motives for reluctance to follow their leaders. There are many matters of which the printed page or the spoken word can only reproduce a lifeless simulacrum. The foreign offices and war staffs of Europe were not of much interest to Canadians, and competition in armament, though it was described in the newspapers, remained largely unreal to a people most of whom had never seen a battery or a warship. Accordingly, when the British Ministers spoke their warning words in the spring of 1909, many Canadians felt the emotions which are normally induced by an apparent threat to the common safety; but very few possessed any detailed knowledge bearing on that problem, any preconceived opinions as to how it should be solved, or much sustained interest in the subject. To use an often-quoted phrase, Canadians were \(\text{“more interested in box-cars than in battleships.”}\) A correspondent of Borden’s who had been sounding public opinion throughout the west, reported in the fall of 1910 that:

I did not find any interest in the Navy question except in parts of British Columbia where the population is quite English and direct contribution was strongly favored. The general attitude in the West seemed to be towards the Navy about what it is towards the I.C.R.; if the East wanted it then the West ought to have the Hudson Bay railway or something else as an offset.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) Correspondence in Borden Papers, O’C. No. 660.

\(^{39}\) Correspondence, \textit{ibid.}

\(^{40}\) I. W. King to Borden, Oct. 28, 1910, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes No. 3.
Neither of the political Parties had as yet committed themselves to attitudes or dogmas relating to naval defence, with the important exception of the stand which Laurier had consistently taken at the imperial conferences that any future effort should take the form of a separate Canadian naval force. The makers of policy at this time, therefore, had an almost clean slate to write upon. A people seldom achieves a greater unanimity concerning any public question than Canadians then showed in regard to naval policy; but this high degree of concurrence was partly due, as later events were to show, to the fact that they had not as yet reflected much upon the subject.

The debate on the Naval Service Bill saw the two Parties begin to diverge from each other, and thenceforth, down to August 1914, the naval policy of the Dominion remained a bone of Party contention. The imperialists in the Conservative Party wanted a more ambitious policy, one which would emphasize imperial defence more strongly, and one by which Canada’s share in the common defence would find expression through or in the closest possible integration with the Royal Navy. Opposition critics no doubt attacked the bill because it was a government measure; but most of them probably did so on less partisan grounds as well.

The precise origin of the Naval Aid Bill is uncertain! The idea of a contribution had become commonplace in Canada long before Borden went to England in 1912; indeed he had himself, during the naval debate of 1909, foreshadowed a possible need to adopt such a policy. In 1910 the secondary and conditional idea which he had enunciated the year before was converted into a primary and absolute one. In 1912 he may have suggested to the Admiralty the idea of contributing battleships; in which case the father of the idea may have been one of the government’s supporters, or Sir William White, or Borden himself. More probably Borden asked the Admiralty what would be the best means of giving quick and effective aid; but the idea of a contribution of battleships was already exceedingly familiar to him. If he merely sought the Admiralty’s advice, Mr. Churchill’s words during the first meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence were probably the formal statement of the Admiralty’s opinion which Borden had already been given unofficially. The origin of Borden’s contribution idea owes its obscurity largely to the fact that in Britain and the Dominions the air had long been filled with
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the three related notions of a German naval threat, Dominion contributions, and battleships.

The close relations that existed between the Liberal First Lord and the Conservative Prime Minister throughout the whole period when the contribution policy was under consideration rested upon mutual confidence and a common aim. Mr. Churchill's undisguised desire to see Borden's policy carried out was largely based, no doubt, on motives that he shared with the other members of the British Government. In addition, however, it is probable that he would have welcomed a contribution from Canada, both as an imperialist and also because it would have redounded greatly to his credit as First Lord. He realized that the contribution was a temporary one only, and his full acceptance of this fact seems to be suggested in a letter that he wrote to Borden at the end of 1913. In it he said that a current attempt to arrange a "holiday" in naval building could probably be facilitated by Borden: "What I ask is this. In introducing yr. proposal, could you say that these are emergency proposals, distinct from the permanent naval policy of Canada." The unofficial correspondence between these two men, which was published only in part, was unusual and drew considerable criticism at the time.

During its pre-war tenure of office the Borden government had not implemented the Naval Service Act. It had not set on foot its own intermediate policy, still less a permanent one. Nor had it been able to start its immediate project, born of the German naval threat and a fear of war. When this fear became a reality, therefore, there were no Canadian Bristols and destroyers, nor fleet units, nor contributed Queen Elizabeths, either built or building.

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* Churchill to Borden, Dec. 19, 1913, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921."
WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

EVER since the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 it had been evident that success in war would thenceforth depend upon systematic preparation which would take care of every predictable detail. The Committee of Imperial Defence in Great Britain had arranged in 1911 for the compiling of a "War Book," a comprehensive programme of measures to be taken by each Department of the government in the event of a serious international crisis or of war. Each of these programmes was co-ordinated with the others. A first set of steps was preliminary in character, while a second set was to be taken after the actual outbreak of war. Of the first set of steps a "Precautionary Stage" would reflect strained relations with a certain Power or Powers, and the next stage was to be ushered in by the sending of the "Warning Telegram" to all concerned. The second set of steps would be initiated on the decision to declare war. ¹

A suggestion that a War Book should be compiled in Canada was made in the summer of 1912 by Lieut. R. M. Stephens, R.N., who was attached to N.S.H.Q.; and the Prime Minister, during his visit to England the same year, had asked the Committee of Imperial Defence for information regarding the British War Book. The Overseas Defence Committee accordingly prepared a memorandum on the subject which reached Canada early in 1913; but nearly a year passed before anything more was done. On January 12, 1914, an Inter-departmental Conference, at which the Naval Service was represented by its Deputy Minister, met for the purpose of starting the preparation of a Canadian War Book, which was to include drafts of all telegrams, Orders in Council, and other paper instruments that would be needed to effect the various precautionary measures. Arrangements were included for establishing an examination service at certain ports, detaining enemy shipping, inspection of outward-bound ships to prevent

¹Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, i, pp. 18-22; see also Asquith, Genesis of the War, p. 118.
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the exporting of contraband, and a strict control of wireless stations with censorship of messages sent out from them.

Rapid progress was made, and before the end of July, with dramatic timeliness, the War Book was ready. On July 29 the completed War Book arrived at N.S.H.Q. The Deputy Minister was sitting at his desk preparing to sign it, when the telephone rang. It was a call from Government House to say that a coded signal from the Admiralty had just arrived. The message was sent for and decoded, and turned out to be the Warning Telegram.²

When the Warning Telegram arrived in Ottawa, Parliament was not in session and the Prime Minister was having a holiday in Muskoka. He hastened back to Ottawa where he arrived on August 1.³ A Cabinet meeting was held the same day, and the Governor General sent the following message to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

My Advisers while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved and their strong desire to co-operate in every possible way for that purpose wish me to convey to His Majesty’s Government the firm assurance that if unhappily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our Empire.

This cable was implemented the same day by another, in which the Canadian Government stated that they would "welcome any suggestions and advice which the Imperial Naval and Military authorities may deem it expedient to offer", concerning the most effective means of affording help.⁴ On August 1, also, all midshipmen were recalled from leave, the naval authorities at Esquimalt were empowered to enrol volunteers, and the Niobe and Rainbow were ordered to prepare for active service.

On August 2 the cordial thanks of the British Government were received for the promise of unstinted support which the Canadian Government had tendered. The British Government also undertook to inform the Canadian Government should the situation call for further measures.⁵ This day the Naval Service assumed control of all wireless stations, and the collectors of customs at the seaports were instructed to give

² Interview with G. J. Desbarats, Jan. 1942.
⁵ Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Aug. 2 and 3, ibid., pp. 41-2.

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notice of the fact that the Admiralty had called out the Royal Naval Reserve. The volunteer reserve company at Victoria was ordered to report at the Esquimalt dockyard.

Esquimalt presented an animated appearance ... Its busy streets reminded one of the days, not far back, when the British fleet made Esquimalt its home port. Throughout the afternoon and well on into the evening, many Victorians and a number of the people visiting this city took the street cars to the naval town to look over what may be the scene of an engagement.6

The examination service went into force that evening.

On August 3 a number of wireless stations were shut down, and censors were provided for the others. Certain ports were warned to be on guard against surprise attack, and Esquimalt, which was not a mercantile port, was closed to all except naval vessels. At 1 a.m. the same day H.M.C.S. Rainbow put to sea on the first of her operational cruises. During the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war many last-minute naval preparations were being made, including the distributing of ammunition and equipment and rounding up personnel.

On August 4 news reached London that German troops had entered Belgium. The neutrality of that country was a primary consideration with Great Britain, for reasons that rested upon both good faith and self-interest. At 2 p.m. on that day, accordingly, the British Government sent an ultimatum to Berlin, demanding that Germany undertake to respect Belgian neutrality, and asking for a reply by midnight. When the ultimatum had expired without a favourable reply, the British Empire declared war on Germany.

Mr. Winston Churchill has vividly described the scene at the Admiralty that night as the dreadful moment arrived:

It was 11 o'clock at night—12 by German time—when the ultimatum expired. The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders were gathered a small group of Admirals and Captains and a cluster of clerks, pencil in hand, waiting. Along the Mall from the direction of the Palace the sound of an immense concourse singing 'God save the King' floated in. On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room. The war telegram, which meant 'Commence hostilities against Germany', was flashed to the ships and establishments under the White Ensign all over the world.7

6 Times, Victoria, Aug. 3, 1914.
7 Churchill, World Crisis, pp. 245-6.
WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

On the morning of August 4 the Governor General and Sir Wilfrid Laurier arrived in Ottawa. As soon as he had reached the capital the Leader of the Opposition, who had been spending the summer at his home in Arthabaska, issued a statement. In it he expressed a hope that war might even yet be averted. If it came, however, he considered that it would be the duty of the Dominion to take an active part in waging it, and he declared a truce to Party strife. The Prime Minister has epitomized in a few lines the most portentous time that Ottawa had ever known:

We were in Council on August 4th at eleven and again at four. During the evening, while again in Council, at 8.55 p.m. the momentous telegram arrived announcing that war had been declared. Immediately an Order-in-Council was passed summoning Parliament to meet on August 18th.

The same evening the Niobe and Rainbow, as authorized by Section 23 of the Naval Service Act, were “placed at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy”; C.G.S. Canada and C.G.S. Margaret were transferred from the Department of Customs to the Naval Service, and ordered to hoist the white ensign; and the naval and naval volunteer forces were placed on active service. Instructions were sent out through the Department of Customs embodying the advice that should be given to British shipping regarding precautions against capture, and arrangements were made by N.S.H.Q. to secure daily information concerning German cruisers near the Pacific coast.

The task which the war imposed upon the naval forces of the allies was, of course, to obtain and keep control of the seas, so that allied merchant ships and transports could use them in comparative safety, and enemy shipping be prevented from doing so. Command of the seas would also shield the allies from serious attacks against or by way of their coasts. The Austro-Hungarian fleet was small, and was largely immobilized by the uncertain attitude and later the hostility of Italy. The French Navy ranked about fourth among the fleets, while that of Russia was small and poorly equipped. Except in the Pacific Japan would not seriously exert her formidable naval strength. The most powerful naval weapon on either side was that wielded by Great Britain, and during the night of July 28-29,

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9 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 456.
1914, the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet, with lights out and at high speed, steamed to its war station at Scapa Flow.

The German fleet was inferior in size only to the Royal Navy, while in quality it was second to none. The naval war was therefore to be largely a duel between the Royal Navy and that of Germany. The German High Seas Fleet was to be contained throughout the war by the British Grand Fleet, with some help from the United States Navy in the later stages. Of the British Dominions Australia alone had a naval force to be reckoned with. In wealth of bases at home and overseas and of shipyards, and in the size of her merchant fleet, Great Britain was in a class by herself. On the other hand, she was far more dependent than any other Power upon sea-borne supplies, and like the rest of the Empire except South Africa, could bring land forces to bear against the enemy only by sending them across salt water. The great superiority of the allied navies, therefore, was partly discounted by their much greater responsibilities. The German Navy had relatively few commitments and its home bases were invulnerable.

Both navies maintained considerable cruiser forces in non-European waters. Of the German ones Admiral Scheer states that "...importance was attached to sending the best we had in the way of light cruisers to foreign seas." The position of the Royal Navy in this respect has been set out by Mr. Churchill:

The keynote of all the Admiralty dispositions at the outbreak of war was to be as strong as possible in home waters in order to fight a decisive battle with the whole German Navy. To this end the foreign stations were cut down to the absolute minimum necessary to face the individual ships abroad in each theatre. The fleet was weak in fast light cruisers and the whole of my administration had been occupied in building as many of them as possible. The inconvenience in other parts of the globe had to be faced. It was serious.

Apart from the German cruisers on distant stations, a commerce raider might occasionally escape from the North Sea. There was also the certainty that attempts would be made to arm German liners in neutral ports and send them out to raid.

Their lack of bases and friendly coasts throughout the oceans was in fact destined to hamper, though not to prevent, commerce raiding by German warships. A skilfully-handled raiding cruiser is exceedingly difficult to run down—at one

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11 Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, p. 15.
12 Churchill, World Crisis, pp. 308-9.
time during the war S.M.S. *Emden* was to occupy the undivided attention of about twenty allied cruisers. In the event, the achievements of the German surface raiders conformed to Mahan's thesis that such raiding might cause embarrassment but had never proved to be decisive.

In the course of hostilities, however, a new type of commerce raider appeared, the advent of which had been foreseen by so few that no provision had been made to meet it. This was the submarine, which in skilful and ruthless German hands almost proved a decisive weapon. Several anti-submarine measures, however, among which the most important was the old device of escorted convoys, provided a defence against the U-boat raider which was sufficiently effective to make an allied victory possible.

The outbreak of war faced the Naval Service with many immediate and detailed problems. In 1914 the waging of war was a more gentlemanly procedure than it afterwards became, and on August 5, 1914, the Canadian Government provisionally granted ten days of grace during which German merchant ships might leave Canadian ports, a privilege which was later extended to Austro-Hungarian shipping as well.\(^{13}\) At this time Canadian millers and food exporters were expressing great anxiety about shipping their products to Great Britain under existing conditions. The British Government was consulted, and replied with the following cable announcing a policy that solved the problem by re-establishing confidence:\(^{14}\)

With reference to your cypher telegram of yesterday, food shipments. As stated in House of Commons yesterday His Majesty's Government are inaugurating a scheme of state insurance for ships and cargoes based on report of committee, copy of which goes to you by mail. Every effort is being made to protect shipping.

The shortage of trained naval officers was greatly eased at this time by an understanding with the Admiralty that the Naval Service might have the first call on the services of retired officers of the Royal Navy living in Canada. On August 5 Aemilius Jarvis of the Navy League of Canada informed N.S.H.Q. that he had rounded up fifty former ratings, who were likely-looking young men and willing to serve in *Niobe*. In addition to facing its own problems of personnel at this time, the Naval Service was helping to smooth the path of numerous British naval reservists who wished to go to Great

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\(^{13}\) P.C. 2055, Aug. 5, 1914; P.C. 2129, Aug. 14, 1914.

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Britain or wherever they were needed. The following telegram from the Collector of Customs at Fort William was typical of many that were arriving at N.S.H.Q. from various parts of the country:

Fourteen Royal Naval Reserve men and one Board of Trade A.B. reported here for duty. Please advise if these men are wanted and if any arrangements have been made for transportation from here.

On August 6 the exporting of certain commodities useful in war, to ports in Europe through which they might easily reach the enemy, was prohibited; and other measures to regulate exports, to the enemy's detriment and in the interest of the allies, were enacted the following day. On August 7, also, Collectors of Customs were informed that the days of grace permitting the departure of German ships had been terminated, and two submarines which had been obtained in Seattle by the government of British Columbia became the property of the Canadian Government and were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty the same day.

Advice was received from the British Government on August 8 that enemy merchant ships should be detained permanently, and instructions to this effect were immediately issued. The 9th customs officers were told to report the names of merchant vessels thought to have embarked German reservists. Since the beginning of the month various steps had been taken by the army authorities to protect the principal seaports and other vital installations, and on the 11th the naval authorities mounted guns to protect the city of Vancouver. Next day the news of war with Austria-Hungary was received, and on the 14th and 15th further regulations were issued covering certain types of export. By the middle of August the important immediate measures covering the naval side of the war had been completed or set on foot.

Long-term policy for making war soon began to occupy the centre of the stage, and early in October the Admiralty was confidentially asked, through the High Commissioner in London, for advice concerning the naval side of this policy:

Probability elections makes it desirable to ascertain Admiralty view as to cooperation Canada in naval defence during war. Please obtain following information: First. What course would Admiralty advise if we

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15 The only German ship in a Canadian port was the barque Bellas, which was seized at Rimouski and later condemned in prize court. The Austro-Hungarian S.S. Ida was also seized after the outbreak of war with that country, but was afterwards released.
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decided offer naval aid. Second. In case we make official inquiry is Admiralty prepared to give advice?

The reply was as follows:

Secret regarding cooperation advocated naval defence during war Admiralty inform me don't think anything effectual can now be done as ships take too long to build and advise Canadian assistance be concentrated on army would probably give that advice if official inquiry made.\textsuperscript{16}

This was convincing advice, and in developing its war policy the government did not try, except in one limited respect,\textsuperscript{17} to expand the sea power of the Dominion. Accordingly, only a very small part of the country's resources was used for that purpose, and the naval side of Canada's effort in the First World War can be told in a comparatively small space.

In spite of Canada's concentration on the army, the Naval Service enrolled during the war over nine thousand officers and ratings. When hostilities began the only naval reserve force in the country was the volunteer unit at Victoria. Its members took an important part in manning H.M.C.S. Rainbow, the submarines \textit{CC 1} and \textit{CC 2} and their parent ship the \textit{Shearwater}, and other vessels at Esquimalt. They also supplied some men to H.M.S. \textit{Newcastle} after the arrival of that cruiser in the waters of British Columbia. Towards establishing the reserve on a country-wide basis, however, only the preliminary steps had been taken by August 1914. Early in the war 9 officers and 120 men of the R.N.C.V.R. offered to go to Britain in order to join the Royal Naval Brigade which had been formed there. The brigade, however, had been raised for service ashore: applicants for entry were therefore advised to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force.\textsuperscript{18}

No serious attempt was made during the first year and a half of the war to enlist any considerable number of men for naval purposes. In February 1916, however, the Minister of the Naval Service asked the Admiralty if they would care to have recruits obtained in Canada for service in the Royal Navy. It was pointed out that the Royal Navy would have to train any such recruits, as the Canadian Service had no instructors to spare for that purpose. The Admiralty welcomed the proposal and suggested that the men should be enlisted at the


\textsuperscript{17} For the development of the east coast patrols, see ch. 11.

\textsuperscript{18} "Canada's Effort," Borden Papers, O'C. No. 237A.
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rates of pay prevailing in the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{19} Capt. the Hon. Rupert Guinness was sent to Canada with a small party to recruit for the Yacht Patrol Services. But the rate of pay that was offered—about a third of that which could be obtained by enlisting in the Expeditionary Force—was too low to attract recruits.

The Dominion Government therefore offered to enrol volunteers in the reserve so as to bring their pay up to the Canadian rate, and to place them at the Admiralty's disposal. This offer the Admiralty accepted.\textsuperscript{20} The Canadian Government authorized the enrolment of five thousand men;\textsuperscript{21} the Naval Service created an Overseas Division of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, for service with the Royal Navy; and a recruiting organization was set up. The Dominion was divided into nine recruiting districts with head offices in each of the provincial capitals, except in British Columbia where the office was in Vancouver. Influential committees were formed to forward the recruiting campaign, and Capt. Guinness and his staff addressed eighty-three meetings throughout the country. By these means about seventeen hundred men were enrolled for service with the Royal Navy; and the number would probably have been larger had not the east coast patrols, later in the war, become the primary naval need as far as manning was concerned. The divisional organization, however, continued to be used for obtaining naval recruits generally until the end of the war, when the district offices were closed.\textsuperscript{22} In all about eight thousand officers and ratings were enrolled in the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, including the Overseas Division, during the period of the war, at the close of which the reservists were demobilized and the organization was allowed to lapse.

In recruiting as in almost all the other forms of naval activity, the main emphasis was upon supplementing as far as possible the undertakings of the Admiralty, rather than upon developing a large and distinctively Canadian effort. Enrolment by the Naval Service during the war was for the duration only. In July 1915 a system of pensions was provided to cover disabilities incurred on active service by officers and men of the

\textsuperscript{20} Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Aug. 1, 1916, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{21} P.C. 2130, Sept. 9, 1916.
\textsuperscript{22} “Occasional Paper No. 12.”
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R.C.N. and R.N.C.V.R., and to meet the needs of widows and other dependents of casualties.

The following figures are round numbers only, and even in that form most of them are offered diffidently. At the end of July 1914 the total strength of the R.C.N. did not exceed 350 officers and ratings; while the R.N.C.V.R., which had been established by Order in Council earlier in the year, comprised about 250 officers and ratings, all of them in the company at Victoria. The total enrolment of officers and ratings during the war may be listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.C.N.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.N. and R.N.R.</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.N.C.V.R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Subdivision</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Subdivision</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Division</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deaths from all causes amounted to more than 150. A large but unknown number of Canadians also enlisted and served in the Royal Navy.

A considerable number of officers of the R.C.N. served during the war in H.M. ships. Eng. Lieut. Stanley Nelson de Quetteville was killed in action at Jutland while serving in H.M.S. *Indefatigable*. Lieut. William McKinstrey Maitland-Dougall was killed in action on March 15, 1918, while serving in H.M. submarine *D 3*. Mids. Malcolm Cann, William A. Palmer, Arthur W. Silver, and John V. W. Hathaway, were lost in H.M.S. *Good Hope* at Coronel on November 1, 1914, and were the first Canadian-Service casualties of the war.

Important Intelligence activities were carried on by the Naval Service during the war years. The naval Intelligence organization in Canada, when first established in 1911 had been local in character, but two years later it had been included in the Admiralty’s world-wide naval Intelligence organization. Immediately after the outbreak of war, the Commander in Chief, North America and West Indies, selected Halifax as the naval Intelligence centre for his station, making use of the already-existing Canadian organization. Responsibility for part of the area concerned was later transferred to a centre at St. John’s, Newfoundland, but in 1917 the unit at St. John’s was abolished, and its duties were returned to the Halifax centre which remained under Canadian control. At the begin-
ning of the war the naval Intelligence centre at Esquimalt became responsible for the North Pacific, an area which was later reduced in size when a centre was established at Callao. The centre at N.S.H.Q. looked after the interior of the Dominion and co-ordinated the work done by the three centres.

When hostilities began, no coast wireless stations were available which could provide reliable communication with ships of the North America and West Indies Squadron when in the neighbourhood of New York. The Canadian Government accordingly built a 10-kilowatt station for that purpose at Barrington Passage in south-eastern Nova Scotia. This station began operating in May 1915, and became a link in a chain of wireless stations extending from St. John's, Newfoundland, to British Guiana. The station at Barrington Passage was subsequently enlarged.

The Naval Service, early in the war, arranged transportation for reserve officers and men wishing to return to Great Britain. It also assisted the Admiralty in selecting and enrolling residents of Canada for the Royal Naval Air Service, the Yacht Patrol Service, and the Royal Naval Auxiliary Patrol (Motor Boat Service), and itself enrolled some 1,700 men in the Overseas Division, Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, for service with the Royal Navy.

It was also possible for the Naval Service to help the Admiralty considerably in the matter of fuel and stores. When war was declared both the British and Canadian stocks of Welsh steam coal at Halifax and Esquimalt were low. The Department therefore bought five cargoes of suitable coal, and stored it at both bases for the use of H.M. as well as H.M.C. ships. Early in the war also, the Department offered to supply H.M. ships at Canadian bases with all provisions, clothing, and such other naval stores as were readily obtainable in the Dominion. This offer was accepted fully as far as provisions were concerned, and partly with respect to the rest. Stocks of provisions were therefore maintained for this purpose, and arrangements to supply fresh provisions were made, at both the dockyards. Supplies were also issued from time to time to Australian and allied warships. In addition to H.M.C. ships,
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moreover, H.M. and allied warships occasionally used the repair facilities at the two dockyards.

Examination services were maintained at the principal ports in order to prevent hostile merchant ships, including disguised warships, from entering. Minesweeping was carried out as a routine in the approaches to those harbours where the traffic was heaviest. The Naval Service moreover, was responsible for “naval control” at these ports. Even in peace-time a considerable degree of regulation is exercised by civil officials over shipping in and near harbours. In time of war against a naval Power, however, a much more extensive and rigid regimentation is needed, and most of it is placed in naval rather than civilian hands. At the beginning of hostilities, therefore, the functions of the civil port authorities at the principal Canadian ports were transferred to the Naval Service, which controlled the movements of shipping inward and outward for the duration of the war. Among the most important functions of naval control was that of giving routing and other instructions to merchant ships about to sail, and in the latter part of the war, organizing and directing the sailing of convoys.

The war brought about an immediate and progressive increase in control of shipping by the British and other governments. The great majority of British-registered ships, and many others besides, which in peace-time had sailed from port to port and handled cargoes at the sole discretion of their owners or private charterers, came under the control of the British Government by being chartered, often by requisition. Their movements and the types of cargo which they carried were thenceforth determined by agents of that government, in terms of war requirements as a whole, and of the volume and character of the shipping which was available to meet those requirements. The movements of ships, however, were interdependent with the transportation of commodities to make up cargoes, and government controls had therefore to be extended inland so as to cover rail shipments to ports.

On August 4, 1914, the President of the Canadian Pacific Railway wrote to the Prime Minister, offering the assistance of the company’s organization in obtaining and forwarding foodstuffs to Great Britain, in the event of hostilities. The

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26 See Salter, Allied Shipping Control, passim.
27 Shaughnessy to Borden, Aug. 4, 1914, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 212.
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following month A. H. Harris of the C.P.R. was appointed Acting Director of Overseas Transport, 28 although he remained on the payroll of the company. It was obviously desirable that the handling of shipments for overseas should be centralized as far as possible, and as time went on an ever larger part of these movements came under Harris's capable supervision. As far as movements of freight destined for transports were concerned, the D.O.T. received his instructions from the Admiralty acting through N.S.H.Q.

On the east coast, for the seven months or so during which the St. Lawrence was open, Montreal was the principal shipping port because of its greatly superior equipment. It was served by 2 double-track and 2 single-track railways in addition to the St. Lawrence waterway, and its terminal facilities were adequate to war-time needs. Halifax was the chief outlet for overseas shipments in winter. Its magnificent harbour left nothing to be desired, but its port and rail facilities were inadequate. Like the other Maritime Province ports it was considerably closer to Britain than were Montreal and any of the United States ports. Saint John was supplementary to Halifax, and when pressure on the Canadian outlets became too great, shipments were sometimes diverted to New England ports. Sydney, N.S., with the coal mines nearby, was a valuable asset. All merchantmen and most warships were coal-burners, and many merchant ships went to Sydney for fuel. In May 1916, because of congestion in the ports in Great Britain, the Admiralty instructed all transports that could do so to take aboard enough coal at a Canadian port for the return voyage to Canada. Early in the war the Admiralty had a contract with the Dominion Coal Company to supply coal at $3.50 a ton.

After the organization for handling transports had taken shape, the procedure was more or less as follows. When a ship was due to sail from Britain, and when she actually sailed, the Admiralty informed N.S.H.Q., which in turn notified the D.O.T. and the Naval Transport Officer at the Canadian port or ports concerned. As the transport approached Cape Race she reported to the wireless station there, which notified N.S.H.Q., and the ship was then instructed by wireless to which port she should proceed. Her arrival was signalled to N.S.H.Q. which notified the D.O.T. and the Admiralty. The port then reported the arrangements for loading, the size and

28 Later Director of Overseas Transport.
nature of the cargo, and the estimated time of sailing, to N.S.H.Q., which relayed this information to the Admiralty and the ship's route orders to the port. N.S.H.Q. also received from the port for transmission to the Admiralty the actual time of sailing and a detailed description of the cargo, and later the bill of lading. The Admiralty signalled to N.S.H.Q. the name of the port in Britain at which the ship had arrived, and the date of her arrival.

The Naval Service helped in every way possible to expedite sailings and to iron out such difficulties as arose. For example, in February 1916, the Admiralty transport Harmattan arrived at Saint John. A Chinese member of her crew had appendicitis and was therefore sent to a hospital on shore, whereupon the immigration authorities insisted that the $500 head tax on Chinese entering Canada should be paid by the Harmattan's master, who possessed only $400 which he needed for the purpose of paying his crew. When the transport was ready to sail, N.S.H.Q. signalled to the Naval Transport Officer at Saint John: "HARMATTAN is not to be delayed. You are to make any necessary arrangements. The Department will assume liability for the tax." 29

Special precautions were for obvious reasons taken in the case of troop transports. Whenever possible these sailed in convoy with a powerful escort, and the first million troops transported overseas under the auspices of the Admiralty, from different parts of the British Empire, reached their destinations without the loss of a single life from enemy action or the risks of the sea. The first Canadian contingent embarked at Quebec, and the transports afterwards assembled in Gaspé Bay whence they sailed, a convoy of thirty-one ships, on October 3, 1914. 30 The later contingents embarked at Halifax, for both the Admiralty and the Naval Service considered that port to be safer than Montreal or Quebec, because of the difficulty of avoiding any U-boats that might be present in the lower reaches of the St. Lawrence. In 1917 and 1918 large numbers of coolies were sent from Hong Kong via Vancouver and east-coast ports to France, to serve in labour units, and many of these coolies were returned home by the same route after the war was over. 31

29 N.S.H.Q. to N.T.O., Saint John, Feb. 6, 1916, N.S. 1048-12-49 (1).
31 Material in N.S. 1048-45-2 and 1048-45-11.
Prior to the First World War the Admiralty had not planned to arm merchant ships.\textsuperscript{32} This had seemed to be unnecessary, and the arming of a merchantman would have deprived her of non-combatant status. The use of submarines against merchant shipping, however, was unexpectedly introduced, and the U-boat raiders made little distinction between combatant ships and others. Soon after the submarine campaign started, therefore, the Admiralty began to arm British merchant ships as a defence against the U-boat. The guns were mounted astern, for a ship attacked by a submarine was best advised to present her stern to the enemy, and the position was testimony to the defensive purpose of the armament. It was necessary to strengthen the deck beneath each gun, to fit up a magazine, and to provide trained gunners.

Canadian-registered ships were treated in this respect like those of British registry, and if about to undertake a voyage into a danger-zone they were defensively armed. The cost of preparing these ships for their armament was borne by the owners or by the Canadian Government, while the guns, ammunition, and gunners, were supplied by the Admiralty. Forty-three Canadian-registered ships were armed with 6-inch, 4.7-inch, or smaller weapons, and paravane gear was also fitted in some cases. All the ships under construction for the Canadian Government’s mercantile marine during the war period were “stiffened,” and provided with magazine-space, while they were being built. None of these government ships were actually armed, however, as the coming of the armistice made this unnecessary.\textsuperscript{33}

It is well known that in the course of the hostilities the U-boat raiders came within an ace of barring the seas against allied shipping, and thereby winning the war. In February 1917, the German Government initiated unrestricted submarine warfare, after which the losses of allied shipping became almost insupportable. In April no less than 169 British merchant ships totalling 545,282 gross tons were sunk by enemy action.\textsuperscript{34} The practice of convoy—sailing merchantmen in company, and if possible escorted by warships—was an old and formerly successful device for protecting shipping in time of war. During the First World War, however, until no other recourse seemed to be left, the Admiralty made no general use

\textsuperscript{32} Apart from a few liners for use as auxiliary cruisers.

\textsuperscript{33} “Occasional Paper No. 18,” Oct. 21, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-3 (1).

\textsuperscript{34} Hurd, \textit{The Merchant Navy}, iii, table in App. C.
Shipbuilding in Ashbridge’s Bay

by

Robert F. Gagen

(National Gallery of Canada)
of convoy, for the ship-owners and masters and many naval officers thought that under modern conditions it was impracticable. But the sinkings that occurred in the spring of 1917 were terrifying, and as a last resort the Admiralty decided to introduce convoy on the most dangerous routes through the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The ports of assembly for convoys proceeding to Great Britain were to be Gibraltar, Dakar, New York, Hampton Roads, and Sydney or Halifax. The first convoy from Canada left Sydney on July 10, 1917, escorted by H.M.S. *Highflyer*. The following month, in order to make a more efficient use of the available tonnage, ships were segregated according to their speed. Fast convoys comprising vessels with a speed of 12-½ knots or more sailed from Halifax; medium-speed convoys from New York; and slow convoys from Hampton Roads. These convoys, with a cruiser or auxiliary cruiser as ocean escort, were accompanied outward through the approaches by small escort craft, and were met by destroyers at the edge of the U-boat danger-zone on the European side. In the spring of 1918 very large numbers of American troops were being transported to Europe, and in order that they might embark at New York, and sail in fast convoys, the western terminus of these convoys was transferred from Halifax to New York where it remained until the end of the war. During the period when convoys were used, ships from Canada bound for the Mediterranean either sailed independently or started in convoy and broke off part-way over. Ships on the Pacific routes were not placed in convoy.

At the time when the convoy system was introduced, convoy officers were appointed at the ports where the ships assembled prior to departure. On the day before a convoy was due to sail, a conference was held which was attended by masters, chief officers, and engineers. Instructions were issued to masters regarding such matters as keeping station and a careful watch, wireless silence, and rendering assistance to other ships. In the event of their becoming separated from the rest of the convoy, they were expected to open sealed instructions with which they were provided and to proceed accordingly. The organizing of shipping into convoys, although

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36 The United States declared war on Germany on Apr. 6, 1917.
37 *Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations*, v, pp. 48, 52, 104-5.
38 A collection of these general instructions is to be found in N.S. 1048-48-4 (1).
it did not give complete protection, reduced shipping losses sufficiently to make possible an allied victory.

At the outbreak of war, in accord with the usual British practice, the army took over the fixed-artillery defences at the Halifax base, which were in good condition. The approaches to the harbour were well covered by powerful lights. An examination service went into force at midnight of August 1-2, 1914, and a port war signal station was established at Camperdown where there was also a wireless station. The blocking of the eastern passage by means of schooners was a failure, and a barrier was therefore made by means of a line of piles driven across the channel. During a large part of the war a mine-sweeping service was maintained. An anti-submarine net defence was laid across the harbour entrance in 1917, and mine nets were added the following year. The weak point in the defences lay in the lack of destroyers, and throughout most of the war of submarines also.\(^39\) In addition to the duties implied above, the naval authorities at Halifax were responsible for operating the patrol vessels which were based there, regulating the traffic inside the harbour, assembling and organizing convoys and routeing merchant ships proceeding overseas independently, the handling of troop transports, certain services connected with defensively armed merchant ships as such, collecting and distributing naval Intelligence, and for contraband control.\(^40\)

Halifax was one of many ports at the disposal of the Admiralty, into which neutral ships were sent to be searched for contraband. At one time during the war more than eighty neutral vessels were anchored in Halifax harbour awaiting examination of their cargoes.\(^41\) In addition to H.M.C.S. Niobe many Commonwealth cruisers and other warships used the base at various times. Among these was the distinguished Australian cruiser *Sydney*, and H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* which brought a German-owned prize into Halifax.\(^42\) In the course of the war, repair facilities at the base were not always equal to the demands made upon them.

In earlier wars Halifax had been an advanced base for Operations against enemies in North America; during the First World War the place served as a base for warships operating


\(^{40}\) N.S. 1001-1-3.

\(^{41}\) D. Min. to T. C. Keenleyside, July 11, 1921, N.S. 1000-5-5 (I).

\(^{42}\) See Jose, *Royal Australian Navy*, pp. 254, 255, 259.
against the forces of a European Power, and a port from which ships sailed bearing the material and human resources of North America. The sending forth of these ships and their protection at sea being one of the decisively important war activities on the Allied side, Halifax was able to contribute at least as much toward victory as it had ever done in earlier wars. Until comparatively late in the struggle most ships sailed independently. After the introduction of convoy, however, the two important ports of departure for convoys were Halifax and Sydney. The first of a series of convoys left Sydney on July 10, 1917, and the first of another series, consisting of five Canadian troop-ships and seven merchantmen, sailed from Halifax on September 5. The following year, after considerable reorganization, convoys were leaving Halifax at eight-day intervals.44

In the early winter of 1917 Halifax was smitten by a disaster so sudden and severe that the inhabitants have never since forgotten it. The French-registered S.S. Mont Blanc, after loading a cargo of high explosives in New York, had sailed on the night of December 1-2 from that port for Halifax, to join a slow convoy. The Mont Blanc arrived at the Halifax examination anchorage late in the afternoon of December 5, and at or soon after 7.30 the following morning weighed anchor for Bedford Basin. Her cargo comprised 8,830 barrels of wet picric acid, 11,500 kegs of dry picric acid, and 3,000 kegs of dry T.N.T.; while on deck she carried containers of highly-inflammable benzo1.45

Meanwhile the S.S. Imo, Norwegian-registered and chartered to the Belgian Relief Commission, had arrived at Halifax in ballast on December 3, and anchored in Bedford Basin. She had been due to sail for New York on the afternoon of the 5th; but her departure had been postponed because a supply of coal for her bunkers had arrived late. The Imo got under way about 8.00 a.m. on December 6, passed out of the basin, and steamed down the harbour towards the incoming munitions ship. Each of the two vessels was carrying a pilot, and the weather was fine and clear; yet by extraordinary mismanage-

43 These statements would also apply to the rôle of Halifax in the Second World War.
44 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, iii, esp. ch. 9.
ment they collided, the bow of the *Imo* striking the *Mont Blanc* on the starboard side forward. Their combined speeds produced only a moderate impact, and apart from the delaying of the two ships for repairs no serious effects would have resulted, had it not been for the terrible cargo which one of them carried.

As a result of the collision *Mont Blanc* caught fire. Her captain then gave orders to abandon ship, knowing that she might blow up at any moment, and her crew rowed to shore on the Dartmouth side of the harbour where they successfully sought refuge. The abandoned munitions ship drifted, or steamed slowly, burning, straight across the harbour toward Halifax. She grounded almost touching Pier 6 next to the dry dock, and a few minutes after 9 a.m. her disastrous burden exploded. In the meantime the *Imo* had got clear, and having attempted unsuccessfully to turn up the harbour in order to return to Bedford Basin, steamed over to the Dartmouth side where she went aground. The captain, the pilot, and some others on board the *Imo* were killed when the *Mont Blanc* exploded, but the rest got safely ashore.\(^{46}\)

As the *Mont Blanc* disappeared, a ravaging blast like the breath of a destroying angel swept over harbour and city. After visiting that stricken place the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, who knew Halifax intimately, said in an interview:

One cannot realize the force of the explosion or the extent of the destruction without visiting the scene. At least one square mile of the city is absolutely wiped out. Many of the houses which remain standing are so shattered as to be utterly useless without extensive repairs. Hardly a pane of glass remains intact. Two miles away from the scene of the explosion heavy doors were blown from their hinges and window casings were crushed and swept away. The heavy gun on the *Mont Blanc* was hurled two miles into the woods beyond Dartmouth. Huge pieces of the ship were thrown more than a mile through the air and crashed through roofs of houses. Large telephone poles a mile away were snapt off like pipestems. The railway track was washed away by the tidal wave created by the explosion. The shock was felt as far away as Charlottetown and glass was broken in windows at Truro, 60 miles distant .... Apparently there was a minor preliminary explosion and many persons rushed to the windows just before the final tremendous explosion occurred. Instantly the glass was shattered into countless myriads of minute fragments and driven so forcibly as to render countenances almost unrecognizable with minute scars. Thus in many cases there has been loss of eyesight .... Nearly every person who described the explosion told me that they thought it had occurred quite near to the place where they happened to be at the moment .... A great many people believed that a German raider had got

\(^{46}\) "Evidence in Wreck Commissioner's Court," *passim.*

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through and that the first shell had fallen in their immediate locality. Hence there was at first a rush to the cellars for safety from the shells which were expected to follow.47

Help was quickly and generously extended from many quarters. On the evening of December 7 medical parties began to arrive from outside points, the first units on the scene being from New Glasgow, Saint John, Moncton, and Truro, in the Maritime Provinces. Early help and encouragement were also given by an American naval hospital ship, sent to Halifax for the purpose, which put a large party ashore to assist in caring for the wounded. To administer relief funds the federal authorities on January 22, 1918, appointed a commission whose status was later confirmed by special statute. The British Government subscribed £1,000,000, and the Dominion Government from time to time appropriated sums which by the end of the war had reached a total of $15,000,000. Many private subscriptions for relief came from the rest of the Dominion and from other countries.48

The explosion caused fewer casualties among naval personnel than might have been expected. H.M.S. Highflyer sustained over twenty.49 The official list of Canadian naval casualties, officers and men, showed 20 killed; 1 died in hospital; 1 missing, believed killed; and 8 injured.50 Noteworthy among the naval casualties was a group of six ratings under the charge of Niobe’s boatswain, Warrant Officer Albert C. Mattison, who all lost their lives as the result of a very brave act. After the collision and before the explosion, H.M.C.S. Niobe’s steam pinnace put off with a volunteer crew of seven for the purpose of trying to scuttle the burning munitions ship. When they had come alongside, the Mont Blanc blew up and the seven sailors were all killed. The Highflyer also sent off a boat, whose crew were saved by the fact that they had not yet reached the Mont Blanc when the explosion occurred.51

The commanding officer of the Royal Naval College was seriously injured by the explosion, and many of the staff and

47 Extract from a paper dated Dec. 12, 1917, Borden Papers, O’C. No. 185. A full and dramatic account of the Halifax explosion and its aftermath, in fictional form, is to be found in MacLennan, Barometer Rising; numerous photographs of the effects of the blast are reproduced in Bell, Romance of the Disaster.
48 Halifax Herald, Dec. 8, 1917; 8-9 Geo. V, c. 24; and several Orders in Council.
49 Halifax to Naval (signal), Dec. 9, 1917, N.S. 37-25-1 (1).
50 Halifax Morning Chronicle, Dec. 11, 1917.
cadets were also injured, seriously or otherwise. The college building remained standing with its walls and roof intact, yet its condition was such that the staff and cadets had to be moved, and they were sent to Kingston, Ont., for the ensuing term, the needed accommodation being provided by the Royal Military College. In September 1918 the naval college was transferred to Esquimalt, and for a few months after their arrival there the cadets slung their hammocks in the Rainbow, until the buildings in the dockyard which had been assigned to the college were ready to be occupied.

Much of the physical damage wrought by the explosion, needless to say, was of such a nature as to obstruct naval and shipping activities. Besides the Mont Blanc herself three smaller vessels were destroyed, among which, unfortunately, was the wrecking steamer Stella Maris. Including the Imo, ten non-naval vessels were badly damaged.\(^{52}\) Naval ships and craft suffered less severely, damage in their case being limited to demolition of superstructures, perforation of decks, breakage of glass, and other minor injuries. Although the dockyard lay just outside the heaviest zone of destruction, its buildings were all more or less wrecked and two of them were completely destroyed. There was much wreckage in the harbour; piers, wharves, and warehouses, other than those belonging to the dockyard, were damaged; and the dry dock was rendered inoperative. Telegraph communication was interrupted.

Apart from the losses and hardships that had been inflicted upon the city, the most important Canadian outlet for sending armed forces and war materials overseas had been crippled. It was thrice unfortunate, moreover, that the disaster occurred when it did, for the long northern winter had just begun. The St. Lawrence would be frozen for months to come: the port of Halifax was therefore carrying a heavy burden, and rebuilding is relatively difficult in the winter season. Immediate problems were intensified by a very heavy snowstorm which followed upon the heels of the explosion and greatly hampered railway traffic. The task of getting the port and naval installations into working order had to be undertaken at once. A meeting was accordingly called on December 9, under the auspices of the Halifax Board of Trade, at which four naval representatives were present. The meeting was addressed by the Prime Minister.\(^{53}\) The most pressing need was to renew the ship-\(^{52}\) Navy Yard to Naval (signal), Dec. 19, 1917, N.S. 37-25-1 (1).
\(^{53}\) Dir. of Stores to D. Min., Dec. 24, 1917, N.S. 37-25-3 (1).
repairing facilities, and both these and the port as a whole were gradually restored to their normal state.

The owners of the *Mont Blanc* brought action in the Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia, claiming damages from the owners of the *Imo* for loss caused by the collision, and the verdict placed the entire responsibility upon the *Mont Blanc*. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Canada modified this decision. Two judges held the *Mont Blanc*, and two others the *Imo*, alone to blame. The fifth justice considered that both ships had been negligent, and in the end this was the judgment of the court.\(^4^1\)

At Esquimalt, as soon as war had been declared, an examination service and port war signal station were set up, the fixed artillery defences were placed on a war footing, and other measures suited to a state of hostilities were taken. In view of the limited naval forces available, it was possible that an enemy light cruiser might enter the Strait of Georgia by the northern route, and so obtain access to the Nanaimo coal mines or to Vancouver. To prevent such a raid, sixteen old mine shells were fitted and loaded by H.M.S. *Newcastle*, then at Esquimalt, and were placed on board C.G.S. *Newington* which had meanwhile been equipped with dropping gear. All arrangements were made so that should the need arise these mines could be laid immediately in a position just west of Malcolm Island, so as to block the main channel leading to Johnstone Strait. The eastern entrance to that strait was protected by a patrol of three motor launches carrying 14-inch torpedoes. Farther to the south-east, as an added precaution, two 4-inch guns from H.M.S. *Shearwater* were mounted on the mainland side of Seymour Narrows a short distance north of Ripple Rock, and were manned by naval reservists. After the destruction of von Spee’s squadron at the Falkland Islands on December 8, this defence organization was withdrawn and the equipment was returned to Esquimalt.

Early in November 1914, the commanding officers of H.M.S. *Newcastle* and the Japanese armoured cruiser *Idzumo*, both of which were operating out of Esquimalt, decided to base their ships in Barkley Sound for a time, so as to avoid advertising their movements by passing up and down the Strait of Juan de Fuca. A patrol consisting of three Dominion Fishing Patrol launches manned by naval reservists was accordingly

\(^4^1\) C.G.T. *vs. Imo*, Reports of the Supreme Court of Canada, vol. 59, pp. 644-5.
maintained throughout the last six weeks of that year, in order to prevent unauthorized vessels from entering the eastern channel of Barkley Sound.55

After the end of 1914 allied naval power in the Pacific was virtually unchallenged, and Esquimalt thenceforth lay far from the scene of any actual or probable Operations. An occasional allied warship visited the port; the most notable being H.M. cruiser Kent, which, after having been in action at the Falkland Islands and later at the destruction of the German cruiser Dresden, put in to Esquimalt in May 1915 for a general refit. The Rainbow remained there throughout the war, and H.M.C. submarines CC 1 and CC 2 were based at Esquimalt from August 1914 until they were transferred to the east coast in June 1917.

Although the shipbuilding industry in Canada was not highly developed in 1914, a considerable number of warships were built or assembled in the Dominion during the First World War. For anti-submarine work, 36 trawlers and 100 drifters were constructed to the order of the Admiralty, and 12 trawlers were built for the Naval Service. In the spring of 1915 the Royal Navy needed a large number of fast, seaworthy, and well-armed motor launches for anti-submarine work, patrolling, and other purposes. No less than 550 of these craft were ordered in the United States and assembled at Quebec and Montreal.56

In March 1916, N.S.H.Q. consulted the Admiralty about the advisability of building two or three destroyers in Canada. The Admiralty expressed great pleasure at the suggestion and undertook to help by supplying detailed drawings of the latest British designs. They doubted, however, whether such destroyers, which would probably have had to be built in Montreal, could be delivered before the close of navigation in 1917. In these circumstances the Admiralty, without directly advising against the attempt, suggested that the Canadian authorities should carefully consider whether it might not be better to use the resources of Canadian yards for building merchant ships. The idea does not seem to have been further

55 This and immediately preceding paragraph chiefly based on “The Great War 1914-1918—Reports, Organization, etc.” This volume consists of typed papers dealing with the activities of the R.C.N. during the First World War, principally on the west coast.
WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

entertained. The difficulty in the way of carrying it out, which in similar circumstances had appeared before and was to do so later, was that Canadian shipbuilders had not the experience needed for constructing the more complicated types of warship.

An interesting series of incidents, however, led to the building of submarines in Montreal at this time. Soon after hostilities began, Charles M. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Corp. went to England with an offer to undertake the production of war materials for the British Government. He promised very rapid delivery of submarines, and the Admiralty ordered 20 to be produced jointly by Bethlehem and the Electric Boat Co. of Groton, Connecticut. The United States Government, however, objected to the arrangement as likely to violate the neutrality of that country. Accordingly, although the construction of 10 of the boats was continued in the United States, Schwab arranged with Canadian Vickers Ltd., Montreal, to build the other 10 in the yards of the Canadian company. Schwab took over Vickers’ yard on behalf of the Electric Boat Co., and the American experts remained in charge of it for a considerable period while the submarines were being constructed. The 10 submarines built at Vickers for the British Government were completed in the course of a few months. Some finishing was done at Quebec, and the trials were carried out off Murray Bay. These submarines were allocated to the H class in the Admiralty’s system of classification. Six of them left Halifax for Britain on July 22, 1915, and were the first submarines to cross the Atlantic under their own power. The other 4 sailed shortly afterwards for the Dardanelles.

After these submarines had been completed, 8 more of the same type were built at Canadian Vickers for the Italian Government, and 6 H-class hulls for the Russian Government which were shipped in “knockdown” condition. In all, therefore, 24 H-class submarines, of which 6 were hulls only, were built at Vickers in Montreal during the war. The hulls of these vessels were constructed at the Vickers yard, while the machinery, piping, fittings, and equipment, were supplied from the United States and installed in Montreal. Of the other

57 D. Min. to Undersec. of State (Ext. Aff.), Mar. 23, 1916; Bonar Law to Gov. Gen., May 26, 1916; and other correspondence: “Notes relative to Defence and Naval Intelligence.”
58 H 5 to H 10 incl.
59 This account of the Schwab contract with the Admiralty and the building of submarines in Montreal is chiefly based on information kindly supplied by the Electric Boat Co., Groton, Conn. Disparate statements exist concerning the number of submarines built at Canadian Vickers for Italy and Russia respectively; but Electric Boat’s figures have been used as the most likely to be correct.
10 submarines ordered by the British Government, which were built in the United States, 2 were commissioned in the R.C.N. after the war.  

In September 1914 the Colonial Office forwarded a message from the Russian Government, asking the Canadian Government to sell them an ice-breaker for use during the coming autumn at Archangel. It was very important from the military point of view to keep open the channels of supply into Russia. The Canadian Government's ice-breaker *Earl Grey* was accordingly sold to Russia, sailed to Archangel by a naval crew, and turned over to the Russian authorities there.  

Almost all the various functions of the Naval Service during the First World War were supplementary to and intimately co-ordinated with the corresponding activities of the Royal Navy, which were supported in every practicable way. One of these activities which the Naval Service was able to reinforce to some extent remains to be described, and it was the most directly important of all. The two old cruisers which the Naval Service had obtained in 1910 were in its possession when hostilities began four years later. H.M.C. ships, whose number greatly increased in the course of the war, played a useful if unspectacular part in Operations in both oceans; the *Niobe* and a patrol flotilla in the Atlantic, and the *Rainbow* and the submarines *CC 1* and *CC 2* on the Pacific coast.  

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61 "Canada's Effort," Borden Papers, O'C. No. 237A.
In the summer of 1914 the Niobe was lying in Halifax, exceedingly deficient in trained personnel, her engines suffering from disuse, the ship in general very far from being in condition to go to sea. On August 1 the Captain in Charge at Halifax received the following signal from N.S.H.Q.: "NIOBE may commission. Telegraph earliest date probably available. Commence work immediately. Use Fishery Protection Engine Room staff as necessary under Engineer Officer 'NIOBE'.” ¹ In the absence of his seniors a very young engineer lieutenant had to say how long the renovation of those aged and bedridden engines would take, and grasping his courage in both hands he asked for a month. The ship was dry-docked for cleaning, and her engines were gradually got into running order and everything done that was necessary to fit her for sea and for war. Her crew was greatly enlarged, though not completed, by the addition of the well-trained crews of the Algerine and Shearwater who were brought across from Esquimalt, of ex-Service men living in Canada, and of volunteers, ² the whole under the command of Capt. R. G. Corbett, R.N. In the meantime the diplomats had yielded their place to the soldiers and sailors, and on August 4 the Canadian Government placed the Niobe at the disposal of the Admiralty.

The western part of the North Atlantic, and more especially the Caribbean area, has probably seen more naval warfare than have any other non-European waters. During the contests between France and England from the late seventeenth century to the close of the Napoleonic Wars, North American waters formed a theatre of naval Operations second in importance only to those of western Europe, because it was there that the most important and easily accessible colonial possessions of both powers were situated. A French or a

British admiral was especially likely to take his ships to the West Indies, the most highly valued of all colonies in a mercantilist age. Small islands, moreover, have always been extremely easy to seize by means of a fleet and a landing force, in the absence of a stronger enemy fleet. The West Indies, however, gradually sank from their position of high esteem, while their mighty neighbour North America was rising from relative obscurity towards a plenitude of wealth and strength. That continent was the second largest and richest area in the world in which white men can make their homes, and during the nineteenth century it had come to contain, except for Europe itself, the most dynamically productive society and the most abundant springs of power on earth. This reduplication of Europe across the Atlantic is probably the most portentous development of modern times. Its already visible effects are manifold, and one of them has been this, that Europe, the mother of wars, has lost that absolute control of her offspring which she formerly possessed. In the great wars of the twentieth century a new world, mightier by far than the one which Canning knew, has been called in to redress the balance of the old.

By 1914 North America possessed the greatest of industrial nations, and exportable surpluses of food and raw materials which exceeded those of any other continent. The sea routes which led from it to Europe were short. The British Empire held in its hand decisively superior naval power, a chain of bases and other ports on or near the North American coast, more than half the world's merchant shipping, and unrivalled resources of cash and credit. A large part of North America was also part of the British Empire, and most of the rest of it was increasingly sympathetic to the allied cause. The North Atlantic routes were pipe-lines leading to the most abundant and accessible non-European sources of the ingredients of fighting strength. To the British Empire, and to its allies also since they shared the benefits, the importance of keeping those pipe-lines open was obviously enormous.

The western part of the North Atlantic routes was guarded by the cruisers of the North American Squadron, which had to watch both the West Indies with the routes intersecting them and also the more northerly waters off the United States and Canada. Lord Fisher's policy of concentration in the North Sea had greatly reduced this squadron; but in the year 1913 it had been strengthened again. It was realized, of course, that
in time of war these waters would be of very great significance, even though the important rôle that was to be played by Canada and the United States as the war progressed was not foreseen. The headquarters of the station was at Bermuda, and the two principal bases were there and at Halifax. The warships constituted the Fourth Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, who was to leave the station soon after the war began and meet a hero’s death at Coronel. The squadron consisted of four 23-knot armoured cruisers, the Suffolk (flagship), Lancaster, Essex, and Berwick, and the 25-knot light cruiser Bristol. Other ships were to be added later, including the old battleship Glory. The French had two cruisers in that area, and the Germans also had two, the very fast Dresden and the even faster Karlsruhe. Germany had no naval base on that side of the Atlantic. Of the whole trade between North America and Europe, so large a proportion passed near Newfoundland that the waters immediately south of that island, and between it and New York, would offer to a German raider in the event of war a field of unsurpassed richness in which to reap.

When Cradock received the preliminary warning on July 27 at Vera Cruz, he sent the Essex northward to join the Lancaster which was docked at Bermuda, the two of them being detailed to guard the northern routes. At the moment when war was declared the exact position of the two Germans in the West Indies was unknown to the British admiral; but it was virtually certain that they would begin to raid commerce without delay. The German cruiser warfare which was to begin with the declaration of war had been carefully planned by the Naval Staff in Berlin. The Dresden and Karlsruhe might choose the northern routes for their début, and it was not long before reports began to come in that they were in the waters near Newfoundland and Canada. One unofficial story which was published in Sydney, had it that two German cruisers had been sighted off St. Pierre. The fastest ship in the squadron, the Bristol, was then sent northward. A few hours before the declaration of war, Cradock was warned by the Admiralty that the point of greatest danger on his station appeared to be off New York, and he thereupon started northward himself in the Suffolk. On his way he saw the Karlsruhe, and more than once came within a hair’s breadth of catching her. Although she was saved by her great speed which exceeded that of any of Cradock’s cruisers, the British admiral succeeded in pre-
venturing her from raiding the northern routes, if that was her intention. Rumours in Canada, however, continued to locate one or more Germans in northern waters; but in fact none of them had gone there, and before the month was half over those routes had been well secured. On September 28 Admiral von Tirpitz wrote: "The cruisers out at sea must one after the other perish for lack of coal, provisions, and refitting stations." He was right, and by the end of the year the German raiders all over the seas were under control. They failed to produce more than a local and temporary effect on the flow of trade. Admiral Cradock took the Suffolk to Halifax where she arrived on August 13, and where a large number of the inhabitants, including three hundred officers and men of the 63rd Regiment, came down to the dockyard and helped to coal her.

The Operations which have been described were almost exclusively directed against German cruisers. There was another danger, however, which was present from the beginning and which lasted until the entry of the United States into the war. The North American routes had been distinguished from all others by the large number, the size, and the speed of the liners which plied upon them. Many were German, and of these, when the war-cloud burst, a large number were lying in the ports of the United States or were racing to reach them. A considerable proportion of these enemy liners were admirably adapted to commerce raiding. The decision in the famous Alabama case had affirmed the principle that a neutral government is bound to use due diligence to prevent, within its jurisdiction, the arming and equipping of a belligerent ship for commerce raiding, and also to prevent the departure of such ships from its territorial waters. This principle had been further validated by the Hague Convention of 1907. Nevertheless there was nothing to prevent the conversion of a liner into a warship on the high seas. This had already been done in the case of the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which had left New York a short time before war was declared and had received guns and men from the Karlsruhe not far from the Bahamas. In the ports from Cartagena to Boston ninety-one enemy ships had found refuge. Along the northern part of that coast there were fifty-three, of which thirty-two were at New York. The liners at New York and Boston were particularly dangerous, because

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3 Tirpitz, Memoirs, ii, p. 352.
4 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, i, p. 1.
5 Account of these cruiser Operations is based on Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, i, pp. 44-51.
EAST COAST OPERATIONS

those two ports were so close to the most vulnerable part of the North Atlantic routes. In addition to the danger of merchant ships being sent out to raid commerce, there was also the chance of their trying to cross the Atlantic with cargoes destined for Germany, or slipping out to coal some German cruiser. Moreover there were German officials and organizations in the United States with both the will and the means to assist them. On November 7, for example, the following report reached Ottawa from Halifax:

Glory, Niobe in port. No cruisers in Canadian Waters. Other ships out of wireless touch since noon. Dutch ships leave today New York with balloon for Germany, also German reserves. Crown Princess Cecilie arrived Boston from Bar Harbour. North German Lloyd Breslau coaling at New Orleans to proceed Panama Canal to coal German cruisers.4

From time to time, until the United States entered the war, naval Intelligence continued to receive reports of German liners preparing to leave.7

The danger of enemy cruisers on the northern part of the station was removed in a little more than a week, except for the chance, which was present throughout the war, that raiders might slip or break out from Germany to raid on the routes between Europe and North America. In addition to preventing enemy merchant ships from leaving American ports, the Fourth Cruiser Squadron had occasionally to provide escorts for Canadian troops crossing to Great Britain. Later in the war, auxiliary patrols were developed on a considerable scale to deal with any enemy submarines which might operate near Canada or New foundland.8 These patrols, although commanded by an officer of the Canadian Naval Service, were under the general direction of the Admiral at Bermuda.

While the Niobe was being refitted at Halifax, the manager of the powerful wireless station at Glace Bay, which was an important strategic link, had come to fear that German and Austrian miners living in the neighbourhood, or an enemy ship, might try to disable his station, and he asked for an armed guard. A party from Niobe with two 12-pounders and two Maxims left Halifax for Glace Bay on the night of August 4-5 by special train. They reached the wireless station the following day, mounted their guns, and made other defensive preparations. The Niobe’s party remained on guard until, two

4 Halifax to Naval (signal), Nov. 7, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-2.
7 These German liners are fully dealt with in Fayle, Seaborne Trade, 1, ch. 6.
8 See below pp. 245-55.
days later, an army guard being present to protect the wireless station, they returned to their ship.\(^9\)

The *Niobe* had been acquired for training purposes and not for war. She was not comparable in usefulness for warlike Operations to a more modern cruiser, and was far too slow to catch or escape from the enemy cruisers which she might have met. Her guns might possibly have been outranged by theirs, and she was very liable to mechanical defects. In war, however, almost any warship is useful. Had *Niobe* been able to engage at her own range, a privilege ordinarily but not always denied to the slower ship, and with reasonably good gunnery, she would have been more than a match for any of the German light cruisers which operated in the outer oceans during the war, because of her extraordinarily heavy battery. She was also thoroughly adequate to deal with an armed merchant cruiser, and was a valuable addition to the Fourth Cruiser Squadron.

By September 1 the *Niobe* was ready for duty, and reported to Ottawa: “Trial most satisfactory worked up to 104 revolutions, ammunition completed to full stowage. Coaling tonight; have reported myself to Fourth Cruiser Squadron; leave here tomorrow for St. John’s in accordance with orders received from SUFFOLK.”\(^10\) The Halifax *Chronicle* reported her going: “At seven yesterday morning the cruiser’s anchors were hoisted and she steamed rapidly down the harbor, passing Chebucto Head before eight o’clock. The *Niobe* will assist in the protection of the transatlantic trade routes.” She was actually on her way to Newfoundland in order to complete her complement. A branch of the Royal Naval Reserve which had been formed in that colony in the year 1900 was now able to supply the trained ratings the *Niobe* so sorely needed, and these were taken on board at the Canadian rates of pay. The island was living up to its reputation as a “nursery for seamen.” On October 30 the numbers borne on the *Niobe’s* books were:\(^11\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.N.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.N.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.N.</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.N.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers, including Newfoundland Reservists</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) Duguid, *Canadian Forces in the Great War*, 1, pp. 17-18; Capt. C. E. Aglionby’s account noted below.

\(^10\) *Niobe* to Naval (signal), Sept. 1, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-2.

OPERATIONAL AREA OF H.M.C.S. NIOBE
1914 – 1915

For eastward continuation of map see inset.

CANADA

UNITED STATES

ATLANTIC OCEAN

FOR EASTWARD CONTINUATION OF MAP SEE INSET.
The *Niobe*'s first operational assignment on October 22, 1914, took her to the northward, where she cruised about among icebergs off the Strait of Belle Isle, trying to intercept a German cruiser which had been reported to be in the Gulf, but which turned out to have been a myth. Her second mission was as an escort. The first armed force to leave Canada during the war was the Royal Canadian Regiment—the only infantry regiment in the Permanent Force—which was detailed to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment on garrison duty in Bermuda. They sailed in the transport *Canada*, with *Niobe* escorting, to arrive at Bermuda on September 13. The *Canada* reached Halifax on her return journey with the Lincolnhires on board on September 18, the *Niobe* again acting as escort. On her arrival the cruiser was suffering from a defective condenser which necessitated several days of dockyard treatment. *Niobe* had been earmarked as one of the escorts for the first Canadian contingent, which was expected to sail for England in the near future: but this plan was not carried out.

The ‘Niobe’ then joined the blockading squadron of the Royal Navy [Fourth Cruiser Squadron] off New York harbour, inside which there were thirty eight German ships including some fast liners, which could act as commerce destroyers if they could escape. We boarded and searched all vessels leaving the harbour, and in the early days took off many German reservists who were trying to get back to Germany in neutral ships . . . we had to pass many things in neutral ships which we knew were destined for Germany, to be used against our men. One particular example I remember was a large sailing ship carrying a cargo of cotton bound for Hamburg, but this was not contraband at that time and we had to allow it to go on. It was very monotonous work, especially after the first few weeks when, owing to reports of possible submarine attacks, we had to keep steaming up and down, zig-zagging the whole time. After the first few weeks, owing to complaints in the American press by German sympathizers to the effect that we were sitting on Uncle Sam’s doorstep preventing people coming in and out, we had to keep our patrol almost out of sight of land. The American Navy were very friendly to us, and when their ships passed us they used to cheer ship and play British tunes. One day when we had news that the ‘Vaterland’ had raised steam and would probably bolt out at night, we overheard a signal made by wireless ‘En clair’ from one American ship to another “it is the Dutch ‘Vaderland’ not the German ‘Vaterland’ which is going out tonight.” We used to spend sixteen days at sea, return to Halifax for coal and provision, and then resume our beat. This was done in all weathers, and sometimes the temperature off Nova Scotia would fall to 20° below zero, and then the spray would freeze into a solid coating all over the ship, making it almost impossible to work the guns. Our most exciting moment perhaps was when the ‘Niobe’ was ordered down to Newport News

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in Virginia, for which port a German armed raider was making. We were unlucky enough to meet a 100 mile an hour gale, and the ship had to turn head to sea and go slow till the weather moderated. During this time we had many S.O.S. messages, but were unable to render any assistance. When the weather moderated and we arrived off the harbour, the German raider had passed in. She was given 24 hours to put to sea again, and declared her intention of doing so, so we waited just outside the three mile limit for her. When the 24 hours expired, however, she decided not to risk it.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Niobe} spent about nine months taking her turn at patrolling off New York, and so successful were she and the other cruisers assigned to that duty that no enemy ship sailed from that port.\textsuperscript{14} The composition of the Fourth Cruiser Squadron varied from time to time. On February 22, 1915, for example, it consisted of the \textit{Glory} (flagship), \textit{Berwick}, \textit{Caronia}, \textit{Essex}, \textit{Melbourne}, \textit{Niobe}, \textit{Suffolk}, and \textit{Sydney}.\textsuperscript{15} The \textit{Niobe}'s base throughout was Halifax, which other members of the squadron also visited occasionally. As their names imply, the cruisers \textit{Melbourne} and \textit{Sydney} were Australian warships serving ten thousand miles from home. The \textit{Sydney} was already famous for having destroyed the \textit{Emden}, and when she put into Halifax during August and September 1915 she was given a welcome befitting a conqueror.

On July 17, 1915, \textit{Niobe} returned to Halifax badly in need of reconditioning. Her hull was intact; but the funnels were collapsing, the boilers worn out, and the bulkheads in bad shape, besides which she had no fire-control mechanism. To recondition her would have been an extensive and expensive task, and one which was not worth undertaking because of the ship's obsolescence.\textsuperscript{16} The Admiralty proposed that H.M.S. \textit{Sutlej}, a large cruiser three years younger than \textit{Niobe}, should be exchanged for the latter free of cost. But the Canadian naval authorities were in no position to man the \textit{Sutlej}, because of their commitments in connection with the east coast patrols, and the Admiralty's offer was therefore not accepted.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Niobe}'s records of movements for the period Aug. 1914-July 1915 have not been found in Canada, England, or Bermuda. The above quotation is from an account kindly written and supplied in 1944 by Capt. Aglionby, who in 1914-15 was Cdr. C. E. Aglionby, R.C.N., and was the cruiser's executive officer. Capt. Aglionby's account is based on memory supplemented by some documents in his possession. In the early days of the patrol off New York, until the practice was stopped out of deference to United States neutrality, outgoing British liners used to stop and send over to \textit{Niobe} turkeys and other choice fare.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Hurd, \textit{The Merchant Navy}, 1, p. 170.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Corbett and Newbolt, \textit{Naval Operations}, II, p. 422.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Correspondence in A.R.O., L 745-1915; and in Borden Papers, O'C. No. 660.
\end{itemize}
Niobe was paid off on September 6, reverting to the disposal of the Canadian authorities who recommissioned her as a depot ship. The great explosion at Halifax on December 6, 1917, wrecked Niobe’s superstructure and caused a number of fires. Many of the records on board were destroyed, and the depot was disorganized for some time. The damages were repaired, however, and the ship continued to act as a depot until 1920 when she was sold for $40,175 to be broken up.

In an earlier age the warship was by no means the highly specialized vessel which she has since become. For the most part she was a merchant ship used in time of war for fighting, and Henry VII of England was accustomed, during the periods of peace which he so dearly loved, to hire out to merchants his men-of-war. Before the end of the nineteenth century, however, a warship had become as different from any vessel built for peaceful ends as a suit of armour is from a suit of clothes. Accordingly, when the First World War broke out, no one had foreseen that such inoffensive little craft as fishing boats, yachts, excursion boats, and tugs, would have any significant naval part to play at all. Yet in the course of that war Great Britain was obliged to mobilize for warlike purposes an auxiliary navy of nearly four thousand small commercial or pleasure craft, manned by almost fifty thousand officers and men. She was, in fact, compelled, in order to command the sea, to employ two distinct navies instead of just one, each of a formidable size. On a much smaller scale the same was true of the other allied powers with maritime interests. This was a manifestation of the tendency of modern war to replace the national army and navy by the nation in arms.

Prior to 1914 the submarine mine and the submarine had been adjuncts of practically every navy; nevertheless, although commerce raiding was an old story, it had been generally assumed for various reasons that these two modern devices would be used against warships and transports only. Consequently, when in the course of the First World War the German Navy loosed them both against the merchant ships, defensive measures were almost wholly wanting and had to be improvised in all haste. The mine and the submarine are two of the most furtive and elusive products of the industrial revolution. They walk in darkness and destroy in the noonday; and so menacing did their achievements along the sea routes become, that it seemed not only that the allies would suffer defeat, but also

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that sea power itself in any positive sense had passed away. As time went on, however, many means were found to counter this dire threat. Each was a palliative rather than a cure, yet in their aggregate they enabled the war to be won. The mines were sought by patrol craft and removed by minesweepers. Various were the means employed against submarines, the most important being escorted convoys, and the patrolling of known or likely hunting-grounds by vessels armed with guns and depth charges. It was chiefly for the latter duty that the small ships which formed the auxiliary flotillas were taken over, armed and equipped, and sent forth.

The Naval Service set up a small coastal patrol on the east coast of Canada in the early months of the war, and during the summer of 1915 a patrol was maintained on the Newfoundland coast by the governments of that colony and of Great Britain. By the end of the season it had become evident to all concerned—the governments of Canada and Newfoundland and the Commander in Chief of the North America and West Indies Station—that it was desirable to co-ordinate this work with that of the Canadian flotilla. An arrangement was accordingly made whereby the Canadian patrols became responsible for the whole Canadian coast, and for the shores of Newfoundland, except that part extending from St. Pierre eastward and northward to Belle Isle which the Newfoundland ships were to patrol. In other words, the Canadian patrols were to watch the coasts which bordered the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the open-sea coast of the Maritime Provinces. The senior officer of the Canadian flotilla was to command the whole, and the ships were to be interchanged if necessary.\(^{19}\) During the season of 1916 the Canadian patrol and minesweeping vessels were twelve in number, of which five were on duty at Halifax, while seven patrolled in the Gulf, and of the Newfoundland ships there were three.\(^{20}\) These vessels were armed with 3- or 6-pounder guns, and as their fewness implies their function was a limited one. They provided coastal and port patrols—a wartime naval coastguard service.

Meanwhile Germany’s naval designers had been working very hard, and her yards were turning out submarines greatly superior to their predecessors in size, armament, and cruising radius. The possibility consequently arose that submarines

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19 Material in N.S. 1065-4 series.
EAST COAST OPERATIONS

might cross the Atlantic, and in April 1916 the Admiralty, whose responsibilities were almost unlimited, sounded a warning. This was to the effect that any submarines which might operate near the Newfoundland or Canadian coasts would probably be U-boats of the latest type, and that nothing smaller than a 12-pounder gun was in the least likely to put them out of action. 21 This despatch was full of submarine lore, learned in the school of bitter experience. In May the Commander in Chief also warned the Canadian authorities: "It should be clearly understood that, should enemy submarines appear off the Canadian Coasts, my cruisers are no protection to Transports against submarine attacks." 22 No raiders appeared that summer; nevertheless in November the Admiralty sent word that in view of the activity of German submarines in the North Atlantic the twelve existing patrol vessels ought to be increased in number to about thirty-six, and offered to lend an officer experienced in patrol work to advise the Canadian Government, and, if desirable, to command the patrols.23

The Canadian Government's reply went across a few days later in these words: "As danger to Admiralty store transports and Canadian trade in near future from enemy submarines appears to be growing serious, Canadian Government considers adequate protection should be accorded by Admiralty." 24 To support this claim the government pointed out that in the early months of the war it had asked the Admiralty whether or not Canada should undertake to supplement the naval defence of the Empire, and had received the reply that Canada's efforts should be concentrated on providing land forces. 25 The government's case also rested upon the fact that every available man with naval training, and every spare gun, had been scraped together and sent to England. The problem was further made difficult because the fishing boats on the Canadian coasts, unlike the trawlers and drifters which operated out of the ports in Britain, were not considered suitable for patrol work. Nor were more than a handful of other ships that could

21 Admiralty to Col. Office, Apr. 8, 1916, N.S. 1065-4-1 (1).
23 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Nov. 11, 1916, N.S. 1065-7-2 (1). A similar message was sent to the Newfoundland Government. Additional weight was lent to this warning by the fact that during the summer the German submarine Deutschland had crossed the Atlantic to Norfolk, Va., with a commercial cargo, and returned safely to Germany.
25 See pp. 218-9 above.
be used available either in Canada or in the United States. The other side of the picture was that although unrestricted submarine warfare had not yet formally begun, the Admiralty already had tremendous responsibilities and commitments in waters where submarines were not merely feared but were actually swarming. For a while longer, therefore, the Admiralty declined to provide for the east coast patrols.  

Accordingly the Canadian Government, receding from its first position, reported that it was making every effort to buy or build the necessary ships, and asked the Admiralty to provide guns and trained men for them. It also suggested that the cruiser Rainbow, stationed on the west coast, should be paid off, and that some of her men and guns should be used for the new patrol vessels, and this was done. The government bought a number of suitable ships, and arranged for twelve trawlers to be built at the Vickers yard in Montreal, and at Polson’s in Toronto. Attempts were also made to obtain guns in the United States, and later in Japan, but without success. At this point Sir Robert Borden stepped into the picture by sending a personal cablegram to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Edward Carson, asking for guns and trained gunnery ratings. Ships to the required number were available or in prospect, but these would be useless without guns and men to fire them. 

Borden’s appeal for help had only just been received when the German submarine campaign suddenly entered a new and much more menacing phase. On January 31, 1917, the German Government announced to the world its decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare, declaring that shipping found in the Mediterranean and the north-eastern Atlantic would thenceforth be sunk at sight. The newcomer to the seas was making his own rules as the game proceeded. This declaration did not apply to Canadian and Newfoundland waters; yet besides greatly complicating the problem on the European side of the Atlantic, it intensified the potential danger elsewhere. The combined result of Borden’s appeal and of the increased danger was that the Admiralty began to contribute largely to the resources of the east coast patrols, and this support was continued to the end. Carson replied to the Prime Minister, offering to release to the Canadian Government enough 12-

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28 Jan. 27, 1917, ibid.
pounder guns, ordered by the Admiralty from a firm in the United States, to arm the flotilla, and promising that everything possible would be done about the gunners.\textsuperscript{29} The Admiralty went much further than this, moreover, for it asked the Canadian Government to arrange for and supervise the building of 36 trawlers and 100 drifters. These were to be built in Canada at the expense of the British Government. The Admiralty undertook to furnish the designs, and implied that some of the vessels would be added to the Canadian patrols.\textsuperscript{30} The Dominion Government arranged to have the vessels constructed, distributing the work among the principal shipbuilders in eastern Canada.

Neither these vessels, nor the dozen trawlers which the Canadian Government had ordered for itself, were available during the summer of 1917. In the spring the Admiralty’s expert arrived and was placed in command of the patrols. His tenure of office was brief, however, for wherever he went he trod on other people’s toes; so the Admiralty recalled him and the patrols saw him no more. Capt. Walter Hose, R.C.N., who had formerly commanded the Rainbow, was appointed Captain of Patrols and held that position until the end of the war.

The commander of a German submarine entering the area in question had a choice of objectives. He might try to attack the coastwise traffic or the fishing fleets, or he might turn his attention to the stream of shipping which flowed between the Canadian ports and Europe, chiefly Great Britain. Ships might be attacked either in port or at sea; a harbour and its immediate approaches, however, are relatively easy to protect against naval forces, largely because the vulnerable area is very restricted. The greatest threat, therefore, was to ships at sea, and of these by far the most important and the most difficult to safeguard were the ones which plied between Canada and Europe. The route was one of the main channels through which supplies flowed to Great Britain from the outside world. It was comparatively short and therefore economical of ships. It tapped the resources of the greater part of the North American continent, which included by far the greatest industrial area outside Europe. The route was frequented by troop transports, and it is difficult to think of anything which governments in war-time fear more than the loss of these. Along it

\textsuperscript{29} Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Feb. 8, 1917, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{30} Signal, Feb. 5, 1917, \textit{ibid.}
too, in a westerly direction, came ships bringing gold from Great Britain to Canada.

A raider, whether surface or submarine, was unlikely to find good hunting in the open spaces of the ocean, for there the ships which he was seeking to capture or destroy had a choice of many routes. For this reason raiders generally operated at those points where traffic is compelled to concentrate—near straits, off prominent headlands, or near a terminus. The waters off Canada and Newfoundland were well adapted to a raider’s work, at least in the summer; for they contained a number of places where the traffic, both inward bound and outward, was forced to concentrate. The most important of these areas lay off Cape Race, in Cabot and Belle Isle Straits, in the upper reaches of the Gulf near Anticosti, and off Halifax and Sydney. Along those coasts too, the land surrenders reluctantly to the sea, the continental shelf projecting itself outward for many miles to form a broad belt of water shallow enough in many places to permit of mines being laid, or of submarines resting on the bottom. The coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador, and Canada, were in great part unsettled, and dotted along them were many inlets where a submarine might go for rest and minor repairs, or in order to meet a supply ship. In the raider’s favour also was the immense area of the region to be patrolled, and the consequent length of the coast-lines surrounding and within it. The special disadvantage of those waters from the point of view of German submarines was the great distance from home or from any friendly territory.

The last summer of the war saw a great increase in the size and effectiveness of the flotilla, as the newly-built trawlers and drifters became available after the St. Lawrence opened in the spring. Modern war is insatiable, however, and the plans now called for an auxiliary fleet of 112 vessels, in place of the 36 which the Admiralty had recommended a year and a half before. On March 2 the Commander in Chief had written that:

In view of the vital interests at stake, and the natural geographical features which offer so strong an inducement to the enemy to undertake a submarine and mine offensive in the area mentioned against Allied troop and cargo vessels and convoys as soon as weather and ice conditions admit, I cannot but regard the position as involving very grave risks, and feel it my duty to urge that every effort be made to have the whole flotilla completely equipped and organized and at work in their assigned positions at as early a date as possible.\[^{32}\]

\[^{31}\] They could be laid effectively in depths up to a hundred fathoms.

\[^{32}\] C. in C. to Admiral Supt., Halifax, Mar. 2, 1918, N.S. 1065-7-6 (1).
Like so many human endeavours, the construction of the trawlers and drifters was slower than had been anticipated; nevertheless, soon after the river opened, nearly 50 patrol ships were available, and by early October the auxiliary fleet consisted of 116 vessels. Of these, 87 belonged to the Admiralty and the remaining 29 to the Canadian Naval Service; but all except those attached to Halifax were under the Captain of Patrols. The 12 trawlers belonging to the Naval Service were modelled on the North Sea fishing vessels of that name. They were sea-worthy craft of 136 tons and a speed of 10 knots, and they had cost $191,000 each to build. The commercial or pleasure boats which had been taken over for the patrols were of various types. Several had been obtained from other government Departments, a number were bought in the United States, and 3 had been Canadian-owned private yachts.\(^{33}\) One of these last, the Grilse, was a most formidable little craft for a patrol vessel, since she carried two 12-pounders and a torpedo tube, and could travel at 32 knots. The Admiralty drifters were fitted with a 6-pounder gun apiece, while most of the others mounted a 12-pounder. All carried depth charges—from 2 to 6 per vessel—and a large number were fitted with wireless.\(^{34}\) They had the status of warships and flew the white ensign.

They were obviously not Dreadnoughts, nor did their work require that they should be. Between them and the German battleships stood the Grand Fleet, and in order to reach them hostile cruisers would have had to pass both the British cruisers in Europe and those of the North America and West Indies Squadron. It was to deal with submarines, against which battleships and cruisers could give little protection, that the auxiliary patrols had been called into existence. What was required for this purpose was not powerful ships, which can never be very numerous, but a large number of vessels capable of dealing with a submarine, preferably single-handed. These being many could scatter widely, to sweep up mines, to reconnoitre, or to stand on guard:

Each degree of Latitude
Strung about Creation
Seeth one (or more) of us . . .

They could attack a hostile submarine with gun-fire if it was on the surface, and with depth charges if it was submerged.

\(^{33}\) Digest by Asst. N. Sec., N.S. 1001-5-1.

\(^{34}\) Memo. for the Admiralty, July 18, 1918, N.S. 1065-7-6 (1).
By these means, with luck and good management, they could destroy the submarine, or damage it, or drive it away.

The area which the east coast patrols had to cover extended from Belle Isle to the Bay of Fundy, and from Rimouski to the Virgin Rocks. Their sole purpose was to protect shipping in those waters, and as they increased in number this protection assumed various forms and they ceased to be merely coastal patrols. The principal ports were Halifax, Sydney, Montreal, and Quebec. Halifax was at all times important, but particularly so in winter when it became the principal shipping centre. Being also the chief Canadian naval base, British and other warships frequented it and it had always to be carefully watched. Sydney, with the coal mines close by, was the most important fuelling station on the coast. The two St. Lawrence ports served the larger part of the shipping during the open season. The difficult river navigation was their protection; but the stretch below them where the river slowly merges into the Gulf had to be watched. During the season of 1918 the flotilla was divided into three roughly equal groups, one of which looked after Halifax. The channels leading to the port had to be swept every day and the harbour itself patrolled. Merchant ships and transports about to sail in convoy necessarily left the harbour one by one, and were placed in convoy formation outside. Patrol vessels were therefore assigned to protect them while they were forming up, and in general to watch the approaches to the port. For the same purposes a second group of vessels was stationed at Sydney. In addition, the coasts of the whole area were patrolled, in order to watch for suspicious craft and for mines, and to investigate any reports received from shore of unusual and possibly sinister doings. The positions of special strategic importance which have already been mentioned had to be watched. Escorts were provided for convoys moving along the coast, and to accompany for some distance to sea the slower convoys sailing to Great Britain. The third group of patrol vessels attended to these various duties.

Even little patrol ships must have bases, and with these the region was well supplied. There are many harbours along those coasts, and even the smaller ones could accommodate these vessels. With one exception, all the patrol craft were coal-burners for which a supply of good fuel was obtained from the mines on Cape Breton. The three principal bases were at Sydney, Halifax, and St. John's, Newfoundland. The head-
quaters of the east coast patrols and the main base for most of the vessels were at Sydney, the easiest port at which to coal, and admirably situated with relation to the whole Gulf area from a strategic point of view. The vessels protecting Halifax and its approaches were based on that port, and nearly all extensive repairs were done there, minor ones often being carried out elsewhere. The main base for the Newfoundland ships was at St. John’s. A number of other ports, among them Gaspé, were used as cruising bases for the more distant patrols. Those vessels whose duties took them away from their bases ordinarily spent slightly more than a third of their time in port for supplies, repairs, rest, and training.

The manning of the flotilla had been a matter of extreme difficulty, since practically all the trained naval personnel in Canada had been pre-empted long before, and no adequate steps had been taken well in advance to train crews for the greatly-enlarged auxiliary fleet. The Admiralty and the Naval Service between them, however, had contrived to rake up officers and men, some of those sent over from England being Canadian volunteer reservists who had been serving in trawlers off the British coast. There were barely enough to go around, and a large proportion were inexperienced. “The officers and men of the vessels are untrained”, reported their commander, “not only in the technical knowledge required to handle the weapons and offensive appliances on board the ships, but also in service discipline being drafted to ships as hardly more than raw recruits.” By the end of the war there were nearly two thousand officers and ratings serving in the east coast patrol vessels. This improvised organization was never called upon to deal with any sustained or serious attack. Not until the summer of 1918 did the German submarines appear in those waters; and when at last they came their behaviour was passive and discreet. This unwonted abstention from vigorous measures was attributed by the Captain of Patrols to their being on their way home and to their mission in those waters being largely to spy out the nakedness of the land.36

A few staccato generalizations are perhaps in order. The east coast patrols were a successful venture in imperial cooperation—mainly between the Services, for in purely naval matters the governments did not intervene. The Admiralty

35 Capt. of Patrols to Sec. N.S., Sept. 24, 1918, N.S. 1065-7-12 (1).
36 Ibid., Oct. 21, 1918. The relevant volume of the German official history is not yet available.
prescribed the general policy, which was carried out by officers responsible to the Department of the Naval Service. The Admiralty on the whole acted with restraint and tact, and the Canadian Service cheerfully accepted its subordinate rôle. "Knowing full well we have not a proper organization," wrote its Director, "we have most warmly appreciated and acted on the advice of the Admiralty on every occasion." The technical advantages of this close association to the smaller Service are evident at every turn. The relatively large share in the cost of the shipbuilding programme borne by the Admiralty is noticeable, and the close common interest of Canada and Newfoundland in any scheme of naval defence on the east coast is clearly revealed. In their joint patrol arrangements, the relations of Newfoundland with Canada were very similar to those which existed between Canada and Great Britain in matters naval.

The difficulties and dangers which lie in unpreparedness for war, given the type of world in which we have had to live, are apparent enough throughout. It is not always recognized, however, that of all forms of defence, naval defence is the most difficult to improvise rapidly. The patrols were probably as efficient as circumstances permitted; nevertheless the bricks which the Israelites were forced to make without straw were not necessarily the best in Egypt. The flotilla suffered from two irremediable weaknesses, one being the scarcity of trained officers and men. The other was a lack of supporting destroyers or their equivalent, for there was only one well-armed vessel available capable of quickly reinforcing a threatened area. In view of an opinion which is sometimes expressed, it is worth noting that the Canadian Government reacted to the threat of hostile submarines off the coast precisely as governments with large maritime interests have always done on similar occasions.

The east coast patrols were a necessary precaution, and may have been a deterrent as well. They also, with the auxiliary fleets elsewhere, built up a large part of that foundation of experience on which the much more recent campaign against the submarines was based. The flotilla was prolific of precedents: it was the first fleet to be commanded by an officer of the Royal Canadian Navy; it contained the first ships built expressly for the Naval Service; and it faced the first direct naval attack in the history of the Dominion. The east coast patrols and their organization now seem like the first run of a

17 Memo. by Dir. Naval Service, Jan. 16, 1917, N.S. 1065-7-2 (1).
play which was to be revived many years later in the same theatre during the Second World War.

In the summer of 1918 the efforts of the flotilla began to be supplemented by means of air patrols.\(^{38}\) During the spring of that year the appearance of U-boats on the western side of the Atlantic had been considered to be more likely than ever, and in March the Admiralty, in drawing the attention of the Canadian Government to the probable danger, had advised that air defences should be set up on the east coast of the Dominion. The question was considered on April 20, at a meeting of representatives of the British, United States, and Canadian navies, which was held in Washington. It was decided that air stations should be immediately established as follows: at Cape Race, two dirigibles and two kite balloons; at Sydney, six flying boats, three dirigibles, and four kite balloons; at Halifax, six flying boats, three dirigibles, and four kite balloons; and at Cape Sable, three flying boats or two dirigibles. Canada possessed none of the necessary equipment or trained personnel, and owing to the pressure of the submarine campaign on the eastern side of the Atlantic the British Government was not in a position to make up the deficiencies. The United States authorities were accordingly asked to do so, pending the time when a Canadian organization should be in a position to assume the responsibility. The Dominion Government was to provide the necessary bases.\(^{39}\)

The construction of two air bases at Halifax and North Sydney respectively, at an estimated cost of $2,189,600 for the first year, was therefore authorized.\(^{40}\) The American Government having undertaken to supply the necessary personnel and planes, the United States Naval Reserve Flying Corps transferred elements of its coast patrol organization, equipped with flying boats, to Halifax and North Sydney, with instructions to operate from those bases. A number of officers were loaned by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for the purpose of organizing an aviation branch of the Department of the Naval Service, and early in September the Royal Canadian Naval Air Service was established. The reason for creating the new service was stated to be “... that pending further consider-

\(^{38}\) In this chapter the designation "east coast patrols" has been applied exclusively to the auxiliary-vessel flotilla, as was customary at that time.

\(^{39}\) Paragraph based on "Occasional Paper No. 6," Sept. 10, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1); and on P.C. 3066, Dec. 5, 1918.

\(^{40}\) P.C. 1379, June 5, 1918.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ation of the organization of a Canadian Air Service for military and for naval purposes and in order to provide for immediate needs it is desirable that a Canadian personnel be enrolled and trained for service in connection with the two Air Stations above referred to . . .” The government authorized the entry as cadets of about 80 suitable young men between the ages of 17½ and 26 years, and of 1,000 ratings. The Minister was given authority to arrange for the training of cadets, and of ratings as far as might be necessary, in Great Britain, or the United States, or elsewhere.41 Lieut.-Col. J. T. Cull, R.A.F., served as Director during the first few months, and was succeeded by Major C. MacLaurin, R.A.F., with the title of Acting Director. Both these officers had been lent to the Canadian authorities by the Royal Air Force.

The machines sent from the United States were single-motored Curtis flying boats, with Liberty engines. These planes required a suitable area of water on which to take off and land. The base near Halifax was situated at Baker Point42 on the Eastern Passage about three miles south of Dartmouth. It was served by the Dartmouth Road, a railway siding, and a water route across the harbour to Halifax. The buildings comprised a mess and recreation building to accommodate three hundred men; a barracks for a hundred men; a large stores building; and a temporary steel hangar. The base at North Sydney was located at Kelley’s Beach on the western boundary of the town, and was served by a main road, a railway siding, and an electric railway. The buildings corresponded to those at the Halifax station: the mess and recreation building, however, had accommodation for four hundred men, and the hangar was slightly larger than the one at Halifax.43 The site had required considerable filling to prevent flooding at high tide.44

The cruising speed of the flying boats was approximately 60 knots, and their endurance about four hours. At first there were 4 of them at each station, a number which was later increased to 6. The plan was to provide air escort through the approaches to the two ports for all convoys, both inward and outward; to reserve one plane for emergency anti-submarine

41 P.C. 2154, Sept. 5, 1918.
42 An R.C.A.F. station was situated at Baker Point during the Second World War.
43 Dimensions: hangar at Halifax 110’ x 120’, with 25’ clearance; hangar at North Sydney 110’ x 140’, with 28’ clearance.
44 Paragraph based on “Occasional Paper No. 6.”

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missions; and to do as much patrolling as possible, given the number of planes and the commitments which have just been mentioned. Practises in spotting for harbour-defence guns were also carried out. From each station anywhere from 11 to 51 hours of flying were performed weekly, these operational flights being almost wholly uneventful. During the week preceding October 13, a convoy leaving Sydney was given air protection for a distance of about 60 miles by 4 seaplanes working in relays. In the course of the following week a submarine was reported to be 6½ miles from the entrance to Halifax harbour. Within ten minutes 2 planes were in the air followed a little later by 2 others, and the whole of the suspected area was searched without result. Late in October a successful flight was made from Halifax to Sydney with a load of bombs.

It had originally been intended to set up more than two air stations, to employ dirigibles and kite balloons as well as flying boats, and to replace the Americans as soon as possible by trained Canadian personnel. After the bases had been set up, also, there was a desire to obtain planes of a later and therefore better design than those which had been supplied. The scheme would no doubt have evolved along all or most of these lines, had not its development been arrested at a very early stage by the armistice of November 11. It had been suggested in the course of the summer that air sub-stations should be established at Cape Sable, Canso, Cape North, and the Magdalen Islands. The idea of setting up such a station at St. John's, Newfoundland, and another in northern Newfoundland or Labrador to cover the Strait of Belle Isle, had also been put forward. Only four of the kite balloons and none of the dirigibles of the original plan materialized, nor were the improved planes forthcoming.

In order to implement the policy of providing a Canadian personnel, immediately after the creation of the new service on September 5, candidates for entry as cadets were examined at various centres across Canada, and at the end of that month the first draft of cadets reached Boston, Mass., to begin their training, and the third and final draft left a month later for the same destination. While in Boston all these cadets were

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46 Minutes of meeting to discuss air operations, held on Aug. 26, 1918, N.S. 63-I-1 (1).
46 Weekly reports by the Dir., R.C.N.A.S., N.S. 63-I-4 (1).
47 Correspondence in N.S. 63-I-1 (1).
housed and trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A much smaller number of cadets were sent to Great Britain for their training. The recruiting and training of these cadets went forward very rapidly, in spite of some delay caused by the influenza epidemic which was sweeping across North America at this time.\(^{48}\) The recruiting and training of ratings had gone forward more slowly, and no trained Canadian personnel were available while the war lasted. The Americans therefore continued to maintain and operate the planes until the stations were closed down shortly after the armistice.

The air patrol formations were supplied by the United States Navy. They were instructed to comply promptly with all requests made by the Canadian naval authorities, but were not under Canadian command. Partly, perhaps, because a unified command was lacking, but chiefly because co-ordination of air and sea forces was in its infancy, the joint Operations were by later standards very loosely integrated. In passing it is worth mentioning that the commanding officer of the American unit at Halifax was Lieut. Richard E. Byrd, U.S.N., who was later to become widely known as an airman and antarctic explorer.\(^{49}\)

In December the Deputy Minister went to Washington, where he came to an understanding with the American naval authorities regarding the division of expenses. It was agreed that Canada should pay for all the ground material which the United States had furnished and left at the stations; and that the flying material which the United States Navy had supplied, consisting of 12 flying boats, 4 kite balloons, 26 spare Liberty motors, and other equipment, should become the property of the Canadian Government.\(^{50}\) Early in the same month recruiting for the service was stopped and the existing personnel were ordered to be discharged, on the ground that:

... a large number of Canadians have enlisted in the Royal Naval Air Service, and many of these have distinguished themselves by their work at the front. These men will return to Canada shortly and many of them would doubtless wish to remain in the service permanently, and would form a proper nucleus for a Canadian Naval Air Service.\(^{51}\)

\(^{48}\) Weekly reports in N.S. 63-1-4 (1).
\(^{49}\) For Lieut. Byrd's personal account of his tour of duty at Halifax, see Byrd, *Skyward*, pp. 64-76.
\(^{50}\) D. Min. to Min., Dec. 13, 1918, N.S. 63-1-1 (1).
\(^{51}\) P.C. 3009, Dec. 5, 1918.
The question of perpetuating the organization was raised from time to time during the ensuing months, most notably in the *Jellicoe Report* a year later. On his mission to Canada at the end of the year 1919, Lord Jellicoe was asked, among many other questions, whether permanent naval air forces were necessary for the defence of the Canadian coasts, and if so what their scale should be and where the necessary air stations should be placed.

In his report Jellicoe recommended that a squadron of flying boats and a torpedo squadron should be stationed on the west coast. The purpose of the flying boats would be reconnaissance and anti-submarine Operations, and the torpedo squadron would be ready to operate from some point near the Strait of Juan de Fuca or elsewhere on the coast, or from an aircraft carrier. Jellicoe felt unable to specify suitable sites for air stations on the west coast, or to recommend what permanent disposition should be made of the existing stations at Halifax and North Sydney. His suggestion that naval air forces be maintained on one coast only doubtless resulted from his opinion that, in the existing circumstances, Japan was a likelier enemy than any other Power. Of the four fleet programmes which he put forward for the Dominion Government to choose from, the two more ambitious ones included one and two aircraft carriers respectively.52

During the year 1919 various suggestions were also made and seriously considered, for combining Service aviation in some way with the carrying of mail by air, forest protection by means of planes, or commercial flying. At that time these activities were potential, not actual; yet to a few minds they seemed capable of being developed. In the Dominion of that post-war period, however, a feeling of hostility to any measures reminiscent of war together with a strong desire for retrenchment soon came to prevail; and the naval air service was not revived in any form.

This abortive naval air organization calls to mind several relevant features or incidents of the Second World War, among which three may be mentioned. The Royal Canadian Naval Air Service was a precursor of the Naval Air Division, R.C.N., which was to be started a quarter of a century later. As an instance of welcome assistance given by the United States

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Government to the Naval Service, the incidents which have been recounted foreshadowed many similar forms of help or co-operation that were to appear in the course of the later conflict. It is interesting to note, moreover, that as early as 1918 the outstanding rôle which air support was later to play in anti-submarine warfare was faintly presaged, among other places, on the east coast of Canada. 53

THE Admiralty's problem off the west coast of North America was threefold. First of all there was the coast of British Columbia to protect. The greater part of it was unrewarding to a raider, but it offered several inviting objectives, of which, though Vancouver and Nanaimo were difficult to get at, Victoria, Esquimalt, and Prince Rupert, were more or less exposed. In the second place, shipping had to be guarded. The coastwise trade received some protection from the configuration of that extraordinary seaboard, and the fishing boats were unlikely to invite a serious attack. The Strait of Juan de Fuca with its approaches, however, formed a focal area where the ships on two important ocean routes converged. The routes were those from Vancouver to the Orient and from Vancouver to Great Britain. The ships on the former run were mainly fast liners, and were protected by the immense size of the ocean on which they sailed, except in the terminal waters. The ships sailing for Great Britain, carrying for the most part grain, lumber, and canned salmon, took their cargoes southward down the coast and around by the Strait of Magellan, or passed them by rail across the Isthmus of Panama. This traffic lane was a tempting one for commerce raiders, because, running along the coast as it did, merchantmen using it would be easy to find, while the raider operating along it could remain close to possible sources of fuel and of information. Moreover, in addition to receiving the trade to and from Vancouver, this route was fed by the principal Pacific ports of the United States. On the other hand it was easy for a merchant ship on this run to hug the coast. By doing this, should a hostile cruiser appear anywhere north of Mexico, the merchantman might have a good chance to take refuge inside the territorial waters of an exceedingly powerful neutral.

On August 4, 1914, the naval force at the disposal of the Admiralty in those waters consisted of three units. This number was soon and unexpectedly increased to five when, a
few hours after the war began, the Canadian Government acquired two submarines. Although not immediately ready to act effectively at sea, the submarines could afford considerable protection to both coast and trade from Cape Flattery inward, by the deterrent effect of their presence. Two little H.M. sloops, the Algerine and Shearwater, had also for some years been stationed on the coast with their base at Esquimalt. The Algerine was a seasoned veteran, having taken in the year 1900 a prominent and dangerous part in the action off the Taku Forts in China,¹ and the Shearwater was a relic of the once proud Pacific Squadron. Their functions were to visit various ports in North and South America, being available to assist British subjects in times of unrest or revolution and to discharge Great Britain’s responsibility in connection with the sealing patrol. These sloops were useful for police work, but they would have been quite helpless against a cruiser. On the eve of the war they were on the west coast of Mexico, safeguarding British subjects and other foreigners during the civil war between Huerta and Carranza. When Britain declared war on Germany the Algerine and Shearwater sailed for Esquimalt, and during the voyage they were themselves in need of protection, a fact which constituted the Admiralty’s third responsibility. The remaining naval unit in the area, and the only one theoretically capable of taking the offensive, was H.M.C.S. Rainbow.

The German squadron in the Pacific consisted of two powerful armoured cruisers, and three modern-type light cruisers, the Emden, Nürnberg, and Leipzig, besides several smaller vessels.² The squadron, which was commanded by Admiral Graf von Spee, was based on Tsingtau, and had no bases or depots whatever in the eastern Pacific. When the war began the squadron was at Ponape in the Carolines, and von Spee had a wide choice of objectives. His purposes were, of course, to damage allied trade, warships, and other interests, on the largest possible scale, and eventually to take as many of his ships as he could safely back to Germany. His two most evident anxieties were the probable entry of Japan into the war and the very powerful Australian battle cruiser Australia. On the morning of August 13 von Spee made the following entry in his diary:

¹ Keyes, Adventures Ashore and Afloat, pp. 210-27; Longstaff, Esquimalt Naval Base, pp. 164-6.
² This paragraph is based almost entirely on the German official naval history, Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918: Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausländischen Gewässern, i.
If we were to proceed toward the coast of America, we should have both [coaling ports and agents] at our disposal, and the Japanese fleet could not follow us thither without causing great concern in the United States and so influencing that country in our favour.\(^3\)

There were no enemy bases there, and the continent was composed of neutral states; consequently von Spee thought that on that coast it would be comparatively easy for him to get coal and to communicate with Germany. He evidently meant the coast of South America, and in the event it was there that he took his squadron, having first detached the *Emden* to the Indian Ocean where she began the most distinguished career of any German raider of the First World War.

The civil war in Mexico had some time before resulted in the forming of an international naval force, under American command, to protect foreigners near the coast. S.M.S. *Nürnberg* represented the German Navy, until she was relieved on July 7 at Mazatlan by S.M.S. *Leipzig*, commanded by Capt. Haun. On her arrival at Mazatlan, the *Leipzig* found, among other warships, the Japanese armoured cruiser *Idzumo* and H.M.S. *Algerine*, and while they were in port together friendly relations were established between the German cruiser and the British sloop. The *Shearwater* at that time was stationed at Ensenada. At the end of July the American, German, and British warships had co-operated in evacuating the Chinese from Mazatlan and embarking Europeans and Americans, because the Carranzists were about to storm the town. On July 31 the Canadian collier *Cetriana* arrived at Mazatlan to coal the *Leipzig*.\(^4\) During the night of August 1 the *Leipzig*'s guns were cleared for action while she and the *Cetriana* made ready for sea. In order to keep the collier as ignorant as possible about current events in the field of international relations the Germans took charge of her wireless set.\(^5\)

On August 1 the Admiralty asked the Canadian Government that the *Rainbow* might be kept available for the protection of trade on the west coast of North America, where the *Leipzig* was known to be.\(^6\) Had it not been for the govern-

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 80.

\(^4\) The *Cetriana* was owned in Vancouver, her master was a Royal Naval Reservist, and she had been chartered in the spring by the *Nürnberg*'s commander to carry coal and other supplies to him from San Francisco. After the Germans had chartered her, according to the British consul in San Francisco, the *Cetriana* had engaged a fresh crew consisting mainly of Germans and Mexicans. Consul Gen., San Francisco, to N.S.H.Q., Sept. 12, 1914, N.S. 1048-10-2.

\(^5\) This paragraph is based on the account in Kreuzerkrieg, 1, ch. 5.

\(^6\) Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen.'s Sec., n.d., N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).
ment’s earlier decision to send her out on sealing patrol the Rainbow could not have intervened in connection with the Komagata Maru, nor would she have been fit for sea when war came. As it was, however, she was ready for sea though not for war, and in accordance with the Admiralty’s request N.S.H.Q. telegraphed this order the same day to her captain, Cdr. Walter Hose, R.C.N.:

Secret. Prepare for active service trade protection grain ships going South. German cruiser NURNBERG or LEIPSIG [sic] is on West Coast America. Obtain all information available as to Merchant ships sailing from Canadian or United States Ports. Telegraph demands for Ordnance Stores required to complete to fullest capacity. Urgent.7

Rainbow was also ordered to meet at Vancouver an ammunition train from Halifax, which it was hoped would arrive by August 6.8 The same day the press got wind of a German cruiser’s supposed presence near the coast. “The Rainbow,” said the Victoria Times, “a faster boat and mounting two six-inch guns, is more than a match for the German boat. If Britain engages in war it will be the business of the Rainbow to get this German boat.”9

After receiving her orders the Rainbow was alongside at the dockyard or anchored in Royal Roads, preparing for war, and on August 2 she reported herself ready.10 The railway and express companies were not organized for war, and their refusal to handle explosives was a tangle that had to be unravelled before the promised ammunition train could start. In any case it could not arrive for several days, while the European crisis was becoming more acute every hour. The cruiser therefore had to meet her needs as best she could from old Royal Navy stores in the dockyard.11 When all possible preparations had been made, Rainbow remained weak at many points. Her wireless set had a maximum night range of only two hundred miles, though this defect her wireless operators were able to overcome at a later date. An almost incredible fact is that she had no high-explosive ammunition: all that she had been able to obtain was old-fashioned shell filled with gunpowder.12 She had no collier, and no depend-

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7 N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 1, 1914, ibid.
8 N.S.H.Q. to Commander in Charge, Esquimalt Dockyard, Aug. 1, 1914, ibid.
9 Times, Victoria, Aug. 1, 1914.
11 N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty, Aug. 3, 1914, N.S. 1046-1-48 (1).
12 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings kindly lent by Rear Admiral Walter Hose, C.B.E., R.C.N. (Ret’d), and other documentation. The statement that Rainbow at first had no H.E. shells is made after full consideration of the available evidence, and in spite of the fact that it has been contradicted by a well-informed witness whose testimony, if it stood alone, would seem to be conclusive. Rainbow’s Reports of Proceedings for this period have not been found, but the extracts are probably adequate.
able coaling station south of Esquimalt. Less than half the full complement was on board, and more than a third of these were Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reservists, many of whom knew nothing of the sea or of warships. There was little likelihood, however, that the enemy would learn of the Rainbow's deficiencies in shells and men, and the German official history—which refers to her as "the Canadian training ship 'Rainbow'"—gives no indication that they did so.

In the afternoon of August 2 Cdr. Hose received the following message direct from the Admiralty:

LEIPZIG reported left Mazatlan, Mexico, 10 a.m. 30th July. RAINBOW should proceed south at once in order to get in touch with her and generally guard trade routes north of the equator.13

As Cdr. Hose did not know whether or not the Canadian warships had come under the Admiralty’s orders, he repeated the above message to Ottawa with a request for instructions, and ordered the fires lit under four boilers. Shortly afterwards he wired to N.S.H.Q.:

With reference to Admiralty telegram submitted RAINBOW may remain in the vicinity Cape Flattery until more accurate information is received LEIPZIG, observing that in event of LEIPZIG appearing Cape Flattery with RAINBOW twelve hundred miles distant and receiving no communications, Pacific cable, Pachena W.T. Station, and ships entering straits at mercy of LEIPZIG with opportunity to coal from prizes. Vessels working up the West Coast of America could easily be warned to adhere closely to territorial waters as far as possible. Enquiry being made LEIPZIG through our Consul.14

N.S.H.Q. did not approve his suggestion, and at midnight, August 2-3, this signal arrived from Ottawa:

You are to proceed to sea forthwith to guard trade routes North of Equator, keeping in touch with Pachena until war has been declared obtain information from North Bound Steamers. Have arranged for 500 tons coal at San Diego. United States does not prohibit belligerents from coal in her ports. Will arrange for credits at San Diego and San Francisco. No further news of Leipzig.15

The Admiralty knew that the Leipzig was, or had very recently been, in Mexican waters, and thought it possible that the Nürnberg might also be cruising somewhere near that coast. Lloyd’s thought that both the German cruisers were operating on the west coast of North America, and warned

13 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.
14 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 2, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).
15 N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 3, 1914, ibid.
It goes without saying that rumours grew thick and fast along the coast, flourishing in the fertile soil of uncertainty. For the most part these rumours reported the presence and doings of the Leipzig and the Nürnberg. Though the Leipzig was actually near the North American coast, the Nürnberg was not; yet the story of her presence with Leipzig, and the rumour which was current in those days that one or both of these cruisers operated in the coastal waters of British Columbia, have often since been repeated as facts.

At 1 a.m. on August 3, the Rainbow put to sea from Esquimalt, and according to a well-informed witness, "but few of those who saw her depart on that eventful occasion expected to see her return." Yet if any protection at all were to be given to the two helpless sloops and to shipping off the coast, the Rainbow had to be sent out since nothing else was available. She rounded Cape Flattery and steamed southward, proceeding slowly so as to keep in touch with the Pachena wireless station. With the same end in view, at 4 a.m. on August 4 she altered course to the northward, having reached a point a little to the southward of Destruction Island, forty-five nautical miles down the coast from Cape Flattery.

The same day the Rainbow was informed that war had been declared against the German Empire, and at this time she became the first ship of the Royal Canadian Navy ever to be at sea as a belligerent. On this day too the cruiser was placed at the disposal of the Admiralty for operational purposes. Since the early hours of August 3 all hands had been engaged in preparing the ship for action, exercising action stations, and carrying out firing practice in order to calibrate

16 Times, Victoria, Aug. 5, 1914.
17 Launched in 1891, Rainbow was obsolescent and much inferior to either the Leipzig or the Nürnberg in speed and type of armament. Statistics of Rainbow: displacement, 3,600 tons; length, 298'; beam, 431/2'; draught, 171/2'; h.p. (designed), 9,000; designed speed, 19.75 k.; armament, 2 6'' and 4 12-pdr. guns, and 2 14'' torpedo tubes; complement, c. 300. The displacement, main armament, designed speed, and laying-down date of each of the other warships mentioned prominently in this chapter were: Leipzig, 3,250 tons, 10 4.1'' guns, 23 k., 1904; Nürnberg, 3,450 tons, 10 4.1'' guns, 23.5 k., 1905; Newcastle, 4,800 tons, 2 6'' and 10 4'' guns, 25 k., 1909; Idzumo, 9,800 tons, 4 8'' and 14 6'' guns, 20.75 k., 1898; Algerine, 1,050 tons, 4 4'' guns, 13 k., 1894; Shearwater, 980 tons, 4 4'' guns, 13 1/4 k., 1899. Of these warships only the Idzumo was armoured.
18 George Phillips, "Canada's Naval Part in the War." The author was superintendent of the Esquimalt Dockyard. MS kindly lent by Mrs. Phillips.
19 Rainbow's movements throughout are based on her Logs.
20 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 4, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).
21 P.C. 2049, Aug. 4, 1914.
the guns. At 5.30 p.m. on August 4 a southerly course was set, the objective being San Diego; but three hours later a signal was received to the effect that the inestimable high-explosive shell had reached Vancouver, and the course was altered accordingly.\(^2\) Off Race Rocks at 6 a.m. on August 5 the following message from N.S.H.Q. reached the Rainbow:

Received from Admiralty. Begins—'NUREMBERG' and 'LEIP-ZIG' reported August 4th off Magdalena Bay steering North. Ends. Do your utmost to protect Algerine and Shearwater, steering north from San Diego. Remember Nelson and the British Navy. All Canada is watching.\(^3\)

The cruiser therefore turned about once more and proceeded down the coast at fifteen knots, with no high-explosive shell. As the two submarines which had been bought in Seattle arrived at Esquimalt that morning, the waters which the Rainbow was leaving would thenceforth enjoy the protection which their presence afforded. At 6 a.m. on August 6 the cruiser was abreast of Cape Blanco, and she arrived off San Francisco twenty-four hours later.

Cdr. Hose decided to put in for the purpose of filling up with coal, and in order to obtain the latest information from the British consul. At 9.30 a.m. on August 7 the Rainbow anchored in San Francisco harbour, and only an hour and twenty minutes later the German freighter Alexandria of the Hamburg- Amerika Line, said to be carrying a valuable cargo, was sighted off the Heads inward bound. She had been requisitioned by the Leipzig a few days before and ordered to discharge her cargo at San Francisco. After taking in coal and some lubricating oil, she was to rendezvous with the Leipzig.\(^4\) A richly-laden enemy ship which was about to become an auxiliary to a hostile cruiser would have been no ordinary prize.

The Rainbow did not experience much better luck in San Francisco than she had met with outside:

On arrival in Port was boarded by Consul-General who informed us that 500 tons coal were in readiness. Made arrangements to go alongside when informed by Naval & Customs authorities that in accordance with the President's Neutrality proclamation we could only take in sufficient coal to enable us to reach the nearest British Port. As we already had sufficient it meant we could not coal at all, but on the plea that we had not a safe margin we were permitted to take 50 tons. The Consul-General

\(^2\) Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.

\(^3\) N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 5, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

\(^4\) Krenzkrig, 1, ch. 5.
could give no news of 'Algerine' and 'Shearwater' and stated that last news of 'Leipzig' was that she coaled at La Paz two days previously. All through that day various conflicting reports were received regarding the two German cruisers.25

The consul's information before the Rainbow left was that both the German cruisers had been seen near San Diego steering north.26 Four former naval ratings joined the ship here, and at 1.15 a.m. on August 8 she weighed and with all lights extinguished sailed out of the bay.

Instructions had been sent to Cdr. Hose from Ottawa early on the same day:

Your actions unfettered considered expedient however you should proceed at your utmost speed north immediately, order will be given ALGERINE, SHEARWATER wait Flattery.

The cruiser had sailed, however, before this signal arrived. She steered northward so as to keep between the enemy who was thought to be very near San Francisco, and the little sloops, and also because a store ship was expected from Esquimalt, which was to meet Rainbow near the Farallones Islands. The morning watch was spent in tearing out inflammable woodwork and throwing it overboard. Flotsam from a warship, doubtless the Rainbow's woodwork, which was reported to have been found shortly afterwards near the Golden Gate, caused some anxiety.27 During the 8th and 9th Rainbow cruised at low speed in the neighbourhood of the Farallones, whose wireless station kept reporting her position en clair. By the morning of August 10 the Rainbow's supply of coal was running low. No German cruiser, nor British sloop, nor store ship had been sighted. It seemed probable that the sloops must have got well to the northward by this time, and at 10 a.m. the cruiser altered course for Esquimalt.28

The Rainbow was operating alone on a very dangerous mission. In order to reduce to some extent the risks which were being run by her complement, the S.S. Prince George was hurriedly fitted up as a hospital ship and sent out from Esquimalt on August 11 to meet Rainbow and accompany her. The Prince George, a fast coastal passenger liner owned by the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, had three funnels,29 a cruiser stern, and a general appearance not unlike that of a warship. On the 12th, about 8 o'clock in the morning, a vessel

25 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.
26 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 7, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).
27 N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty, Aug. 11, 1914, ibid.; Times, Victoria, Aug. 12, 1914,
28 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.
29 The Leipzig and Nürnberg each had three funnels.
which appeared to be a warship was sighted on the port bow by *Rainbow's* lookouts. The cruiser immediately altered course about fourteen points to starboard, and put on full speed while all hands went to action stations. A few minutes later the stranger was identified as a merchant ship which turned out to be the *Prince George*. The latter carried an order that Cdr. Hose should return to Esquimalt, and both vessels accordingly proceeded towards Cape Flattery. Early next morning about twenty miles from Esquimalt they found the *Shearwater* at last: she had no wireless set, and her first question was whether or not war had been declared. Shortly after 6 a.m. Esquimalt was reached.

The *Shearwater*'s commander was unable to supply any news of the *Algerine*, and expressed great anxiety regarding her. N.S.H.Q. reported that she had been off Cape Mendocino on August 11, and Cdr. Hose now obtained permission to proceed down the coast as far as Cape Blanco in order to find and protect her.\(^29\) *Rainbow* was coaled as quickly as possible and a consignment of high-explosive shell was taken aboard; but the delight of the gunners was short-lived since there were no fuses. Twenty of the volunteers on board who had experienced as much of the seafaring life as they could endure were replaced from shore. At 5.30 that evening the cruiser set out once more, at full speed, to look for the *Algerine*, which was sighted at 3 o'clock the next afternoon. The little vessel had been struggling northward against headwinds. Having run short of fuel she had stopped a passing collier, and was engaged in getting coal across in her cutters. As the *Rainbow* approached the *Algerine* signalled: “I am damned glad to see you.” When the sloop was ready to proceed *Rainbow* took station astern, and late in the afternoon of August 15 they reached Esquimalt.\(^31\) The most pressing naval responsibility in those waters had now been discharged, and before the cruiser went to sea again she had received fuses for her high-explosive shells.

On August 11, 12, and 13, the *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg* were reported to be off San Francisco.\(^32\) It was soon rumoured that they were capturing ships in the approaches to the Golden Gate, and the stories which travelled up and down the coast paralysed the movements of British shipping from Vancouver.

\(^{29}\) Signals in N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

\(^{31}\) *Algerine*'s and *Shearwater*'s Reports of Proceedings covering this period are in A.R.O., H.S. 762, Pacific Coast of America, Letters of Proceedings, July 1914-May 1916.

\(^{32}\) The *Leipzig* was in fact close to San Francisco on the 11th and 12th. See below p. 274.
to Panama.33 On August 14 the two cruisers were reported to be headed for the north at full speed. “Should they continue directly up the coast,” wrote the editor of the Victoria Times, “they will get all the fighting they want. The Rainbow and the two smaller vessels will be ready for them.”34 Shortly after midnight, on the morning of the 17th, the Leipzig herself sailed boldly into San Francisco harbour in order to coal, and her commanding officer, Capt. Haun, received a group of journalists on board. His fighting spirit flamed as brightly as did that of the Times’ editor. “We shall engage the enemy,” he told the San Francisco reporters, “whenever and wherever we meet him. The number or size of our antagonists will make no difference to us. The traditions of the German navy shall be upheld.” The Leipzig’s captain landed, called on the mayor, presented the local zoo with a couple of Japanese bear cubs, and put to sea again at midnight.35 Meanwhile the Rainbow at Esquimalt had been preparing to go to sea once more. Although Japan had not yet declared war on Germany, the powerful Japanese cruiser Idzumo which had represented her country in the international naval force in Mexican waters, was still on the west coast, and it was reported that her commander intended to shadow the Leipzig. The Victoria Times offered words of sympathy: “Unhappy cruiser Leipzig! For the next six days she is going to be stalked wherever she may go by a warship big enough to swallow her with one bite.”36

From August 4, to August 23 when Japan entered the war, the warships at the Admiralty’s disposal on the Pacific coast of North America were incapable of destroying, bottling up, or driving away, both or even either of the German cruisers, a fact which was emphasized by the widely-advertised entry of the Leipzig into San Francisco. The waters in question clearly required more protection. The Admiralty accordingly ordered the Admiral commanding on the China Station to send one of his light cruisers, and on August 18 H.M.S. Newcastle left Yokohama for Esquimalt.37 The Newcastle was a light cruiser of the Bristol class—38 she was a newer ship

33 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, 1, p. 163.
35 Colonist, Victoria, Aug. 18, 1914.
36 Times, Victoria, Aug. 18, 1914.
37 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, 1, pp. 154, 164.
38 She came to protect waters which a former Canadian government had undertaken to defend, and there was irony in the fact that she was a Bristol. Of the four Bristol-class cruisers in the Canadian naval programme of 1910, two were to have been stationed on the Pacific coast.
than either of the Germans and was faster and more powerfully armed. The same day Cdr. Hose asked for permission to take the *Rainbow* to San Francisco in order to find and engage the *Leipzig*. The Admiralty approved the suggestion and the following signal was sent to *Rainbow* at sea:

Proceed and engage or drive off *Leipzig* from trade route; do not follow after her . . . . You should cruise principally off San Francisco.\(^{39}\)

This order, of course, was based on the idea that the *Leipzig* might be molesting shipping in the approaches to San Francisco. The same day the order was countermanded, however, because both the German cruisers were reported to be off San Francisco, and the *Rainbow* returned to Esquimalt to await the arrival of the *Newcastle*.

The most exposed town on the British Columbia coast was Prince Rupert, which had no local protection whatever. The war had consequently brought a feeling of uneasiness to many of the citizens, and the mayor had arrived in Victoria a few days after hostilities began, hoping to obtain some defences for the town.\(^{40}\) Rumours that one or both of the Germans were on their way northward had been current for some time, and on August 19 a cruiser with three funnels—the *Leipzig* and the *Nürnberg* each had three funnels—was reported to be in the vicinity of Prince Rupert.\(^{11}\) Before dawn next day *Rainbow* set out for the northern port which she reached on August 21, and where inquiries elicited further evidence that a strange cruiser had been seen. Two days after his arrival Cdr. Hose reported to N.S.H.Q.: “Strong suspicions Nurnberg or Leipzig has coaled from U.S. Steamship Delhi in vicinity of Prince of Wales Island on Aug. 19th or Aug. 20th.”\(^{42}\) The carrying of coal to Prince Rupert by water in British ships was immediately stopped. The suspicions were never confirmed, and whatever the cause of anxiety may have been it was not a German cruiser.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{39}\) N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 18, 1914 (two signals), N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

\(^{40}\) *Colonist*, Victoria, Aug. 11, 1914.

\(^{11}\) S.N.O., Esquimalt, to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 19, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

\(^{42}\) Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 23, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (2).

\(^{43}\) A similar rumour had germinated during the Spanish-American War. In July 1898, the Admiralty sent the following message to the Commander in Chief at Esquimalt: “The American Consul, Vancouver, has reported that a Spanish privateer of five guns is in the waters near Queen Charlotte Sound, apparently on look out for vessels going to and from Klondyke and is suspected of endeavouring to obtain a British pilot.” Warships of the Pacific Squadron at Esquimalt went north to look for the Spaniard, but found nothing. In this case the anxiety was lest a belligerent warship might compromise British neutrality. Admiralty to C. in C., July 17, 1898, Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.).
The Rainbow remained in the north until August 30 when she sailed south. When Japan had declared war on August 23, the Japanese armoured cruiser Idzumo had been at San Francisco; and two days later, firing a salute as she came in, the Idzumo dropped anchor in Esquimalt. The Newcastle reached the same base on the 30th, and the Canadian warships together with the Idzumo came under the orders of her commander, Capt. F. A. Powlett. On September 2 the Rainbow arrived at Esquimalt, having steamed during the month of August more than 4,300 miles.

On September 3 the Newcastle left Esquimalt to look for the Leipzig. Capt. Powlett’s first idea had been to take the Rainbow with him; but after that ship’s return from the north she had needed a few days in dockyard, and was therefore left behind to protect the approaches to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. At the same time the Idzumo was detailed to watch the approaches to San Francisco. The Nürnberg had been at Honolulu on September 1, a fact which rendered it unlikely that she would appear off North America. There were numerous stories which pointed untrustworthy fingers at the whereabouts of the Leipzig, and some of these, as so often happens in time of war, seemed to rest on first-hand evidence. Since August 18, however, no certain news of her whereabouts had been received, and the disturbance to trade which she had caused was rapidly subsiding. The Newcastle carried out a thorough search along the coast down to and including the Gulf of California, and on her way she established a series of improvised lookout and Intelligence stations on shore which assured her receiving immediate information should the Leipzig return to her former hunting grounds. Capt. Powlett then concluded that the Leipzig had gone too far south to be followed, and he returned to Esquimalt.

There was a bare possibility that if the other parts of the Pacific got too hot for them, the German Pacific Squadron might come to the North American coast, where in addition to causing havoc among shipping they might even attack Vancouver or the coal mines at Nanaimo. With this in mind Capt. Powlett suggested measures of shore defence at these points and made arrangements for mines to be laid in suitable areas should the need arise. On September 30 the Newcastle set out on a second reconnaissance of the coast as far south as

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44 The proceedings of the Newcastle described in this paragraph are based on Fayle, Seaborne Trade, 1, pp. 229-30.
H.M.S. Newcastle
the Gulf of California, leaving the *Idzumo* and the *Rainbow* behind on guard as on the previous occasion. While the *Newcastle* was on her two cruises, *Rainbow* had watched her part of the trade routes, keeping a lookout for supply ships from United States ports and engaging from time to time in gun and torpedo-firing practice.

The actual Operations of the German cruisers remain to be described. The *Nürnberg* left Mazatlan on July 7, called at Honolulu, and joined von Spee on August 6 at Ponape. She later revisited Honolulu and rejoined her squadron on September 6. The same day she was detached to destroy the Canada-Australia cable and cable station at Fanning Island. On September 7 she landed a party there which cut the cable and destroyed the essential installations on shore. She then returned to von Spee once more. It is almost certain that after the outbreak of war the *Nürnberg* was never less than about 2,500 miles from the coast of British Columbia. She strongly influenced the movements of the *Rainbow* and other allied warships, but she did so *in absentia*.

The *Leipzig* was at Magdalena Bay when on August 5 she received the news that Great Britain had declared war. Her mobilization orders instructed her to join von Spee in the western Pacific, but before he did this Capt. Haun wanted to make sure of his coal supply. The problem of fuel almost stultified all the German surface raiders, and it seems to have been unusually difficult on the west coast of North America:

German warships very seldom visited the north-west coast of America, and it had always been thought that these waters would not be of much importance to Germany in time of war. Accordingly the Naval Staff had made little preparation for furnishing coal and provisions to warships in this area.

Of such organization as there was, San Francisco was the principal centre. Haun therefore telegraphed to that port asking that arrangements be made to send coal and lubricating oil to him at sea. Early on August 5 the *Leipzig* left Magdalena Bay for San Francisco, following a circuitous route. On the night of August 6 she heard the press radio service at San Diego reporting that the British naval force on the west coast consisted of the *Rainbow*, *Algerine*, and *Shearwater*, and two submarines bought from Chile. Haun hoped that after coaling he would be able to do some local commerce raiding.

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15 Kreuzerkrieg, 1, has dispelled all but a few remnants of the fog which formerly hid most of the movements of the *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg* during Aug. and Sept. 1914.
16 Kreuzerkrieg, 1, p. 349.
before joining von Spee, and for that purpose the most likely hunting grounds in those waters were considered to be the areas off Vancouver, Seattle and Tacoma, San Francisco, and Panama.

Captain Haun naturally weighed the advisability of winning an immediate military success by attacking the Algerine and Shearwater on their way to Esquimalt, by capturing one of the Canadian Pacific liners which could be fitted as an auxiliary cruiser, or by attacking the Canadian training ship Rainbow.

Considering the importance of commerce raiding, however, these enterprises would scarcely have been justified; for even a successful action with the Rainbow, which was an older ship but which had mounted a heavier armament, might have resulted in such serious damage to the Leipzig as would have brought her career to a premature end.\(^47\)

On August 11, apparently in the forenoon, and in misty weather, the Leipzig reached the approaches to the Golden Gate, and next day near the Farallones Islands the German consul came on board. He told Haun that Japan would probably enter the war and that the presence of the Rainbow north of San Francisco had been reported. The consul said that American officials were unfriendly in the matter of facilities for coaling, and also that he had not been able so far to obtain either money or credit with which to pay for coal.

When the German Consul met the Leipzig, he was not even sure that the United States authorities would permit her to coal once, in spite of the fact that no objection had been made to supplying the Rainbow. Such a refusal would have made it necessary to lay the Leipzig up before she had struck a single blow. As Captain Haun and his crew could not bear to think of such a thing, he determined to remain at sea for as long as he could, to try to hold up colliers and other merchant ships off the Golden Gate, and then to steam northward and engage the Rainbow. He therefore told the consul that he would return to San Francisco on the night of August 16-17 and enter the harbour, unless he should have been advised not to do so.

The Leipzig cruised in territorial waters on August 12, proceeding as far northward as Cape Mendocino. She then made for the Farallones Islands, keeping from twenty to thirty miles from the coast. The Rainbow was not sighted, and all the merchant ships that came along were American. These the Leipzig did not interfere with in any way, so as not to wound American susceptibilities.\(^48\)

\(^47\) Ibid., p. 347.
\(^48\) Ibid., p. 354. Cape Mendocino was the most northerly point reached by the Leipzig. In 1917 the Admiralty published a chart which showed the Leipzig's track running north as far as Cape Flattery. A British official chart published immediately after the war, however, shows her as "Cruising off S. Francisco Aug. 11th-17th". Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, 1 (Maps), No. 14. There seems to be no reason for doubting the accuracy of the German official history on this point. It is true that none of von Spee's ships got home; nevertheless the Leipzig had opportunities of reporting her movements to the German consul at several places, including San Francisco, and no doubt she did so. Four of her officers, moreover, survived the battle of the Falkland Islands.
At the appointed time the Leipzig returned to San Francisco. She entered the harbour just after midnight, paying a visit which has already been described, and twenty-four hours later she left after taking aboard five hundred tons of coal.

When she had cleared the harbour the Leipzig steamed at high speed towards the Farallones Islands, without lights and ready for action; but no enemy ships were seen. After August 18 she proceeded outside the trade routes at seven knots, steaming on only four boilers while the others were cleaned. On August 22 she passed Guadelupe. Because future supplies of coal were so uncertain, it was impossible for her to raid commerce, especially as British ships were still being kept in port while the searching of neutral vessels would merely have advertised the Leipzig's whereabouts.\(^{49}\)

The cruiser continued her way down the coast. She left the Gulf of California on September 9, well supplied with coal, and proceeded on her southward journey making her first captures as she went.\(^{50}\) During the opening weeks of the war Admiral von Spee's squadron had been crossing the Pacific in a leisurely fashion, far to the southward.\(^{51}\) In the words of Admiral Tirpitz:

The entry of Japan into the war wrecked the plan of a war by our cruiser squadron against enemy trade and against the British war vessels in those seas, leaving our ships with nothing to do but to attempt to break through and reach home.\(^{52}\)

Von Spee was able to remain undetected because of the vast size of the Pacific and because the strength of his squadron forced his enemies to concentrate. The Leipzig joined him on October 14 at Easter Island. His squadron arrived at last off the coast of South America, where on November 1 it engaged and almost completely destroyed a British squadron off Cape Coronel—a battle in which the Leipzig took part and in which the Nürnberg sank the already seriously damaged H.M.S. Monmouth. The arrival of von Spee off the South American coast had not for long remained a secret, and the Admiralty tried to bar his path wherever he might go. It was possible that he might elect to sail northward, in order to go through the recently-opened Panama Canal or to the west coast of North America. To deal with such a move on his part a British-


\(^{50}\) The Leipzig's movements, Sept. 11-21, are described in a personal account by the master of a captured British merchant ship. (Hurd, *The Merchant Navy*, i, pp. 180-84).

\(^{51}\) This brief account of the Operations of von Spee and his opponents is based on: *Kreutzerkrieg*, i; Corbett and Newbolt, *Naval Operations*, i; and Jose, *The Royal Australian Navy*.

Japanese squadron was formed off the Mexican coast, whence it proceeded to the Galapagos Islands. This concentration proved to have been unnecessary, however, for after Coronel von Spee moved southward. After rounding South America he ran headlong into a decisively stronger British force on December 8 at the Falkland Islands, where all his ships save one were sunk. The *Nürnberg* met her end at the hands of H.M.S. *Kent*, after an epic chase during which the *Kent*’s stokers, in order to squeeze out a little more speed, burned up practically all the woodwork in the ship. The *Leipzig* was sunk by the *Cornwall* and the *Glasgow*, only eighteen of her officers and men being saved. The very fast *Dresden* alone escaped, to remain at large in South American waters until, on March 14, 1915, she too was found and destroyed by H.M.S. *Kent* and *Glasgow*, in Cumberland Bay on the island of Más a Tierra off the coast of Chile.

It seems evident that at the outbreak of the war, Capt. Haun’s intention had been to obtain coal in order to join von Spee, seizing or sinking any British merchant ship which he might meet *en route*. He probably wanted to take a collier with him when he should start to cross the Pacific, and apart from this consideration the need to fill his own bunkers prolonged his stay on the coast. The only ports available were neutral ones in which he could not stay for more than twenty-four hours, and to enter which would tend to defeat his purpose as a raider. When he did in fact enter San Francisco, the news spread far and wide, and British merchant ships in the neighbourhood went into hiding or postponed their sailings. Moreover his presence in port might have brought up the *Rainbow*, to force an action under circumstances which could have been very unfavourable for him. To remain at sea, on the other hand, meant burning precious coal. Operations by the *Leipzig* anywhere on that coast were severely hampered by her orders to join von Spee, and by the fact that the nearest German base was thousands of miles away.

Did Haun desire to engage the *Rainbow*? On the information available it seems highly probable that he considered his principal obligations to be, in the order of priority, to join von Spee, to damage commerce, and to engage enemy warships. Of these duties the two last as well as the first, in order of precedence, may have been assigned to him by von Spee. If not, they were prescribed for his case by orthodox naval doctrine. Haun did not know about the *Rainbow*’s
obsolete shells; but he did know that serious injury to the 
Leipzig, situated as she was, would probably have deprived 
his country of a fine cruiser for the duration of the war. It is 
suggested that Haun would have been very pleased to see the 
Rainbow, and that had he done so he would have attacked 
at once; but that only during August 13 and 14 did he feel 
free to search for her.

During her Operations between August 4 and September 
10, the Leipzig failed to lay hands upon a single merchant 
vessel or warship, or to alarm by her visible presence any 
Canadian community. Turning to the other side of the ledger, 
some anxiety was caused among the coast population of Bri-
tish Columbia—banks in Vancouver and Victoria, for example, 
transferred some of their cash and securities to inland or neu-
tral cities. A serious effect on British shipping was also 
produced:

In view of the frequent reports received as to the supposed move-
ments of these ships [Leipzig and Nürnberg], owners were generally un-
willing to risk their vessels until the situation should be cleared up. Char-
tering was suspended at all ports on the coast, and most tramp steamers 
remained in port, while the liner services were curtailed and irregular.... 
[but] within two or three weeks of the Leipzig's departure from San Fran-
cisco trade had become brisk all along the coast.  

Most important of all, the attention of three allied cruisers, 
of which two were considerably more powerful than the 
Leipzig herself, was wholly occupied until the German cruiser 
was known to have removed herself from the area. It is safe 
to say that during the first six weeks of the war, from the 
point of view of the German Government, the Leipzig was a 
paying concern. The dividend would probably have been 
smaller, however, had it been known on shore that she was 
operating alone.

After Coronel the Rainbow co-operated for a time with the 
British-Japanese squadron which had been formed in order 
to meet von Spee should he turn northward. She could not 
keep up with the other ships, and was frequently used as a 
wireless link between them and Esquimalt. At a time when 
it was thought likely that von Spee would turn northward, 
Cdr. Hose sent the following signal to the Director of the 
Naval Service:

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24 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, 1, pp. 162, 179.
Submit that Admiralty may be asked to arrange with Senior Officer of Allied Squadron . . . that Canadian ship *Rainbow* shall if possible be in company with squadron when engaged with enemy.\(^5\)

He received in reply a refusal, with reasons for the same, one of them being that "if the *Rainbow* were lost, immediately there would be much criticism on account of her age in being sent to engage modern vessels."\(^6\) Among the squadron whose lot her commander wished to share was the battle cruiser *Australia*.

After the German squadron had entered the Atlantic the threat on the Pacific coast of North America was greatly diminished, and with the destruction of the *Dresden* it ceased altogether as far as German cruisers were concerned. The only danger thereafter, which was present until the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, lay in the possibility that German agents might send out merchantmen lying in neutral harbours, armed as commerce raiders. This threat, though it never actually materialized on that coast, was a real one none the less. German sympathizers were at work at various neutral ports, and attempts were probably made to send out raiders. The *Rainbow* was well adapted to the work of intercepting armed merchant ships. She was less vulnerable than a liner, faster than any except the swiftest of them, and adequately armed. The nature of this problem and some of the means used to deal with it are clearly illustrated by the case of the S.S. *Saxonia*.

On August 1, 1914, the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Saxonia* was at Tacoma taking aboard 1,000 tons of hay for Manila. On orders from her company she unloaded the hay and went to Seattle where she tied up. Late in October the naval authorities at Esquimalt learned that the *Saxonia* would probably be transferred to American registry, and that she had been measured for the Panama Canal which had been opened for traffic during the summer. The British Vice-Consul at Tacoma made inquiries and arranged to have the ship kept under observation. She did not leave, and in March 1915 Esquimalt was warned by the postmaster at Victoria that she would probably try to do so on the night of March 16, and that guns were awaiting her at Haiti and gun-mountings in New York. N.S.H.Q. was notified, and spread a wide net by passing the warning on to the Admiralty, St. John's, New-

\(^5\) Hose to Dir. Naval Service, Nov. 9, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (2).

\(^6\) Dir. Naval Service to Hose, Nov. 10, 1914, *ibid.*

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foundland, the Embassy in Washington, and the Vice-Consul at Tacoma. Naval measures were also taken to block the exit of the *Saxonia* through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The Vice-Consul went to Seattle on March 16, and after dark he patrolled the entrance to the port in a motor launch until 1 a.m. He then entered the harbour and circumspectly investigated the *Saxonia* at close quarters. She had no steam up, and the Vice-Consul decided that she would not sail that night and that she would never be able to raise steam without its being observed by his agents in a nearby shipyard. On several subsequent occasions it was reported that she was about to sail. In the end the United States authorities seized the *Saxonia*; but not before her crew had put her engines out of commission by damaging the cylinder-heads and by throwing overboard various indispensable parts.\(^{57}\)

Another of the *Rainbow*'s duties during the rest of her commission was to assist in preventing German shipping, open or disguised, from using the coastal waters. By the end of October 1914 she had 251 officers and men on board. Of this total, 8 officers and 45 ratings belonged to the R.N., 5 officers and 139 ratings to the R.C.N., and 2 officers and 52 men to the R.N.C.V.R.\(^{58}\) On December 18 *Rainbow* left Esquimalt to superintend the dismounting of certain guns which had been temporarily placed at Seymour Narrows to prevent an enemy from entering the Strait of Georgia by the northern route. The following spring she did useful reconnaissance work off Mexico. In February 1916 she set out once more for a similar patrol of Mexican and Central American waters, her freedom of movement being greatly enlarged by the presence of a collier. During this cruise the *Oregon*, a vessel on the American register, was intercepted on April 23 near La Paz. A boarding party went over to her, and after a search it was decided to send her to Esquimalt with a prize crew on board. On May 2 the Mexican-registered *Leonor*, owned by a German firm, was also seized. This schooner had taken part in coaling the *Leipzig* in the Gulf of California. These prizes were both taken on the ground that they were actually German ships whose neutral registry was a disguise for activities which were in the interest of the enemy. They had to be towed a good part of the way home, and as a result of the delay provisions ran short. The *Rainbow* therefore

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\(^{57}\) Signals and letters in N.S. 1048-10-25.

\(^{58}\) Hose to N.S.H.Q., Oct. 31, 1914, N.S. 1-1-19.
pushed on ahead of her collier and prizes, and on May 21 she reached Esquimalt. From August 8 to December 14, 1916, *Rainbow* was on a third cruise of the same kind, during which she went as far south as Panama.\textsuperscript{59}

On several occasions in the middle period of the war the *Rainbow* performed an unusual service. During 1916 and 1917 the financial operations of the Russian Government included the transfer to Canada of large amounts of gold, which came across the Pacific in Japanese warships. In February and August 1916, and again in February 1917, very large consignments of Russian bullion were transshipped to *Rainbow* at Esquimalt or Barkley Sound and taken by her to Vancouver. The value of all the gold transported by the cruiser in this way amounted to about $140,000,000.\textsuperscript{60}

Early in 1917 great difficulties were encountered in manning the east coast patrols. N.S.H.Q. accordingly suggested that as *Rainbow* would soon need to be extensively refitted, she should be paid off so that her crew might be transferred to the patrols, and the Admiralty concurred.\textsuperscript{61} The Japanese navy had long since assumed responsibility for the whole of the North Pacific except for Canadian coastal waters, and the small remaining possibilities of danger were cleared away on April 6, 1917, when the United States entered the war. The *Rainbow* performed her last war service in training gunners for the patrol vessels, and was paid off on May 8. She reverted to the disposal of the Naval Service on June 30, 1917, and was recommissioned as a depot ship at Esquimalt. In 1920 she was placed out of commission, and sold for $67,777 to a firm in Seattle to be broken up.

What would have happened, during those opening weeks of the war, had the *Rainbow* met the *Leipzig*? The latter would almost certainly have attacked. *Rainbow* was older and slower than the German cruiser, and less effectively manned. The type of main armament which she mounted, consisting of guns of two calibres, was less efficient than that of the *Leipzig* because a mixed armament makes spotting difficult. The *Rainbow*'s 6-inch guns were probably inferior in range to the *Leipzig*'s much smaller weapons, and German gunnery at

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\textsuperscript{60} Signals in N.S. 1047-19-3 (4); note among papers kindly lent by Rear Admiral Walter Hose, C.B.E., R.C.N. (Ret'd).

\textsuperscript{61} See p. 248 above.
Captain Walter Hose
that time was the best in the world. Notwithstanding these great disadvantages, the Rainbow would probably have had a very uneven chance of disabling or even destroying her opponent, had all else been equal which it was not. The fact that during the critical period she had only gunpowder-filled shells on board made the old cruiser nearly helpless. Off the coast where she was operating, however, fog-banks are frequent, and the Rainbow encountered many of them. Her commanding officer hoped that if he met a German cruiser he might be able to use the fog-banks very much as smoke-screens were to be employed later. By that means he hoped for a chance to engage at a range at which the enemy could be so damaged as to make her return home difficult or impossible.62

The Rainbow performed useful services during the war. She afforded a considerable measure of protection to the coast of British Columbia and the moral effect of her presence there was very valuable, especially during the first three weeks. After the arrival of the Idzumo and Newcastle, she played a useful if secondary part. The Rainbow was unable to afford much protection to trade. The Leipzig searched for merchant ships as freely as her coal-supply and her orders permitted, and temporarily succeeded in clearing the nearby waters of British ships.

At the same time, the presence of the Rainbow was even more effective in putting a stop to German trade. The few enemy steamers on the coast cut short their voyage at the nearest port, sending on their cargoes under the American flag, and numerous sailing vessels of large size were held up in Californian and Mexican harbours.63

Rainbow's services throughout were more restricted and much less valuable than would have been the case had she been newer and consequently faster and more powerful. If she had succeeded in disabling the Leipzig, it is obvious that von Spee's squadron would have been seriously weakened. The young Canadian Service would have benefited immeasurably and in a host of ways had the Rainbow been able to clothe herself in a mantle of glory as Australia's Sydney did; but this she could not reasonably hope to achieve. She had been acquired purely as a training ship and not in order to fight. Obsolescent vessels are very useful in time of war, but only for duties which take account of their limitations. Be-

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62 Interviews with Admiral Hose, June 1944 and April 1947.
63 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, I, pp. 162-3.
cause of the *Rainbow's* outmoded design and defective ammunition, moreover, her officers and men had to be sent out expecting to face almost hopeless odds. They had to be placed in a very unfair moral position as well, for uninformed opinion on shore concerning the *Rainbow* as a ship alternated illogically between ridicule and a tendency to regard her undiscriminately as a cruiser and therefore a match for any other cruiser. Her complement did all that could have been done with the instrument at their disposal, cheerfully facing unequal danger with little prospect of earning the fame which crowns unqualified success, and they served their country well.
Chapter 13

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

ONE of the most interesting stories of the Canadian Naval Service in the First World War has to do with submarine activity on the west coast. It is to this that Compton Mackenzie refers on page 110 of his Gallipoli Memories, where he says:

About ten o'clock on the morning of the Fourth of June, the destroyer Wolverine commanded by Lieut.-Commander Adrian Keyes, the younger brother of the Commodore, took us from Kephalo to Helles ... Keyes was full of stories about his experiences in Canada at the very beginning of the war, when he manned a submarine with a crew of local business-men. I wish I could remember the details of the good stories he told us; but they have passed from my recollection irretrievably, and I can only remember the gold watch that was presented to him by his amateur crew. One of those Canadian business-men ought to give us the tale of that submarine's adventures: Blackwood's Magazine would be the proper medium. Keyes himself is no longer alive, and the little epic ought not to be lost eternally.

Although vessels able to navigate under water had been thought of and built in the eighteenth century, it was not until near the end of the nineteenth century that a fully practicable one had been designed. The prototype of the modern submarine was invented by John P. Holland of Paterson, N.J., an Irish patriot who saw in such a vessel, used against the Royal Navy, a means of achieving independence for Ireland. His boats were the first to use a combination of internal-combustion engines for cruising on the surface and electric motors driven by storage batteries for propulsion when submerged. In the year 1900 the Admiralty ordered the first submarines for the Royal Navy, and these were of the Holland type. By 1907 all the great naval Powers, most of whom had bought plans and permission to use them from the Holland Company in the United States, were building their own submarines. Smaller countries usually ordered any they wanted from the shipbuilders of their larger neighbours.¹

On July 29, 1914, with war apparently imminent and the waters off the British Columbia coast very poorly protected, a group of about half a dozen men met at the Union Club in Victoria. Among them were Capt. W. H. Logan, Surveyor to the London Salvage Association, and Mr. J. V. Paterson, President of the Seattle Construction and Drydock Company, who was in the city on business.

War possibilities were under discussion. The acquisition of a Chilean warship was suggested and put aside as impossible. Paterson stated that his company had, at Seattle, two submarines which might be obtained. Of their existence Logan was aware. This was the first intimation, however, that there was chance of their acquirement.2

These submarines had been ordered by the Chilean Government in 1911 from the Electric Boat Co. of New Jersey, holders of the Holland patents, who had arranged for Paterson’s company to build them. The Chilean Government had agreed to pay $818,000 for the pair, and had actually paid $714,000; but the payments were slightly in arrears. Chilean naval experts had recommended that the boats should not be accepted, on the ground that they were overweight and that their sea endurance was consequently not up to specification. The builders were willing and anxious to sell the submarines to some one else, because their relations with the Chileans were strained, and also because in this way they would probably obtain a much higher price.

During the first two days of August the international situation was rapidly deteriorating. The Premier of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, took the matter of the submarines in charge, and conferences of leading men were held at McBride’s office, at the dockyard, and elsewhere. The Hon. Martin Burrell, Dominion Minister of Agriculture and Member for Yale-Cariboo, happened to be taking a holiday on the Pacific Coast at the time, and McBride obtained his advice and personal support; but Burrell would not commit the Federal Government.

So exigent did the situation become, that a summons was issued to meet at the Naval Yards on Monday morning the 3rd of August at 3 o’clock. Later in the day other meetings took place. Logan got into telephonic communication with Paterson, and asked for a definite price. The answer was $575,000 each. Logan expressed surprise at the figure, and handed the receiver to Mr. Burrell, who found it confirmed. To an attempt at bar-

2 Account of this meeting and the rest of the paragraph are based on Report of the Commission [Davidson Commission] concerning Purchase of Submarines (Ottawa 1917), pp. 7-25. It is not clear whether Paterson had come to Victoria in order to sell his submarines or whether he was there on other business.
gaining Paterson answered brusquely: “This is no time to indulge in talk of that kind and that I would not listen to it, and that if they did not care to get the boats they did not need to take them.” On the next day Logan, at Seattle, again brought up the question of price. Paterson replied that the price was not open to discussion at all. The price included the cost of delivering the vessels at the border of Canadian territorial waters. Naval opinion supported the belief that the purchase ought to be made, and Sir Richard McBride assumed the responsibility of completing arrangements.\(^3\)

On August 3 the Commander in Charge at Esquimalt signalled to N.S.H.Q.:

Two submarines actually completed for Chilean Government Seattle, estimated cost £115,000 each. Could probably purchase. Ready for action torpedoes on board. Chilean Government cannot take possession. I consider it most important to acquire immediately. Burrell concurs. Provincial Government will advance money pending remittance.\(^4\)

The next day, having been warned that the submarines should leave American waters by midnight, he sent another signal to N.S.H.Q.:

Can get submarines over immediately. Urgently suggest to do this before declaration of war, after which builders fear international complications. Shall not act without authority.\(^5\)

After receiving the first signal from the Commander in Charge, N.S.H.Q. had twice cabled to the Admiralty:

Am informed two submarines ready for delivery Seattle, ordered by Chile. Chile unable to take possession. Government desires information as to Admiralty opinion of capabilities of Chilean submarines at Seattle. Understand skilled British ratings in crews. Do you advise purchase?\(^6\)

As time was very pressing, however, McBride, fearful that further postponement might make it impossible to obtain the submarines, went ahead on his own responsibility and arranged to buy them with Provincial money. The negotiations were completed by Capt. Logan, who had gone to Seattle for that purpose accompanied by Sub-Lieut. T. A. Brown, R.N.C.V.R.\(^7\) The Chilean Government strongly objected to losing the

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3 *Ibid.*, p. 11. This report, the whole of which should have been rewritten before publication, is responsible for the strange mixture of *recta* and *obliqua* in Paterson's quoted reply.

4 N.S. 1062-1-2- (1). The statement that the submarines had torpedoes on board was incorrect.


6 N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty, Aug. 4, 1914 (two signals), *ibid.*

7 McBride later told the Davidson Commission that "had it not been for Captain Logan, we would never have had these vessels." *Royal [Davidson] Commission concerning Purchase of War Supplies, Evidence (Sess. Pap. No. 60, 1917)*, p. 1598. Brown was disguised in clothes which he had borrowed from a cook. His job seems to have been to try to make sure that no German agents were included in the crews when the submarines left Seattle.

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submarines, but it had not completed the payments. Through-out the day of August 4 Logan kept in touch with Victoria by telegraph and telephone. Paterson finally accepted McBride’s assurance that whatever amount was agreed to would be paid, and the deal was closed at the price which he had earlier set and refused to discuss. The amount was $1,150,000 for the two submarines, which was $332,000 more than the Chileans had undertaken to pay.

The Seattle Construction and Drydock Co. had agreed to take the two submarines out so as to reach, by daylight on the morning of August 5, a position five miles south of Trial Island where, just outside Canadian territorial waters, the S.S. *Salvor* was to meet them. Precautions were taken to prevent news of the transfer from reaching the ears of American officials, of the local Germans, and also of certain Chileans who were in Seattle in connection with the hoped-for release of the submarines to their own government. It was to be an escape rather than a clearance, for clearance papers had not been obtained. Paterson and Logan went on board one of the submarines, and at about 10 o’clock in the evening of August 4 the boats cast off, manned by company crews. Covered by darkness and fog, and running on their comparatively silent electric motors, they came safely to the harbour entrance. Here, in spite of the loud noise which the exhausts would make, the diesel engines were started and the submarines worked up to full speed. During this cruise, or earlier, one of them must have scraped her plates on some obstruction; but this fact was not known to their new owners until later.

Meanwhile the Canadian authorities had been arranging to receive the two vessels. An officer who had had several years’ experience with submarines was fortunately available in the person of Lieut.-Cdr. Bertram Jones, R.N. On the retired list and living on the west coast, he had reported at the dockyard in Esquimalt when war seemed imminent, and his services had been accepted. Jones was ordered to go out with the *Salvor* to meet the submarines at the rendezvous. He carried written

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8 The rather formidable Chilean navy which had been in the making was deprived of more than the two submarines at this time. The British Government requisitioned the battleship *Almirante Latorre*—28,000 tons, 10 14-inch guns—which had been launched a short time before in a British yard. Renamed the *Canada*, she was present at Jutland, and was released to Chile after the war. Three powerful Chilean flotilla leaders were similarly requisitioned for the duration of the war. (See Brassey’s *Naval and Shipping Annual*, 1920-21, p. 61).

9 The story of how the submarines were acquired, except where otherwise indicated, is based on the evidence given before the Davidson Commission, and the ensuing report.
instructions to inspect them as carefully as conditions permitted, spending at least an hour in each boat. If they appeared to be fully satisfactory the submarines were to be paid for, and he was then to bring them to Esquimalt. Jones carried with him a cheque for $1,150,000 drawn by the Province of British Columbia on the Canadian Bank of Commerce and endorsed by McBride. Accompanied by Lieut. R. H. Wood, Chief Engineer at Esquimalt, Jones met the submarines at the appointed place, where they drew alongside the Salvor. About four hours were spent in inspecting the boats, the huge cheque was then given to the impatient Paterson, British colours were hoisted, and no time was lost in making for Esquimalt which they reached safely on the morning of August 5. ⁴⁰

On the heels of the various declarations of war President Wilson signed a series of identical neutrality proclamations. These forbade, within the jurisdiction of the United States, a number of acts likely to benefit one of the belligerents at the expense of the other. The acts which were specified included:

Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents.

This, the most nearly relevant section, would hardly have applied to an intention to take the two submarines out of American and into Canadian waters. As the two boats had not been cleared out of Seattle, however, their seizure could no doubt have been based on that fact, and it is easy to see why the United States authorities should have wished to bar any possibility of a couple of miniature Alabamas running loose in the Pacific. Whatever the legal position may have been, the President’s proclamation covering the hostilities between Germany and Great Britain was signed on August 5, and the following day, at 8 a.m., the United States cruiser Milwaukee sailed from Bremerton Navy Yard in order to intercept the two submarines if they were still in American territorial waters, and “prevent violation of Neutrality.” The Milwaukee searched Port Townsend harbour, and having steamed for some distance towards New Dungeness without finding the submarines she returned to Bremerton. ⁴¹

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⁴⁰ Report... concerning Purchase of Submarines; Richard Ryan to McBride, Aug. 6, 1914, B.C. Archives. The Ryan letter is a report by an eyewitness.

⁴¹ Material from the Milwaukee’s Cruising Report and Log kindly furnished by the Officer in Charge of Naval Records and Library, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.
The unheralded arrival of the submarines caused much excitement. Many of the people in Esquimalt concluded that the enemy was upon them. The examination vessel on duty outside ran hastily into the harbour, with the lanyard of her siren tied to the rail and the siren sounding an uninterrupted alarm. The shore batteries, which were manned by the army and which apparently had not been warned, telephoned to the dockyard before opening fire, in order to find out whether or not any submarines were expected. In the end, the causes of the excitement entered the harbour unmolested and tied up at the dockyard. The Esquimalt base was ill-prepared to receive the newcomers, and wired at once to Ottawa:

Require all gear in connection with 18" submerged tubes firing torpedoes; including gyroscopes spare tools and torp. manuals, torp. artificers, torp. ratings. We have nothing.¹²

They also asked for any submarine officers and men who might be available.

The request from N.S.H.Q., mentioned above, for advice as to the desirability of buying the submarines, brought a reply from the Admiralty favouring the purchase, provided that Canada could man the boats.¹³ This opinion was given principally on the advice of Sir Philip Watts, who had been for many years Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty. He was naval adviser to the Chilean Government, and he knew all that could be known about the two submarines by anyone who had not actually seen them. He thought that they were well worth buying, and his opinion was supported by the commodore of the British submarine service. The Canadian Government had thus been advised to buy the boats by the best-informed authority accessible to it.

As soon as he had made up his mind to buy the submarines with Provincial funds, Sir Richard McBride had sent the following telegram to Sir Robert Borden:

After consultation with Burrell and Naval Officers have advanced to-night one million and fifty thousand dollars... for purchase two modern submarines lying Seattle harbour and built for Chile. All arrangements complete for their arrival Esquimalt to-morrow morning unless untoward incident occurs. Congratulate Canada if this operation successful on acquisition of such useful adjunct defence of country.

Borden replied:

Yesterday morning we communicated with Admiralty as to advisability of securing two submarines mentioned, and as to feasibility of man-

¹² Dockyard to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 5, 1914, N.S. 46-1-48 (1).
¹³ Admiralty to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 5, 1914, N.S. 1062-1-2 (1).
Canada's First Submarines

ning them, as without crew they would be useless. They advise purchase provided crews could be secured. As this has been accomplished we appreciate most warmly your action which will greatly tend to increase security on the Pacific coast, and send hearty thanks. Please advise us of their arrival.¹⁴

The naval signals which bracketed the actual buying of the submarines were very terse. On August 5, N.S.H.Q. sent a signal to Esquimalt: “Prepare to purchase submarines. Telegraph price.” The reply was: “Have purchased submarines.”¹⁵ British Columbia thus became the only Province that has ever, since Confederation, owned any warships. On August 7 the Dominion Government assumed responsibility for the purchase, and the boats were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty by Order in Council on the same day.¹⁶

Their prospective Chilean owners had named the vessels Iquique and Antofagasta. The Senior Naval Officer at Esquimalt, subject to the approval of N.S.H.Q., called the new arrivals Paterson and McBride after their builder and buyer. His action was not approved, however, an Australian precedent being followed instead. Some time previously the Royal Australian Navy had acquired two submarines of the Royal Navy’s E class, and had named them AE 1 and AE 2. The Canadian submarines approximated to the Admiralty’s C class boats, so the Iquique became CC 1 and the Antofagasta CC 2. Yet President Paterson did not go entirely unrewarded, for the Electric Boat Company let him keep $40,000 by way of commission.¹⁷

These were small submarines of a type well adapted to operating in coast waters. The approaches to Victoria and Vancouver through the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the islands within were admirably suited to defence by means of submarines, because a ship entering those narrow waters would have to follow more or less predictable courses. Also the knowledge that submarines were present might weigh heavily with the commander of a raider so far from any friendly base that a serious injury would make her return home impossible. It was with this in mind that the Secretary of State for the

¹² N.S. 1062-1-2 (1).
¹³ P.C. 2072, Aug. 7, 1914.
¹⁴ The Electric Boat Company’s representative had quoted to Paterson the price of $555,000 for each of the submarines. Paterson hoisted the amount to $575,000, and kept the difference.
Colonies, when he accepted the submarines for operational purposes on behalf of the Admiralty, transmitted the following suggestion:

The fact of their being on the coast cannot be too widely advertised but their actual position should be concealed. Plausible reports should be issued from time to time of their presence at different ports.\(^{18}\)

Nor was the knowledge that two submarines were stationed on the coast valuable only with respect to its probable effect on the enemy. During those earliest days of the war there was much uneasiness among the seaboard population. The banks in Victoria and Vancouver, for example, were transferring their cash and securities to inland or neutral cities. Blasting in connection with work on sewers in Victoria was stopped, because of nervousness among the people. Several million dollars' worth of insurance against bombardment seems to have been bought, and one family went so far as to prepare a vault in the cemetery for occupancy in case of attack. There was no panic, yet it was very desirable that the coast should not only be but also seem to be adequately protected. The local press almost from the start struck a note of confidence, and the submarines gave it something tangible to work with. Thus the Victoria Daily Times was only enlarging a salutary fact when on August 5, after announcing their arrival, it added:

The Iquique and Antofagasta are modern submarines of high speed and wide radius of activity. They could cope with a hostile fleet of considerable proportions.\(^{19}\)

The following day the Colonist, of the same city, alluded to the arrival of the submarines in an editorial:

These vessels are a highly important addition to the defences of the Coast, and fortunately one of the best experts in submarine navigation is on hand to take charge of them . . . .

The southwestern part of the British Columbia Coast is now very well provided for in the matter of defence. In deference to the wishes of Ottawa we shall not enter into any details as to the nature of these preparations, but we can assure the citizens that nothing has been left undone that ought to be done or that can be done with the available facilities, and that these are quite sufficient for defence against any probable enemy.\(^{20}\)

During the first few days of the war the naval arrangements at Esquimalt call to mind those on board H.M.S. Pinafore.

\(^{18}\) Col. Sec. (Harcourt) to Gov. Gen., Aug. 9, 1914, N.S. 1062-1-2 (1).

\(^{19}\) Daily Times, Victoria, B.C., Aug. 5, 1914.

\(^{20}\) Daily Colonist, Victoria, B.C., Aug. 6, 1914.
The Senior Naval Officer, who had been overloaded with work, had a nervous breakdown, and his actions showed that he roundly suspected the enemy of roaming at large in the streets of the town. Accordingly there was a hiatus which was filled for the time being, adequately if unofficially, by the Provincial Premier. The position of Senior Naval Officer was then assumed by Lieut. Bertram Jones, pending the arrival from Ottawa of Admiral W. O. Storey, who took over the duties on October 20. Preparations were begun to man the submarines and get them to sea, and much of the credit for this achievement belongs to the late Lieut. Adrian Keyes, R.N. (Ret'd). When the war began Keyes was working in Toronto for the Canadian Northern Railway, and Admiral Kingsmill, at his wits' end to find a submarine officer, heard of him and asked him to report in Ottawa. It was a real windfall for the Naval Service to obtain at this time a first-rate submarine commander of great ability and unusually wide training, and after an interview Keyes was sent forthwith to Esquimalt to take charge of the submarines. His resources consisted of two strange boats, a badly-equipped dockyard, and about a hundred volunteers most of whom were amateurs. Keyes lined up these volunteers, asking that any men who might not wish to serve in a submarine should step out of the ranks, whereupon not a man moved. From this group the crews were chosen, and the work of learning to handle the boats began.

During the first few days, largely as a means of training, CC 1 and CC 2 were taken apart on the dry dock by the crews, and after about five hundred tally plates had been changed from Spanish to English the submarines were put together again. In this period no leave was granted, and the busy days spent on valves, tanks, and tallies, were rounded out with lectures by Keyes from 8 to 10 p.m., in which he imparted to them as much of his knowledge as they could absorb. By the time that the submarines were afloat once more the crews could dive them without turning the wrong taps or other untoward incidents.

No torpedoes for the submarines had been supplied at Seattle, and none of the required 18-inch calibre were available at Esquimalt as the Rainbow's were 14-inch ones. The Niobe, which was at Halifax, used 18-inch torpedoes however, and a

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21 Keyes was a brother of Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes.
22 Most of the information contained in this and the preceding paragraph was supplied by Capt. B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R.
supply of these was sent to Vancouver as quickly as possible. One of them went bumping across the continent with its compressed-air chamber filled; but all arrived safely.

Less than two weeks after the boats had reached Esquimalt long strides had been taken towards making them fit for active Operations. Keves himself commanded CC 1, and with him were Lieut. Wilfrid T. Walker, R.N. (Ret'd), and Mid. Maitland-Dougall, a graduate of the Royal Naval College of Canada, who was later to see much submarine service and to lose his life on the other side of the Atlantic. The crew consisted of three former naval ratings and thirteen volunteers who had been enrolled locally. CC 1 had on board five of Niobe's torpedoes and was fitted with wireless. She was reported ready for active service. CC 2 had a full complement in training under the command of Lieut. Bertram Jones. His first officer was Lieut. B. L. Johnson, R.N.R. The crew was composed of six active or former naval ratings and ten local volunteers. The CC 2 had three torpedoes and was expected to be ready for service before the end of the month. The two submarines were almost identical. Their surface displacement was 313 tons, and their submerged displacement 421 tons. They measured 15 feet across the beam and were 144 and 152 feet long respectively. CC 1 had 5 torpedo tubes and could stow 5 torpedoes; CC 2 had 3 tubes and could carry 6 torpedoes. One of the tubes in each submarine was mounted in the stern. The designed speed of these boats was 13 knots on the surface and slightly over 10 knots submerged; on November 2, 1914, however, in a surface trial over a measured mile, CC 1 achieved a speed of 15.1 knots. Neither of the submarines possessed any gun armament.

On September 8, H.M.S. Shearwater, one of the two R.N. sloops stationed on the coast, was commissioned as tender to the submarines, having been lent by the Admiralty for that purpose. Workshops and other conveniences were installed in the Shearwater so that the endurance of the submarines would be greatly increased by cruising in company with her. The Shearwater's former crew had been sent east to join the Niobe,

23 This officer was later to command H.M. submarine H 8, which he took from Montreal across to Great Britain and afterwards commanded in the North Sea. On one occasion, while running submerged, the H 8 struck a mine which blew off a portion of the bow. Lieut. Johnson brought her safely back to Harwich, and was promoted to lieutenant-commander, and awarded the D.S.O. a year and a half later for continued good service in H.M. submarines. For a description of this extraordinary incident see Carr, By Guess and By God, pp. 280-82.

and the officers and men of CC 1 and CC 2 lived in the sloop when in port. She accompanied her charges wherever they went, and acted as a target for their practice torpedoes. A submarine is at once the least comfortable and the most dangerous of all naval craft which spend any prolonged periods of time at sea. The discomfort arises principally from the lack of space on board. On the surface, submarines have only a small margin of buoyancy, and when submerged they are exposed to a whole series of hazards which surface vessels never know. Experienced "submariners" testify that the life is made much more eligible that it would otherwise be by a characteristic informality and an unusually strong feeling of comrade-ship.  

The crews of these two Canadian submarines had given themselves to an exigent apprenticeship which was more irksome if less perilous because, except during the first few weeks of the war, there was no likelihood of their seeing the enemy. These crews were largely composed of landsmen, most of whom probably had never seen a submarine before, and the way in which they carried out a task which was the more dangerous because of their inexperience was, as Sir Richard McBride put it, "most creditable to the naval volunteers of British Columbia."

An exceedingly unpleasant experience early befell the complement of CC 1. During her first cruise, with an expert from the Seattle yard still on board, somebody accidentally pushed against the handle controlling the horizontal rudders. The tremendous down helm which the boat received resulted in a steep and sudden dive. The Seattle man instantly called for full speed ahead while Lieut. Keyes ordered full speed astern. Fortunately it was Keyes' command which was obeyed, and the submarine righted herself.  

The following descriptions are taken from a personal account supplied by a former R.N.C.V. reservist who was selected at the beginning for one of the crews:

A few days after the commencement of the fateful 4th of August, 1914 . . . I was 'peeling spuds' as 'cook of the Mess' for the day, when I happened to glance casually seaward from outside the old barrack room of the present Dockyard and observed two low lying craft proceeding towards the entrance of Esquimalt Harbour . . . . Little did I realize . . . that these boats in about a week's time were to be my home for over three years . . . .

25 E.g.: "In a U-Boat there was scarcely any visible difference of rank; no clicking of heels, the life itself bound us to a common fate: a common life or death." Hashagen, U-Boats Westward, p. 131.

26 Information supplied by Capt. B. L. Johnson.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

It was an extreme transformation from an office to a submarine complete with electric motors, pumps, pipe lines, high pressure lines and air bottles, but with the tolerance of those splendid men of the Royal Navy, who willingly assisted me in my new duties, I spent three of the happiest years of my life on these two boats . . . in a few months the work of each branch of the boat i.e. engineers, stokers, seamen, electricians and torpedo men, was splendidly coordinated and resulted in most efficient operations . . .

After Coronel was avenged . . . there was no menace to the B.C. coast and for two years the peacetime routine of the Royal Navy for submarines was observed, which was approximately two weeks sea time per month and two weeks harbour routine which included the care and maintenance of the engines, torpedoes, motors and so on.

During these years with diving and torpedo running, the boats reached a high state of efficiency and had the opportunity of showing the White Ensign in many parts of British Columbia where it had not been previously seen and possibly in many places where it has been impracticable to show it since . . . Many interesting practice torpedo attacks were made, one being an attack on H.M.S. 'Orbita' 27 an auxiliary cruiser which CC 1 attacked scoring a direct hit with a collision head. This attack was the result of a wager made in the wardrooms the previous night between the Captain of the 'Orbita' and our Commanding Officer. The submarines, in accordance with plan, proceeded to sea early in the morning to attack 'Orbita', although it must be admitted 'Orbita' had little chance to see our periscope as the sea was very choppy that particular morning . . .

Leave was practically unobtainable in the months which succeeded the opening of the war and one afternoon both boats happened to be in Harbour, having returned from patrol that morning. The crew desired leave and after a 'council of war' it was decided that we would have a wedding, to which the Officers could hardly refuse to grant leave for the afternoon and evening. This was consequently applied for in the service manner to attend the wedding of a petty officer whose name I will not record. This was readily granted and one of our officers even kindly thought that a wedding present would not be inappropriate and proceeded accordingly. As many men from both boats as could be spared went ashore and the first problem was to procure a bride and bridesmaids. This was not a difficult matter in Victoria and a most glorious party resulted. This took the form of a dinner party in the famous Westholm Grill, attended of course, by the bride and her maids. It was felt that the suspicions of the officers might be aroused and this actually proved to be the case, as several of the officers attended the Westholm Grill and witnessed the wedding supper and they were then apparently satisfied, or at least they could not deny the existence of the wedding. Leave expired at 1 a.m. and our Commanding Officer, being still somewhat suspicious, to use his own words, decided 'to give the beggars a wedding breakfast' and took both boats to sea at 4 a.m. in very heavy weather. 28

For nearly three years the submarines remained on the west coast, based on Esquimalt and engaged in cruising and training. The Admiralty then sent them around to Halifax on their

27 A new liner of 15,486 tons gross, owned by the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. In 1939 she was still in service, running between Great Britain and South America.

28 Account by F. W. Crickard, Esq.
way to Europe, and they left Esquimalt for the last time on June 21, 1917, accompanied by the Shearwater. During this cruise engine-trouble was almost chronic, and twelve days were spent at Balboa for overhaul and repairs, after which, on August 12, the sloop and the two submarines obtained the distinction of being the first warships flying the white ensign ever to pass through the Panama Canal. The United States naval authorities signalized this event by giving the little flotilla a welcome at Balboa and Colón, and the British Minister to Panama and the Vice-Consul at Colón accompanied them through the canal. The personal account which follows testifies to the fact that this was no ordinary cruise:

Leaving Esquimalt harbour quietly on the morning of June 21st, the three vessels started on their long voyage. Two days later bad weather set in and the submarines were battened down with the decks just awash. The temperature in the engine rooms of these subs in the Tropics reached as high as 140 degrees and considerably added to the discomfort of the crews as we were unfortunate in having much bad weather which necessitated the boats steaming battened down.

In order to keep the engines from racing it was necessary for the CC 2 to keep charging the storage batteries. Then the submarine would use her motors until the batteries were run down. The only ventilation obtainable was through the operation of the engines. They would be run for ten minutes drawing fresh air into the craft, and in twenty minutes time they would be again started and would draw in a fresh supply.

It was not often possible to keep both engines running at once. While one engine was propelling the submarine, the engine crew would be working feverishly on the other. When the running engine showed signs of weakening and then quit entirely the idle engine would be started while the disabled one was fixed.

Then came another horror. During a heavy gale off Cape Blanco on the Oregon coast, and again off Salina Cruz, Mexico, the storage batteries, through weak construction, were short-circuited time and again and caught fire, giving out chlorine gas that laid low the greater portion of CC 2’s personnel. For one night the craft was navigated by the coxswain, while only one or two others were fit for duty, the others lying around in an unconscious state. Sardine sandwiches were the only sustaining power given the men for their all-night vigil. Sometimes they wondered if the game wasn’t up for them. That was one of the worst experiences of the whole trip.

On October 14th, 1917, the Shearwater and the submarines made Halifax, and the latter were promptly ordered to refuel and proceed across the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. This was impossible, and the order was later cancelled.

The CC 1 and CC 2 were badly strained and their engines were down and out. A pile of cracked piston heads, and other parts discarded, bore testimony to the difficulties of the long trip. The CC 2 made 7,000\(^{29}\) miles

\(^{29}\) “CC 2 has been the more reliable of the two boats and her engines have run 5,000 miles out of the whole distance of 7,300.” Letter of Proceedings by the Shearwater’s C.O., Oct. 17 1917, N.S. 45-2-12 (1).
with her own engines, a wonderful tribute to the men who coaxed and en-
ticed the machinery to endure the strain which it was never designed to
bear. The engine room staff was repeatedly complimented by the Shear-
water's commander on the fine performance and on arrival at Halifax the
little flotilla received a highly congratulatory message from Sir W. Brown-
ing, then Commander-in-Chief of the North America and West Indies
station. 20

As it was evident after their arrival in Halifax that the sub-
marines were unfit to cross the Atlantic without new engines, the Admiralty cabled: "Consider submarines should be re-
paired and should remain at Halifax where they may be useful
if enemy submarines cross Atlantic."

The two boats re-
mained at Halifax until the close of the war. They were laid
up for repairs during the summer and early fall of 1918, and it
was during this time that German submarines appeared in
those waters. In 1920 CC 1 and CC 2 were sold out of the
Service.

The purchase of these two submarines in 1914 had been
made in very unusual and difficult circumstances, and Sir
Richard McBride seems to have realized from the first that he
was taking his political life in his hands. If the boats were to
be obtained at all, swift, secret, and irregular steps had to be
taken. McBride's action bears a striking resemblance to that
of Disraeli in 1875 when he bought the shares in the Suez
Canal for the British Government. Unlike Disraeli, however,
McBride caused public money to be spent without the author-
ity of his legislature. This serious irregularity had been
inevitable; but the transaction was made to appear even more
questionable by two incidents which happened to occur in
connection with it. In the telegram quoted above which
McBride sent to Borden on August 4, owing to a clerical error
made in Ottawa the amount paid for the submarines was
stated to have been $1,050,000 which was $100,000 less than
the amount that had actually been asked for and paid. Fur-
thermore, as soon as the submarines had been delivered in
Esquimalt, Paterson had taken his cheque for $1,150,000 to the
Canadian Bank of Commerce in Victoria, the bank that had
issued the cheque, and had there converted it into three drafts,
two on New York and one on Seattle. The manager of the
bank seems to have considered this to be an odd proceeding.

20 Account by a crew member, printed in Harbour and Shipping (Vancouver), Apr. 1921, p.
745. J. H. Hamilton, Esq., editor of Harbour and Shipping, has kindly permitted this account
to be reprinted here.

31 Admiralty to N.S.H.Q., Oct. 28, 1917, N.S. 45-2-12 (1).
CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

He evidently expected a simple transfer of credit to a single account somewhere, and he probably wondered why Paterson was in such haste to get his money out of the country.\textsuperscript{32} Altogether it is not to be wondered at that the transaction gave rise to criticism. By the end of the year scandals were beginning to be suspected in connection with many acquisitions of war materials, and the purchasing of the submarines, when viewed from the outside, had a sinister appearance.

On February 11, 1915, the Hon. William Pugsley, who had been Laurier’s Minister of Public Works, moved in the Canadian House of Commons that a copy of all the official correspondence and reports relating to the submarines and their purchase should be laid before the House. Pugsley asserted that the submarines were out of date and not built according to specifications, that Chile had not wanted them, that the price paid had been too high, and that the government had been too secretive. He also asked whether anyone had got a commission out of the deal. In the course of his speech he referred to McBride as “the sixteenth member of this Government, though he is not yet sworn in.” Pugsley also said:

\ldots it looks to me as if this Government was hesitating about purchasing the submarines and Sir Richard McBride took it upon himself to force the hand of the Government by purchasing them himself on behalf of the British Columbian Government. \ldots I myself am very much in favour of adding submarines to the Canadian navy. \ldots My only regret is that there should be any question as to the suitability of these submarines for the purpose for which they were bought.

Later in the debate Pugsley expressed the opinion that McBride would probably have known what to do with a quarter of a million dollars. The suggestion was, not that McBride had put money into his own pocket, but that he might have used it for Party purposes.

The Minister\textsuperscript{33} replied for the government. He argued that there was no reason to consider the submarines defective; that the naval experts, including those at the Admiralty, had recommended that the boats should be bought; that it had been exceedingly desirable to have two submarines stationed at Esquimalt; and that there had been no time to lose. He promised to produce all the relevant documents at an early date, excepting any that might give useful information to the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32} The evidence given before the Davidson Commission is extremely detailed regarding the whole transaction.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} Hon. J. D. Hazen.}
enemy. Sir Robert Borden supported his Minister, emphasizing the danger that had seemed to threaten the west coast and the duty of the government to furnish all possible protection. He added that:

If Sir Richard McBride had not taken the action which he did the submarines could not have been purchased by Canada and the security they have afforded to the Pacific coast would not have been available.34

McBride also defended what he had done, in a long speech delivered on February 24 in the Provincial Legislature.35 The same day he telegraphed to Borden asking for a strict investigation. The Prime Minister replied that he did not think Pugsley worth that much attention, and McBride agreed to let the matter rest for the time being. On June 2, 1915, the Dominion Government authorized Sir Charles Davidson, under Royal Commission, to inquire into war purchases, and during the same month McBride went to Ottawa and asked once more for an investigation. The buying of the submarines was included in the terms of reference of the Davidson Commission, which took evidence on that subject in Victoria, Vancouver, Ottawa, Montreal, and New York. The Commission reported that the submarines could not, in the circumstances, have been obtained for less, and that alternative purchasers were available to whom Paterson or the Electric Boat Co. would have sold them had McBride not met the quoted price. The report also completely exonerated McBride and all others whose names had been unfavourably mentioned in connection with the purchase, stating that "this... enterprise was, throughout, of blameless character."36 Both of these verdicts seem to be worthy of acceptance. The sequence of political events which has been described—the unorthodox transaction in emergency; the criticism and demand for information, by the Opposition; the publishing of the relevant documents; and the Commission's investigation, followed by a published report and minutes of evidence—furnishes a good instance of parliamentary institutions functioning at the top of their form in time of war.

The assertion that the boats were of an unsuitable type was invalid. Their design was not perfect; but it should be remembered that practical submarines were a comparatively recent

34 The debate on the submarines is in House of Commons Debates, 1915, 1, pp. 94-116. Sess. Pap. No. 158, 1915, carried out the Minister's promise.
35 Reported in Colonist, Victoria, Feb. 25, 1915.
36 Report, p. 25.
invention, and that contemporary boats of virtually the same design gave an excellent account of themselves in European waters. The question of workmanship is more difficult; yet on this point, too, it is possible to reach a fairly certain conclusion. The Kingston valve leading from the main ballast-tank of each submarine seemed from the first to be obstructed, and on examination a piece of 2-inch plank was discovered in one of the tanks and a pair of overalls in the other. Both submarines were docked for overhaul in the spring of 1915, and the Chief Engineer at Esquimalt reported on their condition. Of CC 1 he said among other things that: “The general state of the valves conveyed the impression of gross carelessness in the original workmanship;” and of CC 2: “The defects mentioned indicate a lack of detailed inspection during the Construction of the boats.” Of both submarines he stated that: “The workmanship put into the vessels does not approach the Admiralty standard of construction.” CC 1 was docked again in December 1915, and on this occasion about seventeen hundred of her hull rivets had to be renewed.37

The Davidson Commission, on the other hand, basing its judgment mainly on evidence given by a number of naval officers who were in a good position to know the facts, praised the construction of the boats.38 The overalls and plank in the tanks did not necessarily indicate inferior workmanship, and the deterioration of the rivets referred to above has been credibly attributed to electrolytic action resulting from contact between the steel hulls of the submarines and the copper sheathing of the Shearwater. Among those who served in the boats, whose special knowledge carries weight and whose opinions have been available, the prevailing judgment is that the submarines were well constructed, and this verdict it is probably safe to accept.

The main propelling machinery consisted of two direct, reversible, six-cylinder, two-cycle diesel engines, of 300 b.h.p. each at 500 r.p.m. The engines operated under blast injection, with a two-stage air-compressor driven directly from the main crank-shaft at the forward end of the engines. Blast air was supplied at 1,000 lb. pressure per square inch at the compressor, and restricted to 900 lb. at the fuel-nozzles. Circulating water, lubricating oil, and primary fuel pumps were connected to a single cross-head and driven by a small auxiliary crank-shaft.

37 Reports by the Chief Engineer, Esquimalt, N.S. 45-2-8 (1).
also geared to the main crank-shaft at the forward end. A single cam-shaft operated the fuel-injection valves, scavenger valves, and air-starting valves, and was mounted on top of the cylinders and fitted with a reversible clutch. Lubrication was on the closed pressure system, and the oil, after passing the main bearings and the bottom and top ends of the connecting-rods, passed into the piston-heads in order to cool them, and then returned to the crank-case. These engines had been designed at a time when the diesel was in its infancy, and trouble with them was almost chronic. Cracked piston-heads, broken auxiliary crank-shafts, and trouble with the compressor and the inter-coolers, were extremely frequent experiences, and only the untiring efforts of the engine-room staff kept the engines running.39

The German cruiser *Leipzig* had been in Magdalena Bay, Mexico, when she received the news that Great Britain had declared war on Germany, and from August 5 to September 9 she operated off the west coast of North America between Mazatlan and Cape Mendocino.40 During a press broadcast from San Diego on the night of August 6-7, while she was on her way to San Francisco, she learned for the first time that the naval force at the Admiralty’s disposal on the west coast included “two submarines bought from Chile.”41 The German official history42 does not represent the *Leipzig*’s captain as having known that *CC 1* and *CC 2* would for some time be unprepared for serious Operations. Nor does it credit the Canadian submarines with having influenced the *Leipzig*’s movements in any way. Submarines were an untried weapon at that time, and many naval officers, of whom the *Leipzig*’s captain may possibly have been one, had a low opinion of their capabilities. A more likely explanation, however, is that the Germans probably weighed the two submarines very lightly in their calculations because they had no intention of entering the Strait of Juan de Fuca or its approaches.

The great masters of naval strategy from Drake to Mahan have practised or preached concentration of force, and offen-


40 See ch. 12.

41 Several weeks later S.M.S. *Nürnberg* informed Admiral von Spee from Honolulu that the enemy ships on the Canadian coast consisted of three cruisers [correct] and two auxiliary cruisers [Hilfskreuzer]. It seems much more likely that the last three words were an inaccurate description of the *Algerine* and *Shearwater* than that they referred to the submarines.

42 *Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918: Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausländischen Gewässern*, I, ch. 5.
sive action whenever practicable. Landsmen, on the other hand, often think of naval war as being chiefly a matter of passively defending coasts and ports. During the Napoleonic wars Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty and one of the greatest of all British naval strategists, was loudly criticized for keeping the fleet concentrated and out of sight of land when invasion seemed to threaten:

As the panic grew, frenzied demands came from all parts of the kingdom for ships to be stationed on the nearest parts of the coast, and an insistence on the manning of flat boats, brigs, and other small craft to repel a landing.\(^43\)

In the United States, at the beginning of the Spanish-American War:

...the seashore people were swept off their feet by fear of invasion or bombardment... Senators rushed to the Secretary of the Navy pleading that a naval vessel, any kind of ship, be sent to the leading ports of their states to reassure the population.\(^44\)

The phenomenon is not peculiar to English-speaking countries, nor does it occur only in time of war. "Throughout my whole career," wrote Grand-Admiral Tirpitz at the end of it, "I have always had to oppose two ideas, especially beloved of the lay mind—the idea of a special coastal defence..."\(^45\) The fundamental objection of the experts to a shallow-water policy is that it violates the principle of concentration of force and destroys any prospect of offensive action. To place a warship or a small squadron like a goal-keeper outside each port, will weaken the main fleet to the point of ineffectiveness and may expose the isolated ships to being destroyed in detail by superior forces of the enemy. This policy is therefore one of passive defence. The most eminent of the prophets of concentration and the offensive as sound principles of naval strategy has declared that:

When war has been accepted as necessary, success means nothing short of victory; and victory must be sought by offensive measures, and by them only can be insured.\(^46\)

He also writes:

A raid? Well, a raid, above all a maritime raid, is only a raid; a black eye, if you will, but not a bullet in the heart, nor yet a broken leg.\(^47\)

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\(^{44}\) Davis, *A Navy Second to None*, p. 81.

\(^{45}\) Tirpitz, *Memoirs*, 1, p. 92.

\(^{46}\) Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect*, p. 152. Mahan's insistence on offensive measures as the only certain means to victory is too extreme to win unreserved acceptance among the expert; but there is general agreement that naval forces should act offensively whenever practicable.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 175.
Lord Fisher has put the naval point of view on this subject into two pithy sentences, written in his tempestuous style:

General principle: The Admiralty should never engage itself to lock up a single vessel even—not even a torpedo-boat, or submarine—anywhere on any consideration whatever. The whole principle of Sea fighting is to be free to go anywhere with every d—d thing the Navy possesses.48

This plebiscite of the giants has been held only in order to show that a blessing pronounced upon the action of the Provincial and Dominion governments in acquiring the two submarines should not be construed too widely.

Purchasing the submarines and stationing them at Esquimalt were acts thoroughly justified in the circumstances of place and time. The 700-mile front which British Columbia presented to the ocean was exceedingly easy to protect against a naval attack. By fortifying its northern entrance, the Strait of Georgia could be quickly and easily converted into an inlet from the strategic point of view. Inside the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which would then form its single, narrow entrance, lay all but one of the important ports. The exception, Prince Rupert, was not a vital spot except in the virtually impossible event of an attempted invasion, and lent itself admirably to local defence by means of shore batteries. The remainder of the exposed coast, including the seaward side of Vancouver Island, was practically uninhabited except for a few very small towns and an occasional village. Through the Strait of Juan de Fuca came and went almost all the merchant ships which plied overseas, and into it or its approaches any enemy ship hoping to cause serious physical damage would have to come. The coastwise trade route up to a point nearly two hundred miles north of Vancouver was covered by the rampart of Vancouver Island. The presence of the submarines in or near the Strait of Juan de Fuca, therefore, achieved far more than merely local protection for Esquimalt and Victoria. Placing them there was, in fact, applying the principle of concentration for defence to the abnormal coast of British Columbia.

Had it been possible to obtain and man, in place of the submarines, one or more cruisers as good as the Leipzig or better, they would have been even more effective than the submarines were, for pure defence. They would also have been able to go wherever the enemy might be, and so to make a positive rather than a purely passive contribution toward

48 Fisher, Memories, p. 197.
winning the war. Such ships could have caught the Leipzig off the coast of Mexico, or driven her at once from North American waters. They could then have formed an important addition to the allied naval forces in the Pacific or elsewhere. The supreme merit of the two submarines was, however, that they were available.49

49 For expert and unstinted help in connection with this chapter sincere thanks are due to Capt. B. L. Johnson, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.C.N.R. (Ret'd.), and to R. Pearson, Esq., O.B.E. Dr. W. Kaye Lamb very kindly placed at the author's disposal his private collection of material concerning these submarines.
Chapter 14

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

At the Imperial Conference of 1917 it was agreed "that the Admiralty be requested to work out, immediately after the conclusion of the war, what they consider the most effective scheme of Naval Defence for the Empire for the consideration of the several Governments summoned to this Conference, with such recommendations as the Admiralty consider necessary in that respect for the Empire's future security." 1 Acting on this request the Admiralty submitted to the Imperial War Conference, in May 1918, a memorandum containing their recommendations. 2 In the Admiralty's opinion, war experience had shown that the maintenance of adequate sea power was essential to the independence of the separate communities which formed the British Empire. The memorandum pointed to the superior value of a single navy, as a means to facilitate the preparing of effective war plans, and to command the seas and protect seaborne traffic. The Admiralty therefore proposed a scheme whereby the whole naval force of the Empire would form one organization, all effective units being under the control of an imperial naval authority both in peace and war. Ships were to be available for service in any waters, and officers and men for service in any ship. The partner nations would establish local naval boards, and these, while working in co-operation with the imperial naval authority, would be under their respective Ministers for the navy and responsible to their respective Parliaments. Under this scheme the imperial naval authority would deal with questions of strategy and the utilization of the navy as a fighting force, organization, equipment, efficiency, promotions and appointments, principles of training, and the formulation of the requirements which the annual Estimates would reflect. The naval boards, on the other hand, would control all local naval establishments such as dockyards and institutions for training. They would also be responsible for

2 Copy with "Occasional Paper No. 21," Oct. 1919, N.S. 1017-31-3 (1)
construction and repairs, the entry and training of personnel, providing material and supplies, and other functions which help to keep a fleet in a state of efficiency. Discipline, the type of uniform, and qualifications for promotion, were to be the same for all, and the rates of pay would be as nearly equal as possible. The Admiralty did not make any specific proposals about the permanent composition and constitutional status of the imperial naval authority; but arrangements to cover the transitional period were tentatively suggested. In the opinion of the Admiralty the final arrangement would be determined by the form in which a desire for closer imperial unity might ultimately be expressed. On the naval and professional side, the staff of the single navy would form the basis of an organization which would gradually become fully representative as officers drawn from the overseas nations acquired sufficient naval experience to fit them for the higher posts. It was suggested that if the Dominions accepted the proposed scheme, arrangements might be made to include India.

It was decided, however, that this memorandum should be considered by the Dominion Prime Ministers individually, before it was presented to the Imperial War Conference. The memorandum was first of all given to Sir Robert Borden, who decided that it could not be accepted, as it did not sufficiently recognize the status of the Dominions and would therefore offend the newly-awakened sense of nationhood in Canada and the other members of the Commonwealth. Agreeing that the Admiralty’s proposal was probably the best that could be devised from the standpoint of efficiency, he thought that it was politically impracticable, and the same conclusion was reached at a meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers. Borden states in his Memoirs that after this meeting he called on the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, and explained that the Prime Ministers felt unable to accept the proposals contained in the memorandum. He adds that “Geddes asked me to put proposal forward for visit of Jellicoe and I agreed.” The day before he left for Canada, Borden wrote to the First Lord enclosing a memorandum which had been approved by all the Prime Ministers except the Prime Minister of Newfoundland. This memorandum expressed the opinion that the scheme for a single navy under a central authority was not

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3 "Occasional Paper No. 3."
4 In his letter Borden stated: “The Prime Minister of Newfoundland has been requested to communicate with you direct.”
practicable; and that even from the standpoint of naval strategy the Admiralty’s arguments on behalf of such a navy, although they were weighty, were not unanswerable. It argued that experience during the war had shown that Dominion navies could operate with the highest efficiency as parts of a united navy, and cited the Royal Australian Navy as an example. The memorandum admitted, however, that construction, armament, equipment, training, organization, and administration, should be kept uniform as far as possible in all the navies of the Empire, and pointed out that this policy had, in fact, been followed hitherto by those Dominions that had established naval forces. For this purpose “the Dominions would welcome visits from a highly qualified representative of the Admiralty who, by reason of his ability and experience would be thoroughly competent to advise the naval authorities of the Dominions in such matters.” It was also suggested that as the naval forces of the Dominions developed it might become necessary to consider establishing, for purposes of war, a supreme naval authority in which each Dominion would be adequately represented.  

On November 18, 1918, Lord Jellicoe accepted an invitation to visit the Dominions. A similar visit by Jellicoe to Canada had been projected in 1914, but had been prevented by the outbreak of war. See pp. 205-9 above.

Early in 1919 the Canadian Naval Service had begun to consider plans for its own future. A deliberative body known as the Naval Committee was set up in February, and at an early meeting the committee decided to advise the Minister that the Service should be reduced as far as possible, so as to be ready for a fresh start after Lord Jellicoe’s report should have been presented. The committee instructed the Assistant Director of the Naval Service to prepare basic plans “so that

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5 Borden Memoirs, II, pp. 841-3.
6 A similar visit by Jellicoe to Canada had been projected in 1914, but had been prevented by the outbreak of war. See pp. 208-9 above.
7 Bacon, Life of Jellicoe, pp. 393-4. Ch. 24 contains the story of Jellicoe’s visit to India, Australia, and New Zealand; a detailed account of the mission to Canada is given in ch. 25.
when a programme was finally adopted by the Government, the foundation would be ready and progress would be immediately made.” The advisability of preparing a report for presentation to Lord Jellicoe was also agreed upon. At a meeting on June 11 the Deputy Minister informed the committee that the Minister wished to have a definite basis for the discussion of future naval policy, and the Assistant Director was asked to prepare alternative suggestions for a naval programme. The result was a memorandum dated July 3, 1919, prepared by the Naval War Staff. In it the Staff stated that they had attempted to formulate the principles which ought to govern a decision on any recommendations which the Admiralty might put forward. They urged that a definite policy extending over a period of years should be adopted, and that its central feature should be a programme of naval construction to be spread over the space of fifteen or twenty years and sanctioned by a special Act of Parliament.

Assuming that only a policy which provided for a Canadian navy would be acceptable, the memorandum stated that the size and composition of such a navy would depend on Canadian requirements. These might be met more or less adequately in any one of four different ways: providing docking and repair facilities for the Royal Navy; creating a local naval force as well; maintaining a fleet unit in addition to the foregoing; and finally by means of a fair-sized fleet, to include capital ships and all the other components of a complete and versatile force. The Staff considered the experience of the war to have shown that provision for local defence was essential. They also felt that because of the importance of Canada’s overseas trade and the growth of Canadian interests abroad, some additional form of naval defence should be provided. It was suggested that the best policy would be to maintain, in accordance with the third of their four suggested schemes, a small fleet to consist of cruisers which would be available for service anywhere in time of war, and local defence forces, together with bases at which facilities for docking and repairs would be available to ships of the Royal Navy. For local defence the Staff recommended the use of several destroyers and submarines, eighteen PC-boats.

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8 Meetings of Mar. 13, Mar. 20, and June 11, 1919, N.S. 1078-1-1 (1).
10 P-boats had been built during the war in order to take the place of destroyers in patrol and escort work, and submarine hunting. Their special characteristics were smallness, good sea-keeping qualities, simplicity of construction, a speed considerably in excess of that of a submarine on the surface, shallow draft, high manoeuvrability, low upperworks to reduce visibility, and economy of fuel. They had a speed of twenty-three knots when new, and were a successful anti-submarine type. Those converted into decoy ships were called PC-boats. See Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1922.
with a parent ship, and certain auxiliary vessels to be earmarked for commissioning at the outbreak of war. The PC-boats were recommended on the ground that they were in general adequate, and in some ways superior to destroyers for the purpose of Canadian local defence: also because they were about half as expensive to build and maintain as the same number of destroyers would be. Some destroyers were needed, however, to escort fast merchant ships or cruisers, to support the weaker vessels, and for hunting submarines and other special purposes. The Naval War Staff did not advise the building of battle cruisers for the present. To help in the defence of trade routes they recommended cruisers of the Frobisher class; and they suggested that submarines would be the best means of dealing with enemy battle cruisers, being of the opinion that the presence of submarines would have a great moral effect upon any battle cruiser operating so far from her bases. Suggestions were also made concerning dockyards and naval bases. Owing to the prevailing uncertainty about future air policy in Canada, no recommendations were made regarding it, beyond the statement that either a naval air service or air forces attached to the navy would be essential in modern war.

Two successive programmes were proposed, each covering seven years. The first would provide, by 1926, 18 PC-boats, 3 destroyers, and 3 cruisers. The second programme would expand this force by 1934 to 18 PC-boats, 3 parent ships, 6 submarines, 12 destroyers, and 7 cruisers. When that time came, Parliament could decide whether or not to extend the navy by including battleships in a new scheme. The cost of these two programmes was estimated at $60,522,000 for construction, and $15,939,500 for annual upkeep. Finally the Staff pointed out that a small navy provides little opportunity for the advancement of officers, and suggested that some arrangement be made similar to that contained in the Admiralty memorandum of May 1918, whereby Canadian officers might get into the flow of imperial promotion and command. This memorandum was considered in detail by the Naval Committee on July 9, and the proposals which it contained were generally concurred in as providing a good

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11 Later rejected as being too expensive. The Frobishers were the only British light cruisers superior to the corresponding Japanese ships, and were considered to be well suited to Canadian conditions. When the actual cost of a Frobisher—£1,600,000—became known, it was decided to recommend D-class cruisers instead. Note attached to "Occasional Paper No. 2."

12 The type considered most suitable was a coastal boat similar to the H class, but slightly larger.
basis for future development. In order to provide a factual foundation for a naval policy, the Naval War Staff prepared thirty-six "Occasional Papers" covering every aspect of the naval problem. Twenty-three of these, including the one which has just been summarized, were prepared before Jellicoe's arrival and were available for his use.

Lord Jellicoe reached Ottawa on November 27, 1919, having visited Esquimalt, Victoria, Port McNeill, and Vancouver. Soon after his arrival he had several conferences with Sir Robert Borden in which they discussed the extent of Canada's participation in naval defence, and Borden told him that the financial position of the Dominion was very difficult. Jellicoe cabled to the Admiralty on November 30, stating that the Canadian Cabinet was discussing naval Estimates for the next few years, and that there had been some expression of a desire to bear a proportionate share of the Empire's naval defence. In order to provide the government with a standard for comparison he asked to be given the approximate total of probable British naval Estimates for the next two or three years. Jellicoe added that the matter was urgent, as a decision would shortly be reached. Having received no reply, he wrote privately to the First Lord on December 3, saying that Borden, pressed hard by Ballantyne, the naval Minister, was in favour of an immediate start being made on a new programme; but that some of the Ministers wished to postpone any action either for political or financial reasons. Jellicoe suggested that some modern ships should, if possible, be offered by the Admiralty to Canada as a gift, light cruisers and submarines being principally required:

Mr. Ballantyne who is very much in earnest, is concerned that unless the matter is settled now, before I leave Canada nothing will be done for several years. He tells me distinctly that unless a serious start is made now, he intends to wipe out completely the present Canadian Naval Service as being a pure waste of money. He is right.

On December 5 Jellicoe received a memorandum from the Admiralty in which it was stated that in view of their decision on the previous Admiralty memorandum, the Dominions could now best contribute by building up their own navies. The

13 Proceedings, 18th meeting, N.S. 1078-1-1 (1).
14 The "Occasional Papers" are in N.S. 1017-31-2 (1), 1017-31-3 (1), and 1017-31-4 (1). It seems almost certain that the earlier papers were shown to Lord Jellicoe. While the Mission was in Canada Admiral Kingsmill was a member of Jellicoe's staff. In any case, many of the ideas contained in "Occasional Paper No. 2" are to be found in the Jellicoe Report.
Admiralty expressed the view that the primary rôle of the
Dominion navies should be to assist in the control of imperial
communications in distant seas and in protecting the trade
along their own coasts. Sound strategy, however, required
that each ship should be available for war service in any part
of the world, and a general campaign directed by one central
authority. Each Dominion would have to decide its own
programme on its own responsibility. Initial difficulties might
be overcome by taking over ships, and temporarily absorbing
personnel, from the Royal Navy; but the problem could only
be adequately solved by organizing as soon as possible the entry
and training of officers and men. The special needs of the
Dominions in number of ships and types required should be
under the continued consideration of the Naval Staff at the
Admiralty, in consultation with representatives of the Domin-
ions. The Admiralty thought that in all cases a start should be
made with light cruisers and submarines. Concerning the
system of command and direction in war, the Admiralty
suggested that an Imperial Council should be created to
consider questions of policy. It was also recommended that the
Dominions should be represented on the Naval Staff of the
Admiralty, that officers from the Dominions should be appoint-
ted to the Naval Staff College, and that common operational
and technical text-books should be used. Dominion officers
should be in entire command of their own ships and squadrons
for purposes of discipline and administration; but they should
obey the Commander in Chief or Senior Naval Officer in all
operational matters.16 Jellicoe received permission to inform
the Canadian Government of the contents of this memorandum.

On December 22 Jellicoe attended a meeting of the Cabinet
where he presented his proposals concerning naval policy.
These were discussed in Cabinet on December 30, and it was
agreed that they should be submitted to caucus for considera-
tion before any decision was made.17 The Jellicoe Report18
was presented to the Governor General on December 31, 1919.
It was printed in three volumes, of which the first subsequently
appeared as a Sessioal Paper. Jellicoe had been instructed by
the Admiralty:

To advise the Dominion Authorities whether, in the light of the
experience of the war, the scheme of naval organization, which has been

17 Borden Memoirs, ii, p. 1018.
were secret, but vol. i was published as Sess. Pap. No. 61, 1920.
adopted, or may be in contemplation, requires reconsideration; either from the point of view of the efficiency of that organization for meeting local needs, or from that of ensuring the greatest possible homogeneity and co-operation between all the naval forces of the Empire; and, should the Dominion Authorities desire to consider how far it is possible for the Dominions to take a more effective share in the naval defence of the Empire, to give assistance from the naval point of view in drawing up a scheme for consideration.

The Canadian Government had given Jellicoe a memorandum outlining the points on which they wished to be advised. In general terms they asked for his opinion on the steps to be taken, and the best methods to be adopted, should the government decide to adopt a policy of a local navy. They requested that his advice should cover as many incidental points as possible, and attached a list of questions which they did not by any means regard as being exhaustive. The government told Jellicoe that they would gladly consider any other recommendations he might wish to make, and that they would value his opinion on any point concerning naval defence on which he cared to express himself. The questions submitted by the Canadian Government, listed under fourteen general headings, in themselves gave Jellicoe wide scope, covering as they did most aspects of the naval problem from the policy of imperial co-operation to the details of organization and training. Jellicoe answered this request very fully. His report not only concerned itself with general policy, but also included detailed recommendations regarding administration, personnel, training, Intelligence and wireless telegraphy, naval air requirements, bases, docks, fuel, and the defence of Canadian harbours.

The Report began by stating that the question of the naval forces suited to Canada’s needs could be viewed in two ways: first the requirements of the Dominion for the defence of her own coasts; and second her requirements if, in addition to providing for local defence, she were to take part in the defence of the seas as a whole. The naval force suggested as being fully adequate for the defence of Canada’s trade and ports would consist of 3 light cruisers, a flotilla leader, 12 torpedo craft, 8 submarines with a parent ship, and certain auxiliary small craft for training purposes. Jellicoe advised that if Canada decided to participate with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions in the naval defence of the whole Empire, she should obtain and man, in addition to the purely defensive navy already mentioned, either one or two fleet units each of
which would by itself be a complete and versatile naval force. The fleet unit which Jellicoe suggested as being suited to Canadian conditions would consist of a battle cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 fleet minesweepers, an aircraft carrier, and certain additional vessels including a depot ship and a flotilla leader for the destroyers, and a parent ship for the submarines.

With these two forces in mind, Jellicoe approached the question from the point of view of cost, drawing up four plans based on yearly Estimates which would ultimately approximate respectively: 1, 2, 3 1/2, and 5 million pounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
<td>3 light cruisers, 1 flotilla leader, 8 submarines, 4 local defence destroyers, 8 P-boats, 4 trawler minesweepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>£2,000,000</td>
<td>3 light cruisers, 1 flotilla leader, 12 destroyers, 1 destroyer parent ship, 16 submarines, 4 local defence destroyers, 8 P-boats, 4 trawler minesweepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>£3,500,000</td>
<td>1 battle cruiser, 5 light cruisers, 1 flotilla leader, 6 destroyers, 1 destroyer parent ship, 16 submarines, 4 local defence destroyers, 8 P-boats, 4 trawler minesweepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>£5,000,000</td>
<td>2 battle cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 1 flotilla leader, 12 destroyers, 1 destroyer parent ship, 16 submarines, 4 local defence destroyers, 8 P-boats, 4 trawler minesweepers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Also provided for: Administration, Training Establishments, Dockyards, Local Defences, Fuel Reserves; and, except in the case of Plan No. 1: Wireless, Naval Air Squadron—12 machines.

Plans No. 1 and No. 2 were based exclusively on the needs for local defence. Plans No. 3 and No. 4 provided for participation in imperial naval defence as well, by adding one and two fleet units respectively, with one minor modification, to the larger local defence force. The Admiralty had previously offered surplus ships of certain types to the Dominion, and the vessels

19 The modification occurs in column No. 3, where the addition of one complete fleet unit would have given 12 submarines instead of 8.
in the two lower estimates, excepting the light cruisers and the submarine parent ship, were assumed to be gifts. The estimated cost of each of these programmes included the annual cost of maintenance as well as the cost of construction of those ships not given by the Admiralty. Plans No. 1 and No. 2 would be completed in seven years, and No. 3 and No. 4 in nine years.  

Jellicoe recommended the formation of a Canadian Navy Board similar to the Board of Admiralty. Subject to the control of Parliament, this body would be charged with the administration of all matters relating to the Royal Canadian Navy. It would be composed of the Minister of the Naval Service, the First Naval Member and Chief of the Naval Staff, the Second Naval Member, and the Civil and Finance Member. There would also be a secretary who would not, however, be a member of the Navy Board. The Minister, responsible to Parliament, would be charged with the general direction of all business including questions of policy and finance. The First Naval Member would be responsible for preparations for war, the fighting efficiency of the fleet, the movements of ships, and all matters coming under the heading of Operations. The Second Naval Member would control personnel, training, discipline, engineering and construction, dockyard management, and stores. The Civil and Finance Member would be in charge of finance and works. It was considered advisable that he should be a Member of Parliament, in order to ensure that close touch was maintained between Parliament and the Navy Board in regard to financial and other questions of mutual concern. The board would act as a whole, its orders being issued over the signature of the secretary. It was also suggested that the Minister should have a naval assistant, preferably a naval officer of the executive branch. Beneath this apex Jellicoe drafted in detail the naval organization that would be required, and the various spheres of responsibility. He pointed out that if Canada were to confine herself to a very small navy some of this organization might be superfluous, but that the principles were the same no matter what the size of the navy might be.

20 "There has never been any real measure of agreement in Canada regarding naval defence, and it was very difficult to formulate proposals during my visit which would be likely to meet with any general approval. Consequently, four alternative schemes were placed before the Government ..." Earl Jellicoe, "Naval Policy of the Empire—The Need for Co-operation," Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1926.
Other recommendations regarding administration included one that the Naval Service should have a separate Minister of its own. Jellicoe felt that the general interests of the Royal Canadian Navy would be better served by a Minister who should be free to devote his undivided attention to naval affairs: therefore he urged strongly that the existing arrangement whereby the Naval Service and Marine and Fisheries were under the same Minister, should be discontinued. A close understanding should exist, however, between the naval authorities, the ship-owning community, and the fishing industry. An elementary knowledge of naval warfare, as far as it affected the conduct of merchant ships in time of war, was suggested as part of the qualification for masters' and mates' certificates. All new fishing vessels should be made as suitable for naval purposes as might be possible without interfering with their normal occupation. Jellicoe proposed that a shipping committee comprising representatives of ship-owners, fishery firms, the Department of Marine and Fisheries, and the Naval Staff should meet periodically to consider the general development of marine resources. Their function would be purely advisory during peace; but in war they would take control of shipping, their chairman acting as Shipping Controller. The report stressed the value of direct communication with the Admiralty so as to ensure rapidity and secrecy. It therefore recommended that both in peace and war the method which had been used until that time should be continued, namely, direct communication between the Naval Service and the Admiralty on all questions except important ones of policy, which should pass through the usual official channels.

Close co-operation between the Naval Service and the Admiralty was considered to be extremely important, and Jellicoe set a very high value on similarity of ships, organization, training, and discipline. In time of war, co-operation between the two Services would necessarily be very close, and this co-operation could be most effectively achieved by following uniform principles of command and staff work, and by having a common understanding of tactical and strategic requirements. If these were to be achieved, similarity of training was essential. Jellicoe recommended that the Royal Naval College of Canada should be continued, its regulations for entry and for training up to the rank of lieutenant following closely the lines laid down by the Admiralty. It was considered desirable that Canadian staff officers should receive their
training at the Naval Staff College at Greenwich, along with officers of the Royal Navy and the other Dominion navies, and that Canada should be represented on the Staff of the Admiralty. The point was also made that in a small navy it is impossible for officers to obtain a wide and varied experience, and that for this reason the policy adopted in the past of giving officers fleet training with the Royal Navy should be continued. The best way of ensuring that officers should obtain this experience would be by placing all officers of the military branch in all the navies of the Empire on one general list. If this were not feasible, a general list of all officers above the rank of lieutenant-commander or commander was suggested; or a separate list for each Dominion might be retained, combined with a frequent interchange of their officers with those of the Royal Navy.

Lord Jellicoe's Report also discussed the recruiting of ratings and their conditions of service. Specific recommendations were made for the organization and training of the naval reserve. A whole chapter was devoted to the importance of discipline. The question of training was carefully considered, including the development of establishments for that purpose, and training, both general, and also in gunnery, torpedo and mining, wireless telegraphy, anti-submarine technique, and air force work. Jellicoe recommended that naval Intelligence work in the Dominion should be centralized in Ottawa. The establishment of a high-power wireless station on the Pacific Coast was considered to be necessary, and suggestions were made concerning direction-finding and low-power stations in Canada. The Report dealt fully with naval bases, docks and docking facilities, and the defence of Canadian harbours. The importance of air co-operation was stressed, and Jellicoe expressed the opinion that as time went on this importance would increase. He outlined naval needs in this respect, pointing out that flying personnel needed specialized training in order to co-operate effectively with naval forces; but he refrained from making any specific recommendations as to the nature of the force. He urged, however, that the navy should be strongly represented on the recently-formed Air Board, so as to ensure that naval matters should be duly considered by that body.

Reviewing the general naval situation Jellicoe pointed out that the financial burden which had been imposed on the people of Great Britain by four years of war had brought about
a great reduction in the strength of the Royal Navy. Although the German menace had disappeared, the people of the Empire would have to make considerable efforts in the future in order to maintain their sea power on the same proportionate scale as in the past. The United States and Japan were adding to their already large fleets, and while it was “almost inconceivable” that war would ever again occur between the British Empire and the United States, future relations with Japan were less predictable. The widespread nature of the British Empire emphasized the value of sea communications to the prosperity of its various members, and even to their existence as such. The Dominions were well placed to defend the sea communications of the Empire, and to provide war anchorages and refitting bases for sea-going trade and naval ships. Canada faced two oceans, and it was pointed out that while her own naval problem was complicated by this fact, her value in the general realm of imperial defence was thereby increased. If the Dominions and India should decide to protect their own ports and coast trade, and to provide war anchorages and refitting bases for ships which might operate near their shores, they would be affording some support to the general defence in any future war. They could assist still further by providing warships which would strengthen the forces protecting the sea communications of any particular area or which might be used as a portion of the main fleet.

Early in the First World War the Admiralty had ordered a number of H-class submarines in the United States. Some of these were to be made in the United States and assembled in Canada. In the spring of 1915 the Naval Service had asked that two of those which were being completed in the Dominion might be stationed at Halifax, for they were anxious about the floating defences of that port. The Admiralty felt unable to grant this request, however, being of the opinion that such additional defences were not an urgent need, and that the submarines in question were more vitally needed elsewhere.

Of the H-class submarines completed in the United States for the Admiralty, two were on their way to England when the hostilities ended, and were thereupon ordered to Bermuda, where they remained. In January 1919, Sir Robert Borden,
who was in Paris at the time, was asked whether the Canadian Government would wish to accept a gift of the two submarines at Bermuda. The gift was intended as some recognition of the contribution which had been made by the Naval Service to the defence of the Empire during the war. After consulting his colleagues by cable Borden replied that the Canadian Government would accept the submarines "with deep appreciation." The two submarines, \( H \, 14 \) and \( H \, 15 \), arrived at Halifax in June and were commissioned in the Royal Canadian Navy as \( CH \, 14 \) and \( CH \, 15 \).

In April Borden had asked the British Government confidentially whether, in view of the fact that Great Britain possessed many more warships than she would presumably need in time of peace, it might not be possible to arrange for the Naval Service to take over a fleet unit consisting of ships that would otherwise be superfluous. The reply was that the British Government would be willing to transfer to Canada a number of warships of various types, and wished to know how many the Canadian Government would like to have, and of what types. If the Dominion would undertake their care and maintenance and to pay their personnel, the ships would be given free of charge. A decision on this subject was delayed, however, possibly because Lord Jellicoe's mission was already under way.

In the fall of 1919 the Admiralty began to reduce the fleet to a peacetime basis, which involved both a reduction in personnel and disposing of surplus ships. The vessels to be relinquished included capital ships, light cruisers, submarines, destroyers, sloops, patrol gun-boats, minesweepers, coastal motor-boats, motor-launches, trawlers, and drifters. Before disposing of these vessels, the Admiralty wished to have some idea of what the Dominion navies might require. The Admiralty recognized that a final decision regarding Canadian requirements must await Jellicoe's recommendations, but asked the Canadian Government if a very general estimate of its probable needs, especially in smaller vessels, could be supplied at an early date. These small units were deteriorating rapidly while awaiting disposal, and the commercial market for them was depreciating; the Admiralty therefore wished to sell

\( ^{24} \) Correspondence, Jan. 24-Feb. 15, 1919, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 589.

\( ^{25} \) Displacement, 304 tons surface, 434 tons submerged; dimensions, 150\( \frac{1}{4} \) x 15\( \frac{3}{4} \) x 12\( \frac{3}{4} \); speed, 13 k. surface, 11 k. submerged; torpedo tubes, 4-18" (bow); complement, 20-22.

\( ^{26} \) Correspondence, Apr. 14-Aug. 25, 1919, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes-Years 1912-1921."
the surplus ones as soon as possible. The Naval Service asked for further information about the classes which were available except trawlers and drifters which were not required. The Canadian Government was informed in December that the British Government had authorized the Admiralty to offer, as gifts to the Dominion governments, any surplus warships which might help the Dominions to develop their naval forces. The Admiralty pointed out, however, that owing to congestion and costs of maintenance they could not undertake to reserve any vessels for which a good offer might be received. The Canadian Government soon afterwards informed the Admiralty that Lord Jellicoe, who was then in Canada, had told them that applications for any of the surplus warships would have to be made before the end of January 1920, and asked that the deadline should be postponed until March 15, as the acquisition of any of the vessels in question would need to have the approval of Parliament which was not due to meet until February 20. This the Admiralty agreed to do. The Canadian Government then intimated that the surplus vessels which they had in mind were a light cruiser of the Bristol class, a flotilla leader, four destroyers of the M class, eight P- or PC-boats, and six submarines of the G class.

Lord Jellicoe's report, presented on December 31, 1919, was before the Canadian Government for some months. No decision had been made by the time that the extended deadline was reached on March 15, and the government consequently requested a week's further postponement. On March 24 the Naval Service advised the acceptance of one light cruiser of the Bristol class and two destroyers. The Minister announced that these ships were being accepted in order to replace the obsolete and useless training ships Niobe and Rainbow. On May 26 the news came that H.M.S. Glasgow and the destroyers Patriot and Patrician had been selected for Canada. The Canadian Government gratefully accepted the destroyers. They added, however, that the Glasgow had been launched as far back as 1910, and that it was not considered advisable for Canada to acquire an obsolescent ship of this class; and they asked the Admiralty if a more modern cruiser could be spared—an oil-

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27 H.M.S. Glasgow had a striking war record. She had been the only British ship actually engaged at Corun to escape from that battle. At the Battle of the Falkland Islands she helped to sink S.M.S. Leipzig, and not long afterwards, assisted by H.M.S. Kent, she sank the Dresden (Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, i and ii). The most famous of all twentieth-century warships, H.M.S. Dreadnought, was being disposed of by the Admiralty at this time.

28 Displacement, 1,004 tons; dimensions, 271' x 27½' x 11'; h.p., 27,500; speed, 35 k.; guns, 3 4", 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 4 21"; complement, 80.
burner being particularly desired. The Admiralty agreed to allot the best oil-burning cruiser available, the selection to depend largely upon the amount of reconditioning which would be necessary, and H.M.S. *Aurora* was finally chosen.\(^{29}\)

The three warships were given the necessary repairs, and a meat-room, refrigerating room, and magazine-cooling plant, were installed in *Aurora*. Great difficulty was experienced in finding crews. Most of the ratings were recruited in Canada, some in Great Britain, and some were loaned by the Admiralty. Most of the officers were supplied by the Canadian Service, though several came from the Royal Navy, including Capt. H. G. H. Adams, C.B.E., R.N., who was lent by the Admiralty to command the *Aurora*. Lieut. George C. Jones, R.C.N., and Lieut. Charles T. Beard, R.C.N., commanded *Patrician* and *Patriot* respectively. All three ships were commissioned on November 1, 1920, at Devonport, and sailed a month later for Halifax where they arrived on December 21, 1920.\(^{30}\)

The three ships that Canada acquired at this time had all seen service in the First World War. *Patriot* and *Patrician* had been commissioned on June 17 and July 27, 1916, respectively, for service in the destroyer flotillas of the Grand Fleet. They had been employed on patrol and anti-submarine duties in the North Sea until the end of the war, and had never been in action. The *Aurora*, a light cruiser of the Arethusa class, had served with the Grand Fleet from 1914 to 1916. She had taken part in the Operations occasioned by the raids on Gorleston and Scarborough in 1914; was the first British ship in action at the battle of the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915; and had participated in other important Operations.\(^{31}\)

These and all later Canadian warships were oil-burners, a fact which largely altered the nature of the fuel problem. Even before the first war the Royal Navy had begun to commit itself to oil in place of coal as fuel, in spite of the tremendous disadvantage that whereas unlimited quantities of the best steam coal in the world were produced in Great Britain, that island possessed no petroleum. As a fuel for warships, however, oil has almost every advantage over coal. It is more

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\(^{29}\) Displacement, 3,500 tons; dimensions, 436' x 39' x 13½'; h.p., 40,000; speed, 29k.; guns, 2 6½" 6 4"; 11 smaller; torpedo tubes, 8 21½"; complement, 370.

\(^{30}\) Account of the acquisition of *Aurora*, *Patriot*, *Patrician*, and the submarines, is based on material in N.S. 1062-22-1 (1), 1017-10-8 (1), and 1017-10-8 (2).

\(^{31}\) Capt. Adams to N.S.H.Q. (signal), Apr. 18, 1921, N.S. 31-1-1; Corbett and Newboul, *Naval Operations*, passim.
efficient, far more convenient to handle, and produces less smoke. Canada also suffered a disadvantage, although a much smaller one than did Great Britain, in turning to oil in place of coal for naval fuel. The mines of Cape Breton and Vancouver Island, and in the Rocky Mountains, produced a fairly satisfactory naval coal from sources which were either at the very edge of tidewater or easily accessible from it. The home-produced oil supplies of the Dominion were very limited; but there was easy physical access, overland if necessary, to the immense supplies of the United States. At the close of the First World War the only stocks of fuel oil on either coast were maintained by the Imperial Oil Company at Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Vancouver, Victoria, and Prince Rupert. These commercial stocks of oil were maintained by tankers. Much of the fuel was not ideal for naval purposes; but most of it was capable of being used in emergency. For financial reasons, however, at no time between the two wars did it prove possible to build up sufficient stocks of naval oil on the coasts.

The Minister was very anxious that an adequate naval policy, preferably along one of the lines suggested in the Jellicoe Report, should be adopted and carried out. The country was in a frame of mind, however, in which any suggestion that money should be spent for naval defence was distasteful.

The newspaper press, on the whole, showed little enthusiasm for Jellicoe's recommendations, and did not divide in any clear-cut way on Party lines in commenting upon them. The Toronto Globe thought: "What the majority of the people will want to be assured of is that the Dominion is really in earnest about the establishment of a moderate but efficient system of naval defence." The Victoria Colonist considered that it was Canada's duty to maintain a naval force sufficiently strong to defend its own shores:

If the Union Government be true to the principles it always has expressed it will adopt one of the plans outlined by the distinguished British authority and proceed with the work of its execution . . . . There is nothing that the manhood and womanhood of this Dominion regret so much as the fact that we were represented only in an infinitesimal way on the seas during the Great War in which victory, first last and all the time, was decided by sea power.34

32 Material in N.S. 31-9-3 (1).
34 Colonist, Mar. 11 and 24, 1920.
L'Action Catholique, on the other hand, remarked:

La guerre a certes montré l’utilité d’une marine; mais elle a fait disparaître du même coup, avec l’anéantissement de la flotte allemande, le principal prétexte mis de l’avant par ceux qui voulaient nous inciter aux dépenses d’une flotte de guerre.36

Shortly after the arrival of the Jellicoe Mission in Canada the Manitoba Free Press expressed a belief that the adoption of a naval policy was important but not urgent, emphasized the fact that Jellicoe’s function was purely advisory, stated that any scheme of imperial defence must recognize the existence of Dominion navies locally controlled, and hoped that “profiting by the experience of the past, there will be agreement by all parties upon a national naval policy and the question will not again become a party issue in Canada.”38 Le Devoir feared that the Jellicoe Mission and Report were influences making for imperialism. The most frequent comment called forth by the Report was that the country could not afford to spend money on naval preparations. This point of view was expressed, for example, by La Presse and the Gazette of Montreal.

Neither the Party nor the Cabinet would support the Minister’s point of view. The Jellicoe Report had been tabled in the House of Commons on March 10, without comment, and on March 25 the Minister announced the government’s decision concerning it:

The Government has had under consideration for some time the question of the naval defence of Canada and the suggestion of Admiral Viscount Jellicoe in reference thereto. In view of Canada’s heavy financial commitments and the fact that Great Britain has not yet decided on her permanent naval policy and of the approaching Imperial Conference at which the question of naval defence of the Empire will come up for discussion between the Home Government and the Overseas Dominions, it has been decided to defer in the meantime action in regard to the adoption of a permanent naval policy for Canada. The Government has decided to carry on the Canadian Naval Service along pre-war lines and has accepted the offer of Great Britain of one light cruiser and two torpedo-boat destroyers to take the place of the present obsolete and useless training ships, the Niobe and Rainbow. The Minister of the Naval Service, in order to be free to thoroughly reorganize and place the present service on an economical and efficient basis, has issued orders for the demobilization of all officers and naval ratings and for the discontinuance of civilian help at Headquarters and at the Naval Dockyards in Esquimalt and Halifax.

The Canadian Officers who are in the Imperial fleet and who are now being paid by the Canadian Government will be recalled and placed on

36 L’Action Catholique, Mar. 12, 1920.
38 Manitoba Free Press, Nov. 24, 1919.
duty with the Canadian Naval Service. The Naval College will also be continued. After reorganization has been completed, only those officers and other ratings and civilians will be taken on who are absolutely necessary and possess the qualifications desired.

The Minister also announced the forthcoming retirement of Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill, and stated that an officer of lower rank would shortly be appointed as Director of the Naval Service.

The Minister made a further statement in the House towards the close of the session in which he described how the reorganization had been carried out:

So that I might have a free hand to reorganize the entire Naval Service of Canada, with the consent of the Government, I issued general demobilization orders to all naval ratings and to all civilians at headquarters, Esquimalt and Halifax, that their services would not be required on and after the 15th May. I did that so that I, as responsible head of the Naval Service, and my technical officers associated with me, might re-engage only those naval officers, ratings and civilians who possessed the necessary efficiency. Furthermore, my instructions were that only those who were absolutely needed and who possessed the requisite efficiency would be taken on.

These orders would not affect Canadian officers serving in the Royal Navy, nor officers and men at the naval college. The Minister stated that the number of naval and civil personnel had been reduced from 1,303 to 521, adding: “The naval officers and civilians who are now in the employ of the Government are all men who possess the necessary knowledge and efficiency, and we certainly have not two men where only one is necessary.” He also said that the very small navy which Canada had retained, consisting of one cruiser, two destroyers, and two submarines, would be absolutely efficient. They would be stationed part of the time on each coast, and would spend as much time as possible at sea in order that the crews might get the best training that could be given to them. The Minister announced that arrangements for the future had been made with the Admiralty to interchange ships and officers so that at all times the Canadian navy, though small, would be kept up to the Royal Navy’s standard of efficiency. He hoped that a decision as to participation by the Dominions in the defence of the Empire would be made at the forthcoming imperial conference:

It is to be sincerely hoped also that Canada, as a result of that conference, will adopt a permanent naval policy in keeping with her position as a self-governing nation within the Empire, and in many respects the
most important. Aside from every consideration, either sentimental or other, she ought to take measures to insure that her long coast lines and important seaports, as well as her merchant marine should be amply protected at all times and against any eventuality.

This exceedingly modest programme did not escape criticism. There was some objection to the manner in which the Estimates had been introduced.\(^{37}\) It was argued that this policy was itself a permanent one, and should have been laid before Parliament for discussion. It was also pointed out that times were hard; that the German menace had disappeared; and that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which it was supposed would be renewed shortly, would remove all danger from the Pacific. The hope was expressed that the League of Nations would settle any future international differences and that there would therefore be no further appeals to force. Among other arguments used was the one that air power might replace sea power. It was clear that Parliament did not wish to impose any added financial burdens for the sake of national defence.\(^{38}\)

The demobilization of officers and men who had enrolled for service during the war had been practically completed by the middle of 1919, and after that date only those officers and men needed for existing ships and establishments were retained. In May 1919 a complement of 500 was authorized, and by the end of the year it had been filled.\(^{39}\) The future naval policy of the country was as obscure as it had been before the war; consequently no boys or inexperienced men were accepted, and ratings were entered for one year only. On March 17, 1920, the emergency was officially declared to have ceased, and the naval forces were placed on a peace footing.\(^{40}\) The Minister had directed that the personnel of the Service, both civil and naval, should be drastically curtailed prior to reorganization on a post-war basis. Graduates of the naval college, however, were not discharged at this time, and by the middle of May, 143 officers of all ranks remained in the Service, of whom 39 were undergoing training in H.M. ships.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{37}\) Only $300,000 had been asked for the Naval Service in the main Estimates, as against $2,200,000 in the supplementary Estimates. The Minister explained that: "The reason that only $300,000 appears in the main Estimates is that the Government were anxious to table the Estimates and our arrangements not being at the time completed with the Admiralty, we did not know just what we would be able to get from them in the way of ships." The supplementary Estimate was later reduced to $1,700,000.

\(^{38}\) *House of Commons Debates*, 1920, i, p. 707; iv, pp. 3499-506 and 4380-413.

\(^{39}\) P.C. 1008, May 15, 1919.

\(^{40}\) P.C. 559, Mar. 17, 1920.

\(^{41}\) *Annual Report*, 1921, p. 6.
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The transfer of the naval college to Esquimalt in 1918 had always been regarded as a temporary one; but before the question of a permanent location had been settled post-war retrenchment had changed the whole picture. In May 1922 the Minister paid a tribute to the college, but he said that for the time being at least the prospects of naval employment for the cadets were too limited to justify the continuance of that institution.42 The college was accordingly closed. In each of the eleven years of its existence the number of cadets that had entered was as follows: 1911—21; 1912—10; 1913—12; 1914—8; 1915—6; 1916—14; 1917—20; 1918—16; 1919—17; 1920—15; 1921—11. During the whole period about 150 cadets had passed through the college, and the appropriations had amounted to $1,453,000.

Throughout the brief life of the Royal Naval College of Canada the prospect of a naval career had appealed only to a comparatively small number of Canadian youths, the buildings and equipment of the college had been makeshift, and specialized instruction in so small an institution had been relatively expensive. Until the First World War, also, the Naval Service had remained a political issue, and in 1911 Stephen Leacock had derided the college as “a Canadian naval college for instruction in Canadian naval tactics.”43 At the time when the college was closed, however, another distinguished educator, who must have been well familiar with its methods and products, expressed his regret in these words:

I am very sorry indeed that it has been found necessary to abolish the Royal Naval College, and consider it a distinct loss to Canada in many respects. It is an educational loss. The training the boys received made them valuable citizens and an excellent influence in their communities. It furnished naval reserve officers which were useful in the War and may again be badly needed. It furnished technical men for the hydrographic survey, and trained officers for the merchant marine. In deciding to restrict Canada’s participation in the Navy to training personnel, one would have expected that they would have retained the school, for trained men require trained officers . . .”44

As a substitute was needed for the training which the college had been providing, the Admiralty was asked and agreed to

42 House of Commons Debates, 1922, III, p. 2048. For financial reasons it would hardly have been possible to retain the college and in addition to develop a volunteer reserve, and the college was probably the less important consideration.
accept Canadian cadets for training on a basis similar to that of the “special entry” system, and until the Second World War all cadets were trained in England.

When the delegates met at the Imperial Conference of 1921, they were too greatly interested in disarmament and the fate of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to spend much time on naval affairs. The delegates wished the British Empire to maintain a naval force equal to that of any other Power; but they seemed prepared to rely on alliances and ententes for imperial security rather than on their own combined efforts. The conference had opened on June 20, 1921, and was still in session when Warren G. Harding, the recently-elected President of the United States, issued his invitation to the principal naval Powers to attend a disarmament conference in Washington. With this further meeting in view the imperial conference passed the following resolution:

That, while recognizing the necessity of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire to provide such naval defence as may prove necessary for security, and while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned, and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on disarmament.46

A desire that the Powers should agree to limit their naval armaments had been officially expressed in Great Britain early in 1921. The idea also found considerable support in Japan where the pace which had been set by American naval expansion was found to be exhausting. The Harding administration seemed resolved to continue the huge American programme of naval building; yet there was an increasing public demand in the United States for a conference on naval disarmament. From the American point of view, a major stumbling-block on the road to any naval agreement was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was due to be renewed in July 1921.46 Whether the treaty ought to be given a new lease of life, or terminated, was thoroughly discussed at the imperial conference. Canada, in the person of the Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen, stood solidly, and at first alone, against renewing the treaty; claiming that the reasons for its existence had passed away, that it was incompatible with the principles of the League, and that extending its life would arouse mistrust in the United States and

46 Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, ch. 8.

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China. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in fact, made it possible, however unlikely, that Great Britain might some day feel obliged to take up arms at the side of Japan in a war against the United States. This conceivable result of the treaty would have placed the Dominion in an immeasurably difficult plight. Because of Canada’s resolute opposition, and for other reasons, British statesmen were reconsidering the advisability of prolonging the alliance when Harding invited the Powers to confer on the limiting of naval armaments and on far eastern policy generally.

The Washington Conference met on November 12, 1921, and continued its deliberations into the following February. The Treaty for the Limitation of Armament which was signed on February 6, 1922, set a ratio of capital ships for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, at 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 respectively. The particular capital ships to be retained by these countries were specified, and it was agreed that no new ones should be acquired except as replacement tonnage. The total displacement of capital ships was eventually not to exceed 525,000 tons in the case of Great Britain and the United States, and 315,000 tons in that of Japan; while France and Italy were to be allowed 175,000 tons each. The Washington Treaties also covered the relations of the signatories in the Pacific area, and prohibited the construction of fortifications and naval bases throughout a considerable part of that ocean.

The British Government did not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A serious threat to Anglo-American relations and any danger that the treaty might be invoked against the United States were thus removed; but the position of the Royal Navy in the Pacific was very weak. Its greatest disadvantage was that no British base capable of servicing large, modern ships, existed anywhere in or near that ocean. Accordingly the British Government decided to make possible fleet Operations by the Royal Navy in the western Pacific by building there a large modern base. A position was required which would enable a fleet based on it to cover Malaya, Burma, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the sea routes leading to them; and after careful consideration the island of Singapore was chosen. It had been left outside the area within which the signatories at Washington had agreed not to build fortifications and bases,

and on a site acquired and presented by the Straits Settlements the British Government began the construction of a tremendous naval base. In 1924 construction was suspended, to be resumed later, and the work was completed shortly before the Second World War. The cost was mainly borne by Great Britain; but contributions toward it besides the one already mentioned were made by the Federated Malay States, New Zealand, and Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{48}

While the Washington Conference was sitting there had been a change of government in Canada. The Conservative government, having been decisively defeated at a general election on December 6, 1921, resigned on the 29th and was succeeded by a Liberal administration under the leadership of the Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King. The naval policy of the new government was announced in the House of Commons, in May 1922, by the Hon. George Graham, Minister of the Naval Service.\textsuperscript{49} Speaking of the naval situation in general the Minister said that every country in the world was trying to reduce its armaments. He referred to the recent Washington Conference where the great nations had agreed not only to take a holiday from naval construction but also to scrap many of their fighting ships. All peoples were anxious to reduce expenditures on armaments, as far as they could do so without sacrificing national dignity. Canada had certain obligations, however, which resulted from her status as a nation and her relations with the mother country, and one of these was to have a naval Service of some kind.

The Minister recommended that a naval reserve force of fifteen hundred officers and men should be developed; that Canada's five warships should be placed out of commission; and that the permanent force should be reduced as far as possible. He felt that this arrangement "would be more in keeping with the protection of our coasts than it would be in harmony with high-sea fighting, because the fleet as now constituted is for action on the sea, and not for the protection of our harbours and coasts as we understand that protection." Under this scheme four officers of the Royal Navy would be retained in Canada, the rest of those on loan from the Admiralty being returned to the United Kingdom. The Minister later modified his recommendation that all the five ships

\textsuperscript{48} Lord Jellicoe's report on the naval requirements of Australia had strongly recommended that a great naval base should be built at Singapore.

\textsuperscript{49} The Minister made three statements, on May 12, 16, and 22, respectively.
should be decommissioned, stating that it had been based on a misunderstanding of what his naval adviser had suggested. His final recommendation to Parliament, on May 16, 1922, was that the two destroyers only should be retained in service, one on each coast, where they would be used for training reservists. He also intimated that it would be desirable to close the naval college.\textsuperscript{50} The House was asked to vote $1,500,000 for the Naval Service, a sum which had been reached only by reducing demands to a bare minimum, and Parliament passed the Estimates. This policy of retrenchment was praised or criticized by the newspapers in the main according to the Party affiliation of each.

It has been seen that in the years which immediately followed the First World War there was no lack of precise and authoritative drafts for a Canadian naval policy. Two such plans were carefully worked out, one by those experts who possessed the greatest knowledge of Canadian conditions, and the other by the most widely-experienced naval officer of his time. Except in a few minor details, however, neither of these policies was adopted; the naval force which was actually maintained being scarcely more than a nominal one. The attitude which her largely negative policy reflected, however, was not peculiar to Canada at this time, war-weariness being general in the countries that had taken an exacting part in the recent conflict. It was widely hoped that peace could be ensured; social and economic reconstruction was taking precedence over armies and navies; and there was an almost universal wish for some form of “holiday” from preparations for war.

\textsuperscript{50} House of Commons Debates, 1922, ii, pp. 1736-41, 1843-4; iii, p. 2048.
Chapter 15

HOPE FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1922-1933

The decade which began in 1922 was a comparatively peaceful interlude between the aftermath of the first war and the ominous tensions that preceded the second. It had become evident that conflict between modern nations in arms furnished with unprecedentedly destructive weapons threatened to undermine the foundations of life itself, and that man, if he continued to wage wars under the conditions which had come into existence, would be sawing off the branch on which he sat. Moreover many burdens resulting from the recent war were still being borne. The urgent need to prevent war had accordingly impressed itself on the human consciousness.

The League of Nations had been set up for this very purpose, and to many it seemed to have a promising future. Numerous disarmament conferences appeared to be a step in the right direction. Moreover the fund of international good will was impressively large, and Foreign Ministers circulated widely among their kind making fraternal statements and gestures, like heralds of the millennium. Certain sombre facts lay in the background: the basic causes of war were not being removed, the machinery for enforcing peace was weak, attempts to achieve disarmament usually failed, and the nations were not yet prepared to pay the price of collective security. Nevertheless a peaceful and hopeful spirit was abroad in the world.

Canadians fully shared this spirit. Their national feeling had been strengthened by the war, but it remained unaggressive and not at all disposed to be gratified by the panoply of war. They welcomed the prospect of peace in their time, accorded at least verbal support to the League, and addressed themselves wholeheartedly to their civil tasks. Their government pursued a policy of aloofness in the field of external affairs, and laid before Parliament, year by year, singularly modest defence Estimates. Indeed the average of the annual naval Estimates in this period was only $2,278,000.

At the Imperial Conference of 1921, it had been decided that recommendations concerning the method and cost of
Commonwealth co-operation in naval defence should be postponed. In this conference also the arguments that led to the terminating of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been presented. The Washington Conference of the same year had little effect upon Canadian naval policy. The Imperial Conference of 1923 asserted the principles that a further general limitation of armaments was exceedingly desirable; that the minimum ratio of naval strength consistent with imperial security was equality with the strongest foreign power; and that each part of the Empire represented at the conference was primarily responsible for its own defence. It was also agreed that the air forces of the various Dominions and of Great Britain should be developed on uniform lines. In general the imperial conferences after the First World War played a much smaller part in imperial naval policy than those which preceded it had done, partly because the lines which that policy was to follow had already been laid down.

After the uncertainties of the period which immediately followed the war had disappeared, Canadian naval policy crystallized, and it retained its form largely unaltered down to the Second World War. The general policy may be stated as follows. Canada had, in theory, a double naval responsibility: first of all to provide means for the defence of mainly Canadian interests, and then to prepare for co-operation with the other naval forces of the Commonwealth in more general measures of defence. In practice, however, the Dominion was obliged to build her naval forces on a foundation of exceedingly limited appropriations. It was not practicable, therefore, to aim at discharging for the time being more than the primary obligation. Nor was this close objective reached until just before the Second World War, and then only in respect to the defences of a single threatened coast. The expanding defence measures which reflected the growing threat of the nineteen-thirties involved no change in principle. They merely implemented a programme which had been worked out years before.

The general considerations on which Canadian naval policy was based may be briefly stated. War with the United States was judged to be so "unthinkable" that it was not considered when plans were being made. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was no longer in existence, and until the later nineteen-thirties

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2 See App. x. In almost every year from 1910 to 1939, moreover, the appropriations exceeded the actual expenditures.
Japan was regarded as being the most probable enemy. In the event of a war with Asiatic or European Powers it was not anticipated that major enemy naval forces would appear in Canadian waters, and it seemed to be even less probable that an invasion of the Dominion would be attempted. On the other hand, it was thought that raids on commerce or sporadic attacks on harbours might be attempted by light naval forces. Until the late 'thirties, any forecast of probable Operations by the enemy in waters close to Canada always depicted one or two cruisers or armed merchant cruisers, or a few submarines, motor torpedo boats, or airplanes from a carrier, raiding commerce, shelling or bombing the shipping and shore installations in one or more Canadian ports, or perhaps laying mines. In the event of war the naval forces would seek, in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Air Force, to protect coastwise shipping and also all trade in the crowded areas lying off the principal harbours. These focal areas on the west coast were the approaches to the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the strait itself. On the east coast the focal area lay off Cape Breton Island in the summer and eastward from Halifax in winter. The defence of naval bases and other harbours was a joint responsibility of the three Services. The army was responsible for the fixed defences of defended ports, and was expected to deal with any raiding parties that might get ashore. The air force was partly responsible for reconnaissance and for opposing any hostile aircraft that might appear in the neighbourhood of a defended port. Patrolling along the coasts by aircraft and naval vessels would be necessary, so as to prevent the least-frequented parts of the shore from being used by hostile ships, particularly submarines.

It was also considered possible that Canada might remain neutral in an important war. The most likely contingency of this sort seemed to be a war in which the United States would be engaged, probably against Japan; and it was recognized that Canada's freedom of action, and even her existence as an independent nation, might depend upon an ability to carry out her obligations as a neutral in such a conflict. From the naval point of view the problem would be that of preventing the enemy of the United States, by force if necessary, from establishing bases in Canadian territory for the use of his warships, and from attacking American ships in the territorial waters of the Dominion. Such ships, in the event of an American-Japanese war, would probably be exceedingly numerous along
the coast route between the United States and Alaska, and would constitute a vital artery of American defence and a correspondingly strong temptation to Japanese raiders. To keep those and other territorial waters inviolate constant patrolling would be necessary, as also would available force sufficient to expel an enemy found carrying on naval or air activities in neutral Canadian territory. These were the primary obligations which it was considered should be adequately met before any attempt was made to protect trade routes at a distance from the shores of the Dominion. It was always assumed that if Canada were a belligerent the Operations of Canadian naval forces engaged in performing any of these tasks would be covered by the heavy ships of the Royal Navy.

The Royal Canadian Navy, after it had disposed of the *Aurora* and the two H-class submarines in 1922, remained a small-ship navy. The fighting ships, moreover, were all of one type, which greatly simplified the problems of training, manning, and refitting. The type of warship of which the whole striking force was to consist until early in the Second World War was the destroyer. The case for destroyers rather than cruisers as a means of meeting Canadian needs was stated in 1930 by the Chief of the Naval Staff:

It is more important to have numbers than individual unit size and offensive power. One cruiser is more than powerful enough to deal with an armed merchant raider, but her range of visibility is limited. On the other hand, two or three destroyers would render the position decidedly dangerous for a light cruiser; each would be a match for most armed raiders; and for search purposes they would cover a large radius of effective action, and concentration on any point could be achieved with rapidity.

The destroyer was developed at the end of the nineteenth century to meet a particular need. In the eighteen-sixties Robert Whitehead had invented a practicable torpedo, which underwent steady improvement thereafter. For the first time in the history of naval warfare, a weapon powerful enough to damage or destroy the most heavily-armed and well-protected warship afloat could be used by a very small vessel, a fact which was to have revolutionary effects on tactics and design. Small, fast craft, known as torpedo boats, intended to deliver attacks on capital ships by means of torpedoes, made their appearance in the French navy. In 1892 the Admiralty set up a committee to find a reply to this threat. The committee

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recommended that the torpedo boat should be answered by a larger and faster vessel, armed with guns. This idea the Admiralty accepted. The first torpedo boat destroyers were ordered the same year, and the Royal Navy soon had a considerable flotilla of them. Torpedo tubes were mounted in destroyers, which assumed the function of the type that they had been created to offset, and other vocations besides. As fleet destroyers they became a necessary screen for the battle fleet, and a frequent threat to the enemy’s larger ships. In the First World War destroyers acquired a wholly new sphere of usefulness, indeed of indispensability, as the most formidable enemy of the submarine, whether acting as patrol vessels or as escorts for warships or convoys. The special feature of the destroyer is her tremendous speed, which is both an essential component of her offensive strength and her principal protection. Destroyers are also very manoeuvrable, and they are the most versatile of all types of warship. They lose most of their speed, and consequently of their effectiveness, in a very heavy sea; are peculiarly subject to weather damage; and need to be overhauled more frequently than do warships of any other type. A destroyer, in theory, has a life of only twelve or fifteen years. She is not intended to fight against other surface vessels alone, but as one of a group. In the Royal Navy and in those of the Dominions destroyers were organized to operate in flotillas of nine, divisions of four, and sub-divisions of two each.

One of the earliest destroyers to have its base in Canada was H.M.S. Sparrowhawk, which was stationed at Esquimalt at the end of last century. In 1901 the Admiral commanding on the station wrote that:

Destroyers in these waters are most useful, as the nature of the Coast lends itself to the general operations for the defence of Esquimalt and Vancouver, and of the coaling Ports of Nanaimo and Comox by offensive operations on the part of these destroyers. The mere fact of their presence being a defence in itself, instead of withdrawing destroyers from this station I am of opinion that their number should be largely increased.  

The Patriot and Patrician were the first destroyers in the Royal Canadian Navy. By 1927 they were worn out, and the government decided to build two destroyers to replace them. For the time being, however, the Admiralty was asked and agreed to supply two substitutes. H.M.S. Torbay and H.M.S.

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5 Rear Admiral Bickford to Sec. Admiralty, Sept. 17, 1901, "Records of the North Pacific Naval Station," vol. 17 (Pub. Arch.).
Toreador were lent to the Canadian Government, and were re-named respectively H.M.C.S. Champlain and H.M.C.S. Vancouver.⁶ There was already a Vancouver in the Royal Navy; but the Admiralty agreed to change her name and she became H.M.S. Vimy. These were the first ships of the Royal Canadian Navy, other than auxiliary-type ones, to receive names associated with the Dominion, although the idea had been suggested earlier at the time when Patriot and Patrician were acquired. Champlain had been launched on March 6, 1919, and Vancouver on December 7, 1918. The Patriot and Patrician were paid off, and their crews went to Great Britain to man the replacements. Champlain and Vancouver were commissioned for service in the Royal Canadian Navy on March 1, 1928, at Portsmouth. They sailed on March 17 for Canada. The Champlain arrived in Halifax on May 12, and the Vancouver at Victoria on May 24, and they were stationed on the east and west coasts respectively.

The two destroyers which the Canadian Government intended to build were proceeded with after considerable delay. In 1928 it was decided:

That tenders should be invited by the High Commissioner for Canada, from the fifteen firms who quoted for the construction of the Royal Naval Destroyers known as the new Admiralty "A" Class, and by the Department of National Defence from such firms in Canada as are equipped for the construction of ships of this Class, which may desire to tender; these tenders to be for one and two vessels respectively, of the same design and specification as the Admiralty "A" Class vessels, subject to certain changes and additions considered necessary for service in Canadian waters, particulars of which changes and additions will be furnished to the firms invited to tender.⁷

As in 1910, when it had also been a question of building warships expressly for the R.C.N., the possibility of building them in Canada was carefully canvassed. In this case, however, a cost from 50% to 60% greater than that of construction in Great Britain would have had to be accepted. On account of the great complexity of warships, moreover, the conclusion was reached that "the building of a modern destroyer must of necessity be performed by contractors who have long experience and who are specialists in the work if a reliable ship in every way is to be obtained." Tenders were received from fourteen British firms, and of the designs considered most

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⁶ Displacement, 1075 tons; dimensions, 266³/₄ x 27¹/₂ x 11'; h.p., 29,000; speed, 36 k.; guns, 3 4"; 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 4 2½'; complement, 90.
⁷ P.C. 764, May 7, 1928.
suited to Canadian conditions, that of Messrs. John I. Thornycroft was thought to be the best. The contract for the two destroyers was awarded to Messrs. Thornycroft in January 1929, and the ships were built at that firm’s Woolston Works in Southampton.\(^8\) The arrangements with the firm were identical with those for building a ship for the Admiralty, except that Canadian officers acted as overseers.

The destroyers were named *Saguenay* and *Skeena*.\(^9\) The *Saguenay* was launched on July 11, 1930, Mrs. G. J. Desbaracts, the wife of the Deputy Minister, performing the naming ceremony. This was followed by a luncheon given by the directors of Thornycroft’s, presided over by Sir John Thornycroft and at which the Acting High Commissioner for Canada and other prominent Canadians were present. On her full-power trials which were held on January 22, 1931, the *Saguenay* did slightly over 35 knots. After her acceptance trials on May 21 a dinner was given on board for the officials of Thornycroft’s. She was commissioned at Portsmouth on May 22 with Cdr. P. W. Nelles, R.C.N., in command. The *Skeena* was launched on October 10, 1930. At her full-power trials on March 23, 1931, she did 36 knots. She was commissioned on June 10 at Portsmouth, under the command of Cdr. V. G. Brodeur, R.C.N., and the two destroyers left the same day for nearby Portland. From there they sailed on June 23 for Halifax where they arrived on July 3. Next day the Halifax *Herald* carried the following editorial, which is quoted in full:

**A FERVENT HOPE**

Halifax welcomes the two trim new Canadian destroyers, *Saguenay* and *Skeena*—and trusts that this country never will have need to send them into action.\(^10\)

The *Saguenay* remained on the east coast where *Champlain* was already stationed. The *Skeena* sailed on July 8 to join the *Vancouver* on the west coast, and she arrived on August 7 at Esquimalt.\(^11\)

The *Saguenay* and *Skeena* were the first warships, other than auxiliary-type vessels, that had ever been built expressly

\(^8\) Champlain and *Vancouver* had been built by the same firm.

\(^9\) During the remainder of the period covered by this volume all destroyers were named after Canadian rivers.

\(^10\) Halifax *Herald*, July 4, 1931.

\(^11\) *Saguenay* and *Skeena*: displacement, 1,320 tons; dimensions, 322’ x 32½’ x 12’; h.p., 34,000; speed, 35 k.; guns, 4 4.7” 2 2-pdr. pom-poms, 5 machine-guns; torpedo tubes, 8 21”: complement, 138.
for the Royal Canadian Navy. They were also the first warships, in the same sense of the word, that had been bought for that navy for almost seventeen years. They were destroyers of the Acasta class with certain special features built into them to make them better suited for Canadian conditions. In order to adapt them for cruising in the northern waters of the western Atlantic, they were given additional strengthening against floating ice, as well as an unusually large margin of stability to counterbalance possible accumulations of ice on the upper decks, bridges, and rigging, and a heating system was installed. Against the sub-tropical climate of the West Indies they were equipped with ice-cupboards, shower-baths, and a special ventilating system. Even with these additional structural features, however, they were perfectly capable of operating with destroyers of their general type which belonged to the Royal Navy. 

While Saguenay and Skeena were still in the hands of the builders, the Chief of the Naval Staff had recommended that a clearly-defined mark should be set up and aimed at in the matter of acquiring warships:

The Naval force considered essential to be maintained in peace time as a defensive measure to protect the focal points of Canada’s Overseas trade and the requirements necessary to carry out her obligations as a neutral, should comprise: 1 destroyer leader, 5 destroyers, and 4 twin screw mine-sweepers... He advised that Champlain and Vancouver be kept in commission in the Royal Canadian Navy until the end of 1936, to make, after Saguenay and Skeena should have been acquired, a total of four destroyers in commission for the time being; and he wanted two new minesweepers to be provided as soon as possible. The strong wind of the most formidable economic depression on record was already blowing, however; while the Paris Pact, which was said to “outlaw” war, had been drawn up only two years before and was still being signed by various nations. The London Naval Treaty, moreover, had been signed in April 1930, setting an upper limit to the total tonnage of warships of each type that the British Empire, the United States, and Japan, might respectively possess. The world’s

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13 C.N.S. before Defence Council, Aug. 29, 1930, C.S.C.P.
14 Including destroyers. The destroyer allotments were set at 150,000 tons each for the British Empire and the United States, and 105,000 tons for Japan. At this conference Great Britain and the United States, supported by Canada and the other Dominions with one exception, unsuccessfully urged the abolition of submarines. Throughout the conference the Canadian delegates showed a special interest in proposals for limiting the construction of submarines and also of aircraft carriers.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

first general disarmament conference was soon to be called together. In this atmosphere of financial stringency and of optimism concerning disarmament, the Canadian Government took no steps to procure new warships; nor were any such steps to be taken for some time to come.

In the period covered by this chapter Halifax and Esquimalt continued to function as small-scale naval bases. At the climax of retrenchment in 1922 the Halifax dockyard had almost ceased to operate as far as repairs were concerned; but from that time on it performed the usual duties of a base for the minute Canadian naval force, and also from time to time provided facilities for ships of the Royal Navy. Certain services were also performed for vessels of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Marine Section) and for the Departments of Transport and Fisheries. In 1927 the construction of the Joint Services Magazine on the eastern shore of Bedford Basin was begun; and this magazine, the naval part of which consisted of twenty-four buildings, was completed in 1931. At Esquimalt the naval barracks were commissioned in 1922 as H.M.C.S. “Naden”, and in the same year the destroyer Patrician arrived at the Pacific base where she was stationed until paid off in 1928. In 1926 a new dry dock able to accommodate the largest ship afloat was completed at Esquimalt by the Dominion Government.¹⁵

The most important step taken by the Naval Service between the two wars was the establishing of the naval and naval volunteer reserves as continuing institutions. In 1920 and 1921 suggestions had been made that a naval reserve force should again be formed,¹⁶ and in 1923 action was taken. The Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve was created, with an authorized complement of a thousand officers and ratings,¹⁷ and the prefix “Royal” was soon afterwards added to its title. The initiative in forming it had come chiefly from the Director of the Naval Service, who had taken a warm and effective interest in the setting up and training of the reserve company at Victoria in 1913-14. He argued that on a very limited budget more preparation for naval war could be obtained by building up one or more reserve forces than in any other way. Moreover with a unit in each of the principal cities across the Dominion, a

¹⁵ Dimensions: length, 1,173’; bottom width, 126’; depth on sill at high water, 40’. Canada Year Book 1943, p. 618.

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

volunteer reserve would be visible to the people who lived in the hinterlands, which the navy proper could never be.

The Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve,\(^\text{18}\) whose authorized complement comprised 70 officers and 930 ratings, was originally organized into companies or half-companies, one of which had its headquarters in each of the following cities: Calgary, Charlottetown, Edmonton, Halifax, Hamilton, Montreal, Ottawa, Quebec, Regina, Saint John, Saskatoon, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg. Montreal had two companies, one French-speaking and the other English-speaking. By September 1939, units, each of which was known as a Division, were in existence in the above cities, and also in Kingston, London, Port Arthur, and Prince Rupert.

The volunteer reserve was for civilians who did not follow a seafaring career. Those entering were required to be physically fit British subjects between the ages of 18 and 32, or in certain cases 40, years of age. They had to sign an engagement for three years, be willing to serve wherever required in case of need, and perform at least thirty drills a year at Divisional Headquarters. A further requirement was two weeks of training each year at Halifax or Esquimalt or at sea.\(^\text{19}\) A member of the R.C.N.V.R. received a 25-cent bonus for each drill attended, and during his periods of training in a warship or naval training establishment he was paid on the R.C.N. scale. The volunteer reservists were intended to provide a pool of partly-trained personnel for use in emergency.

At about the same time as the R.C.N.V.R., a seaman's reserve was also authorized.\(^\text{20}\) It consisted of men who had followed a seafaring career in foreign-going, coasting, fishing, or other vessels. A complement of 70 officers and 430 ratings was laid down. Enrolment was to be for one or more periods of five years each up to a maximum of twenty-five years. The minimum age for entry was set at 18 years, and the maximum

\(^{18}\) The earlier organization had been entitled "The Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve." In 1919 Lord Jellicoe had recommended that: "In order to bring the Naval Reserve Forces in Canada into line with the Naval Reserves of other Dominions ... its title should be changed to that of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve." (Jellicoe Report, I, p. 33.) In 1923 the more logical order of words was adopted.

\(^{19}\) At the start of its career the R.C.N.V.R. received a splendid introduction to sea training. In 1924 the Special Service Squadron (battle cruisers *Hood* and *Repulse*, and 5 light cruisers), during its world cruise reached Victoria on June 22. The battle cruisers later sailed around to the east coast reaching Halifax on Aug. 5, and 40 officers and men of the R.C.N.V.R. accompanied them for training on this 33-days' cruise. (Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1925, pp. 22-4; 1926, p. 28).

\(^{20}\) P.C. 80, Jan. 15, 1923.
at 35 years for first entry and 50 years for re-entry. Candidates were to be physically fit British subjects of good character, living in Canada, and willing to serve at sea or wherever required.

The Royal Canadian Naval Reserve was originally organized in nine Port Divisions which were soon afterwards reduced in number to five, one at each of the following ports: Charlottetown, Halifax, Montreal, Quebec, and Vancouver. Small annual retaining fees to an amount determined by rank were paid to the members of this reserve, while periods of training were prescribed which varied in length according to rank and branch. On account of the limited funds available actual enrolment remained far below the complement, as is shown by the following figures which represent the average numbers borne in each of three years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike the larger R.C.N.V.R. which was composed of amateurs, the R.C.N.R. consisted of men who possessed a professional knowledge of ships and the sea.

In the year 1922 the defence Services were combined to form one Department of National Defence.\(^21\) The National Defence Act vested in a single Minister the powers deriving from the Naval Service Act, the Militia Act, and the Air Board Act, and the responsibility for all matters relating to defence. The Act had been advocated on the grounds of efficiency and economy, and for the principle involved there were Australian and South African precedents. The Naval Service Act was amended accordingly, and the necessary changes were made within the Service. While this centralization of Departments was being carried out, five technical services which had been under the naval Department were transferred to the Department of Marine and Fisheries—the Radiotelegraph Service, Hydrographic Survey, Tidal and Current Survey, Fisheries Protection Service, and Patrol of Northern Waters.\(^22\) The Purchasing, Accounts, Records, and

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\(^21\) By the National Defence Act, 12-13 Geo. V, ch. 34, June 28, 1922.

\(^22\) P.C. 1246, June 14, 1922. The Fisheries Branch had been transferred from Marine and Fisheries to the Naval Service in 1914 and back again in 1920. (P.C. 1574, June 16, 1914; and P.C. 1227, May 29, 1920).
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Printing and Stationery organizations of the respective Services were amalgamated.

In order to facilitate the co-ordinating of defence policy a number of joint-Service bodies were created during the nineteen-twenties. Shortly after the control of the Services had been centralized in 1922 the Defence Council was formed by adding a naval and later an air force member to the former Militia Council. Its duties were to advise the Minister on any matter related to national defence.23 On June 9, 1927, a Joint Staff Committee was set up in order to co-ordinate the work of the three Services, and to advise on all questions which the Services might refer to it. This committee, which had no executive functions, consisted of the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Director of the Air Force. The Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was an associate member, and the committee was provided with a secretary.24 The first meeting was held on October 31, 1927. In 1928 Local Defence Committees, on each of which the three Services were represented, were set up at Halifax and Esquimalt to bring about co-operation between the Services in defensive measures on the coasts.25

After the National Defence Act of 1922 had gone into force there was a marked tendency for the Naval Service to become partly absorbed in the much larger militia organization. The most important phase of this process of partial absorption concerned the relations of the senior officers of the two Services. By two Orders in Council passed in 1922 the senior officer at Militia Headquarters became Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence, and also Inspector General of the Militia, Navy, and Air Force. The Director of the Naval Service consistently protested against and resisted all attempts on the part of the Chief of Staff to exercise authority inside the Naval Service or to advise the Minister regarding it.26 This difficulty was partly removed by a double change of title and status. In June 1927 the office of Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence, was abolished. The following year the Director of the Naval Service was made Chief of the Naval Staff of Canada, as had been suggested by the Admiralty in 1924, and the officer

23 Memo. in H.Q.S. 5199K.
24 C.G.S. to Min. (memo.), Jan. 22, 1929, C.S.C.P.
25 Material in N.S. 1006-1-3 (1).
26 These protests were based on both legal and technical grounds.
concerned continued to be "charged with the direction of the Naval Service." 27

At the time when the Services were combined in one Department, the organization of the Naval Service at the top consisted of the Minister and Deputy Minister, with a Naval Staff comprising the Director of the Naval Service, an Assistant Director, a Consulting Naval Engineer, and a secretary. In theory the Director was responsible for the purely naval part of the Service, the Assistant Director was in charge of the War Staff, and the Consulting Naval Engineer of material. The War Staff was divided into Operations, Intelligence, and Transport. This whole division of responsibility was often an aim rather than a fact, owing to the small number of the officers at headquarters. A civilian staff was responsible for the Stores and Accounts branches, under the Director of Stores and the Chief Accountant. The five branches which were transferred to the Department of Marine and Fisheries in 1922 were included in the departmental structure. The organization was different from that of the Admiralty in some respects, and particularly because there was no Naval Board prior to the Second World War. The structure was modified as a result of the centralized control of the Services, and by 1933 the Naval Staff had been grouped in the following divisions: Naval Intelligence and Plans, Operations and Training, Reserves, Stores, Engineering, and the Naval Secretariat.

Canadian naval Intelligence continued to function after the First World War as a part of the Admiralty's world-wide Intelligence organization. The work was done from centres at Ottawa, Halifax, and Esquimalt, each with an area of observation allotted to it. The part of the ocean for which Halifax was responsible was bounded by a line drawn from the point where the east coast of the United States reaches 33° N. due east to 40° W. and thence due north to the coast of Greenland. The Ottawa centre was responsible for the Great Lakes, and the St. Lawrence River west of a line from Cap des Rosiers to South West Point, Anticosti, and thence due north from West Point, Anticosti. Esquimalt looked after the space bounded by a line drawn from the frontier between the United States and Mexico at Lat. 32° N., to Lat. 5° N., Long. 135° W., and thence due west to Long. 180°, and then north to the coast of Siberia. 28

27 P.C. 372, Mar. 7, 1928; Naval Service Act, Sec. 9 (2).
The principal duty was to report the movements of ships in these areas. The Naval Service also assumed responsibility for all naval Intelligence on the North American continent.

The latter part of the buoyant nineteen-twenties witnessed an economic boom of the first magnitude, which lasted out the decade. The boom was succeeded by the severest of the depressions that have characterized the age of the industrial revolution. Beginning in 1930 the world’s economy suffered for several years from an increasing paralysis in all its parts. Everywhere the depression weighed down upon the whole fabric of society, which in Germany was already so ill-adjusted that it slowly collapsed under the strain.

The sensitive economy of Canada suffered severely, with numerous results that need not be mentioned here. From the point of view of national defence the more immediate effects of the depression, which were also related effects, were that Canadians understandably became more than ever preoccupied with their economic problems, and that defence Estimates were greatly reduced. The naval Estimates for 1930-31 were $3,600,000; those for 1934-35 were only $2,222,000—a reduction from the earlier figure of more than 38%.

By 1933 the depression had already become exceedingly severe, and when in June of that year the Department of National Defence was being pressed very hard to reduce its expenditures, the Chief of the General Staff advised that should sufficient funds not be available to maintain a really effective army, navy, and air force, it would be best to throw one Service out of the sleigh in order to save the other two. He considered the navy to be the least necessary of the three, and therefore the one to be sacrificed; the army and air force being relied upon to deal with offensive action by an enemy on the coasts. The Treasury Board suggested that the appropriation for the Naval Service for 1933-34, which amounted to $2,422,000, should be cut to $422,000. The Chief of the Naval Staff was summoned to appear before the Treasury Board where he presented the naval point of view, and after further consideration this extraordinary suggestion was dropped. At the time when it was made the Japanese invaders had been in Manchuria long enough to feel at home, and a dark man named Hitler had for a number of months been Chancellor of the German Reich.
POST-WAR hopes for organized peace had been vain or premature. The great depression watered seeds of fear and hatred, which sprouted, grew luxuriantly, and later produced a prodigious harvest of war. The first sign of this dangerous germination was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, an unprovoked assault which the League of Nations ominously failed to prevent or even to hinder. This outbreak was the first of an unprecedented series of threats and aggressions that laid the structure of collective security in ruins.

The most menacing of these events occurred early in 1933 when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. Thereafter the National Socialist Party, whose leader he was, assumed complete control over the strongest and most highly disciplined community in Europe. The Nazis preached a fanatical racialism, gloried in many other forms of intolerance, and repudiated the very concept of impartial law. Into the field of international relations, such as it was, they brought a diplomacy in which muscularity and deceit were bewilderingly blended, and exercised it on behalf of a policy that dismayed the world. There were many careful observers of the new Germany who asserted that the only destination at which it could possibly arrive was war.

The passing of Germany into the hands of the Philistines was followed in the year 1935 by the Italian invasion and conquest of Abyssinia; in 1936 Germany and Italy became allies, and the demilitarized Rhineland was occupied by Hitler’s troops; in 1937 Japan attacked China proper; and in 1938 Germany annexed Austria and the border zones of Czechoslovakia. In 1939 the occupation of Czechoslovakia was completed, and Hitler opened upon Poland one of the verbal barrages with which he was accustomed to prepare the way for a physical onslaught.

The democratic nations had not been wholly blind to the meaning of these portents; but an aversion to war, which had
become ingrained, and wishful thinking, came near to paralyzing them. Accordingly they did not intervene effectively, or form a counter-alliance, or begin to rearm, until it was almost too late. Moreover attempts to reach a satisfactory understanding with Germany, at Munich and elsewhere, ended in failure. The fate of Czechoslovakia, however, induced Britain and France to serve notice, in March 1939, that an armed attack on Poland would bring them into the lists. Ignoring this warning Hitler invaded Poland on September 1; two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany, and Canada followed their lead on September 10.

In Canada the appearance of Nazi Germany upon the stage, and the chain of events that followed, had given rise to great uneasiness; yet as in the case of the other democracies the people detested the idea of war and of making warlike preparations. Such preparations began in 1935, but the government’s ability to provide protection against the coming storm was restricted by the divided state of public opinion. An examination of the newspaper press during the critical period from 1935 to 1939 clearly reveals the failure of the community as a whole to reach any substantial agreement concerning the nature of the danger and what was best to be done.

Editorials seldom discussed international events in Europe or Asia in the light of the effects which those events were likely to have on the Dominion, except in the case of certain French-Canadian newspapers in which the traditional fear lest Canada became involved in a war which did not concern her was frequently and eloquently expressed. An editorial in *Le Droit*, Ottawa, in October 1935, entitled “Les élections et la menace de guerre” ended with the exhortation: “Et tâchons d’élire au parlement d’Ottawa des hommes qui comprendront leur devoir, poseront les actes et prononceront les paroles qui nous délivreront de l’impérialisme militaire.”

This point of view was very forcibly stated by *Le Devoir* early in 1937:

Nous savons les fruits de cette néfaste politique de l’impérialisme militaire; nous devinons quelles terribles conséquences comporterait une nouvelle et sanglante aventure. Et nous entendons bien faire tout ce qui dépendra de nous épargner à nos fils à tous ceux que nous aimons à la

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1 *Le Droit*, Oct. 7, 1935. Twelve carefully-selected newspaper files were used. It is not suggested that the newspaper press is an accurate means of measuring public opinion. The results of this survey are presented only in order to indicate the political difficulties that lay in wait for any full and timely measures to meet the oncoming danger.
patrie canadienne, ce tragique destin ... Le temps ne tardera peut-être pas beaucoup où le Canada se demandera si, vraiment, il est de son intérêt, avec de pareils risques de demeurer dans le Commonwealth ... Où fixez-vous la première ligne de défense du Canada? En Amérique, en Afrique, en Europe ou en Asie? ... Il faudra tout de même finir par le savoir. Car c'est la réponse à cette question qui domine forcément tout ce qu'on appelle notre politique de défense.2

When the League of Nations imposed limited economic sanctions on Italy in the fall of 1935, considerable discussion was aroused. Some newspapers, with the Manitoba Free Press in the vanguard, strongly supported collective action. The Toronto Globe opposed sanctions on the ground that ineffective ones would only produce further humiliation at Geneva, while adequate ones would inevitably lead to war.3 Some French-Canadian editors viewed the League as primarily an instrument of British policy, and feared that support of the League would entangle Canada in affairs in which she had no interest, including the next European war. Le Devoir thought that: “L'attitude que le Canada devrait tenir dans le cas où l'Angleterre irait jusqu'aux sanctions militaires;— et pour nous, on le sait, c'est: Pas un homme, pas un sou.”4

After the attempt by the League to stop Italy had failed, the Winnipeg Free Press bitterly criticized the English-speaking nations for their League policy, but expressed a long-term optimism:

Thus the matter stands at the moment; but this is not the end. Dead men rise up never but lost causes sometimes show a vitality surprising to undertakers who give them imposing funerals. In any case, the issue is now joined in the lists of history. What will be, will be. It is well, however, that the day of duplicity and deceit is over; and that the events of tomorrow will be played out in the open.5

According to the Edmonton Bulletin:

It is the smaller nations—such as Canada—to whom collective security is most vital, and to whom the disappearance of the League would be most perilous. Europe is back now to pre-war days—without a recognized code of international law. For the time the pre-war system of alliances offers the only existing guarantee of peace.6

At this time the press for the most part began to take up one of two positions. That more support should be given to Great Britain and the Commonwealth was one of these: the

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2 Le Devoir, Feb. 12, 15, 23, 1937.
5 Winnipeg Free Press, June 20, 1936.
6 Bulletin, June 20, 1936.
other and more frequently expressed opinion favoured an attitude of aloofness toward developments in Europe, and supported the government's policy of avoiding any commitments made in advance. At various times it was suggested in Parliament and elsewhere that Canada should formally declare her intention of remaining neutral in any future war unless directly attacked. The advocates of this negative commitment, however, obtained little support from the press.

The considerably increased defence Estimates of 1937 found general support in the English-language newspapers, but were strongly opposed in those representing French Canada. "The King government," wrote the Vancouver Province, "in its programme of defense, which is the strongest programme of defense Canada has had since the war, is entitled to the sympathy and support of the Conservative party." Other Conservative newspapers expressed the same opinion. The editorial in the Province which has just been quoted went on to say: "But the Conservative party would not be overstepping the bounds of propriety if it pointed out to the government that Canada can be defended more effectively by coordinating her efforts with those of the Empire than by going it alone."7 The Edmonton Bulletin pointed out:

Canadians hate war whole-heartedly, as they have the best reasons for doing. But we live in a world where several powerful states are declaring by word and action that they intend to make war the instrument of their aggrandizement, with reference particularly to the capture of sparsely populated territories.8

A French-Canadian newspaper, on the other hand, warned: "Les députés qui s'imaginent que, en votant pour l'augmentation des crédits, ils ne votent pas pour des armements qui serviront dans une guerre future de l'Angleterre se trompent."9

The Munich crisis fixed the attention of Canadians as never before on the European situation. The policy of Great Britain found general support in the Canadian press, although some newspapers did not like appeasement. The Halifax Chronicle belonged to the latter class, and at this time it referred to the defences of Halifax as being deplorably weak. "Canada should and must have a small but highly efficient air force, fully capable of defending such seaports as Halifax."10

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7 Province, Feb. 19, 1937.
8 Bulletin, Feb. 8, 1937.
9 Le Droit, Feb. 17, 1937.
10 Chronicle, Sept. 30, 1938.
The *Winnipeg Free Press* opposed appeasement, including the Munich pact:

It may be that racial animosities in the Czechoslovak state, steadily fanned by the provocative and savage incitement of the Nazi Press, will make such a peaceful solution impossible for years to come. In that case it remains the first duty of British statesmen to maintain and extend, by definite commitment, the front against aggression.\(^\text{11}\)

*L'Action Catholique* hailed the Munich settlement and felt that as long as Great Britain and France worked together there was some hope: "Aujourd'hui, ces vieilles nations traditionnalistes tiennent une dictature déraisonnable en échec; souhaitons qu'elles s'unissent demain, pour endiguer la marée montante du bolchevisme . . ."\(^\text{12}\) The Toronto *Globe and Mail* predicted that: "If a major war comes Canada will be found fighting with Great Britain for self preservation."\(^\text{13}\)

The defence Estimates which were introduced in the spring of 1939 found considerable support in the press. In the opinion of the *Winnipeg Free Press*: "If anyone can be found who questions the desirability of Canada this year spending more than 60 millions on defence the quick and effective answer is that the Canadian taxpayer can consider himself lucky it is not more."\(^\text{14}\) Some newspapers thought that the government's defence policy was insufficient. The *Globe and Mail* considered the danger to be so great that: "... surely this is no time to divide public expenditures: $557,000,000 for the routine duties of government and $63,000,000 for national defence . . ."\(^\text{15}\) In the opinion of the *Vancouver Province*:

What our money should be spent for is to make the most weighty contribution possible to the combined military strength of the British Empire. We cannot do that by frittering it away on piffling little adventures in coastal defence.\(^\text{16}\)

Typical of criticism from the opposite direction was the statement of *Le Droit* that:

La situation internationale est pleine de menace. Nous n'avons pas à nous mêler de ce qui ne nous regarde point. Nous avons suffisamment des problèmes intérieurs à résoudre ici pour exiger le concours de toutes les forces du pays.\(^\text{17}\)


\(^{12}\) *L'Action Catholique*, Sept. 21, 1938.

\(^{13}\) *Globe and Mail*, Sept. 16, 1938.

\(^{14}\) *Winnipeg Free Press*, Apr. 28, 1939.

\(^{15}\) *Globe and Mail*, Apr. 28, 1939.

\(^{16}\) *Province*, May 3, 1939.

\(^{17}\) *Le Droit*, Apr. 26, 1939.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Throughout this period the newspaper press seldom referred to Canadian defence policy, and when it did so was primarily interested in air defence. The only editorial that has been found, written during the four years which led up to the Second World War and wholly concerned with Canadian naval policy, appeared in the Montreal Gazette of May 4, 1939. This editorial stated, inter alia:

The fact is that in this matter of Naval defence the Dominion has fallen far short of what was contemplated under the Laurier naval policy, to say nothing of the program sponsored by the Borden Ministry. There is indeed a question as to whether or not the majority of Canada’s destroyers, judged in terms of effective war service, are worth their upkeep.... Mr. Mackenzie is scarcely to be blamed for...[his] gallant endeavour to fit the Dominion’s naval responsibilities into the small compass of its naval strength. Nevertheless the proposition is that Canada must go on sponging upon the Mother Country and, what is even worse, upon the goodwill of a foreign nation, the United States, for the protection which Canada itself should provide, having regard to the position it occupies as a trading country. The Dominion should be in a position either to protect its own trade routes or to cooperate adequately with Great Britain in providing the protection that is necessary. It is absurd to suggest that anything like this is possible with six destroyers, four of which are antiques, and a few minesweepers. 18

In and after the year 1935, increased appropriations enabled the Naval Service to make special preparations for meeting the threatened storm. Throughout this period the amounts of the annual naval Estimates remained small, yet the ratio of increase was very considerable. The Estimates for 1931-32 had been the first to reflect the depression, and during the next three years the amount of the Estimates was progressively reduced. For the year 1935-36 they showed an increase, and were further enlarged every year up to the outbreak of war. From 1934-35 to 1939-40 they increased from $2,222,000 to $8,800,000. 19

During the period of special preparation the naval facilities at Halifax and Esquimalt were improved. Until a short time before the war began, however, the defences on the west coast were accorded a priority, no doubt because the Royal Navy afforded such strong cover in the Atlantic. The Halifax base entered the Second World War barely equipped to meet the needs of the peace-time navy and ill prepared to carry the unforeseen and heavy burden which the war was to lay upon it. The war-time duties of Esquimalt were to be much less

18 Gazette, May 4, 1939.
19 See App. x.
ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

onerous than those of Halifax, and therefore more easily discharged.

Throughout its long history the suitability of Halifax as the sole or principal naval base on the east coast was never challenged. On the other hand, the qualifications of Esquimalt for the same rôle on the west coast were sometimes seriously questioned, mainly on the following grounds: the smallness of its harbour, in which, moreover, ships and installations are relatively exposed; the narrowness of the approaches; the vulnerability of Esquimalt to attack from the south; and the fact that being on an island the base could be cut off from the mainland by a superior naval force. It was variously suggested, therefore, between 1910 and 1939, that to replace or supplement Esquimalt a base should be established at Prince Rupert, Barkley Sound, Vancouver, or elsewhere. 20 No attempt to act on any of these suggestions was made at any time prior to the Second World War.

During the later nineteen-thirties as additional warships were acquired the complement of the R.C.N. was increased, as was that of the R.C.N.V.R. which attracted a wider interest with the growing threat of war. In this period also the personnel of both reserves were specifically earmarked for various duties which they would be required to assume at the outbreak of a war, and instructions were issued accordingly.

From the closing of the naval college in 1922 until the Second World War the training of cadets was carried out in ships and establishments of the Royal Navy. Officers and ratings were also sent to the Royal Navy for advanced and specialized courses. In 1935, for example, 32 officers were training with the Royal Navy, of whom 22 were following courses preparatory to qualifying for lieutenant, while the remainder were taking specialist courses or acquiring fleet experience. In 1938, 53 officers and 90 ratings were similarly in training overseas. 21 By the nineteen-thirties the older Canadian officers were largely replacing the officers of the R.N. on loan, but down to the Second World War there was always at least one R.N. officer in a senior post at N.S.H.Q.

The importance of naval training can hardly be exaggerated. The proper handling of a modern warship in action

20 E.g. Paper entitled "Esquimalt", July 15, 1913, N.S. 1017-1-1 (1); Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion, 1919, N.S. 1017-10-8 (1); Cdr. in Charge, Esquimalt, to N. Sec., Nov. 8, 1937, N.S. 1006-1-4 (1).
21 Annual Reports, 1936, p. 19, and 1939, p. 23.
is extraordinarily difficult. Both officers and ratings have exacting and specialized tasks to perform, and all the separate functions must co-ordinate precisely under the direction of a single mind. The problem is much increased by smoke, noise, and imminent danger, and also by the awkward fact that any individual or group on board, no matter how important, or the ship's communication system, may at any moment be put out of action. Most people perform their occupational functions in the fullest sense almost every day; but the naval man ordinarily does so only a few times in his whole career, and for the rest he must practice and rehearse under conditions which at the best are thoroughly fictitious. Nor can he be certain in peace-time that the doctrine which he follows will prove to have been valid. These are formidable conditions in which to prepare, and they emphasize the importance of conscientious training as well as of constant appraisal of existing doctrine.

A warship at sea is the best place of all in which to perfect naval training. Accordingly a warship spends as much time as possible at sea, and when cruising, unless she has to reach a destination quickly, she carries out various exercises more or less continuously. These may consist of tactical exercises with other ships; gunnery or torpedo practice; action stations, fire, and abandon-ship drills; or other forms of rehearsal. The following sketch of the activities of H.M.C. destroyers between the two wars affords a glimpse of a segment of Canadian life which, though almost unknown to the public, was the culmination of all the naval preparations that were being made in Canada.

It was customary for H.M.C. ships to remain during the greater part of the year in Canadian waters, where they cruised, trained, and visited as many ports as the rest of their programme permitted. Typical of such visits was one made by Saguenay in September 1931, shortly after her first arrival in Canada. The destroyer called at Gaspé and Tadoussac, and then steamed up her name-river to Chicoutimi where she was hospitably welcomed. Calls at various ports were also utilized for the purpose of taking reservists on board for their annual period of training, which it was exceedingly desirable that they should spend at sea.\(^22\) Some of these visits were synchronized with general or local occasions involving a con-

\(^{22}\) The most difficult problem in the training of naval reservists is that of giving them experience at sea.
siderable amount of ceremonial. For example, Saguenay and Champlain took a prominent part in the Jacques Cartier quatercentenary celebration at Gaspé on August 25, 1934, a ceremony in which H.M.S. Dragon and a French destroyer and sloop also took part. An exceptional duty took the Saguenay and Skeena across the Atlantic in May 1937, when they represented the R.C.N. at functions in England connected with the coronation of King George VI.

During the first three or four months of each year the Canadian destroyers were accustomed to cruise in southern waters, chiefly in order to take part in fleet exercises with the America and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy. Warships stationed on the east coast cruised to Bermuda and the West Indies, and occasionally continued round to the west coast by way of the Panama Canal. The winter cruises of those stationed in British Columbia took them down the west coast of North America, and they usually joined the east-coast ships in the West Indies.

On January 5, 1932, Skeena and Vancouver left Esquimalt for their winter cruise. Nearing Balboa they altered course for Acajutla, Salvador, to protect British residents, and arrived there on January 23. Ten British subjects of whom five were women were accommodated on board for some time. On the 31st Skeena left Acajutla. Vancouver arrived back at Esquimalt on February 29, and Skeena on March 19.

On January 3, 1934, the Saguenay sailed from Halifax in company with the Champlain, and called at Bermuda, Jamaica, and British Honduras, and then at Colón where Skeena and Vancouver joined, having come round from Esquimalt. The four destroyers then proceeded to Curacao, and from there to La Guaira, Venezuela. During the last-mentioned visit a newspaper in near-by Caracas printed the following front-page headlines:

**LA VISITA DE LOS DESTROYERS CANADIENSES**

Excursión al Campo de Carabobo.—Lunch en el Hotel Jardín.—Homenaje al Libertador en el Panteón Nacional.—Otros actos.24

23 Better climatic conditions in the south for training, and meeting the special problems connected with cruising in a hot climate, were further advantages, and Canadian trade commissioners in the countries on their route seem to have thought that the visits of the destroyers were beneficial to their work. During the period no cruises were carried out in far northern latitudes in either ocean.

24 *Eng. tr.:* Visit of the Canadian Destroyers: Excursion to Carabobo Field—Lunch at the Hotel Jardín—Homage to the Liberator at the National Pantheon—Other functions.
The warships then called at the following places in succession: Trinidad, St. Kitts, Grenada, St. Vincent, Barbados, St. Lucia, Martinique, Antigua, and Jamaica where the west-coast destroyers parted company. Saguenay and Champlain returned to Halifax by way of Port au Prince, Nassau, and Bermuda, reaching their home base on May 10.

The same two ships sailed from Halifax for Bermuda on January 13, 1936. From Bermuda they proceeded to Jamaica, and on the way colours were half-masted for the death of King George V. Shortly afterwards the accession was proclaimed, and on the high seas all the commissioned officers swore allegiance to King Edward VIII. At Jamaica they were in company with a number of H.M. ships, and with Skeena and Vancouver who had come from the west coast. During this cruise the Champlain called at a port in Texas where a very warm welcome was extended to the ship. A strenuous round of motor drives, lunches, and other entertainments, had been arranged, and the commanding officer was versatile enough to manage addresses to the students of the State Teachers’ College and to those of a Senior High School. The destroyer was open to the public every afternoon, and about fifteen hundred visitors were estimated to have come on board daily. On the day after her arrival a local newspaper gave Champlain about half its front page, said that as she appeared over the horizon on the way in she had “literally plowed up the rolling sea,” and added: “In naval parlance, such a vessel is a veritable ‘hornet.’” Champlain arrived back in Halifax on May 3, and Saguenay two weeks later.

A normal feature of the winter cruises to the West Indies was exercises and manoeuvres in company with ships of the Royal Navy, the benefits of which were obvious. These joint exercises enabled the Canadian destroyers to take part in relatively complex and large-scale practices which would otherwise have been beyond their means, and gave them a useful standard of comparison. Moreover the probability of close co-operation between the two Services in the event of war lent considerable realism to such rehearsals. During the winter cruise of 1934 which has been briefly described above, the four Canadian destroyers exercised for several days with ships of the Home Fleet, including the battleships Nelson, Rodney, Valiant, and Malaya, and an aircraft carrier, cruisers, and destroyers. In this period of combined training the
Canadian division formed a complete flotilla with H.M.S. Kempenfelt, Crescent, Cygnet, Crusader, and Comet, all five of which were later to become H.M.C. ships.²⁵ Through the nineteen-twenties and thirties, also, one of H.M. cruisers usually appeared at Esquimalt in the course of the summer, and exercised in company with the one or more H.M.C. destroyers on that station.²⁶

Immediate action on the outbreak of war calls for many detailed arrangements made in advance. Some planning of this sort had always been done by the Naval Service, but after the year 1932 progressively greater attention was given to it. Existing arrangements were extended, and additional ones were made as the threat of war grew more serious. A War Book was prepared and frequently revised along lines suggested by the Oversea Defence Committee. Co-operation between certain Departments was provided for, and various means for assisting the Admiralty were devised. The naval Intelligence organization was to be immediately expanded, wireless censorship instituted, and the naval part of the defence schemes put into effect at naval ports. Suitable government and privately-owned vessels were earmarked as auxiliaries, to be used in most cases for anti-submarine work or minesweeping. Arrangements were made to institute naval and contraband control, and to issue routeing and other instructions to merchant ships, some of which would also have to be defensively armed. Preparations were made to set up examination services where needed. Enemy merchant ships which might happen to be in Canadian ports at the outbreak of a war were to be seized, subject to any agreement for according “days of grace” to them. Plans for mobilizing the reserves were drawn up, while suitable retired as well as reserve officers were marked out for particular duties. The supply of highly-trained officers who would be available in war was largely increased by the fact that the Admiralty had given the Naval Service the first call on retired officers of the Royal Navy living in Canada. At most of the principal ocean ports office accommodation was selected in advance. Such signals, Orders in Council, and other paper instruments as were likely to be required on or immediately before the outbreak of war were drafted in advance.

²⁵ With names respectively changed to Assiniboine, Fraser, St. Laurent, Ottawa, and Restigouche.
²⁶ Account of winter cruises is based on the Logs of the destroyers concerned.
On July 1, 1934, Capt. Percy Walker Nelles succeeded Cdre. Hose as Chief of the Naval Staff.\textsuperscript{27} The new C.N.S. had been born in Brantford, Ont., in 1892. He may have acquired his vocation for a Service career unusually early, for his father commanded a regiment in the South African War. He was a member of the original group of Canadian naval cadets who entered the profession in 1908 before the Naval Service had been founded, and received their first training in C.G.S. \textit{Canada}. During the First World War Lieut. Nelles served with the Royal Navy, returning to his own Service in 1917. He later attended the Royal Naval Staff College and the Imperial Defence College. Along with a few other officers he chose to remain in the Naval Service during its very difficult and unpromising early years, and his career was to be closely interwoven with the story of that Service to near the end of the Second World War. He was the first Canadian to reach the highest post in the R.C.N., and his appointment closely preceded the period of preparation for an early conflict.

Seen through Canadian eyes, the possibility of war seemed to have increased greatly after Hitler's \textit{régime} had become firmly established, and a war might have to be waged against both Germany and Japan. The chance of attack on or near the coasts of the Dominion, therefore, appeared to have increased, and the prospect of immediate support from the Royal Navy in the waters near Canada to have diminished. The naval authorities accordingly advised in November 1934 that the recommended minimum force of 6 destroyers and 4 minesweepers should be increased in the least expensive way possible by the addition of 12 auxiliary vessels, to be taken up in the event of war or the threat of war, chiefly or wholly from other Departments. It was recommended that this force, which would suffice only to afford a minimum of security on one coast, should be provided as a first objective. The desirability of acquiring some submarines had been considered, and rejected on the ground that submarines would prove to be less efficient and economical than destroyers.\textsuperscript{28}

The general election in the fall of 1935 resulted in a change of government at Ottawa. One of the first acts of the new Minister of National Defence, Hon. Ian Mackenzie, was to ask the three Services to report on their organization and

\textsuperscript{27} At this time Cdre. Hose retired with the rank of Rear Admiral, and Capt. Nelles was promoted to Cdre. 1st Class.

\textsuperscript{28} Memo. by Acting C.N.S., Nov. 21, 1934, N.S. 1017-10-18 (1).
ability to face any tasks which might confront them.\textsuperscript{29} The reports which resulted all showed a serious deficiency in equipment. The Minister was anxious, therefore, to present Estimates in 1936 substantially higher than had been asked for; but his colleagues urged him not to press the matter at that moment. A postponement would provide time in which the European situation might become clearer, and would permit the requirements of national defence to be further examined.\textsuperscript{30}

Under the terms of the London Treaty, the Champlain and Vancouver were due to be discarded at the end of 1936. Early in 1935, after some correspondence between N.S.H.Q. and the Admiralty, the latter had agreed to transfer two C-class destroyers to the Royal Canadian Navy. It seemed better to accept this offer than to have two new destroyers laid down; for although new ships would be longer lived and slightly more efficient than second-hand ones, they would cost considerably more and would take a couple of years to build. The Admiralty recommended H.M. ships Crescent and Cygnet. They were very similar to Saguenay and Skeena; consequently their acquisition would mean that the Royal Canadian Navy would possess a largely homogeneous half-flotilla.\textsuperscript{31} These particular destroyers also, together with H.M. ships Comet and Crusader, formed a distinctive half-flotilla in the Royal Navy. Canadian plans envisaged the acquisition of four additional destroyers, and it would be possible for the Admiralty to hand over the four C’s without breaking up a homogeneous flotilla. After considerable delay, and in accord with the recommendations of the Naval Service and the Joint Staff Committee, the Cygnet and Crescent were purchased from the Admiralty for $978,527 each. They had been built by Vickers-Armstrong, and launched on September 29, 1931.\textsuperscript{32} They were commissioned in the Royal Canadian Navy at Chatham on February 17, 1937. The Crescent was re-named Fraser, while the Cygnet’s name was changed to St. Laurent. On March 12 the two destroyers sailed from Portland for Barbados by way of the Azores. At Barbados they joined the

\textsuperscript{29} Statement by Min., Apr. 26, 1939, House of Commons Debates, 1939, iii, p. 3237.


\textsuperscript{31} Cable from Can. High Comm., London, to Sec. of State (Ext. Aff.), June 22, 1935; C.N.S. to Min. (memo.), June 26, 1935; Admiralty to N.S.H.Q. (signal), Sept. 4, 1936: N.S. 1017-10-18 (1).

\textsuperscript{32} Statistics of the four C’s: displacement, 1,375 tons; dimensions, 320’ x 33’ x 81/2’; h.p., 36,000; speed, 35.5 k.; guns, 4 4.7”, 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 8 21”.

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Saguenay and Skeena, and in company with these the St. Laurent reached Halifax on April 8, 1937. The Fraser sailed around to the west coast from Barbados, arriving on May 3 at Esquimalt.\textsuperscript{33}

In the summer of 1936 it was evident that greatly-enlarged defence Estimates were in prospect. The government therefore took the important step of setting up the Canadian Defence Committee, a sub-committee of the Cabinet, for the purpose of exercising a general supervision over defence measures and expenditure. Its members were the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Justice, Finance, and National Defence.\textsuperscript{34}

During the same summer the Joint Staff Committee undertook a complete survey of the question of Canadian defence, and embodied their conclusions in a long memorandum.\textsuperscript{35} They stated that the responsibility for national defence could no longer be considered to rest solely with the Department of National Defence. They pointed out that in view of developments in industry and the reliance of the contemporary civilization upon machinery, modern war made the heaviest demands on every sphere of civil activity, and that the effectiveness of a nation’s armed forces was now governed less by the size of its population than by the extent of its industry. In dealing with Canada’s responsibility for defence the committee briefly reviewed the principles of Canadian and imperial defence as these had evolved during the preceding thirty years. They reiterated the well-established principles that the direct defence of Canada was the primary responsibility of the Canadian forces; that the possibility of war with the United States was not considered when Canada’s defensive needs were being estimated; and that an attempt by an overseas Power to invade the Dominion was unlikely. It was pointed out, however, that the development of air power had lessened Canada’s immunity to attack, and that adequate air support would now have to be afforded to defended ports and to the defence of the focal areas of trade.

In the committee’s opinion the likelihood of a major war was increasing; and if such a conflict were to occur, the same relentless forces that had drawn the Dominion and afterwards the United States into the First World War would again

\textsuperscript{33} Logs.
\textsuperscript{34} P.C. 2097, Aug. 20, 1936; House of Commons Debates, 1937, ii, p.1051.
\textsuperscript{35} Joint Staff Cttee. memo., Sept. 5, 1936, H.Q.S. 5199B.
make their influence felt, perhaps with even greater intensity. The Joint Staff Committee thought that the war which they feared was more likely to break out in Europe than in Asia; nevertheless they felt that from the point of view of Canada's direct defence the needs of the west coast ought to be attended to first. This conclusion was probably reached in the light of the facts that the Royal Navy commanded the eastern approaches to Canada, that the German Navy was much smaller than that of Japan, and that Canadian neutrality was far more likely to be endangered on the west than on the east coast.

There were two possible developments, in the opinion of the committee, which the Dominion should urgently prepare to meet. The first was a situation in which Canada might be neutral in a war between the United States and Japan. The other possibility was that in such a war Great Britain, the Australasian Dominions, and Canada, might find themselves allied with the United States. In the first case Canada would need to dispose of a force strong enough to carry out her obligations as a neutral. These duties might not be easy to perform on the Pacific coast, indented and sparsely settled, and lying squarely between Alaska and the United States and also between the latter and Japan. In the second eventuality Canada might definitely expect attacks on her west coast and ought to have an adequate force with which to meet them; and in this connection the Joint Staff Committee altered the scales of attack for the west coast so as to include the possibility of Japanese landing parties operating in some strength.

The indirect defence of Canada through the participation by its forces in a war overseas was considered to be a secondary responsibility, but also one that might ultimately require a much greater effort. Any decision to participate in that way, however, would have to depend on future circumstances. The Joint Staff Committee nevertheless expressed the opinion that neither the Dominions nor the United States could remain unaffected by any threat to the continued existence of Great Britain as a world Power. Should Canada decide to take part in a European war, the committee considered that this participation would involve land and air forces rather

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36 In June 1933, the British Government had concluded an agreement with the German Government whereby the strength of the German fleet was to be limited to 35% of the aggregate naval strength of the British Commonwealth. This percentage was to apply to each type of ship, except submarines of which Germany was entitled to a larger proportion.
than naval ones. They would be highly mechanized, and their effectiveness would depend upon the ability of Canadian industry to maintain them in the field.

For the direct naval defence of Canada the Joint Staff Committee repeated the earlier recommendation that a force should be built up as soon as possible which would consist of 6 modern destroyers and 4 minesweepers, and that the necessary auxiliary vessels should be earmarked, and equipment for the defence of bases provided. They proposed a systematic programme for naval expansion, the details of which were included in an appendix to the memorandum. It was pointed out that of the four destroyers in commission, Vancouver and Champlain would have to be scrapped at the end of the year; the committee therefore endorsed the immediate acquisition of H.M. ships Cygnet and Crescent, which were available. Under the five-year plan an additional destroyer, H.M.S. Crusader, would be acquired in the first year, and another, H.M.S. Comet, in the third year, to make a total of six destroyers. The agenda for the first year called for the laying down of four minesweepers, and the balance of the programme included the providing of base-defence equipment, ammunition, and an increase in naval personnel including reserves. The committee pointed out that if their programme were followed, most of the new material would be acquired in the course of the first three years, but that it would be five years before the personnel were fully trained to man the ships. During the five years following the completion of this programme it was proposed to increase the number of destroyers to 8, and also to acquire a flotilla leader and 4 more minesweepers. The total naval force would then consist of a complete flotilla of destroyers and 8 minesweepers.37

The Joint Staff Committee also urged that the fixed defences at Esquimalt should be extensively modernized, that the militia should be reorganized and provided with modern equipment, and that the air force should be increased to 11 permanent and 12 non-permanent squadrons. The duties of the air force in connection with the direct defence of Canada were defined as being: to reconnoitre at sea and along the coast-lines; to attack hostile surface craft or submarines, and any forces entering Canadian territory; to assist in defending

37 Statement attached to the memo. of Sept. 5.
ports against enemy aircraft from carriers or cruisers; and generally to co-operate with the naval and land forces. The great mobility of aircraft largely reduced the problem of their disposition, as they could be concentrated very quickly in any threatened area on either coast.

Early in the Session of 1937 the government introduced substantially higher Estimates for national defence. These Estimates went part of the way towards implementing the recommendations of the Joint Staff Committee. The occupation of the Rhineland by the German army in March 1936, the capitulation of Addis Ababa in May of the same year, and the beginning of the Spanish civil war in July, had further increased the general concern over international affairs; nevertheless these Estimates were not passed without considerable opposition. Some members claimed that the Dominion was in no danger, and that consequently the defence Estimates were not for local defence but to prepare for Canadian participation in a war overseas. Others said that preparing for war would make its advent certain, and that Canada should rely solely upon goodwill in international relations. The Prime Minister assured the House that the Estimates were intended to provide for home defence only, and replied to other critics by arguing that if competitive arming meant war, then war on a colossal scale was inevitable, and it was surely time that Canadians should begin to place their country in a position to defend itself. He also pointed out:

... that any nation that does not wish to become a belligerent in a war must at least be able to see that the waters adjacent to its own coasts are so patrolled by its own vessels that no belligerent can come and operate from that base against some other country with which it may be at war. 34

Although the appropriations for national defence as a whole were higher in 1937 than they had been in the preceding year, those for the Naval Service were not as high, the increase being confined to the other two Services. This was owing to the fact that the naval appropriations had been doubled in 1936 as compared with the preceding year in order to provide for the purchase of the Crescent and Cygnet from the Admiralty.

Canadian defence policy as recommended by the Joint Staff Committee in 1936, and enunciated by the government

in 1937, was almost wholly concerned with the direct defence of Canada; yet the likelihood of the Dominion's becoming involved in a major war, which might originate either in Europe or Asia, raised the question of co-operating with the United Kingdom and the other members of the Commonwealth in such an event. In January 1937 the Joint Staff Committee drew up a memorandum bearing upon the agenda of the forthcoming imperial conference. The committee re-stated briefly the opinions that they had set forth in their defence memorandum of the previous September, emphasizing the conclusion that should a world war break out it was improbable that Canada would be able to remain aloof. The committee thought that although commitments in advance were out of the question, an exchange of information concerning the measures that were being taken by the governments of Great Britain and the Dominions would be helpful in solving Canada's own defence problems. In a later expression of opinion on this subject the Joint Staff Committee stated that to protect trade on the west coast was clearly beyond the resources of the Royal Canadian Navy as existing or as planned, and that in the event of a Pacific war the trade in question would cease entirely unless help were to come from some external source. The obvious fact was also pointed out that co-operation with the Royal Navy was essential to the protection of Canada's vitally important Atlantic trade.

In view of the dependence of the country in this respect, there were those who felt that the government had not gone far enough with its naval programme. In March 1937 the Rt. Hon. R. B. Bennett broke the silence of the Conservative Opposition on the subject of defence, reviewing the history of Canadian naval policy and generally endorsing Laurier's point of view. He asked for unity of purpose and expressed a hope that when the delegation to the imperial conference conferred with the Admiralty: "they might be able to arrive at a common understanding which would look not merely to the defence of our own shores, but, in the words of the late Sir Wilfrid Laurier more to the defence of civilization and the maintenance of world peace by the defence of the British Empire itself." During a debate in the Upper House, Senator C. C. Ballantyne said that he did not think that naval defence

40 Joint Staff Cttec. memo. on imperial conference agenda, Apr. 9, 1937, C.S.C.P.
had received the attention which it deserved, and expressed concern over the possibility that the Royal Navy might not be able to come to Canada's aid if war broke out.42

At the Imperial Conference of 1937 the vital importance of defending the sea communications of the Empire was stressed, but no change was made in the existing arrangements for imperial defence. Each Dominion reported on its own preparations, and it was generally acknowledged that these did not exceed what was needed for local defence. The conference also agreed that the security of the member nations could be increased by a free exchange of information concerning the state of the three Services in each country, by continuing the existing arrangements to concert the scale of defence for ports, and by co-operating to protect communications. "At the same time the Conference recognized that it is the sole responsibility of the several Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope of their own defence policy." The conference likewise considered the question of the munitions and supplies which would be required by the United Kingdom and the Dominions in time of war, and means of providing them.43 A general survey of Canadian industry from the point of view of wartime needs was begun in Canada the same year.

During the year 1938 international relations deteriorated alarmingly. The forcible annexation of Austria by Germany was unopposed except by gesture. The Spanish conflict continued unabated, with three of the Powers intervening to an extent that converted the war into a dress rehearsal. The Munich crisis in September brought Europe to the brink of war.44 In March 1938 the Canadian Government introduced its defence Estimates for 1938-39. The amounts asked for the army and air force were less than those of the preceding year: the naval Estimates, however, were increased by about two million dollars, mainly in order to pay for two additional destroyers. As in 1937, the government's defence policy was stated in terms of home defence and of safeguarding neutrality.45 The Minister also referred, however, to the possi-

42 Senate Debates, 1937, p. 113, Mar. 3, 1937.
43 Cmd. 5482, Parl. Papt., 1936-37, xii. This Summary of Proceedings deals only in generalities.
44 Precautionary steps were taken in Canada at this time. The destroyers Ottawa and Restigouche which had arrived at Gaspé on Sept. 13, on their way from England to the west coast, were kept on the Atlantic coast until the crisis was over.
45 House of Commons Debates, 1938, ii, pp. 1645-51.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

bility that Canada might take her part, along with Great Britain, France, and the United States, in the defence of democracy itself. He reviewed in detail the principles and requirements of the country's direct defence, and emphasized Canada's reliance on the Royal Navy in the Atlantic and on "friendly fleets" in the Pacific to prevent major attacks. The Minister outlined the scales of probable attack as laid down by the Joint Staff Committee, namely, minor attacks by combined sea, land, and air forces, or sporadic hit-and-run raids by light cruisers or submarines, and he added:

If that be the situation; if that is a correct description of potential dangers, then what are the defensive requirements needed in Canada to meet them? In the first place, for the defence of our focal sea areas we require sea and air forces capable of finding and destroying hostile service [surface?] craft, submarine or aircraft raiders, and this requires aircraft and naval strength. That is why the small naval force of Canada is being increased by two destroyers at the present time. A slight increase in our naval forces is vital and essential, in cooperation with air and militia services, for the preservation of our neutrality, and the defence of our focal areas, our trade routes, our terminals and our ports.\(^6\)

The Minister also pointed out the need of anti-aircraft defences, of ground troops, and of aircraft to co-operate with the army and to patrol the coast areas. He announced that the Naval Service was planning to establish a Fishermen's Reserve on the Pacific coast, and once this was done it was intended to establish a similar one on the Atlantic. This policy was criticized in the House as being inadequate for the coastal defence of Canada.

On June 15, 1938, H.M. ships Comet\(^17\) and Crusader were commissioned in the Royal Canadian Navy at Chatham, and as had been the case with the Fraser and St. Laurent they were manned from the beginning by Canadian crews. They were identical with the Fraser and St. Laurent, and had been built at Portsmouth Dockyard and launched on September 30, 1931. The Admiralty was paid $1,635,000 for the two destroyers; and before these were transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy alterations were made so as to provide for general messing and central stores, a heating system was installed, and general repairs were carried out. H.M.S. Comet was re-named H.M.C.S. Restigouche, and the Crusader became the Ottawa. They sailed from Portland on September 6, 1938, arriving at Gaspé on the 13th; and the six-destroyer pro-


\(^17\) An earlier Comet had been the first steam-driven warship ever ordered by the Admiralty.
gramme had at length been completed. A month after their arrival at Gaspé the Ottawa and Restigouche left for their station on the west coast, and on November 7 they reached Esquimalt. In January and February of 1938 four Basset-class minesweepers were laid down, two on the west coast, one on the Great Lakes, and one at Quebec.48 These vessels were specially strengthened against ice. They were commissioned late in the year with the names of Fundy, Gaspé, Comox, and Nootka. The minimum, single-coast, defensive flotilla which had been aimed at for so long, was now complete. In October 1937, the auxiliary wooden training-schooner Venture, built for the Department in Nova Scotia, was commissioned and stationed on the east coast.49

In July 1938, the Canadian Fleet Reserve was created,50 with an authorized complement of 500, and this reserve became effective on April 1, 1939. It was to consist of ratings who had been honourably discharged after having served for not less than seven years in the Royal Canadian Navy. The C.F.R. was in course of being organized when war broke out.51 Like the R.C.N.R. and the R.C.N.V.R. it was modelled after a similar reserve of the Royal Navy.

In 1938 the Fishermen’s Reserve was also formed. This reserve was designed to meet a special Canadian problem, and was in many ways peculiar to the Dominion. For several years before the outbreak of the Second World War the concentration of Japanese on the west coast of Canada had caused anxious speculation in British Columbia and in Ottawa concerning special measures that might be needed in case of hostilities with Japan. The Japanese in British Columbia, many of whom operated fishing boats and had an intimate knowledge of the coast waters, were one side of the problem. Defence against actual attack was the other. With the coming of war the destroyers based on the west coast would probably have to be employed elsewhere, and an alternative force seemed to be needed, particularly for patrol work.

In the summer of 1937 Mr. Roland Bourke, at that time a civilian employee of the Naval Service, during an informal

48 Displacement, 696 tons; length, 150'; speed, 12.5 k.; guns, 1 4"; average cost, $310,500.
49 Displacement, 250 tons; guns, 2 3-pdr.; complement, 40 including 24 boys under training.
50 P.C. 1753, July 20, 1938.
51 In many of the years between the two wars, members of the Royal Fleet Reserve living in Canada received their annual training in H.M.C. ships.
conversation with certain naval officers had suggested that
the fishermen should be organized, and trained in their own
boats.\textsuperscript{52} A fishermen's reserve was not a new idea, but the
project of a largely self-sufficient training organization was
original. The suggestion met with favour in a small Service
in which economy was unusually important. In January 1938,
Mr. Bourke was instructed to visit the west-coast ports and
consult those engaged in the fishing industry. His idea was
welcomed by enough of the owners and fishermen to make
practicable the desired force of two hundred men.\textsuperscript{53} A re-
cruiting campaign was carried on during the summer, and the
Fishermen's Reserve was formally established.

Those proposing to enter the reserve maintained an un-
usually independent attitude, for several reasons. A fisher-
man's occupation encourages a sturdy individuality.\textsuperscript{54} Some
of the men concerned had been liquor smugglers during the
prohibition period in the United States; others had brought
from Europe a dislike of compulsory military service; and
still others were political and social radicals. There was
therefore a tendency to look upon the State and its represen-
tatives with a suspicious eye. From these roots sprang two
demands for special treatment which the Naval Service felt
that it was desirable to recognize. The members of the
Fishermen's Reserve thus received two unusual if not unique exemption: they would not be used in industrial disputes, nor would they be liable for general service in the navy.\textsuperscript{55}

The Fishermen's Reserve was formed as a separate sec-
tion of the R.C.N.R. Their officers were accordingly design-
nated skippers and chief skippers as were officers in the senior
organization who held coasting or home-trade certificates.
The classes of rating were fewer than those in the R.C.N.R.,
being limited to able-bodied seaman and seaman cook, for
the chief duty of the fisherman patrols would be reconnais-
sance. The reservists were to receive a month's training each
year during the off season in the fishing industry between
October 15 and April 1, chiefly in seamanship, signalling, and
patrol duties. Enrolment was limited to men who made their
living by fishing. As a rule a complete crew entered the reserve
with their boat, in which they would train in peace-time and

\textsuperscript{52} D.N.R. to D.N.O. and T., Nov. 15, 1937, N.S. 126-1-2 (1).
\textsuperscript{53} Roland Bourke to N. Sec., Mar. 5, 1938 (N.O.I.C. Esquimalt: Records).
\textsuperscript{54} See Walmsley, Fishermen at War, passim.
\textsuperscript{55} N.S.H.Q. to "Naden" (signal), n.d. (N.O.I.C. Esquimalt: Records).
patrol in the event of war. During the training period the typical F.R. vessel was a fishing boat whose crew had stopped fishing for the time being and had sailed her to Esquimalt where they were receiving naval instruction.

In August 1938 an Honorary Advisory Committee for each Service was created, composed of senior non-permanent officers whose help was likely to be useful. The members appointed to the Honorary Naval Advisory Committee were: Cdrs. B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.N.R. (Ret’d); J. J. Des Lauriers, R.C.N.R. (Ret’d); W. B. Armit, R.C.N.R. (Ret’d); E. A. Brock, R.C.N.V.R. (Ret’d); and K. C. Sherwood, R.C.N.V.R.66

In June of the same year the Joint Staff Committee drew up a combined Services plan, the principal object of which was to facilitate common action and to ensure that the responsible commanding officers of each Service were informed of the plans of the other two.67 At this time too the committee reviewed the appreciation of Canadian defence problems and the recommendations which they had made in September 1936, and set forth their revised conclusions in a memorandum dated July 22, 1938.68 The committee thought that the international situation had developed in such a way as to shift the primary threat from the Pacific to the Atlantic coast; not because the danger to the Pacific coast had diminished, but because the risks on the Atlantic had increased. They revised the forms and scales of attack to allow for possible incursions by one or more of the most powerful of the German warships—the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the three "pocket battleships" of the Deutschland class. These five ships were especially well suited for raiding at a distance from their home bases, and by reason of their eleven-inch guns, speed, and endurance, were held to constitute a serious menace to the safety of the Atlantic seaboard.69 Owing to the marked advances in range, speed, and useful load, of modern aircraft, and the great

66 P.C. 1933, Aug. 10, 1938.
67 Joint Staff Ctte. Plan for the Defence of Canada, June 27, 1938. In January 1939 the Joint Staff Ctte. was renamed the Chiefs of Staff Ctte., and up to the time when its title was changed it had held forty-eight meetings.
69 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau: announced displacement, 26,000 tons; supposed speed c. 29 k.; guns, 9 11", 12 5.9", and smaller. Deutschland (later Lützow), Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee: displacement, 10,000 tons; speed, 26 k.; radius, 18,000 miles at 13 k.; guns, 6 11", 8 5.9", and smaller.
number of them that Germany had come to possess, the committee also revised the scales of air attack to include Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto, as centres subject to attack by airship or to occasional raids by ship-borne aircraft.\(^\text{60}\)

Concern was expressed over the lack of defences on the east coast and it was urged that immediate attention should be paid to these deficiencies. To meet the increased danger of attack the committee recommended, for the navy, that a flotilla leader should be acquired as soon as possible, and an immediate increase of personnel. They also suggested that orders for 2 motor torpedo boats and 2 anti-submarine vessels should be placed with Canadian firms, so that experience in building these vessels might be gained, with a view to the ultimate provision of at least a flotilla of motor torpedo boats for each coast and of 8 anti-submarine vessels for the east coast. They urged that Halifax, Sydney, and Saint John, should be furnished with anti-submarine and anti-torpedo nets and booms. An early increase in the accommodation at Halifax and Esquimalt was recommended, as well as a gradual expansion of the general facilities and of the joint Service magazine at each of these bases, to meet the needs of the growing naval force. The authorities were asked to consider the desirability of purchasing one or more cruisers as soon as the navy should be in a position to provide crews for them. For the army the committee advised that the necessary coast and anti-aircraft armament and equipment should be provided immediately. They pointed out that delay in procuring all that was needed in this respect had been unavoidable, and urged the immediate emplacing of all available coast-defence armament. They also advocated determined action to finish the equipping of two divisions. For the Royal Canadian Air Force the committee advised the early completion of seaplane bases, aerodromes, and other facilities on both coasts, the provision of aircraft and equipment for fighting units, and the training of additional personnel.

The Speech from the Throne which opened the parliamentary Session of 1939 expressed concern at the deteriorating international situation and the aggressive policies which were being actively pursued in other continents:

\(^{60}\) In July 1938 the Joint Staff Committee decided that because of the disturbed international situation and of constant developments in methods of air and naval attack, the forms and scales of attack should be reviewed by the committee at least every six months. (Minutes, July 6, 1938, C.S.C.P.).
The government shared in the general sense of relief that the appalling disaster of war, which threatened Europe during the month of September last, was averted, and in the recognition which that crisis manifested of the widespread will of the peoples for peace. They are hopeful that the efforts now being made to find a solution for the specific differences which are causing friction will meet with success. They recognize, nevertheless, that time is required for these forces to work, and that the possibility of further tension in the meantime must be faced. In this situation, the government have considered that the uncertainties of the future and the conditions of modern warfare, make it imperative that Canada's defences be materially strengthened. Two years ago the appropriations for defence were substantially increased, and a beginning made on a program of modernization to safeguard the country from the dangers of attack. The government intend to pursue this policy vigorously, and to propose to Parliament that the program of defence should be further augmented and that particular emphasis should be laid upon air defence.\(^{41}\)

The defence Estimates for 1939-40 reflected both the tone and the emphasis of the Speech from the Throne. The amount asked for exceeded by more than $24,000,000 the defence Estimates of the preceding year, and of this increase almost $18,000,000 went to the air force.

When introducing his Estimates in the House of Commons the Minister made the fullest statement on Canadian defence policy that the government had yet given.\(^{42}\) He reviewed in detail the policy which had been followed since the government had taken office in 1935, and reiterated the well-established principles on which it had been based. The Minister announced that as far as the Naval Service was concerned it was proposed during the coming year to buy a flotilla leader from the Admiralty, to create a Fleet Reserve, and to form a Fishermen's Reserve on the east coast similar to the one that had recently been set up on the Pacific. He also announced an increase in the personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, and the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, and referred to plans for constructing new facilities at Halifax and Esquimalt. In a later statement, speaking of a long-range programme for defence, the Minister set up a new goal in developing the naval forces of the country:

The ultimate objective which the navy has set out for Canada is to build up a naval force of eighteen destroyers, nine on each coast; eight anti-submarine vessels, four on each coast; sixteen minesweepers, eight on each coast; eight motor torpedo vessels, to be used on the east coast only;

\(^{41}\) *House of Commons Debates*, 1939, i, p. 3, Jan, 12. 1939.

two parent vessels, one for the destroyers on the west coast and one for the motor torpedo boats on the east coast.\textsuperscript{63}

Several members from the west coast criticized the government’s immediate naval programme on the ground that the naval force envisaged would be inadequate for the tasks which would have to be assigned to it. One member urged that more destroyers and also a cruiser should be acquired. Another objected that destroyers were designed to work with a battle fleet, and that they were useless against cruisers, unnecessarily fast for escorting convoys, and expensive: he wanted a larger number of motor torpedo boats to be acquired and perhaps some submarines as well. The government was also criticized for not embarking upon a definite programme of naval construction as both Australia and Great Britain had done.\textsuperscript{64}

The ultimate objective of eighteen destroyers, which the Minister had announced, had been envisaged within the Naval Service as the number of destroyers required, as early as November 1936. The formula had been that the minimum number of immediately-available destroyers required for coastal defence was six on each coast, and that to make sure of six destroyers being available at any moment a flotilla of nine destroyers would be needed. This idea was incorporated in a secret memorandum on policy early in 1939. Capital ships were still considered as being beyond Canada’s capacity to man, maintain, or finance. It was suggested that the need for cruisers should never be lost sight of, but that owing to their cost and the numbers needed to man them cruisers could not be considered at the moment. It was repeated that a flotilla of destroyers on each coast should provide reasonably adequate naval defence, and vessels of the Admiralty’s tribal class were recommended as being suitable:

The modern destroyer (Tribal class with powerful gun armament and moderate torpedo armament) is able to fulfil many of a cruiser’s functions and with the number proposed should provide a real defence to cruiser attack. They are also an efficient counter to attack by Armed Merchant Vessels, Submarines or Minelayers.

The memorandum also advocated the acquisition of eight “specially fitted” anti-submarine vessels, on the ground that the increasing powers of the modern submarine had rendered

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., iv, p. 4129, May 16, 1939.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., pp. 3994-5, 4020-21, 4282.
such craft essential to the defence of approaches to naval and commercial harbours and the focal areas of trade. It was stated that while the considerably greater number of these vessels which would be needed in an emergency could be obtained by requisitioning suitable craft, at least four were required on each coast for training personnel and so as to be immediately available at the outbreak of hostilities. Eight minesweepers for each coast were also recommended, and it was proposed that a few motor torpedo boats should be acquired for use on the east coast:

The increasing development of this type of vessel by all Naval Powers shows the value attached to them for both offensive and defensive action. In the St. Lawrence area motor torpedo vessels should be of real value and a flotilla of 8, with a parent vessel, must be included in our ultimate Naval objective.

In order to man and maintain the proposed force, and expand the reserves proportionally, it was recommended that the existing complement of 1,965 officers and ratings should be increased to 6,000. In addition to the two existing naval bases, a subsidiary base at Sydney and another at Prince Rupert would ultimately need to be developed. The capital cost of all these additions, to be spread over six or more years, was estimated at $68,860,000, and the annual cost of maintaining the expanded Naval Service, at $13,500,000.66

In August 1939 arrangements were completed to buy from the Admiralty the flotilla leader H.M.S. Kempenfelt. A flotilla leader is a destroyer with extra accommodation on board for the commanding officer of a flotilla and his staff. Kempenfelt had been launched on October 29, 1931; she was recommissioned as H.M.C.S. Assiniboine and arrived in Canada shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War.66

During the spring of 1939, in the black shadow of impending war, King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visited their Dominion of Canada from coast to coast. Their Majesties crossed the Atlantic in the Empress of Australia, and were met on May 15, about fifteen miles west of Cape Ray, by the Eastern Sub-Division consisting of H.M.C.S. Saguenay and H.M.C.S. Skeena. The Empress of Australia was accompanied by H.M.S. Southampton and H.M.S. Glasgow. The two destroyers approached from ahead, cheered ship as they


66 Displacement, 1,390 tons; dimensions, 326' x 33' x 8½'; h.p., 36,000; speed, 35.5k.; guns, 4 4.7", 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 8 21"; complement, 175.
passed down the Empress’ side, and took station on either bow of the liner. The King and Queen were escorted up the St. Lawrence to Quebec where they landed on May 17.\(^6^7\) During their journey through the Dominion they received unstinted expressions of the affection and allegiance of their Canadian subjects. At each of the cities which they visited, where a Naval Volunteer Reserve Divisional Headquarters was situated, the Division concerned provided a naval guard of honour. At Vancouver their Majesties were met by the Western Destroyer Division—Ottawa, Restigouche, Fraser, and \textit{St. Laurent}—which escorted the royal party on board the \textit{Princess Marguerite} to Victoria. As they left Vancouver harbour:

The complete stretch from Prospect Point to Spanish Bank, was kept clear by vessels of the Fishermen’s Reserve, who steamed slowly seaward in two straight columns, forming a channel three-quarters of a mile wide, through which the Escort was able to steam at high speed, in cruising order No. 20, without interruption.

On May 31 the royal visitors, turning their faces eastward, embarked in the S.S. \textit{Prince Robert} at Victoria, and the Western Division escorted them back to Vancouver.\(^6^8\)

Toward the end of their return journey across the continent the King and Queen visited Prince Edward Island. They crossed the Northumberland Strait from Tormentine to Charlottetown, and back again the same day to Pictou, in \textit{Skeena} with \textit{Saguenay} in company; and on this occasion \textit{Skeena} wore the royal standard and the Admiralty flag. Their Majesties left Canada on June 15 on board the \textit{Empress of Britain}, and were escorted by \textit{Skeena} and \textit{Saguenay} for some distance to sea. The King sent a signal to his two Canadian destroyers as they turned to leave: “Thank you for your escort, good-bye and good luck!”\(^6^9\) In days and years that were approaching fast there would be plenty of escorting for them to do, in circumstances far more rigorous, and they would need all the good luck which their Sovereign had wished them.

\(^6^8\) Logs of destroyers; Report of Proceedings by Capt. (D), June 5, 1939, N.S. 141-7-5.
\(^6^9\) Logs; Report of Proceedings, June 22, 1939, N.S. 138-7-5 (2).
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT, 1817

Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Minister at Washington and the United States Secretary of State concerning the Naval Force to be maintained on the Great Lakes, Washington, 28-29 April, 1817.

From His Majesty's Minister at Washington to the United States Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1817.

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, has the honour to acquaint Mr. Rush that having laid before His Majesty's Government the correspondence which passed last year between the Secretary of the Department of State and the Undersigned upon the subject of a proposal to reduce the Naval Force of the respective countries upon the American lakes he has received the commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to acquaint the Government of the United States, that His Royal Highness is willing to accede to the proposition made to the Undersigned by the Secretary of the Department of State in his note of the 2nd of August last.

His Royal Highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, agrees, that the Naval Force to be maintained upon the American lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side—that is:

On Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burthen and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon.

On the Upper Lakes to two vessels not exceeding like burthen each and armed with like force.

On the waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel not exceeding like burthen and armed with like force.

And His Royal Highness agrees, that all other armed vessels, on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and that no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed.

His Royal Highness further agrees, that if either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

The Undersigned has it in command from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to acquaint the American Government, that His Royal Highness has issued orders to His Majesty's Officers on the lakes directing, that the Naval Force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.

The Undersigned has the honour to renew to Mr. Rush the assurances of his highest consideration.

CHARLES BAGOT

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APPENDIX

From the United States Secretary of State to His Majesty’s Minister at Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, April 29, 1817.

The Undersigned, acting Secretary of State, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Bagot’s note of the 28th of this month, informing him that, having laid before the Government of His Britannic Majesty, the correspondence which passed last year between the Secretary of State and himself upon the subject of a proposal to reduce the naval force of the two countries upon the American lakes, he had received the commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to inform this Government that His Royal Highness was willing to accede to the proposition made by the Secretary of State in his note of the second of August last.

The Undersigned has the honour to express to Mr. Bagot the satisfaction which the President feels at His Royal Highness the Prince Regent’s having acceded to the proposition of this Government as contained in the note alluded to. And in further answer to Mr. Bagot’s note, the Undersigned, by direction of the President, has the honour to state, that this Government, cherishing the same sentiments expressed in the note of the second of August, agrees, that the naval force to be maintained upon the lakes by the United States and Great Britain shall, henceforth, be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is:

On Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon. On the Upper Lakes to two vessels not exceeding the like burden each, and armed with like force, and on the waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel not exceeding like burden and armed with like force.

And it agrees, that all other armed vessels on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and that no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed. And it further agrees, that if either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

The Undersigned is also directed by the President to state, that proper orders will be forthwith issued by this Government to restrict the naval force thus limited to such services as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.

The Undersigned eagerly avails himself of this opportunity to tender to Mr. Bagot the assurances of his distinguished consideration and respect.

[From Treaties and Agreements affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States of America, 1814-1925 (Ottawa 1927), pp. 12-13.]

RICHARD RUSH

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF THE COLONIAL NAVAL DEFENCE ACT, 1865

28 Victoria
Ch. 14

An Act to make better Provision for the Naval Defence of the Colonies.

(7th April 1865.)

Whereas it is expedient to enable the several Colonial Possessions of Her Majesty the Queen to make better Provision for Naval Defence, and to that end to provide and man Vessels of War, and also to raise a Volunteer Force to form Part of the Royal Naval Reserve established under the Act of Parliament of 1859 “for the Establishment of a Reserve Volunteer Force of Seamen, and for the Government of the same,” (hereafter in this Act called the Act of 1859,) and accordingly to be available for general Service in the Royal Navy in Emergency:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, as follows:

1. This Act may be cited as The Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865.

2. In this Act—

The Term “Colony” includes any Plantation, Island, or other Possession within Her Majesty’s Dominions, exclusive of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Islands being immediate Dependencies thereof, and exclusive of India as defined by the Act of Parliament of 1858 “for the better Government of India:

The Term “the Admiralty” means the Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom, or the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral.

3. In any Colony it shall be lawful for the proper Legislative Authority, with the Approval of Her Majesty in Council, from Time to Time to make Provision for effecting at the Expense of the Colony all or any of the Purposes following:

(1). For providing, maintaining, and using a Vessel or Vessels of War, subject to such Conditions and for such Purposes as Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time approves:

(2). For raising and maintaining Seamen and others entered on the Terms of being bound to serve as ordered in any such Vessel:

(3). For raising and maintaining a Body of Volunteers entered on the Terms of being bound to general Service in the Royal Navy in Emergency, and, if in any Case the proper Legislative Authority so directs, on the further Terms of being bound to serve as ordered in any such Vessel as aforesaid:
APPENDIX

(4). For appointing Commissioned, Warrant, and other Officers to train and command or serve as Officers with any such Men ashore or afloat, on such Terms and subject to such Regulations as Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time approves:

(5). For obtaining from the Admiralty the Services of Commissioned, Warrant, and other Officers and of Men of the Royal Navy for the last-mentioned Purposes:

(6). For enforcing good Order and Discipline among the Men and Officers aforesaid while ashore or afloat within the Limits of the Colony:

(7). For making the Men and Officers aforesaid, while ashore or afloat within the Limits of the Colony or elsewhere, subject to all Enactments and Regulations for the Time being in force for the Discipline of the Royal Navy.

4. Volunteers raised as aforesaid in any Colony shall form Part of the Royal Naval Reserve, in addition to the Volunteers who may be raised under the Act of 1859, but, except as in this Act expressly provided, shall be subject exclusively to the Provisions made as aforesaid by the proper Legislative Authority of the Colony.

5. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the Admiralty to issue to any Officer of the Royal Navy volunteering for the Purpose a Special Commission for Service in accordance with the Provisions of this Act.

6. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the Admiralty to accept any Offer for the Time being made or to be made by the Government of a Colony, to place at Her Majesty’s Disposal any Vessel of War provided by that Government and the Men and Officers from Time to Time serving therein; and while any Vessel accepted by the Admiralty under such Authority is at the Disposal of Her Majesty, such Vessel shall be deemed to all Intents a Vessel of War of the Royal Navy, and the Men and Officers from Time to Time serving in such Vessel shall be deemed to all Intents Men and Officers of the Royal Navy, and shall accordingly be subject to all Enactments and Regulations for the Time being in force for the Discipline of the Royal Navy.

7. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the Admiralty to accept any Offer for the Time being made or to be made by the Government of a Colony, to place at Her Majesty’s Disposal for general Service in the Royal Navy the whole or any Part of the Body of Volunteers with all or any of the Officers raised and appointed by that Government in accordance with the Provisions of this Act; and when any such Offer is accepted such of the Provisions of the Act of 1859 as relate to Men of the Royal Naval Reserve raised in the United Kingdom when in actual Service shall extend and apply to the Volunteers whose Services are so accepted.

8. The Admiralty may, if they think fit, from Time to Time by Warrant authorize any Officer of Her Majesty’s Navy of the Rank of Captain or of a higher Rank to exercise, in the Name and on behalf of the Admiralty,
in relation to any Colony, for such Time and subject to such Limitations, if any, as the Admiralty think fit, any Power exerciseable by the Admiralty under this Act.

9. Nothing done under this Act by Order in Council, or by the Admiralty, or otherwise, shall impose any Charge on the Revenues of the United Kingdom without express Provision made by Parliament for meeting the same.

10. Nothing in this Act shall take away or abridge any Power vested in or exerciseable by the Legislature or Government of any Colony.

Appendix III

Text of the Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act, 1909

9 Edward VII
Ch. 18

An Act to make better provision respecting Naval Establishments in British Possessions.

(20th October 1909.)

Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

1.—(1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty, on the representation of the Admiralty and of the Treasury that it is expedient to do so, by Order in Council to vest any store, yard, magazine, building, or other property in any British Possession held in trust for naval purposes (whether vested in His Majesty or in the Admiralty or in any officer), and the care and disposal of such property, in the Governor of the possession for such estate and interest, and upon such terms and conditions, and subject to such reservations, exceptions, and restrictions, as may be specified in the Order, and the Governor of the possession shall, by virtue of this Act and the Order, take and hold, subject to the provisions of the Order, the premises transferred to and vested in him accordingly.

(2) Every representation to His Majesty proposed to be made under this Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and shall lie for not less than forty days on the table of both Houses before it is submitted to His Majesty.

(3) Nothing in an Order made in pursuance of this Act shall affect any estate, interest, right, or claim in or to any property comprised in the Order other than such as at the date of the Order was vested in or held in trust for His Majesty or the Admiralty.

2.—This Act may be cited as the Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act, 1909.
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Appendix IV

BRITISH NAVAL ESTIMATES, 1901-1915

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<th>Expenditure on New Construction</th>
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<td>1914-15*</td>
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* Estimated

Taken from Cd. 7302, 1914.

Appendix V

TEXT OF THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT AS PASSED IN 1910

9-10 Edward VII
Ch. 43

An Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada.

(Asessed to 4th May, 1910.)

His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:—

**Short Title**

1. This Act may be cited as The Naval Service Act.

**Interpretation**

2. In this Act, and in any regulations made hereunder, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) "Active Service," as applied to a person in the Naval Forces, means service or duty during an emergency;

(b) "Department" means the Department of the Naval Service;

(c) "Deputy Minister" means the Deputy Minister of the Naval Service;
(d) "emergency" means war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended;

(e) "general orders" means orders and instructions issued to the Naval Forces by the authority of the Minister;

(f) "Minister" means the Minister of the Naval Service;

(g) "naval establishment" includes officers’ quarters, barracks, dockyards, victualling yards, naval yards, factories, rifle and gun ranges, naval colleges, and all other buildings, works and premises under the control of the Minister, constructed or set apart for the Naval Service;

(h) "Naval Forces" means those naval forces organized for the defence and protection of the Canadian coasts and trade, or engaged as the Governor in Council may from time to time direct;

(i) "Naval Service" includes His Majesty’s service in respect of all naval affairs of which by this Act the Minister is given the control and management, and also the Fisheries Protection Service, Hydrographic Survey, tidal observations on the coasts of Canada, and wireless telegraph service;

(j) "officer" includes commissioned, warrant and subordinate officers serving in the Naval Service of Canada, but not petty officers so serving;

(k) "prescribed" means prescribed by this Act or by regulations made thereunder;

(l) "regulations" means regulations made by the Governor in Council under the authority of this Act;

(m) "seaman" includes petty officers, seamen and all other persons engaged in the Naval Service of Canada, other than officers;

(n) "on service" means when called upon for the performance of any duties other than those specified as active service.

3. *The Interpretation Act* and section 2 of this Act shall apply to all regulations, orders and articles of engagement made or entered into under this Act.

**Command in Chief**

4. The Command in Chief of the Naval Forces is declared to continue and be vested in the King, and shall be exercised and administered by His Majesty, or by the Governor General as His representative.

**Department of The Naval Service**

5. There shall be a Department of the Government of Canada, which shall be called the Department of the Naval Service, over which the Minister of Marine and Fisheries for the time being shall preside, and he shall be the Minister of the Naval Service.

6. The Governor in Council may also appoint an officer, who shall be called the Deputy Minister of the Naval Service, who shall be the deputy head of the Department, and may also appoint such other officers and clerks as are requisite for the due administration of the business of the Department, each of whom shall hold office during pleasure.

2. The Governor in Council may transfer to the Department of the Naval Service any officer, clerk or employee of the Department of Marine
APPENDIX

and Fisheries whether or not such officer, clerk, or employee is at present connected with any one of the branches of the Department of Marine and Fisheries which is by this Act transferred or assigned to the Department of the Naval Service, and the money voted by Parliament for the financial year ending the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and eleven, applicable to the payment of the salary or the increase of salary of any such officer, clerk or employee shall be available for the payment of his salary or increase of salary in the Department of the Naval Service in the same manner and to the same extent as if such officer, clerk or employee had not been so transferred.

Administration

7. The Minister shall have the control and management of all naval affairs, including the purchase, maintenance and repair of the ordnance, ammunition, arms, armories, stores, munitions, and habiliments of war intended for the use of the Naval Service.

8. The Minister shall have the control and management, including the construction, purchase, maintenance and repair, of naval establishments and of ships and other vessels for the Naval Service.

9. There shall be appointed an officer, not lower in rank than Rear Admiral, to be called the Director of the Naval Service of Canada. If a suitable officer of such rank is not available then an officer of the rank of captain may be appointed, who shall have the rank of Commodore of the first class.

2. The Director of the Naval Service of Canada shall, subject to the regulations and under the instructions of the Minister, be charged with the direction of the Naval Service.

10. The Governor in Council may appoint a Naval Board to advise the Minister on all matters relating to naval affairs which are referred to the Board by the Minister.

2. The composition, procedure and powers of the Board shall be as prescribed.

11. The Governor in Council may organize and maintain a permanent naval force.

12. The Governor in Council may authorize the engagement of officers and seamen in the Naval Service upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, and may from time to time fix the maximum number that may be so engaged.

2. Every officer and seaman shall take and subscribe the following oath upon engaging to serve in the Naval Service:—

"I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear (or, solemnly declare) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty."

3. Such oath may be administered by any commissioned officer in the Naval Service.

13. The rank and authority of officers in the Naval Service shall be as prescribed.

14. The commissions of officers in the Naval Service shall be granted by His Majesty during pleasure, and all warrant, subordinate and petty officers shall be appointed in such manner and shall hold such rank and perform such duties as may be prescribed.
15. The Governor in Council may at any time relieve from duty any officer or seaman in the Naval Service.

16. Any person who has voluntarily engaged in the Naval Service shall be entitled to be discharged at the expiration of the time of service for which he engaged, unless such expiration occurs in time of emergency, in which case he shall be liable to serve for a further period of not more than twelve months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any increase of pay unless, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned merits it.

17. The uniform, arms, clothing and equipment of the Naval Service shall be of such patterns and designs as are prescribed, and where supplied at the public cost shall be issued as may be prescribed.

18. Officers of the Naval Service shall provide their own uniforms and equipment, with the exception of officers of torpedo vessels and of the submarine service, to whom special clothing may be issued as prescribed.

NAVAL RESERVE

19. The Naval Reserve Force shall consist of such persons as join the said reserve after naval service or after undergoing such training as may be prescribed. All members of the said reserve shall be liable to active service upon an emergency.

20. The Governor in Council may make regulations for the government of the Naval Reserve Force.

21. In time of war no officer or seaman in the Naval Reserve Force shall be required to serve continuously for a longer period than one year; but any officer or seaman who volunteers to serve for the war, or for any longer period than one year, may be compelled to fulfil his engagement. Provided, however, that the Governor in Council may, in case of unavoidable necessity (of which necessity the Governor in Council shall be the sole judge), call upon any officer or seaman to continue to serve beyond his one year’s service for any period not exceeding six months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any increased rate of pay, unless, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned merits it.

ACTIVE SERVICE

22. The Governor in Council may place the Naval Forces or any part thereof, on active service at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of an emergency.

23. In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

24. Whenever the Governor in Council places the Naval Service or any part thereof on active service, as provided in the two preceding sections, if Parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall issue for a meeting of
Parliament within fifteen days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue to sit in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.

25. When the Governor in Council declares that an emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public service that His Majesty should have control of any dock, shipyard, pier, wharf, machine shop, repairing or salvage plant, factory, warehouse, store or other building the Minister may, by warrant under his hand, empower any person named in such warrant to take possession thereof in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, and to use it for the service of His Majesty in such manner as the Minister directs, and all persons, officers, servants and employees employed thereon shall obey the directions of the Minister in connection with the management or operation thereof.

2. Such warrant shall remain in force so long as, in the opinion of the Minister, the emergency exists.

3. There shall be paid to any person whose property is taken possession of in pursuance of this section, out of moneys to be provided by Parliament, such full compensation for any loss or injury he so sustains as is agreed upon between the Minister and the said person, or, in case of difference, as is fixed upon reference to the Exchequer Court of Canada.

4. Where any property is taken possession of under the provisions of this section all contracts and agreements between the persons whose property is so taken possession of and the directors, officers and servants of such person or between such person and any other person in relation to the working or maintenance of such property which would, if such possession had not been taken, have been enforceable by the said person shall, during the continuance of such possession, be enforceable by His Majesty.

Naval Volunteer Force

26. The Governor in Council may organize and maintain a force to be called the Naval Volunteer Force.

27. The Naval Volunteer Force shall consist of officers and seamen raised by voluntary engagement from among seafaring men and others who may be deemed suitable for the service in which such volunteers are to be employed.

28. The Governor in Council may make regulations for the government of the Naval Volunteer Force.

29. Every naval volunteer shall be engaged for the term of three years and, provided his conduct and qualifications are satisfactory, shall be eligible for re-engagement for further periods of three years up to the age of forty-five years; at the expiration of each term he shall be entitled to his discharge, save as hereinafter mentioned.

30. Naval volunteers shall receive such training and capitation or other remuneration as may be prescribed.

31. In an emergency the Governor in Council may order and direct that the Naval Volunteer Force, or such part thereof as may be deemed necessary, shall be called into active service, and the naval volunteers so called out shall be liable to serve under such regulations as may be prescribed.
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

2. If a naval volunteer's period of service expires while he is employed on active service, he shall be liable to serve for a further period of not more than six months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any increased remuneration, unless, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned merits it.

Naval College

32. There shall be an institution for the purpose of imparting a complete education in all branches of naval science, tactics and strategy.

2. Such institution shall be known as the Naval College of Canada, and shall be located at such place as the Governor in Council may determine.

33. The Naval College shall be governed and its affairs administered under such regulations as may be made by the Governor in Council.

2. Such regulations shall be published in The Canada Gazette, and upon such publication shall have the same force of law as if they formed part of this Act.

34. The Naval College shall be conducted under the superintendence of a naval officer who has special qualifications with regard to discipline and to the instruction to be given, and such professors, instructors and assistants as are found necessary and as are authorized by Parliament.

2. The staff of the Naval College shall be appointed by the Governor in Council and shall hold office during pleasure.

35. Every candidate for admission to the Naval College shall be required to pass a medical examination and produce satisfactory proof of date of birth and satisfactory certificates of good character.

2. No candidate shall be admitted until he has passed a medical examination, and thereafter such qualifying examination as may be prescribed.

3. The age of candidates on admission for the Military and the Engineering branches of the Naval Service shall be as prescribed.

36. Every person admitted as a student to the Naval College shall engage to serve in the Canadian Naval Forces for such length of time and under such conditions as may be prescribed, and shall take the oath of allegiance to His Majesty.

Target Practice

37. The Minister may lay down targets, buoys and other appliances for target practice by the vessels in the Naval Service, and also may provide rifle ranges suitably equipped for the use of the Naval Service at or near any port or any naval establishment.

2. The Governor in Council may make regulations for ensuring the safety of the public during such practice and may provide penalties for infringement of such regulations and for wilful damage to any such targets, buoys, ranges or other appliances.

General Provisions

38. For the purpose of legal proceedings, all moneys subscribed by or for or otherwise appropriated to the use of the Naval Service, and all
APPENDIX

vessels, arms, ammunition, clothing, equipment, musical instruments, or other things belonging to or used by the Naval Service, shall be deemed to be the property of His Majesty; and no gift, sale or other alienation of any such thing by any person shall be effectual to pass the property therein without the consent of the Governor in Council.

39. All general orders issued to the Naval Forces shall be held to be sufficiently notified to all persons whom they concern by their publication and exhibition in the vessel or naval establishment to which those concerned belong, and proof of such exhibition shall be evidence of the issue of such orders.

40. The production of a commission or appointment, warrant or order in writing, purporting to be made under the provisions of this Act, or of regulations made hereunder, shall be prima facie evidence of such commission or appointment, warrant or order, without proving the signature or seal thereto, or the authority of the person granting or making it.

41. When any officer or seaman is killed on active service, or dies from wounds or disease contracted on active service, drill or training, or on duty, provision shall be made for his widow and family out of the public funds at the prescribed rates.

42. Every case of permanent disability, arising from injuries received or illness contracted on active service, drill or training or on duty, shall be reported on by a medical board and compensation awarded, under such regulations as are made from time to time by the Governor in Council.

43. The Governor in Council may from time to time transfer to or from the Naval Service any vessel belonging to His Majesty.

44. The Governor in Council may from time to time direct that The Government Vessels Discipline Act shall or shall not apply to any ship or vessel in the Naval Service, or to the officers, seamen or persons engaged for service thereon. Until otherwise provided the said Act shall continue to apply to all ships and vessels in the Fisheries Protection Service and the officers and persons engaged for service thereon, and to all ships and vessels employed on the Hydrographic Survey and Tidal Survey and the officers and persons engaged for service thereon.

Regulations

45. The Governor in Council may make regulations for carrying out this Act, and for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government generally of the Naval Service.

46. Such regulations shall be published in The Canada Gazette, and upon being so published they shall have the same force in law as if they formed part of this Act.

47. Such regulations shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within ten days after the publication thereof if Parliament is then sitting, and if Parliament is not then sitting then within ten days after the next meeting thereof.

48. "The Naval Discipline Act, 1866," and the Acts in amendment thereof passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom for the time being in force, and the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, in so far as the said Acts, regulations and instructions are applicable, and except in

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so far as they may be inconsistent with this Act or with any regulations made under this Act, shall apply to the Naval Service and shall have the same force in law as if they formed part of this Act.

2. Where in the said Acts or in the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions any power or duty is vested in or imposed upon the Admiralty or any other body or officer, and there is no such body or officer in Canada or in the Naval Service, the Governor in Council may direct who shall exercise or perform such power or duty in Canada, or in the Naval Service.

3. This section shall not apply to any ship or vessel to which The Government Vessels Discipline Act applies, or to officers or persons who, being engaged for service upon such ships or vessels, are subject to the said Act.

Penalties

49. Any person who,—

(a) procures or persuades any member of the Naval Forces to desert; or,
(b) aids or assists any member of the Naval Forces in deserting; or,
(c) knowing any person to be a deserter from the Naval Forces conceals him or aids or assists him in concealing himself,

shall be liable upon summary conviction to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding twelve months.

Execution of Warrants and Sentences

50. The keeper, jailer or warden of every jail, prison or penitentiary in Canada shall receive and detain according to the exigency of any warrant under the hand of the senior commissioned officer in the Naval Service present in any district, or other person authorized under the regulations to issue a warrant, any person mentioned in such warrant and delivered into his custody, and shall confine such prisoner until discharged or delivered over in due course of law; and every such keeper, jailer or warden shall take cognizance of any warrant purporting to be signed by any such officer or other authorized person.

51. Any prisoner sentenced for any term of imprisonment by any naval court martial, or by any naval authority under this Act, may be sentenced to imprisonment in a penitentiary.

2. If such prisoner is sentenced to a term less than two years, he may be sentenced to imprisonment in the common jail of the district, county or place in which the sentence is pronounced, or if there is no common jail there, then in that common jail which is nearest to such locality, or in some other lawful prison or place of confinement other than a penitentiary in which imprisonment may be lawfully executed.

52. Any officer or seaman in the Naval Service, sentenced to be imprisoned may, if the Governor in Council by regulation or otherwise directs, be imprisoned in any place specially appointed therefor, instead of in a jail, prison or penitentiary.
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REPEAL

53. Chapter 41 of the Revised Statutes, 1886, intituled an Act respecting the Militia and Defence of Canada, is repealed in so far as it concerns the Active and Reserve Militia Marine Force.

54. The schedule to The Department of Marine and Fisheries Act, chapter 44 of the Revised Statutes, 1906, is amended as follows:—

Clause 5, by adding thereto the following: “except steamships and vessels belonging to the Naval Service;”

Clauses 15 and 20 are repealed;

Clause 23, by adding thereto the following: “except the Fisheries Protection Service which is under the control and management of the Department of the Naval Service;”

Clause 24, by adding thereto the following: “except such matters as are under the control and management of the Department of the Naval Service.”

APPENDIX VI

TEXT OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT, 1910
(Commonwealth of Australia)

No. 30 of 1910

An Act relating to Naval Defence

(Assented to 25th November, 1910).

Be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, as follows:—

PART I.—INTRODUCTORY

1. This Act may be cited as the Naval Defence Act 1910.

2. This Act is divided into Parts as follows:—

Part I.—Introductory.

Part II.—Administration.

Part III.—The Naval Forces.

Part IV.—The Service of the Naval Forces.

Part V.—Obligations in respect of Naval Training.

Part VI.—Special Powers in relation to the Naval Forces.

Part VII.—Miscellaneous.

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3. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—

"Active service" means service in or with a force which is engaged in operations against the enemy, and includes any naval or military service in time of war;

"The Defence Act" means the Defence Act 1903-1910 as amended from time to time and includes any Act for the time being in force in substitution for that Act;

"Governor-General" means the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, or the person for the time being administering the Government of the Commonwealth, acting with the advice of the Executive Council;

"The Naval Discipline Act" means the Imperial Act called The Naval Discipline Act as amended from time to time and includes any Act for the time being in force in substitution for that Act;

"Naval establishment" includes any Naval College, instructional establishment, ship, vessel, or boat used for services auxiliary to Naval Defence, and any dock, shipyard, foundry, machine shop, work, or establishment in connexion with Naval Defence;

"Officer" means a commissioned officer, subordinate officer, or warrant officer, but does not include a petty officer;

"Prescribed" means prescribed by this Act or the Regulations;

"Regulations" means the regulations relating to the Naval Forces whether made in pursuance of this Act, the Defence Act, or any other power;

"Seaman" means a member of the Naval Forces not being an officer, and includes any person serving in any capacity on board a vessel of the Naval Forces when engaged in any naval service;

"This Act" includes all regulations under this Act;

"Time of War" means any time during which a state of war actually exists, and includes the time between the issue of a proclamation of the existence of war or of danger thereof, and the issue of a proclamation declaring that the war or danger thereof, declared in the prior proclamation, no longer exists;

"War" means any invasion or apprehended invasion of or attack or apprehended attack on the Commonwealth or any territory under the control of the Commonwealth by an enemy or armed force, and includes actual war in which the Naval Forces take part.

4. The Defence Act is amended as set out in the First Schedule, and that Act as so amended may continue to be cited as the Defence Act 1903-1910.

5. Part I., sections thirty, forty-three, forty-six, forty-seven, fifty-one, fifty-three and fifty-eight of Part III. and parts IV. to XIV. both inclusive of the Defence Act shall, subject to this Act, continue to apply in relation to the Naval Forces.

6. Nothing in this Act shall be taken as an appropriation of any public moneys.
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PART II.—ADMINISTRATION

7.—(1). The Governor-General may appoint a Board of Administration for the Naval Forces, to be called the Naval Board.

(2). The Naval Board shall have such powers and functions as are prescribed.

8. The Governor-General may—

(a) appoint and promote officers of the Naval Forces, and issue commissions to them; and

(b) appoint an officer to command the whole or any portion of the Naval Forces.

9. Officers of the Naval Forces holding office at the commencement of this Act shall continue to hold office as if appointed under this Act.

10. The appointment or promotion of an officer under this Act shall not create a civil contract between the King or the Commonwealth and the officer.

11.—(1). Subject to sub-section (2), a person shall not be appointed to be an officer in the Naval Forces or promoted to any higher rank therein unless he has passed the prescribed examination for the rank to which he is appointed or promoted.

(2). A person who has not passed the prescribed examination for any particular rank may be appointed provisionally to be an officer of that rank.

(3). A person provisionally appointed to be an officer of any particular rank shall cease to hold office as an officer of that rank if he fails to pass the prescribed examination for the rank to which he has been provisionally appointed within the prescribed time, not exceeding eighteen months, after his appointment.

(4). The requirements of this section may be dispensed with by the Governor-General in the case of persons who are officers of the King’s Regular Naval Forces.

12. Every officer shall hold his appointment during the pleasure of the Governor-General, but the commission of an officer shall not be cancelled except for cause and after he has had notice, in manner prescribed, of the cause, and has been called upon to answer in his defence.

13.—(1). Except in time of war, an officer may by writing under his hand resign his commission at the expiration of any time not being less than three months from the date of the receipt of the resignation.

(2). The resignation shall not have effect until it has been accepted by the Governor-General.

(3). For special reasons the Governor-General may accept any resignation at any time after the receipt thereof.

14. Warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and petty officers shall be appointed and shall hold their offices as prescribed.

15. The seniority of officers in their respective ranks shall be as prescribed.

16. The Governor-General may appoint any person to be an officer, or promote any officer to a higher rank for distinguished service or for marked
ability and gallantry on active service, without that person having passed
the prescribed examination for the rank to which he is appointed or pro-
moted.

17. The ages for the compulsory retirement of officers and members of
the Naval Forces shall be as prescribed, but in special cases the Governor-
General may extend the prescribed age of retirement for a period not ex-
ceeding two years.

18.—(1). The Governor-General may establish Naval Colleges and
Instructional Establishments for the purpose of imparting education in the
various branches of naval science and in the subjects connected with the
naval profession, and for the purpose of qualifying persons for the naval
service.

(2). Persons receiving instruction or training at any Naval College
on Instructional Establishment shall be subject to this Act and the regu-
lations.

PART III.—THE NAVAL FORCES

19. The Naval Forces shall be divided into two branches called the
Permanent Naval Forces and the Citizen Naval Forces.

20. The Permanent Naval Forces shall consist of officers who are
appointed officers of those Forces, and seamen who have enlisted or engaged
as members of those Forces and who are bound to continuous naval service
for the term of their enlistment or engagement.

21.—(1). The Citizen Naval Forces shall be divided into the Naval
Reserve Forces and the Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces.

(2). The Naval Reserve Forces shall consist of officers and seamen
who are not bound in time of peace to continuous naval service and who
are paid for their services as prescribed.

(3). The Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces shall consist of officers and
seamen who are not bound in time of peace to continuous naval service and
who are not ordinarily paid for their services in time of peace.

22. The Governor-General may raise, maintain, and organize such
Permanent and Citizen Naval Forces as he deems necessary for the defence
and protection of the Commonwealth and of the several States.

23.—(1). The Naval Forces existing at the commencement of this
Act shall be subject to this Act as if raised thereunder.

(2). Members of the Naval Militia Forces under the Defence Act are
by this section transferred to the Naval Reserve Forces.

(3). Members of the Naval Volunteer Forces and members of the
Naval Reserve Forces under the Defence Act are by this section transferred
to the Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces.

24. Except as provided in the Defence Act, the Naval Forces shall be
raised and kept by voluntary enlistment only.

25. Enlistment in the Naval Forces shall be for such period as is
prescribed, but no prescribed period shall be less than two years.

26.—(1). Every person enlisting in the Naval Forces shall take and
subscribe an oath or affirmation of enlistment in accordance with the form
in the Second Schedule.
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(2). The oath or affirmation of enlistment shall be taken before an officer, a Justice of the Peace, or a prescribed person.

(3). The oath or affirmation of enlistment shall bind the person subscribing it to serve in the Naval Forces in accordance with the tenor of the oath until he is discharged, dismissed, or removed therefrom, or until his resignation is accepted.

27. Persons in any part of the King's Dominions may, subject to the law in force in that part, voluntarily enlist as members of the Naval Forces of the Commonwealth, and this Act shall apply to persons who enlist as members of the Naval Forces in parts beyond the limits of the Commonwealth to the same extent as if they had enlisted within the limits of the Commonwealth.

28. A member of the Naval Forces shall be entitled to be discharged therefrom at the expiration of the period of service for which he enlisted, unless such expiration occurs in time of war, in which case he shall not be entitled to his discharge until the war has terminated.

29.—(1). A seaman of the Citizen Naval Forces may, except in time of war, claim his discharge before the expiration of the period of service for which he enlisted subject to the following conditions:—

(a) He shall give three months' notice in writing to his commanding officer of his intention to claim his discharge; and

(b) He shall, if a member of the Naval Reserve Forces, pay such sum not exceeding two pounds as is prescribed; or

(c) He shall, if a member of the Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces, pay such sum not exceeding one pound as is prescribed.

(2). Any payment under this section may for special reasons be waived by any authorized officer.

(3). This section shall not apply to persons undergoing training or liable to be trained in pursuance of the Defence Act.

30. The Governor-General may at any time by order published in the Gazette—

(a) disband any corps or portion of a corps; or

(b) dispense with the services of any officer or seaman.

PART IV.—THE SERVICE OF THE NAVAL FORCES

31. The Permanent Naval Forces are liable to continuous naval service, and shall at all times be liable to be employed on any naval service, including active service, and the defence and protection of the Commonwealth and of the several States.

32.—(1). The Citizen Naval Forces are not liable in time of peace to continuous naval service, but are liable to such naval service as the regulations prescribe.

(2). The Citizen Forces shall only be liable to be employed on active service when called out for active service by proclamation.

(3). Nothing in this section shall prevent the employment on active service or any naval service of any members of the Citizen Forces who volunteer for such service.
33. Members of the Naval Forces may be required to serve for training or any naval service either within or beyond the limits of the Commonwealth.

34. The Naval Forces shall be subject to such drill training and inspection as are prescribed by the regulations.

35.—(1) The Governor-General may, for the purpose of naval service or training, place any part of the Naval Forces on board any ship of the King's Navy or in any naval training establishment or school in connexion with the King's Navy.

(2) The members of the Naval Forces while so placed shall—

(a) be under the command of the officer commanding the ship, training establishment, or school; and

(b) be subject to the laws and regulations to which the members of the King's Naval Forces on the ship or attending the training establishment or school are subject.

36. The Naval Discipline Act and the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions for the time being in force in relation to the King's Naval Forces shall, subject to this Act and to any modifications and adaptations prescribed by the regulations, apply to the Naval Forces.

37. Whenever the Commonwealth Naval Forces are acting with the King's Naval Forces for the purpose of training or for any naval service—

(a) the command of the forces shall, subject to any Imperial Act or Regulation, devolve upon the senior naval officer present and acting in a position of command; and

(b) any part of the Commonwealth Naval Forces may be placed under the command of any officer of the King's Naval Forces.

PART V.—OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF NAVAL TRAINING

38. Persons who are liable under the Defence Act to be trained in the Junior or Senior Cadets and who are allotted to the Naval Forces shall be subject to this Act and the regulations.

39. Commissioned rank in the Junior and Senior Naval Cadets shall be deemed honorary rank in the Naval Forces, but shall not confer any right to command in those Forces.

40. Persons who are liable under the Defence Act to be trained in the Citizen Forces and who are allotted to the Naval Forces shall be subject to training as prescribed, and shall be subject to this Act and the regulations, and shall while undergoing training be deemed to be members of the Citizen Naval Forces.

PART VI.—SPECIAL POWERS IN RELATION TO THE NAVAL FORCES

41.—(1) In addition to any powers contained in section sixty-three of the Defence Act, the Governor-General may—

(a) acquire or build and maintain ships, vessels, or boats, for Naval Defence, or for services auxiliary to Naval Defence;

(b) acquire or construct and maintain docks, shipyards, foundries, machine shops, and other works or establishments in connexion with Naval Defence; and

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(c) authorize the employment of any persons in a civil capacity in connexion with any services auxiliary to Naval Defence or any works or establishments under this section.

(2). The provisions of section sixty-three of the Defence Act shall apply in relation to the above-mentioned powers as if they were included in that section.

42.—(1). The Governor-General may—

(a) accept the transfer to the Commonwealth Naval Forces of any vessel of the King's Naval Forces or of the Naval Forces of any part of the King's Dominions;

(b) accept the transfer to the Commonwealth Naval Forces of any officers and seamen of the King's Naval Forces or of the Naval Forces of any part of the King's Dominions;

(c) transfer to the King's Naval Forces or to the Naval Forces of any part of the King's Dominions any vessel of the Commonwealth Naval Forces; and

(d) transfer to the King's Naval Forces or to the Naval Forces of any part of the King's Dominions any officers or seamen of the Commonwealth Naval Forces.

(2). Any transfer in pursuance of this section may be for such period and subject to such conditions as the Governor-General thinks desirable.

(3). Subject to the conditions of transfer, all officers and seamen of the King's Naval Forces or of the Naval Forces of any part of the King's Dominions transferred in pursuance of this section to the Commonwealth Naval Forces shall, while so transferred, be deemed to be members of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, and shall be subject to this Act and the regulations so far as they are applicable.

(4). Subject to the conditions of transfer, all officers and seamen of the Commonwealth Naval Forces transferred in pursuance of this section to the King's Naval Forces or to the Naval Forces of any part of the King's Dominions shall, while so transferred, be subject to the laws and Regulations governing the King's Naval Forces or the Naval Forces of the part of the King's Dominions to which they are transferred so far as those laws and regulations are applicable.

Part VII.—Miscellaneous

43. When any member of the Naval Forces—

(a) is killed on active service or on duty, or

(b) dies, or becomes incapacitated from earning his living from wounds or disease contracted on active service, provision shall be made for his widow and family or for himself, as the case requires, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund at the prescribed rates.

44. Funds may be established in such manner and subject to such provisions as are prescribed for providing for the payment of annuities or gratuities to members of the Naval Forces permanently injured in the performance of their duties, and for the payment of annuities or gratuities to members of the Permanent Naval Forces who are retired on account of age or infirmity.
45.— (1) The Governor-General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, prescribing all matters which by this Act are required or permitted to be prescribed, or which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for securing the discipline and good government of the Naval Forces, or for carrying out or giving effect to this Act, and in particular prescribing matters for or in relation to—

(a) the good government of Naval establishments;
(b) the discipline of persons receiving instruction or training in or employed in or in connexion with Naval establishments; and
(c) the regulation and control of shipping in time of war or for the purposes of any naval operation or practice.

(2) The regulations may provide penalties for breaches thereof, not exceeding imprisonment with hard labour for three months, in the case of imprisonment, or Twenty pounds, in the case of pecuniary penalties.

(3) The power to make regulations contained in this section is in addition to any power to make regulations contained in the Defence Act.

[Two Schedules which follow are omitted.]

APPENDIX VII

TEXT OF ORDER IN COUNCIL TRANSFERRING HALIFAX DOCKYARD ETC. TO CANADIAN CUSTODY

At the Court at St. James's,

The 13th day of October, 1910.

Present,
The King's Most Excellent Majesty
Lord President Lord Pentland
Lord Chamberlain Sir W. S. Robson

Whereas by Section 1 of the Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act, 1909, it is enacted that it shall be lawful for His Majesty on the representation of the Admiralty and of the Treasury that it is expedient to do so, by Order in Council to vest any store, yard, magazine, building, or other property in any British Possession held in trust for naval purposes, and the care and disposal of such property, in the Governor of the Possession for such estate and interest, and upon such terms and conditions, and subject to such reservations, exceptions, and restrictions, as may be specified in the Order, and that every representation to His Majesty proposed to be made under the said Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and shall lie for not less than forty days on the table of both Houses before it is submitted to His Majesty:

And whereas it hath been represented to His Majesty by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury that it is expedient by Order in Council, pursuant to the aforesaid Act, to vest in the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada the yards,
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buildings and other property, specified in the Schedule hereto, situate at Halifax, in the Province of Nova Scotia:

And whereas the said representation was laid before both Houses of Parliament, and lay for not less than forty days on the table of both Houses before it was submitted to His Majesty:

Now, Therefore, His Majesty doth order, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, and in pursuance of the powers vested in Him by the Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act, 1909, as follows:—

1. The buildings and other property specified in the Schedule hereto and the care and disposal thereof shall be and the same are hereby vested in the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada for all such estate and interest as is at the date of this Order vested in or held in trust for His Majesty or the Admiralty and for the public purposes of the Dominion upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations, exceptions and restrictions, namely:—

(i) If the Dominion Government fail to maintain the said properties in a state of efficiency or make any alteration in the buildings, wharves, jetties, &c., or in the present use of the sites, or if they fail to maintain the existing depth of water alongside the frontages of the properties conveniences at least equal in character to those which exist at present shall be provided by the Dominion Government at the same port:

(ii) The Dominion Government will arrange for the storing of coal or other fuel at Halifax in a suitable manner for the use of His Majesty's Ships and will allow their local representatives to take charge of it the necessary arrangements being settled as occasion requires by the Admiralty and the Dominion Government:

(iii) The Dominion Government will grant all facilities required by His Majesty's Navy including user of workshops and appliances by men of the Fleet whenever wanted at any Government Establishments of which the Dominion may now or in the future be possessed, such facilities with the exception of labour and materials to be given free of cost:

(iv) The Dominion Government will inform the Admiralty before carrying out any proposal which they may have in view to use the said properties for other than naval or military purposes:

(v) The Dominion Government will undertake the responsibility for all existing liabilities to which the said properties are subject:

(vi) The transfer is made subject to all tenancy and other Agreements affecting the properties and includes all rents payable to the Admiralty under such Agreements:

(vii) Subject to the observance of the above conditions the Dominion Government will be free to make such use of the properties as they may think best.

2. This Order may be cited as "The Canadian Naval Establishments (Halifax Dockyard) Order, 1910."

Almeric Fitzroy

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Appendix VIII

TEXT OF THE ADMIRALTY'S SECRET MEMORANDUM

AUGUST 20, 1912

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Secret

Memorandum on the General Naval Situation
(Prepared for the Information of the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, K.C., M.P.)

I.—General Position

1. THE power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on the sea which is essential to its security must obviously be measured from time to time by reference to the other Naval Forces of the world, and such a comparison does not imply anything unfriendly in intention, or in spirit, to any other Power, or Group of Powers. From this point of view the development of the German Fleet during the last fifteen years is the dominant feature of the Naval situation to-day. That development has been authorised by five successive legislative enactments, viz., the Fleet Laws of 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912. These laws cover the period up to 1920.

Whereas in 1898 the German Fleet consisted of—
  9 battleships (excluding coast-defence vessels),
  3 large cruisers,
  28 small cruisers,
  113 torpedo-boats, and
  25,000 men,
maintained at an annual cost of £6,000,000, the full Fleet of 1920 will consist of—
  41 battleships,
  20 large cruisers,
  40 small cruisers,
  144 torpedo-boats,
  72 submarines, and
  101,500 men,
estimated to be maintained at an annual cost of £23,000,000.
These figures, however, give no real idea of the advance, for the size and cost of ships has risen continually during the period, and, apart from increasing their total numbers, Germany has systematically replaced old and small ships, which counted as units in her earlier Fleet, by the most powerful and costly modern vessels. Neither does the money provided for the completed law represent the increase in cost properly attributable to the German Navy, for many charges borne on British naval funds are otherwise defrayed in Germany; and the German Navy comprises such a large proportion of new ships that the cost of maintenance and repair is considerably less than in Navies which have been longer established.

Even if no further increases are made by Germany in the interval, the Fleet possessed by that Power in 1920 will be far stronger than the British Navy of to-day. Already, by 15 years of scientific effort, Germany from having practically no Fleet at all has raised herself to what is indisputably a second place among the Fleets of the world. The whole of this extraordinary evolution—comprising as it does not only the building of ships of all kinds and of the most powerful types, but the formation and training of great numbers of officers and men of every specialist grade and rating; the development of a naval science and of naval tactics of their own; the provision of colleges and training schools, of vast arsenals for the supply of guns, ammunition, torpedoes, armour plate, and every kind of naval equipment; of naval harbours, docks, dockyards, and of marine fortifications on an unexampled scale,—has been achieved under the guidance and during the tenure of a single Minister, Admiral von Tirpitz.

2. The cause which has led Germany to create and develop this Navy is still a matter of dispute. The debates in the British Houses of Parliament for the past 10 years reproduce with monotonous fidelity two antagonistic views: While the one points to the inherent anti-British nature of German increases and the necessity for Great Britain to reply from time to time with larger programmes, if she be determined to maintain her naval superiority and consequently her national existence, the other insists that German Naval expansion is due to the naval or the foreign policy of Great Britain.

With foreign policy this memorandum is not concerned: it is sufficient to observe that the great German Law, that of 1900, was passed with national assent before the friendship between England and France rendered the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 a possibility, and while we were still on bad terms with Russia. It is therefore impossible to regard the good relations which have prevailed since 1904 between Great Britain and France, or since 1907 between Great Britain and Russia, as the cause or reason for German naval expansion, much of which had been publicly determined on in periods anterior to these dates.

3. Again, the naval policy of Great Britain has certainly not been provocative. On the accession of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's administration to power at the end of 1905 a deep and earnest desire prevailed throughout the dominant political forces in Great Britain to check and mitigate the rivalry in naval armaments. The expression of this desire and the hope that the Hague Conference of 1906 might be productive of some reasonable scheme for the limitation of armaments were not well received by the German Government. They declined to discuss the matter
at The Hague, or between the Sovereigns, and proceeded to the passage of their new law of 1906, which had already been projected during the tenure of Mr. Balfour’s administration in the preceding year. Great Britain, however, did not relinquish her efforts to check the rivalry of armaments, and in order to support words by deeds and precept by example, the British construction in capital ships and the cost of the Naval Estimates were substantially reduced. The following figures are instructive:—

In 1905 Great Britain was building 4 capital ships and Germany 2.

In 1906 Great Britain reduced to 3 capital ships and Germany increased to 3.

In 1907 Great Britain built 3 capital ships and Germany built 3.

In 1908 Great Britain reduced to 2 capital ships and Germany increased to 4.

The year 1906 was signalised by the passage of the 3rd German Naval Law, which provided among other things for the addition of 6 large cruisers, the greatest ships in the world, to that Fleet. It is noteworthy also that whereas prior to the year 1906 the Germans were building only 6 torpedo-boat destroyers a-year, they have since built double that number annually.

A man must be very anxious to prove Great Britain in the wrong if he seeks to found any charge of naval provocation against her upon the above figures. It cannot be contended with justice that Germany has been compelled by British naval rivalry and British naval increases to expand her naval establishments.

It has, indeed, been made a matter of reproach in many quarters that the reduction in British naval construction in the 3 years 1906, 1907, and 1909, encouraged the German Navy to a sudden and more rapid exertion in the hopes of overtaking the naval power of Great Britain. This is not the Admiralty view, as will be shown later; but it is necessary to state that it was not until the efforts of Great Britain, to procure the abatement or retardation of naval rivalry, had failed for 3 successive years that in 1909 upon a general review of the naval situation we were forced to take exceptional measures to secure against all possible hazards the safety of the Empire. In that year 8 capital ships were laid down in Great Britain and 2 others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand respectively—a total of 10. The German new construction continued at 4.

4. In the spring of the present year the fifth German Navy Law was assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers, it will in the near future consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and whereas at present, owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile during the
winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers, instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; 72 new submarines will be built within the currency of the new law, and of these it is apparently proposed to maintain 54 with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German Navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war. Such a proportion is without example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers.

So great a change and development in the German Fleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has reached 66,000. Under the previous Navy Laws, and various amendments which have preceded this one, Germany has been working up to a total in 1920, according to Admiralty calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they have been approaching that total by increments of approximately 3,500 a year. The new law adds 15,000 officers and men, and makes a total in 1920 of 101,500. The new average annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the next three years, from 1912 to 1914, by special provision, 500 men extra are to be added, and in the last three years of the currency of the law 500 less will be taken, making the total rate of increase of the German Navy personnel about 5,700 men a-year for the first three years.

The new construction under the law prescribes for the building of 3 additional battleships—1 to be begun next year, 1 in 1916—and 2 small cruisers, of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six years which are in view. The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 spread over that period above the previous estimates.

The facts set forth above were laid before the House of Commons on the 22nd July, 1912, by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

5. The effect of the new German Navy Law is to produce a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers which will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the law from 21, the present figure, to 33—an addition of 12, or an increase of about 57 per cent.

The new fleet will, in the beginning, include about 20 battleships and large cruisers of the older type, but gradually as new vessels are built the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels.

This full development will only be realised step by step; but already in 1914 2 squadrons will, according to Admiralty information, be entirely composed of what are called Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the “Deutschlands” and the “Braunschweigs”, together with 5 Dreadnought battle cruisers.

The organisation of the German Fleet will be 5 battle squadrons and a fleet flagship, comprising 41 battleships in all, each attended by a battle
or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines.

This great fleet is not dispersed all over the world for duties of commerce protection or in discharge of Colonial responsibilities; nor are its composition and character adapted to those purposes. It is concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German and British coasts, and has been organised and designed at every stage and in every particular with a view to a fleet action on a large scale in the North Sea or North Atlantic with the navy of some other great naval Power.

Attention must be drawn to the explicit declaration of the tactical objects for which the German Fleet exists as set forth in the preamble to the Naval Law of 1900 as follows:—

"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing "conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess "a battle fleet of such a strength that even for the most powerful naval "adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's "own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely "necessary that the German Fleet should be as strong as that of the "greatest naval Power, for, as a rule, a great Naval Power will not be "in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

6. When in 1900 Germany commenced the building of her Fleet, the well-known preamble to her Naval Law fully defined the objects and determination of that law. The development of the law by the various amendments is perfectly consistent with the preamble, and the Admiralty do not believe that the naval programmes or general policy of Great Britain have had any effect whatever upon the German Naval Law or its amendments. Although the German Naval Law has been developed in stages, and each stage has afforded opportunity for political recrimination in this country, it is more likely that the full scope of the Naval Law was clearly foreseen by the rulers of Germany in 1900, and that its announcement in instalments was merely accommodated to the capacity for digestion of the German finances and of their naval organisation at the moment of announcement. Harbours had to be designed and constructed for the new Fleet; docks to be provided; personnel to be entered and trained; the Kiel Canal to be deepened, and fortifications everywhere to be designed and established. Neighbouring nations that could not take umbrage at the more modest proposals of the earliest period might well have been shocked had the whole scheme been announced at once. A close study of the Naval Law of 1900 and its amendments and a careful consideration of the strength of our Fleet at that time compared with its strength to-day, leads the Admiralty to the conclusion that the law as we know it to-day was in the mind of the author of the law of 1900, and that it was reasons of policy and method only that caused the successive announcements of its development to be spread over a decade. What more there is to come cannot be known, but there are already signs, similar to those which have appeared on former occasions of increases, that even the mighty fleet which Germany will possess in 1920 is no final limit to her naval aspirations.

7. The purpose of German naval expansion is also a subject of doubt and controversy. We have often been assured that the German Navy is
APPENDIX

intended simply for the defence of Germany’s oversea possessions and her growing seaborne commerce and mercantile marine. If this were the true object, we might have expected to see a Navy of numerous and powerful cruisers distributed widely all over the world, showing the German flag in distant seas and aiding German commerce and colonial developments by their presence and influence. Instead of this, we are confronted with a very strong fleet of battleships concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German shores and our own.

Next we have been informed that the German Fleet exists for the defence of Germany against an attack by a naval Power, presumably Great Britain. If this be a sincere apprehension, it is singularly ill-founded, and becomes increasingly ill-founded as the march of naval science progresses. Germany has a very small coast-line and few great harbours in the North Sea. It would be difficult to find a more unpromising coast for a naval attack than this line of small islands, with their dangerous navigation, uncertain and shifting channels and sand banks, currents, mists, and fogs. All the difficulties of nature have been developed by military art, and an immense front of fortifications crowned by enormous batteries already covers and commands all the approaches to Germany from the North Sea. With every improvement in the mine, the torpedo, and the submarine-boat the German coasts become more effectually protected from a naval attack. The total military force which Great Britain could provide for an invasion of Germany would not exceed at the most 150,000 men. The German Army attains on mobilisation a strength of over 4,000,000.

Although, no doubt, the scare of a British invasion has been used in Germany to delude the vulgar, it is impossible that it can have any basis in the minds of the powerful naval and military classes in Germany, or of the men who direct the policy of that Empire.

8. The whole character of the German Fleet shows that it is designed for aggressive and offensive action on the largest possible scale in the North Sea or the North Atlantic. The structure of the German battleships shows clearly that they are intended for attack in a fleet action. The disposition of their guns, torpedo tubes, armour, the systems of naval tactics which the Germans practise and the naval principles which they inculcate upon their officers, leave no room to doubt that the idea of sudden and aggressive action against a fleet of great power is the primary cause for which they have been prepared.

Their “torpedo-boats,” as they call them in contrast to our term “torpedo-boat destroyers,” by their high speed and general characteristics, show themselves to be designed with the prime purpose of making an attack upon the great ships of the Navy they may be opposed to. The British torpedo-boat destroyers, on the other hand, are designed primarily for the purpose of destroying the torpedo-boats of the enemy and thus defending the British Battle Fleet from attack. Gun power for defence is the main characteristic of British torpedo craft: speed for closing to effective torpedo range that of the German.

No class of vessel yet designed belongs more naturally to the defensive than the submarine; but the German development of the submarine, from all the information we can obtain, tends to turn even this weapon of defence into one of offence by building not the smaller class, which would be useful
for the defence of their limited coast-line, but large submarines capable of
a sudden and offensive operation at a distance from their base across the sea.

The Admiralty feel it impossible to resist the conclusion that the Ger-
man Fleet, whatever may be said about it, exists and has been created for
the purpose of fighting, if need be, a great battle in the North Sea or the
North Atlantic both with battleships and all ancillary vessels against some
other great naval Power. The weapon which has been so patiently and
laboriously prepared is fitted for that purpose, and that alone.

9. We have further been assured from German sources that, even if
this were so, the Germans have no expectation of obtaining a victory over
the strongest naval Power, and that all they seek to achieve is a standard
of strength that will leave the greatest naval Power so seriously weakened
after the battle is over that she would hesitate before embarking on a
quarrel. This explanation is scarcely respectful to the sagacity of the
German Government, and to the high degree to which they carry their
studies of the military art both by land and sea. Whatever purpose has
animated the creators of the German Navy, and induced them to make so
many exertions and sacrifices, it is not the foolish purpose of certainly
coming off second best on the day of trial.

10. Reference must here be made to a very secret matter. During
the last few years we have become aware of the development in the United
Kingdom of an extensive system of German intelligence agents. The
materials at the disposal of the Admiralty on this subject were submitted
by the present First Lord in November last to the Director of Public
Prosecutions (Sir Charles Mathews), and to Mr. A. H. Bodkin, K.C., in
order to obtain a perfectly cool and dispassionate opinion from persons
unconnected with the Admiralty and accustomed to weigh evidence. The
following is an extract from their report:—

"We have carefully examined and considered the material with
"which we have been furnished, and have come to the following
"conclusions:—
"(a) That as far as England and Wales are concerned there is
"already established therein an extensive and systematic machinery of
"secret service, kept in motion and controlled by one or more persons
"in the secret service of Germany.
"(b) That agents in this country are employed and controlled
"from Germany in collecting information relating to land and naval
"defence of this country, and in communicating such information to one
"or more members of the German secret service.
"(c) That such agents are distributed over various parts of
"England and Wales, chiefly at places near to the sea coast, where
"information upon such matters would more probably be obtained.
"(d) That such agents in this country are principally, it would
"appear, of German nationality, but in some cases English in one or
"other of the services."

11. The purpose which governs the creation of a weapon may be un-
connected with any intention to employ it. It would not be fair to draw
from the character of the German Fleet the conclusion that the German
Government, or still less, the German people, have formed any conscious
APPENDIX

intention of attacking the British Empire; and so long as we maintain a
good and sufficient superiority in naval power it is unlikely that they will
ever do so. It is permissible to believe that Germany wishes to be powerful
at sea, simply for the sake of being powerful and of obtaining the influence
which comes from power without any specific danger to guard against or
settled purpose to employ the power. Still, the German Empire has been
built up by a series of sudden and successful wars. Within the lifetime of
many she has carved a maritime province out of Denmark, and the Rhine
provinces out of France. She has absorbed half the ancient Kingdom of
Poland; she dominates Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Her policy has been
such as to place her in a position to absorb Holland with scarcely an effort.
Her military strength renders her alone, among the nations of Europe, free
from the fear of invasion. But there is not a State on her borders, nor a
small State in Europe, but has either suffered at her hands or lies under the
impression of her power. From these anxieties Great Britain, and the
British Empire, sheltered by the Navy of Great Britain, have hitherto been free.

12. In this connection the disparity of the naval risks of the British
and German Empires must not be overlooked.

Great Britain can never violate German territory even after a defeat
of that Power at sea, her Army not being organised or strong enough for
such an undertaking. Germany with her large Army could, however, if she
chose, invade and conquer Great Britain after a successful naval campaign
in the North Sea. Germany has no overseas territory desired by Great
Britain. Great Britain has overseas territories, the cession of which might
be demanded by Germany after a successful war. A decisive battle lost at
sea by Germany would still leave her the greatest Power in Europe. A
decisive battle lost at sea by Great Britain would for ever ruin the United
Kingdom, would shatter the British Empire to its foundations, and change
profundly the destiny of its component parts. The advantages which
Great Britain could gain from defeating Germany are nil. There are
practically no limits to the ambitions which might be indulged by Germany,
or to the brilliant prospects open to her in every quarter of the globe, if
the British Navy were out of the way. The combination of the strongest
Navy with that of the strongest Army would afford wider possibilities of
influence and action than have yet been possessed by any Empire in modern
times.

II.—Situation in 1915

13. In Home Waters:—

In the spring of the year 1915—

Great Britain will have 25 Dreadnought battleships and 2 Lord Nelsons.
Germany will have 17 Dreadnought battleships.
Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.
Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

The Admiralty have decided upon a certain margin of superiority in
Home waters which they consider to be absolutely necessary to secure the
safety of our shores. This margin has been broadly fixed for that year at a
ratio of 3 to 2 in Dreadnought battleships apart from other vessels.

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Consequently, when Germany has—
2 battle squadrons of Dreadnoughts and 1 fleet flagship; total, 17;

Great Britain will have—
3 battle squadrons of Dreadnoughts and 1 fleet flagship; total, 25

It will be noted that, owing to the dispatch of 4 battle cruisers to the Mediterranean, Great Britain and Germany will each have an equal number of these vessels in Home waters, viz., 6.

14. These standards in new ships are sober and moderate. No one can say that they err on the side of excess. The reason we are able to content ourselves with them for the present is that we possess a good superiority in battleships and especially armoured cruisers of the pre-Dreadnought era.

In this are included 8 King Edwards (3rd Battle Squadron), which are more powerful than any other pre-Dreadnought ships; 8 Formidables (5th Battle Squadron) and 5 Duncans (6th Battle Squadron), which are as good as the ships of the 3rd German Squadron; and 8 Majestics (7th Battle Squadron); 6 Canopus, and 2 Swiftsures (8th Battle Squadron), which are superior to the 4th and 5th German Squadrons as they will be in 1915. There are, besides, 22 armoured cruisers, some of which are very good ships, against which the Germans have 7 of similar strength. There is also a preponderance in torpedo-boat destroyers and a good margin in submarines.

This reserve of strength will steadily diminish every year, actually because the ships of which it is composed grow old, and relatively because the new ships are more powerful. It will diminish more rapidly if new construction in Germany is increased or accelerated. As this process continues, greater exertions will be required by the British Empire.

15. The margin above prescribed in new ships has been decided upon after a consideration of many factors, including the individual power of the ships on both sides, and the British preponderance in older vessels to which reference has been made.

16. Attention is directed to the necessity of our being prepared at our average moment for an attack by Germany at her selected moment.

With regard to this:—

In the North Sea Germany has about 140 miles of coast line. Approximately one-half of this is north of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal which, 40 miles in length, communicates directly with Kiel, the largest German naval station. This northern coast is protected by the Frisian islands, which are being fortified, but it comprises no harbours or naval stations. The southern and western half includes the entrance to the Kiel Canal with a coast line of approximately 75 miles, contains the naval stations of Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Emden, and is protected by a long line of islands strongly fortified, Heligoland being an outlying fortified post. It follows that, without any variation of routine conditions, the whole German Navy can be concentrated within a narrow compass at any moment without exciting any attention.

17. It here becomes necessary to allude to the German pre-Dreadnought forces.
APPENDIX

In addition to the 17 Dreadnought battleships and 6 Dreadnought cruisers above mentioned, Germany will have in permanent commission by 1915 a 3rd squadron of 8 ships, bringing the total numbers in full commission up to 25, or 3 squadrons of 8 and 1 Fleet flagship.

She will also have from 12 to 14 battleships in reserve, of which under the new law 4 will be in permanent commission. The numbers thus available at any selected moment in battleships alone are:

29, of which 17 are Dreadnoughts and 12 pre-Dreadnoughts, with 6 battle cruisers;

and, without attracting any attention whatever, these ships can, by reason of the conditions of the coast-line and harbours above alluded to, be concentrated for war at any moment 300 miles from the entrance to the River Thames.

18. Great Britain, average moment.

In 1915, according to the present arrangements (which may have to be reconsidered in the light of German progress), we shall have in permanent full commission—

4 battle squadrons and 1 Fleet flagship,

of which 3 squadrons or 25 ships will be Dreadnoughts. One of these four squadrons (King Edwards) may at an average moment be at Gibraltar, leaving 25 ships, or 3 squadrons in British waters.

In addition, there will be a squadron of 8 ships (Formidables) and 5 Duncans manned permanently as to 50 per cent. of their crews, the remaining 50 per cent. being at the various schools of torpedo, gunnery, &c., available at the shortest notice provided the ships are at their ports. An average moment may find them away from their ports exercising, and at all moments it will be necessary to embark the balance crews before they can be put in the line of battle.

Further, as regards the three fully commissioned squadrons numbering 25 ships in full commission, the possibility of concentration which has been alluded to in the case of Germany does not exist for us at our average moment. There is in effect no harbour where such an assemblage of ships could lie at an average moment without causing a great disturbance of organisation; the exigencies of their practices in tactics, gunnery, torpedo, &c., actually compel their dispersion among the various ports and harbours of the British Isles.

There are not very many harbours convenient for these purposes. The necessity of non-interference with commerce, fisheries, &c., practically limits the normal exercising positions to the east and west coasts of Scotland, Berehaven on the south-west of Ireland, and Portland on the south coast of England. It will, therefore, be noticed that at an average moment our whole active Fleet may be dispersed, as to one squadron as far as Gibraltar, as to 3 squadrons over the whole coast-line of about 2,000 miles of the British Isles, as to the 5th and 6th (not yet formed) at a distance measured in time for mobilisation of anything up to 48 hours, and as to the 7th and 8th up to, say, 5 days.

Although after the Reserves have been mobilised the British forces will be superior, unremitting vigilance is required; and anything which increases
our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our
security and our chances of being left unmolested.

19. Mediterranean Station.—Four battle-cruisers and four armoured
cruisers will be required to support during the years 1913 and 1914 the
interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and the important food
supplies and Oriental trade which pass through that sea. By keeping this
squadron in the Mediterranean we reduce our superiority in battle-cruisers
in Home waters, leaving us a bare equality in this important class. During
these years the Navies of Austria and Italy will gradually increase in
strength, until in 1915 they will each possess a formidable Fleet of 4 and
6 Dreadnought battleships respectively, together with strong battleships of
the pre-Dreadnought types and other units, such as cruisers, torpedo craft,
&c. It is evident, therefore, that in the year 1915 our squadron of 4 battle-
cruisers and 4 armoured cruisers (maintained, be it remembered, at the cost
of our superiority in the former vessels in Home waters) will not suffice to
fulfil our requirements, and its whole composition must be re-considered.
To maintain a force that will secure consideration for our interests from
Mediterranean Powers we should have at least 6 Dreadnought battleships
with 2 battle-cruisers. The maintenance of such a force may well be the
factor that will determine Mediterranean Powers to hostility or amity with
Great Britain.

It is not that with inferior forces our officers and men would fear to
meet an enemy: no doubt they would do so, and with good heart; but it is
the duty of the citizens of the Empire, upon whom the actual fighting cannot
devolve, to furnish those upon whom it might devolve with such forces as
will give them fair prospects of victory.

The policy of keeping upon foreign stations ships of which the strength
is less than that of the ships of foreign Powers whom they may expect to
meet in battle proved disastrous to this country in the American War of
1812, when, owing to the policy of expecting our 32-gun frigates to fight with
success the American 44-gun frigates, many mortifying reverses attended
our arms.

20. Overseas.—Within a decade the paramount duty of ensuring our
preponderance in Home waters (at present the decisive theatre of a possible
war), has compelled Great Britain to abandon her policy of maintaining at
great expense in men and money squadrons in every distant sea, and to
concentrate the Fleet mainly in Home waters.

Thus in 1902 there were 55 pennants in the Mediterranean; to-day there are 19. There were 14 pennants on the North America and West
Indies Station; to-day there are 3.

There were 3 cruisers on the south-east coast of America; to-day there is 1.

There were 16 pennants on the Cape of Good Hope Station; to-day there are 3.

There were 8 pennants on the Pacific Station; to-day there are 2.

There were 42 pennants on the China Station; to-day there are 31.

There were 12 pennants on the Australian Station; to-day there are 8.
These will eventually be increased by the formation of the Australian Fleet
unit to 10.
APPENDIX

There were 10 pennants on the East Indies station; to-day there are 9. Or a total of 160 pennants on foreign stations against 76 to-day.

On the other hand, there has been a substantial accession of strength at home. Whereas in 1902 the Channel Fleet had 13 ships in full commission, while 25 were under the orders of the Admiral Superintendent of Naval Reserves and 24 destroyers were attached to the Home ports for instructional purposes, to-day the 1st Fleet numbers 56 ships, while 11 ships and 66 destroyers in full commission are attached to it. The 2nd Fleet, with 50 per cent crews embarked, comprises 21 ships; and 13 ships with 66 destroyers and 24 torpedo-boats, also 48 submarines with 4 attached ships, are within its organisation.

The 3rd Fleet, which represents all remaining effective vessels required upon outbreak of war, comprises 16 battleships and 38 cruisers, all of which have a small number of men embarked in order that they may be effective on mobilisation. (These last would greatly need a short period in which to develop their efficiency.)

Neither the 2nd nor 3rd Fleet existed in 1902, vessels not in full commission being kept in dockyards with no men on board of them.

Heavy and increasing as the strain has been, the Admiralty cannot admit that up to the present it has not been met, or that there is not time to provide for the future.

21. From this comparison it will be seen that the growth of the German Navy has compelled us to concentrate our Fleet at home. Money has not been stinted by Parliament. Estimates of £31,000,000, which were sufficient in 1902, have risen to £45,000,000 in the present year, and will rise again substantially next year. The enlistment of men, the training of officers, the steady and methodical development by every possible means of British naval strength and efficiency have been and will be untiringly pursued. But in spite of this largely increased expenditure and these exertions the fact remains that the Admiralty have been compelled by the pressure of circumstances to withdraw or diminish various forces which in time of peace were a symbol of Empire and the visible link which united all the subjects of the Crown and citizens of our race.

Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things, impart a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons, and enable the flag to be again flown confidently in the distant seas.

22. Naval supremacy is of two kinds: general and local. General naval supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive from the seas the strongest hostile Navy or combination of hostile Navies wherever they may be found. Local superiority consists in the power to send in good time to, or maintain permanently in, some distant theatre forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. It is the general naval supremacy of Great Britain which is the primary defence for the safety and interests of the great dominions of the Crown, and which for all these years has been an effective deterrent upon possible designs prejudicial to or inconsiderate of the policy and the security of Canada.

23. The rapid expansion of Canadian sea-borne trade and the immense value of Canadian cargoes always afloat in British and Canadian bottoms
NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

here require consideration. On the basis of the figures supplied by the Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the overseas trade (imports and exports) of the Dominion of Canada in 1909-10 was not less than £72,000,000, and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was 718,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still increasing. For the whole of this trade wherever it may be about the distant waters of the world, as well as for the maintenance of her communications both with Europe and Asia, Canada is dependent, and has always depended, upon the Imperial Navy without contribution or cost to her of any kind.

24. Further, at the present time and in the immediate future we still have the power by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion of our reserves to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective Fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand. And these communities are also protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of Great Britain so long as her naval strength is unbroken.

25. This power both specific and general will be diminished with the growth not only of the German Navy, but by the simultaneous building by many Powers of great modern ships of war. Whereas, in the present year Great Britain possesses 18 battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought class against 19 of that class possessed by the other Powers of Europe, and will possess in 1913 24 to 21, the figures in 1914 will be 31 to 33, and in 1915 only 35 to 51. The existence of a number of Navies all comprising ships of high quality creates possibilities of adverse combinations being suddenly formed against which no reasonable standard of British naval strength can fully guard. And the development of British naval strength has to be accompanied by a foreign policy which does not leave us without friends in Europe and Asia, and relieves us from the impossible task of building against the whole world.

26. Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present serious juncture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the Overseas Dominions of the Crown. She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and the greatest military Powers; and she has not lost her capacity, even if left wholly unsupported, of being able by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire. The Admiralty will not hesitate if necessary to ask next year for a further substantial increase beyond anything that has at present been announced, with consequent extra additions to the burden of the British taxpayer. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. It will have a moral value out of all proportion to the material assistance afforded. The failure of Canada at this moment, after all that has been said, to take any effective step would produce the worst impression abroad and expose us all to much derision. But any action on the part of Canada to increase the power of the Imperial Navy, and thus widen the margins of our common safety, would, on the other hand, be recognised everywhere as the proof and sign that those who may at any time be minded to menace any part of the Empire will have to contend with the united strength of the whole.
27. On these grounds, not less than from purely naval reasons, it is desirable that any aid given by Canada at this time should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply.

It is true that the forms of naval architecture change and are changing as the years pass; that great ships are not the only units in which decisive naval power can be measured; and that new weapons and new conditions may modify their influence.

It is after a full consideration of these aspects that the Admiralty record their opinion as above. They are satisfied that no step which Canada could take at the present time would be so helpful to the British Navy, or so likely to put a stop to dangerous naval rivalry, as the provision of capital ships for general Imperial service.

Admiralty, September 20, 1912.

Appendix A—Tables illustrating the Development of the German Navy under the Fleet Laws of 1898 and 1900, and Amendments of 1906, 1908, and 1912.

Appendix B—Extract from Memorandum accompanying the German Fleet Bill of 1900.

Appendix C—Translation of German Naval Law Amendment Bill, 1912.

Appendix 1—Comparison of the Amendment with the Fleet Laws.

Appendix 2—Programme of Construction.

Appendix 3—Increased requirements of Personnel.

Appendix 4—Calculation of Cost.

Appendix D—Statement showing Construction of Ships for the British and German Navies under the Programmes 1902-3 to 1912-13, inclusive.

[This memorandum is published here with the kind permission of the Admiralty. The appendices listed above are omitted.]

APPENDIX IX

TEXT OF THE NAVAL AID BILL, 1912-13

2nd Session, 12th Parliament, 3 George V., 1912-13

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA

BILL 21

An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.

HIS MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:—

1. This Act may be cited as The Naval Aid Act.

2. From and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.
3. The said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.

4. The said ships when constructed and equipped shall be placed by the Governor in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire.

5. The said sum shall be paid, used and applied and the said ships shall be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the Governor in Council and His Majesty’s Government.

Appendix X

ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES, 1910-40

Naval Service

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimates $</th>
<th>Expenditures $</th>
<th>Under-expended $</th>
<th>Over-expended $</th>
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<td>1910-11</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>1,790,017</td>
<td>1,209,983</td>
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<td>1911-12</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<td>1918-19</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>209,457</td>
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<td>(War)</td>
<td>6,780,905</td>
<td>1,999,362</td>
<td>638</td>
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<td>1919-20</td>
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<td>(Demob.)</td>
<td>2,041,379</td>
<td>199,932</td>
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<td>(Demob.)</td>
<td>1,378,927</td>
<td>1,354,527</td>
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<td>1922-23</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>44,284</td>
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<td>(War Claims) 764,794</td>
<td>1,399,056</td>
<td>944</td>
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<td>1923-24</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>3,788</td>
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<td>(War Claims) 59,836</td>
<td>1,419,664</td>
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<td>1924-25</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>1,667,848</td>
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<td>(War Claims) 48</td>
<td>2,261</td>
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1927-28 1,748,000 1,725,195 22,805
(War Claims) 2,111
1928-29 2,725,000 1,836,488 888,512
(War Claims) 1,061
1929-30 3,600,000 3,013,396 586,604
(War Claims) 356
1930-31 3,600,000 3,597,591 2,409
(War Claims) 6
1931-32 3,375,000 3,043,201 331,799
(War Claims) 309
1932-33 2,462,000 2,167,328 294,672
(War Claims) 6
1933-34 2,422,000 2,171,210 250,790
(War Claims) 213
1934-35 2,222,000 2,226,439 4,439
1935-36 2,395,000 2,380,017.80 14,982.20
1936-37 4,853,000 4,763,294.05 89,705.95
1937-38 4,485,097.25 4,371,980.48 113,116.77
1938-39 6,639,232 6,589,714.46 49,517.54
(To Aug. 31, 1939)
1939-40 8,800,000 1,869,162.36

1 Covered by Salary Deduction Act, 1934-35.

APPENDIX XI

ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES
FOR THE
THREE SERVICES
1935—1940

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<th>ARMY Estimate</th>
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<td>1936-37</td>
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<td>1937-38</td>
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<td>1938-39</td>
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<td>6,589,714.46</td>
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<td>1939-40</td>
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<td>21,146,750.00</td>
<td>5,795,356.62</td>
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AIR FORCE TOTALS

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<td>1935-36</td>
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<td>3,777,319.58</td>
<td>17,348,900.00</td>
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<td>1937-38</td>
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<td>1938-39</td>
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<td>12,499,795.50</td>
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1 To August 31, 1939.

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MINISTERS 1910—1949

Minister of Marine and Fisheries and of the Naval Service

Brodeur, Hon. Louis Philippe............. June 3, 1910 to Aug. 10, 1911
Lemieux, Hon. Rodolphe.................... Aug. 11, 1911 to Oct. 9, 1911

Minister of National Defence

Graham, Hon. George Perry............. Dec. 29, 1921 to Apr. 28, 1923
Macdonald, Hon. Edward Mortimer..... Apr. 28, 1923 to June 28, 1926
Guthrie, Hon. Hugh ...................... June 29, 1926 to Sept. 25, 1926
Ralston, Hon. James Layton............. Oct. 7, 1926 to Aug. 6, 1930
Sutherland, Hon. Donald Matheson...... Aug. 7, 1930 to Nov. 17, 1934
Stirling, Hon. Grote...................... Nov. 17, 1934 to Oct. 23, 1935
Rogers, Hon. Norman McLeod............ Sept. 19, 1939 to June 10, 1940
Ralston, Hon. James Layton............. July 5, 1940 to July 12, 1940

Minister of National Defence for Naval Services

Macdonald, Hon. Angus Lewis......... July 12, 1940 to Apr. 18, 1945

Minister of National Defence

Claxton, Hon. Brooke.................. Dec. 12, 1946

1 Minister of Militia and Defence and of the Naval Service until the Services were formed into one Department by the Department of National Defence Act of June 28, 1922.
2 Acting from April 28, 1923, and sworn as Minister Aug. 17, 1923.
3 Acting from June 29, 1926, and sworn as Minister July 13, 1926.
5 Three Defence Services.
THE NAVY LEAGUE OF CANADA

The Navy League of the British Empire was founded in 1894. Its declared purpose was “to do its utmost to secure naval efficiency and a fleet entirely adequate to the needs of the Empire.” In the closing years of the century similar organizations were established elsewhere, including the German Navy League, which enjoyed the active support of the Kaiser and soon after its creation claimed to have over 600,000 members. These navy leagues were predominantly civilian organizations whose primary purpose was to forward the interests of their respective national navies.

The Navy League of Canada was founded in 1896, affiliated with the Navy League of the British Empire. Its founders were responsible Canadians who considered sea power to be one of the strongest imperial links. The League was to be non-sectarian and free from Party affiliations, and its purposes were declared to be:

(a) To assist in securing as a primary object of the Imperial Policy the Command of the Seas;

(b) To spread information showing the vital importance to the British Empire of the maintenance of Naval Supremacy, upon which depend its Trade, Empire and National Existence;

(c) To urge these matters upon public men and in particular upon candidates for Parliament;

(d) To collect, receive, invest and hold funds and property from voluntary contributions, subscriptions, gifts and legacies for the objects of the League, or such of them as the donors may direct.

One of the most active early members of the League, and for some time its president, was Aemilius Jarvis of Toronto. Among its prominent supporters were Sir William Hearst, sometime Premier of Ontario, Sir John Eaton, and Edward W. (later Sir Edward) Beatty. A staunch supporter of the League during the difficult years after the First World War, when the public was tired of everything having to do with defence, Beatty became honorary president of the organization in 1920, a position which he retained until his death in 1943.

In 1918 the Navy League of Canada was organized under federal charter. At this time also the Dominion Council of the League was formed. An advisory body, the council, which consisted of Dominion presidents and ex-presidents, and Provincial or territorial presidents, met once a year or oftener. The national presidents of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and of the Federated Women’s Institutes of Canada were ex-officio members of the council. The president at that time was William Gillies Ross, chairman of the Montreal Harbour Commission. The League was subsequently organized in fifteen divisions: Nova Scotia Mainland, Cape Breton Island, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Quebec City, Three Rivers, Montreal, Ontario, Manitoba, North Saskatchewan, South Saskatchewan North Alberta, South Alberta, British Columbia Mainland, and Vancouver Island.
The League sought at all times to convince the Canadian people of the importance of sea power, stressing the dependence of the Dominion and Empire on ships and the men who sail in them. In December, 1919, when the Jellicoe Mission was in Canada, a delegation from the League was received by the Cabinet in Ottawa. Aemilius Jarvis urged that future naval policy, which was being considered by the government at that time, should include a navy large enough to be effective, the principle that the Dominion should retain control of its warships, and the modernizing of the Canadian merchant fleet. During the nineteen-twenties the organization preached continually, in print and through Members of Parliament, the desirability of developing the Canadian navy and merchant marine, and of educating the youth of the country in the meaning of good citizenship. To further these aims, naval brigades which were later to be known as sea cadet corps were established in the coast and lake cities, and also in certain western centres which were remote from any large bodies of water. Naval traditions were taught under the direction of volunteer officers, and boys in their formative years were shown the value of self-discipline and co-operation.

In addition to its primary function of seeking to arouse interest in the sea and sea power, the Navy League of Canada worked to promote the welfare of both naval and merchant sailors, and sought to co-operate with other organizations possessing the same interest, usually by granting funds to help them in their efforts. The following are examples of its activities on behalf of seamen. During the First World War the League endowed sailors' homes in Saint John, Quebec, and Montreal, and also contributed to the Limpsfield Sailors' Home in England. In 1918 a gift of $500,000 was made to the King George Fund, a benevolent fund for seamen. From 1914 to 1918 about $1,700,000 was raised in the Dominion for relief work in Great Britain. At the close of the war returned Service men were assisted in various ways, some of them for example being helped with the procedure of placing claims before the government. Early in the nineteen-twenties hostel and recreation centres for naval and merchant seamen were opened in Halifax and Sydney. In 1928-29, 150 English families, relatives and dependents of former sailors, were brought to Canada and provided with money wherewith to establish themselves in their new homes.

When war approached once more in 1939, the Navy League, under the presidency of David H. Gibson Esq., was available to help in alleviating some of the hardships which seamen were likely to suffer in the course of that conflict.

[This account, except for the first paragraph, is based on information supplied by officials of the Navy League of Canada and on certain publications of that organization. The records of the League have not been used.]
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(Referred to in Footnotes in this Volume)


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Robinson, C. N. (present ed.), *Brassey’s Naval and Shipping Annual*, London. This useful publication first appeared in 1886.


Walmsley, Leo, *Fishermen at War*, London, 1941.


## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.R.O.</td>
<td>Admiralty Record Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>approximately</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can. High Comm.</td>
<td>High Commissioner for Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdre.</td>
<td>Commodore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.F.R.</td>
<td>Canadian Fleet Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.G.S.</td>
<td>Canadian Government Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.G.T.</td>
<td>Compagnie Générale Transatlantique</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. in C.</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.N.S.</td>
<td>Chief of the Naval Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.O.</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Sec.</td>
<td>Secretary of State for the Colonies</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.S.C.P.</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff Committee Proceedings</td>
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<td>Cttee.</td>
<td>Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dir.</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td>D. Min.</td>
<td>Deputy Minister</td>
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<td>D.N.O. and T.</td>
<td>Director of Naval Operations and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.N.R.</td>
<td>Director of Naval Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.O.T.</td>
<td>Director of Overseas Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. Aff.</td>
<td>External Affairs</td>
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<td>F.R.</td>
<td>Fishermen's Reserve</td>
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<td>H.M.A.S.</td>
<td>His Majesty's Australian Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.C.S.</td>
<td>His Majesty's Canadian Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>H.M.S.</td>
<td>His Majesty's Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>h.p.</td>
<td>horse power</td>
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<td>I.C.R.</td>
<td>Intercolonial Railway</td>
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<td>k</td>
<td>knots</td>
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<td>Min.</td>
<td>Minister</td>
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<td>N.A. and W.I.</td>
<td>North America and West Indies</td>
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<td>Naval Service</td>
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<td>pounder</td>
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<td>Seine MajestLts Schiff</td>
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<td>Senior Naval Officer</td>
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<td>W.T.</td>
<td>Wireless Telegraph</td>
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