Pichon’s letter provokes an expedition a gainst Beausejour—Preparations in New England—Monkton, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonels Winslow and Scott, arrives at Fort Lawrence with 2,000 men. June 2nd, 1755—Consternation of the French and weakness of the garrison—Assistance impossible—Siege of Beausejour—The Acadians refuse help—Three hundred are forced to take up arms—Capitulation—Le Loutre’s flight—Pichon claims his reward—What England owes to the Acadians.

During the autumn preceding the capture of Beau-s^jour, Pichon communicated to Captain Hussey, then commanding at Fort Lawrence, a letter supposed to have been addressed to Le Loutre by Duquesne, Governor of Canada, in which was the following : “ 7 invite you and M. de Vergor to seek a plausible pretext for a vigorous attack on the English.” Hussey, when transmitting this letter to Captain Scott, enumerated at some length the reasons for which be believed that it must have been fabricated by Pichon himself. Yet, three weeks later, Lawrence wrote to Shirley:

“Being well informed that the French have designs of encroaching still farther upon His Majesty's right in this Province, and that they propose, the moment they have repaired the fortifications of Louisburg. to attack our Fort at Chigneoto (Fort Lawrence), I think it high time to make some effort to drive them from the north side of the Bay of Fundy.”

Under other circumstances Lawrence would have hesitated to base an important decision upon a letter the spuriousness of which was demonstrated to him by solid arguments ; but, in view of the projects he entertained, he now thought it advisable to seize the opportunity and to act as if there were no doubt as to the contents of that letter. He said he was “well informed,” for he knew that this would be quite enough to make Shirley, whose ardent nature was cousin-german to his own, chime in with him and help him with all his might. Nor was he mistaken. Shirley immediately resolved to levy 2,000 men in New England for an expedition destined to dislodge the French from their strongholds on the isthmus the following spring. Preparations were pushed on with vigor, and the fleet, comprising thirty-three vessels under the order’s of Colonel Monkton, assisted by Lieutenant-colonels Winslow and Scott, appeared before Fort Lawrence on the 2nd of June, 1755.

There is reason to believe that the letter sent by Pichon to Hussey as if it came from Duquesne, was. really, as Hussey thought, of Pichon’s own composing; for, since the preceding autumn, the French had done nothing to give a color of likelihood to this letter. The Indians were quieter than they had been for a long time. The garrison of Beausejour had not been reinforced and numbered hardly 1(50 soldiers ; the fortifications had not been improved. At the very moment when the fleet appeared at the entrance of the Bay, Le Loutre was busily engaged in the building of those dikes that were to ensure farms to the Acadians. So skilfully and secretly had this expedition been organized and conducted that its appearance before the fort was the first intimation of the danger that threatened the French. Although tlie two nations were, ostensibly at least, on terms of peace, there was no mistaking the purpose of this display of force; and great was the consternation at Beansejour, which became greater still, a few days afterwards, when it was realized that no assistance could be hoped for from Cape Breton; for English vessels were cruising before Louisburg, and to force the blockade in order to assist Beausejour would expose Louisburg to be taken by surprise. There were, it is true, on the French side of the frontier, from twelve to fifteen hundred Acadians able to bear arms, and this was quite enough to hold the besiegers in check and perhaps to make the expedition a failure; but for many reasons De Vergor could not count upon them. Those who had always lived in this part of the country, aud they were the majority, were undoubtedly French subjects. So were also those who, iu Cornwallis's time or later, had chosen to emigrate; on their arrival they had taken the oath to the French government; but Lawrence, knowing their dispositions, had shrewdly played upon their feelings by signifying to them that they still remained British subjects, and that, .should they ever be taken in arms against England, they would be treated as rebels. He knew that this declaration, how absurd soever it was from a legal point of view, would trouble their consciences and give them scruples of which he would take advantage. These scruples coupled with his threats Votfld produce the desired effect.

De Vergor issued severe orders, commanding all ablebodied Acadians to repair without delay to the fort for enlistment; but, though his orders were repeated and accompanied by threats, they remained deaf to his commands: “He sent them orders upon orders,’’ says Murdoch; “they answered that he should have used them better when they were in liis power.” De Vergor could get together only about three hundred of those who, having no homestead, lived in Fort Beausejour, and, receiving rations from the Government, were under its control. But even they, in the straits to which they were reduced, with a view to protect themselves against disaster, stipulated that the orders should be repeated in writing. This force was insufficient for a long resistance, especially as two thirds of it were men who had never done military duty, and, what is worse, were lighting unwillingly under compulsion of the most terrible threats. “Many of the Acadians,” Murdoch adds, “escaped from the Fort, but seventeen of them were caught and brought back.”

Nevertheless, had the chief been brave and determined, it would have still been possible to make a fine stand and save the honor of France; but the defence was most miserable: nothing that I know of in the military annals of that nation approaches, :u point of stupidity and cowardice, the conduct of this siege, which the French themselves derisively nicknamed “ the velvet siege.” With Vergor and his kinsman and accomplice De Mannes, the greed of gold had stifled every feeling of honor and patriotism. Their only care seems to have been to save their ill-gotten gains and their precious persons. Without waiting for the investment of the fort, without any deadly fight, despite the protests of Le Loutre and some officers, De Vergor made overtures to Colonel Monkton, and on June 16th, only fourteen days after the arrival of the expedition, Beausejour capitulated on the following terms:

“1st. The commandant, officers, staff and others, employed for the King, and the garrison of Beausejour, shall go out with arms and baggage, drums beating. 2nd. The garrison shall be sent direct by sea to Louisburg, at the expense of the King of (ireat Britain. 3d. The garrison shall have provisions sufficient to last until they get to Louisburg. 4th. As to the Acadians, as they were forced to bear arms under pain of death, they shall be pardoned. 5th. The garrison shall not bear arms in America for the space of six months.

“ Robert Moxktox.
“ At the Camp before Beausejour.
“ 16th June, 1755.”

This capitulation involved at the same time that of Fort Gaspereau on Bay Verte. This latter was defended by a mere handful of soldiers and was, strictly speaking, only a storehouse for provisions and ammunition. Vergor ordered M. de Villerai, the commandant, to surrender his fort; which he did a few days later. Beausejour was immediately occupied by the English troops and its name changed to that of Cumberland. In the course of the ten days that followed the capitulation, all the Acadians came one by one to surrender their arms to Colonel Monkton. Not long afterwards the French also evacuated the fort of the River St. John; thus there remained no vestige of French domination north of the Bay of Fundy, except the trading posts at Miramichi and on the Gulf coast in the neighborhood of Bay des Chaleurs. Le Loutre had prudently slipped off before the occupation of Fort Beausejour, and on his way to Quebec, through the solitudes of the St. John River, he had leisure to meditate on the instability of human affairs. From Quebec he embarked for France in the following August; but another misfortune awaited him: the ship he was on was taken at sea In’ the English, and he was imprisoned in Elizabeth Castle in the Isle of Jersey, whence he did not recover his freedom till eight years later on the conclusion of the peace.

The capture of Beausejour was really Pichon’s work. It was the letter of Duquesne, whether true or forged, that gave rise to the expedition. According to a previous agreement between him and Captain Scott, instead of accompanying the French garrison to Louisburg. he was held prisoner for some time at Beausejour, then sent to Fort Edward at Pigiguit, and finally to Halifax, where he remained apparently a prisoner, in order that he might mingle with the French officers who were already there or who would be brought thither, and learn the secret plans of the French.

It was time for him to claim the full price of his services. The memorial he addressed 011 this subject to the Governor’s secretary bears, as may well be supposed, the stamp of his baseness And cupidity. Men of this kind can hardly possess aught else than second-rate skill, ingenious enough, perhaps, in the playing of their yile parts, but puerile and lame when they have to seek their own interest, for then all the vileness in their make-up oozes at every pore. Pichon’s memorial contains, together with much sycophancy, a long enumeration of his services and losses: “I have lost,” he says, “a fine future with my countrymen, in order to attach myself to the fortune of a nation which I loved, and which 1 know to be the most reasonable and the most generous of all those that exist in both hemispheres..... Mr. Scott promised that he would surround me with comfort and ease. Am I not now warranted in desiring the fulfilment of these promises, by securing for myself a solid and advantageous position? . . . Kindly bear in mind that I had a good social status in France, where I still own property. The Court had charged me with .... These posts would have been very profitable; I have had to give them up, as well as all I have in France, whither I must never think of retaining. I have lost the extensive property I had bought near Fort Beausejour, moreover two houses and gardens on a very fine site. By the taking of this fort I have lost two valuable horses, a quantity of provisions, furniture, linen, clothes, books and a thousand guineas stolen from me.....

There are circumstances when a man should be allowed to speak in praise of himself, and when it is his interest to make himself known and to direct attention to the services he has rendered. . . .

“I am well aware of all the power the Admiral wields and of the advantages 1 may hope for from his illustrious patronage and from that of His Excellency the Governor. May I not request .the honor of a recommendation from them to General Shirley, as well as to the other governors of the English provinces, in order to invite them to exercise their generosity by doing good to the most devoted of men in the service of the wisest of nations? The main point would be to beg their Excellencies to grant me their powerful patronage at the Court of England and with the Prime Minister, in order to obtain special favors for me. I am pretty well stricken in years and have reached an age token one's needs become generally greater.”

Among services rendered, Pielion mentioned his having brought about the surrender of Beausejour, by persuading the Acadians that were in the fort to refuse to fight at all and to insist on immediate surrender. Although any assertion of Pichou’s carries very little weight, especially when, as in this instance, it was his interest to make the most of his services, still, with due allowance for his bragging about his influence in the matter, his affirmation may well be true as to the Acadians refusing to light, a fact which could easily be verified at the time and which is sustained by much other evidence. If so, as we already have proof that the great majority of the Acadians refused to bear arms, we may also rest assured that those who, under pressure of cruel threats when they were absolutely at the mercy of the authorities, consented to enlist, did, by refusing to fight at the critical moment, bring about the surrender of Beausejour. As to the Acadians, said that article of the capitulation which concerned them, as they were forced to bear arms under pain of death, they are pardoned.

All this proves that Lawrence was not mistaken when, at the beginning of his administration, he wrote to the Lords of Trade concerning the Acadians who had emigrated: “I believe that a very large part of them would submit to any terms rather than take up arms 011 either Fide.” Lawrence knew them well and could make correct forecasts with respect to their future conduct. And yet this opinion of Lawrence seems strange. Why should they not have taken up aims for the French? Were they not subjects of France and as such had they not the right to serve her cause ? Undoubtedly. The greater part of them had dwelt for generations iu this part of the country ; the remainder were those to whom Cornwallis, revoking the compromise of 1.830, had given the choice between, an unrestricted oath and departure, that is, the choice between English and French allegiance. “My friends,” he had said, “the moment that you have declared your desire to leave and submit yourself to another Government, our determination was to hinder nobody.” Even had he not made this declaration, it is evident that, by revoking the condition of their stay, he set them free to depart, and, once gone, as soon as they dwelt on French territory, they became French subjects. It mattered little that the part of the country where they took refuge was then disputed by the two crowns. The telling fact was that it was then occupied by France; this was enough to settle the question of their French citizenship in virtue of the most elementary principles of the law of nations and especially of the diplomatic formula un possidetis. How, then, could Lawrence, in the teeth of this evident right, believe that they would not take up arms against him ? Simply because he knew that a question of this sort, clear enough in itself, would not appear to them clear enough to satisfy their conscience; that the scruples that would beset them would suffice to keep them from acting; that the oath they had formerly taken and the habit of looking upon themselves as British subjects would be a powerful deterrent; that long years of peace had made them lose the taste for fighting ; and that, by taking up arms, they would provoke their tyrannic oppressor to wreak his fury on their brothers of the Peninsula. To make his belief a certainty, Lawrence had taken care to

issue a proclamation in which he warned them that they still remained British subjects, that they were not released from their oath of fidelity, and that, should they be taken armed, they would be treated as rebels.

Lawrence’s forecast was fully continued. Despite the efforts and threats of the French, out of fifteen hundred Acadians only three hundred took up arms, and, even of these, several deserted; finally those w ho remained refused to fight, and Beausejour had to capitulate. To an impartial observer these Acadians would seem to have won for themselves, not merely the par-, don which the capitulation granted them, hut the eternal gratitude of England for the territory, the prestige and the glory they had brought her. At any rate the official pardon in the deed of surrender should have implied perfect immunity from annoyance for anything that might have happened in the past. We shall see that it was not so, and that, for want of valid motives, Lawrence made the events just related serve as pretexts for the deportation of the Acadians of the Peninsula. Hence the importance, on the reader’s part, of deeply fixing these events in his memory; they will help him to understand subsequent developments. Meanwhile, the conduct of the Acadians on either side of the frontier should be separately examined. I will first take up the case of the Acadians who remained on English territory.