

III.—*Nova Scotia under English Rule; from the Capture of Port Royal to the Conquest of Canada, A.D. 1710-1760.*

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The maritime provinces of the Dominion are very nearly co-extensive with the tract of country that in the days of the French regime bore the name of Acadia. Possibly the day may come when these provinces may deem it well to reunite under one local government, in which event a return to the ancient name of Acadia would be eminently fitting.

The earlier history of this part of the Canadian Dominion naturally divides into (a) the Pre-historic, or Indian, period, (b) the Acadian period, and (c) the Pre-loyalist period. This paper will deal with the later portion of the Acadian period, and will serve as an introduction to the progress of settlement in Nova Scotia during the Pre-loyalist period, the consideration of which is reserved for another paper.

During the century that followed the attempt of the Sieurs de Monts, Champlain and Poutrincourt to establish a colony in Acadia, the centre of authority remained, for the most part, at Port Royal. But Port Royal had a chequered experience and, while it remained for the greater part of the century in possession of the French, it was repeatedly taken by the British, only to be restored to its former owners by conquest or by treaty. Samuel Argal, Sir Wm. Alexander, Sir David Kirk, Col. Robert Sedgewick and Sir Wm. Phips in turn held possession and for fully a century, from the time of its first occupation by the French, Port Royal was doomed to be the foot-ball of fortune. It was not until the brave Commander Subercase, overpowered by a superior force, surrendered to General Nicholson in September, 1710, that the ancient stronghold passed permanently into the hands of the British. The treaty of Utrecht, three years later, confirmed the English in possession; but for the next fifty years they held Acadia by a very slight tenure, and, had it not been for the efforts of the people of New England in various emergencies, the country would undoubtedly have again passed under French control.

By the treaty of Utrecht "all Nova Scotia, or Acadia, comprehended within its ancient boundaries," was ceded to the English. At once there was a disagreement as to the "ancient boundaries." The English insisted that the territory north of the Bay of Fundy—now the Province of New Brunswick—was undoubtedly part of Acadia. The French, on their part, stoutly asserted that Acadia included nothing more than the peninsula of Nova Scotia. The dispute lasted for nearly half a century, sometimes confined to wordy warfare over the council

board and anon a leading cause of strife on the bloody battlefield. The issue was at length decided in favour of the English by the stern arbitrament of the sword. The peninsula of Nova Scotia having been conceded to the English, it became the aim of the French to prevent them from obtaining any foothold north of the Bay of Fundy. The Governor of Quebec, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, wrote to the English governor at Annapolis Royal in 1718, strongly objecting to any English vessels entering the River St. John, which he claimed as one of the rivers of Canada and entirely within the French dominion. He encouraged the Acadians to withdraw from the peninsula, promising them lands on the River St. John on application to the missionary Loyard, who was empowered to grant them. As a consequence some of the Acadians removed thither.

Not until the capture of Quebec in 1759 was there any really well considered effort to introduce English-speaking inhabitants in considerable numbers, although the province had for nearly half a century been regarded as a British possession. It will be necessary, before proceeding to speak of the efforts of Alexander McNutt and his contemporaries to further the colonization of Nova Scotia in the days of Governor Lawrence, to consider the course of events under Lawrence's predecessors.

The restoration of all Acadia to France was narrowly averted at the time of the peace negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. However, the Nova Scotia peninsula remained in possession of Great Britain. To the chagrin of the people of New England, Cape Breton was restored to France, and the re-establishment of the old stronghold of Louisbourg proved a menace to the security of the adjoining British colonies. The territory to the north of the Bay of Fundy was claimed by each of the rival nations and was a bone of contention for the next ten years.

Whether the restoration of Louisbourg to France by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was an act of prudence or of folly on the part of the rulers of Great Britain is a matter that we need not here discuss. The re-establishment of French power in the ancient stronghold, however, led the Lords of Trade and Plantations to establish an important British post at Chebucto to serve as a counterpoise. This post was named Halifax, as a compliment to the Hon. George Dunk Montague, Earl of Halifax, the president of the Lords of Trade.

Up to this period no real progress had been made by the English in the colonization of Nova Scotia. The governor had hitherto resided at Annapolis Royal, with a garrison of two or three hundred soldiers and a handful of dependants. The French population of the peninsula was much greater and comprised several thousands of Acadian peasants, scattered along the valley of the Annapolis river, the shores of

Minas Basin and the Bay of Chignecto. Although professing neutrality, the Acadians naturally sympathized with their mother country in her prolonged struggle with England. They repeatedly declined the oath of allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain and were known to be unfriendly to British rule. Their removal from the province had been discussed by the authorities of Nova Scotia and New England on several occasions. It was, however, the opinion of William Shirley, the Governor of Massachusetts, that their removal at this juncture would be attended with very hazardous consequences and that it should be avoided if possible.¹

*First Proposals Concerning the Introduction of English Settlers
into Nova Scotia.*

The scheme for the establishment of a settlement of English people at Chebucto originated with the people of Massachusetts, by whom Nova Scotia was regarded in the light of a ward. The establishment of such a colony, well fortified and garrisoned, it seemed to them, would be invaluable for offensive and defensive operations in Acadia, to say nothing of the commercial advantages that would naturally follow, of which the shrewd New Englanders were not unmindful.

Shirley believed that the frontiers of New England were never safe so long as French power dominated Acadia, and as the French were strongly established in Cape Breton he was alive to the necessity of planting English settlers in Nova Scotia in order to make it in point of fact, and not merely in name, an English colony. In his letter to the Secretary of State (the Duke of Bedford), dated February 18, 1749, he expresses his preference for New England settlers as being familiar with the cultivation of new lands, staunch Protestants and of rooted allegiance to the British Crown. He recommends New England troops for the garrisons and expresses his conviction that if spirited exertions are made the province will in ten years have an English-speaking population large enough for self-government.

Although so little had yet been accomplished, the idea of introducing English settlers had frequently been considered on both sides of the Atlantic. Shortly before the capture of Port Royal in 1710, the royal instructions for raising troops in New England for the expedition under Nicholson contained these words: "You shall assure them (the New Englanders), in our name, that such of them as contribute to the reduction of Port Royal, and any of the country and places adjacent belonging to the enemy, shall have a preference both with regard to the soil and trade of the country, when reduced, to any

¹ Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, Vol. II, p. 130.

other of our subjects.”¹ This was interpreted by the New Englanders to signify that the lands of the French would be given to those taking part in the expedition if they desired to settle upon them when their regiments were disbanded.

In November, 1711, Governor Vetch wrote to the Lords of Trade and Plantations in praise of the resources of Nova Scotia, the fertility of its soil, the abundance of its minerals, marts and naval stores and the richness of its fisheries. “What I am now about to say,” he adds, “is in my humble opinion the most effectual and easy way to make this a populous and flourishing country. The first thing is that your Lordships would be pleased to advise Her Majesty (Queen Anne) to give, as an encouragement to all her Protestant subjects of Britain and Ireland who are willing to come over and settle in the country, free transportation, tools and twelve months’ subsistence, as she was pleased to do with the Palatines in New York.” He also requested that two clergymen should be sent who could speak French, hoping that they would be able to induce many of the Acadians to become Protestants. He was convinced that the situation of the garrison of Annapolis Royal would be more secure if four or five hundred Protestant families were settled near them. However, the home authorities would not commit themselves to any policy of development, and their instructions to the Governors of Nova Scotia were largely directed towards the keeping down of expenses.

By the treaty of Utrecht, such of the Acadians as were not disposed to become British subjects were allowed to remove with their effects, within the space of one year, to any part of the French dominions. Those who chose to remain as subjects of Great Britain were guaranteed the free exercise of their religion, and were by Queen Anne’s permission to enjoy their lands and tenements without molestation. Those who did not choose to become British subjects were permitted to sell their property before removing elsewhere.

A large number signified their intention of removing to Isle Royale (or Cape Breton). Governor Vetch asserts that they would not have offered to go “had they not been not only importuned but threatened by the French officers, in the French King’s name, to be treated as rebels if they did not remove.” Vetch was anxious to have them remain upon their lands, as he was apprehensive that the accession of a large number of inhabitants would make Isle Royale a very powerful French colony. He argued that one hundred French, natives of America, familiar with the woods, able to march on snowshoes and

¹ Collections of the Nova Scotia Hist. Soc., Vol. IV, p. 22.
Nova Scotia Published Archives, p. 7.

accustomed to the use of birch canoes, were of more value and service than five times their number of raw men newly come from Europe.

Three months later Colonel Vetch wrote another letter to the Lords of Trade concerning the state of affairs in Nova Scotia, in which he observes:—

“As to the french Inhabitants In that Country, by what I can learn there is not many of them removed, notwithstanding the discouragements they mett withal some time ago. They will no doubt gladly remain upon their plantations (some of which are considerable) providing they may be protected and encouraged by the Crown, and as no country is of value without Inhabitants, so the removal of them and their cattle to Cape Brittoun would be a great addition to that new colony, so it would wholly ruine Nova Scotia unless supplied with a Brittish Colony, which could not be done in severall years, so that the french Inhabitants with their stocks of catle remaining there is verry much for the advantage of the Crown, provided that it shall be found practicable to keep them faithfull to their aledgence in case of a war with france, which will be hard to doe while the priests remain amongst them to whose dictates they are absolutely devoted.”¹

Opinions of early English Governors respecting the Acadians.

Lieut. Governor Caulfield succeeded Vetch in the administration and was at first favourably impressed with the attitude of the Acadians, but at the close of his term of office thought differently, for he writes:—
“My sentiment of them is very much altered from my former one and believe that there is but little dependence on their friendship, tho’, at the same time, I am persuaded it will be with reluctancy they leave the Country, most of those who had formerly gone being again returned; but for the better improvement of the country English Inhabitants are absolutely necessary.”

Governor Philipps had a still more unfavourable opinion of them, for he writes in 1719, that they were “growne so insolente as to say that they will neither sweare allegiance nor leave the Country.” He states further that at the time of the surrender of the province to the Crown of Great Britain “it was stipulated in their behalf to have their choice either to remain in the Province, if they would transfer their allegiance, or, in case of the alternative, to dispose of their estates and effects to the best advantage; to determine which one year’s time was allowed them; but at the expiration thereof, finding their new masters in no condition to oblige them to the obsevance of the one or the other, they have remained upon their possessions in contempt of the

¹ Transactions Royal Society of Canada for 1888, part I, p. 56.

Government, awaiting the opportunity of a rupture between the two Crowns to re-establish their former Government, and in the mean time are daily in secret inciting the Indians to robbery and murder, to the destruction of trade and hinderance of settling the Country.”¹

Philipps, nevertheless, desired to retain the Acadians within the province, although he admits in his letter to Secretary of State Craggs, of the 26th May, 1720, that the task is beyond him, for “once joined in a body, with the help of the Indians to favour their retreat, they can march off at their leisure by the way of the Bay of Verte, with their effects, and distroy what they leave behind without danger of being molested by his Garrison, which scarce suffices to secure the Fort in its present condition.”²

He thought it probable, however, that they would be obedient to Government so long as the two crowns should continue in alliance but in case of a rupture “they will be,” he says, “so many enemyes in our bosom, and I cannot see any hopes or likelyhood of making them English, unless it were possible to procure their Priests to be recalled, who are tooth and nayle against the regent, not sticking to say openly that ’tis his day now, but will be their’s anon.” In the same letter he displays his lack of confidence in the Acadians in the words following: “You will please to observe that the lands at Minas, which afford great quantitys of wheat yearly and are the best farms as yet in the country, are lyable to be all drown’d by cutting a dyke, which the Inhabitants at going off will not want ill nature to do. It would be great pity those farms should want Inhabitants when vacated by the French and great inconveniency to the Garrison which they supply with plenty of fresh provisions.”

In July, 1720, Philipps tells of the efforts of the French governors to strengthen Isle Royale by persuading the Acadians to migrate thither. “Among other things,” he says, “they are told that the promise made them (by the English), of enjoying their Religion is but a Chimera, which they must not depend upon, for they will quickly be reduced to the same state with his Majesty’s Popish subjects in Ireland and their Priests deny’d them. I endeavour all I can to undeceive them, but scarce hope to find more credit with them than their Priests. If these prevaile there will be a great many fine possessions become vacant. I believe it would not be difficult to draw as many people almost from New England as would supply their room, if it were not robbing a neighbouring Colony, without gaining much by the exchange, therefore hope there are schemes forming at home to settle this Country

¹ Nova Scotia Published Archives, p. 19.

² Nova Scotia Published Archives, pp. 31, 34.

with British subjects in the Spring, before which time these Inhabitants do not think of removing."

The hopes of the governor were doomed to disappointment. The problem that gave so much trouble thirty-five years later might probably have been solved had the Lords of Trade followed the policy he had indicated. They took no action, and it was not until the lapse of forty years that any serious effort was made to people the province with English-speaking inhabitants.

Mascarene urges that the Acadians must take the Oath of Allegiance or be removed from the Country.

Paul Mascarene at this time drew up a report on the state of Nova Scotia, which was endorsed by the Governor and Council and sent to the Lords of Trade for their consideration. Mascarene very pointedly expressed the opinion that if Great Britain expected to reap any permanent benefit from the acquisition of Nova Scotia, there should be no further delay in promoting its settlement with people whose loyalty was undoubted. He accordingly recommended "that the French inhabitants should not be tolerated any longer in their non-allegiance, but might have the test put to them without granting them any further delay, for which," he says, "it is requisite a sufficient force be allowed to make them comply with the terms prescribed them, which force ought to be at least six hundred men, to be divided to the several parts already inhabited by the French and Indians, and might be at the same time a cover to the British Inhabitants who would come to settle in the room of the French." For the encouragement of new settlers Mascarene proposed that they be given free transportation, free grants of land and some of the cattle confiscated from those of the French who should choose to withdraw from their lands rather than take the oath of allegiance.¹

With the small force at his command Governor Philipps was puzzled how to deal with the problem that confronted him. He informed the Lords of Trade that the Acadians, seemed determined not to swear allegiance and yet to have no expectation of removal, for they went on with their tillage and building as if they had no thought of leaving the country. "It is likely they flatter themselves," he adds, "that the King's affaires here will allways continue in the same feeble state. I am certain that nothing but a demonstration will convince them to the contrary."²

Seven years had now elapsed since the signing of the treaty of

¹ Nova Scotia Published Archives, p. 43.

² Nova Scotia Published Archives, p. 51.

Utrecht and the sentiments of the Acadians had varied little during those years from the declaration they had made to the Recollet missionary, Felix Pain, in 1713;¹—"We will never take the oath of fidelity to the queen of Great Britain to the prejudice of what we owe to our king, to our Country and to our religion; and if any attempt were made against one or the other of these two articles of our fidelity, that is to say to our king and our law, we are ready to quit all rather than to violate in the least thing one of these articles. Besides we do not know in what manner the English will use us. If they burthen us in respect of our religion, or cut up our settlements to divide the lands with people of their nation, we will abandon them absolutely."

Bravo Acadiens! No one, least of all a descendant of the U.E. Loyalists, can find fault with such a declaration of fidelity to king and country and religion. But admirable as the sentiment may be in the abstract it must be admitted that from the English point of view it did not render those who held such views desirable inhabitants of a province in which British authority was extremely weak.

A suggestion looking to the ultimate deportation of the Acadians was made about this time to Gov. Philipps by Secretary of State Craggs in a private communication. The Secretary of State refers to the fact that the Acadians may decide to abandon their lands in the peninsula and retire to Isle Royale where they will serve to reinforce the French. "This," he says, "must not be; they must eventually be transferred to some place where, mingling with our subjects, they will soon forget their language, their religion and remembrance of the past and become true Englishmen. For the moment we are too weak to undertake this deportation—encourage them with any hopes you choose—provided you obtain the desired end, which is to prevent their departure." Craggs, it may be observed in passing, was an unscrupulous politician, who was afterwards disgraced, and died on his way to the Tower.

The Lords of Trade propose a plan for the settlement of Nova Scotia.

It seemed at length that the British ministry was about to do something for the development of the province, for in February, 1727, the King in Council ordered the Lords of Trade and Plantations to submit a scheme for the civil government of Nova Scotia, and also to report what encouragement might with advantage be held out to English-speaking settlers. The Lords of Trade prepared a report in which, after mentioning the proposals that had been made from time to time for promoting English settlements (all of which had failed on account of the risks the settlers ran through lack of protection), they make the

¹ Murdoch's History of Nova Scotia, Vol. I., p. 336.

following proposals. That forts be built and garrisoned; that free transport be provided for the settlers; each to receive a grant of fifty acres upon his arrival; double that quantity to be granted to carpenters and other artificers; the same to soldiers in garrison who should turn planters, their pay to continue for one year after the grant, every soldier to have leave to carry his wife with him, transport to be paid by Government; encouragement to be given to intermarriage with the Indians; grants now restricted to 500 acres to any one person to be extended to 1,000 acres, free from fines and quit rents for ten years; the Governor and Council to be empowered to make laws until there should be a sufficient population for an Assembly.

Here at least was a definite, though somewhat crude, plan, which with a little elaboration might have been fruitful of results; but no immediate action was taken and the old policy of *drift* was followed.

Meanwhile the Acadians continued to multiply and to feel a more deeply rooted affection for the land of their forefathers. A dozen years had now passed without a change of political masters. They began to realize that the existing state of affairs was likely to continue, and so, upon being again requested to swear allegiance to the British Crown, they offered to take the oath on condition that they should not be compelled to bear arms against the French or Indians. The authorities of Nova Scotia, however, would not consent to such a modification of the oath.

It would be tedious to enumerate the attempts made by the various governors and administrators of Nova Scotia to induce the Acadians to take an unqualified oath of allegiance. All were unsuccessful until Governor Philipps in 1730, after an absence of eight years in England, prevailed upon them to take the following oath:—

“Je promets et jure sincèrement en foi de chrétien que je serai entièrement fidèle et obéirai vraiment sa Majesté le Roy George le second, qui je reconnais pour le souverain seigneur de L'Accadie ou Nouvelle Ecosse. Ainsi Dieu me soit en aide.”

Controversy respecting the Oath of Allegiance.

The Acadians always declared that when they took this oath it was upon the understanding that they should be exempted from bearing arms. Commenting on this Hannay observes, “If that were the case, it only goes to show that twenty years after Acadia had become a British province the French inhabitants still refused to regard themselves as British subjects.” Governor Philipps evidently did not regard them as a very loyal people for, writing in November, 1732, to the Duke of Newcastle, he says: “I have sent to their Lordships a report of the gentlemen of the Council upon the present state of the Province, which

I am sorry should be in such a poor condition, as it really is in, after having been so long as upwards of twenty-one years (which may be said imaginarily only), under the English Government; for the inhabitants here, being all French and Roman Catholics, are more subjects to our neighbours of Quebec and those of Cape Breton than to his Majesty, whose Government by all their proceedings (notwithstanding their oath of fidelity), they seem to despise."¹

Nor could Paul Mascarene guarantee their loyalty eleven years later, for he wrote to the Secretary of State in December, 1743, "The Inhabitants of this province, except what belongs to the two garrisons of Annapolis and Canso, are all French Roman Catholics, who were allowed on taking the oaths of allegiance to keep their possessions and enjoy their religion. These Inhabitants cannot be depended on for assistance in case of a rupture with France; it is as much as we can expect if we can keep them from joining with the enemy or being stirred up by them to rebel. To prevent this I have used the best means I could since I have had the administration of the affairs of this province, especially by making them sensible of the advantage and ease they enjoy under British Government, whereby to wean them from their old masters; but to do this effectually a considerable time will be required—this province in the meantime is in a worse condition for defence than the other American Plantations which have inhabitants to defend them, whilst far from having any dependence on ours we are obliged to guard against them."

Mascarene adopted a policy of conciliation, which proved so far successful that when Duvier, the French commander, besieged the English at Annapolis Royal the Acadians declined to take up arms and this contributed not a little to the failure of his plans. Still, the idea of substituting English settlers in the room of the Acadians was not abandoned, for about this time Mascarene wrote to Shirley, "If new measures are to be taken and these inhabitants can be removed and good Protestant subjects transplanted in their room, nothing can be of greater advantage to the Brittish interest in general, and to that of the Northern Colonies in particular, and especially to that of this province."

The removal of the Acadians, in Mascarene's opinion, could only be brought about by the co-operation of the neighbouring colonies and, if projected by them, he suggested that the preparations be carried on "without our knowledge, and talkt of even in Boston as little as possible." A copy of Mascarene's letter was sent to the Duke of Newcastle in December, 1745, together with a representation from the Council of Nova Scotia respecting the conduct of the Acadians since the

¹ Nova Scotia Published Archives, p. 101.

reduction of Port Royal by Nicholson in 1710. The general conclusion embodied in the report was "that if not utter enemies, they cannot be accounted other than unprofitable inhabitants" and, "upon the whole it is most humbly submitted whether the said French inhabitants may not be transported out of the province of Nova Scotia, and be replaced by good Protestant subjects."¹ Though opportunity did not come for the execution of this policy until ten years later, there can be little doubt that it remained latent in the minds of the authorities of Nova Scotia. The idea certainly did not originate with Governor Lawrence, as has been commonly supposed.

The state of affairs in Nova Scotia during the next few years was extremely critical, although the capture of Louisbourg by Warren and Pepperrell in 1745 afforded a measure of relief. Mascarene claimed that if the French plans had proved successful while they held Louisbourg, they would have gained possession of Acadia, thereby adding to their strength several thousands of men fit to bear arms, not to mention their Indian allies, and that in less than a year they might have overrun New England. Possibly he exaggerated the danger; but his statement serves to explain the keen interest which the people of New England began to take in the affairs of Nova Scotia. Had Louisbourg not been restored to France by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the project of the expulsion of the Acadians might never again have been heard of.

The difficulties which the governors of Nova Scotia had to face were chiefly due to the neglect, or apathy, of the British ministers, who seemed careless as to whether they kept possession of Acadia or lost it. At the outset the Acadian problem was of minor importance. It might easily have been solved if the English government had followed the advice of Governor Vetch, which was that the Acadians who would not take the oath of allegiance should be removed to Martinique, or some other French colony, and their places supplied with settlers from England or Ireland. The Acadians were at that time a mere handful of people, and if removed, as suggested by Vetch, would have been placed in not uncongenial surroundings. But years had elapsed; no English colonists had appeared, nor was there the smallest sign that the Home Government would trouble itself to attract any. Meanwhile

¹ See Canadian Archives for 1894, p. 110. In connection with the repeated references to "Protestant subjects," it is to be noted that after the English Revolution, religion and politics were very closely interwoven in regard to the relations existing between England and France. Protestantism seemed to be as closely identified with the administration of British affairs in America as Roman Catholicism was with the national policy of France.

the number of the Acadians in the peninsula had increased to more than 12,000 souls.

France continued to regard the recovery of her lost colony as an object of prime importance. D'Anville's expedition and that of La Jonquière the next year both had in view the reconquest of Acadia.

Governor Shirley's efforts to make Nova Scotia a strong British Colony.

William Shirley, the Governor of Massachusetts, was by all odds the most watchful and strenuous defender of British interests in America. If France was bent on recovering Acadia, Shirley was no less resolved to keep it. He regarded it as the key of the British American colonies, and repeatedly urged the English ministry to strengthen it. If Nova Scotia were lost, he contended that there could be neither peace nor safety for the other colonies. He assured the Duke of Newcastle that if a thousand French troops should land in Nova Scotia all the Acadians would rise to join them, besides all the Indians. This, too, was the opinion of the French Governor and of the Intendant at Quebec, who wrote in September, 1745, to their colonial minister, "The inhabitants (of Acadia), with few exceptions wish to return under the French dominion, and will not hesitate to take up arms as soon as they see themselves free to do so; that is as soon as we become masters of Port Royal or they have powder and other munitions of war and are backed by troops for their protection against the resentment of the English."

Shirley continued to write most perseveringly to the Duke of Newcastle upon the defenceless state of Nova Scotia. In his letter of May 10, 1746, he says, "I think it my indispensable duty to suggest again to your Grace my Fears that the Enemy will soon find an opportunity of snatching Accadie, by some sudden stroke, from his Majesty's Government, unless there be a Removal of the most dangerous of the French Inhabitants from thence, and transplanting English Families there in their room, which I think very practicable, from hence."

Later, he writes that the Province of Nova Scotia will never be out of danger whilst the Acadians are suffered to remain upon their present foot of subjection. Nevertheless, Shirley's mature judgment did not at this time favour so drastic a procedure as a general expulsion. His remarks in this connection are so striking that I venture to quote them, in slightly abbreviated form, from his letter to the Duke of Newcastle of the 21st November, 1746:—"It is indeed now to be wished that General Nicholson had upon the first Reduction of the Colony removed the french Inhabitants, when they were but a few, out of the Country, as was done at Louisbourg; and that during the Interval of Peace the Colony had been planted with Protestant subjects: But after their having remained so long in the Country upon the foot of British

subjects, and making Improvements on their Lands for one or two Generations, and being grown up into such a Number of Families, to drive 'em all off their settlements without farther Inquiry seems liable to many objections. Among others it may be doubted whether it would be a just usage of 'em. It is true that the Notion of their Neutrality, entertained for some time by the English as well as themselves, is ill-grounded; But if it is considered that this Notion was founded upon an act of the late Lieut. Governor Armstrong, whereby he took upon himself to grant Exemption from bearing Arms upon any Account whatever, on their consenting to take an Oath of Allegiance to his Majesty, it may perhaps be deemed too rigorous a Punishment for their behaviour to involve the innocent with the guilty in the Loss of their Estates, and the Expulsion of their Families out of the Country. It is not improbable but that there may be many among 'em who would even prefer his Majesty's Government to a french one, and have done nothing to deserve such a forfeiture; some Allowances may likewise be made for their bad situation between the Canadians, Indians & English, the Ravages of all which they have felt by Turns in the course of the War, during which they seem to have been continually placed between two fires; the force and menaces of the Canadians and Indians, plundering 'em of whatever they wanted & deterring 'em in the strongest manner from having any Communication with His Majesty's Garrison, on the one hand; and the resentments of the Garrison for their withholding Intelligence & supplies, on the other.

“Wherefore it seems a matter worthy of your Grace's consideration, whether under such doubtful circumstances the driving all the french Inhabitants of Nova Scotia off their Settlements and thereby very greatly strengthening the Enemy upon this Continent and depopulating the Province for some time (how long may be uncertain), is more eligible than treating 'em as Subjects, confining their Punishment to the most guilty & dangerous among 'em & keeping the rest in the Country and endeavouring to make them & their Posterity useful members of Society under his Majesty's Government. I can't omit observing to your Grace, that it would be exceeding difficult to fill the Chasm which driving off the Inhabitants would make in the Country: During the Rupture with France it would certainly be impracticable, and I doubt whether it would not be so when peace shall be made with France, if the Indians should continue at War with us.”¹

There is much force in Parkman's observation that if the Newcastle Government had vigorously carried out Shirley's recommendations with regard to the policy pursued in Nova Scotia, the deportation of

¹ See Parkman's "Half Century of Conflict," Vol. II, p. 343.

the Acadians in 1755 would never have occurred. Time and again the Lords of Trade commended Shirley's proposals but hesitated to take action because of the expense involved.

Unhappy Situation of the Acadians.

The situation of the Acadians was now really pitiable. France claimed them on the one hand and England on the other, and both demanded their obedience without regard either to their feelings or their interest. Le Loutre terrified them with his savages, in order to make them renounce the English allegiance and support the French. The English governors threatened to banish them if they were not faithful to King George. There can be little doubt that their oath of allegiance to the British Crown had been taken, in the first instance, upon the understanding that they would not be forced to bear arms against the French or their old Indian allies. They were now commonly known as the "Neutral French." This term served but to add to their perplexity, and in their ignorance and simplicity they hardly knew to which side they owed allegiance. They were the humblest and simplest of peasants and their illiteracy was such that only a few could even read or write. The most potent influence employed to turn them against the English was not their natural affection for France or their race sympathy, but the power of their religion. They were taught to look to their priests for guidance both in temporal and spiritual matters, and as nearly all of these, like the Abbé le Loutre, were ardent patriots, it is little wonder that their influence was inimical to the sovereignty of King George.

"It was the duty of the British ministry," says Parkman, "to occupy the province with a force sufficient to protect the inhabitants against French terrorism, and leave no doubt that the King of England was master of Acadia in fact as well as in name. This alone could have averted the danger of Acadian revolt and the harsh measures to which it afterwards gave rise. The ministry sent no aid, but left to Shirley and Massachusetts the task of keeping the province for King George. Shirley and Massachusetts did what they could, but they could not do all that the emergency demanded."¹

Shirley told the Duke of Newcastle plainly in 1747 that New England had furnished for years the only succor and support the Garrison at Annapolis Royal had received, and that the General Assembly of Massachusetts were growing tired of having the burden of defence thrown upon them, and desired his Majesty's more immediate interposition for the protection of Nova Scotia.

¹ Parkman's "Half Century of Conflict," Vol. II, p. 220.

The Founding of Halifax.

We come now to consider the first really important move in the development of the province by the British government, namely the founding of Halifax.

The credit of suggesting the establishment of a fortified post at Halifax, or Chebucto Harbour, as it was then called, belongs, perhaps, to Paul Mascarene, who wrote to the Lords of Trade in October, 1748, that it would be a wise step to establish a number of English families on the Atlantic coast and to erect fortifications necessary for their security.¹

A few months later Shirley proposed a scheme for settling 2,000 families from Europe, 2,000 families from the Colonies in America and 2,000 disbanded soldiers in various parts of Nova Scotia at an estimated cost of £131,700. He proposed to mix Protestant settlers with the Acadians, taking part of the marsh lands for the new settlers, the Acadians to be indemnified with woodland and upland. He believed that unless the French were intermixed with Protestant English they would remain a separate body and eventually become strong enough to subvert the King's government.

The Lords of Trade took the initial step in the direction recommended by sending out Cornwallis with a colony of 2,500 persons, many of them disbanded officers, soldiers and sailors. These immigrants sailed from England in thirteen transport ships in May, 1749, arriving at Chebucto about the end of June. They at once set to work and were comfortably settled in their log houses before winter. The population of the town was augmented during the summer by arrivals from Louisbourg² and New England. A number of German Protestants from the Palatinate arrived in the course of the same year and were established at Dartmouth, whence they proceeded to Lunenburg in 1753. The founding of Halifax, however, was but the planting of a garrison, a military movement rather than an intelligent scheme of colonization.

Nevertheless, in view of what followed, the founding of Halifax by Cornwallis in 1749 must be regarded as by far the most important step yet taken by the English in the development of Nova Scotia. It is right that due credit should be given to the Earl of Halifax, First Lord of Trade and Plantations, by whose energy and influence the ministry in England were led to establish the settlement. This accomplished and far-sighted statesman was the only son of the second Earl of Halifax, whom he succeeded in 1739. He married in 1741 Miss

¹ Canadian Archives for 1894, p. 131.

² Louisbourg was evacuated by the English at this time under the provisions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Anne Dunk, a rich heiress, and assumed the name of Dunk in addition to that of Montague. He was appointed President of the Lords of Trade and Plantations in 1748. Among other important positions, he filled the offices of a major-general in the army, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. At the time of his death he was Principal Secretary of State in the British Cabinet. As an instance of his liberal spirit it is recorded that having found the expenses attending the post of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to be very great, he obtained an additional grant of £4,000 per annum for all subsequent Viceroy, at the same time declining the emolument for himself. As First Lord of Trade and Plantations he contributed so largely to the development of the commerce and well being of the British possessions in America as to be styled the "Father of the Colonies." He died in 1771 and was buried in Westminster Abbey, where a beautiful memorial by the famous sculptor Bacon was erected in his honour.

The next ten years proved a period of much unrest. Peace nominally prevailed between France and England, but peace did not bring tranquillity.

Although Acadia, according to its ancient boundaries, had been awarded to Great Britain by the late treaty, the French endeavoured to confine the English to the peninsula, claiming that the territory north of the Bay of Fundy was still under their jurisdiction and had never been ceded to the English by the King of France. This claim Shirley and Cornwallis stoutly repudiated. The French, however, continued to hold possession of the River St. John and also erected a fort north of the isthmus of Chignecto which they named Fort Beau-séjour. The Abbé le Loutre now began to use every means in his power to induce the Acadians to forsake the peninsula and remove to the New Brunswick side of the Bay of Fundy, which the French claimed to be within their jurisdiction as a part of "the Continent of Canada."

Governor Cornwallis and the Acadians.

Cornwallis urged the Acadians to remain and take the oath of allegiance to the British Crown. His words to them were couched in conciliatory language:—

"My friends," he wrote, "the moment that you declared your desire to leave, and submit yourselves to another government, our determination was to hinder nobody from following what he imagined to be his interest. We know that a forced service is worth nothing, and that a subject compelled to be so against his will, is not very far from being an enemy. We frankly confess, however, that your determination to leave us gives us pain. We are well aware of your industry and your temperance, and that you are not addicted to any vice or

debauchery. This province is your country; you and your fathers have cultivated it; naturally you ought yourselves to enjoy the fruits of your labour. Such was the desire of the King our master. You know that we have followed his orders. You know that we have done everything to secure to you not only the occupation of your lands, but the ownership of them for all time. We have given you also every possible assurance of the enjoyment of your religion, and the free and public exercise of the Roman Catholic faith. When we arrived here we expected that nothing would give you so much pleasure, as the determination of His Majesty to settle this province. Certainly nothing more advantageous to you could take place. You possess the only cultivated lands in the province; they produce grain and nourish cattle sufficient for the whole colony. It is you that would have had all the advantages for a long time. In short we flattered ourselves that we would make you the happiest people in the world. We are sorry to find in our government persons whom it is impossible to please, and upon whom our declarations have produced nothing but discontent, jealousies and murmurings. We must not complain of all the inhabitants; we know very well that there are ill-disposed, interested and mischievous persons among you who corrupt the others. Your inexperience and your ignorance of the affairs of government, and your habit of following the counsels of those who have not your real interests at heart make it an easy matter to seduce you."

The motives that inspired Cornwallis thus to address the Acadians we need not go far to seek. Their presence was of substantial benefit to the province.¹ To drive them from their lands would have been bad policy since they would have gone to Isle Royale and have greatly added to the strength of the French in that quarter. Better to have them remain as "neutrals" than that they should join themselves to the French in their strongholds. Cornwallis quite appreciated the fact that the infant colony could hardly do without them, as they furnished cattle, grain, firewood and general supplies to both Halifax and Annapolis Royal.

The assertion has frequently been made, by writers who have participated in the controversy respecting the Acadian Expulsion, that if the Acadians had not been hindered by the English governors they would, on more than one occasion, have voluntarily retired from the peninsula; and the inference drawn is that they remained on their

¹ Hopson, who succeeded Cornwallis, wrote to the Lords of Trade in 1752: "Mr. Cornwallis can inform your Lordships how usefull and necessary these people are to us, how impossible it is to do without them, or to replace them even if we had other settlers to put in their places." [Canadian Archives for 1905, part III p. 56.]

lands because they could not leave them. The argument upon this head is not at all convincing. The earlier governors, Vetch, Caulfield, Philipps, Armstrong and Mascarene, repeatedly state that it was impossible with the means at their command to prevent the Acadians leaving the country, if they were disposed to do so, and Governor Lawrence, so late as January, 1754, said that great efforts were being made by the French commanders to induce them to withdraw from the peninsula and he was unable to prevent some from going, though the greater part were too much attached to their lands to leave them. In view of the fact that so many of the Acadians who were transported to the Atlantic colonies in 1755 were able to traverse immense distances and to return to Nova Scotia, in spite of the tremendous obstacles in their way, it is impossible to believe that those who lived along the Annapolis valley and at Grand Pré, Piziquid and Chignecto could not have found means to leave the peninsula at almost any time prior to the expulsion if they had been really anxious to do so.

Policy of the Marquis de la Jonquière and Abbé le Loutre.

The French governors at Quebec were very unwilling to give up the hope of repossessing Acadia. With this idea in mind they determined to render the foothold of the English as insecure as they could. The Marquis de la Galissonnière and the Marquis de la Jonquière adopted the policy of employing the savages to deter the English from making settlements. They found an able coadjutor in the Abbé le Loutre. Their policy was attended with such success that Governor Lawrence, upon being asked by the Lords of Trade why he did not proceed with the colonization of Nova Scotia, replied with some acerbity, "What can I do to encourage people to settle on frontier lands when they run the risk of having their throats cut by inveterate enemies, who easily effect their escape by their knowledge of every creek and corner?"

Indian atrocities at Dartmouth, Chignecto and other places kept the infant colony in constant alarm, and at times the hold of the English on the country seemed very precarious. The administrators of the government in Nova Scotia became more and more convinced that a policy of inaction would in the end prove fatal to their interest. Two things, it was agreed, were essential, namely, the introduction of English settlers in large numbers and compelling the Acadians either to swear unqualified allegiance to the British Crown, or, in the event of their refusal, to take measures for their removal from the country.

It was felt that a supreme struggle with France was impending, on the issue of which depended the question of sovereignty upon the American continent. The general situation in Nova Scotia was by no

means encouraging. From the head of the Bay of Fundy to Annapolis Royal, a stretch of one hundred and fifty miles, not an English settler was to be found; nor was there one on the eastern shores of New Brunswick or upon the valley of the Saint John. The French and Indians were the only inhabitants, for no man of English nationality had ventured, or was permitted, to settle amongst them. Cornwallis had proposed to settle a body of "Foreign Protestants" at Minas, but his successor, Hopson, asked that no more settlers of that description should be sent, for if those already arrived were settled among the French the latter would leave. This, Hopson said, they had no intention of doing, nor did he wish them to go.

Under the administration of Cornwallis the hold of the English upon the Nova Scotian peninsula was strengthened very considerably. The building of the town of Halifax at Chebucto, the presence of several regiments of British troops and the establishment of fortified posts at Grand Pré, Piziquid and Chignecto, gave to the few English settlers a sense of security they had not before enjoyed. Colonel Charles Lawrence commanded an expedition which established a post at Chignecto and in an encounter there with Chevalier la Corne displayed much personal bravery. Lawrence was considered by Cornwallis to be a man of good sense and ability and of honour and veracity.

British Ministry at length begins to further the settlement of Nova Scotia.

The importance of planting settlements in different parts of Nova Scotia is referred to in the royal instructions issued to Governor Cornwallis when he came out from England in 1749, so that from this period onward the colonization of Nova Scotia may be regarded as forming a part of the policy of the Lords of Trade.

Colonel Hopson succeeded Cornwallis in 1752. During his short tenure of office he tried to get on amicably with the Acadians, expressing to the Lords of Trade his fears that ill consequences would follow any attempt to compel them to take an unqualified oath of allegiance. The Lords of Trade decided to leave the matter in his hands, adding, in their reply, the following words, which are important in the light of after events:—"We must, however, recommend it to you to enforce this measure when the circumstances of the Province are such that it may be done with safety, leaving it to you to determine the time and manner of doing it, *who being on the spot* are a much better judge of it than we can be."

Colonel Lawrence succeeded Hopson as Governor in 1753. He was a man of an entirely different type and his policy quite the reverse of that of his predecessor. Whatever may be said as to the humanity or inhumanity of his dealings with the Acadians, there can be no question

as to his soldierly qualities, ability and force of character. He was at this time in the prime of life, having been born at Portsmouth, in England, in 1709. He was a man of fine physique, standing six feet two inches, and was, according to his biographer, "a picture of strength and rugged health, of frank and pleasant manner and largely endowed with that mysterious element of character we to-day call, for want of a better name, magnetism."¹

There can be no doubt that Lawrence commanded the confidence of the British Government, for the Lords of Trade left matters largely to his judgment; but if the Acadians were cognizant of any element of *magnetism* in his character, history has not recorded it. Lawrence was undoubtedly more the soldier than the diplomat. He was accustomed to command and to be obeyed. The attitude of the Acadians annoyed him greatly, and he was disposed to deal with them in a summary fashion. Accordingly, after consultation with his council and the admirals on the station, he determined to give them one more opportunity of taking the oath required of them, with the understanding that if they failed to do so steps would be taken without further parley "to rid the country of such perfidious subjects."

The Controversy as to the Acadian Expulsion.

No attempt will be made in this paper to deal adequately with the vexed question of the Acadian expulsion, yet, in any careful consideration of the measures which Governor Lawrence subsequently adopted for the development of the province, the question cannot well be passed over in silence.

A careful study of the documents bearing upon the expulsion will satisfy the honest investigator that the last word is not likely soon to be spoken concerning it. Even the most impartial writer will find

¹ See sketch of Governor Lawrence by James S. McDonald in Collections of the Nova Scotia Hist. Society, Vol. XII, p. 19.

Col. Charles Lawrence was the third son of Lieut.-General John Lawrence, who served in Flanders under Marlborough. In his 18th year young Lawrence was gazetted an ensign in the 11th Devon regiment. He came to America with the Regiment in 1729, and was engaged in outpost service against the Indians. In 1733 he accompanied his regiment to the West Indies and returned to England in 1738. After three years' service as a military attaché at the War Office, he entered the 54th Regiment, and served as Captain in the Flanders campaign of 1745. He was slightly wounded at the terrible battle of Fontenoy. After the return from Flanders he was gazetted Major in 1747, and sailed to New York with his regiment, proceeding not long after to Louisbourg. When the English were obliged under the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle to leave that place, he came to Halifax and was thenceforth closely identified with the history of Nova Scotia until his death in 1760.

some difficulty in arriving at definite conclusions upon some of the points involved. At the same time, a very superficial writer, if a partizan, will find it comparatively easy by careful selection of his materials to show—if it please you—either that Charles Lawrence was a patriotic and far-sighted administrator, or that he was an obstinate and brutal tyrant! But this surely is not the way to study history.

After carefully weighing the evidence adduced by Parkman, Murdoch, Hannay, Akins and Sir Adams Archibald, on the one hand, and by Haliburton, Savary, Casgrain, Richard, Poirier and Gaudet, on the other; and after a careful study of the publications of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, the transcripts in the Archives department at Ottawa, and other available evidence, the following points seem, to the writer of this paper to be fairly well established:—

1. That after the ratification of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the Acadians were repeatedly urged by the French commanders and their priests to abandon their lands in the peninsula of Nova Scotia, but were very reluctant to do so.

2. That, although the English governors endeavoured to hinder their desertion of the peninsula, the weakness of the garrison at Annapolis Royal was such that the Acadians could readily have found opportunity to retire to Isle Royale, or to some other place under French jurisdiction, had they so desired.¹

3. That finding the Acadians were of service to the colony and that their removal would strengthen the French at Louisbourg and elsewhere, the governors of Nova Scotia became anxious to retain them within the province, and, having failed to induce them to take an unconditional oath of allegiance, adopted a temporizing policy and permitted them to remain as "Neutrals."

4. That the circumstances of the age rendered it well nigh impossible to separate religious creed and national policy; it was, therefore, natural that the French missionaries should join hands with the military authorities in their endeavour to keep the Acadians in a state of hostility to the English—the Abbé le Loutre even threatening to set the Indians upon them and to place them under the ban of the church if they dared to take the oath of allegiance.

5. That Lawrence and Shirley shared the unfavourable opinion entertained by the English in America with regard to the Acadians as old-time allies of the savages, suspecting them (perhaps unjustly) of being instigators of their barbarities, and believing them to be inimical to British rule and ready at the first convenient opportunity to be openly hostile.

¹ See on this head Parkman's *Half Century of Conflict*, Vol. I, p. 189.

6. That after he had committed himself to the policy of deporting the Acadians, Lawrence was unrelenting, and acted with the sternness of a soldier and with little consideration for the feelings of the unfortunate victims of his policy.

7. That New England was more directly implicated in the expulsion than was the British Ministry, in view of the following facts: that the Governor of Massachusetts was jointly concerned with Governor Lawrence in devising the plan of deportation; that the details of the expulsion were carried out by Massachusetts troops, and that Massachusetts vessels, chartered from Massachusetts merchants, officered and manned by Massachusetts captains and crews carried the Acadians into exile.

8. That, prior to the expulsion, the Acadians had been so repeatedly threatened by the governors of Nova Scotia, in connection with their refusal to take the oath, without any punishment consequent upon their refusal, that they were lulled into a state of false security and would not believe they were really to be deported until Winslow began to put them on ship-board.¹

9. That the Acadian expulsion did not attract anything like the attention in England that many modern writers have supposed, but was obscured by other events of world-wide interest to such an extent that in the eyes of the Lords of Trade it was deemed a matter of local importance, which could very well be left to the discretion of the Governors of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts.

From the controversial point of view the most vital question of all remains to be considered, namely, was Lawrence justified in adopting so extreme a measure as a general deportation, upon the refusal of the Acadians to take the oath of allegiance? On this point the opinion of Canadian writers probably will never be unanimous.

The writer of this paper has honestly endeavoured to divest himself of the prejudices that naturally arise in connection with race and religion, and to view the events leading up to the Acadian expulsion from an impartial standpoint. In so doing he has been driven to the conclusion (unlooked for at the outset) that the course pursued by all of the parties concerned was quite natural under the circumstances of the case.²

The policy of the Marquis de la Galissonnière and the Marquis de la Jonquière was not an unnatural one for those who wished to pro-

¹ See foot-note, page 82 *supra*.

² I am gratified to find that in the discussion which followed the reading of this paper at the meeting of the Royal Society, Mr. W. D. Lighthall, one of the Fellows of this Society, who has given time and thought to the subject, stated that he had reached the same conclusion.—W.O.R.

mote the cause of New France under trying and perplexing conditions. It may be perfectly true that the action of the French governors in employing the missionaries, le Loutre, Germain and Gaulin, to incite the Indians to acts of hostility at a time when peace prevailed between the rival crowns was unjustifiable, but such proceedings were characteristic of an age which acted in accordance with the maxim "all is fair in love and war." There was little confidence at the time on the part of the opposing leaders with regard to the designs of their rivals, and neither the one nor the other was disposed to be too scrupulous in securing an advantage. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle did not bring peace in America.

The Acadians, in their simplicity, were at a loss how to act and hesitated as to their course of action until they were involved in a common ruin. That they would have been wiser to have shown more decision is easily said, but in view of what they were and the situation in which they were placed, the line they followed seems a natural one.

The conduct of the French missionaries, too, was not unnatural. They were ardent patriots, for the most part, and Church and State were so closely united in their day that the priests were regarded by the Acadians and the Indians as their natural leaders in both temporal and spiritual affairs. The Abbé le Loutre was surely an extreme specimen of his class and his actions bordered on phrenzy at various times, drawing upon his head the censure of his ecclesiastical superiors.

The attitude of the English inhabitants of Nova Scotia and of the people of New England towards the Acadians implied want of confidence and dislike. They had suffered much at the hands of the savages, who had devastated their settlements, and were believed to have been inspired in their hostility by their French allies. There was also an element of religious bigotry that intensified the mutual dislike that subsisted between the two races. The temperate historian who reads the anathemas uttered by either party against the religion of its rival may deplore the lack of charity, but realizes how natural it all was.

The controversy over the Acadian expulsion has been, even in recent days, too much influenced by religious and racial instincts. The conduct of Winslow and of Lawrence, on the one hand, and of La Jonquière and the Abbé le Loutre, on the other, have been alike execrated by partizan writers.

Governor Lawrence's part in the Acadian Expulsion.

There are, doubtless, many Canadians who will dissent from the statement that the course taken by Charles Lawrence was a very natural one, in view of all the circumstances of the case, but is there good reason

to doubt that he acted along what he believed to be the line of duty? Putting aside for the moment the sad details of the expulsion, we may face, from an academic standpoint, this question: Is it permissible for a government, desirous of building up a strong and vigorous colony, in the face of a rival nationality with which it is in conflict, to remove from its borders a class of inhabitants whom it believes to be disloyal and a source of peril? To this it seems to the writer there can be only one answer. But was this the question Charles Lawrence and his associates had to face? Or did they honestly *believe* that such an emergency had arisen? Here again opinions may differ.

In any consideration of the policy for which the governors of Nova Scotia and New England were jointly responsible in 1755, it must be borne in mind that the idea of a general deportation of the Acadians was not a new thing. It had been suggested ten years before by so mild a governor as Paul Mascarene, who gave it as his opinion that the most practical solution of the problem of making a strong British colony of Nova Scotia would be to remove the Acadians, and to give their lands to settlers from New England or to Protestant settlers from Europe and the British Isles.¹ Various suggestions made by the Governors of Nova Scotia along those lines have been already mentioned in this paper.

It is difficult in these days of the *entente cordiale*, which King Edward, of blessed memory, did so much to create, to realize that a century ago each of the great powers of western Europe regarded the other as its hereditary enemy. In the period now under review profound distrust prevailed in America between the colonists of New England and those of New France. Long years of conflict had greatly embittered their relations and the antipathy had been accentuated by the atrocities begotten of the contact of either race with American savagery. New England undoubtedly suffered most from the prolonged border warfare; indeed, there was hardly a hamlet or a village on the frontier that had not been the scene of a tragedy.

For many years the situation of the Governors of Nova Scotia had been beset with difficulty. Granted that much may be said in favour of the Acadians, the fact nevertheless remains that, with singular unanimity Vetch, Caulfield, Philipps, Armstrong, Mascarene and Cornwallis expressed the opinion, that they were inimical to British rule and ready at the first favourable opportunity to side with the enemy.

In order to form a proper estimate of the conduct of Lawrence, Shirley and Winslow in connection with the expulsion, it is necessary

¹ See Canadian Archives for 1894, p. 109.

to view the measures they adopted from the standpoint of their day. As one who has written forcibly on this phase of the question points out, nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event. Could the principal actors in the tragic expulsion have foreseen what would happen in the course of the next few years, they might have been saved the recollection of one of the most painful chapters of Acadian history.¹ But they did not know, and the experience of the past gave them small reason to hope that within four years the French strongholds of Louisbourg and Quebec would pass permanently into British possession, and the influences that had so long emanated from thence would be no longer a cause of unrest in Acadia.

Whether justifiable or not, it is certain that the policy of Lawrence and Shirley was adopted in what they considered a serious emergency. The situation in America in 1754 had become so critical that the two governors were instructed to take joint action for the defence of Nova Scotia.² Lawrence informed Shirley that he had received information that the French proposed, as soon as they had repaired their fortifications at Louisbourg, to attack Chignecto. "Your Excellency must undoubtedly be sensible," he adds, "what an advantage we shall gain upon the French by attacking them first, more especially as their chief dependence is in the Indians and our deserted³ French inhabitants, who most probably will leave them when they find they are not able to keep their ground, but who would infallibly assist them if they should begin with us."

In order to carry out the plan of striking the first blow, it was determined to raise 2,000 troops in New England for service in Nova Scotia, the expense to be paid out of the Imperial grant to the latter province. Lawrence claimed that the assistance of New England was absolutely needed at this time, for should the enemy be successful in their contemplated attack on Chignecto they would certainly attempt the reconquest of Acadia. He admits also that he was anxious to show "a proper resentment" against French encroachments upon British soil in Nova Scotia and elsewhere.⁴

¹ Collections of N.S. Hist. Society, Vol. V, p. 37.

² The two Governors were congenial spirits. Shirley wrote to Lawrence on November 7, 1754, "It gives me a real pleasure that I have the honour of being joined in this service for procuring a happy deliverance of His Majesty's northern colonies from the danger of the present neighbourhood of the French in their encroachments within your Honour's Government, with a gentleman of whose zeal and abilities for promoting the service of our King and Country in this instance I have so high an opinion."

³ The "deserted French" were those of the Acadians who had left their lands in the peninsula and retired to the north of the isthmus of Chignecto under the protection of Fort Beauséjour.

⁴ See Nova Scotia published Archives, p. 378.

The idea of re-peopling the lands which the French had abandoned at Beaubassin¹ suggested itself to Shirley's fertile brain, and he wrote to the Secretary of State that the defection of the Acadians of Chignecto had left a large tract of rich arable land vacant, upon which there was room for perhaps a thousand families to settle. He recommended that settlers should be procured from Great Britain, New England or the north of Ireland, "persons of Industry and Sobriety and acquainted with Husbandry, whose fidelity and attachment to His Majesty's Government might be depended upon." Such settlers, he considered, would form "an exceeding good barrier to the Peninsula by securing the Isthmus, and serve as a curb to the French inhabitants of Mines and Annapolis River.

The Acadians of the peninsula failed to realize the seriousness of the situation in which they were about to be placed. Lawrence and Shirley were men of action and they now had a sufficient force at their disposal to enforce submission. Their first move was to get possession of Beauséjour, which surrendered to General Monckton on the 16th of June, 1755. The next step was to demand from the Acadians an unqualified oath of allegiance to the British sovereign. The unfortunate people were placed in a serious dilemma. They had for some time attempted to steer a middle course—not absolutely to break with their compatriots of Canada and Cape Breton, yet at the same time to show some deference to the government under which they lived; not to forsake their lands at the instigation of La Corne and Le Loutre, but at the same time not to swear unqualified allegiance to the King of England. Their attempt to please two masters pleased neither, and in the end lost them their country.

A few extracts from the correspondence of those who were most directly concerned in their deportation will suffice to show that little confidence was felt in the professed neutrality of the Acadians by either Lawrence or his subordinates. Colonel John Winslow wrote on July 3, 1755, "as to how far the Mean Submission Made by ye French (to say no worse) Fickel Inhabitants, commonly cal'd the Nutrals, or their brethren the Indians are to be Trusted, I submit in My opinion Litle Stres is to be laid on their ever being Good."

Lawrence's profound distrust appears in his instructions to Captain Murray, dated August 9th, in which that officer is instructed to "take

¹ Upon the arrival of the expedition under Lawrence at Chignecto, in April, 1750, the Indians, acting, as was supposed, under the direction of La Corne, reduced the settlement of Beaubassin to ashes. It comprised about 140 houses and two churches. The inhabitants crossed the river Missequash and threw themselves under the protection of the French commander, who not long after established Fort Beauséjour for their defence.

an oppertunity of Acquainting the Inhabitants that if any persons attempt, by Indians or others, to Destroye or otherwise Molest his Majesty's Troops, you have my orders to take an Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth and in shorte Life for Life from the nearest Neighbours where such Mischiefe is Performed."

Capt. Sylvanus Cobb wrote on the 24th of September to Col. Winslow, "I have the Pleasure by Honest Crooker to hear of your welfare and fine Success in Securing so Many of the Bogers. I hope you will Continue in Such Success til you have routed all such Enemys from the Land."

Winslow writes on September 29th from his camp at Grand Pré, "I know all, and more than they Feel, they Deserve, yet it hurts me to hear their weeping and waling and Nashing of Teeth, I am in Hopes our affairs will soon put on another Face and we Get Transportes and I rid of the worst peace of Service yt Ever I was in."

It is claimed on behalf of the Acadians that Lawrence and his subordinates were unduly prejudiced against them. This may be so. The object of these quotations is merely to show that, if language means anything, those who were responsible for their deportation had absolutely no confidence in their loyalty to Great Britain, and believed their presence in Nova Scotia to be detrimental to British interests.

The Expulsion a War Measure.

The expulsion of the Acadians, whether justifiable or not, was a war measure.¹ It was carried out in accordance with the standards of morality which prevail when rival nations are engaged in deadly strife. Lawrence made no attempt to act with gentleness. Rightly or wrongly he distrusted the Acadians and believed them to be a source of danger in any emergency that might arise, as well as an insuperable barrier to the introduction of English-speaking people. Accordingly, on the 28th of July, with the approval of his Council and of Boscawen and Mostyn, the admirals on the station, he decided that if they persisted in refusing to take an unqualified oath of allegiance they should be removed forthwith and distributed among the colonies to the southward.

Before this conclusion had been formally approved, or any instructions had been issued to carry it into effect, news arrived of the terrible disaster that had befallen General Braddock's expedition against Fort Duquesne. The news of this disaster was brought to Halifax, on the 23rd of July, 1755, by the brig *Lily*, Captain Morris, one of

¹ See remarks on this head by Dr. W. F. Ganong in the Transactions of the Royal Society, Series II, Vol. X, English section, p. 35.

Mr. Saul's flour vessels from New York.¹ The destruction of Braddock's army rendered the condition of affairs very serious from the British standpoint. Lawrence dreaded its effect upon the Acadians. It seemed not improbable that an attempt would now be made from Louisbourg to reconquer Nova Scotia. The New England troops had only been enlisted for one year and would not remain long. Whatever was to be done by them must therefore be done speedily. On receiving the tidings of Braddock's defeat, Shirley wrote to Lawrence:—"This is undoubtedly an heavier stroke than ever the English upon this Continent have met before." He hoped the effect would be "to raise the spirit and resentment of the several colonies against the French," and he asked Lawrence to consider "whether the danger with which His Majesty's interest is now threatened will not remove any scruples which may heretofore have subsisted with regard to the French Neutrals, as they are termed, and render it both just and necessary that they should be removed."²

The fate that was now to befall the unfortunate Acadians was all the more sorrowful in that it was on their part so unexpected. They had been warned and threatened repeatedly by the English governors, it is true, but as no serious consequences had ever followed in the wake of these warnings they were satisfied that they might follow the same policy that they had followed in the past.³ At this time they occupied nearly all the cultivated lands in Nova Scotia. The lands were fertile and easy of access. They governed themselves, for the most part,

¹ Collections of the Nova Scotia Hist. Society, Vol. XII, p. 42.

² Murdoch's History of Nova Scotia, Vol. II, p. 286.

³ That the Acadians believed that the English would never really banish them is quite evident. Lawrence wrote to Winslow in August 1755, that no danger need be apprehended at Grand Pré, for the people (notwithstanding the fact that they had been threatened with expulsion for refusing the oath of allegiance) imagined themselves to be *living in great security*. Lawrence also wrote to Murray that the Acadians should "be kept in the dark as to their destination, as much as may be, for should they be of opinion Privately (and I believe they certainly are) that the Government will not after all remove them from their Possessions, they have the Less temptation to be Doing Mischief whilst the Transports are getting round."

On the 5th of September Winslow notified the people of Minas, in the presence of his soldiers, that they were to be removed from the province and their lands, cattle and effects forfeited to the Crown; but in a letter written to Lawrence twelve days later he says: "I believe that they did not then, nor to this day do imagine that they are actually to be removed." Even after another month had expired we find this entry in his journal: "October 6th, with the advice of My Captains made a Division of the Villages and Concluded that as many of the Inhabitants of each as Could be Commoded should proceed in the same Vessel & That whole Familys go together, and sent Orders to the several Familys to hold themselves in readiness to embarke with all their Household Goods, &c, but even now *Could not persuade the People I was in Earnest.*"

and enjoyed the privileges of their religion, their priests being subject to no other restriction than that they were not to use their position to promote disloyalty on the part of their people to the Government under which they lived. No taxes or duties were required of them. Their circumstances were yearly improving and they were rapidly increasing in numbers. The fate to which they were doomed might have been avoided had Lawrence possessed greater patience or had they been more wisely led.

Winslow's journal has been published in full in the Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society. It tells the pitiful story of the expulsion. The number of those removed from the province is usually stated to have been between 6,000 and 7,000 souls.

Proposals for placing English speaking People on the Lands formerly cultivated by the Acadians.

In one particular the authors of the deportation were disappointed. They had hoped to substitute, almost immediately, a loyal population for one they had pronounced disaffected, but they failed for some time to find settlers for the vacant lands. The Massachusetts soldiers, to whom they were offered, would not stay in the province, and it was not until the lapse of five years that English settlers began to occupy the waste fields of the Acadians. This was doubtless due in a large measure to the war with France.

Governor Lawrence, however, realized the importance of an immediate attempt at colonization. In his letter to Colonel Monckton, of August 8, 1755, he gives the following instruction:—"When the French inhabitants are removed, you will give orders that no person presume to take possession of any of the lands until a plan of the whole has been laid before me, and terms of encouragement to English settlers deliberately formed and made publick." On the 18th of October he wrote to the Lords of Trade that the removal of the French had left vacant large tracts of good land, ready for immediate cultivation, and that he should use his best endeavours to encourage people from the neighbouring colonies to settle upon them. A bitter Indian war, however, now broke out, and the development of Acadia was once more at a stand. The matter of promoting the settlement of the country, nevertheless, had now assumed an importance in the eyes of the Lords of Trade that it had not heretofore possessed. They wrote to Governor Lawrence in July, 1756, in the following terms:—"As the recall of the two thousand New England troops puts an end to any view which might have been entertained of converting them into settlers upon the lands left vacant by the transportation of the French inhabitants, we shall remain extremely anxious till we hear what occurs

to you with respect to the settlement of those lands, which appear to us to be an object of the utmost importance, and on the right determination of which the future strength and prosperity of the Colony greatly depends."

Benjamin Green, one of the Council of Nova Scotia, went to Boston in January, 1756, with instructions to discuss with Governor Shirley the question of re-peopling the evacuated lands "with good Protestant subjects" from New England. Shirley wrote to Lawrence shortly afterwards on the subject, expressing his fears that the present state of hostilities in North America would seriously interfere with the accomplishment of the project. He also states that the present constitution of government in Nova Scotia may prove an obstacle to its settlement, since the people of New England have a preference for being ruled by a governor, council and *House of Representatives*, and set much store by a Charter Constitution. He adds: "All that occurs to me at present that can be done for drawing settlers from this continent to the evacuated lands in Nova Scotia, is a publication of the terms upon which they may be encouraged to settle there, and the protection from an Indian or French enemy they may expect in the district where they are to sit down."

In the course of the war with France, which had now begun, Governor Lawrence served with distinction at the reduction of Louisbourg and Colonel Monckton (who was now Lieut.-Governor of Nova Scotia) took possession of the valley of the river St. John and built Fort Frederick on the site of the abandoned French fort at the mouth of the river.

The surrender of Quebec the next year was the last dramatic act of the final campaign between England and France for supremacy on the North American continent. Meanwhile, the province of Nova Scotia had established a House of Assembly and, with representative institutions, was in a position to take measures for its own development as a British possession. The story of the beginning of this development under Charles Lawrence and his successors must be delayed for another paper.