

The Corps  
of  
Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

A History of RCEME to 1946

By

Colonel R.H. Hodgson



The RCEME Heritage Archives



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## Editor's Note

This document is the unpublished *A History of RCEME to 1946* by Colonel R.H. Hodgson. In 1959, Colonel Hodgson was invited to write a history of the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Second World War. This project was never completed although he, and others, carried out considerable research into the activities of RCEME units and tried to place them in the context of the Second World War as recorded in the Official History of the Canadian Army. Eventually, this research became part of the source documentation for Colonel Murray Johnston's *Canada's Craftsmen* and *Canada's Craftsmen at 50*.

This is not a conventional Corps history. It is a collection of data and documents that were written over 50 years ago. As part of the EME Heritage Reprints project, *A History of RCEME to 1946* has been scanned and reproduced electronically. It will be posted on the Internet, so that this part of the RCOC (E), RCEME, LORE, LEME, and EME heritage will be easily available to EME soldiers and historians.

The original document is more than 600 11x17 pages, and is divided into six parts, most of which can be searched electronically. The two sections in Part 4 that cannot be searched have an index. The document structure is:

Part 1 – RCEME Unit Origins, Formation, Reorganization, and Disbandment Chronology (dates of formation, reorganization, disbandment, etc). This part has been enhanced by unit data provided by Mark W. Tonner, CD, (Ret'd The RCR) and reproduced with permission from his work *On Active Service*.

Part 2 – Selected RCEME unit histories. A few units prepared a short history of their wartime operations, and they are included here. This should not be confused with *A Collection of RCEME Individual Unit Histories in North-West Europe in World War II*, which is a separate document in the EME Heritage Reprint series.

Part 3 – The Formation of RCEME

Part 4 – Organization.

Section 4A – Organizational development.

Section 4B – Organization Charts (not electronically searchable).

Section 4C – War Establishments of RCEME units (not electronically searchable).

Section 4D – RCEME in Italy and in the Canadian Army Occupation Force.

Part 5 – RCEME in the North-West Europe Campaign.

Part 6 – RCEME in Operation Eclipse, Military Government, and the Canadian Army Occupation Force.

I have also added some information from other sources [in square brackets]. The glossary is for a modern audience and did not exist in the original.

The original digital edition was split into six files for easier transmission. This version combines these into a single file and corrects some minor errors based on helpful comments.

Doug Knight  
February 2010

## Glossary

[This glossary has been compiled for a modern audience who may not be aware of contemporary abbreviations. It does not exist in the original document.]

### **Ranks**

Gen	General
Lt-Gen	Lieutenant-General
Maj-Gen	Major-General
Brig	Brigadier
Col	Colonel
Lt-Col	Lieutenant-Colonel
Maj	Major
Capt	Captain
Lt	Lieutenant
WO1	Warrant Officer (Class 1)
WO2	Warrant Officer (Class 2)
AQMS	Artificer Quartermaster Sergeant
QMS	Quartermaster Sergeant
S/Sgt	Staff-Sergeant
Sgt	Sergeant
Cpl	Corporal
L/Cpl	Lance-Corporal
Pte	Private
Cfn	Craftsman, Craftsmen

### **Terms**

2i/c	Second-in-Command
AA	Anti-aircraft – also known as “ack-ack”
AA&QMG	Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General – the senior administrative and logistic officer in a division
“A” Vehicles	Armoured fighting vehicles – tanks, armoured cars, scout cars, etc
Adm O	Administrative Order
AFV	Armoured Fighting Vehicle
AGRA	Army Group Royal Artillery – a group of artillery regiments at Corps or Army level. It had no fixed organization, unlike the division artillery.

APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ARV	Armoured Recovery Vehicle
Att	Attached to
AWD	Advanced Workshop Detachment
“B” Vehicles	Non-armoured vehicles - trucks, cars, motorcycles, etc
BARV	Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle
BEME	Brigade Electrical and Mechanical Engineer [Senior RCEME officer in a brigade]
BLR	Beyond Local Repair
BRAC	Brigadier, Royal Armoured Corps
BRS	Beach Recovery Section
Cwt	hundredweight – equal to 112 pounds (50.9 kg)
CAB	Canadian Armoured Brigade
CAD	Canadian Armoured Division
CAO	Canadian Army Order
CAOS	Canadian Army Overseas
CAR	Canadian Armoured Regiment
CBP	Corps Backloading Point
CDC	Canadian Dental Corps
CFEF	Canadian Far East Force [The Canadian contribution to the war against Japan formed from the NWE forces. The war ended before it could be deployed.]
CIB	Canadian Infantry Brigade
CID	Canadian Infantry Division
CMF	Central Mediterranean Forces
CMHQ	Canadian Military Headquarters [in London]
CO	Commanding Officer
CREME	Commander, Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers [Senior RCEME officer in a division]
DA and QMG	Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General [the senior logistics officer at corps headquarters]
DADEME	Deputy Assistant Director, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering
DADME	Deputy Assistant Director, Mechanical Engineering
DBP	Division Backloading Point
DD	Duplex Drive [a tank with propellers for operating in the water]
DDME	Deputy Director, Mechanical Engineering [the senior RCEME officer at Army Headquarters]
DDOS	Deputy Director Ordnance Services

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DVP	Drowned Vehicle Park
FAMTO	First Aid Motor Transportation Outfit
GO	General Order
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HQ	Headquarters
LAD	Light Aid Detachment
L of C	Line(s) of Communication
LRS	Light Repair Section
LST	Landing Ship (Tank)
MT	Motor (or Mechanical) Transport
NMRU	Naval Mobile Recovery Unit
NPAM	Non-Permanent Active Militia
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NWE	North-west Europe
OC	Officer Commanding
OFP	Ordnance Field Park
OME	Ordnance Mechanical Engineer
OR	Other rank [non officer]
PAM	Permanent Active Militia
POL	Petrol, Oil, and Lubricants
POW	Prisoner of War
PWD	Port Workshop Detachment
RCA	Royal Canadian Artillery
RCOC	Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
Recce	Reconnaissance
REME	Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers [British]
RCEME	Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RMA	Rear Maintenance Area
RP	Recovery Post
SP	Self-propelled
Wef	with effect from

## Foreword by Colonel R. H. Hodgson

On 10 December 1959, I was invited to write the history of The Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers by the Director, Colonel R.A. Campbell, MBE, CD. My initial intention was to write a historical sketch of each unit. At a later date these sketches would be consolidated into a single narrative, using Colonel C.P. Stacey's official history "*The Canadian Army 1939-45*" as a background.

After collaborating with Colonel W.S. Hunt, CD, on the history of 61 Light Aid Detachment, I decided that the time and effort I expended in research could have been more efficiently used in writing the narrative for the Italian Campaign. Because time was running out and being familiar with the European theatre, I decided to write about The Corps' contribution to the North-West European Campaign. The story of this Campaign will be found in Part 5. This narrative still requires the addition of descriptions of the events for which many of our members received awards in recognition of their service.

All the organization charts in this collection are new and were compiled from the different references indicated. Table 4, to be found on page 560 is unique in that it reflects the phasing in of RCEME/REME units 3 Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group from D Day to D+17 onwards. This table not only shows the original plan but in addition shows the dates these units actually landed.

The paper, "The Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers", in Part 3, is based on various British White Papers and references dating back to 30 November 1928 contained in Colonel E. C. Mayhew's (CD) study, "Formation of REME in the British Army" and the Estate Papers of Lt-Col E.A. Campbell's (CD) father, Colonel EA Campbell, dealing with the formation of RCEME.

The paper "Organization" found in Part 4 contains representative wartime establishments of each type of unit overseas when the Corps was at its strength.

I am indebted to the Engineering Institute of Canada for access to Dr L Austin Wright's (the General Secretary) files dealing with the employment of the Professional engineer in the Services.

Time and events have terminated my research before completion. It would not have been possible to get this much done without the direct support and invaluable assistance by many. I am grateful to Colonel R.A. Campbell, MBE, CD, Director RCEME, who had the foresight to take positive action to get our history recorded and to his successor Colonel A. Mendelsohn, CD, who continued his policy; to Colonel A. L. MacLean, CD, who has given me his personal support and who wrote the narrative of No. 1 Mobile Tire Repair Unit; to Colonels C. F. Way, CD, B. W. Mellor, CD, and C. D. Simpson, CD, my Commanding Officers at 27 Central Ordnance Depot, London, for permitting me to continue my work on a part time basis; to Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, CD, Director of the Historical Section of the General Staff, who gave me support in my work and for permission to read General A.G.L. McNaughton's personal war diary, and to his successor, Colonel G. C. Sprung, MC, CD; to their Deputy Director, Lt-Col H. F. Wood, CD; to Mrs E. A. Sorby, MBE, and Sgt P. R. Marshall, CD, of her enquiries Section, for making available all of her department's files; to Dr J. M. Hitsman who gave me advice, encouragement, and office space, and made available to me many of his unpublished manuscripts dealing with the Services; to Mr A.G. Steiger who made available to me the basic material on Operation ECLIPSE; to SSgt A. A. Azar, CD, for his invaluable help in identifying our units, for his tremendous personal knowledge of our Corps, and for his aid in searching war diaries of his section; to Colonel W. S. Hunt, CD, for writing the narrative of 61 LAD for the period he commanded; to Dr D. C. Paterson, Editor of RCEME Technical Bulletin, for writing the narrative of 5 Armoured Brigade Workshop; to The RCEME Corps Association for their support; to their Honorary Secretary-Treasurer Lt-Col Le S. Brodie ED.

I am particularly indebted to the late Colonel Commandant of The Corps, General The Honourable AGL McNaughton, PC, CH, CB, MG, DSO, CD, for several informal interviews; to Brigadier G. M. Grant, CBE, for reviewing, guidance and comments on this work; to Colonel G. W. Beecroft for his comments

and a review of his files; to Oberstleutnant Gunther Klan, a serving officer in the West German Army and to Mrs H. Johnson, a former Fernschreiber of Luftgau 8 Breslau, for reviewing pages in Part 6..

To these, and to many others who assisted in typing, printing, binding, filing, I offer my gratitude.

*R.H. Hodgson H. Col  
23 August 1963*

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# Part 1

## RCEME Unit Origins, Formation, Reorganization, and Disbandment Chronology

*Expanded edition with additional information provided by Mark W. Tonner, CD, (Ret'd The RCR)*

### **Editor's Notes on Part 1**

**Content.** Part 1 includes Colonel Hodgson's introduction, and the formation, restructuring, and disbandment information on all RCOC(E) and RCEME units that were called out on active service in the Second World War. It includes additional data provided by Mark W. Tonner, CD, (Ret'd The RCR) on these units and on the Reserve units (see below).

**Original Intent.** Approximately the first 350 pages of the original document covered the formation, mobilization, reorganization, renaming, and disbandment of RCOC (E) and RCEME units in the Second World War. The basic data for each unit was assigned to a separate page, and the intent was that as each unit's history was written, it would replace the page. In the event, only a few units had a history, and their pages were renumbered using the 25, 25a, 25b, etc., system. In the electronic version, the unit histories have been extracted and placed in Part 2.

**Organization of Part 1.** The organization of the original section on the unit formations is somewhat obscure, and the table of contents is difficult to use. This is not necessarily surprising since the document was written long before the introduction of word processors, with their automatic assistance. I therefore grouped the electronic version by unit type (which I think Col Hodgson was attempting), and allowed the automatic table of contents generated by Microsoft Word to perform the access operation. The hyperlinks of the table of contents are retained and usable in the .pdf file that is the normal type of file used for distribution.

**Unit Geneology.** During the course of the war, some units changed their names or were converted to a different type of unit. I consider that most readers will be looking for a specific unit, so most units have an individual entry. If a unit was completely restructured (for example, No. 27 LAD became 2<sup>nd</sup> Heavy Anti-aircraft Workshop), each unit has a separate entry. However, in the interests of space, renaming a unit is simply indicated in the heading (for example, 1<sup>st</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 1<sup>st</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop). The electronic search feature can also be used for assistance.

**Additional Information Provided by Mark W. Tonner, CD, (Ret'd The RCR).** While working on Part 1, I was made aware that Mark Tonner had prepared a massive collection of data on all the formation of all the units of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. This has been published as *On Active Service* (Service Publications, Ottawa, 2007). However, he very generously sent me his data on all the RCOC(E) and RCEME units, and with his permission, I have incorporated this into Col Hodgson's work, considerably expanding the latter's account. In many respects, the two documents were complementary, because Mark Tonner used Canadian Army General Orders as a primary reference, whereas Col Hodgson used data from Canadian Military Headquarters. Where there was a conflict, this has been noted. Mark Tonner's document structure is based on the unit serial number, so I reorganised his data into Col Hodgson's format. In retrospect, it might have been better to do the opposite, but again, I believed that most EME readers will be looking for a unit by name, and may not be familiar with the unit serial number system. In addition, he has provided information on Reserve RCOC(E) and RCEME units. This has been added at the end of this document in their original formatting. His assistance and generosity has been greatly appreciated.



## ***Introduction to Part 1 by Colonel R. H. Hodgson***

The information contained in the following pages is an attempt to show the creation and the subsequent reorganization, redesignation, and eventually the disbandment of RCOC units that became part of the Corps of RCEME on 15 May 1944.

The period of time under study is from the reorganization of the RCOC militia in Canada on 15 December 1936, until the formation of the New Army on 1 October 1946 known as plan H.

A trial reading of six war diaries has revealed that they cannot be relied upon for continuity or in many cases correctness of facts, particularly in respect to dates. This is natural when one considers that, in many cases, orders were published authorizing retroactive changes in organization, designation, etc., in some instances as far back as six months. The writing of the war diary was usually considered a chore by the diarist, and consequently many diaries suffered in quality. Sometimes the pressure of events delayed the writing, and important details were not recorded. In other cases, the diarist became a casualty and thus continuity was lost for a time.

It is because of these problems that it has been decided to search out and authenticate the creation, the reorganization, and redesignation, and finally the disbandment of the many units that eventually became The Corps of RCEME. The war diaries may now be read with the many discrepancies and omissions accounted for. A brief historical sketch of each unit is planned for each unit and will appear on issue two of each page. [In the event, only about ten units ever had a historical sketch prepared – ed].

Units formed in Canada are recorded by Military Districts where known. The section entitled UK contains units that are known to have been formed in the United Kingdom. Units formed, but where the country of origin is unknown, have been included in the “unknown” section. When the place of origin of these units has been established, the pages will be moved to the correct section and given a page number.

The following symbols were in use for the Canadian Militia in 1938.

	capt	Captain
C. M.		Canadian Militia
c. o. t. c.		An officer in possession of certificate “A” C. O. T. C.
C. O. T. C.		An officer in possession of certificate “B” C. O. T. C.
D.F.C.		Distinguished Flying Cross
E. D.		Canadian Efficiency Decoration
maj		Major
M. C.		Military Cross
M. S. C.		Passed the Advanced Militia Staff Course
m. s. c.		Passed the Militia Staff Course
V. D.		Colonial Auxiliary Forces Officers Decoration
*		Not qualified or provisional
×		Officer who had service in any of the several theatres of war <b><i>[Note: the real symbol is crossed sabres – this is the closest symbol I found – ed]</i></b>
=		Not qualified in technical subjects

## ***Military Districts***

### ***Military District No. 1 (London)***

#### **No. 1 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 1 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), London, Ontario, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, London, Ontario with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: \* Curtis, CF, maj 9 Apr 38

No. 1 District Store Section, London, Ontario

#### **No. 1 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 1 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), London, Ontario, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 1 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3302

Redesignated 15 Jul 43 No. 1 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3302, by GO 396/43

No. 1 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

HQ No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3343

HQ No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3343, disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 22/44

No. 1 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3350

No. 1 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3350, disbanded 1 Jul 43 by GO 375/43

The Technical Workshop Company of No. 1 Ordnance Depot, RCOC was reorganized by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, into No. 1 Company, RCEME, Serial 3902

## ***Military District No. 2 (Toronto)***

### **No. 2 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 2 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Toronto, Ontario, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Toronto, Ontario with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: \*× Thompson, HG, DFC, maj 1 Jun 37

3<sup>rd</sup> Class: \* Beecroft, GW, capt, 1 Jul 37

4<sup>th</sup> Class: = Barber, AS, lt, 1 Jul 37

\* Millman, JM, lt, 1 Jan 38 (capt CM 1 Jan 38)

\* Bradford, JK, lt, 1 May 38

No. 2 District Store Section, Toronto, Ontario

### **No. 2 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 2 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Toronto, Ontario, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 2 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3302

No. 2 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 4 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 5 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 6 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 2 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3344

No. 2 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3351

No. 3 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3352

No. 4 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3353

No. 5 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3354

No. 6 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3355

No. 7 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3356

No. 1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3375

No. 2 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3376

No. 3 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3377

No. 4 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3378

The following units were disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 453/43

No. 2 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3344

No. 2 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3351

No. 3 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3352

No. 4 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3353

No. 5 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3354

No. 6 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3355

No. 7 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3356

No. 1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3375

No. 2 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3376

No. 3 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3377

No. 4 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3378

No. 2 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3302 was redesignated 1 Sep 43 No. 2 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3303, by GO 451/43

No. 2 Company, RCEME, Serial 3903, was formed by GO 263/44, reorganized 15 May 44 from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 2 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

### ***Military District No. 3 (Kingston)***

#### **No. 3 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 3 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Kingston, Ontario, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, Kingston, Ontario with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

3<sup>rd</sup> Class: \* Styles, HJ, capt, 1 Apr 38

4<sup>th</sup> Class: \* Roy, P, lt, 2 Apr 38

\* Henderson, JR, lt, 3 Apr 38

\* Murray, KL, lt, 4 Apr 38

\* Dolan, ML, lt, 5 Apr 38

No. 1 Ordnance Store Company, Ottawa, Ontario

No. 3 District Store Section, Kingston, Ontario

### **No. 3 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Kingston, Ont**

No. 3 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Kingston, Ontario, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

- No. 3 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3304
- No. 7 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 8 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 9 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 3 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3345
- No. 4 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3346
- No. 8 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3357
- No. 9 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3358
- No. 10 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3359

The following units were disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 453/43

- No. 3 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3345
- No. 4 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3346
- No. 8 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3357
- No. 9 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3358
- No. 10 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3359

No. 3 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3304 was converted and redesignated 1 Aug 43 No. 3 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3304, by GO 436/43

No. 3 Company, RCEME, Serial 3904, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44 reorganized from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 3 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

### **No. 9 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Ottawa, Ont**

No. 9 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Ottawa, Ontario, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

- Central Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3381
- Ottawa Workshop Company, RCOC, Serial 3384
- No. 10 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 11 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 12 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 13 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

### ***Military District No. 4 (Montreal)***

#### **No. 4 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 4 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Montreal, PQ, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 1 Anti-aircraft Group Workshop Company, RCOC, Montreal, PQ, with four Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: \*× Jackson, RR, maj, 1 Feb 38

3<sup>rd</sup> Class: \* Young, GM, lt, 23 Mar 38

\* Loomis, AP, lt, 24 Mar 38

\* McGregor, LS, lt, 30 Mar 38

No. 3 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, PQ with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: \*× Bennett, CH, maj, 1 Dec 37

3<sup>rd</sup> Class: \* Ferrabee, FG, capt, 24 Mar 38

4<sup>th</sup> Class: \* Carter, WFS, lt, 24 Mar 38

\* Wright, AL, lt, 12 Apr 38

Note: Personnel of 3 AFWS were warned of mobilization into No. 4 AFWS Friday evening 30 Aug 40 by Maj Bennett. (From the war diary, vol 1, No 4 AFWS)

No. 4 District Store Section, Montreal, PQ

#### **No. 4 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 3 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Montreal, PQ, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 4 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3305

No. 14 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 15 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

“A” Subsection of No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3343

“A” Subsection of No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3343 was disbanded 15 Jun 43 by GO 343/43

No. 11 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3360

No. 11 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3360 was disbanded 15 Jun 43 by GO 343/43

No. 4 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3305 was converted and redesignated 15 Jun 43, No. 4 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3305, by GO 341/43

No. 4 Company, RCEME, Serial 3905, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, reorganized from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 4 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

#### ***Military District No. 5 (Quebec)***

#### **No. 5 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 5 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Quebec, Quebec, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 5 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3306

No. 16 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

“B” Subsection of No. 3 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3340

“B” Subsection of No. 3 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC,  
Serial 3340, disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 430/43

No. 12 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3361

No. 12 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3361, disbanded 1 Sep  
43 by GO 430/43

No. 5 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3306, converted and redesignated 1 Sep 43 No. 5  
Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3306, by GO 429/43

No. 5 Company, RCEME, Serial 3906, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, reorganized from the  
Technical Workshop Company of No. 5 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

### ***Military District No. 6 (Halifax)***

#### **No. 6 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 6 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Halifax, NS, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 4 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Halifax, NS, with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers  
including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: \*× Montgomery, SD, maj (m.s.c), 15 Dec 37

4<sup>th</sup> Class: = Baker, ML, lt, 15 Dec 37

= Greene, AG, lt, 15 Dec 37

= Ripley, HA, lt, 17 Dec 37

No. 6 District Store Section, Halifax, NS

## No. 6 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)

No. 6 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Halifax, NS, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

- No. 6 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3307
- No. 17 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 18 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 19 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
- No. 1 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3338
- No. 2 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3339
- No. 13 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3362
- No. 14 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3363
- No. 15 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3364
- No. 16 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3365
- “C” Subsection of No. 20 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3369
- “C” Subsection of No. 21 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3370
- No. 5 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3379

The following units were disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 430/43

- No. 1 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3338
- No. 2 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3339
- No. 13 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3362
- No. 14 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3363
- No. 15 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3364
- No. 16 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3365
- No. 5 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3379

The following units were disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 498/43

- “C” Subsection of No. 20 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3369
- “C” Subsection of No. 21 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3370

No. 6 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3307, was converted and redesignated 1 Sep 43 No. 6 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3307, by GO 429/43

No. 6 Company, RCEME, Serial 3907, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, reorganized from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 6 Ordnance Depot, RCOC



## ***Military District No. 7 (St. John, NB)***

### **No. 7 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 7 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), St John, NB, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 7 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3308

No. 20 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

HQ and “A” Subsection of No. 3 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3340

“B” Subsection of No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3343

No. 17 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3366

No. 18 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3367

“C” Subsection of No. 25 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3374

The following units were disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 22/44

HQ and “A” Subsection of No. 3 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3340

“B” Subsection of No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3343

No. 17 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3366

No. 18 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3367

“C” Subsection of No. 25 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3374

No. 7 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3308, was converted and redesignated 1 Sep 43 No. 7 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3307, by GO 457/43

No. 7 Company, RCEME, Serial 3908, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, reorganized from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 7 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

## ***Military District No. 10 (Winnipeg)***

### **No. 10 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 10 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Winnipeg, Man, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

- No. 1 Cavalry Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Winnipeg, Man with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers (none listed)
- No. 10 District Store Section, Winnipeg, Man

### **No. 10 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 10 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Winnipeg, Man, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

- No. 10 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3309
  - No. 21 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC
  - No. 5 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3347
  - No. 5 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3347, disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 22/44
  - No. 19 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3368
  - No. 19 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3368, disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 22/44
- No. 10 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3309, converted and redesignated 15 Jul 43 No. 10 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3309, by GO 366/43
- No. 10 Company, RCEME, Serial 3909, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, reorganized from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 10 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

## ***Military District No. 11 (Esquimalt)***

### **No. 11 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 11 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Esquimalt, BC, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 5 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Esquimalt, BC, with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: =x Goodman, HE, VD, maj (m.s.c), 24 Feb 38

3<sup>rd</sup> Class: \* Parkes, AS, capt, 1 May 38

4<sup>th</sup> Class: = Sturrock, HA, lt, 25 Feb 38

= MacKay, JA, lt, 1 May 38

= Branston, GW, lt, 2 May 38

= Bennell, JA, lt, 19 May 38

= Clelland, AD, lt, 20 May 38

No. 11 District Store Section, Esquimalt, BC

### **No. 11 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 11 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Esquimalt, BC, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 22 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 23 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 24 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC

No. 4 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3341

“A” Subsection of No. 7 field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3349

“HQ”, “A”, & “B” Subsection of No. 25 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3374

The following units were disbanded 1 Jan 43 by GO 98/43

No. 4 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3341

“A” Subsection of No. 7 field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3349

The following units were disbanded 15 Mar 43 by GO 162/43

No. 5 Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3342

No. 22 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3371

No. 23 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3372

No. 24 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3373

No. 11 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3310

## ***Military District No. 12 (Regina)***

### **No. 12 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 12 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Regina, Sask, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 12 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3311

HQ of No. 6 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3348

HQ of No. 6 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3348, disbanded 1 Jul 43  
by GO 375/43

HQ of “A” & “B” Subsection of No. 20 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial  
3369

HQ of “A” & “B” Subsection of No. 20 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section,  
RCOC, Serial 3369 Disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 498/43

No. 12 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3311, converted and redesignated 15 Jul 43 No. 12  
Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3311, by GO 396/43

No. 12 Company, RCEME, Serial 3910, formed by GO 263/44, 15 May 44, reorganized from the  
Technical Workshop Company of No. 12 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

## ***Military District No. 13 (Calgary)***

### **No. 13 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM)**

No. 13 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), Calgary, Alta, reorganised by GO 181/36 wef 15 Dec 36 into:

No. 6 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Calgary, Alta with seven Ordnance Mechanical Engineers including:

2<sup>nd</sup> Class: =x Shields, PR, MC, maj (m.s.c), 1 Jan 38 (lt-col, CM, 1 Jan 38)

No. 13 District Store Section, Calgary, Alta

### **No. 13 Detachment, RCOC (PAM)**

No. 13 Detachment, RCOC (PAM), Calgary, Alta, formed from the Ordnance Stores Corps by GO 194/1907. The same order shows a change in nomenclature of “Ordnance Stores Corps” to “Canadian Ordnance Corps”

Reorganized 17 Jun 42 by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 into:

No. 13 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3312

HQ of No. 7 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3349

HQ of No. 7 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3349, disbanded 1 Jul 43 by GO 389/43

HQ “A” & “B” Subsection of No. 21 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3370

HQ “A” & “B” Subsection of No. 21 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, Serial 3370, disbanded 1 Sep 43 by GO 498/43

No. 13 Ordnance Depot Company, RCOC, Serial 3312, converted and redesignated 15 Jul 43 No. 13 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3312, by GO 396/43

Reorganized 15 May 44 No. 13 Company, RCEME, Serial 3910, formed by GO 263/44 from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 13 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

## ***Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot and Central Mechanisation Depot***

### **Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3407

Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot, RCOC, called out on Active Service 1 Nov 41 by GO 75/42

The conception of the workshop dates back to 1942, shortly after the Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot came into being. At that time, a group of Technical Ordnance personnel established a small workshop and they became known as the Ordnance Mechanical Engineers.

When the RCEME Corps was formed, the workshop became the RCEME Workshop. The workshop continued to expand, and in 1946, the workshop moved to Building No. 10.

On 1 Oct 46, the RCEME Workshop was designated 202 Base Workshop, RCEME, at the same time as the Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot became 25 Central Ordnance Depot. The workshop was administered by 25 COD as a depot component until 1 Apr 48, when it was made a self-accounting unit. The formation was authorized by CAO 110-2, Issue No. 73, effective 21 Apr 48.

### **Central Mechanization Depot, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3408

Central Mechanization Depot, RCOC, called out on Active Service 1 Nov 41 by GO 75/42

The Workshops section was known as No. 4 Component

In Oct 46, the Central Mechanization Depot became known as 27 Central Ordnance Depot

Effective 1 Apr 48, No. 4 Component, 27 COD, was redesignated as 204 Base Workshop, RCEME, and became a separate formation authorized by CAO 110-2, Issue No. 73, effective 21 Apr 48.

Converted and redesignated No. 17 Company, RCEME, effective 24 Jan 49 by CAO 76-2, Issue No. 112

## ***Light Aid Detachments***

### **No. 1 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 615

No. 1 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 1 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix A, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 615/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 1 LAD (Type A) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 1 Sep 45

### **No. 2 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 616

No. 2 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 2 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 2 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 14/42 (1) with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix A, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 616/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 2 LAD (Type A) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 2 Sep 45

**No. 3 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 617

No. 3 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 3 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 3 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 14/42 (1) with conversion effective on 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective on 15 Oct 41. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix A, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 617/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 3 LAD (Type A) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 5 Sep 45

**No. 4 Light Aid Detachment (Att Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG), later HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division)**

Mobilization Serial: 618

No. 4 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 4 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 4 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG)

Disbanded by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Disbandment cancelled by GO 302/43 effective 31 Mar 43. Attached to HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division

No. 4 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 302/43 effective 31 Mar 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 Nov 43, Serial 618/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated No. 4 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 6 Dec 45



**No. 5 Light Aid Detachment (Att Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG), later HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division)**

Mobilization Serial: 619

No. 5 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 5 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 5 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG)

Disbanded by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Disbandment cancelled by GO 302/43 effective 31 Mar 43. No. 5 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 302/43 effective 31 Mar 43. Attached to HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 619/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 5 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 11 Dec 45

**No. 6 Light Aid Detachment (Att Royal Montreal Regiment (MG), later Cameron Highlanders of Canada (MG))**

Mobilization Serial: 620

No. 6 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 6 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 6 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to Royal Montreal Regiment (MG)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated No. 6 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O No. 19, 28 Jan 43. Attached to the Cameron Highlanders of Canada (MG)

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 620/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 6 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 15 Aug 45

**No. 7 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 621

No. 7 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 7 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 7 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 621/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 7 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 24 Aug 45

**No. 8 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 622

No. 8 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF. authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 8 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 8 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 622/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 8 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 24 Aug 45

**No. 9 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 623

No. 9 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 9 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 9 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 623/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 9 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 26 Aug 45

**No. 10 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 624

No. 10 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 10 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 10 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43 effective 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 624/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 10 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 30 Aug 45

**No. 11 Light Aid Detachment (Att 11<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 625

No. 11 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 11 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 11 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 11<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43 effective 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 625/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 11 LAD (Type B) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 3 Sep 45

**No. 12 Light Aid Detachment (Att 8<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA, later 19<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 626

No. 12 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 12 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 12 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 8<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43 effective 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 626/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Reassigned to 19<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA, from 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, date uncertain, but about this time. The 19<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment had only just arrived in the UK when 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division was sent to Italy in October 1943. The regiment was considered too inexperienced and was replaced in the division by 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment. The 19<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment took 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment's place as an army field regiment.

Redesignated No. 12 LAD (Type D), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O No. 159, 2 Nov 43, effective 1 Nov 43

Redesignated No. 12 LAD (Type D) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 29 Oct 45

**No. 13 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 627

No. 13 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 13 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 13 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 627/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 13 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Converted and redesignated No. 13 LAD (Type D) RCEME by GO 252/45 effective 31 Mar 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 28 Aug 45

**No. 14 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 628

No. 14 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 14 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 14 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Signals

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App A), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 628/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 14 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 6 Sep 45

**No. 15 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2 Field Park Company, RCE, later 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Engineers)**

Mobilization Serial: 629

No. 15 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 15 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 15 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Engineers

[Their War diary indicates that 15 LAD was attached to 2 Field Park Company, RCE, before being attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Engineers – ed]

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App A), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 629/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 15 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 1 Sep 45

**No. 16 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 662

No. 16 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 16 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 16 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 662/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 16 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 17 Light Aid Detachment (Att 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 663

No. 17 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 17 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 17 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 663/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 17 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 18 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 664

No. 18 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 18 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 18 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 664/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 18 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 19 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 665

No. 19 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 19 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 19 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 665/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 19 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 20 Light Aid Detachment (Att 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Recce Regiment (14 Cdn Hussars))**

Mobilization Serial: 666

No. 20 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 20 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 20 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Recce Regiment

Converted & redesignated No. 20 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 666/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 20 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 21 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 667

No. 21 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 21 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 21 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Signals

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 667/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 21 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 22 Light Aid Detachment (Att 5<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 668

No. 22 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 22 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 22 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 668/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 18 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45



**No. 23 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Engineers, later 1<sup>st</sup> Field Park Company, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 669

No. 23 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 23 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 23 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Engineers [War Diary says 1<sup>st</sup> Field Park Company, RCE - ed]

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 669/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 23 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 1 Aug 45

**No. 24 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 670

No. 24 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 24 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 24 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (App B), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 670/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 24 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 25 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, RCE, later 11<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 650

No. 25 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 184/40 effective 24 May 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 25 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 25 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, RCE [War Diary says later attached to 11<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE – ed]

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43 effective 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 650/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 25 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 22 Jul 45

**No. 26 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Survey Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 651

No. 26 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 26 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 26 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Survey Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix F), 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 651/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 26 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 28 Jun 45

**No. 27 Light Aid Detachment (became No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section)**

Mobilization Serial: 652

No. 27 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 27 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated & converted to Serial No. 499, No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, by GO 148/41 effective 3 Jun 41

No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section

(Note: Formerly Serial No. 652 - No. 27 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, Redesignated and Converted and Allotted New Serial No. 499 under GO 148/41)

Mobilization Serial: 499

No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 148/41 effective 3 Jun 41

Reorganised and redesignated No. 2 Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Mobile) Ordnance Workshop Section, RCOC, by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

Redesignated & converted No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCOC, by GO 243/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Redesignated No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCOC, by GO 420/43 effective 15 Jul 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 499/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 23 Aug 45

**No. 28 Light Aid Detachment (Att 7<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA, later 7<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 653

No. 28 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 28 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 28 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 7<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA, and later 7<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43 effective 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 653/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 28 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 29 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 654

No. 29 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 29 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 29 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, RCE

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43 effective 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 654/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 77, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 29 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 5 Aug 45

**No. 30 Light Aid Detachment (att 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Engineers, later 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Park Company, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 630

No. 30 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 30 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 30 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Engineers later 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Park Company, RCE

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 630/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 30 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 31 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Signals)**

No. 31 Light Aid Detachment

Mobilization Serial: 631

No. 31 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 31 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 31 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 631/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 31 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 32 Light Aid Detachment (Att 12<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 632

No. 32 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 32 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 32 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 12<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 632/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 32 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 33 Light Aid Detachment (Att 13<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 633

No. 33 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 33 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 33 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 13<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 633/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Converted & redesignated No. 33 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O no. 159, 2 Nov 43

Redesignated 33 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Converted & redesignated No. 33 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O no. 155, 30 Sep 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 34 Light Aid Detachment (Att 14<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 634

No. 34 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 34 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 34 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 14<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 634/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Converted & redesignated No. 34 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O no. 159, 2 Nov 43

Redesignated 34 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Converted & redesignated No. 34 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O no. 155, 30 Sep 44

[War Diary states later attached to HQ RCEME, 4<sup>th</sup> Netherlands Division – ed]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 15 Dec 45

**No. 35 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 635

No. 35 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 35 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 35 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 635/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

[War Diary also says attached to 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade – ed]

Redesignated 35 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 127, 14 Nov 45

Reactivated and redesignated No. 170 Light Aid Detachment (Type D) RCEME by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

**No. 36 Light Aid Detachment (Att 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ)**

Mobilization Serial: 636

No. 36 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 36 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 36 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 636/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 36 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 37 Light Aid Detachment (Att 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ)**

Mobilization Serial: 637

No. 37 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 37 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 37 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 637/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 36 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 38 Light Aid Detachment (Att 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ)**

Mobilization Serial: 638

No. 38 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 38 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 38 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 638/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 36 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

**No. 39 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 639

No. 39 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 39 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40,

Disbanded, authorized by GO 156/41 effective 25 Jan 41



**No. 40 Light Aid Detachment (Att 18<sup>th</sup> Armoured Car Regiment, CAC, (12<sup>th</sup> Manitoba Dragoons))**

Mobilization Serial: 640

No. 40 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 40 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 40 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41.

[No. 40 LAD was attached to the 18<sup>th</sup> Manitoba Reconnaissance Battalion (Type A LAD). Later, when the unit became 18<sup>th</sup> Armoured Car Regiment, CAC (12<sup>th</sup> Manitoba Dragoons), the LAD retained the attachment – just became a Type “C” LAD – ed]

Converted & redesignated No. 40 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 132/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix G, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 640/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 56, 19 Apr 43

Converted & redesignated No. 40 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O 55, 10 Apr 44 (Mark Tonner says by GO 505/44 Effective 4 Apr 44).

Redesignated 40 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 6 Dec 45

**No. 41 Light Aid Detachment (Att 28<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (British Columbia Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 641

No. 41 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 41 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 41 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41.

[No. 41 LAD was attached to the British Columbia Regiment when they were infantry (Type A LAD). Later, when the BCR became 28<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (The British Columbia Regiment), the LAD retained the attachment – just became a Type “C” LAD – ed]

Converted & redesignated No. 41 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 132/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 641/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 41 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 6 Nov 45

**No. 42 Light Aid Detachment (Att 29<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (South Alberta Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 642

No. 42 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 42 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 42 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41.

[No. 42 LAD was attached to the South Alberta Regiment when they were infantry (Type A LAD). Later when the South Alberta Regiment became 29<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (The South Alberta Regiment), the LAD retained the attachment – just became a Type “C” LAD – ed]

Converted & redesignated No. 42 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 132/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 642/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 42 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 6 Dec 45

**No. 43 Light Aid Detachment (Att 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment, CAC (The Elgin Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 643

No. 43 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 43 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated: No. 43 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41.

[No. 43 LAD was attached to the Elgin Regiment when they were infantry (Type A LAD). Later when the Elgin Regiment became 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (The Elgin Regiment), the LAD retained the attachment – just became a Type “C” LAD. The regiment was later renamed the 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment, CAC (The Elgin Regiment) – ed]

Converted & redesignated No. 43 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 132/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 643/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Oct 43

Redesignated 43 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 6 Nov 45

**No. 44 Light Aid Detachment (Att 15<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 644

No. 44 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 44 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 44 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 15<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 644/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 44 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 15 Dec 45

**No. 45 Light Aid Detachment (Att 5<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 645

No. 45 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 45 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 45 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Converted & redesignated No. 45 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated No. 45 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by GO 134/44 effective 18 Oct 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 645/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 45 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 6 Dec 45

**No. 46 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Engineers)**

Mobilization Serial: 646

No. 46 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 46 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 46 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Engineers [War Diary says later 6<sup>th</sup> Field Park Squadron, RCE]

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 646/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 46 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45

**No. 47 Light Aid Detachment (Att Lake Superior Regiment (Motor))**

Mobilization Serial: 647

No. 47 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 47 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 47 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to Lake Superior Regiment (later Lake Superior Regiment (Motor))

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 647/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 47 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45

**No. 48 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, later 10<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ)**

Mobilization Serial: 648

No. 48 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 48 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 48 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41

[The LAD was initially attached to the 4<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise Dragoon Guards as a Type B LAD, and later to 10<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ as a Type A LAD]

Converted & redesignated No. 48 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 648/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 48 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45

**No. 49 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 649

No. 49 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 49 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 49 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Signals

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 649/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 49 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 6 Nov 45

**No. 50 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 109

No. 50 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 50 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 50 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 17 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Signals

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix F, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 109/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 50 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 26 Jul 45

**No. 51 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Field Park Company, later 9<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 655

No. 51 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 51 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 51 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Field Park Company, later 9<sup>th</sup> Field Park company, RCE

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix F, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 655/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 51 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 1 Aug 45

**No. 52 Light Aid Detachment (attached to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division Support Battalion (Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)), later HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Ordnance Field Park, later 2<sup>nd</sup> Survey Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 656

No. 52 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 52 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 52 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41.

[War Diary notes No. 52 LAD was attached to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division Support Battalion (Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)), later to HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Ordnance Field Park, later to 2<sup>nd</sup> Survey Regiment, RCA – ed]

Converted & redesignated No. 52 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix G, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Redesignated 52 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 22 Jun 45

**No. 53 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (Lord Strathconas Horse))**

Mobilization Serial: 671

[No. 53 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 295/40 effective 20 Oct 40 – Mark Tonner]

No. 53 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, called out on Active Service authorized by GO 243/40 effective 23 Oct 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 53 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 53 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Regiment, CAC (Lord Strathconas Horse)

[The War Diary states that No 53 LAD was previously attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA, and 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop – ed]

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 671/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 53 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 18 Sep 45

**No. 54 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (1<sup>st</sup> Hussars))**

Mobilization Serial: 672

No. 54 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 295/40 effective 23 Oct 40 [20 Oct 40 – Mark Tonner]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 54 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 54 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (1<sup>st</sup> Hussars)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 672/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 92, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 54 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 7 Aug 45

**No. 55 Light Aid Detachment (Att 10<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Fort Garry Horse))**

Mobilization Serial: 673

No. 55 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 295/40 effective 23 Oct 40 [20 Oct 40 – Mark Tonner]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 55 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 55 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 10<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Fort Garry Horse)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 673/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 92, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 55 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 7 Aug 45



**No. 56 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor General's Horse Guards))**

Mobilization Serial: 674

No. 56 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 295/40 effective 23 Oct 40 [20 Oct 40 – Mark Tonner]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 56 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 56 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor General's Horse Guards)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 674/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 56 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 18 Sep 45

**No. 57 Light Aid Detachment (Att 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 675

No. 57 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 295/40 effective 23 Oct 40 [20 Oct 40 – Mark Tonner]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 57 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 57 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Signals

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 675/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 57 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 9 Aug 45

**No. 58 Light Aid Detachment (Att 17<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 676

No. 58 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 61/41 effective 15 Nov 40

Converted & redesignated No. 58 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 17<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43 effective 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 676/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 58 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 9 Aug 45

**No. 59 Light Aid Detachment (Att 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 677

No. 59 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 11 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 59 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 15 May 44

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 677/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 73, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 59 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 9 Aug 45

**No. 60 Light Aid Detachment (Att 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion (Three Rivers Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 678

No. 60 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 11 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 60 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion (The Three Rivers Regiment)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 678/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 73, 19 Apr 43

Reorganized 1 Apr 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 84, 15 May 44

Redesignated 60 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 9 Aug 45

### **No. 61 Light Aid Detachment (Att Canadian Tank Battalion (The Calgary Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 679

No. 61 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 11 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 61 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion (The Calgary Regiment)

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 679/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 73, 19 Apr 43

Reorganized 1 Apr 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 84, 15 May 44

Redesignated 61 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 11 Aug 45

*Note: this unit has a history recorded in Part 2.*

### **No. 62 Light Aid Detachment (Att 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Recce Regiment (17<sup>th</sup> Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars))**

Mobilization Serial: 680

No. 62 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 12 Feb 41

[Converted & redesignated No. 62 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41 – Mark Tonner]

Converted & redesignated No. 62 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 91/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reconnaissance Battalion – later 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Recce Regiment (17<sup>th</sup> Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars)

Converted & redesignated No. 62 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Reorganised by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix C, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 680/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 62 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

### **No. 63 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Reinforcement Units)**

Mobilization Serial: 681

No. 63 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 81/41 effective 1 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 63 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Reinforcement Units

Redesignated 63 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 30 Sep 45

**No. 64 Light Aid Detachment (Att Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit, “A” Group, Canadian Reinforcement Units, later HQ 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Training Brigade, later 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Training Brigade, Canadian Reinforcement Units)**

Mobilization Serial: 682

No. 64 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 81/41 effective 1 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 64 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to the Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit, “A” Group, Canadian Reinforcement Units, later HQ 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Training Brigade, later 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Training Brigade, Canadian Reinforcement Units

Redesignated 64 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 15 Feb 46

**No. 65 Light Aid Detachment (Att “B” and “D” Groups, Canadian Reinforcement Units, later “B” and “E” Groups, Canadian Reinforcement Units)**

Mobilization Serial: 683

No. 65 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 81/41 effective 1 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 65 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to “B” and “D” Groups, Canadian Reinforcement Units, later “B” and “E” Groups, Canadian Reinforcement Units

Redesignated 65 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 31 Oct 45

**No. 66 Light Aid Detachment (Att 5<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 684

No. 66 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 15 Feb 41

Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 72, 14 May 41 shows mobilization 25 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 66 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA

[War Diary states attached to 3 Canadian Infantry Holding Unit, Canadian Base Units, later 1 Canadian Ordnance Holding Unit, later 5<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA – ed]

Reorganised 18 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 29 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 684/1, under supervision HQ 1 Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 68, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 66 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 30 Jun 45

**No. 67 Light Aid Detachment (Att 7<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 685

No. 67 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 15 Feb 41

Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 131/41 shows formed in UK 15 Sep 41

Converted & redesignated No. 67 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 7<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 18 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix F, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 685/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46, 19 Apr 43

Converted & redesignated No. 67 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by GO 134/44 effective 18 Oct 43 [7<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment became an SP regiment – ed]

Redesignated 67 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 27 Jun 45

**No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reconnaissance Battalion (IV Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards), later 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ)**

Mobilization Serial: 686

No. 68 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 15 Feb 41

Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 65 shows formed in UK 24 Apr 41

Converted & redesignated No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reconnaissance Battalion (IV Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards), later 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ

Converted & redesignated No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix A, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 686/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 68 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 5 Sep 45

**No. 69 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 687

No. 69 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 15 Feb 41

Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 94 shows formed in UK 15 Jul 41

Converted & redesignated No. 69 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix B, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 687/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 69 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Converted & redesignated No. 69 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME, with a HQ and four self-propelled battery sections by GO 155/45 effective 10 Dec 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 70 Light Aid Detachment (Att 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (8<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise's New Brunswick Hussars))**

Mobilization Serial: 688

No. 70 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 70 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (8<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise's New Brunswick Hussars)

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 688/1, under supervision HQ by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 70 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 11 Aug 45

**No. 71 Light Aid Detachment (At 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons))**

Mobilization Serial: 689

No. 71 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 71 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 13 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons)

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 689/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 71 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 18 Sep 45

**No. 72 Light Aid Detachment (Att the Westminster Regiment (Motor))**

Mobilization Serial: 690

No. 72 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 72 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to the Westminster Regiment (Motor)

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 690/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 72 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 11 Aug 45

**No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Att the Perth Regiment (Motor))**

Mobilization Serial: 691

No. 73 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to the Perth Regiment (Motor)

Converted & redesignated No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 691/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 73 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 30 Sep 45

**No. 74 Light Aid Detachment (Att the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons))**

Mobilization Serial: 692

No. 74 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 74 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 4 Mar 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons)

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix F, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 692/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 74 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Converted & redesignated No. 74 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 463/44 effective 1 Jun 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 18 Sep 45

**No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Att 21<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor General's Foot Guards))**

Mobilization Serial: 693

No. 75 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 21<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor General's Foot Guards)

Converted & redesignated No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by GO 132/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 693/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 75 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45



**No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 694

No. 76 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Converted & redesignated No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43, [Hodgson entry also refers to CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43]

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 694/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Converted & redesignated No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by GO 134/44 effective 18 Oct 43

Redesignated 76 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 18 Sep 45

**No. 77 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Field Park Squadron, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 695

No. 77 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 88/41 effective 27 Feb 41

Converted & redesignated No. 77 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 14/42 with conversion effective 25 Feb 41 and redesignation effective 15 Oct 41. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Field Park Squadron, RCE

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 695/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 77 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded 10 Oct 45, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 122, 17 Oct 45

Reactivated and redesignated No. 143 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

**No. 78 Light Aid Detachment (Att 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division)**

Mobilization Serial: 1084

No. 78 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 63/42 effective 29 Jul 41. Attached to 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division

Redesignated No. 78 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 31 Mar 45

**No. 79 Light Aid Detachment (Att 18<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, later 4 Camp Ordnance Depot, later 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Fusiliers de St. Laurent, later HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 1085

No. 79 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 63/42 effective 29 Jul 41

[War Diary says attached to 18<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, later to 4 Camp Ordnance Depot, later to 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Fusiliers de St. Laurent, later HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade – ed]

Redesignated No. 79 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 31 Mar 45

**No. 80 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop, later 5 Central Ordnance Depot, later 19<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, later 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Signals, later 19<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 1086

No. 80 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 63/42 effective 29 Jul 41

[War Diary says attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop, later 5 Central Ordnance Depot, later 19<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, later 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Signals, later 19<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade – ed]

Redesignated No. 80 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 208/45 effective 31 Jan 45

**No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Att 19<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, later 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 1087

No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 63/42 effective 29 Jul 41

Converted & redesignated No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43. Attached to 19<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix E, 10 Jan 43

Reorganised 18 Oct 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 151/43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1087/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 87, 29 Oct 43

Reassigned to 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, from 19<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, date uncertain, but about this time. The 19<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment had only just arrived in the UK when 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division was sent to Italy in October 1943. The regiment was considered too inexperienced and was replaced in the division by 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment. The 19<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment took 8<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment's place as an army field regiment (ie: Corps artillery). 81 LAD stayed with 5<sup>th</sup> Division.

Redesignated 81 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 24 Nov 45

**No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 1088

No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 63/42 effective 29 Jul 41

Converted & redesignated No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43. Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by GO 134/44 effective 18 Oct 43

Redesignated 82 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 23 Jun 45

**No. 83 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 1089

No. 83 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 63/42 effective 29 Jul 41

[War Diary says attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop – ed]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43

**No. 84 Light Aid Detachment (Att 22<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards))**

Mobilization Serial: 1090

No. 84 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42. Attached to 22<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards)

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1090/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 84 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 6 Nov 45

**No. 85 Light Aid Detachment (Att 27<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers))**

Mobilization Serial: 1091

No. 85 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42. Attached to 27<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers)

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1091/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 92, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 85 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 6 Nov 45

**No. 86 Light Aid Detachment (Att 20<sup>th</sup> Canadian Army Tank Regiment, later 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured corps Reinforcement Unit, later 1 Canadian Ordnance Reinforcement Unit, later 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG))**

Mobilization Serial: 1092

No. 86 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42

[War Diary says attached to 20<sup>th</sup> Canadian Army Tank Regiment, later to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit, later to 1 Canadian Ordnance Reinforcement Unit, later to 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG) – ed]

Disbanded, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 111 effective 26 Jul 43

Reconstituted, converted & redesignated No. 86 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME by GO 18/45 effective 13 Jul 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 26 Aug 45

**No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit, later 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit, later Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG))**

Mobilization Serial: 1093

No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit, later to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit

Disbanded, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 111/43 effective 26 Jul 43

Reauthorized 20 Mar 44, No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O No. 45, 22 Mar 44

Converted & redesignated No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 298/44 effective 20 Mar 44. Attached to the Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG)

Mobilised for operational duty 31 Mar 44, Serial 1093/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 109, 12 Apr 44

Redesignated 87 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Att Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Units, later “E” Squadron, 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)). Became No. 159 LAD post-war**

Mobilization Serial: 1094

No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42. Attached to Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Units

Disbanded, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 111/43 effective 26 Jul 43

Reauthorized 20 Mar 44, No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O No. 45, 22 Mar 44. Attached to “E” Squadron, 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)

Mobilised for operational duty 31 Mar 44, Serial 1094/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 109, 12 Apr 44

Redesignated 88 LAD (Type C), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, 26 Sep 45, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 119, 4 Oct 45

Reactivated and redesignated No. 159 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

**No. 89 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 855

No. 89 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 26 Jan 42. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 855/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 89 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 90 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 1096

No. 90 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 26 Jan 42. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1096/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 90 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 29 Oct 45

**No. 91 Light Aid Detachment (Att 4<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 1097

No. 91 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOG, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42. Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RCA

Reorganised 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1097/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 91 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**No. 92 Light Aid Detachment (Att 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 858

No. 92 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOG, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42. Attached to 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, RCE

Reorganised 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 858/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 77, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 92 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 15 Dec 45

[Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46 – Mark Trevor]

**No. 93 Light Aid Detachment (Att 10<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 1098

No. 93 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOG, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Apr 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 227/42 shows formed in UK 14 Sep 42. Attached to 10<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE

Reorganised 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Redesignated 93 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 15 Feb 46 [15 Jan 46 – Hodgson]

**No. 94 Light Aid Detachment (Att 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 1099

No. 94 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 227/42 shows formed in UK 1 Mar 42. Attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Signals

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix G, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1099/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 56, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 94 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 3 Jul 45

**No. 95 Light Aid Detachment (Att to No. 1 Canadian Reinforcement Unit, later No. 1 Canadian Special Tunnelling Company, later HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Ordnance Field Park, later 8<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE)**

Mobilization Serial: 1105

No. 95 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 227/42, 12 Sep 42, shows formed in UK 14 Sep 42

[War Diary states attached to No. 1 Canadian Reinforcement Unit, later to No. 1 Canadian Special Tunnelling Company, later to HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Ordnance Field Park, later to 8<sup>th</sup> Field Park Company, RCE – ed]

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix G, 10 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1099/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 56, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 95 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 3 Aug 45

**No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Att Polar Bear Force, later Winnipeg Grenadiers)**

Mobilization Serial: 1106

No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to the Polar Bear Force, later to the Winnipeg Grenadiers

Converted & redesignated No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 451/43 effective 25 Jun 43

Converted & redesignated No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 45/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 30 Apr 45

**No. 97 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1107

No. 97 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – GO 162/43]

**No. 98 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1108

No. 98 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – GO 162/43, 16 Apr 43]

**No. 99 Light Aid Detachment (Att 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 1109

No. 99 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Workshop

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – GO 162/43, 16 Apr 43]

**No. 100 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1110

No. 100 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – GO 162/43, 16 Apr 43]

**No. 101 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1111

No. 101 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

**No. 102 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, later Polar Bear Force)**

Mobilization Serial: 1112

No. 102 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, later to Polar Bear Force

Redesignated No. 102 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 30 Apr 45



**No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Att 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop, later 31<sup>st</sup> Recce Regiment (Alberta Regiment))**

Mobilization Serial: 1113

No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop, later to 31<sup>st</sup> Recce Regiment (Alberta Regiment)

Converted & redesignated No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 451/43 effective 25 Jun 43

Converted & redesignated No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 45/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 30 Apr 45

**No. 104 Light Aid Detachment (Att 23<sup>rd</sup> Field Regiment (SP), RCA)**

Mobilization Serial: 1114

No. 104 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to 23<sup>rd</sup> Field Regiment (SP), RCA

Converted & redesignated No. 104 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Reorganised 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix D, 10 Jan 43

Reorganised 18 Oct 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 151, 21 Oct 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1114/1, under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 104 LAD (Type D), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45

**No. 105 Light Aid Detachment (Att 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Ordnance Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 1115

No. 105 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Ordnance Workshop

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

**No. 106 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1116

No. 106 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42. Attached to 23<sup>rd</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, later to 20<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA

Converted & redesignated No. 106 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 45/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated No. 106 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 208/45 effective 31 Jan 45

### **No. 107 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1117

No. 107 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 108 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1118

No. 108 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 109 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1119

No. 109 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 110 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1120

No. 110 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 111 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1121

No. 111 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Att 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**

Mobilization Serial: 1122

No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42.  
Attached to 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade

Redesignated No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 30 Apr 45

### **No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Att 9<sup>th</sup> US Army Tank Force, later 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 1123

No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

[War Diary says attached to 9<sup>th</sup> US Army Tank Force, later to 13<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop – ed]

Converted & redesignated No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, by GO 451/43 effective 25 Jun 43

Converted & redesignated No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 45/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 208/45 effective 31 Jan 45

### **No. 114 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1124

No. 114 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 115 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1125

No. 115 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – GO 162/43]

### **No. 116 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1126

No. 116 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – GO 162/43]

### **No. 117 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1127

No. 117 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

**No. 118 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1 Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit)**

Mobilization Serial: 1145

No. 118 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 172/42 effective 15 Apr 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 207, 8 Aug 42, shows formed in UK 10 Aug 42. Attached to 1 Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit

Reorganized 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Redesignated 118 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 31 Jan 46

**No. 119 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1 Canadian General Reinforcement Unit)**

Mobilization Serial: 1146

No. 119 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 172/42 effective 15 Apr 42. Attached to 1 Canadian General Reinforcement Unit

Reorganized 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Redesignated 119 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 31 Jan 46

**No. 120 Light Aid Detachment (Att No. 3 Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit, later No. 2 Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit, later t No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot)**

Mobilization Serial: 1147

No. 120 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 172/42 effective 15 Apr 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 207, 8 Aug 42, shows formed in UK 10 Aug 42.

[War Diary states attached to No. 3 Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit, later to No. 2 Royal Canadian Artillery Reinforcement Unit, later to No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot – ed]

Reorganized 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Redesignated 120 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 15 Sep 45

**No. 121 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1 Canadian General Reinforcement Unit, later 1 Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Unit)**

Mobilization Serial: 1148

No. 121 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 172/42 effective 15 Apr 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 207, 8 Aug 42, shows formed in UK 10 Aug 42.

[War Diary states attached to 1 Canadian General Reinforcement Unit, later to 1 Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Unit – ed]

Reorganized 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Redesignated 121 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 15 Feb 46

### **No. 122 Light Aid Detachment (Att No. 3 Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit)**

Mobilization Serial: 1149

No. 122 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCOC, authorized by GO 172/42 effective 15 Apr 42. Note: CMHQ Adm O No. 207, 8 Aug 42, shows formed in UK 10 Aug 42. Attached to No. 3 Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit

Reorganized 29 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 18 Jan 43

Redesignated 122 LAD (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 15 Feb 46

### **Light Aid Detachment, for No. 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron**

Light Aid Detachment, RCEME, for No. 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, CAC, Serial CM 812, called out on Active Service 24 Aug 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 158, 10 Oct 44

Disbanded 24 Oct 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 179, 9 Nov 44

### **No. 123 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment)**

Mobilization Serial: 1511

No. 123 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 464/44 effective 1 Jan 43

No. 123 Light Aid Detachment (Type E), RCEME, authorized by GO 60/45 effective 24 Oct 44 [Hodgson - CMHQ Adm O No. 170, 9 Nov 44]. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron (later Regiment)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 20 Jun 45

### **No. 124 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1512

No. 124 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 464/44 effective 1 Jan 43

No. 124 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Serial, CM 430 authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 7, 16 Jan 45

Disbanded 28 Jan 46, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 4, 15 Jan 45

## **No. 125 Light Aid Detachment (Att 21<sup>st</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, later 1 Canadian Line of Communications Signals)**

Mobilization Serial: 1513

No. 125 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 233/43 effective 24 Mar 43. Attached to 21<sup>st</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, later to 1 Canadian Line of Communications Signals

Converted & redesignated No. 125 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, by GO 45/44 effective 9 Sep 43

Mobilised for operational duty 30 Nov 43, Serial 1513/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 69, 12 Nov 43

Redesignated 125 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded 22 Oct 45, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 126, 6 Nov 45

Reactivated and redesignated No. 92 Light Aid Detachment (Type “A”), RCEME by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

## **1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army Signals LAD (became No. 126 Light Aid Detachment)**

Mobilization Serial: 1514

1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army Signals LAD, RCOC, CASF, called out on Active Service 23 Apr 42 by CMHQ Adm O No. 89, 23 Apr 42

Redesignated No. 126 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 242/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1514/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated 126 LAD (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 9 Nov 45

## **No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (became No. 131 LAD)**

Mobilization Serial: 1515

No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, authorized by GO 365/44 effective 15 Jul 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 425/45 effective 14 Dec 45

And in another lifetime...

No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (Type F), RCEME, Serial 2638, called out on active service on 23 Dec 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 9, 22 Jan 45. Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Rocket Unit (Battery), RCA

Redesignated 23 Dec 44, No. 131 Light Aid Detachment (Type F), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 29, 19 Mar 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 21 Jun 45

*Note: 127/131 LAD was the only Type F LAD ever formed in the British Commonwealth.  
It has a short history in Part 2, which was not a part of Hodgson - ed*

**No. 128 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1516

No. 128 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, authorized by GO 365/44 effective 15 Jul 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 425/45 effective 14 Dec 45 [Hodgson – 1 Nov 45]

**No. 129 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1517

No. 129 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME, authorized by GO 412/45 effective 1 Sep 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 198/46 effective 14 Dec 45

**No. 130 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 1518

No. 130 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME, authorized by GO 412/45 effective 1 Sep 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 198/46 effective 14 Dec 45

**No. 131 Light Aid Detachment (Att 1<sup>st</sup> Rocket Battery, RCA)**

See also 127 LAD.

Mobilization Serial: 2638

No. 131 Light Aid Detachment, Type F, RCEME, authorized by GO 175/45 effective 23 Dec 44.  
Attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Rocket Battery, RCA

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 21 Jun 45

*Note: 127/131 LAD was the only Type F LAD ever formed in the British Commonwealth.  
It has a short history in Part 2, which was not a part of Hodgson - ed*

**No. 132 Light Aid Detachment (Attached to 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment). Became No. 158 Light Aid Detachment post-war)**

Mobilization Serial: 2650

No. 132 Light Aid Detachment, Type C, RCEME, authorized by GO 251/45 effective 29 Mar 45.  
Attached to 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)

Mobilized for operational duty 22 Apr 45, Serial 2650/1, under supervision HQ CRU by CMHQ Mob O  
No. 139, 3 Apr 45

Disbanded 26 Sep 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 119, 4 Oct 45

Reactivated and redesignated No. 158 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME, by GO 138/46 effective  
1 Mar 46

### **No. 143 Light Aid Detachment**

[Hodgson does not mention this unit]

Mobilization Serial: 695

No. 143 Light Aid Detachment (Type “B”), RCEME, authorized by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 158 Light Aid Detachment**

[Hodgson does not mention this unit]

Mobilization Serial: 2650

No. 158 Light Aid Detachment (Type “C”), RCEME, authorized by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

Embodied as a unit of the Post-War Permanent Force (Active Force) under GO 158/46 effective 27 Jun 46

### **No. 159 Light Aid Detachment**

[Hodgson does not mention this unit]

Mobilization Serial: 1094

No. 159 Light Aid Detachment (Type “C”), RCEME, authorized by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

Embodied as a unit of the Post-War Permanent Force (Active Force) under GO 158/46 effective 27 Jun 46

### **No. 170 Light Aid Detachment**

[Hodgson does not mention this unit - ed]

Mobilization Serial: 635

Formerly No. 35 Light Aid Detachment, RCEME

No. 170 Light Aid Detachment (Type “D”), RCEME, authorized by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

Embodied as a unit of the Post-War Permanent Force (Active Force) under GO 158/46 effective 27 Jun 46



## **Canadian Army Occupation Force LAD**

### **2/6 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4063 [Hodgson – 4063/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 6<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45 [Hodgson – 16 Jun 45]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 29 Apr 46

### **2/30 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4048 [Hodgson – 4048/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 30<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, (2/3 Canadian Field Park Company) authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 1 May 46

### **2/31 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4049 [Hodgson – 4049/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 31<sup>st</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, ( Sigs 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 238/46 effective 12 Jun 46

### **2/32 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4046 [Hodgson – 4046/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 32<sup>nd</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, (Artillery Units), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 18 May 46

### **2/33 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4047 [Hodgson – 4047/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 33<sup>rd</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, (Artillery Units), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 29 Apr 46

### **2/36 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4050 [Hodgson – 4050/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 36<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, (2/7 Canadian Infantry Brigade), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 162/46 effective 4 Apr 46

### **2/37 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4051 [Hodgson – 4051/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 37<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, (2/8 Canadian Infantry Brigade), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 29 Apr 46

### **2/38 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4052 [Hodgson – 4052/1]

2<sup>nd</sup> 38<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, (2/9 Canadian Infantry Brigade), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 14 May 46

### **2/62 Light Aid Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 4045

2<sup>nd</sup> 62<sup>nd</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, (2/7 Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment), authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 18 May 46

### **Force “Z” Light Aid Detachment**

Force “Z” Light Aid Detachment formed Jun 40 with HQ “Z” Force

Personnel: 1 officer (Lt G Branston) and 12 ORs

Disbanded 1 Dec 40

## **Army Field Workshops**

### **No. 1 Army Field Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 232

No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 232, Corps troops mobilizing with 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39, in London, Ontario, with 9 light aid detachments designated by GO 245/40 [probably Nos. 16-24 LAD – ed]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Reorganised & Redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 185/41 effective 10 Jul 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 7/43 [GO 151/43 according to MT] effective 7 Jan 43. Note: “Personnel to provide 4, 5, & 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portions of HQ REME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division.” (taken from CMHQ Adm O No. 2 Appendix K, 10 Jan 43)

*This unit has a short history that is recorded in Part 2.*

### **No. 2 Army Field Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 116

No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39.

Mobilised with 1 Division in Toronto, Ontario, with 15 light aid detachments designated by GO 245/40 [probably Nos. 1-15 LAD – ed]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Reorganised & Redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 185/41 effective 10 Jul 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. Note: “Personnel to provide 1, 2, & 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portions of HQ REME 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division” (taken from CMHQ Adm O No. 2 Appendix K, 10 Jan 43)

*Note: this unit has a short history recorded in Part 2.*

### **No. 3 Army Field Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 255

(Note: Formerly Serial No. 147 - No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, CASF, Converted and Allotted New Serial No. 255 under GO 244/40)

Authorized by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 3 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Reorganised & redesignated 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 185/41 effective 10 Jul 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

## **No. 4 Army Field Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 255-A

[No. 4 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40 – Mark Tonner]

Called out on active service 24 Oct 40 at Montreal, PQ, by GO 243/40 with 10 light aid detachments designated by GO 245/40. [probably Nos. 40-49 LAD – ed]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 4 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Reorganised & redesignated 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 185/41 effective 10 Jul 41

Converted & redesignated 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 132/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 200/42 effective 31 Mar 42. Note: “Personnel reposted to 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Ordnance Companies, RCOC, and Support Group Ordnance Company.” (taken from the war diary)

*Note: this unit has a short history recorded in Part 2.*

## **No. 5 Army Field Workshop, (Details)**

Mobilization Serial: 406

Details called out for duty at Esquimalt, BC, 1 Sep 39 by GO 135/39

No. 5 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, [Note: N.P.A.M. Called Out on Service in Military District No. 11 under GO 124/39 effective 26 Aug 39– Mark Tonner]

No. 5 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, (Details) called Out on Active Service by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

Redesignated 1 Sep 39 as No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop, CASF, (Details) by GO 256/39

[Deleted from CASF, Orbat: GO 256/39 effective 18 Sep 39 – Mark Tonner]

Disbanded 31 Dec 40 by GO 44/41. Note: “...personnel on strength will be absorbed by ...” No. 1 RCOC, Fortress Workshop

[Replaced by: No. 1 RCOC, Fortress Workshop, CASF, (Details) by GO 256/39 effective 18 Sep 39]

## ***Infantry Brigade Workshops***

### **1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 116A

Formed from No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC

1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 116A/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded 12 Sep 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 115, 19 Sep 45

Reactivated and redesignated No. 23 Composite Brigade Group Workshop, RCEME, by GO 138/46 effective 1 Mar 46

Embodied as a unit of the Post-War Permanent Force (Active Force) under GO 158/46 effective 27 Jun 46

### **2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 116B

Formed from No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC

2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 116B/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Sep 45

### **3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 116C

Formed from No. 2 Army Field Workshop

3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 116C/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Sep 45

## **4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 232A

Formed from No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC

4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 232A/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Oct 45

## **5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 232B

Formed from No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC

5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 232B/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Sep 45

## **6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 232C

Formed from No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC

6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 232C/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 21 Aug 45

## **7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 255B

7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 255B/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

## **8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 255C

8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 255C/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

## **9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 255D

9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43. CMHQ Adm O No. 2 (Appendix A) 10 Jan 43 shows formed in UK 11 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 255D/1, under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Redesignated, 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 15 Jul 45

## **4<sup>th</sup> (Armoured) Divisional Support Group Ordnance Company (10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 958

4<sup>th</sup> (Armoured) Divisional Support Group Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Converted & redesignated 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 Nov 43 under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91 dated 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 10<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 6 Dec 45

### **5<sup>th</sup> (Armoured) Divisional Support Group Ordnance Company (11<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 557

5<sup>th</sup> (Armoured) Divisional Support Group Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Converted & redesignated 11<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, serial 557/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36 dated 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 as 11<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45

### **13<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 856A

13<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 44/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated 13<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by GO 221/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 213/45 effective 30 Apr 45



## ***Armoured Brigade Workshops***

### **1<sup>st</sup> Tank Brigade Ordnance Company (1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 558

1<sup>st</sup> Tank Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Converted & redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 88/44 effective 26 Aug 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 25 Sep 45

### **2<sup>nd</sup> Tank Brigade Ordnance Company (2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 959

2<sup>nd</sup> Tank Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Converted & redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Tank Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 88/44 effective 22 Jul 43  
[CMHQ Adm O No. 108, 22 Jul 43]

Mobilized for operational duty 1 Nov 43, Serial 959/1 under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by  
CMHQ Mob O No. 92 dated 7 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16  
May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 388/45 effective 20 Aug 45

### **4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company (4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 957

4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Converted & redesignated 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 Nov 43 under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by  
CMHQ Mob O No. 91 dated 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16  
May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 16 Dec 45

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company (5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 556

2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Converted & redesignated 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 556/1, under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 7 Dec 45

## ***Fortress Workshops***

### **No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details)**

Mobilization Serial: 419d

No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) CASF, authorized by GO 242/39 effective 18 Sep 39

Serial 419d - Deleted from CASF Orbat and No. 1 RCOC, Fortress Workshop (Details), CASF, assigned Serial No. 406, taking the place of No. 5 Army Field Workshop (Details), RCOC, CASF, by GO 256/39 effective 18 Sep 39

Mobilization Serial: 406

(Note: Formerly Serial No. 419d - No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details), CASF, Redesignated Serial No. 406 under GO 256/39)

No. 1 RCOC, Fortress Workshop (Details), CASF, authorized by GO 256/39 effective 18 Sep 39,

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Disbanded, authorized by GO 44/41 effective 31 Dec 40

No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop authorized by GO 44/41 effective 1 Jan 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Jan 41

### **No. 2 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) MD5**

Mobilization Serial: 332

No. 2 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details), MD 5 CASF, authorized by GO 242/39 effective 18 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 2 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details), CASF, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Disbanded, authorized by GO 44/41 effective 31 Dec 40

Reactivated as No. 2 RCOC Fortress Workshop authorized by GO 44/41 effective 1 Jan 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Jan 41

### **No. 3 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) MD7**

Mobilization Serial: 377

No. 3 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) MD7, CASF, authorized by GO 242/39 effective 18 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 3 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Disbanded, authorized by GO 44/41 effective 31 Dec 40

Reactivated as No. 3 RCOC Fortress Workshop authorized by GO 44/41 effective 1 Jan 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Jan 41

#### **No. 4 RCOC, Fortress Workshop (Details) MD 6**

Mobilization Serial: 364A

No. 4 RCOC, Fortress Workshop (Details) MD6, CASF, authorized by GO 242/39 effective 18 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 4 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Disbanded, authorized by GO 44/41 effective 31 Dec 40

Reactivated as No. 4 RCOC Fortress Workshop authorized by GO 44/41 effective 1 Jan 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Jan 41

#### **No. 5 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) MD6**

Mobilization Serial: 364B

No. 5 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) MD6, CASF, authorized by GO 242/39 effective 18 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 5 RCOC Fortress Workshop (Details) by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Disbanded, authorized by GO 44/41 effective 31 Dec 40

Reactivated as No. 5 RCOC Fortress Workshop authorized by GO 44/41 effective 1 Jan 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Jan 41

## ***Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsections***

### **No. 1 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 612A

No. 1 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

### **No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 612B

No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

### **No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 612C

No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

### **No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 609A

No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 609B

No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 6 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 609C

No. 6 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 609D

No. 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 8 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 610A

No. 8 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 9 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 610B

No. 9 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 10 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 610C

No. 10 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 11 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 610D

No. 11 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 12 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 611A

No. 12 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 13 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 611B

No. 13 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 14 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 611C

No. 14 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41. (Reorganised and redesignated from No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

### **No. 15 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 611D

No. 15 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41.

(Reorganised and redesignated from No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

**No. 16 Ordnance Workshop Subsection (No. 16 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection)**

Mobilization Serial: 696A

No. 16 Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 189/41 effective 9 Jul 41

Reorganised & Redesignated No. 16 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43 [14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

**No. 17 Ordnance Workshop Subsection (No. 17 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection)**

Mobilization Serial: 696B

No. 17 Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 189/41 effective 9 Jul 41

Reorganised & Redesignated No. 17 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43 [14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

**No. 18 Ordnance Workshop Subsection (No. 18 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection)**

Mobilization Serial: 696C

No. 18 Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 189/41 effective 9 Jul 41

Reorganised & Redesignated No. 18 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43 [14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

**No. 19 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 697A

No. 19 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43 [14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

**No. 20 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 697B

No. 20 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43 [14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]



### **No. 21 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 697C

No. 21 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43 [14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 22 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 698A

No. 22 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

### **No. 23 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 614A

[Reorganised and redesignated 1 Jul 41 from No. 7 Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, CASF, Serial 614, by GO 275/41 – Hodgson]

No. 23 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41 – Hodgson]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 343/43 effective 15 Feb 43

### **No. 24 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 614B

[Reorganised and redesignated 1 Jul 41 from No. 7 Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, CASF, Serial 614, by GO 275/41 – Hodgson]

No. 24 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41 – Hodgson]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 343/43 effective 15 Feb 43

### **No. 25 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 614C

[Reorganised and redesignated 1 Jul 41 from No. 7 Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, CASF, Serial 614, by GO 275/41 – Hodgson]

No. 25 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41 – Hodgson]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 343/43 effective 15 Feb 43

### **No. 26 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 698B

No. 26 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

### **No. 27 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 698C

No. 27 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

### **No. 28 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 699A

No. 28 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [1 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 29 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 699B

No. 29 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [1 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 30 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 699C

No. 30 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [1 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 31 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 699D

No. 31 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [1 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 32 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 1499A

No. 32 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 33 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 1499B

No. 33 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 34 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 1499C

No. 34 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

### **No. 35 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection**

Mobilization Serial: 1499D

No. 35 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

## ***Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Workshop Sections***

### **No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section)**

Mobilization Serial: 609

No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 184/40 effective 24 May 40

Converted to No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, CASF, by GO 244/40 effective 15 Aug 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Reorganised & Redesignated into Serial's 609A, 609B, 609C and 609D - No.'s 4, 5, 6 and 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, respectively by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

[Section HQ "A" Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, disbanded 16 Jul 42 by CMHQ Adm O No. 178, 9 Jul 42]

### **No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 610

No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 243/40 effective 28 Sep 40

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Reorganised & Redesignated into Serial's 610A, 610B, 610C and 610D - No.'s 8, 9, 10 and 11 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, respectively by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 611

No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 12 Feb 41

Reorganised & Redesignated into Serial's 611A, 611B, 611C and 611D - No.'s 12, 13, 14 and 15 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, respectively by GO 275/41, effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 612

No. 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 15 Feb 41

Reorganised & Redesignated into Serial's 612A, 612B and 612C - No.'s 1, 2 and 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, respectively by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

### **No. 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 614

No. 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 147/41 effective 3 Jun 41

Reorganised & Redesignated into Serial's 614A, 614B and 614C - No.'s 23, 24 and 25 Light Anti-Aircraft Ordnance Workshop Subsection, RCOC, respectively by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

## ***Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Workshops (Light Anti-aircraft Workshops)***

### **1<sup>st</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 1<sup>st</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 612E

1<sup>st</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated (Type A), RCOC, by GO 341/43 effective 15 Jan 43

Reorganized 11 Jan 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, 10 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 612/1 under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46 dated 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 1 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Converted & redesignated 12<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME by GO 18/45 effective 13 Jul 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 354/45 effective 5 Jul 45

### **2<sup>nd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 2<sup>nd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 609E

2<sup>nd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCOC, by GO 342/43 effective 8 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 609/1 under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6 dated 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45

### **3<sup>rd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 3<sup>rd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 610E

3<sup>rd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Redesignated 3<sup>rd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCOC, by GO 342/43 effective 8 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 610/1 under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16 dated 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 3 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 17 Aug 45

**4<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 4<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 611E

4<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Redesignated 4<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCOC, by GO 342/43 effective 8 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 611/1 under supervision HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 26 dated 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 29 Oct 45

**5<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 5<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 696E

5<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Redesignated 5<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCOC, by GO 342/43 effective 2 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 696/1 under supervision HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36 dated 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 5 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 24 Nov 45

**6<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 6<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 698E

6<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated 6<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCOC, by GO 341/43 effective 15 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 698/1 under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 56 dated 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 6 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 24 Jun 45

## **7<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 614D

7<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 340/43 effective 16 Feb 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 614D/1 under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66 dated 20 Apr 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 357/44 effective 1 Mar 44

## **8<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 8<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 697E

8<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Redesignated 8<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCOC, by GO 342/43 effective 2 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 697E/1 under supervision HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91 dated 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 8<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 25 Oct 45

## **11<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, later 11<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 1173

11<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 242/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Redesignated 11<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCOC, by GO 342/43 effective 7 Mar 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1173/1 under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66 dated 20 Apr 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 357/44 effective 1 Mar 44



## ***Other Anti-aircraft Workshops and Sections***

### **No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, later No. 2 Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Mobile) Ordnance Workshop Section, later No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop**

(Note: Formerly Serial No. 652 - No. 27 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, Redesignated and Converted and Allotted New Serial No. 499 under GO 148/41)

Mobilization Serial: 499

No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 148/41 effective 3 Jun 41

Reorganised and redesignated, RCOC, by GO 275/41 effective 1 Jul 41

Redesignated & converted No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCOC, by GO 243/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Redesignated No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCOC, by GO 420/43 effective 15 Jul 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 499/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 23 Aug 45

### **No. 2 Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Mobile) Ordnance Workshop Section – see No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section**

### **No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B) – see No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section**

### **No. 1 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A)**

Mobilization Serial: 2669

No. 1 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, Type A, RCEME, authorized by GO 294/45 effective 15 Mar 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 29 Jun 45

### **No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 139

No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC, CASF, (less one section) authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC, (less one section) by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Disbanded, authorized by GO 276/41 effective 1 Sep 41 [1 Sep 39 – Hodgson]

## **Base Ordnance Workshops**

### **No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844

No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 13/42 effective 6 Nov 41

[Partially formed in UK by CMHQ Adm O No. 65, 3 Apr 42 – Hodgson]

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844, by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43, and the same order created:

Headquarters, No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844B

No. 1 Base Tank Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844C

No. 1 Base Vehicle Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844D

No. 1 Base Armament and General Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844E

No. 1 (Infantry Division) Increment No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844F

No. 2 (Armoured Division) Increment No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844G

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44 [CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44 – Hodgson]

Reorganized 27 May 44 by GO 463/44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45

*Note: this unit has a history recorded in Part 2*

### **Advanced Component, No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844A

Advanced Component, No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 95/43 effective 20 Jan 43

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCOC, by GO 327/43 effective 10 Mar 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 844A, under supervision HQ CMHQ Mob O No. 77, 20 Apr 43

Serial Number changed to 913 effective 4 Jan 44, under authority of Letter M.259 dated 4 Jan 44 [from 844/1 to 913/1 by CMHQ Adm O No. 183, 21 Dec 43 – Hodgson]

Redesignated No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45

*Note: this unit has a history recorded in Part 2*

## **Headquarters, No. 1 Base Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844B

Headquarters, No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43

Absorbed into Serial No. 844, No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45 – Hodgson]

## **No. 1 Base Tank Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844C

Converted and redesignated No. 1 Base Tank Workshop, RCOC, from No. Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43

Absorbed into Serial No. 844 - No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45 – Hodgson]

## **No. 1 Base Vehicle Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844D

Converted and redesignated No. 1 Base Vehicle Workshop, RCOC, from No. Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43

Absorbed into Serial No. 844 - No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45 – Hodgson]

## **No. 1 Base Armament and General Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844E

Converted and redesignated No. 1 Base Armament and General Workshop, RCOC, from No. Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43

Absorbed into Serial No. 844 - No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45 – Hodgson]

## **No. 1 (Infantry Division) Increment No. 1 Base Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844F

Converted and redesignated No. 1 (Infantry Division) Increment No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, from No. Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43 [Hodgson – probable typo – GO 78/44]

Absorbed into Serial No. 844 - No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45 – Hodgson]

## **No. 2 (Armoured Division) Increment No. 1 Base Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 844G

Converted and redesignated No. 2 (Armoured Division) Increment No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, from No. Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 79/44 effective 22 Aug 43 [Hodgson – probable typo – GO 78/44]

Absorbed into Serial No. 844 - No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 31 Aug 45 – Hodgson]

## **No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 913

No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCOC

(Note: Formerly Serial No. 844A - No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial Number changed under authority of Letter M.259 dated 4 Jan 44)

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 14 Aug 45

## **Rear Party of No. 1 Base Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: CM 516

Rear Party of No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, Serial CM 516 called out on Active Service 25 Aug 45. CMHQ Adm O No. 107 shows formed in UK 31 Aug 45

Disbanded 31 Jan 46, by CMHQ Adm O No. 4, 15 Jan 46

*Note: this unit has a history recorded in Part 2*

## **No. 2 Advanced Base Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 1707

No. 2 Advanced Base Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 380/43 effective 26 Jul 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 679/1, under supervision HQ, CRU by CMHQ Mob O No. 70, 15 Nov 43

Redesignated No. 2 Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 10 Oct 45

## **Other Workshops**

### **No. 1 General Troops Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 2527

No. 1 General Troops Workshop, RCEME, authorized by GO 462/44 effective 24 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 28 Nov 45

### **First Army Troops Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 1599

First Army Troops Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 242/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1599/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66, 20 Apr 43

Redesignated First Army Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 96/46 effective 8 Jan 46

### **No. 1 Army Ordnance Workshop (No. 1 Infantry Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 446

No. 1 Army Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 134/41 effective 30 May 41.

[CMHQ Adm O No. 93, 14 Jul 41, shows formed in UK 21 Jul 41 – Hodgson]

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 446/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 17 Apr 43

Mobilised under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by Amendment 2 to CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 25 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 1 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 115, 19 Sep 45

### **No. 2 Army Ordnance Workshop (No. 2 Infantry Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 849

No. 2 Army Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/42 effective 24 Dec 41

Converted & redesignated, No. 2 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 849/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 18 Apr 43

Mobilised under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by Amendment 2 to CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 25 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 2 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Oct 45

### **No. 3 Infantry Troops Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 1530

No. 3 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1530/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 26, 18 Apr 43

Mobilised under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by Amendment 2 to Mob O No. 6, 25 Apr 43

Redesignated, No. 3 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

To reorganize under instructions of HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division (CAOF) 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 238/46 effective 12 Jun 46

### **No. 1 Army Tank Ordnance Workshop (No. 1 Army Tank Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 584

No. 1 Army Tank Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 134/41 effective 6 Jun 41

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Army Tank Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 243/43 effective 6 Mar 43. Attached 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army Tank Brigade Ordnance Field Workshop, RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O No. 196, 29 Nov 41, also CMHQ Adm O No. 46, 13 Mar 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 584/1, under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 73, 19 Apr 43

Reorganized 1 Apr 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 84, 15 May 44

Redesignated No. 1 Army Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 30 Sep 45

### **No. 2 Army Tank Ordnance Workshop (No. 2 Tank Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 949

No. 2 Army Tank Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Converted & redesignated No. 2 Tank Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 217/43 effective 15 Apr 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 949/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 92, 7 Oct 43

Redesignated No. 2 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 21 Aug 45

**No. 4 Section Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop (No. 4 Armoured Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 911

No. 4 Section Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 103/42 effective 1 Mar 42

Converted & redesignated No. 4 Armoured Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 Nov 43, Serial 911/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 59, 8 Oct 43

Redesignated No. 4 Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Struck off strength Canadian Army (Overseas), 20 Jan 46, by CMHQ Adm O No. 8, 29 Jan 46

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 15 Feb 46

**No. 5 Section Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop (No. 5 Armoured Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 496

No. 5 Section Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 20/42 effective 20 Aug 41

Converted & redesignated No. 5 Armoured Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 496/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 Apr 43

Mobilised under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by Amendment 2 to CMHQ Mob O No. 6, 25 Apr 43

Redesignated No. 5 Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 20 Nov 45

**1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop (1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 497

1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 183/41 effective 10 Jul 41. [CMHQ Adm O No. 114 shows formed in UK 13 Aug 41 – Hodgson]

Redesignated 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 245/41 effective 3 Oct 41

Converted & redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 497/1, under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 12 Jul 45

## **10<sup>th</sup> Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop (2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 851

10<sup>th</sup> Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/42 effective 24 Dec 41

Converted & redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Workshop, RCOC, by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 851/1, under supervision HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 56, 19 Apr 43

Redesignated, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 8 Jul 45

## **No. 2 Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 947

No. 2 Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 131/42 effective 26 Jan 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 200/42 effective 31 Mar 42

## **3<sup>rd</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 956

3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

## **No. 1 Mobile Tire Repair Unit**

Mobilization Serial: 2615

No. 1 Mobile Tire Repair Unit, RCEME, authorized by GO 92/45 effective 17 Nov 44

Mobilized for operational duty 15 Dec 44, Serial 2615/1, under supervision HQ CRU by CMHQ Mob O No. 135, 20 Nov 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 27 Sep 45

*This unit has a short history that is recorded in Part 2.*



**No. 1 Radar Battery Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 2603

No. 1 Radar Battery Workshop, RCEME, authorized by GO 46/45 effective 22 Sep 44

Mobilised for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 2603/1, under supervision HQ CRU by CMHQ Mob O No. 133, 28 Oct 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 21 Jun 45

**1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 555

1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 199/42 effective 1 Apr 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

*Note: this unit has a short history recorded in Part 2.*

**No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company (3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 147

No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 135/39 effective 1 Sep 39.

Mobilized with 1<sup>st</sup> Division in Kingston, Ontario, with 10 light aid detachments designated by GO 245/40 [probably Nos. 30-39 LAD – ed]

Converted and redesignated effective 15 Aug 40 to No. 3 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial No. 255 by GO 244/40

Reorganized and redesignated 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 185/41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Note: “Personnel to provide 7, 8, & 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portions of HQ REME 3 Canadian Division” (taken from CMHQ Adm O No. 2 Appendix K, 10 Jan 43)

*Note: this unit has a short history recorded in Part 2.*

**No. 1 Armoured Division Workshop (5<sup>th</sup> Canadian (Armoured) Divisional Ordnance Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 575

No. 1 Armoured Division Workshop, RCOC, CASF, authorized by GO 295/40 effective 20 Oct 40 [23 Oct 40 – Hodgson]

CASF designation dropped and redesignated No. 1 Armoured Division Workshop, RCOC, by GO 273/40 effective 7 Nov 40

Designation changed to 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian (Armoured) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 135/41 effective 5 Jun 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 200/42 effective 31 Mar 42

*Note: this unit has a short history recorded in Part 2.*

## **6<sup>th</sup> Divisional Ordnance Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 856

6<sup>th</sup> Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 147/42 effective 18 Mar 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43

[Disbanded 1 Jan 43 by GO 98/43, amended to read effective 15 Mar 43 by GO 162/43 – Hodgson]

## **7<sup>th</sup> Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 1456

7<sup>th</sup> Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 309/42 effective 12 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 15/44 effective 1 Dec 43

## **1<sup>st</sup> Army Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop (No. 1 Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop)**

Mobilization Serial: 586

1<sup>st</sup> Army Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 71/41 effective 11 Feb 41

Redesignated No. 1 Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 274/41 effective 15 Sep 41

Disbanded, authorized by GO 200/42 effective 31 Mar 42

## **No. 1 Engineer Equipment Workshop (Type A)**

Mobilization Serial: 1832

No. 1 Engineer Equipment Workshop (Type A), RCOC, authorized by GO 87/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated, No. 1 Engineer Equipment Workshop (Type A), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 7 Aug 45

## **No. 2 Engineer Equipment Workshop (Type B)**

Mobilization Serial: 1833

No. 2 Engineer Equipment Workshop (Type B), RCOC, authorized by GO 87/44 effective 1 Dec 43

Redesignated, No. 2 Engineer Equipment Workshop (Type B), RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Nov 45

*Note: this unit has a history recorded in Part 2*

### **No. 1 Port Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 2336

No. 1 Port Workshop, RCOG, authorized by GO 297/44 effective 23 Mar 44

Redesignated No. 1 Port Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 16 Oct 45 [Amended to read 16 Aug 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 127, 14 Nov 45]

### **No. 2 Port Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: CM 605

No. 2 Port Workshop, RCEME, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 142, 26 Aug 44

Disbanded 7 May 45, authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 65, 22 May 45

### **No. 1 L of C Telecommunications Workshop (Type A)**

Mobilization Serial: 2687 [Hodgson – 2687/1]

No. 1 L of C Telecommunications Workshop (Type A), RCEME, authorized by GO 319/45 effective 16 May 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 8 Oct 45

### **No. 2 L of C Telecommunications Workshop (Type B)**

Mobilization Serial: 2688 [Hodgson – 2688/1]

No. 2 L of C Telecommunications Workshop Type “B”, RCEME, authorized by GO 319/45 effective 16 May 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 14 Aug 45

### **No. 1 Training Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 1488

No. 1 Training Brigade Workshop, RCEME, authorized by GO 419/44 effective 1 Oct 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 18/46 effective 15 Sep 45

## **Commander, RCEME, and Headquarters, RCEME**

### **Commander, First Army Troops, Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 1508

Called out on Active Service 10 Jan 43 [Hodgson says Jan – suspect this is a typo for Jun – ed] by GO 371/43

CMHQ Adm O No. 90 11 Jun 43 shows formed in UK 10 Jun 43

[Commander First Army Troops, Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 371/43 effective 10 Jun 43 – Mark Tonner]

Mobilized for operational duty 30 Nov 43, Serial 1508/1 under supervision of HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 69 dated 12 Nov 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 Headquarters, RCEME, First Army Troops, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 85/46 effective 19 Dec 45

### **Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1506

Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1506/1 under supervision of HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 46 dated 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 12 Jul 45

### **Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1507

Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 14 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1507/1 under supervision of HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps by CMHQ Mob O No. 56 dated 19 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 8 Jul 45

## **Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1501

Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1501/1 under supervision of HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 6 dated 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Sep 45

## **Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1502

Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1502/1 under supervision of HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 16 dated 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Oct 45

## **Headquarters, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1503

Headquarters, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 7 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1503/1 under supervision of HQ by CMHQ Mob O No. 26 dated 18 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 Headquarters, RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 23 Nov 45

## **Headquarters, 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1504

Headquarters, 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1504/1 under supervision of HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 91 dated 7 Oct 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, Headquarters, RCEME, 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 22 Dec 45

## **Headquarters, 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 1505

Headquarters, 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC, authorized by GO 151/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1506/1 under supervision of HQ 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36 dated 17 Apr 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, Headquarters, RCEME, 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 12 Dec 45

## ***Recovery Companies and Sections***

### **No. 1 Recovery Company, RCOG**

Mobilization Serial: 1597

No. 1 Recovery Company, RCOG, authorized by GO 242/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1597/1 under supervision of HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66 dated 20 Apr 43

Reorganized 16 Nov 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 166 dated 18 Nov 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 No. 1 Recovery Company, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 238/46 [Hodgson probable typo – 23/46] effective 18 Sep 45

### **Headquarters, No. 1 Recovery Company**

Mobilization Serial: 1597A

Headquarters, No. 1 Recovery Company, RCOG, called out on Active Service 16 Nov 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43

Allotted Serial No. 1597A under GO 207/44, 16 Nov 43

[No. 1 Recovery Company, RCOG, authorized by GO 207/44 effective 16 Nov 43 – Mark Tonner]

Redesignated 15 May 44, Headquarters, No. 1 Recovery Company, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 10 Jul 45

### **No. 1 Heavy Recovery Section**

[No. 1 Canadian Heavy Recovery Section, RCOG, CASF, Serial 1597A, called out on Active Service 15 May 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 79, 27 May 43 – Hodgson]

[Mobilization Serial changed to 1597B by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43 – Hodgson]

[Allotted Serial No. 1597B by GO 207/44, 16 Nov 43]

Redesignated No. 1 Heavy Recovery Section, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 18 Sep 45

### **No. 2 Heavy Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 1597C

[No. 2 Heavy Recovery Section, RCOG, called out on Active Service 16 Nov 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43 – Hodgson]

[Allotted Serial No. 1597C under GO 207/44 effective 16 Nov 43– Mark Tonner]

Redesignated No. 2 Heavy Recovery Section, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 9 Jul 45

### **No. 3 Light Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 1597D

[No. 3 Light Recovery Section, RCOC, called out on Active Service 16 Nov 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43 – Hodgson]

[Allotted Serial No. 1597D effective 16 Nov 43 by GO 207/44, 26 Apr 44 – Mark Tonner]

Redesignated No. 3 Light Recovery Section, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 23 Aug 45

### **No. 2 Recovery Company, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 1598

No. 2 Recovery Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 242/43 effective 6 Mar 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, Serial 1598/1 under supervision of HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 66 dated 20 Apr 43

Reorganized 16 Nov 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 166 dated 18 Nov 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 No. 2 Recovery Company, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 27 Nov 45

### **Headquarters, No. 2 Recovery Company**

Mobilization Serial: 1598A

Headquarters, No. 2 Recovery Company, RCOC, called out on Active Service 16 Nov 43 by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43

Allotted Serial No. 1598A under GO 207/44, 16 Nov 43

[No. 2 Recovery Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 207/44 effective 16 Nov 43 – Mark Tonner]

Redesignated 15 May 44, Headquarters, No. 2 Recovery Company, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 9 Jul 45

### **No. 4 Heavy Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 1598B

[No. 4 Heavy Recovery Section, RCOC, by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43 – Hodgson]

[Allotted Serial No. 1598B effective 16 Nov 43 by GO 207/44, 26 Apr 44 – Mark Tonner]

Redesignated No. 4 Heavy Recovery Section, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 71/46 effective 27 Nov 45



### **No. 5 Heavy Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 1598C

[No. 5 Heavy Recovery Section, RCOG,

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 9 Jul 45

### **No. 6 Light Recovery Section, RCOG**

Mobilization Serial: 1598D

[No. 6 Light Recovery Section, RCOG, by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43 – Hodgson]

[Allotted Serial No. 1598D effective 16 Nov 43 by GO 207/44, 26 Apr 44 – Mark Tonner]

Redesignated No. 6 Light Recovery Section, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 12 Sep 45

### **No. 7 Light Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 1598E

[No. 7 Light Recovery Section, RCOG, by CMHQ Adm O No. 166, 18 Nov 43 – Hodgson]

[Allotted Serial No. 1598E effective 16 Nov 43 by GO 207/44, 26 Apr 44 – Mark Tonner]

Redesignated No. 7 Light Recovery Section, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 52/46 effective 29 Oct 45

### **No. 3 Recovery Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 2526

[No. 3 Recovery Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 462/44 effective 24 May 44 – Mark Trevor].

No. 3 Line of Communication Recovery Company, RCEME, called out on Active Service effective 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96 29 May 44. The same order shows formed in the UK.

Redesignated 24 May 44 No. 3 Recovery Company, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 102 3 Jun 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 10 Jan 46

### **Headquarters, No. 3 Recovery Company**

Mobilization Serial: 2526A

Headquarters, No. 3 Recovery Company, RCEME, CASF, called out on Active Service 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96. Shows formed in UK 29 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 10 Jan 46

### **No. 8 Heavy Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 2526B

No. 8 Heavy Recovery Section, RCEME, CASF, called out on Active Service 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96. Shows formed in UK 29 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 10 Jan 46

### **No. 9 Heavy Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 2526C

No. 9 Heavy Recovery Section, RCEME, CASF, called out on Active Service 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96. Shows formed in UK 29 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 10 Jan 46

### **No. 10 Light Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 2526D

No. 10 Light Recovery Section, RCEME, CASF, called out on Active Service 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96. Shows formed in UK 29 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 10 Jan 46

### **No. 11 Light Recovery Section**

Mobilization Serial: 2526E

No. 11 Light Recovery Section, RCEME, CASF, called out on Active Service 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96. Shows formed in UK 29 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 10 Jan 46

## ***Other Units***

### **Corps Headquarters, Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers**

Mobilization Serial: 3900

Corps Headquarters, Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers authorized by GO 175/46 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 176/46 effective 3 Apr 46

### **Mechanical Transport Inspectorate, Canadian Military Headquarters, United Kingdom**

Mechanical Transport Inspectorate, Canadian Military Headquarters, United Kingdom, authorized by GO 257/41 effective 1 Oct 41

Allotted Serial No. 517 - Mechanical Transport Inspectorate, R.C.A.S.C., Canadian Military Headquarters by GO 71/42 effective 5 Nov 41

Mobilization Serial: 517

Mechanical Transport Inspectorate, R.C.A.S.C., Canadian Military Headquarters, authorized by GO 71/42 effective 5 Nov 41,

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Mechanical Transport Inspectorate, RCEME, by GO 463/44 effective 27 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 139/46 effective 28 Feb 46

### **No. 1 Proving Ground Detachment**

Mobilization Serial: 877

No. 1 Proving Ground Detachment, RCOC, authorized by GO 231/41 effective 23 Jul 41

Redesignated No. 1 Proving Ground Detachment, RCEME by GO 303/44 effective 15 May 44

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Vehicle Proving Establishment (NDHQ) by GO 508/44 effective 1 Aug 44

### **No. 1 Sub Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 1776

[Serial No. 177 – probable typo – authorized by CMHQ Adm O No. 140, 6 Oct 43 – Hodgson]

No. 1 Sub Workshop, RCOC, authorized by GO 485/43 effective 20 Sep 43

Redesignated No. 1 Sub Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 238/46 effective 30 Jun 46

### **6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 1934

6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 241/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 425/45 effective 1 Nov 45

### **No. 1 “B” Vehicle Inspectorate (Overseas) (No. 1 Section Unit Maintenance Inspectorate)**

Mobilization Serial: 2390

No. 1 “B” Vehicle Inspectorate (Overseas), RCEME, authorized by GO 493/44 effective 10 May 44

Mobilized for operational duty 10 Jun 44 under supervision HQ First Canadian Army by CMHQ Mob O No. 116 dated 18 May 44

Converted & redesignated No. 1 Section Unit Maintenance Inspectorate, RCEME, by GO 494/44 effective 27 Jun 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 15 May 45

### **No. 2 Canadian Reinforcement Group Workshop Platoon**

Mobilization Serial: [CM806 Serial 5 – Hodgson]

No. 2 Canadian Reinforcement Group Workshop Platoon, RCOC, CASF, called out on Active Service, 22 Aug 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 159 13 Oct 44

Disbanded 20 Mar 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 48 20 Apr 45

### **Canadian Section Armoured Fighting Vehicle Inspectorate, 21 Army Group**

Mobilization Serial: 2502

Canadian Section Armoured Fighting Vehicle Inspectorate, 21 Army Group, RCEME, authorized by GO 462/44 effective 21 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 321/45 effective 15 May 45

### **Headquarters 12 Railhead Evacuation Section**

Mobilization Serial: 2526F

Headquarters 12 Railhead Evacuation Section, RCEME, CASF, called out on Active Service 24 May 44 by CMHQ Adm O No. 96. Shows formed in UK 29 May 44

Disbanded 10 Jan 45 by GO 111/46

### **Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Band**

Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Band

Embodied as a unit of the Permanent Force (Active Force): CAO 110-2, Issue No. 29/47 -

Effective 1 Oct 46, Placed on Active Service under the authority of GO 279/46 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 1 Servicing Unit**

Mobilization Serial: 2376

No. 1 Servicing Unit, RCEME, authorized by GO 446/44 effective 27 Apr 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 111/46 effective 17 Jan 46

## ***Schools of Military Instruction***

Schools of Military Instruction, RCOC, Station Ottawa, Ontario. Mechanical Wing at Kingston, Ontario.  
Commandant – Senior Ordnance Officer, HQ Depot

### **The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers School**

The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers School

(Note: Formerly Serial No. 1221 - A 21 Canadian Ordnance and Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Training Centre)

Authorized by CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

### **Training Centre, MD 3**

“A” Canadian Ordnance Corps Training Centre, formation authorized by GO 9/40, 1 Dec 39

Mobilization Serial: 1221

Called out on Active Service as A21 Canadian Ordnance Corps Training Centre, by GO 250/41 effective 15 Feb 41

Redesignated A21 Canadian Ordnance and Electrical Mechanical Engineers Training Centre by GO 366/44 effective 15 May 44

Reorganised as two units of the Permanent Force (Active Force) by CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47, dated 28 Jul 47 effective 1 Oct 46 into:

The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps School, and  
The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers School

### **S 13 Canadian Motorcycle Maintenance School**

Mobilization Serial: 1283

S 13 Canadian Motorcycle Maintenance School authorized by GO 45/43 effective 2 Sep 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 85/46 effective 5 May 45

### **No. 1 Small Arms Inspectorate**

Mobilization Serial: 1385

No. 1 Small Arms Inspectorate, RCOC, authorized by GO 126/43 effective 20 Dec 42

Redesignated No. 1 Small Arms Inspectorate, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85 dated 16 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 401/45 effective 1 Aug 45

## ***Coast Defence and Anti-aircraft Workshop Sections***

### **No. 1 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3338

No. 1 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 2 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3339

No. 2 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 3 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3340

No. 3 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 22/44 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 4 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3341

No. 4 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [Hodgson – 1 Jan 43]

### **No. 5 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3342

No. 5 Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

[Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 – Mark Tonner]

[Disbanded 1 Jan 43 by GO 384/42 – amended to read 15 Mar 43 by GO 162/43 – Hodgson]

## ***Field Artillery Workshop Sections***

### **No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3343

No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

[Reorganised 17 Jun 42 from No. 1 Detachment, RCOC, (PAM) to No. 1 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 – separate Hodgson entry]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 22/44 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 2 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3344

No. 2 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 3 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3345

No. 3 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Aug 43

### **No. 4 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3346

No. 4 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Aug 43

### **No. 5 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3347

No. 5 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 367/43 effective 15 Jul 43

### **No. 6 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3348

No. 6 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 375/43 effective 1 Jul 43



## **No. 7 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3349

No. 7 Field Artillery Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 389/43 effective 1 Jul 43

(Note: “A” Subsection - Disbanded under GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43)

## ***Mechanical Transport Workshop Sections***

### **No. 1 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3350

Reorganised 17 Jun 42 from No. 1 Detachment, RCOC, (PAM) to No. 1 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, by RCOC Corps Instruction No. 71 [Authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42 – Mark Tonner]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 375/43 effective 1 Jul 43

### **No. 2 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3351

No. 2 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 3 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3352

No. 3 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 4 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3353

No. 4 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 5 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3354

No. 5 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 6 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3355

No. 6 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 7 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3356

No. 7 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 8 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3357

No. 8 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Aug 43

**No. 9 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3358

No. 9 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Aug 43

**No. 10 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3359

No. 10 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 438/43 effective 1 Aug 43

**No. 11 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3360

No. 11 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 343/43 effective 15 Jun 43

**No. 12 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3361

No. 12 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 13 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3362

No. 13 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 14 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3363

No. 14 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 15 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3364

No. 15 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 16 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3365

No. 16 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 17 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3366

No. 17 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 460/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 18 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3367

No. 18 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 460/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 19 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3368

No. 19 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 367/43 effective 15 Jul 43

**No. 20 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3369

No. 20 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 498/43 effective 1 Sep 43

**No. 21 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3370

No. 21 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 498/43 effective 1 Sep 43

## **No. 22 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3371

No. 22 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43

[Disbanded, 1 Jan 43 by GO 98/43, amended to read 15 Mar 43 by GO 162/43 – Hodgson]

## **No. 23 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3372

No. 23 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43

[Disbanded, 1 Jan 43 by GO 98/43, amended to read 15 Mar 43 by GO 162/43 – Hodgson]

## **No. 24 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3373

No. 24 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43

[Disbanded, 1 Jan 43 by GO 98/43, amended to read 15 Mar 43 by GO 162/43 – Hodgson]

## **No. 25 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3374

No. 25 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Headquarters, “A” and “B” Subsections disbanded under GO 98/43 effective 15 Mar 43 [1 Jan 43 – Hodgson]

Disbanded, authorized by GO 460/43 effective 1 Sep 43

## **No. 26 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3388

No. 26 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 64/43 effective 15 Dec 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

## **No. 27 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial 3395

No. 27 Mechanical Transport Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 95/43 effective 1 Jan 43

Disbanded, authorized by GO 343/43 effective 15 Jun 43 [Hodgson probable typo – 15 Jan 43]

## ***Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Sections***

### **No. 1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 3375

No. 1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 2 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 3376

No. 2 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 3 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 3377

No. 3 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 4 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 3378

No. 4 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 453/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 5 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 3379

No. 5 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 430/43 effective 1 Sep 43

### **No. 6 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section**

Mobilization Serial: 3380

No. 6 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Workshop Section, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 375/43 effective 1 Jul 43

## **Companies**

### **Ottawa Workshop Company, RCOC**

Mobilization Serial: 3384

Ottawa Workshop Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 384/42 effective 1 May 42

Disbanded, authorized by GO 481/43 effective 1 Nov 43

### **Ottawa Workshop Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3901

Ottawa Workshop Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **“W” Force Ordnance Company**

Mobilization Serial: 516

“W” Force Ordnance Company, RCOC, authorized by GO 75/42 effective 1 Dec 41

Redesignated “W” Force Ordnance Depot, RCOC, by GO 209/44 effective 1 Apr 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 205/46 effective 26 Jun 46

### **“W” Force Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3914

“W” Force Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 302/44 effective 15 May 44

Disbanded, authorized by GO 198/46 effective 14 May 46

### **No. 1 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3902

No. 1 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 2 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3903

No. 2 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Reorganised & redesignated as a unit of the Permanent Force (Active Force): CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

Reorganised & redesignated No. 2 Company, RCEME - CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46  
(Note: amalgamated with Serial No. 3913 - No. 15 Company, RCEME and redesignated - No. 2 Company, RCEME under CAO 76-2, Issue 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46)

### **No. 3 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3904

No. 3 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Reorganised & redesignated as a unit of the Permanent Force (Active Force): CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

Reorganised & redesignated No. 3 Company, RCEME - CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46  
(Note: amalgamated with Serial No. 3912 - No. 14 Company, RCEME and redesignated - No. 3 Company, RCEME under CAO 76-2, Issue 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46)

### **No. 4 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3905

No. 4 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 5 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3906

No. 5 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 6 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3907

No. 6 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 7 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3908

No. 7 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 10 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3909

No. 10 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46



### **Pacific Command Company, RCEME (No. 11 Company, RCEME)**

Mobilization Serial: 3915

Pacific Command Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 297/44 effective 15 May 44

Redesignated and allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force): CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

Redesignated: No. 11 Company, RCEME - CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 12 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3910

No. 12 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 13 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3911

No. 13 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

### **No. 14 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3912

No. 14 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3413, formed 1 Aug 43 by GO 435/43 located at Petawawa Military Camp

No. 14 Company, RCEME, authorized by GO 263/44 effective 15 May 44 from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 14 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

Reorganised & redesignated as a unit of the Permanent Force (Active Force) by CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

Reorganised & redesignated No. 3 Company, RCEME, by CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46 (Note: amalgamated with Serial No. 3904 - No. 3 Company, RCEME, and redesignated No. 3 Company, RCEME, under CAO 76-2, Issue 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46)

### **No. 15 Company, RCEME**

Mobilization Serial: 3913

No. 15 Ordnance Depot, RCOC, Serial 3414, formed 1 Sep 43 by GO 428/43 located at Camp Borden, Ontario

Reorganised effective 15 May 44 No. 15 Company, RCEME, Serial 3913 authorized by GO 263/44 from the Technical Workshop Company of No. 15 Ordnance Depot, RCOC

Reorganised & redesignated as a unit of the Permanent Force (Active Force): CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

Reorganised & redesignated No. 2 Company, RCEME - CAO 76-2, Issue No. 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46

(Note: amalgamated with Serial No. 3903, No. 2 Company, RCEME, and redesignated No. 2 Company, RCEME under CAO 76-2, Issue 30/47 effective 1 Oct 46)

### **No. 16 Company, RCEME, (Northwest Highway System)**

Mobilization Serial: 1685

No. 16 Company, RCEME, (Northwest Highway System) authorized by GO 69/46 effective 15 Dec 45

Allocated to the Permanent Force (Active Force) under the authority of SD 1-3310 effective 1 Oct 46

## **Canadian Army Occupation Force**

### **Headquarters RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, C.A.O.F.**

Mobilization Serial: 4041

Headquarters RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, C.A.O.F., authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 29 May 46

### **2/7 Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 4042 [Hodgson – 4042/1]

2/7 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 162/46 effective 4 Apr 46

### **2/8 Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 4043 [Hodgson – 4043/1]

2/8 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Reorganized 27 Nov 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 132, 1 Dec 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 13 Apr 46

### **2/9 Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Mobilization Serial: 4044 [Hodgson – 4044/1]

2/9 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, authorized by GO 319/45 effective 1 Jun 45

Disbanded, authorized by GO 201/46 effective 29 Apr 46

## Notes to Part 1

### ***Formation of the Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (GO 127/44 dated 11<sup>th</sup> March 1944)***

#### **G.O. 127/44 - Corps of “Canadian Electrical And Mechanical Engineers” - Organization**

1. His Excellency, the Governor-General-in-Council hereby authorizes the organization of a Corps of “Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers”.
2. The Corps of “Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers” shall be composed of:
  - (a) Such units and formations named or hereafter named as Corps of the Active Militia pursuant to Section 20 of the Militia Act, as may be formed as a part thereof or as may be allocated thereto from time to time by the Minister of National Defence.
  - (b) A Corps Reserve of Officers.

Any unit or formation formed as a part of, or allocated to, the Corps of “Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers” may be withdrawn or transferred therefrom at any time by the Minister of National Defence.

3. A General List shall be maintained for the Corps of “Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers” on which shall be placed all officers and other ranks of units and formations allocated to or formed as part of the said Corps, and the personnel so placed on such General List may be posted and re-posted to such units and formations and, in the case of officers, to the Corps Reserve of Officers as the exigencies of the Service may require.
4. Officers and other ranks of the Corps of “Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers” shall be combatant in the fullest possible sense, except that for the purpose of restricting the exercise of command, officers will be limited to military command over such officers and men as may be especially placed under their command or attached to the Corps for duty in accordance with the provisions of King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1939, paragraph 220, as from time to time amended, and which for the present will continue to apply.

Effective 1<sup>st</sup> February, 1944

H.Q.S. 20-1-X, F.D. 1

P.C. 70/1185 of 24 Feb 44

### ***Granting of the Prefix “Royal” (GO 196/44 dated 20<sup>th</sup> April 1944)***

#### **G.O. 196/44 - Title “Royal” - Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers**

1. His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve of the grant of the title “Royal” to the Corps of Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.
2. Consequent upon the above approval the Corps will in future bear the designation hereunder:

Full Title	Abbreviation
Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	RCEME

H.Q.S. 20-4-9

## ***Formation of Section Headquarters***

1. Approval was granted to form Section Headquarters for Ordnance Workshop Subsections by Defensor Cable GS 0623 dated 24 Sep 41.
  2. These Section Headquarters were temporarily established for the supervision of subsections and were disbanded on the admission of the Light Anti-aircraft Regiments concerned to the Corps Order of Battle.
  3. Mobilization of these Section Headquarters took place in Colchester under the supervision of HQ, Canadian Anti-aircraft and Anti-tank Group on 29 Sep 41.
  4. The following Section Headquarters were formed:
    - “A” Section HQ for supervision of the subsection in Colchester
    - “B” Section HQ for supervision of the subsection employed with Canadian Light Anti-aircraft Batteries deployed in the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) under operational control of 5 AA Division
    - “C” Section HQ for supervision of the subsection employed with Canadian Light Anti-aircraft Batteries deployed in the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) under operational control of 6 AA Division
- “A”, “B”, and “C” Designation – CMHQ Adm O No. 160, 15 Oct 41  
“B” and “C” were disbanded: “B” on 15 May 42 by CMHQ Adm O No. 168, 24 Jun 42, and “C” on 30 Jun 42 by CMHQ Adm O No. 168, 24 Jun 42

## **Association of LAD with Formations**

General Order 91 published 17 Mar 42 amended GO 14/42 as follows:

1. (a) The conversion of the under mentioned Light aid Detachment, RCOC, as indicated, is hereby authorized with effect from the date on which the Canadian War Establishments for such units were respectively approved, namely:

Unit	Effective Date
A Light Aid Detachment, Type A, RCOC	4 Mar 41
A Light Aid Detachment, Type B, RCOC	25 Feb 41
A Light Aid Detachment, Type C, RCOC	13 Feb 41

(b) The redesignation accordingly of the under mentioned units is hereby authorized, effective 15 Oct 41

2. Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain, Administrative Order No. 105, published 7 May 42, repeats the essential portions of GO 91/42 and goes on to say:

“3. All provisions heretofore made in General Orders, whereby Light aid Detachments, RCOC, were in any way affiliated with or attached to formations or units have been cancelled.”

“4. The unit with which each LAD is employed is shown on the schedule after the official designation, in brackets, and will be included in reference in all correspondence.”

3. The name of the unit employing this LAD appearing in the schedule is recorded at the end of the entry referring to this footnote. It is to be noted that there are no employing units recorded in the schedule for the following LADs:

Serial	LAD Number
640	40
641	41
642	42
643	43
644	44
645	45
646	46
647	47
648	48
649	49
693	75

## **Additional Information and Data**

**provided by**

**Mark W. Tonner, CD, (Ret'd The RCR)**

## An Introduction to Unit Serial Numbers

The Unit Serial Number(s) came into use with the mobilization of the Canadian Active Service Force under General Order Number 135 of 1939, effective 1 September 1939. From 1 Sept 39 through to 21 Jun 46, all units/formations that were Called Out and Placed on Active Service as either components of either the C.A.S.F. (1 Sep 39 to 7 Nov 40) and the Canadian Army (Active) (7 Nov 40 onwards) were allotted a Unit Serial Number. These numbers were used as a means to identify the units/formations (and their sub-units). The numbers themselves were in thousand blocks, which ran: 1-1999; 2000-2999; 3000-3999; 4000-4999; 5000-5999; 8000-8999. The blocks 6000-6999 and 7000-7999 were not used. As the war went on and the Army grew in size and reorganizations took place some of the Unit Serial Numbers of units/formations were changed.

To identify a unit's/formation's sub-units, the Unit Serial Number was followed by an alpha designation:

Examples:

For the 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Regiment:

Serial No.	Unit
10	2 <sup>nd</sup> Field Regiment, R.C.A.
10A	Headquarters, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Field Regiment, R.C.A.
10B	8 <sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A.
10C	10 <sup>th</sup> (St. Catharines) Field Battery, R.C.A.
10D	7 <sup>th</sup> (Montreal) Field Battery, R.C.A.

For the 1<sup>st</sup> Anti-Tank Regiment:

Serial No.	Unit
20	1 <sup>st</sup> Anti-Tank Regiment, R.C.A.
20A	Headquarters, 1 <sup>st</sup> Anti-Tank Regiment, R.C.A.
20B	51 <sup>st</sup> Anti-Tank Battery, R.C.A.
20C	57 <sup>th</sup> Anti-Tank Battery, R.C.A.
20D	27 <sup>th</sup> Anti-Tank Battery, R.C.A.
20E	90 <sup>th</sup> Anti-Tank Battery, R.C.A.

For a Machine Gun Battalion after they were converted and redesignated Support Battalions:

Serial No.	Unit
34	2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division Support Battalion (The Toronto Scottish Regiment)
34A	Headquarters, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division Support Battalion (The Toronto Scottish Regiment)
34B	4 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Support Group (The Toronto Scottish Regiment)
34C	5 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Support Group (The Toronto Scottish Regiment)
34D	6 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Support Group (The Toronto Scottish Regiment)



For the 25<sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment:

Serial No.	Unit
944	25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944A	Headquarters, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944B	“A” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944C	“B” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944D	“C” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944E	“D” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944F	“E” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944G	“F” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.
944H	“G” Squadron, 25 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), C.A.C.

Starting with the expansion of the Field Army and training establishments in the United Kingdom in 1942, a more or less deal was worked out between NDHQ and the GOC-in-C First Canadian Army and the Senior Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters (London), where by either the GOC-in-C First Cdn Army or the Senior Officer CMHQ (under the authorization of GSD602 of 23 Mar 42) could authorize the establishment of temporary or interim units, pending formal approval from NDHQ. The GOC-in-C First Cdn Army was given additional powers in this regard under the authority of CGS139 (6 March 1943) and CGS149 (13 March 1943), but GSD602 was the one most commonly used for the authority for these temporary or interim units.

These units, whether raised under the authority of the GOC-in-C First Cdn Army or the Senior Officer CMHQ were allotted an alpha prefix of CM followed by a 3 or 4 digit number.

Some examples:

Serial No.	Unit
CM-113	3 <sup>rd</sup> Army Tank Brigade Signals, R.C.C.S.
CM-811	No. 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, C.A.C.
CM-812	LAD-No.1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, RCEME
CM-1017	6 <sup>th</sup> Line Maintenance Section, R.C. Sigs

With the beginning of the standing up of the first units/formations of The Canadian Army (Active Force) (Post-War Permanent Force) on 27 June 1946, the use of Unit Serials Numbers was dropped.

## ***Post-Unification***

Since the time of unification of the Forces, all Regular and Reserve units have what is called a Unit Identity Code (UIC), which is a four digit number. Alpha prefix designations are used to identify distribution accounts within the unit itself.

Example:

For a Reserve unit:

    Their UIC is: 5xxx

    AA5xxx (denotes their main QM/Tech Stores account)

    AB5xxx (denotes their Sigs Stores account)

    AC5xxx (denotes their Tpt Stores account)

## **RCOC(E) and RCEME Units Overseas**

### ***First Canadian Army***

Army Troops HQ: Commander First Army Troops, Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

- No. 43 Light Aid Detachment - F Sqn, 25 Armd Del Regt
- No. 88 Light Aid Detachment - E Sqn, 25 Armd Del Regt
- No. 132 Light Aid Detachment - B Sqn, 25 Armd Del Regt
- No. 123 Light Aid Detachment - 1 CACR
- No. 11 Light Aid Detachment - 11 Army Fd Regt, RCA
- No. 12 Light Aid Detachment - 19 Army Fd Regt, RCA
- No. 10 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Med Regt, RCA
- No. 89 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Med Regt, RCA
- No. 90 Light Aid Detachment - 3 Med Regt, RCA
- No. 91 Light Aid Detachment - 4 Med Regt, RCA
- No. 66 Light Aid Detachment - 5 Med Regt, RCA
- No. 28 Light Aid Detachment - 7 Med Regt, RCA
- No. 131 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Rocket Bty, RCA
- No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 2 HAA Regt, RCA
- No. 93 Light Aid Detachment - 10 Fd Pk Coy, RCE
- No. 25 Light Aid Detachment - 11 Fd Pk Coy, RCE
- No. 126 Light Aid Detachment - First Army Sigs, RC Sigs
- No. 1 Radar Battery Workshop - 1 Radar Bty, RCA
- First Army Troops Workshop
- No. 3 Recovery Company

### ***1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps***

Corps Troops HQ: Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

- No. 74 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Armd Car Regt (RCD)
- No. 67 Light Aid Detachment - 7 A/Tk Regt, RCA
- No. 26 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Survey Regt, RCA
- 1<sup>st</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 1 LAA Regt, RCA
- No. 51 Light Aid Detachment - 9 Fd Pk Coy, RCE
- No. 50 Light Aid Detachment - 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Sigs, RC Sigs
- 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Workshop
- No. 1 Recovery Company

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps**

Corps Troops HQ: Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

No. 40 Light Aid Detachment - 18 Armd Car Regt (12 Man D)

No. 82 Light Aid Detachment - 6 A/Tk Regt, RCA

No. 52 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Survey Regt, RCA

6<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 6 LAA Regt, RCA

No. 95 Light Aid Detachment - 8 Fd Pk Coy, RCE

No. 94 Light Aid Detachment - 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Sigs, RC Sigs

2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Workshop

No. 2 Recovery Company

## **1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division**

Div HQ - Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

No. 68 Light Aid Detachment - 4 Recce Regt (4 PLDG)

No. 7 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Fd Regt, RCHA

No. 8 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 9 Light Aid Detachment - 3 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 13 Light Aid Detachment - 1 A/Tk Regt, RCA

2<sup>nd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 2 LAA Regt, RCA

No. 15 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Fd Pk Coy, RCE

No. 14 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Inf Div Sigs, RC Sig

No. 5 Light Aid Detachment - Sask LI (MG)

No. 86 Light Aid Detachment - Sask LI (MG)

No. 1 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Inf Bde HQ

No. 2 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Inf Bde HQ

No. 3 Light Aid Detachment - 3 Inf Bde HQ

1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division**

Div HQ - Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

No. 20 Light Aid Detachment - 8 Recce Regt (14CH)

No. 19 Light Aid Detachment - 4 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 22 Light Aid Detachment - 5 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 24 Light Aid Detachment - 6 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 69 Light Aid Detachment - 2 A/Tk Regt, RCA

3<sup>rd</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 3 LAA Regt, RCA

No. 23 Light Aid Detachment - 1 Fd Pk Coy, RCE

No. 21 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Inf Div Sigs, RC Sigs

No. 4 Light Aid Detachment - Tor Scots (MG)

No. 87 Light Aid Detachment - Tor Scots (MG)

No. 16 Light Aid Detachment - 4 Inf Bde HQ

No. 17 Light Aid Detachment - 5 Inf Bde HQ

No. 18 Light Aid Detachment - 6 Inf Bde HQ

4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

## **3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division**

Div HQ - Headquarters, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

No. 62 Light Aid Detachment - 7 Recce Regt (17 DYRCH)

No. 32 Light Aid Detachment - 12 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 33 Light Aid Detachment - 13 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 34 Light Aid Detachment - 14 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 35 Light Aid Detachment - 3 A/Tk Regt, RCA

4<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 4 LAA Regt, RCA

No. 30 Light Aid Detachment - 3 Fd Pk Coy, RCE

No. 31 Light Aid Detachment - 3 Inf Div Sigs, RC Sigs

No. 52 Light Aid Detachment - CH of O (MG)

No. 6 Light Aid Detachment - CH of O (MG)

No. 36 Light Aid Detachment - 7 Inf Bde HQ

No. 37 Light Aid Detachment - 8 Inf Bde HQ

No. 38 Light Aid Detachment - 9 Inf Bde HQ

7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

### **4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division**

Div HQ - Headquarters, 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

No. 42 Light Aid Detachment - 29 Recce Regt (SAR)

No. 44 Light Aid Detachment - 15 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 104 Light Aid Detachment - 23 Fd Regt (SP), RCA

No. 45 Light Aid Detachment - 5 A/Tk Regt, RCA

8<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 8 LAA Regt, RCA

No. 46 Light Aid Detachment - 6 Fd Pk Sqn, RCE

No. 49 Light Aid Detachment - 4 Armd Div Sigs; RC Sigs

No. 47 Light Aid Detachment - Lake Supr Regt (Motor)

No. 48 Light Aid Detachment - 10 Inf Bde HQ

No. 75 Light Aid Detachment - 21 Armd Regt (GGFG)

No. 84 Light Aid Detachment - 22 Armd Regt (CGG)

No. 41 Light Aid Detachment - 28 Armd Regt (BCR)

10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop

### **5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division**

Div HQ - Headquarters, 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, RCOC

No. 56 Light Aid Detachment - 3 Armd Recce Regt (GGHG)

No. 58 Light Aid Detachment - 17 Fd Regt, RCA

No. 81 Light Aid Detachment - 8 Fd Regt (SP), RCA

No. 76 Light Aid Detachment - 4 A/Tk Regt, RCA

5<sup>th</sup> Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop - 5 LAA Regt, RCA

No. 77 Light Aid Detachment - 4 Fd Pk Sqn, RCE

No. 57 Light Aid Detachment - 5 Armd Div Sigs, RC Sigs

No. 72 Light Aid Detachment - Westminster Regt (Motor)

No. 73 Light Aid Detachment - 11 Inf Bde HQ

No. 68 Light Aid Detachment - 12 Inf Bde HQ

No. 53 Light Aid Detachment - 2 Armd Regt (LdSH)

No. 70 Light Aid Detachment - 5 Armd Regt (8CH)

No. 71 Light Aid Detachment - 9 Armd Regt (BCD)

11<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

12<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop

### ***1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade***

No. 59 Light Aid Detachment - 11 Armd Regt (Ont R)

No. 60 Light Aid Detachment - 12 Armd Regt (TRR)

No. 61 Light Aid Detachment - 14 Armd Regt (Calg R)

1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop

### ***2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade***

No. 54 Light Aid Detachment - 6 Armd Regt (1H)

No. 55 Light Aid Detachment - 10 Armd Regt (FGH)

No. 85 Light Aid Detachment - 27 Armd Regt (Sher Fus)

2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop

### ***21 Army Group and Line of Communication***

No. 29 Light Aid Detachment - 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn, RCE

No. 92 Light Aid Detachment - 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn, RCE

No. 125 Light Aid Detachment - 1 L of C Sigs, RC Sigs

No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop

No. 2 Advanced Base Workshop

No. 1 L of C Telecommunications Workshop

No. 2 L of C Telecommunications Workshop

No. 1 Mobile Tire Repair Unit

No. 2 Engineer Equipment Workshop

No. 1 Port Workshop

Canadian Section Armoured Fighting Vehicle Inspectorate, 21 Army Group

### ***Third Line Workshops***

No. 1 General Troops Workshop  
No. 1 Infantry Troops Workshop  
No. 2 Infantry Troops Workshop  
No. 3 Infantry Troops Workshop  
No. 4 Armoured Troops Workshop  
No. 5 Armoured Troops Workshop  
No. 2 Tank Troops Workshop  
No. 1 Engineer Equipment Workshop  
No. 1 Servicing Unit

### ***Units in the United Kingdom***

No. 63 Light Aid Detachment - Headquarters, Canadian Reinforcement Units  
No. 64 Light Aid Detachment - Headquarters, Canadian Reinforcement Units  
No. 65 Light Aid Detachment - Headquarters, Canadian Reinforcement Units  
No. 1 Base Workshop  
No. 1 “B” Vehicle Inspectorate (Overseas)

### ***3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, C.A.O.F.***

Div HQ - Headquarters RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, C.A.O.F.

Div Workshops:

2<sup>nd</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME

Div Light Aid Detachments:

2<sup>nd</sup> 62<sup>nd</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 32<sup>nd</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 33<sup>rd</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 30<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 31<sup>st</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 36<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 37<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
2<sup>nd</sup> 38<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME



## **RCOC(E) and RCEME Reserve Units Reserve Brigade Groups as of 24 June 1942**

### ***Military District No. 1***

31<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 2 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 2***

32<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 1 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 3***

33<sup>rd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 3 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 4***

34<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 4 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 5***

35<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 488/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 6 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 7***

37<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 25/43 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 2 Group, No. 7 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 10***

38<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 5 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 11***

39<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

- No. 2 Group, No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 12***

40<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 2 Group, No. 9 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC

No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC

No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 13***

41<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 283/42 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 2 Group, No. 10 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC

No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC

No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

## **RCOC(E) and RCEME Reserve Units Reserve Brigade Groups as of 1 May 1943**

### ***Military District No. 1***

31<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 2 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 2***

32<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 1 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 3***

33<sup>rd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 3 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 4***

34<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 4 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 5***

35<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 6 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 6***

36<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 362/43 - Effective 1 May 43

- No. 2 Group, No. 8 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 6***

42<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution authorized - GO 362/43 - Effective 1 May 43

- No. 2 Group, No. 12 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 45 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 47 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 7***

37<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 2 Group, No. 7 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 10***

38<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 5 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 11***

39<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 2 Group, No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 12***

40<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 2 Group, No. 9 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

### ***Military District No. 13***

41<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 2 Group, No. 10 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC
- No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC
- No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC
- No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC

## **RCEME - Reserve Units Reserve Brigade Groups as of 15 Jul 44**

### ***Military District No. 1***

#### 31<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

### ***Military District No. 2***

#### 32<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 2 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

### ***Military District No. 3***

#### 33<sup>rd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 7 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

### ***Military District No. 4***

#### 34<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 10 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 5***

### 35<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 11 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 6***

### 36<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 9 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 6***

### 42<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 1 (Reserve) Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 45 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 47 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 7***

### 37<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 12 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME



## ***Military District No. 10***

### 38<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 11***

### 39<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 12***

### 40<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 6 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## ***Military District No. 13***

### 41<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group

- No. 13 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

## **Cancellation of the Constitution of the Reserve Brigade Groups**

Starting in September 1944, the constitution of the Reserve Brigade Groups was cancelled and their component units returned to their previous standing within the Military District. The effective dates are as follows:

### ***Military District No. 1***

31<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 145/46 - Effective 28 Nov 45

### ***Military District No. 2***

32<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 86/46 - Effective 30 Jan 46

### ***Military District No. 3***

33<sup>rd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 145/46 - Effective 30 Apr 46

### ***Military District No. 4***

34<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 46/46 - Effective 29 Nov 45

### ***Military District No. 5***

35<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 38/46 - Effective 15 May 46

### ***Military District No. 6***

36<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 128/46 - Effective 15 Feb 46

42<sup>nd</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 128/46 - Effective 15 Feb 46

### ***Military District No. 7***

37<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 500/44 - Effective 14 Sep 44

### ***Military District No. 10***

38<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 86/46 - Effective 31 Jan 46

### ***Military District No. 11***

39<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 177/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

### ***Military District No. 12***

40<sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 500/44 - Effective 15 Sep 44

### ***Military District No. 13***

41<sup>st</sup> (Reserve) Brigade Group - constitution cancelled - GO 86/46 - Effective 30 Jan 46

## **RCEME Reserve Force Units as of 1 April 1946 listed by Military District**

### ***Military District No. 1 (Central Command)***

No. 1 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 2 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 24 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 45 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 46 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 63 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 64 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 65 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 93 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 94 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 95 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 97 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 144 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 162 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Division

### ***Military District No. 2 (Central Command)***

No. 3 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 4 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 5 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 19 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 25 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 26 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 34 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 36 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 47 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 48 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 49 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 66 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME

No. 67 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 69 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 70 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 98 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 99 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 100 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 101 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 102 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 104 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 105 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 106 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 145 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 146 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 160 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 163 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops  
Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Division

### ***Military District No. 3 (Central Command)***

No. 6 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 7 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 30 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 37 Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 50 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 51 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 71 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 72 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 107 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 108 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 109 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 110 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 168 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME

***Military District No. 4 (Quebec Command)***

No. 8 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 9 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 20 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 27 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 35 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 38 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 52 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 53 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 54 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 74 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 77 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 78 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 79 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 111 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 114 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 115 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 116 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 117 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 147 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 148 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 149 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 164 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops  
Headquarters, RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division

***Military District No. 5 (Quebec Command)***

No. 11 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 12 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 55 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 80 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME

No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 118 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 119 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 120 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 121 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 122 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 165 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 4<sup>th</sup> Division

### ***Military District No. 6 (Eastern Command)***

No. 13 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 21 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 39 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 56 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 83 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 84 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 123 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 124 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 125 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 126 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 150 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 166 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 5<sup>th</sup> Division

### ***Military District No. 7 (Eastern Command)***

No. 14 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 28 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 31 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 40 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 57 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 85 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 128 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 151 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME

***Military District No. 10 (Prairie Command)***

No. 16 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 29 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 32 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME  
No. 42 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 60 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 131 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 132 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 133 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 134 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 135 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 152 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 153 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 161 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 167 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 6<sup>th</sup> Division

***Military District No. 11 (Western Command)***

No. 15 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME  
No. 41 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME  
No. 58 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 59 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 86 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 129 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 130 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 154 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME

***Military District No. 12 (Prairie Command)***

- No. 17 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 33 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 43 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 61 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 89 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 90 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 136 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 137 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 138 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 139 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 155 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME

***Military District No. 13 (Western Command)***

- No. 18 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 22 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 44 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 62 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 91 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 140 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 141 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 142 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME
- No. 156 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME
- No. 157 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME
- No. 169 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME



## Numerical Listing of RCEME Reserve Force Units as of 1 April 1946

- No. 1 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 2 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 3 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 4 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 5 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 6 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 7 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 8 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 9 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 10 - number not assigned to any unit
- No. 11 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 12 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 13 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 14 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 15 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 16 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 17 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 18 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 19 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 20 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 21 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 22 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- No. 23 - number assigned to an Active Force Brigade Workshop
- No. 24 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 25 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 26 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 27 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 28 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 29 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 30 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 31 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 32 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME

- No. 33 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 34 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 35 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME
- No. 36 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 37 Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 38 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 39 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 40 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 41 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 42 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 43 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 44 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME
- No. 45 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 46 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 47 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 48 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 49 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 50 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 51 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 52 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 53 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 54 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 55 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 56 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 57 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 58 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 59 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 60 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 61 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 62 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME
- No. 63 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 64 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 65 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 66 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME
- No. 67 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME

No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 69 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 70 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 71 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 72 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 74 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 77 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 78 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 79 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 80 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 83 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 84 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 85 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 86 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME  
No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 89 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 90 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 91 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME  
No. 92 - number assigned to an Active Force LAD (Type A)  
No. 93 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 94 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 95 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 97 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 98 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 99 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 100 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 101 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 102 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 104 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 105 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 106 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 107 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 108 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 109 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 110 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 111 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 114 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 115 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 116 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 117 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 118 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 119 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 120 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 121 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 122 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 123 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 124 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 125 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 126 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 128 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 129 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 130 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 131 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 132 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 133 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 134 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 135 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 136 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 137 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

No. 138 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 139 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 140 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 141 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 142 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME  
No. 143 - number assigned to an Active Force LAD (Type B)  
No. 144 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 145 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 146 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 147 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 148 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 149 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 150 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 151 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 152 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 153 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 154 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 155 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 156 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 157 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME  
No. 158 - number assigned to an Active Force LAD (Type C)  
No. 159 - number assigned to an Active Force LAD (Type C)  
No. 160 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 161 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 162 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 163 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 164 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 165 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 166 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 167 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 168 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
No. 169 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME  
Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops  
Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops  
Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Division

Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Division

Headquarters, RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division

Headquarters, RCEME, 4<sup>th</sup> Division

Headquarters, RCEME, 5<sup>th</sup> Division

Headquarters, RCEME, 6<sup>th</sup> Division

## **RCOC(E) and RCEME units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia and the Canadian Army (Reserve) 15 December 1936 to 1 April 1946**

### ***Military District No. 1***

#### **No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, London, Ont.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40  
Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40  
No. 1 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC, London, Ont  
Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

#### **No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, London, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)  
Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Note: ‘Reserve’ designation dropped Effective 1 Apr 46  
No. 1 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, London, Ont.  
Effective: 1 Apr 46

#### **No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46  
Redesignated: No. 24 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

#### **No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Windsor, Ont. & Redesignated:  
No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42  
No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Windsor, Ont.  
Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44  
Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44  
No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Windsor, Ont.  
Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46  
Redesignated: No. 63 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

#### **No. 2 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, London, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Relocated to Windsor, Ont. from London, Ont.: GO 112/42 - Effective 10 Mar 42

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Windsor, Ont.**

Authorized: GO 112/42 - Effective 10 Mar 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Note: ‘Reserve’ designation dropped Effective 1 Apr 46

No. 2 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME

Effective: 1 Apr 46

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Windsor, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Windsor, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Windsor, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 64 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 3 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 45 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Windsor, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Windsor, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Windsor, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46



Converted & Redesignated: No. 46 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Windsor, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Windsor, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 93 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 24 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 45 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 46 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 63 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 64 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 65 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 93 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 94 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 95 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 96 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 97 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 144 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 162 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Division - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Division

(Note: Formerly Headquarters No. 1 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

***Military District No. 2***

**No. 1 (Reserve) Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Toronto, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 1 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Toronto, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

### **No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Toronto, Ont.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Toronto, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 4 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Toronto, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME, Toronto, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 25 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 47 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 3 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 14 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 4 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Toronto, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 5 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Toronto, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Toronto, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 99 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Toronto, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 101 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Toronto, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Toronto, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 14 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 3 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 19 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 25 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 26 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 34 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 36 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 47 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 48 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 49 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 66 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 67 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 68 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 5 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 69 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 70 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 98 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 99 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 100 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 101 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 7 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 102 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 103 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 8 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 104 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 105 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 106 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 145 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 146 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 160 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 163 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, No. 2 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional RCEME, Toronto, Ont.**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44 and Localized to Toronto, Ont.: GO 236/45 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Division - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, RCEME, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Division**

(Note: Formerly Headquarters No. 2 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

## ***Military District No. 3***

### **No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, Kingston, Ont.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 1 (Reserve) Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, Kingston, Ont.

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

### **No. 3 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Kingston, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Relocated to Ottawa, Ont. from Kingston Ont.: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 3 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 7 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

### **No. 6 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 8 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 7 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Kingston, Ont.**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Note: 'Reserve' designation dropped Effective 1 Apr 46

No. 7 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Kingston, Ont.

Effective: 1 Apr 46

### **No. 8 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 6 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46



**No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Ottawa, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 71 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Ottawa, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Ottawa, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 110 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Ottawa, Ont. & Redesignated:

No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Ottawa, Ont.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 107 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 30 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 37 Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 50 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 51 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 71 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 9 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 72 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 73 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 10 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 107 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 12 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 108 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 109 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 110 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 11 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 168 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

***Military District No. 4***

**No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Group Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Anti-Aircraft Group Workshop, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

**No. 1 (Reserve) Army Tank Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 1 (Reserve) Anti-Aircraft Group Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Converted & Redesignated: GO 15/41 - Effective 15 Dec 40

Converted & Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC - GO 15/41 - Effective 15 Dec 40

**No. 1 (Reserve) Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 15/41 - Effective 15 Dec 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

**No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 35 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 1 (Reserve) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 4 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

### **No. 1 (Reserve) Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Tank Brigade Sub-Park, RCOC - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

### **No. 1 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Army Tank Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 27 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 3 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 3 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

### **No. 3 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

### **No. 4 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 20 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 4 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 10 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 4 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 52 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 8 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 10 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 9 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 10 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 10 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 8 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 10 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 10 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type "A", RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Montreal, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Montreal, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Montreal, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Montreal, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 114 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 20 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) Armoured Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 27 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 35 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 38 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 52 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 53 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 54 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 74 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 75 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 13 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 76 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 77 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 78 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 79 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 111 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 112 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 14 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 113 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 15 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 114 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 16 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 115 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 116 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 117 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 147 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 148 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 149 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 164 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46



**Headquarters, No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional RCEME, Montreal, P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44 and Localized to Montreal, P.Q.: GO 236/45 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: Headquarters, RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Headquarters, RCEME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division

(Note: Formerly Headquarters No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

***Military District No. 5*****No. 2 RCOC Fortress Workshop          Quebec; P.Q.**

Authorized: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 2 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 12 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

No. 2 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Quebec; P.Q.

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

No. 2 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Quebec; P.Q.

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Ordnance Ammunition Company, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 5 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 55 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 6 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Quebec, P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 5 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 11 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 11 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Note: 'Reserve' designation dropped Effective 1 Apr 46

No. 11 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.

Effective: 1 Apr 46

**No. 12 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type "A", RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Quebec, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Quebec, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type "B", RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Quebec, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Quebec, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 119 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Quebec, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Quebec, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 120 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Quebec, P.Q. & Redesignated:

No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Quebec, P.Q.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 121 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 55 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 5 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 80 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 81 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 17 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 82 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 118 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 119 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 18 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 120 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 19 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 121 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Quebec; P.Q.**

(Note: Formerly No. 20 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 122 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 165 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, RCEME, 4<sup>th</sup> Division**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

***Military District No. 6***

**No. 1 (Reserve) Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME, Sydney, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 Group No. 12 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

**No. 2 Group No. 8 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Halifax, N.S.: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 2 Group No. 8 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 9 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 2 Group No. 12 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 361/43 - Effective 1 Jan 43, Localized to Sydney, N.S.: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 2 Group No. 12 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 4 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Halifax, N.S.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Converted & Redesignated: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39

Converted & Redesignated: No. 4 RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39

No. 4 RCOC Fortress Workshop, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 4 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 4 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME, Halifax, N.S.

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

No. 4 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

No. 4 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 4 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 5 RCOC Fortress Workshop, Sydney, N.S.**

Authorized: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 5 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 5 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME, Sydney, N.S.

(Note: Formerly No. 5 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

No. 5 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

No. 5 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 5 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 6 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46  
Converted & Redesignated: No. 39 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 8 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46  
Converted & Redesignated: No. 56 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 9 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Halifax, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 Group No. 8 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46  
Redesignated: No. 13 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46  
No. 13 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Halifax, N.S.

(Note: Formerly No. 9 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 21 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - 1 Apr 46

**No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type "A", RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Halifax, N.S. & Redesignated:

No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.**

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 84 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Halifax, N.S. & Redesignated:

No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 124 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Halifax, N.S. & Redesignated:

No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 126 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Halifax, N.S. & Redesignated:

No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 39 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

No. 45 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC

Authorized: GO 361/43 - Effective 1 Jan 43, Localized to Sydney, N.S.: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

**No. 45 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Sydney, N.S.**

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 45 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 45 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

**No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC**

Authorized: GO 361/43 - Effective 1 Jan 43, Localized to Sydney, N.S.: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 150 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 47 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC**

Authorized: GO 361/43 - Effective 1 Jan 43, Localized to Sydney, N.S.: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43

No. 47 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 364/43 - Effective 1 May 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 47 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 47 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Sydney, N.S.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

**No. 56 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 8 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46



**No. 83 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 84 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 21 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 123 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 124 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 22 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 125 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 126 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 23 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 127 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Halifax, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 24 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 150 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME, Sydney, N.S.**

(Note: Formerly No. 46 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 166 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, No. 1 (Reserve) Corps Troops RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: Headquarters, RCEME, 5<sup>th</sup> Division - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, RCEME, 5<sup>th</sup> Division**

(Note: Formerly Headquarters No. 1 (Reserve) Corps Troops RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

***Military District No. 7*****No. 2 Group No. 7 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Saint John, N.B.: GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 2 Group No. 7 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Saint John, N.B.

Authorized: GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 12 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 3 RCOC Fortress Workshop Saint John, N.B.**

Authorized: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 3 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

**No. 3 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 31 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 3 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Saint John, N.B.**

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

No. 3 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Saint John, N.B.

(Note: Formerly No. 7 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 3 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 7 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 7 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 57 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 12 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 Group No. 7 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 14 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 14 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 12 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to St. Stephen, N.B. & Redesignated:

No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, St. Stephen, N.B.

Authorized: GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, St. Stephen, N.B.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 85 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Saint John, N.B. & Redesignated:

No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Saint John, N.B.

Authorized: GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Saint John, N.B.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 40 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Saint John, N.B. & Redesignated:

No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Saint John, N.B.

Authorized: GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Saint John, N.B.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 151 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 28 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Fredericton, N.B. & Redesignated:

No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42

No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Fredericton, N.B.

Authorized: GO 350/44 - Effective 1 Apr 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Fredericton, N.B.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 128 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 31 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 40 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 26 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 57 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 7 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 85 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, St. Stephen, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 25 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 128 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Fredericton, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 28 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 151 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME, Saint John, N.B.**

(Note: Formerly No. 27 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

***Military District No. 10***

**No. 1 Cavalry Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Cavalry Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 1 (Reserve) Cavalry Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

**No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 5 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 16 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 32 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 5 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Cavalry Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC and No. 10 District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 16 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 29 Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Winnipeg, Man. & Redesignated:

No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Winnipeg, Man. & Redesignated:

No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 131 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Winnipeg, Man. & Redesignated:

No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 132 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Winnipeg, Man. & Redesignated:

No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 133 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 32 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 42 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 60 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 88 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 29 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 131 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 30 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 132 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 31 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 133 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Winnipeg, Man.**

(Note: Formerly No. 32 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 134 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 135 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 152 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 153 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 161 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 167 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, RCEME, 6<sup>th</sup> Division**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46



## ***Military District No. 11***

(Note: Military District No. 11 was redesignated Pacific Command on 1 Jan 43 and was redesignated Military District No. 11 again on 23 Jan 46)

### **No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop, Esquimalt, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 5 Army Field Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop (Divisional Section), RCOC, Esquimalt, B.C.

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 310/43 - Effective 1 Apr 43

Redesignated: No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC - GO 310/43 - Effective 1 Apr 43 and Relocated to Vancouver, B.C.: GO 312/43 - Effective 1 Apr 43

### **No. 1 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME, Victoria, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

### **No. 1 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 58 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 1 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Esquimalt, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop)

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

No. 1 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Esquimalt, B.C.

(Note: Formerly No. 11 (Reserve) District Store Section, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Relocated to Victoria, B.C. from Esquimalt, B.C.: GO 312/43 - Effective 1 Apr 43

No. 1 (Reserve) RCOC Fortress Workshop, Victoria, B.C.

Authorized: GO 312/43 - Effective 1 Apr 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Fortress Workshop, RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 2 Group No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Vancouver, B.C.: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 2 Group No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional Ordnance Field Park, RCOC - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 3 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 59 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 15 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 5 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Esquimalt, B.C.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Converted & Redesignated: GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39

Converted & Redesignated: No. 1 RCOC Fortress Workshop - GO 194/39 - Effective 18 Sep 39

**No. 5 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44 and Localized to Vancouver, B.C.: GO 236/45 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 41 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 11 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop (Divisional Section), RCOC)

Authorized: GO 310/43 - Effective 1 Apr 43, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 13 (Reserve) Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

**No. 15 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Vancouver, B.C. & Redesignated:

No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Vancouver, B.C. & Redesignated:

No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 129 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Vancouver, B.C. & Redesignated:

No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 130 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Vancouver, B.C. & Redesignated:

No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 154 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 41 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 5 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 58 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 59 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 3 (Reserve) Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 86 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 87 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 33 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 129 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 34 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 130 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 35 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 154 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

(Note: Formerly No. 36 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, No. 2 (Reserve) Infantry Divisional RCEME, Vancouver, B.C.**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44 and Localized to Vancouver, B.C.: GO 236/45 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

***Military District No. 12***

**No. 2 Group No. 9 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Saskatoon, Sask.: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 2 Group No. 9 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Saskatoon, Sask.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 6 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Field Park, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 33 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 6 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Saskatoon, Sask.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 Group No. 9 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 17 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 17 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Saskatoon, Sask.**

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 33 Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 4 (Reserve) Infantry Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Regina, Sask. & Redesignated:

No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Regina, Sask.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Regina, Sask.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 89 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Regina, Sask. & Redesignated:

No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Regina, Sask.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Regina, Sask.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 90 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Broadview, Sask. & Redesignated:

No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

**No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Broadview, Sask.**

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Broadview, Sask.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 138 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Moose Jaw, Sask. & Redesignated:

No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Moose Jaw, Sask.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Moose Jaw, Sask.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 137 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 43 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 61 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 89 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Regina, Sask.**

(Note: Formerly No. 37 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 90 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Regina, Sask.**

(Note: Formerly No. 38 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 136 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 137 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Moose Jaw, Sask.**

(Note: Formerly No. 40 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 138 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Broadview, Sask.**

(Note: Formerly No. 39 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 139 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 155 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**Headquarters, No. 2 (Reserve) Corps Troops RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Field Park, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

***Military District No. 13*****No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Drumheller, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Army Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Relocated to Edmonton, Alta. from Drumheller, Alta.: GO 20/45 - Effective 1 Dec 44

No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 20/45 - Effective 1 Dec 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 22 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Drumheller, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Relocated to Edmonton, Alta. from Drumheller, Alta.: GO 174/42 - Effective 16 Feb 42

No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 174/42 - Effective 16 Feb 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 2 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 1 (Reserve) Army Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Drumheller, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 6 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 290/41 - Effective 1 Sep 41, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

**No. 2 Group No. 10 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Drumheller, Alta.: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 2 Group No. 10 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Drumheller, Alta.



Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 13 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME**

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 44 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 2 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Relocated to Drumheller, Alta. from Edmonton, Alta.: GO 20/45 -

Effective 1 Dec 44

No. 2 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME, Drumheller, Alta.

Authorized: GO 20/45 - 1 Dec 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 18 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 6 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Calgary, Alta.**

Authorized: GO 181/36 - Effective 15 Dec 36, Relocated to Drumheller, Alta. from Calgary, Alta.: GO 3/39 - Effective 1 Dec 38

No. 6 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Drumheller, Alta.

Authorized: GO 3/39 - Effective 1 Dec 38, Redesignated: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

Redesignated: No. 6 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC - GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40

No. 6 (Reserve) Army Field Workshop, RCOC, Drumheller, Alta.

Authorized: GO 273/40 - Effective 7 Nov 40, Disbanded: GO 290/41 - Effective 31 Aug 41

### **No. 13 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Drumheller, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 Group No. 10 (Reserve) Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC)

Authorized: GO 431/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Converted & Redesignated: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Converted & Redesignated: No. 62 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME - GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 18 Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Drumheller, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 22 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “A”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Edmonton, Alta. & Redesignated:

No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCOC, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 91 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Edmonton, Alta. & Redesignated:

No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 140 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Edmonton, Alta. & Redesignated:

No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42

No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 279/42 - Effective 24 Jun 42, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 141 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

### **No. 44 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type B), RCEME**

(Note: Formerly No. 2 (Reserve) Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment Type “B”, RCOC**

Authorized: GO 159/42 - Effective 20 Mar 42, Localized to Ponoka, Alta. & Redesignated:

No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC - GO 26/43 - Effective 24 Nov 42

No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Ponoka, Alta.

Authorized: GO 26/43 - Effective 24 Nov 42, Relocated to Westlock, Alta. from Ponoka, Alta.: GO 215/44 - Effective 14 Jun 43

No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCOC, Westlock, Alta.

Authorized: GO 215/44 - Effective 14 Jun 43, Redesignated: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

Redesignated: No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44

No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Westlock, Alta.

Authorized: GO 429/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Redesignated: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Redesignated: No. 142 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME - GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 62 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (Type A), RCEME, Drumheller, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 13 (Reserve) Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME)

Authorized: GO 115/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 91 Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 41 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type A), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 140 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 42 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 141 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 43 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 142 Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME, Westlock, Alta.**

(Note: Formerly No. 44 (Reserve) Light Aid Detachment (Type B), RCEME)

Authorized: GO 116/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 156 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 157 Light Aid Detachment (Type C), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

**No. 169 Light Aid Detachment (Type D), RCEME**

Authorized: GO 114/46 - Effective 1 Apr 46

Headquarters, No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional RCEME

Authorized: GO 428/44 - Effective 15 Jul 44, Localized to Edmonton, Alta.: GO 20/45 - Effective 1 Dec 44

**Headquarters, No. 1 (Reserve) Armoured Divisional RCEME, Edmonton, Alta.**

Authorized: GO 20/45 - Effective 1 Dec 44, Disbanded: GO 113/46 - Effective 31 Mar 46

## General Orders

Note: Mark Tonner's "*On Active Service*" (Service Publications, Ottawa, 2007), contains a complete listing of relevant General Orders. Only a limited selection has been included here.

### **GO 443/1943, Precedence of Corps, Units, Canadian Army, 4 Nov 43**

G.O. 443/43 - Precedence of Corps, Units, Canadian Army, dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 1943

1. The provisions of the King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1939, paragraph 1365, are placed in abeyance for the duration of the present war and the following shall, during such period, be the order of precedence in the Canadian Army: -

Order	Corps, Regiment or Unit
1	The Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
2	Regiments of Cavalry (Horsed)
3	The Canadian Armoured Corps
4	The Royal Canadian Artillery
5	The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers
6	The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
7	The Canadian Infantry Corps
8	The Veterans Guard of Canada
9	The Canadian Chaplain Service
10	The Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
11	The Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
12	The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
13	The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
14	The Royal Canadian Army Pay Corps
15	The Canadian Dental Corps
16	The Corps of Military Staff Clerks
17	The Canadian Postal Corps
18	The Canadian Provost Corps
19	The Canadian Forestry Corps
21	The Canadian Women's Army Corps
22	The Canadian Intelligence Corps
23	The Canadian Officers Training Corps

2. All Corps and Units of the Active Army shall take precedence before all Corps and Units of the Reserve Army.

3. Different Units of the Active Army of the SAME ARM will take precedence as follows: -
  - (a) Units which have been converted from another Arm will, if designated by a number in the new Arm, take precedence by numerical seniority given in the new Arm.
  - (b) Units which have been converted to a Junior Arm will take precedence within that Arm with seniority as if on organization they had belonged to the Arm to which they have been converted.
  - (c) ©All other Units in the order of precedence as shown in the Defence Forces List.
  - (d) Newly formed Corps will take precedence in order of the date of authorization unless otherwise stated.
4. Advanced Training Centres will take precedence with their respective parent Corps. Other Training Centres and Establishments will take precedence with the Canadian Infantry Corps.
5. On parade, other than ceremonials, and for the purposes of manoeuvre, units will be distributed and drawn up in the mode which the officer in command of such parade or manoeuvres may deem most convenient.
6. Field Artillery will take the right of all other Artillery Units with the exception of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.
7. In Brigade, rifle regiments will be on a flank - usually the left.

Effective 15<sup>th</sup> October, 1943

H.Q. 5595-1-6

P.C. 8226 of 26 Oct 43

### ***GO 235/1944, Precedence of Corps, Units, Canadian Army, 24 May 44***

G.O. 235/44 - Precedence of Corps, Units, Canadian Army, dated 24<sup>th</sup> May, 1944.

1. His Excellency, the Governor General in Council, under the authority of the War Measures act, by Order in Council P.C. 3433 dated 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1944, has been pleased to order as follows:  
Order in Council P.C. 8226 dated 26<sup>th</sup> of October, 1943, is hereby amended as follows:

Para 1 - In the table -

Delete “The Royal Canadian Engineers” and substitute “The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers”.

Add “13. The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers” and renumber remaining numbers “13” to “21” as “14” to “22”, respectively.

2. General Order No. 443 of 1943 is amended accordingly.

H.Q. 5595-1-6

P.C. 3433 of 8 May 44

**GO 173/1946, Precedence of Corps, Units, Canadian Army, 17 Jul 46**

G.O. 173/46 - Precedence of Corps, Units, Canadian Army, dated: 17<sup>th</sup> July, 1946.

The provisions of General Order 443 of 1943 as amended by General Order 235 of 1944 are hereby cancelled.

Effective 25<sup>th</sup> June, 1946

H.Q. 1064-24-1, f.d. 35

P.C. 2546 of 25 Jun 46

**GO 135/1939, Calling Out Of Troops On Active Service, 1 Sep 39**

G.O. 135/39 - Calling Out of Troops on Active Service, dated: 1<sup>st</sup> September, 1939.

By an Order in Council of the First day of September, 1939, P.C. 2482, His Excellency the Governor in Council has authorized the organization of a Canadian Active Service Force, and for that purpose has, under the provision of Section 20 of the Militia Act, names as Corps of the Active Militia those Units, Formations and Detachments set out in Schedule D annexed. By the same Order in Council and under and by virtue of the powers conferred by Section 64 of the Militia Act, the Governor in Council has placed on Active Service in Canada, those Units, Formations and Detachments as set out in the said Schedule D, and those Corps and parts of the Militia as set out in Schedule E annexed hereto.

Effective 1<sup>st</sup> September, 1939

H.Q.S. 6615-6

**Schedule “D”**

Schedule Of Corps Named To Form Part Of The Active Militia And To Form The Canadian Active Service Force

Serial No.      Detail

1      Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps, C.A.S.F. (including H.Q. Corps Artillery and Corps H.Q. Section, Intelligence Corps)

**1<sup>st</sup> Division, C.A.S.F.**

2      Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Division, C.A.S.F.

3      1<sup>st</sup> Hussars, C.A.S.F.

4      Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Artillery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

5      Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

6      “A” Battery, R.C.H.A., C.A.S.F.

7      “B” Battery, R.C.H.A., C.A.S.F.

8      “C” Battery, R.C.H.A., C.A.S.F.

9      54<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

10     Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

11     10<sup>th</sup> (St. Catharines) Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

- 12 7<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 13 8<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 14 73<sup>rd</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 15 Headquarters of 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 16 19<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 17 111<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 18 77<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 19 92<sup>nd</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 20 1<sup>st</sup> Anti-Tank Regiment, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 21 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Engineers, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 22 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Park Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 23 1<sup>st</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 24 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 25 4<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 26 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 27 No. 1 Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 28 No. 2 Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 29 No. 3 Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 30 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F.
- 31 The Royal Canadian Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 32 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders of Canada, C.A.S.F.
- 33 The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 34 The Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 35 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F.
- 36 The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, C.A.S.F.
- 37 The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, C.A.S.F.
- 38 The Edmonton Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 39 The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 40 Headquarters of 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F.
- 41 Royal 22e Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 42 The West Nova Scotia Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 43 The Carleton and York Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 44 The Royal Montreal Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 45 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 46 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Ammunition Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.



- 47 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Petrol Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 48 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Supply Column, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 49 No. 5 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 50 No. 9 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 51 No. 4 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 52 No. 3 Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 53 No. 1 Provost Company, C.A.S.F.
- 54 No. 3 Divisional Postal Unit, C.P.C., C.A.S.F.
- 55 No. 1 Employment Platoon, C.A.S.F.
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### **Corps Troops Mobilizing With 1<sup>st</sup> Division**

- 63 Headquarters 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Medium Artillery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 64 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Medium Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 65 7<sup>th</sup> Medium Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 66 2<sup>nd</sup> Medium Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 67 23<sup>rd</sup> Medium Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 68 3<sup>rd</sup> Medium Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 69 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Medium Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 70 8<sup>th</sup> Medium Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 71 57<sup>th</sup> Medium Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 72 11<sup>th</sup> Medium Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 73 1<sup>st</sup> Medium Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 74 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Army Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 75 51<sup>st</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 76 57<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 77 27<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 78 90<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 79 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

- 80 18<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 81 20<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 82 108<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 83 23<sup>rd</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 84 1<sup>st</sup> Survey Regiment, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 85 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 86 12<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 87 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Field Park Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 88 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 89 Headquarters of No. 1 Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 90 No. 1 Line Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 91 No. 2 Line Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 92 Headquarters of No. 2 Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 93 No. 1 Operating Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 94 No. 2 Operating Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 95 No. 1 Wireless Section (Corps Signals), R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 96 No. 1 D.R. Section (Corps Signals), R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 97 No. 1 Line Maintenance Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 98 No. 1 Technical Maintenance Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 99 Headquarters of No. 3 Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 100 No. 1 H.Q. Corps Medium Artillery Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 101 No. 1 Army Field Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 102 No. 2 Army Field Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 103 No. 1 Medium Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 104 No. 2 Medium Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 105 No. 2 R.C.A.F. Wing Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 106 No. 4 Army Tank Battalion Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 107 The Perth Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 108 The Three Rivers Regiment (Tank), C.A.S.F.
- 109 Headquarters of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 110 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Ammunition Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 111 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Petrol Park, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 112 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops Supply Column, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 113 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Ammunition Park, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 114 No. 13 Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.

- 115 No. 8 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 116 No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, C.A.S.F.
- 117 No. 1 Ordnance Field Park, RCOC, C.A.S.F.
- 118 No. 1 Field Cash Office, C.A.S.F.
- 119 No. 2 Postal Unit, C.P.C., C.A.S.F.
- 120 No. 3 Provost Company, C.A.S.F.
- 121 No. 1 A.C. Squadron Intelligence Liaison Section, C.A.S.F.
- 122 No. 2 A.C. Squadron Intelligence Liaison Section, C.A.S.F.
- 123 No. 3 Employment Platoon, C.A.S.F.
- 124
- 125
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### **Army Troops Mobilizing With 1<sup>st</sup> Division**

- 127 Headquarters 2<sup>nd</sup> Anti-Aircraft Regiment, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 128 4<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 129 14<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 130 15<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 131 1<sup>st</sup> (Yorkton) Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 132 Headquarters 2<sup>nd</sup> Searchlight Regiment, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 133 4<sup>th</sup> Searchlight Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 134 5<sup>th</sup> Searchlight Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 135 1<sup>st</sup> A.A. Brigade Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (less two area Sections)
- 136 No. 1 Reserve M.T. Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 137 No. 4 Casualty Clearing Station, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 138 No. 1 Advanced Depot of Medical Stores, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 139 No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC, C.A.S.F. (Less one Section)
- 140
- 141
- 142

### **L. of C. Troops Mobilizing With 1<sup>st</sup> Division**

- 143 9<sup>th</sup> Army Troops Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 144 No. 15 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 145 No. 5 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.

- 146 No. 1 Ordnance Store Company, RCOC, C.A.S.F.
- 147 No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, C.A.S.F.
- 148 No. 1 Ordnance Ammunition Company, RCOC, C.A.S.F.
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## **2<sup>nd</sup> Division, C.A.S.F.**

- 152 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, C.A.S.F.
- 153 The Fort Garry Horse, C.A.S.F.
- 154 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Artillery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 155 Headquarters of 4<sup>th</sup> Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 156 26<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 157 53<sup>rd</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 158 14<sup>th</sup> (Midland) Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 159 2<sup>nd</sup> (Ottawa) Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 160 Headquarters of 5<sup>th</sup> Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 161 5<sup>th</sup> (Westmount) Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 162 28<sup>th</sup> (Newcastle) Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 163 89<sup>th</sup> (Woodstock) Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 164 35<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 165 Headquarters of 6<sup>th</sup> Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 166 13<sup>th</sup> (Winnipeg) Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 167 109<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 168 91<sup>st</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 169 21<sup>st</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 170 2<sup>nd</sup> Anti-Tank Regiment, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 171 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Engineers, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 172 1<sup>st</sup> (Lambton) Field Park Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 173 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 174 7<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 175 11<sup>th</sup> (Lambton) Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 176 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 177 No. 1 Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 178 No. 2 Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.

- 179 No. 3 Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 180 Headquarters of 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F.
- 181 The Essex Scottish Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 182 The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, C.A.S.F.
- 183 The Royal Regiment of Canada, C.A.S.F.
- 184 The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 185 Headquarters of 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F.
- 186 1<sup>st</sup> Bn, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, C.A.S.F.
- 187 Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, C.A.S.F.
- 188 Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, C.A.S.F.
- 189 Le Regiment de la Chaudiere (Mitrailleuses), C.A.S.F.
- 190 Headquarters of 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F.
- 191 The South Saskatchewan Regiment, C.A.S.F.
- 192 The Calgary Highlanders, C.A.S.F.
- 193 The Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, C.A.S.F.
- 194 The Winnipeg Grenadiers (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 195 Headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 196 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Ammunition Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 197 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Petrol Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 198 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Supply Column, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 199 No. 11 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 200 No. 18 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 201 No. 10 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 202 No. 2 Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 203 No. 2 Provost Company, C.A.S.F.
- 204 No. 4 Postal Unit, C.P.C., C.A.S.F.
- 205 No. 2 Employment Platoon, C.A.S.F.
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### **Corps Troops Mobilizing With 2<sup>nd</sup> Division**

- 209 Headquarters of 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 210 40<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 211 15<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.

- 212 29<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 213 9<sup>th</sup> (Toronto) Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 214 Headquarters of 4<sup>th</sup> Army Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 215 61<sup>st</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 216 107<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 217 113<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 218 71<sup>st</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 219 13<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 220 14<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 221 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Field Survey Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 222 No. 3 Line Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 223 No. 3 Operating Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 224 No. 2 Wireless Section (Corps Signals), R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 225 No. 3 Army Field Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 226 No. 4 Army Field Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 227 No. 2 Tank Battalion Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 228 The Westminster Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F.
- 229 The Ontario Regiment (Tank), C.A.S.F.
- 230 No. 1 Bridge Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 231 No. 2 Motor Ambulance Convoy, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 232 No. 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, C.A.S.F.
- 233 No. 2 Field Cash Office, C.A.S.F.
- 234 No. 3 A.C. Squadron Intelligence Liaison Section, C.A.S.F.
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### **Army Troops Mobilizing With 2<sup>nd</sup> Division**

- 238 Headquarters of 5<sup>th</sup> Army Field Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 239 100<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 240 12<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 241 97<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 242 45<sup>th</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F.
- 243 No. 5 Army Field Brigade Signal Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 244 No. 11 Line Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.

- 245 No. 1 Construction Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 246 No. 11 Wireless Section (G.H.Q.), R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 247 No. 2 Reserve M.T. Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 248 No. 5 Casualty Clearing Station, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 249 No. 1 Mobile Bacteriological Laboratory, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 250 No. 1 Mobile X-Ray Laboratory, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 251 No. 1 Motor Ambulance Convoy, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 252 No. 1 Command Cash Office, C.A.S.F.
- 253 No. 5 Postal Unit, C.P.C., C.A.S.F.
- 254 No. 1 Reception Camp, C.A.S.F. (Headquarters and two Divisional Sections)
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### **L. of C. Troops Mobilizing With 2<sup>nd</sup> Division**

- 258 5<sup>th</sup> Army Troops Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 259 No. 1 Workshop and Park Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 260 No. 1 Railway Construction Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 261 No. 2 Railway Construction Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 262 No. 1 Railway Operating Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 263 No. 2 Railway Operating Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 264 No. 1 Railway Workshop Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 265 No. 1 Boring Section, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 266 No. 1 Engineer Base Workshop, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 267 No. 1 Engineer Store Base Depot, R.C.E., C.A.S.F.
- 268 No. 1 Road Construction Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Less Labourers)
- 269 No. 2 Road Construction Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Less Labourers)
- 270 No. 1 Quarrying Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Less Labourers)
- 271 No. 2 Construction Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 272 No. 3 Construction Section, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 273 No. 3 Wireless Section (L of C), R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F.
- 274 No. 1 Supply Personnel Section, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 275 No. 1 Field Bakery, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Headquarters and two Sections)
- 276 No. 1 Field Butchery, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.
- 277 1<sup>st</sup> M.T. Vehicle Reception Depot, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F.

- 278 No. 5 Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 279 No. 14 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 280 No. 8 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 281 No. 13 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 282 No. 1 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 283 No. 1 Convalescent Depot, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 284 No. 1 Base Depot of Medical Stores, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F.
- 285 No. 1 Command Pay Office, C.A.S.F.
- 286 No. 1 Base Cash Office, C.A.S.F.
- 287 No. 10 Postal Unit, C.P.C., C.A.S.F.
- 288 No. 1 Provost Section (L of C), C.A.S.F.  
No. 2 Provost Section (L of C), C.A.S.F.
- 289 No. 1 Infantry Base Depot, C.A.S.F. (Headquarters and two Companies from The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment))
- 290 No. 1 General Base Depot, C.A.S.F. (Headquarters and two Companies from The Sherbrooke Regiment (M.G.))
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***Units Required for the Purpose of Manning Coastal and Anti-Aircraft Defences and providing guards for vulnerable points.***

**Military District No. 2**

- 295 The Governor General's Horse Guards, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 296 The Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 297 The Queen's York Rangers (1<sup>st</sup> American Regiment) (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 298 The Irish Regiment of Canada (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 299 The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 300 The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's) (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 301 No. 2 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
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**Military District No. 3**

- 303 The Midland Regiment (Northumberland and Durham), C.A.S.F. (Details)



- 304 The Governor General's Foot Guards, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 305 The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 306 Le Regiment de Hull, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 307 The Princess of Wales Own Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 308 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Troops R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
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#### **Military District No. 4**

- 311 Victoria Rifles of Canada, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 312 Le Regiment de St. Hyacinthe, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 313 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 314 16<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 315 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 316 3<sup>rd</sup> Divisional R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 317 No. 4 District Store Section, RCOC, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 318 17<sup>th</sup> Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 319 Le Regiment de Chateauguay (Mit), C.A.S.F. (Details)

#### **Military District No. 5**

- 320 3<sup>rd</sup> Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 321 94<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 322 59<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 323 The Royal Rifles of Canada, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 324 Les Voltigeurs de Quebec, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 325 Le Regiment de Levis, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 326 No. 5 District Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 327 Fusiliers du St. Laurent, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 328 Le Regiment de Quebec (Mitrailieuses), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 329 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 330 No. 19 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 331 No. 5 District Store Section, RCOC, C.A.S.F. (Details)
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**Military District No. 6**

- 335 Headquarters, 16<sup>th</sup> Coast Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 336 6<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 337 36<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 338 86<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 339 Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> (Halifax) Coast Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 340 51<sup>st</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 341 52<sup>nd</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 342 53<sup>rd</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 343 9<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 344 1<sup>st</sup> Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 345 9<sup>th</sup> Searchlight Battery (C.D.), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 346 10<sup>th</sup> Searchlight Battery (C.D.), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 347 2<sup>nd</sup> Fortress E. & M. Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 348 3<sup>rd</sup> Fortress E. & M. Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 349 No. 6 District Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 350 No. 5 Fortress Signal Company, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 351 No. 6 Fortress Signal Company, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 352 The North Nova Scotia Highlanders (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 353 The Prince Edward Island Highlanders, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 354 The Halifax Rifles, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 355 The Princess Louise Fusiliers (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 356 The Pictou Highlanders, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 357 The Cape Breton Highlanders, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 358 5<sup>th</sup> Divisional R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 359 1<sup>st</sup> Composite Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 360 No. 21 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 361 No. 22 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
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**Military District No. 7**

- 365 Headquarters, 3<sup>rd</sup> (New Brunswick) Coast Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 366 4<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)

- 367 1<sup>st</sup> Searchlight Battery (C.D.), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 368 1<sup>st</sup> (Brighton) Fortress E. & M. Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 369 No. 4 Fortress Signal Company, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 370 The New Brunswick Rangers, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 371 The Saint John Fusiliers (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 372 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Ammunition Park, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 373 No. 14 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 374 The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 375 The New Brunswick Regiment (Tank), C.A.S.F. (Details)
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### **Military District No. 10**

- 379 The Winnipeg Light Infantry (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
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### **Military District No. 11**

- 383 Headquarters, 5<sup>th</sup> (British Columbia) Coast Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 384 55<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 385 56<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 386 60<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 387 Headquarters, 15<sup>th</sup> (Vancouver) Coast Brigade, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 388 31<sup>st</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 389 58<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 390 85<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 391 102<sup>nd</sup> (North British Columbia) Heavy Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 392 2<sup>nd</sup> Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 393 3<sup>rd</sup> Searchlight Battery (C.D.), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 394 2<sup>nd</sup> Searchlight Battery (C.D.), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 395 17<sup>th</sup> Searchlight Battery (C.D.), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 396 4<sup>th</sup> Fortress E. & M. Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 397 9<sup>th</sup> Fortress Signal Company, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)

- 398 10<sup>th</sup> Fortress Signal Company, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 399 11<sup>th</sup> Fortress Signal Company, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 400 1<sup>st</sup> Bn, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 401 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 402 Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 403 No. 13 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 404 2<sup>nd</sup> Composite Company, R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 405 6<sup>th</sup> Divisional R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 406 No. 5 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 407 No. 11 District Store Section, RCOC, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 408 62<sup>nd</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 409 6<sup>th</sup> Field Company, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 410 Headquarters 11<sup>th</sup> District Engineers, R.C.E., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 411 No. 12 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 412 The British Columbia Dragoons, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 413 11<sup>th</sup> District Signals, R.C. Signals, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 414 Headquarters 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 415 The British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 416 The Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.S.F. (Details)
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### **Military District No. 12**

- 420 The Regina Rifle Regiment, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 421 21<sup>st</sup> Field Battery (H), R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 422 Prince Albert and Battleford Volunteers, C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 423 The Saskatoon Light Infantry, (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)

### **Military District No. 13**

- 424 The Calgary Regiment (Tank), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 425 The Edmonton Fusiliers (M.G.), C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 426 112<sup>th</sup> Field Battery, R.C.A., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 427 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops R.C.A.S.C., C.A.S.F. (Details)
- 428

**Schedule “E”**

Schedule of Corps and Parts of the Militia to be Included in the Canadian Active Service Force

Serial No.	Detail
1	The Chief of the General Staff; the Adjutant-General; the Master-General of the Ordnance; the Quartermaster-General; the Judge Advocate-General.
2	The Militia Staffs at National Defence Headquarters and in the several Military Districts.
3	All Corps, Units and Detachments of the Permanent Force.

## Part 2

### Unit Histories

#### ***Editor's Note***

The unit histories were originally part of the unit chronology. Col Hodgson intended that each unit prepare a history of their operations, but only a few were written and these have been consolidated into this part of the history. The editor thanks LCol (Ret'd) L Hellemans and LCol (Ret'd) N Johnstone for their assistance in proofreading the scanned text. Although the accounts have been edited for clarity and to remove abbreviations, no major effort was carried out to modernize the grammar and copy-edit for consistency. These are their stories, in their words.

# 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC

## Summary

1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCOC, Serial 555, called out on active service 1 Apr 42 by G.O. 199/42

Disbanded 14 Jan 43 by G.O. 151/43

## History

This unit was one of four formed at Camp Borden, Ontario, from the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian (Armoured) Divisional Workshop, RCOC, on 19 September 1941. Although this is the date the new unit commenced its diary, GO 199/42 shows it was called out on active service on 1 April 1942.

Capt GW Painter was the CO, with Lt RJ Birss and RG Waite as his first two officers.

After moving by troop train to Halifax, the unit, comprising three officers and 77 men, embarked for the UK on 9 October 41 on the *Reina Del Pacifico* in a convoy with five other troopships: *Capetown Castle*, *Warwick Castle*, *Andes*, *Aorangi*, and *Monarch of Bermuda*, escorted by four destroyers and an armed merchantman.

The unit disembarked on 19 October at Liverpool and moved to Bordon, Hants, and a month later to Warburg Barracks, Aldershot. In December, it moved again, this time to the Eastern Command workshop of the RAOC, Bittacy Hill, Mill Hill, London, NW7. Here the men worked on Matilda, Valentine, and Churchill tanks. Most of the Canadians were included in the RAOC Christmas festivities. According to their diary they “dined on turkey and plum pudding with beer and soft drinks”.

In April 1942 the unit moved back to Witley Park Stables, Surrey. In June 1942 the unit at last began to function as an Ordnance company. A new OC, Capt (Major as of 1 August) DN Cooke was appointed while Capt GW Painter continued as OIC workshop. According to the diarist: “Today (22 June) is a red-letter day for this Ordnance company ... The field park section and the workshop section have each received a partial scale of MT stores, and workshop tools and equipment. The company is open for business and today received both “A” & “B” vehicles for repair”.

In July, Col HG Thompson, who had just returned from Libya, lectured to the unit officers on the function of Ordnance services, supply, recovery and repair in an armoured division. The unit was inspected by Brig TJ Rutherford, CO 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade, and Lt-Col JW Bishop, ADOS(E) 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division.

During the next three months the unit moved three times in Sussex. On 12 August they were in Hove; in Warren Camp (Crowborough) in September; and back in Hove for December. The men were glad to have a fixed address for their Christmas dinner, served in the traditional manner by the officers and NCOs.

In January 1943, the unit “cleaned up work and camp” and moved back to Crowborough, where it was disbanded. Most of the men, with personnel from No. 2 Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, went to form the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCOC.

## Nominal Roll of Officers 1942 - 1943

Lt	Birss, RJ	Capt	Ruddy, CE	Capt	Smith, WD
Capt	Cleathers, CG	Lt	Sambrook, WL	Lt	Waite, RG
Maj	Cooke, DN	Lt	Serre, JEE	Lt	Wardman, L
Capt	Painter, GW				

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company

### Summary

Mobilisation serial: 556/1

2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, RCO, Serial 556 called out on active service 1 April 42 by G.O. 199/42

Converted and redesignated 1 Jan 43 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCO, by G.O. 151/43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, under supervision of HQ 5 Canadian Armoured Division by CMHQ Mob O No. 36, 17 April 43

Redesignated 15 May 44, 5 Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded 7 Dec 45 by G.O. 71/46

### History

This unit was one of four<sup>1</sup> formed at Camp Borden in September 1941 from the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Divisional Workshop, RCO, with Lt AS Olver (Capt as of 10 November)<sup>2</sup> as CO, and two other officers (Lt GW Procnier and HT Fitzsimmons) and 115 men. In October they left for overseas, disembarking at Liverpool on 19 October and moving to Bordon, Hants. In November the unit moved to Warburg Barracks, Aldershot, and in December to Colliers End, Buntingford, in Eastern Command. Christmas dinner consisted of roast pork, plum pudding and ‘trimmings’ including two barrels of beer.

In June, it began to function as an Ordnance company, with Capt JEH Stethem taken on strength as CO and promoted to major. Capt Olver became OIC workshop. Lt-Col JW Bishop, ADOS(E), and Maj CR Boehm, DADOS(E), were reported as “very frequent visitors to the unit”.

In August, the unit moved to Warren Camp, Little Warren, near Crowborough, and in October moved to Hove, near Brighton. However, in January 1943, it returned to Crowborough where it was reorganized, with No 1 Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company, to become No. 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop. The first OC was Maj JEH Stethem. Other officers were Capts WD Smith, KM Case, Lts L Wardman, and JW Whittingham. The strength at the end of the first month was five officers and 227 men.

In February 1943, the unit took part in Exercise *Spartan* along with 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop. According to the diarist, in March the shop was working on Ram tank modifications.

In the next few months many officers were taken on strength:

Capt HW Hagey	Lt RJC Evans	Lt ED Chauvin	Lt RE Hallam
Lt GE Grainger	Lt RA Anderson	Capt WC Donaldson	Lt PC Neil
Lt BG McKendrick	Lt E Horvatli	Lt JIZ Valiquette	

<sup>1</sup> The other three were 1st Armoured Ordnance Company (disbanded Jan 43); 5 Armoured Division Support Group Ordnance Workshop (became 11 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop); and 1 Division Section Canadian Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop (became 5 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop).

<sup>2</sup> See Annex A for list of officers who served in the unit.



August saw the beginning of truck waterproofing under RCEME<sup>3</sup> personnel. Lt-Col JW Bishop, CREME, took personal direction of this work.

When Maj JEH Stethem was made CREME 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade, Capt JW Whittingham was acting OC of the workshop until Maj RG Farrell took over command on 29 August 1943.

During this summer of 1943, the unit made three moves, to Ahead Camp, Didlington, to Burton Stacey, near Winchester, and in October, to the Brighton area from where, on 23 October, it entrained for Liverpool.

On 26 October the unit sailed in the SS *Monterey* for, it was thought, Ireland, for a scheme known as *Timberwolf*. However, it soon became evident that Ireland was not the destination, and on 4 November, Gibraltar was sighted amid great excitement by all ranks to be followed soon by the distant shoreline of North Africa. Shortly after passing through the straits, on 6 November, the convoy was attacked by German aircraft and the next ship in the convoy, the *Santa Elena*, carrying 1,800 Canadians including 121 nursing sisters of No. 14 Canadian General Hospital, was hit by an aerial torpedo and had to be abandoned. After picking up survivors, the *Monterey* anchored at Phillipville, Algeria, on 7 November while awaiting further orders.

Three days later, they docked at Naples, Italy, and the troops were taken to the unit location at Casoria, eight miles north of Naples. Naples had been captured on 1 October, and the Italian Army had surrendered. This had made little difference to the conduct of the campaign, as the Germans easily disarmed them and made them ineffective as a fighting force.

On arrival, the unit was inspected along with 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop, by Maj-Gen GG Simonds, who had taken command of the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division on its arrival in Italy.

Before settling down to work, the men were taken on conducted tours of the ruins of Pompeii and Mt Vesuvius in parties of 70.

The line held by the enemy at this time ran roughly from the Garigliano River on the west, about 40 miles north of Naples, to the Sangro River on the east coast just south of Ortona. The 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division were with the famous Eighth Army under General Montgomery, and by the time the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division landed in Naples they had taken Campobasso and cleared the enemy from the surrounding area. Campobasso was established as an administrative centre, known locally as ‘Maple Leaf City’. During November 1943, as many men as possible from the 1<sup>st</sup> Division were given a short leave to enjoy the clubs and theatres set up in the city.

A suitable concentration area for the 5<sup>th</sup> Division had been selected at Altamura, 28 miles southwest of Bari, but before the division could move, it had to take over the vehicles and equipment of the British 7<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division, who were moving from Italy to the UK. Shortage of shipping space had forced the 5<sup>th</sup> Division to leave their heavy equipment in England.

Great dissatisfaction was expressed over the condition of this equipment, and the fact that a high percentage of the transport was ‘two-wheel drive’. This might serve on a dry and level desert, but the mountain grades and winter mud of Italy was another matter.

The 7<sup>th</sup> (British) Armoured Division’s own published history remarks that some of its vehicles had been with the division since the previous February (1943), when they had been obtained from the 4<sup>th</sup> Indian Division. Several thousand miles, mostly over open desert, had not subsequently improved the condition of the vehicles.

“It is true”, wrote Gen Simonds to the Canadian Corps Commander, “that the 7<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division landed at Salerno with the same transport, but they had been told that, providing their vehicles were good

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<sup>3</sup> RCEME is used instead of REME as the troops were Canadians. In this early period of transition Canadians used the abbreviation REME, which was later, changed to RCEME.

for 2,000 miles, they should not worry. Most of these vehicles have now done well over 3,000 miles since landing”.<sup>4</sup>

To make matters worse, it appears that a natural spirit of camaraderie among the veterans of the desert fighting had led to unofficial ‘swapping’ of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division’s better vehicles for the worst in other units and formations of the Eighth Army; the latter vehicles passed into the hands of the Canadians.

However, the job had to be done, so on 24 November the workshop set up camp at Marigliano, east of Casoria, and went to work. From here on, the unit was continually on the move until it left Italy fifteen months later. The Advanced Workshop Detachment (AWD) under Capt RE Hallam was sometimes with the workshop and sometimes ahead of it. Early in December, Lt GB McKendrick and sixteen men left for a new location at Matera and the workshop followed in convoy on 8 December. The men were billeted in a school at Matera - here the unit enjoyed Christmas. Strength at the end of 1943 was eight officers and 292 men.

On 1 February 1944, the AWD moved from Matera to a harbour near the Sangro River bridge, and then on the 12<sup>th</sup> they moved to Lanciano, after brief stops at Gravina and Ururi. On the 15<sup>th</sup> they found themselves “in the midst of big guns” near the front line on the Ortona front. Here the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division had replaced the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division in the Canadian Corps sector of the front line on 9 February. The unit historian wrote: “German shells have been landing on both sides of the AWD. Lorries are being damaged by shrapnel.” Two men were wounded on the 27<sup>th</sup>.

The Canadian Corps remained in the line in the Ortona sector for five weeks, when the sector reverted to the 5<sup>th</sup> Corps. Maj-Gen BM Hoffmeister succeeded Maj-Gen ELM Burns on 7 March as GOC 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division. Gen Burns succeeded Gen Crerar as Corps Commander. On 11 March the workshop moved to Casavecchio, where the AWD joined them after being delayed while one of their repair teams repaired a Perth Regiment (11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade) universal carrier under artillery fire.

In April the unit was inspected by the new GOC, Maj-Gen Hoffmeister, and a letter of appreciation was received from the brigade commander, Brig JDB Smith, for keeping the “B” vehicles of the brigade moving, with only seven casualties during the last move.

At 11 o’clock on the night of 11 May, the battle for Rome began with a great bombardment of the Gustav Line. The workshop AWD followed brigade HQ, moving to Sant’ Angelo in Teodice, which had been captured by the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division only on 13 May. An air raid on 22 May drove workshop personnel to their slit trenches. Although a lot of shrapnel fell in the workshop area, there were no casualties. On 23 May, the unit historian reported heavy shellfire by our own artillery. Little wonder! “The spectacular fire plan in support of the assaulting division (5<sup>th</sup> Armoured) was the heaviest ever to be utilized by the western allies up to this stage of the war. The 810 guns to be employed...”<sup>5</sup>

On 24 May, the tanks of the 5<sup>th</sup> Division, who were in a support role, began to roll through the gap in the line made by the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division. On that day the AWD reported all personnel busy and many tanks in for repairs. Recovery tanks were busy forward. On the 27<sup>th</sup>, “six tanks were repaired and returned, and four were recovered and returned to the armoured regiments ready for use”.

At the end of May, the division was back in reserve. During this time the workshop had moved to Villa Volturno on the 3<sup>rd</sup> May and to Venafro on the 18<sup>th</sup>. At the former location a unit news board was set up showing maps of the front lines with a daily record of progress in the battle for Cassino. Here too, on 15 May, the unit was redesignated as the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Letter 58-1/SD 5 Dec 43, Correspondence GOC 1<sup>st</sup> Cdn Corps 21 Feb 42 - 28 Dec 43.

<sup>5</sup> The Canadians in Italy, p 417.

<sup>6</sup> CMHQ Adm Order No 85.

On 1 June, Maj CB Pitt was given command of the unit when Maj RG Farrell was appointed 2ic CREME, 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Troops. Capt JH MacLean, Lt HT McKinnon, Lt FH Bowman, and Lt L Shelling were TOS about this time. The unit suffered a serious misfortune when, a short distance north of the Melfa River, the orderly room truck caught fire and all unit records were lost.

As summer approached, the warm weather necessitated shorter working hours; 0730-1130; 1530-1730; and 1830-2100 hrs. This arrangement was apparently not too satisfactory as on 1 July it was changed to: 0615-1200 and 1730-1945 hrs.

In spite of the heat and discomfort, life in Italy had its compensations. The unit historian reported:

“On 8 June the Army Show featuring three CWAC, the first of its kind, was held in the division maintenance area. All workshop personnel attended, one half in the afternoon and the rest in the evening.”

“15 June - Unit showers are in operation and the men are permitted to bathe in the Volturno River, between 1100 and 1500 hrs. Lt FH Bowman and ten men proceeded on leave to Bari Rest Camp.”

“17 June - Personnel to go on three days’ leave to the beach north of Naples, commencing 19 June. On the same day Lt CG Provan and a party of men went to take over the area on the beach allotted to the workshop. On the 19<sup>th</sup> one third of the unit left for the beach on 72-hour leave.”

On 23 June it was recorded: “...remarkably large amount of fresh fruit around ... having their fill of oranges, cherries, and peaches. Preparations are being made for 112 men to go on a one-day leave to Rome.” There was a sour note, however: “... rail service to and from the leave camps is so poor that the men are not particular about taking leaves.”

On Dominion Day, 1944, personnel took part in the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Sports Meet, which was won by the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division. The weather was now very warm.

At the end of July, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps, after nearly two months’ recuperation and training in the Volturno Valley, secretly moved northward to the Foligno area. Early in August the workshop started its move north. According to the unit war diary, on 4 August it travelled 110 miles and on the next day, 89 miles. “Personnel swam in Lake Bolsena (some 50 miles north of Rome) in the evening, a very pleasant spot.”

During the summer of 1944, the course of operations in Italy again felt the impact of Allied grand strategy. On 5 July, General Alexander was advised that overriding priority would be transferred from the battle in Italy to Operation *Anvil*, the landing in Southern France, which was now to take place on 15 August.<sup>7</sup>

This required the withdrawal from the Fifth Army of three United States and four French divisions, and forced a reconsideration of the new assault plan. The Eighth Army was directed to attack on a narrow front on the Adriatic coast in a surprise thrust, which would swing north-west once the mountains had been passed.

The date set was 25 August and, under a cloak of closest secrecy, regrouping began. The unit historian reported, “Part I Orders were published without mention of unit’s name for security reasons.” Under this regrouping, the Canadian Corps were transferred from the centre of Italy to the Adriatic.

In September, one officer and 40 men were attached from 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop to help with the tank work; the AWD moved to a new location north of the Foligno River, followed by the main shop. Capt WC Donaldson returned to the UK and was replaced by Capt MV Swick. Lt CG Provan was promoted Capt and posted to 70 LAD, and Capt RE Hallam was named as 2ic of the unit.

Although the Gothic Line action had been more of an infantry than an armoured show, the 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade had taken part and suffered many casualties. On one day alone, 31 August, “the 9<sup>th</sup> Armoured

<sup>7</sup> The Canadian Army 1939-45, p 146.

Regiment (BC Dragoons) had a dozen tanks knocked out and two dozen more temporarily disabled.”<sup>8</sup> “Maj-Gen Hoffmeister personally complimented the workshop upon their work in keeping the brigade in good running order, despite the poor replacement situation during the Gothic Line action,” according to the unit historian.

Again according to the unit diary: “Armament shop camouflaging 17-pounder guns on Sherman tanks to give them the appearance of the normal 75-mm gun, by fitting a dummy muzzle brake where the 75 would normally end, and painting the remainder with camouflage design.”

On 2 October the diarist reported: “Very heavy rainfall from morning until noon. The area is very muddy, making working conditions most difficult. The tentage is old and not very weatherproof which makes living quarters very damp.” And on the 5<sup>th</sup>: “Work is at a standstill in the AWD because of the heavy mud.” However, on the 9<sup>th</sup>, Lt-Col DN Cooke, CREME 5<sup>th</sup> Division, arrived with the news that he had located a suitable workshop site in Rimini. The next day Capt WG Cooke with an advance party proceeded to the new site, which was a demolished railway repair shop. Most of the walls were standing, but the roof had completely disappeared and this added to the rubble on the floor. On the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> the unit moved; many of their vehicles had to be towed through the mud onto the main road.

On 13 October, Maj RS Birss had assumed command of the workshop, and Maj CB Pitt became DADME 5 Armoured Brigade.

At Rimini, although the men were still under canvas, the ground was sandy and soaked up the rain very rapidly. “It is a relief to be out of the mud.” However, by the end of October the unit moved again, this time to a damaged hospital on the Adriatic coast two miles north of Cervia. On the 27<sup>th</sup> the unit historian wrote: “Cloudy and wet once again. Capt WG Cooke and Capt EF Lee went to the new area with an advance party from vehicle, armament, and stores sections to lay out the shop. They were also sent as a holding party as there have been several interested parties looking over the area. The roads to the new location are in a very bad condition as the rain has almost completely washed them away in places. The shop is being cleared preparatory to the move. Vehicles such as motorcycles and scout cars for which parts are not readily available are being backloaded to 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop who are in the same lines. Repairable vehicles are being carried forward. Recovery tanks from the AWD arrived at the new workshop location to form a recovery post.”

Enough was left of the buildings to make good locations for all sections and their personnel under cover. Floors were of hard tile and in sound shape. Windows and doors were improvised for the men’s sleeping quarters. “Already the walls resemble the side of an ancient warship with stove pipes jutting out at all angles. The men are truly happy to have a roof over their heads once more. Work is commencing to pour into the shop. Rumour has it that the division is being pulled out of the line, lock, stock, and barrel.”

November was a quiet month as the 5<sup>th</sup> Division was back in Corps reserve until the night of 1-2 December when the Canadian Corps returned to the front line. An AWD of 21 men under Capt RE Hallam moved forward, but reported very little work. Two recovery tanks of the AWD were dispatched to the 9<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment lines to assist in the Lamone River crossing. Only one of the regiment’s tanks developed any trouble and it was pulled across the river.<sup>9</sup>

As Christmas approached, preparations were made for its proper observance. The shop was partitioned off, tables set up for Christmas dinner, and the shop suitably decorated. The officers and senior NCOs served dinner in the traditional style.

In January, Capt RE Hallam was SOS (struck-off-strength) to the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop, and Capt MV Swick to 76 LAD. Capt EC Cox was TOS to be adjutant.

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<sup>8</sup> The Canadian Army 1939-45, p 150.

<sup>9</sup> The Canadian Army 1939-45, p 150.

The reunion of the Canadians in Italy with those in North-West Europe had always been an object of national policy. Such a large readjustment of forces was not easy to arrange. However, at the beginning of February, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Malta and decided that it was desirable to divert up to five British and Canadian divisions from Italy to North-West Europe. Arrangements were started at once on the move.

Moving the workshop started on 15 February, although an advance party had left earlier, The staging area at Foligno was reached at 1700 hours on the 15<sup>th</sup> and Pontassieve on the second night. The final staging area between Pisa and Leghorn was reached at 1200 hours on 21 February.

Eighteen vehicles were loaded that day, with the remainder together with the personnel on 22 February. The ships sailed at 0539 hours 24 February with an escort of two destroyers, and arrived in Marseilles, France, the following night.

The troops were disembarked immediately, and the vehicles were offloaded and sent to the staging area in groups of ten. They arrived at the first staging camp at Macon on 28 February, and at their final destination in Roulers, Belgium, on 4 March.

According to the unit diary, “Personnel are being billeted in private homes, and the workshop expects to be in operation by 6 March 1945. A leave allotment for 20 men to the UK for nine days was most welcome.” From now, of course, these leave allotments were continuous, and in April rotational leaves to Canada were started for long-service men.

The new Sherman tanks with 17-pounder guns that the 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade was receiving were being put through the shop for their initial check.

The GOC, First Canadian Army, Lt-Gen Crerar, made a quick tour of the workshop and “was quite pleased with the layout” to quote the diary. On 5 April, the unit moved to the town of Nijmegen, “the men like the idea of again being in a town rather than a field in the country.”

On 10 April, Brig GM Grant, DME Army, accompanied by Col JW Bishop, DDME, and Lt-Col LD McGee, CREME, made a quick inspection of the workshop, visiting all sections in one hour. April 14 was moving day again, this time to Wehl, in the eastern part of Holland, via the Reichwald Forest, Cleve, and Emmerich (where the Rhine was crossed). The AWD went on to Arnhem, to be followed by the workshop on the 16<sup>th</sup>. On the 18<sup>th</sup> it moved again, to Barneveld, with another move on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, to Haren, in the Groeningen area.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division had come under Lt-Gen Simmonds control on 21 April to relieve the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division in North-eastern Holland. West of the estuary of the Ems River, the division fought its last battle on 1 and 2 May when it attacked and cleared the pocket around Delfzijl, taking over 3000 prisoners.

On 24 April, the workshop finally settled down on a deserted German airfield near Eelde. As the unit historian predicted on 25 April, “The unit appears to have settled down for at least a two-week period. Indeed it had. It remained there to sweat out the remaining seven months of its seemingly endless ‘war’ until disbandment of the unit on 7 December 1945. However, it was an excellent site for a workshop, with billets, hard standing and cover for most sections.

On 1 May, Capt EC Cox was promoted to major and given command of the unit. On the 5<sup>th</sup> came “the expected, and yet startling news of the capitulation of the Germans in Holland ... the workshop was given a holiday and a double issue of rum. There is a mixed feeling of exhilaration and depression in the unit. The general feeling is ‘Hurrah’ but where the hell do we go from here? Last night, when the news broke, there was wild celebrating in the usual army manner.”

VE-Day was proclaimed on 8 May, but to the workshop personnel who had had Saturday (5 May), Sunday, and Tuesday afternoon off, it was an anticlimax, and they went to work, although for one hour

less as new 'peace-time' hours went into effect. The strength of the unit on VE-Day was eight officers and 291 men.

On 23 May, Exercise *Finale* took place at 1100 hours when General Crerar, GOC First Canadian Army, inspected the entire 5th Canadian Armoured Division. The unit had been preparing since the 14<sup>th</sup> of the month for it. "... a most impressive march past of all vehicles, and civilians were present in large numbers."

Now that it was only a matter of time until the personnel would be back in civilian life, the problems of rehabilitation became important. Capt WG Waite and Lt E Kidd attended three-day courses in Groeningen on the subject, so as to be able to talk to all concerned.

On Saturday afternoon, 2 June, the unit was given one hour's notice of the arrival of the GOC, 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division. "... as the shop had been given a half-holiday there was frantic scurrying to nail down every live body on the site, including the medical orderly, cooks and batmen. The GOC arrived at 1515 hours and, gathering the men informally around him, gave a short farewell address in which he gave the unit high praise for its very excellent work in Italy. It appeared that General Hoffmeister had been appointed GOC CFEF (Canadian Far East Force) and was visiting as many 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division units as possible before leaving for Canada."

Later in the month 'Div Finito Park' was set up on the airfield, where eventually all armoured vehicles and artillery equipment were passed through and inspected by RCEME. Capt Shrum was put in charge of RCEME inspection. On 12 June, Maj Cox exchanged commands with Maj JM Harding of the 11<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop.

In July, a meeting of unit officers was told by the GOC that the 5<sup>th</sup> Division would likely not be leaving Holland much before Christmas. "This news left us all stunned and it was a very quiet group of officers who left the lecture hall", wrote the unit historian.

In August, the OC and Capt Shrum left on repatriation leave, and Maj JA McTavish took temporary command of the unit. He followed very soon afterwards and was replaced by Maj JW Blatchford.

In September, five LADs were disbanded and their remaining personnel posted to the workshop. Their vehicles and equipment left in convoy to the turn-in depot at Arnhem. The new CREME, 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division, Lt-Col CMR Elmsley, paid a visit to the workshop.

By November, workshop vehicles were being moved to Arnhem and the word was that the unit would be leaving the continent on or about 5 December. The last entry in the war diary, on 7 December 45, read: "Last repatriation draft left at 0430 hours this morning and will report to Nijmegen via Groeningen. Unit officially disbanded with nil personnel on strength and all equipment turned in."



Map 1. The route of the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop in Italy 10 November 1943 to 20 February 45.

### **5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME, Nominal Roll of Officers, 1942 – 1945**

Maj Birss, RJ	Capt McMullen, SG	Lt Evans, RJC
Maj Blatchford, JW	Capt Olver, AS	Lt Fitzsimmons, HJ
Maj Cooke, WG	Capt Piggott, A	Lt Fry, RM
Maj Cox, EC	Capt Pratt, MJ	Lt Grainger, GE
Maj Donaldson, WC	Capt Provan, CG	Lt Harding, SH
Maj Farrell, RG	Capt Ruddy, CE	Lt Henderson, DW
Maj Harding, JM	Capt Shand, GC (RCAPC)	Lt Horvath, E
Maj Pitts, CB	Capt Shrag, AL (RCOC)	Lt Isbester, DH
Maj Stethem, JEH	Capt Shrum, LK	Lt Kidd, E
McKendrick, BG	Capt Smith, WO	Lt Laing, JL
McTavish, JA	Capt Swick, MV	Lt Leckie, DH
Capt Abbott, RSN (RCAPC)	Capt Tait, SG	Lt Maltby, HD,(RCOC)
Capt Barry, AJ	Capt Waite, RG	Lt Millington, D
Capt Burton, LW	Capt Westcott, CM (RCOC)	Lt Neil, PC
Capt Case, KM	Capt Whitlock, FW	Lt Procunier, GW
Capt Cornish, D	Capt Whittingham, JW	Lt Shelling, L
Capt Dodds, EC (RCOC)	Capt Williams, AL	Lt Simpson, RE
Capt Gage, JO	Lt Anderson, RA	Lt Valiquette, JIZ
Capt Hallam, RE	Lt Baker, DB	Lt Wardman, L
Capt Howard, FH	Lt Barton, ES	Dowswell, GR
Capt Ilagey, HW	Lt Bowman, FH	Serre, JEE
Capt Lee, EF	Lt Briscoe, EC	
Capt MacDonald, RA	Lt Caldicott, AH	
Capt MacEachern, EK	Lt Chauvin, EC	
Capt MacLean, JH	Lt Derraugh, HH	
Capt McKinnon, BC	Lt Dick, BO	



## Monthly Summaries from August – December 1944

End-of-the-month summaries for August 1944 to December 1944 provide a picture of unit activities in Italy during that time.

(August) “Despite the many moves during the month, output was kept high. There is a serious shortage of various major assemblies, which make necessary the backloading of equipments within the scope of the shop. There is still some dysentery in the unit, which seems to return periodically. The VD rate has been knocked down to nil. The unit equipment is in much better condition now at the end of the month than it was at the beginning. There is some optimism among personnel about an early finish to the European War.”

(September) “During the month of September the whole division has been committed to battle. On the whole, the work input to the shop has been lower than during rest periods. There are many more tanks of course, and the arrangement of 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop Advanced Workshop Detachment in advance of the main shop works very well. Equipments beyond local repair include vehicles, instruments, and various miscellaneous items, for which parts are not obtainable. The general health of the unit showed an improvement towards the end of the month. Jaundice was the cause of most illness, although there is still some signs of dysentery.”

(October) “During the month, the unit has been more static than in the previous two months. The weather became worse with increasing rain as the month progressed, until it became so bad the unit had to find hard standings or cease work entirely. The health of the unit has been exceptionally good considering the wet weather, leaky canvas, and mud. Jaundice is still fairly prevalent, but dysentery and other organic disorders prevalent in the hot weather have almost completely disappeared. The armoured brigade has not been in action continuously, which has cut down the work entering the shop considerably. The end of the month finds the advance workshop detachment back with the workshop for the first time since August. With practically the whole of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps out of the line, the wishful thinkers of the unit have us out of Italy before winter.”

(November) “During November, the whole workshop has been in the same lines for the first time since August. Men’s quarters are quite comfortable and working space is excellent. The general conditions are reflected in our increased output from jobs in October to jobs in November. After moving into billets, we had many cases of mild colds, but now the health of the unit is very good. During the month, we were the most forward workshop, and supported the varying elements of Porter Force in their light actions. We have exchanged a few vehicles under exercise *Swap*. While the majority of 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop units have been in rest, we have now had a chance to get most of their vehicles repaired. The weather during the month was mostly good.”

(December) “The unit did not move during the month, and consequently the men’s quarters and the shop have been well set up. The weather has been fine but cold during the whole month. The AWD moved up to Mezzano when the armoured brigade went into action. Work in the shop itself has been comparatively light. The general health of the unit has improved considerably. Exercise *Swap* was cancelled pending 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps moving south to the Chieti area. Speculation ran high in unit as to where the ultimate destination of the Corps would be. However, all speculation fell through when the move south was cancelled indefinitely. The unit had a very successful Xmas day, the men’s dinner being the best one overseas, this including the time spent in England. With leave allotments to Canada being increased, it is hoped that a number of the five-year men will be able to get home, and it is hoped by all (that) the New Year will see the end of the war and the Canadian Corps out of Italy.”

## No. 1 Armoured Division Workshop

### Summary

No. 1 Armoured Division Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 575 called out on active service 23 Oct 40 by GO 295/40

Disbanded 31 Mar 42 by GO 200/42

GO 200/42 refers to disbandment of 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, and shows no reference to redesignation from 1<sup>st</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup>.

### History

This workshop was unique among the original five divisional Ordnance workshops in that it had no parent unit from which to draw personnel. When the 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Division was being assembled at the Canadian Armoured Corps Training Centre at Camp Borden in October 1940, the acting CO, Col FF Worthington, asked Capt WH Bonus to form an RCOC workshop for an armoured brigade or division. Authority was granted on 23 October 1940 to mobilize the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Divisional Workshop, RCOC.

The first officers were Major WH Bonus, CO; Capt WL Sagar, Toronto University COTC, 2i/c; Mr CB Pitt and Mr TC Graham “to be appointed captains” according to the unit diary. The strength at 31 December 1940 was 1 Major, 1 Captain, and 4 S/Sgts attached. Considerable help in organization was received from 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Field Workshop, also stationed in Camp Borden, and Lt-Col HG Thompson, who had returned to Canada from the UK in November 1940.

The first RSM of the unit was WO1 C Corfe.

According to the unit’s diary, “the first official job was the repair of bearings on a US Army T-117 tank”.

In February 1941, 56 men were TOS from MD 13, Calgary, and the first official parade was held with 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Division elements to hear Col Worthington. The first two trucks were received this month, both 15-cwt GS 4x2s.

The first officers TOS were:

Capt GH Parker	Capt AJR Stethem	Lt RJ Birss
Lt RG Farrell	Lt HT Fitzsimmons	Lt JM Harding
Lt AS Oliver	Lt GW Painter	Lt CB Pitt
Lt GW Procnier	Lt JG Wilkin	

By June unit strength was up to 14 officers and 362 men.

In July Major Bonus was promoted to Lt-Col and SOS to be SOME (Senior Ordnance Mechanical Engineer) at Division HQ, and Capt Sagar was appointed A/CO. More officers were TOS during the month:

Lt HW Hagey	Lt RG Waite	Lt BP Mahoney
Lt EA Weir	Lt GB Stark	

Later in the month, the unit was redesignated the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Divisional Workshop, RCOC, and shortly afterwards it was inspected by the GOC of the division, Maj-Gen EW Sansom.

On 19 September 1940, according to the unit diary (GO 200/42 shows the date as 31 March 1942), the workshop was disbanded and the following units formed from the bulk of the personnel: 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company; 2<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Brigade Ordnance Company; 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Support Group Ordnance Company; and 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Section Canadian Armoured Corps Ordnance Workshop.

**Nominal Roll of Officers  
No. 1 Armoured Division Workshop 1940 - 1941**

Lt Birss, RJ	Lt Mahoney, RP	Capt Sagar, WL
Lt-Col Bonus, WH	Lt Olver, AS	Lt Stark, GB
Lt Farrell, RG	Lt Painter, GW	Capt Stethem, AJR
Lt Fitzsimmons, HT	Capt Parker, GH	Capt Stethem, JEH
Capt Graham, TC	Capt Pitt, CB	Lt Waite, RG
Lt Hagey, HW	Lt Procnier, GW	Lt Weir, EA
Lt Harding, JM	Capt Relyea, JD	Lt Wilkin, JG

## No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company

### Summary

No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company, RCOC, CASF, Serial 147 mobilizing with 1<sup>st</sup> Division, 1 Sep 39, by GO 135/39, Kingston, Ont, with 10 Light Aid Detachments designated by GO 245/40

Officers:

Capt HJ Styles

Lt MA Dolan

Lt HG Conn

Lt AO Monk

Lt JR Henderson

Converted and redesignated 15 Aug 40 No. 3 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 255

Reorganized and redesignated 10 Jul 41 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC by GO 185/41

Disbanded 7 Jan 43 by GO 151/43

Note: “Personnel to provide 7, 8 & 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portion of HQ REME 3 Canadian Division.” (Taken from CMHQ Adm 0 No. 2, Appendix K, 10 Jan 43)

### History

Capt HJ Styles was in Camp Petawawa when the message reached him that his unit was mobilized. The first officers TOS with him were Lt JR Henderson, Lt HG Conn, Lt MA Dolan, and Lt AO Monk, followed shortly by Lt WD Gilbert and Lt KL Murray. Lt Henderson was SOS a month later, being considered as essential to industry.

Capt Styles was promoted to major and appointed CO, and Lt Conn was promoted to captain. The first recruit attested was C16506 Pte Frederick, LF. Recruiting instructions permitted a recruit to have a maximum of three dependents. Even with these restrictions, 43 tradesmen were enlisted by 4 September. By the middle of October, the unit was quartered in barracks with the married men granted sleeping out passes. By the end of 1939 the strength of the unit had risen to six officers and 141 men. The men were employed on overhauling 60-pounder guns in the Barriefield workshop. These guns dated back to the First World War!

The unit's first Christmas dinner was held in the Webber Building, Kingston. The men of the 3rd Medium Battery, RCA, shared the festivities.

Early in the new year, the unit moved to 60 Queen Street in Ottawa. In February of the same year, the unit paid their last respects to His Excellency, the late Lord Tweedsmuir, Governor General of Canada by contributing part of the troops lining the Ottawa streets for the funeral ceremonies.

Late in March the old style uniforms were replaced by the new battledress.

A few officers from the unit were sent to other units in Montreal and Ottawa. The unit itself moved to Camp Borden, Ontario, and slept under canvas until such time as the new huts were ready for occupancy.

The tempo of training increased with the lengthening of the summer. Industry was increasing its output of new military pattern vehicles. One hundred and thirteen new vehicles arrived in July. These vehicles had

to be assembled before they could be issued. In the meantime the unit tradesmen were employed at the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicle Training Centre on some rather antique looking armoured fighting vehicles.

The unit became No. 3 Army Field Workshop, RCOC on 18 October 1940, composed of a main workshop, three recovery sections, and ten light aid detachments with a total strength of three officers and 166 men.

The units moved eastwards as they became trained. Many new officers and men joined the unit early in 1941. Among the new officers were:

Lt PC Anderson	Lt JB Annand	Lt AC Bragg
Lt T Bromage	Lt JB Butterill	Lt WM Campbell
Lt MS Cranston	Lt FP Findlay	Lt A Gusen
Lt AR Jupp	Lt FE Martin	Lt HJ McLean
Lt A Mendelsohn	Lt RW Morris	Lt JS Panter
Lt AH Renault	Lt AL Rubinof	

At the same time, 193 men reinforced the unit from Regina, Winnipeg, and Toronto.

Early in 1941, fifteen men moved to Halifax. Lt Mendelsohn took 84 men to the new army training area of Camp Debert, in Nova Scotia, and Capt WD Gilbert took 24 men to the training area in Sussex, New Brunswick. In May, Major FW Cranston commanded a convoy consisting of nine officers, 59 men, and 22 vehicles that travelled 1,263 miles from Camp Borden, Ontario, to Camp Debert. The trip took six and a half days, and all vehicles arrived under their own power. Coloured movies were taken on this trip and shown many times during the unit's stay in England.

His Excellency, Governor General, The Earl of Athlone, accompanied by Princess Alice and the GOC of 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division, Maj-Gen CB Price, inspected the workshop in Camp Debert.

About this time, troops of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division were feeling discontented. This feeling finally resulted in the wrecking of a circus in Truro, the nearest large town. Unfortunately some of the men from the workshop were involved.

The workshop went overseas in two groups. Lt AH Renault and the advance party sailed on HMT (His Majesty's Transport) *Strathmore* on 21 July for Aldershot, Hants, via Scotland. Lt-Col HJ Styles followed with the main party on HMT E249 on 15 September. Col Styles was in command of the 1,701 troops aboard. (The Canadian Naval Historian has identified HMT E249 as the *Empress Of Asia*, sailing from Halifax at 0700 hrs on 16 September with 1,703 troops aboard).

The troop train transporting Col Styles and the main party stopped at Birmingham for a well-organized tea, and then were met at Aldershot by Maj-Gen Price and the advance party.

The unit diarist records that the unit changed its name on 1 November 1941 to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop. (GO 185, 6 Aug 41 shows that the unit became the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC effective 10 July 1941).

Maj-Gen CB Price with his senior staff officers attended a unit mess dinner on 13 November. Among these guests were Lt-Col Charles Foulkes, GSO 1, later to become Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and to hold the rank of General before his retirement in 1960.

The unit's third Christmas dinner was held in the sergeant's mess in the traditional manner with all the men seated at one time. The traditional turkey was missing from the menu as turkey was scarce and pork was issued instead. However even this was better than roast mutton!

The usual cloud of rumours thickened. Even the civilians were talking about a unit move according to Capt Mendelsohn. It would appear from the diarist's entries that "...everybody knows except us." The rumours were true. The unit groups moved more than once within the next few months. HQ and Group 2 moved to Crowborough and Park Farm, Group 1 moved to Heathfield and Sayer's Common, and Group 3 moved to Hadlow Down and Horsham, all in Sussex.

A familiar note to Canadian troops who no doubt often questioned the advisability of exterior piping and the use of straw to insulate interior piping in the many barracks and billets they occupied - "All water pipes frozen in West Gables and Robin Rag, the two houses taken over for quarters."

A Good Drivers Club was organized to help reduce the number of vehicle accidents. The requirement was to drive a minimum of 25 miles per month without a traffic violation or a traffic accident!

During this summer of 1942, the men were kept busy with workshop moves, route marches on Saturday mornings for physical conditioning, and weapon training "... even if work slips a little". The ultimate goal of hardening training, "To be capable of travelling 10 miles in two hours, to be attained through progressive training ..." to quote from a training memorandum. By December, most men were taking a daily four-mile run.

Many officers and men were posted to the unit to fill vacancies because of the tremendous expansion of the services. Senior non-commissioned officers were getting the opportunity for commissions. From this unit, QMS RL MacDonald, AQMS JH Bourne, and JR Forrester were sent to OCTU.

S/Sgt WD Feick received injuries in an accident in the armament shop from which he later died.

In August 1942, Col HG Thompson, DDOS(E) 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army, and party, inspected the workshop. Included in the party were Canadian military men prominent in the early army workshop organization: Col GA Secord, CO 1 Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop; Col GA Townsend, DDOS 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps; Lt-Col MCG Meighen, ADOS(E) 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army; Lt-Col FA Murphy, ADOS(E) 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps; and Maj MH Baker, DADOS(E) 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division.

Winter plans for recreation in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division called for boxing, cross-country running, soccer, and hockey as the major sports. The workshop entered a hockey team in the Division League of 18 teams with little success - only winning a single game and losing five. On the less strenuous side, each group showed movies twice a week; Group 1 held two dances weekly, while Group 2 specialized in games and tournaments, bridge, cribbage, and checkers. "The Kit Bags" a Canadian entertainment group, were constantly in demand for variety shows.

Major H Conn had succeeded Lt-Col HJ Styles as CO in November 1941, and commanded the unit until its disbandment.

Training was started in waterproofing vehicles, driving on and off landing craft, and the lashing down of vehicles. Captains CF Starr and T Bromage and 65 men took part in combined operations exercises. Capt Bromage was OC of a composite REME Beach Recovery Detachment operating on the Firth of Forth, Scotland,

The 1942 Christmas dinner was the fourth such dinner for the unit and also the last. Early in January 1943, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, was disbanded and its groups reconstituted to become brigade workshops. Group 1 became the 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop; Group 2 became the 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop; and Group 3 became the 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop. Other elements of the workshop reported to 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Headquarters, REME, and Lt-Col HJ Shields became CREME.

On 30 January, the unit held a "Bust-up" dance. GO 151/43 records the unit's disbandment date as 7 January 1943.

**Nominal Roll Of Officers  
No. 1 Ordnance Workshop Company 1939 - 1943**

Capt Anderson, PC	Lt Findlay, FP	Lt Murray, KL
Capt Annand, JB	Maj Gilbert, WD	Capt Panter, JS
Capt Baird, LT	Lt Gusen, A	Lt Payan, FC
Lt Bragg, AC	Lt Henderson, J	Lt Pitts, WO
Capt Bromage, T	Lt Hetrick, R	Lt Renault, AL
Capt Butterill, JB	Lt Iveson, FW	Capt Rochereau de la Sabliere, G
Lt Campbell, WM	Lt Jupp, AR	Lt Rubinoff, AL
Lt Carriere, MF	Capt Latimer, TH	RCAPC Lt Samuel, N
Lt Case, KM	Lt MacLean, JH	Lt Star, CF
Capt Cranston, FW	Lt McKibbin, KR	Lt Stewart, MD
Lt Cranston, MS	Capt Mendelsohn, A	Lt-Col Styles, HJ
Maj Conn, HG	Lt Monk, AO	Lt Wallace, EH
Lt Dolan, MA	Lt Morris, RW	

# 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC

## Summary

1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 232, Corps troops mobilizing with 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 1 Sep 39 by GO 135/39, London, Ont, with nine light aid detachments designated by GO 245/40

Reorganized and redesignated 10 Jul 41, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, by GO 185/41

Disbanded 7 Jan 43 by GO 151/43

Note: “Personnel to provide 4, 5, & 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portions of HQ REME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division.” (Taken from CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix K, 10 Jan 43)

## History

No 1 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, (Serial 232) was mobilized with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division in September 1939 in Carling Heights, London, Ont, by GO 135/39. GO 245/40 authorized the formation of nine light aid detachments. The first officers appointed to the CASF unit were:

Major CF Curtis (Lt-Col wef 4 September 39)

Lt CH Hillier (Capt wef 4 September 39)

Lt RA Campbell (Capt wef 4 September 39)

Lt EM Shields (Capt wef 4 September 39)

Lt FL Jones

Lt EH Smith

Lt G McQ. Barr

Lt JHG McKee (Paymaster)

The RSM was A29000 WO1 CE St George; his number shows that he was the first man enlisted in the unit. A/CSM (WO 2) FR Pearson succeeded WO1 St George in Dec 39.

Ptes JR Mc Larnon, W Richardson, GW Fisher, and LB Sreaton were early enlistees.

From Carling Barracks the unit moved to Queen’s Park camp and later to Wolseley Barracks (London) where the first unit Christmas dinner was served. By the end of 1939 unit strength was 103 all ranks.

In April 1940, two officers, Major RR Jackson and Lt JA Roncarelli, and 44 men were taken on strength from No 1 Anti-aircraft Brigade Workshop, RCOC, (Montreal), and on the 20<sup>th</sup>, Lieutenants DW McKay, JA Roncarelli, A DeMaio, R Johnson, HE Mattson, LS McGregor and AD Clelland left for England to attend an Ordnance Mechanical Engineer’s Course at the Military College of Science, Woolwich.

Early in May 1940, the first new truck chassis were convoyed from the manufacturers in Windsor and Oshawa. Unit personnel were busy all summer either delivering them to army centres at Montreal, Quebec City, Kingston, Petawawa, and Camp Borden, or assembling bodies on the chassis.

Recruiting of suitable tradesmen was a serious problem because of the limitations on the number of dependents, and therefore the unit officers spent much time in the industrial centres interviewing and recruiting automotive men. By the end of June, 480 men were on strength.



Although on 1 September 1940 orders were received that mobilization was to be completed immediately, and again on the 9<sup>th</sup> the unit was warned to be ready for dispatch overseas from 0900 hrs, it still hadn't moved from Camp Borden at the end of the month. In fact, it was not until 14 December 1940 that it finally sailed from Halifax and arrived in Aldershot, Badajoz Barracks, via Glasgow, on New Years' Day 1941.

The first field (overseas) return of officers 11 January 1941 shows the following 20 officers on strength of the unit; of these, nine were on course, and three officers were commanding light aid detachments:

Lt-Col CF Curtis	Lt CH Duff
Capt RA Campbell	Lt HE Firth
Capt CH Hillier	Lt JR Johnson
Capt EM Shields	Lt R Johnson
Lt RJ Botterill	Lt HB Mattson
Lt KNR Brands	Lt LD McGee
Lt AD Clelland	Lt LS McGregor
Lt DN Cooke	Lt DW McKay
Lt A DeMaio	Lt JA Roncarelli
Lt RH Ramsay	Lt CA Wakeham

May 1941 saw the workshop placed under 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisional Command for local administration only. However, on 10 July, it became 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC. Major CH Hillier became CO when Lt-Col CF Curtis was SOS to No. 1 Army Ordnance Workshop.

With the increasing importance of electronics, notices in Part I orders were now offering "... four to six months courses in electronic subjects to soldiers NOT now receiving trades pay in other trades. Researchers were unable to determine if this meant that the general duty men were now mustered into the electronic trades! Later the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals accepted high school and technical school graduates in wireless for training as technicians.

By late summer the workshop was beginning to function as a 2<sup>nd</sup> Division unit, although in August they were still working on the 25-pounders for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. These rolled out of the shop on 27 August, the overhauls completed on schedule. A letter from the War Office told of "the defects to watch for in the overhauling of these weapons". The war diarist added, "We could add substantially to the list".

Three noteworthy events happened in September 1941. Divisional battle patches were put up on the 9<sup>th</sup>, ten new lorries, 3-ton, GS, and five trucks, 15-cwt, completely equipped, arrived on the 16<sup>th</sup>, and His Majesty, King George VI, visited the unit on the 18<sup>th</sup>.

Exercise *Bumper* kept much of the unit busy during October, and the workshop was moved by groups to the Crowborough-Mayfield-Heathfield area in Sussex. Group 2 later moved from Mayfield to Wadhurst Castle, Sussex, where mud created problems. A "brick convoy" hauled brick from bombed buildings in London to the castle for hard standings at the rate of 10 tons a day, "which sank out of sight in mud as fast as it was dumped". Lt JE Williamson is reported to have dug the gravel himself for the concrete floor because "he'd paid 10 shillings for 3 yards and wanted to get his money's worth."

Christmas 1941 was a busy time. The officers held a mess dinner at Beaconsfield in Crowborough on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. The traditional Christmas dinner was served to the men by the officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers over a two-day period, the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup>. The canteen staged a Christmas concert and dance for the men in Wadhurst. In addition, throughout the Christmas season, most of the men enjoyed a home-cooked dinner in the homes of the hospitable people of Sussex.

The year 1942 started with a spell of winter, which meant many cracked cylinder blocks, and ‘glassy’ roads covered with three inches of loose snow. “Even the Scammell had to resort to winding herself up some of the hills”, records the diarist. Cracked cylinder blocks were an expensive loss, which with reasonable care by user units, need never have happened. Group 1 had only two cracked blocks to replace, Group 2 had 14, and Group 3 had five, although each workshop group had about the same number (800) of vehicles to service.

Each cylinder block cost £9-5-6, and according to the diarist, took six man-days to replace.

In February 42, Group 1 lost its MT stores lorry ‘in a fire which destroyed Martin’s Garage, Crowborough’. The guard saved the Scammell tractor by driving it through the wall, and then used it to winch out the valuable machinery lorry (lorry, 3-ton, 6-wheel, machinery A).

The summer of 1942 was a repetition of the previous one, but more intensified as the tempo of events increased. Training was getting tougher; two-mile runs were instituted; schemes like *Tiger* and *Simmer* were more like the real thing.

Early in August, twenty men from Group 3 were detailed to waterproof a number of universal carriers. Fifteen jeeps (cars, 5-cwt) were brought into the workshop to be adapted into ambulances. “It appears that both the carriers and 5-cwts are being prepared for a possible raid”, said the diarist on August 15. How right he was! On the 19<sup>th</sup> the big raid on Dieppe took place. Men of the unit, too, were involved, with the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigades. S/Sgt RE Crumb, an armourer, and Lance Corporals HW Gear and CS Norman were reported missing; Pte HW Raymond went to hospital with a shoulder wound while Privates McDonald, McVicar, and McIntyre returned unharmed. Gear was later reported killed, being the first man in the unit to be killed in action, and Crumb and Norman became prisoners of war. These men, with the exception of S/Sgt Crumb were in charge of ammunition in the raid.

German bombing of England was now much more scattered; on 29 September a house and school at Petworth, Sussex were hit. Capt WG Hamilton had all the windows of his office blown in about him and onto his desk. Men from Group 1 with Capt Hamilton and Capt LD Walsh, the Ordnance Spare Parts officer, were first on the scene and dug with their bare hands to get at the trapped children. Twenty-two children were killed and seven died later of their injuries. Eighteen children were listed as missing.

Maj-Gen JH Roberts, GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division, inspected the workshop in October 42. The unit took part in Exercise *Ordmobile*, a two-day live-ammunition training scheme for Ordnance units, on 17 and 18 December.

Christmas 1942, the second in England, saw half the men on Christmas leave, with the remainder given New Years’ leave. Three officers and 22 men were guests of the REME workshop in Ashford, Kent. This area will be remembered for its picturesque oast-houses with their tilted canopies, designed for ventilating the kilns inside the buildings used for curing the harvest of hops.

A welcome, if belated, Christmas present was the raise in pay announced early in 1943.

As a prelude to the Second Front, members of the unit under Lts DL Angus and JH Bourne travelled to Rothesay, Scotland, for eight days combined operations training.

The officers on strength on 1 January 1943 were:

Major CH Hellier	Lt JH Bourne
Capt CF Cockshutt	Lt DC Dobbin
Capt WG Hamilton	Lt HW Mole
Lt DL Angus	Lt WB Moore
Lt CM Barrett	Lt RA Morris

News of the reorganization of the divisional workshop into brigade workshops was received with mixed feelings. The move was welcomed as a great improvement, but the job of handing over, checking the G1098 for surpluses and deficiencies and vehicle tools meant “plenty of midnight oil being burned to keep paper work up to schedule”, wrote the diarist.

The last Part 1 Order of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisional Workshop, RCOC, was published on 29 January 1943, although GO 151/43 showed the unit disbanded on 7 January.

This order showed that Capt CF Cockshutt from HQ Group and QMS HA Popkin and six men were to report to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisional Headquarters, REME. Lt WB Moore from Group 1 and Sgts JB Allen, WS MacDonnell and JE Little and men were to report to 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC. Lt JH Bourne from Group 2 and QMS JL Moyse, Sgt WG Vinson and men were to report to 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC. Major CH Hillier, Capt WG Hamilton, ASM EW Hoffman, QMS WH Norton, Sgt IM Lewis and men of Group 3 were to report to 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCOC.

### Nominal Roll of Officers No. 1 Army Field Workshop, 1939 - 1943

Lt	Angus, DL	Lt	Elliott, WF	Capt	McLarnon, JR
Lt	Barrett, CM	Capt	Firth, HE	Lt	McQueen-Barr, G
Lt	Botterill, RJ	Capt	Hamilton, WG	Lt	Mole, HW
Lt	Bourne, JH	Maj	Hillier, CH	Lt	Moore, WB
Lt	Brands, KNR	Lt	Hore, LT	Lt	Morris, RA
Lt	Butterill, HT	Maj	Hunter, GM	Lt	Morris, RW
Capt	Campbell, RA	Maj	Jackson, RR	Lt	Parker, J
Lt	Carriere, MR	Lt	Johnson, JR	Lt	Phillips, FM
Lt	Clelland, AD	Capt	Johnson, R	Lt	Ramsay, RH
Capt	Cockshutt, CF	Lt	Jones, FL	Lt	Roncarelli, JA
Lt	Cooke, DN	Lt	Kirby, CG	Capt	Scott, JR
Lt Col	Curtis, CF	Lt	Mattson, HB	Capt	Shields, EM
Capt	Darling, HH	Lt	McArthur, DRB	Capt	Smith, EH
Capt	DeMaio, A	Lt	McGee, LD	Lt	Thompson, TC
Lt	Dietrich, EJ	Lt	McGregor, LS	Lt	Wakeham, CA
Lt	Dobbin, DC	Lt	McKay, DW	Capt	Walsh, LD
Lt	Duff, CF	Capt	McKee, JHG	RCAPC Lt	Williamson, JE

## No. 2 Army Field Workshop

### Summary

No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 116 mobilized with 1<sup>st</sup> Division, 1 September 30 by G. O. 135/39, Toronto, Ont, with 15 light aid detachments designated by GO 245/40

Officers: Lt-Col HG Thompson, Maj GW Beecroft, Capt JK Bradford, Capt S Craven, NL Spearing (Lt ret.), FC Smith, Esq.

Reorganized and redesignated 10 Jul 41 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC by G.O. 185/41

Disbanded 7 Jan 43 by G.O. 151/43

NOTE: “Personnel to provide 1, 2 & 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portions of HQ REME 1 Canadian Division, (Taken from CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix K, 10 Jan 43)

### History

No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, (Serial 116) was mobilized in Toronto, 1 September 1939 for active service with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division. The first CASF War establishment was for 31 officers and 704 men. The unit at that time was made up of a main workshop with three recovery sections and fifteen light aid detachments known as LADs. Military qualification examiners for the next two years inevitably trapped the unwary new officer by asking “What is an LAD?”

Major HG Thompson, a DFC winner from the First World War, and Capt GW Beecroft were appointed to the unit and each was promoted almost at once. Within days the following officers were also appointed:

Lt JK Bradford (promoted to Capt 9 September 1939)

Capt S Craven

Capt NL Spearing

Capt TC Smith

The first RSM, WO1 WC Donaldson, was appointed on 10 September. The first Part 2 Order reveals that the first man attested in the unit was B94100 Pte Wilding H.

Orders were received on 11 September from District HQ to suspend recruiting until further notice but to attest all applicants who had been medically examined.

Many problems appeared at this time to delay recruiting. Col CP Stacey<sup>10</sup> in his *Six Years Of War* said:

“For every unit, mobilization was a time of many difficulties, of which the problem of attracting the recruit was normally the least. The worst were those concerning accommodation, clothing and equipment.

“Accommodation for the newly mobilized units was very difficult to find, in spite of the measures taken before the outbreak of war much use was made of available public buildings, particularly exhibition buildings

“The clothing situation caused serious complaints, which continued for some months... Orders for the new battle dress were placed only after the outbreak of war.”

<sup>10</sup> Stacey, Col CP, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Second World War, Vol 1: 56-57. 1955

Col Stacey went on to say, “The situation with respect to boots was particularly difficult, the supply on hand was relatively small, and the recruits’ civilian footwear fell to pieces rapidly.”

An additional problem not discussed by Col Stacey at this point is revealed by the following quotation<sup>11</sup> from the unit’s own war diary.

“Soon after recruiting started, it became apparent that there would be considerable difficulty in securing skilled mechanics and tradesmen to the number required. This condition appears due to largely the lack of a proper apprenticeship system in Canada. Also, it was found that there were few such men available under 30 years of age, and in fact the majority were over 35. This is due largely to the depressed business conditions of the last 10 years, whereby the youth of the country had little opportunity to learn mechanical trades, Hence, it will probably be found that this unit will have an unusually large proportion of married men with children.

Notwithstanding, interviewing continued and full particulars were recorded preparing for the moment that word would be received to commence recruiting again.

To again quote<sup>12</sup> from the unit’s own diary.

“It became increasingly apparent that there would be great difficulty in securing the necessary skilled mechanics for this unit, and in order not to lose any such men applying for enlistment, special representations were made to District HQ requesting that permission be given to take on such men. A similar situation arose regarding prospective commissioned officers, 24 of whom are still required. The qualifications for officers in this unit are quite high, in that they should be graduate engineers, preferably mechanical, and with experience in the work this unit is expected to carry out. Even during the depression, there was no real surplus of such engineers and in wartime, with the greatly increased activity in ... munitions, ... aviation ... and in the air force, there will be real shortage of experienced engineers.

Permission was granted on 19 November 1939 by District HQ to renew recruiting for the workshop and three recovery sections, and for thirteen of the fifteen LADs. There were no lack of volunteers, but there was a decided lack of properly qualified tradesmen suitable for employment in the technical role required of the unit. The ratio of acceptable recruits to volunteers applying to join the unit was at this time one to eight!

In October 1939, the unit moved into the Horse Palace on the Canadian National Exhibition Grounds on Toronto’s waterfront.

Several more officers, some to become prominent in military and civilian affairs, arrived in December 1939.

Lt WL Thompson	Lt JW Clandinan	Lt RL Bartlett
Lt MCG Meighen	Lt HH Darling	Lt JF Weston
Lt WJ Usher	Lt JH Fox	Lt CR Boehm
Lt MH Baker	Lt RH Noble	Lt AC Malloch

A special Christmas party was held in the Fort York Armoury for the married men and their families. A special Christmas dinner was prepared for the men celebrating their first Christmas in the service of their country.

The strength had reached 21 officers and 574 men by the end of 1939.

<sup>11</sup> War Diary, Vol 1, 12 September 1939.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Vol 1, 23 September 1939.

Five more officers arrived in January 1940.

Lt JW Pearson	Lt LP Baker	Lt JG Pope
Lt GRS Henry	Lt LT Baird	

A newly commissioned PAM (Permanent Active Militia) officer, Lt HW Thomas and QMS Morgan HGF were attached from No. 2 Detachment, RCOC, a PAM unit. QMS Morgan was promoted to WO1 before the end of January and rose to the rank of Lt-Col before retiring from the Canadian Army (Regular) in 1960.

Six officers left Canada during January for the Ordnance Mechanical Engineer's Course in England. The 26 remaining officers and 666 men sailed from Halifax on HMT *Aquitania* in convoy with the *Empress of Britain*, *Empress of Australia*, *Monarch Of Bermuda* and the SS *Chrobry* on the 30 January 1940 for Gourock in Scotland.

The *Empress of Britain* arrived on 9 February 1940. The troops left for Aldershot, Hants, by train and were met by Maj-Gen AGL McNaughton GOC 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division, (later to become General, The Honorable AGL McNaughton, CH, CB, CMG, DSO, CD, The Honorary Colonel-Commandant of The Corps of RCEME), Lt-Col JN Gibson, the Senior Ordnance Mechanical Engineer (SOME) of the Division, and Maj GW Beecroft.

The unit was housed in Salamanca Barracks ...“found in general despair; water pipes frozen and burst; barrack rooms and bedding very dirty.” This indeed was to be a familiar story to the Canadian troops sent to Aldershot upon arrival in Great Britain.

Even as late as 1942, officers were required to pay a shilling a hole (provided the hole was no larger than the shilling) for each hole in the walls of their rooms not already recorded on the marching-in state. Many an officer, unaware of the ‘system’, was caught, and paid for holes in the plaster already paid for several times.

Training started in earnest in February 1940. Officers left for technical courses at the Military College of Science. Tradesmen were sent on courses to various parts of the country. A few of the courses and places were:

- RAOC Training Establishment, Hillsea, Portsmouth.
- CAV Ltd, Fuel Injection School in Acton.
- Leicester College of Technology, Instrument Mechanic's Course.
- Messrs Lucas, Ltd, Birmingham.

Maj-Gen McNaughton inspected the workshop in all its activities on 1 May 1940. His impression was recorded as being “decidedly favorable.”

“The first bombs on the mainland of Britain had been dropped on 9 May<sup>13</sup>. A German drive began on the morning of 10 May 1940. The German forces pushed into the Netherlands and Belgium. The German thrust into the Low Countries resulted, among other things, in the cancellation of leave passes and annual leave for the unit and in the mounting of an armed guard on the parade ground to meet any emergency: The leaves and week-end passes were restored on 12 May.

The continued success of the German forces caused tremendous concern in Great Britain. Again the units' passes were cancelled and men on leave were recalled. This time personnel were warned to carry their first field dressing at all times and to complete their wills at once.

<sup>13</sup> Stacey, Col CP, Ibid (1): 291.

At this period consideration was being given to using all or part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division as part of a combined effort to restore the situation on the continent. The division was training vigorously in preparation for going to the continent in the late summer. However the German successes halted these plans. The turn of events was so confused that it is essential to have a brief background introduced at this point in order that the moves of the unit and its fifteen LADs will be shown in proper perspective.

Col CP Stacey, in his book *The Canadian Army 1939-45*,<sup>14</sup> said:

“At this point, the possibility of employing the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division, or a portion of it, as part of an effort to restore the situation, came to the fore in London. On 23 May General McNaughton was called to the War Office and told by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that it was proposed to dispatch him to France to restore the threatened communications of the BEF. The object was to “re-establish the road and railway line through Hazebrouck and Armentieres”. The new line of communication would be opened through Calais if possible or, failing Calais, through Dunkirk. General McNaughton was to take command of all troops in the area, including a brigade group, which had, just been sent from England to Calais; and it was intended to reinforce him with one brigade from his own division, followed by a second if this seemed desirable.

“In the course of the same day, all arrangements were completed for the movement of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Armand A. Smith and composed of the Royal Canadian Regiment, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, and the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders of Canada, with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, two anti-tank batteries and some engineers attached. In the early hours of 24 May, these units began to arrive in Dover by rail. By eleven o’clock, the first flight of the Brigade was embarked and ready to sail. But it did not sail.

“On the evening of 23 May General McNaughton had left Dover to see for himself the situation in the French Channel ports... It was very clear also that the general situation ... was entirely chaotic, and that communications of every sort were uncertain and unreliable. At eleven a.m. on the 24<sup>th</sup>, General McNaughton re-embarked in the “*Verity*”. What he had seen and heard had produced in his mind the conviction that the Dunkirk area was already quite sufficiently congested; what the troops there needed was not reinforcement but organization.

“Before five p.m. he was again with the principal officers of the War Office and General Crerar. General McNaughton reported at length. No final decision as to sending troops to Dunkirk was taken, but it was agreed that this should not be done for the moment, and orders were sent for the units at Dover to disembark and return to Aldershot.

“By 21 May, the Belgian army was weakening under the weight of the very heavy German attacks, and Lord Gort was forced to undertake a withdrawal to the coast, and evacuation through Dunkirk. On the previous day he had already inquired of the War Office whether a Canadian brigade could be dispatched “to provide a nucleus of fresh and well-trained troops on the bridgehead position”. The result, shortly after midnight on the night of 25-26 May, was orders for the same Canadian troops designated on the 23<sup>rd</sup> to be ready to move the following night.

“During the 26<sup>th</sup>, the project was fully discussed at the War Office. Both McNaughton and Crerar were convinced that it was militarily unsound, but the former made it clear that if higher authority thought the expedition desirable he was quite prepared to undertake it. ... the plan had been approved by the War Cabinet, and it was necessary to seek the concurrence of Mr. Churchill before “Angle Move”, as it was called, was cancelled. Even then, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade’s transport was left loaded at Aldershot, and the units remained on eight hours’ notice. And on 27 May the scheme was revived a second time; McNaughton and Crerar agreed upon a revised composition

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<sup>14</sup> Stacey, Col CP, *The Canadian Army 1939-45*: 10-16.1948.

for the force, with a view to committing as few men as possible to what more and more appeared to them a useless sacrifice, but in the afternoon “Angel Move” was finally abandoned.

“The same day the King of the Belgians asked the Germans for an armistice. The evacuation of the BEF through Dunkirk was now beginning. While these great events were taking place, the Canadians in Britain were not idle. It was now quite possible that Hitler might attempt an immediate invasion of the United Kingdom; as Mr. Churchill said on 4 June, “We must expect another blow to be struck almost immediately at us or at France”. General McNaughton, strongly of the opinion that the direct defence of the United Kingdom was now the Canadians’ paramount task, had taken steps, on 25 May, to organize them for it in a new manner. The 1<sup>st</sup> Division and the ancillary troops were to form four self-contained brigade or equivalent groups, capable in turn of being broken down into battalion groups constituting flying columns of all arms. The object was to turn the Canadian force into a “highly mobile, quick acting, hard hitting reserve”; and General McNaughton suggested that it should move to a central area from which it could strike at an invader crossing any portion of the coast. GHQ Home Forces agreed, and the War Office found additional transport for the Canadians; on 27 May they were ordered to an assembly area in the vicinity of Northampton; and on 29 May the whole body, including both the Division and the ancillary troops, was formally constituted as a self-contained organization known as “Canadian Force”. The same night the move from Aldershot to Northampton began.

... The enemy had no immediate intention of attacking England. The destruction of the surviving armies of France was now his object, and on 5 June he assailed General Weygand’s line on a broad front. It was the policy of the British Government to sustain the French, at almost any cost; and on this same day, accordingly, the War Cabinet took the bold resolve to form a “Second BEF”, and dispatch to the continent every division fit to move. ... The only ones in Britain ready for immediate action were the 52<sup>nd</sup> (Lowland) and the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian; and it was now proposed to send these to France immediately...

“On 6 June the Canadians were ordered back from Northampton to Aldershot. By 8 June the move had been completed...

“The 52<sup>nd</sup> Division and the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division were to move to France in that order. Brigadier Smith’s 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade Group ... was to form the first flight of the Canadian movement; and its advanced parties left Aldershot on the evening of 8 June. Vehicles and the men accompanying them were embarked at Falmouth, while parties travelling by rail moved through Plymouth. The leading vehicle parties disembarked at Brest on 12 June, but the main body of the Brigade began landing there only in the early morning of the 14<sup>th</sup>. ...

“...The Canadian units, landing at Brest, were to assemble “north-east of the port”.

“...Only the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Group got to France; and that group, instead of moving, as General McNaughton had expected, to an assembly area close to Brest to await the rest of the division, was immediately sent forward deep into the interior - for the authorities on the lines of communication who were now in control of the movement had not received such instructions as the Canadians had been led to expect. The British Headquarters at Brest had been ordered merely to carry out the same routine followed in the movement of the original BEF to France in 1939, and the Canadian units were sent to the same assembly area - about Laval and Le Mans - which had then been used. In accordance with these orders, the road parties were sent forward from Brest in little groups of vehicles moving independently; the rail parties were put on trains, which carried them, rapidly inland.

“As a result, the Canadian troops, by the night of 14-15 June, were extraordinarily scattered. A large part of the division was in Aldershot preparing to move (one engineer unit in fact was still back at Northampton); other elements were at Plymouth and Falmouth, embarked or preparing to



embark; still others were at Brest or scattered along the roads between there and Le Mans; the 1<sup>st</sup> Field Regiment, RCHA, was in billets at Parce in the assembly area; and three trains - carrying, respectively, the Headquarters of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade with the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders, the Royal Canadian Regiment, and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment - were approaching that area.

“By this time, however, it had been decided to cancel the whole movement. Early on the 14<sup>th</sup> the Germans entered undefended Paris. The same morning General Brooke ... recommended to the War Office that all movement of British forces to France should be stopped, and arrangements made for evacuation.

“To reverse the movement of troops still in England, or on shipboard at Plymouth, or even Brest, and turn them back towards Aldershot, was a simple matter; to extricate the units in France was not quite so easy. ...The Hastings train was turned about at Laval, that of the RCR near (it appears) Chateaubriant. These units were re-embarked at Brest and arrived safely at Plymouth early on the 17<sup>th</sup>.

“Luck, indeed, had been with the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade. It is a remarkable fact, in view of the conditions then existing in France, that only six Canadians were left behind across the Channel. One was dead, having been killed in a motorcycle accident. Four were interned in France by the Germans or the French Vichy government, but succeeded in escaping and made their way back to England during 1941. The sixth man remained a prisoner of war until the end of hostilities.

“With respect to transport the story was less happy. A total of 216 Canadian vehicles was lost; only one is known to have been saved - a station wagon which the Hastings and Prince Edward managed to embark on a trawler.

“Equipment, as distinct from transport, was almost entirely lost save for personal weapons. There was, however, one very notable exception; the 1<sup>st</sup> Field Regiment brought back its guns.”

To return to No. 2 Army Field Workshop, on 2 June the workshop moved by road and rail to Northampton. All ranks were billeted in private homes. Col Stacey wrote that<sup>15</sup> “The people of Northampton and the neighbouring town gave the arriving Canadians a great welcome - a welcome that many of them have never forgotten; but they were not allowed to linger long in this pleasant area.” Ten LADs were ordered to join their units for embarkation to France. Actually only 14 LAD, RCOC, commanded by Lt JG Pope, attached to 1<sup>st</sup> Division Signals landed in France at Brest on 13 June and returned safely to Plymouth the next day.

The workshop stayed in Northampton only eight days before returning to Aldershot. The eight days were spent on infantry drill, weapon training and anti-gas instruction.

The first machinery lorries arrived. Each recovery section received a type ‘A’ and type ‘F’. The ‘A’ lorry was used by workshops in the field for metal turning and drilling and also had a battery charger, which would handle ten 6-volt batteries simultaneously. The ‘F’ lorry was used for the testing and repair of automotive electrical equipment such as starters, generators, etc. By 25 June, seven more special type lorries and two breakdown vehicles had arrived. The special types were ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’ and ‘L’.<sup>16</sup>

The workshop was given many special jobs to do, in addition to their basic role of the repair and recovery of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division vehicles. For example, the workshop was required to produce attachments for the mounting of 700 machine guns on 15-cwt trucks. The lack of standardization of screw threads and gas cylinders between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States meant the manufacture of adaptors in order that the equipment issued in Canada could be used in England - for example oxy-acetylene outfits

<sup>15</sup> Ibid: 12.

<sup>16</sup> Vehicle Data Book Canadian Army Overseas, CMHQ: 79, 81, 82, 105-108, 138-139. 1944. (This reference gives the operational roles of the special vehicles referred to.)

for cutting and welding and anaesthetic machines used in the operating theatres of 15 Canadian General Hospital in Bramshott. The same problem appeared again in the European campaign. More adaptors had to be made in order to use the ‘liberated’ oxygen bottles, the supply of filled oxygen bottles from Ordnance not being anywhere near the demand of the brigade workshops and LADs.

The first bombs on the mainland of Britain had been dropped on 9 May. However it is not generally known that the first Canadian casualties by bombing were suffered by No. 2 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, at Aldershot on 6 July 1940.<sup>17</sup> Two German bombs were dropped on Salamanca Barracks killing B94646 WO2 RT Knox, B88063 S/Sgt JF Bailey, and B94409 Pte LN Sword. Lt WC Bleaken and 28 men were wounded.

Gen McNaughton arrived within the hour to personally see the damage and the officers and men. He was very complimentary on how quickly the men had returned to work. The funeral for the killed was held at Brookwood cemetery with full military honours. The Royal Artillery and the Royal Tank Regiment participated in the service.

The workshop moved to the Durdans, Epsom. It was here that the warm relationship between the workshop personnel and their hosts was commemorated with the gift of eight benches for Rosebury Park by the officers of the unit in a presentation ceremony held in 1951. Col GW Beecroft said, recalling that his old unit came to Epsom on 12 July 1940, “They were happy days, but also eventful and grim because invasion was expected at any moment and we were all ill-prepared for what might come.” He went on to say “I am happy to present these benches as a small token of the appreciation of the wonderful hospitality that was shown to our people during their stay here.”<sup>18</sup>

One year after mobilization (31 August 1940) the unit strength was 26 officers and 375 men. These figures included the LADs.

A nominal roll of officers at this time showed the names of some of the officers.

CO	Lt-Col HG Thompson
2i/c	Maj GW Beecroft
Adj	Capt RKC Jepson (GGFG)
Majors	FA Murphy (COME 7 <sup>th</sup> Corps (British))
Captains	JK Bradford
	MCG Meighen (2 Cdn Div)
	WL Thompson
Lts	RL Bartlett
	HJ Butterill
	LGS Robinson
	GH de la Sabliere
	JR Scott
	NH Spearing
	HW Thomas
	WH Thompson

<sup>17</sup> Stacey, Col CP, Ibid (4).

<sup>18</sup> The RCEME Quarterly, DEME, Vol, 3 No 3: 29. 1951.

## JE Williamson

The following officers (with the names of their sergeant majors) were shown commanding the 15 LADs followed by the name of the units to which they were attached.

No. 1 LAD	Lt GM Hunter ( WO2 GG Gibson)	1 Cdn Inf Bde,
No. 2 LAD	Lt PG Ingram (W02 EJ Hutton)	2 Cdn Inf Bde.
No. 3 LAD	Lt LP Baker (WO2 J Parker)	3 Cdn Inf Bde.
No. 4 LAD	Capt JT Truman (S/Sgt JH Gardiner)	Tor Scot R (MG).
No. 5 LAD	Lt JW Pearson (WO2 J Hall)	Sask L. I.
No. 6 LAD	Lt JF Weston (S/Sgt JW Jenkins)	RMR (MG).
No. 7 LAD	Lt JH Fox (WO2 R McCart)	1 Cdn Fd Regt.
No. 8 LAD	Lt MH Baker (WO2 GA Fleck)	2 Cdn Fd Regt.
No. 9 LAD	Lt CR Boehm (WO2 CG Sharpe)	3 Cdn Fd Regt.
No. 10 LAD	Lt RH Noble (WO2 W Kirkpatrick-Crockett)	1 Cdn Med Regt .
No. 11 LAD	Lt JW Clandinan (WO2 JW Sugden)	11 Cdn A Fd Regt.
No. 12 LAD	Lt GR Henry (WO2 JG Downward)	8 Cdn A Fd Regt.
No. 13 LAD	Lt LT Baird (W02 W Beer)	1 Cdn A/Tk Regt.
No. 14 LAD	Lt JG Pope (W02 JF Bennett)	1 Cdn Div Sigs.
No. 15 LAD	Lt HH Darling (S/Sgt TH Johnson)	1 Cdn Div Engrs.

After the unit moved its winter quarters in Epsom, Lts DA Campbell, DRB McArthur, MH Hastings, DJ Moore, TSG Quance, WP Smith, and RC Sentance arrived as reinforcement officers from the RCOC Training Center in Barriefield, Ontario.

The workshop suffered another bombing when the quarters for No. 2 Recovery Section were destroyed injuring two men. Fortunately most of the men were attending the Mayor of Epsom and Ewell's Charity Ball.

The first mention of a fuel shortage appears in the unit Part 1 Orders of 1 November 1940.

“Until further notice, fires will not be kept burning in quarters during the day. The practice ...is wasteful... and might result in coal not being available when the weather becomes colder.”

Lt-Col HG Thompson left the unit to return to Canada for medical treatment. Major Beecroft was promoted to Lt-Col and appointed commanding officer with effect from 12 November 1940.

During November, two major problems arose. One was the increasing shortage of skilled tradesmen available to reinforce the 15 LADs and the three recovery sections that the main workshop was responsible to supply. The other problem was how technical training could be speeded up to improve the recovery and repair of vehicles.

The workshop realized that more men were being lost through medical reboards than by reinforcement to the recovery sections and LADs. The main reason was that the personnel of the workshop being recruited as skilled tradesmen were of necessity of an older age group. The unit did not record any immediate solution to this problem of reinforcements and the same problem was to arise later. The speed up in training was temporarily solved by running local short courses on Canadian military pattern (CMP) vehicles instead of sending new tradesmen away to training schools for a three-to-four month period studying British vehicles.

Christmas dinner was held on 24 December 1940, because more than 300 of the 400 men had invitations from the people of Epsom and vicinity for dinner on Christmas Day.

The Honorable Mr JL Ralston, Minister of National Defence, Maj-Gen McNaughton, GOC 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division, and Maj-Gen Crerar, Chief of the General Staff in Canada inspected the workshop on Boxing Day. The Hon Mr Ralston was quoted as saying “I had no idea such work was going on - this is the busiest spot I have seen in the Canadian Army.” The GOC agreed.

A Mark H (12A) Matilda tank belonging to 44 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment, was recovered and brought into the workshop. AQMS WM Dalrymple “...who is very keen on tanks, lost no time in getting to work” recorded the diarist on 28 December 1940. Later Dalrymple was promoted to WO1 and on 25 April 1941 he left to train for his commission,

His Excellency, Mr Vincent Massey, Canada’s High Commissioner in Great Britain visited the unit in February. His Excellency reported<sup>19</sup>

“After my visit to Hackwood I went on to see the No 2 Army Field Workshop. ...Here a group of Canadian mechanics are occupied in an extraordinary variety of highly skilled labour, which included, incidentally, the making of a number of medical instruments for the use of the Neurological Hospital at Hackwood, making tunnelling equipment for the tunnelling unit which has been despatched to Gibraltar..., and tank repairs for a British division. The men who form part of this unit are for the most part in peacetime highly-paid skilled specialists.”

The DDOS Canadian Corps handed down a change in policy changing the relationship between the workshop and its fifteen LADs. The army field workshop would no longer be responsible in any way for their administration and would no longer count them in their establishment. The LADs became the direct responsibility of the ADOSs of the formations effective 1 April 1941.<sup>20</sup>

The vexing problem of providing skilled tradesmen again arose in April. A request was received for names of suitable personnel to be returned to Canada to become instructors at the RCOC Training Centre in Barriefield Ontario. “Unfortunately the ones suitable for this will be our best men” said the diarist. “In this connection, we are concerned with demands being made upon this unit and its future demands for personnel for other appointments, particularly in view of the impending expansion of the RCOC.” The diarist goes on to say: “We have not an unlimited supply of such skilled personnel due to:

- (a) Practically no Militia Unit,
- (b) Great handicap placed upon us through suspension of recruiting from 10 September to 21 Nov 1939,
- (c) Loss of more than 100 ORs through medical reboards - principally older and more experienced men; and
- (d) The main shop has already furnished higher NCOs for the LADs and other outside units.

There seems to be an impression that the main shop has a pool of personnel like a spring-fed well, in that we automatically fill up when a portion is removed. The diarist concludes his bitter comments by saying “Actually the analogy is that of filling a bucket with fresh milk, the cream rises to the top, and if the cream is continually skimmed off, there will be nothing left but skimmed milk.”<sup>21</sup>

Lt-Col Beecroft was SOS on 20 June 1941 and appointed CO of No 1 Army Ordnance Workshop. Major WL Thompson, a brother of Lt-Col HG Thompson, took over the command on 2 July 1941.

<sup>19</sup> War Diary, Appx 1 Vol 20, Apr 1941.

<sup>20</sup> DDOS Cdn Corps, File 9-0-2, 25 Mar 1941.

<sup>21</sup> War Diary, Vol 20, 5 Apr 1941.

No 2 Army Field Workshop was reorganized and redesignated on 10 July 1941 into the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOG by General Order 185/41 with an establishment of 11 officers and 334 men under the command of Major WL Thompson.

Officers on strength at this time were:

Capt AC Malloch

Lt AD Clelland

Lt LP Baker

Lt HW Thomas

Lts KNR Brands, GA Wakeham and FGH Hale joined the unit on 25 August.

The necessity to conserve gasoline (as all gasoline had to be imported) introduced vehicle holidays. Twenty-five percent of the units' transport was taken off the road and the remainder were not allowed to be driven more than four days a week. It's not clear just how such a regulation could be effectively enforced. In addition, each Monday became a Corps vehicle holiday when all corps transport was banned from the roads except under cases of emergency.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Ordnance Workshop moved to the south of England and took up winter quarters in Sussex. The HQ of the unit was at Ormonde Hall in Bolney. Group 1 was at Hove, Group 2 was at Buck Barns Corners and Group 3 was at Petworth.

The workshop took part in the South-East Command exercise *Tiger*, from 13 to 30 May 1942. The local name given to the exercise by the troops who inevitably used more succinct terminology called it "South-Eastern Commando", so hard was the training under Lt Gen BL Montgomery the GOC-in-C, South-east Command. The workshop was plagued with rain and bogged-down vehicles throughout the exercise.

There was a continual movement of field officers gaining experience after *Tiger*. The workshop had three new COs in three months and a fourth two months later.

Maj WL Thompson was posted to 2 Army Ordnance Workshop in July 1942. Major JW Inglis succeeded him. In August, Maj Inglis was posted to 1 Army Ordnance Workshop and Maj EM Shields succeeded him. Maj Shields left for 1 Army Ordnance Workshop and was succeeded by Maj HW Thomas in September. In November, Maj GM Hunter succeeded Maj Thomas.

Most of the officers and men enjoyed Christmas Day in the homes of the people of Sussex.

The strength of the unit at the end of 1942 was six officers and 261 men. The unit ceased to function as a divisional workshop on 29 January 1943. GO 151/43 records that the unit was disbanded 7 January 1943. The personnel were posted to 1, 2 and 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops and portions of HQ REME 1 Canadian Division.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> CMHQ Adm 0 No. 2, Appx K, 10 January 1943.

### Nominal Roll of Officers No. 2 Army Field Workshop 1939-1943

Maj Abbott, CF, RCAMC	Lt Edwards, JB	Lt Quart, H, RCAPC
Lt Abel, GC	Lt Else, F	Capt Ready, JM, RCAPC
Capt Anderson, BL	Capt Fox, JH	Lt Richardson, RF
Capt Anderson, PC	Lt Gage, JD	Lt Robinson, TGS
Lt Baird, LT	Lt-Col Gibson, JN	Lt Rochereau de la Sabliere, G
Capt Baker, LP	Lt Gilmour, AH	Capt Rodgers, J
Lt Baker, MH	Capt Graham, TC	Lt Scott, JR
Lt Bartlett, RL	Lt Hale, FWC	Lt Sentance, RC
Lt Beddows, JS	Lt Harrington, WH	Maj Shields, EM
Beecroft, GW	Capt Hastings, MH	Capt Smith, TC
Lt Bleaken, WC	Lt Henry, GRS	Lt Smith, WD
Capt Boehm, CR	Maj Hunter, GM	Capt Spearing, NH
Capt Bradford, JK	Lt Ingham, PC	Lt Stark, GB
Lt Brands, KNR	Maj Inglis, JW	Maj Thomas, HW
Lt Butterill, HJM	Capt Ingram, PG	Lt-Col Thompson, HG
Lt Campbell, DA	Capt Jepson, RKC	Maj Thompson, WL
Lt Cann, WV	Lt Jockel, JH	Capt Truman, JT
Lt Case, KM	Capt Malloch, AC	Lt Usher, WJ
Lt Clandinan, JW	Lt McArthur, DRB	Lt Wakeham, CA
Lt Claxton, E, RCAPC	Maj Meighen, MCC	Lt Weston, JF
Capt Clelland, AD	Capt Morgan, HGF	Lt Williamson, JE
Lt Cleveland, PE	Maj Murphy, FA	
Capt Craven, S	Lt Noble, RH	
H/Capt Daigle, A, RCACHC	Lt Pearson, JW	
Lt Darling, EH	Capt Pope, JG	
Lt Donaldson, WC	Capt Quance, TSG	

## No. 4 Army Field Workshop

### Summary

No. 4 Army Field Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 255-A called out on active service 24 Oct 40 by G.O. 243/40, Montreal, P.Q. with 10 light aid detachments Designated by G.O. 245/40

Officers: Maj CM Benett, A/Capt AP Miller, A/Capt WJS Evans

Reorganized and redesignated 10 Jul 41 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC by G.O. 185/41

Converted and redesignated 26 Jan 42 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOC by G.O. 132/42

Disbanded 31 Mar 42 by G.O. 200/42

Note: “Personnel reposted to 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Ordnance Companies, RCOC, and Support Group Ordnance Company”. (Taken from the war diary)

### History

Major C Morgan Benett announced to his men that No. 4 Army Field Workshop, CASF, would be called out for active service in the near future. The occasion was the evening parade of No. 3 Army Field Workshop, NPAM [Non-permanent Active Militia], held in Montreal on 30 August 1940. His announcement resulted in 56 per cent of his men enlisting in the CASF [Canadian Army Active Service Force] unit when it was officially formed on 24 October 1940.

Benett was promoted and given command. His first officers were:

Capt AP Miller Capt WJS Evans

These officers were joined by the following officers sent by the district (MD4).

Capt WS Hunt	Lt FWG Hale	Capt DS Milligan	Lt HC Jockel
Capt AL Williams	Lt JJ Legate	Lt CL Code	Lt JH Mellor
Lt J Edmond	Lt WD Schofield	Lt All Gilmour	

Four permanent force armament staff sergeants were sent to Lt-Col Benett to help him train his unit. They were:

S/Sgt AT Brown      S/Sgt HJ Millen      S/Sgt JJ Garnett S/Sgt JR O’Neill

Lt HE Marion joined the unit just before the year’s end. The first RSM was WO1 LS Bowen appointed in June 1941. Mr. Bowen came to the unit from the Veterans Guard of Canada.

No. 4 AFW was quartered in the Montreal Athletic Association buildings in Westmount known as the MAA Grounds.

The unit started a motor transport school in Oct 40 in a small garage at 4290 St Catherine St. W, Montreal. Their training equipment was one engine and a stripped vehicle chassis plus a few wall charts. Lt Legate was the instructor, assisted by Cpl AW Carr and Ptes Bertholdi and Lopez. Molson’s Brewery assisted the unit in training mechanics by employing men from the unit in their garage. The men were included with the company employees in receiving a daily ‘free issue’. The Auto Electric Ltd., also assisted the unit in training their men by holding night classes on carburetion and ignition.

Many of the men were employed transporting vehicles to Montreal from No. 1 AFW in London, Ont. The London unit assembled military vehicles received from the manufacturers in Oshawa and Windsor.

The strength of the unit at the end of 1940 was 16 officers and 221 men. These figures included the ten LADs authorized to be mobilized with 4 AFW plus three additional units attached to them for training. These attached units were:

Serial 610E, No 3 Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Workshop

Serial 653, No 28 Light Aid Detachment

Serial 654, No 29 Light Aid Detachment

One hundred and sixty-eight men arrived in January 1941. These men came from Halifax, St. John, NB, Quebec, Ottawa, and Victoria.

No. 3 LAA Regt Workshop ceased its training attachment and left for overseas in February under the command of Lt FWG Hale. No. 29 LAD soon followed under the command of Lt Ali Gilmour.

By May 41 the following officers had joined the unit:

Capt JEH Stethem	Lt AG Edward	Lt EL Akehurst	Lt PD Falk
Lt AT Batchelor	Lt HV Flett	Lt RH Hodgson	Lt PJ Martinson
Lt EC King	Lt AR McCaffery	Lt FJ Lyle	Lt AT Smith

Special arrangements for training of Canadian troops at US training centers had been completed by mid-summer and fifty men left for automotive training under the direction of the United States Quartermaster Corps at their training centre at Holabird in Baltimore MD.

These were the first Canadians to be seen wearing uniform. (The United States had not yet entered the war). They caused quite a stir in their khaki summer tunics, shorts, and puttees. One of the officers was quite embarrassed by the comments made by a policeman who kidded him at a street corner in down town Baltimore about his knobby knees.

The Canadians were certainly overwhelmed by the mass of training equipment, and of the high calibre of both the instructors and of the training they received.

For a while things were very confused as the four officers had to look after the administration of the Canadian troops in addition to their own training. However a major and an RSM were sent down to take over these duties.

One of the officers who wanted very much to be appointed OC of the Motor Mechanics School upon the return of the group was quite disappointed to learn that one of the other officers was to be given the appointment on the grounds that he knew the least of anyone about the subject. It's amazing, when one thinks about it, how often the "blind leaders of the blind" negotiated the "ditch" to eventual success.

Lts Schofield, Marion, Lyle, Legate, and King with 109 men were posted to 1<sup>st</sup> Army Tank Brigade Ordnance Workshop in June 1941.

On 10 July, the unit was renamed the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop and reorganized at the same time.

No. 44 LAD, one of the ten LADs raised with the workshop, left for Tracadie Military Camp in NB under the command of Lt RHD Todd.

In November 1941, the entire workshop left their home in the MAA Grounds and moved by road and rail for Debert Military Camp in Nova Scotia.

The workshop was organized into a HQ and three groups. The junior officers were assigned as follows:



HQ	Capt Code,	Lt Jamieson
Group 1	Lt Edward,	Lt Falk
Group 2	Capt Mellor,	Lt Flett
Group 3	Lt MacEachern, Lt Martinson	

The year-end strength return showed that the workshop had now grown to a strength of ten officers and 194 men, exclusive of the LADs.

Again the unit changed its name. On 26 January 1942 it became the 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, RCOG. This was coincident with the conversion of the infantry battalions to armour within the division.

Lt-Col Benett was transferred to a non-divisional workshop in March and was succeeded by Major EC Mayhew.

On 31 March 1942 the unit was disbanded, and the personnel and equipment were used to form the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divisional Support Companies.

### **Nominal Roll Of Officers No. 4 Army Field Workshop, 1940-1942**

Lt Akehurst, EL	Lt Gilmour, AH	Lt McCaffery, RA
Lt Bannerman, EC	Lt Hale, FWG	Capt Mellor, JH
Lt Batchelor, AG	Capt Hallett, JH	Capt Miller, AP
Lt-Col Benett, CM	Lt Hodgson, RHC	Capt Milligan, DS
Lt Burnett, AR	Capt Hunt, WS	Lt Pomeroy, CB
Capt Code, CL	Lt King, EC	Lt Rankin, CJ
Capt Cunningham, JDL, RCAPC	Capt Legate, JJ de C	Lt Riddle, TL
Lt Edmond, J	Lt Lewis, AHR	Lt Schofield, WD
Capt Edward, AG	Lyle, FJ	Capt Smith, AT
Lt Elliot, WF	Lt MacEachern, EK	Capt Stethem, JEH
Capt Evans, WJS	MacLeod, AD	Lt Todd, RHD
Fairweather, RCW	Marion, HE	Williams, AL
Falk, PD	Martinson, PJ	Wilson, WF
Flett,		

## No. 1 Canadian Mobile Tire Repair Unit

### Summary

Mobilisation Serial: 2615

NO. 1 Mobile Tire Repair Unit RCEME, CASF, called out on active service 17 Nov 44 by G.O. 92/45

Mobilized for operational duty 15 Dec 44 under supervision HQ C. R. U. Serial 2615/1 CMHQ Mob O No. 135 20 Nov 44

Disbanded 27 Sep 45 by G.O. 52/46

### History

#### A New Unit Is Formed

In the late summer of 1944 it became apparent that arrangements would have to be made to repair tires for 21 Army Group on the continent of Europe. To this end, the 1<sup>st</sup> (British) Mobile Tire Repair Unit, REME, (1 MTRU) was mobilized, and sent to France in October. Equipment for a second such unit was being prepared at Old Dalby and, mainly because of a shortage of trained tire maintenance mechanics in the British Army, it was decided to raise a Canadian unit that would use the British equipment. Thus a new RCEME unit was born - the first and only of its kind. It served 21 Army Group in Northwest Europe for ten months, and during that time, was responsible for putting back into service over 21,000 tires and 37,000 tubes. How this was done is the story of N. 1 Canadian Mobile Tire Repair Unit, RCEME (1 CTRU).

1 CTRU was unique in many respects. It had the same commanding officer and pretty well the same other ranks from formation to disbandment, and nearly all of them had originally served with 1 Canadian Base Workshop RCEME (1 CBW) Bordon, England (A list of all Canadian personnel who served with the unit is at Annex A). It was designed to be mobile, but once on the continent it never moved from Boortmeerbeek, Belgium, about 12 miles east of Brussels on the Malines-Louvain Road. Although its establishment authorized one officer and 48 other ranks, its strength grew to a maximum of about 70 Canadian military, 75 British military, and over 100 Belgian civilians. It was a relatively small Canadian unit working for the British on the 21 Army Group Lines of Communication (L of C). Contact with other Canadians was an infrequent pleasure. It operated under three headquarters: Chief Electrical Mechanical Engineer (CEME), Headquarters Advanced Base Workshops, 21 Army Group, for workshop operations; Headquarters 4 L of C (later 20 L of C) Sub Area for local administration and tactical operations; and Canadian Section, General Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Echelon, 21 Army Group, for most administrative matters. These facts must be kept in mind to appreciate fully the story of this unit.

#### Preparations for Move to the Continent

On 2 November 1944, Captain AL Maclean of 1 CBW was appointed commanding officer designate, presumably because among the base workshop ancillary shops of which he had been in charge for over two years, there was a large tire repair section. His first task was to study the proposed establishment and select his personnel, a job made easier because he was given authority to select them all from 1 CBW. All but three eventually came from that unit, many of them having crossed the Atlantic together in March 1942 in the SS *Orbita*.

Formation of Serial 2615/1, No 1 Canadian Mobile Tire Repair Unit, RCEME, was authorized under CMHQ Administrative Order No 173, dated 20 November 1944. It formed on WE Cdn III/203/1 and

AFG 1098 Cdn 2206/1, effective 17 November 1944 (authority CGS 139). The unit was mobilized at No. 1 Canadian Ordnance and Mechanical Engineer Reinforcement Unit, Bordon, England, on 29 November 1944, pursuant to Mobilization Order No 135 dated 20 November 1944.

The establishment called for one captain, 34 tire maintenance mechanics (a group “A” trade), two each of electricians (vehicle and plant), fitters, vehicle mechanics MV, clerks and cooks, and four drivers. Equipment consisted of two jeeps, two 3-ton lorries, six 3-ton machinery lorries and two machinery trailers, two water trailers, and four 22-kw generator trailers. The establishment was designed so that the unit could be deployed in two sections, presumably one per corps.

The unit was ready to leave for the continent after about four weeks of preparation. This included assembling the personnel and completing their documentation, sending the six maintenance tradesmen to Old Dalby to assist in kitting the machinery lorries and to become familiar with the equipment, assembling and checking the vehicles and stores and readying them for shipment to the continent, and collecting stationery, etc.

The advance party, 27 all ranks, left Bordon at 0800 hours 3 December 1944 and reported to S-4 Area, Dagenham, at 1530 hours and was sent to J-K Camp. It embarked on LST No. 162 during the early hours of 4 December and eventually disembarked at Ostende, Belgium, on 7 December, reporting to No. 60 Transit Camp for further orders.

Early the next morning, 8 December, the group set out for Boortmeerbeek with instructions to occupy a factory there. The buildings were in the hands of the 763<sup>rd</sup> Railway Shop Battalion, US Transportation Corps. However, they were eventually ordered to move and 1 CTRU took over what was to be “home” for the next ten months.

### **Settling In At Boortmeerbeek**

The first few days were spent in getting answers to innumerable questions. Under what headquarters did the unit operate? Where were rations drawn? What arrangements had to be made concerning pay, mail, medical attention, auxiliary services, etc? Where did repairable tires come from and where did repaired ones go? And so on. Eventually answers were obtained, and the advance party set up its section and started to work. Some of the answers: the headquarters have already been mentioned; rations were drawn from 143 DID in Louvain (20% extra because the unit strength was under 50); Captain Mayhew, paymaster 1 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop (1 ABW), Vilvorde, was appointed to look after pay matters; mail appeared to be well organized and was picked up from Field Post Office SC756 in Brussels, the first mail arrived on 13 December, only 10 days after the advance party left Bordon; the medical officer assigned was a British lady doctor, the medical officer of 47 British RHU (Louvain) (this was the source of much discontent among the men and she was eventually replaced on 23 February 1945 by Captain Jacques, medical officer of 1 ABW); 1 ABW also provided an auxiliary services supervisor, this on a direct order from Maj-Gen ELM Burns; repairable tires were delivered from 15 British Returned Stores Depot, RAOC, (15 RSD) in Antwerp; repaired tires were sent to 15 British Advanced Ordnance Depot (15 AOD) in Antwerp. These questions may appear pretty elementary to those who served in a brigade, division, corps or even army troops, where organization and functions were clearly defined, but they loomed large in the early days of 1 CTRU.

After getting the above basic problems solved, the unit proceeded to set up shop to accept and repair tires. The first repairs were made on 14 December to four 12.00x20 tires belonging to the US Railway Shop Unit. These tires gave the shop a chance to test its equipment. The repairs were successful, but gave the first indication of some of the troubles to come; the main one being the need for adequate drying facilities.

A load of 41 assorted tires arrived from 15 RSD late in the evening of 14 December and the unit was in business. To provide an interim drying room, a stove made from a 45-gallon oil drum was set up in the blacksmith shop of the factory. This drying room continued in use for several weeks.

On 16 December Colonel Guy from DME, HQ 21 Army Group, and Colonel Farrar, CEME, paid the unit a visit and inquired into the possibility of bringing up 1 MTRU from France and also of installing a 13-mould retread plant in the factory. It was agreed that there was ample space for both of these as well as 1 CTRU.

The first pay parade was held on 17 December and each man loaned the Regimental Institute 300 francs so that NAAFI supplies could be purchased. These were bought from 318 BIS in Brussels.

19 December was a day of excitement: the kitchen stove blew up (no damage or casualties), at 1145 hours the second section under S/sgt Turnbull arrived, a dense fog set in early in the evening, and about 25 buzz bombs passed overhead on their way to Brussels.

The rear party of the unit had spent from 3 to 14 December in assembling stores and equipment and preparing for the move to the continent. They left Bordon at 1810 hours 15 December, and followed the same route as the advance party from there to Dagenham, thence on LST No. 350 to Ostende, arriving at No. 60 Transit Camp at 1700 hours 17 December. They left Ostende the next morning, but because of poor weather and the need for many stops to cater for several bad cases of dysentery, they had to stage overnight just outside Brussels. However, they arrived safely at Boortmeerbeek about noon on the 19<sup>th</sup>.

The last ten days of December were memorable for many reasons: on the twentieth the first load of repaired tires were sent to 15 AOD, and, because of the troop movements resulting from the Battle of the Bulge, all ranks were confined to barracks. On 21 December, elements of XXX UK Corps streamed southward past the unit, in two lanes, nose to tail, completely blocking the Malines-Louvain Road, and S/Sgt Turnbull and Sgt Mathews were promoted to WO2 and S/Sgt respectively. The first burn out of an immersion heater occurred on 22 December (more will be said of this later). Sixteen of the 48 men were on guard duty because of the paratrooper scare, and all ranks were issued with 50 rounds of ammunition. At 0105 hours 24 December, code word *Milk* was received, and the whole unit was ordered to stand-to, and the two jeeps and two 3-ton lorries were checked and made ready for instant use. Stand-down was ordered at 0900 hours 24 December, and the confinement to barracks was lifted. The unit celebrated Christmas with a fine dinner and a party for the children of the village. The US Railway Shop Battalion finally moved out on the twenty-sixth and 1 CTRU took over their accommodation (barracks and mess hall). The shop was closed on the twenty-seventh because all tires on hand (27) had been repaired. Authority to employ 20 Belgian civilians was granted on the twenty-ninth. A telephone was installed on the thirtieth and was operating on the thirty-first (Malines Military 63). A unit dance was held in the mess hall on New Years Eve. The total number of tires repaired in December was 68, an inauspicious beginning.

The last paragraph of the unit's December 1944 War Diary states: "So ended December and 1944. The unit is still suffering from growing pains, but most of the administrative details are falling into line. The shop has not yet started production, but everything should go well. Morale is high and everyone is looking forward to a good year ahead."

## Getting Into Production

The new year started amid a hail of steel from local AA guns engaging the German's last big air strike against Melsbrook airport, about six miles to the west. Four loads of tires were received on 1 January and the unit was never without work from then on. In order to use the curing moulds to capacity, two 12-hour shifts were started on 2 January, 0630 to 1830 hours, and from 1830 to 0630 hours.

It would be well at this time to give a brief description of how tires are repaired and how the unit was equipped to carry out this task. There are five major steps in the repair of a tire:

- The first is an inspection to determine whether or not the tire can be repaired.
- The second is the buffing and skiving of the damaged section to remove loose rubber particles and frayed cord, and to make the cavity the correct shape to receive the patching materials. This is comparable to a dentist drilling a tooth cavity prior to filling it.
- The third step is the building up of the patch with cord and raw rubber.
- The fourth is curing the repair in the steam heated moulds, and
- The fifth is the final inspection of the repair.

Four of the machinery lorries were equipped for tire preparation; two for skiving and buffing the damaged tires preparatory to building in the cord and rubber, and two for actually building up the repairs with cord, cushion gum and tread gum. The other two machinery lorries and the two machinery trailers contained a total of ten curing moulds of varying sizes, capable of handling all of the army type tires from 6.00x16 (jeep) to 14.00x20 (tank transporter tractor). Steam was produced in individual boilers in each mould, heated by 3-kilowatt immersion heaters. Electrical power for these and other needs was provided by the four 22-kw, 110 volt DC, Lister diesel-driven generators. When all moulds were in use, all four generators were needed.

It can be said that production really started on 2 January, the time prior to that having been used mainly in preparation and settling in. By operating two 12-hour shifts, six and one-half days per week, maximum use was made of the curing moulds. However, the men soon became over-tired and production suffered in both quality and quantity. There were not enough tradesmen or cooks in the unit to operate three 8-hour shifts, so the two twelves continued for a short while, it being imperative that the moulds operate 24 hours per day. The average curing time was about three hours so, with 10 moulds, the maximum possible capacity was 80 cures per day. This maximum was never reached for several reasons.

The first serious breakdown occurred on 4 January when the inner shafts on two of the flexible shaft buffers broke. One was repaired.

Tires were arriving in large quantities, so it was possible to choose 10 or 12 of the same size and tread design and put them through the moulds in runs. This reduced the time spent in pouring matrices for the curing moulds.

CEME, HQ Advanced Base Workshops, had asked for a weekly return of work done as of 1600 hours each Thursday. The return was to show, by size, the number of tires received, the number repaired (also the number of repairs because there was usually more than one repair needed per tire) and the number to be returned to the UK or scrapped. The first return was submitted on 21 December showing 64 repairs done on 41 tires. On 28 December the return showed 40 repairs on 27 tires, on 4 January 100 repairs on 77 tires, and on 11 January 369 repairs on 266 tires. This trend continued until the best week, ending 3 May, when the expanded unit made 1,809 repairs on 685 tires, and also repaired 983 tubes.

On 5 January Sgt Cotton of 1 MTRU arrived as advance party to prepare for the arrival of that unit on 10 January. Brigadier Caffyn, Director of Mechanical Engineering (DME) 21 Army Group, also visited the unit on the fifth. Lt-Col Truman, ADME, Canadian Section, GHQ 1 Echelon, 21 Army Group and Col Pope, DDME, CMHQ, inspected the shop on 6 January.

Two immersion heaters burned out on the eighth, and two more on the ninth. This was becoming a serious problem and a rigid control of the water level in the boilers was enforced to ensure that the water would never be lower than one inch above the element.

## 1 MTRU Arrives

1 MTRU under Capt Hawkins, REME, arrived at 0230 hours 10 January. They were given tea and bedded down. 1 MTRU was identical to 1 CTRU in equipment and personnel, and they set up their shop alongside the Canadian one. It was decided to operate only one kitchen and to employ the four cooks on a pool basis. With the increased number of personnel it was possible to share guard duties and other overheads and both units went on to three eight-hour shifts, 0730-1530, 1530-2330 and 2330-0730 hours, commencing at 2330 hours 14 January.

The shop was reorganized to do all the preparation inside the factory instead of in the four preparation lorries. All equipment was removed from these vehicles and set up in the building. Sufficient tires were now on hand to be selective and runs of about 40 of the same size and tread design were made, the first sizes being 9.00x20 and 10.50x16. The 3-shift routine was much better than the two, and output improved in both quality and quantity. The arrangement for guards was simplified, each unit providing one from the shift on duty.

The weather was very bad in that there was a great deal of fog, rain and freezing rain. This increased the difficulty in drying the tires. Two unserviceable German blanket driers were discovered and one was cannibalized to repair the other, which was used in the drying room. This proved to be only partly successful. Difficulty was also experienced with the repairs because the rubber was too cold. Getting adequate heat in the repair building area was never really satisfactorily solved until the arrival of warm weather.

Two more immersion heaters burned out on the seventeenth, and since there were no more spares, the two small moulds were shut down. A check showed that the water level in the boiler had been well above the heater. This was a very serious situation and the cause of these failures had not been found. The British unit was having similar trouble.

Top priority was given to 13.50/14.00x20 and 6.00x16 tires because there were no new ones available in Ordnance stocks. Tires of these sizes requiring up to four repairs were processed.

The nineteenth was inspection day. General Burns and Lt-Col Truman visited the unit in the morning and Lt-Col Binns and Maj Elstrom from the War Office were there in the afternoon with Lt-Col Hampton from 21 Army Group HQ. Their main comment was that neither unit was now very mobile, which was true.

The first load of tubes, about 900, arrived on 20 January, and so another section of the shop started operating.

The German heater did not live up to expectations, so another stove was made from oil drums. This produced a fair amount of heat and tires were dry in about 24 hours, but it was a fire hazard. Both units used the one drying room. Similar type stoves were made up for the building area.

Sixteen cases of Dunlop retread equipment arrived on the twenty-fourth and were unloaded into the building, a crane for the purpose having been borrowed from 1 ABW. Fourteen more cases arrived on the twenty-fifth.

Information was received from CEME that 10.00x22 (10-ton truck) and 8.25x15 (tank transporter trailer) tires and tubes were to be given priority along with the other two because replacements of these sizes were not available in the theatre. Arrangements were also made to repair and replace Canadian Forestry Corps tires on a one-for one basis. This was the unit's only "retail" trade. Thus the unit concentrated on the repair of 6.00x16, 8.25x15, 10.00x22 and 13.50/14.00x20 tires and tubes. This reduced the total possible output, but of course, met the most urgent need.

Captain Wood, RAOC, of HQ Advance Base Workshops, made arrangements to get matrix metal and naphtha for the unit from stocks in the theatre and also arranged for air delivery from the UK of repair materials. The final load of equipment for the retread plant arrived on the twenty-seventh.

Production in January was 1,338 tires with 1,832 repairs and 362 tubes.

A 1,000-gallon fuel tank was received on 2 February and the first load of bulk DERV, 800 gallons, was delivered the same day. This appreciably reduced the time taken in handling fuel, particularly in refuelling the generator diesels.

Lt P Brunskill-Davis, REME, from ME6, War Office, arrived on the fourth. He was attached to the unit and was to remain to supervise the installation of the Dunlop retread plant. Lt-Col Turnbull and Major Elstrom from DME, War Office, paid a short visit to check on the Dunlop equipment. They agreed to phone the UK to have some immersion heaters sent over by air. Brig Bloor, DME War Office, visited the unit for a short while on 7 February.

The DADST at 4 L of C Sub Area HQ had arranged for two echelons of ten horse-drawn carts each to operate daily to haul tires from Antwerp and back. Ten carts left the unit at 0930 hours daily carrying repaired tires, and ten carts left Antwerp at the same time carrying repairable tires to the unit. This unusual, at least for the Canadians, programme started on 8 February.

There was great excitement on the ninth. The crew of a US Flying Fortress bailed out overhead. The plane crashed in an open field about one and a half miles to the northeast, and blew up. No one was hurt and all ten members of the crew parachuted to safety. Four of them were rounded up by unit personnel and brought to the shop, given a drink and a meal, and taken to the nearest US unit where they joined the rest of their crew who had already arrived there. Because of the previous parachutist scare, it was assumed that these were Germans, and four armed patrols were sent out from the unit to deal with them. The rest of the unit was issued ammunition and ordered to stand-to. GHQ 4 Lines of Communication Sub-area was kept informed. Needless to say all were relieved when the parachutists were identified.

## Integration

On 23 February, Col Weir, DDME (Tech), HQ 21 Army Group, visited the unit, and informed Captain Maclean that he would be put in charge of the British mobile unit and the retread plant as well as his own unit, and that Captain Hawkins of 1 MTRU was being posted to DME, HQ 21 Army Group as EME (Tires). This was confirmed by CEME on the twenty-fourth and it was agreed that all three units would be run with Captain Maclean in charge and Lt Brunskill-Davis as second-in-command. 1 CTRU was made the parent unit and all British personnel were attached to it. This was made effective 27 February. Five British NCOs and five craftsmen arrived from the UK on 28 February to form the nucleus of the retread plant staff.

Initially the two mobile shops were operated separately by their own personnel, and administration only was carried out on a pooled basis. ASM (W01) Stokes of 1 MTRU was put in charge of administration and QMS (W02) Turnbull of 1 CTRU was appointed supervisor of the two shops.

Pte Portsmouth was appointed boss cook and put in complete charge of the kitchen under ASM Stokes. He was also made responsible for supervising the separate kitchen and mess hall that had been set up for the Belgian civilians who worked for the two units. They now numbered well over fifty.

February had been a good month; 1,587 tires, having 2,199 repairs, as well as 1,478 tubes were delivered to Ordnance. At the end of the month, because of burnt-out immersion heaters, the Canadian unit had eight moulds in operation and the British only five.

Some of the highlights during March were: on 1 March Pte Graham, a British driver, was sent to 1 ABW to get the MO and returned with his truck loaded with ammo. The newly appointed Canadian medical

officer, Captain Jacques, visited the unit the next day and gave everyone a quick examination. 42 E and M Platoon, RE, initially under Lt Meneer, and later under Lt KG Smith, continued with the installation of the retread plant. 1 MTRU burned out five more immersion heaters, and was reduced to only two moulds, so concentrated on tube repair. Pte Bennie, the second Canadian cook, was sent on rotation leave to Canada, and was replaced by Pte Berg. As a result of Lt-Col Turnbull's phone call to London on 7 February, 24 immersion heaters arrived from UK via air freight on 7 March, and the maintenance crew were busy for several days getting the moulds operating again. It was found that the British unit had not been using their water softener, which was possibly the reason for so many heater failures, and they started using it again on 9 March. On the 10<sup>th</sup>, CREME 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, dropped in looking for workshop sites. This was the first inkling of *Goldflake* that the unit had (the arrival of 1 Canadian Corps from Italy). Small quantities of cushion punt and lead gum arrived via DADOS Dump, 4 L of C. The following men were promoted:

S/Sgt Matthews	to be WO2
Cpl Johnston	Sgt
Cpl Waugh	Sgt
L/C Gaudet	Cpl
L/C Stairs	Cpl
L/C Vandendriessche	Cpl
Cfn Patterson	L/Cpl
Pte Portsmouth	L/ Cpl (chief cook)
Cfn Simons	L/Cpl

Authority was also received to trades-test a number of the tire maintenance mechanics, and many of them were upgraded from groups "C" and "B" to groups "B" and "A". Routine delivery of cushion and tread gum from the UK by air freight was instituted. Several Canadians went for a swim in the Malines-Louvain canal (at the rear of the factory) on 23 March. Capt Gannaway, REME, arrived from the UK on 26 March to be 2ic, but was admitted to 108 (BR) General Hospital on 27 March and was eventually returned to the UK. So much for the incidentals.

The major event in March was the decision to completely integrate the two units and operate as one. Sgt Cotton (British) was put in charge of in and out inspection, reporting directly to the OC. Sgts Jeal (British), Lynch (British) and Waugh (Cdn) were appointed shift foremen with Sgt Johnston (Cdn), Cpl Dunnaway (Cdn) and Cpl Petty (British) as respective seconds-in-command.

The physical plant was reorganized so that all skiving and buffing was done in one area, all building in another, and all vehicles carrying moulds were concentrated so that curing was all done in one place. The eight generators were lined up in a row behind the factory and placed under the control of QMS Matthews and the maintenance crew. The only unit items kept separated were the two regimental institutes, and pay and personnel documentation.

March was a month of consolidation. The two units together (with only 10 moulds operating for quite a while because of burnt-out heaters), by concentrating on the four priority sizes, returned to Ordnance 2,902 tires (with 4,143 repairs) and 4,098 tubes. By careful control of water level in the boilers, and by use of the water softeners, it appeared that the immersion heater problem had been solved. Also, the drying room was operating successfully, and tires were fully dried in 24 hours (of course the weather had improved considerably). The Canadian and British personnel got along very well together and the unit finally seemed to be paying its way.



## Technical Problems Solved

The retread plant was scheduled to start operating in April, and so retreadable tires were no longer returned to the UK. Tires arrived at the rate of 1,000 per day during most of April, and a large gang of civilians under one of the British NCOs was employed in unloading, sorting, and stacking them. By the end of April there were more than 20,000 on hand, and that's a lot of tires. 10.00x22 tires were made top priority, and the curing moulds were operated as follows: four on 6.00x16, four on 8.25x15, four on 10.00x22, and three on 13.50/14.00x20, with the remainder on 9.00x16 and 9.00x20. More could not be put on 10.00x22 because only four moulds were capable of handling that size.

Captain LJ Leapman, REME, was attached from 7 Workshop Coy, REME, as 2ic, on 10 April. Lt Brunskill-Davis left on 16 April.

The number of repairs being rejected by the final inspection was increasing rather alarmingly, and a complete investigation was conducted to discover what was going wrong. One of the faults was under-curing, traced to cold moulds. This was apparently due to insufficient volume of steam, combined with air leaking back through the steam lines into the moulds, cooling them. The steam situation was rectified by reducing the water level in the boilers to give a greater volume of steam, ensuring that the heaters remained covered. The water level in the boilers had to be watched continuously: too much water meant too little steam volume, and too little water uncovered the heaters, which were then liable to burn out. The allowable variation was about one inch. The feedback of air was overcome by installing new air lines so that the air lines and steam lines for the bags were completely separate.

A ninth generator was received so that eight could be kept operating at all times, with one out for maintenance. During a check it was found that the voltage dropped to about 85 volts when the load was increased to 200 amps, on several generators. Instruments were borrowed from 1 ABW and a complete check was carried out. Most generators were running too slowly, one being as low as 950 rpm (regular speed was 1,100 rpm). All nine generator sets were brought up to standard, and the power difficulties were thus overcome. With adequate power, the heaters were more effective, and steam pressure easier to maintain.

To be able to check on rejects, it was decided to operate with a work card for each tire, having each tradesman initial the card when he completed an operation. In this way faulty workmanship could be traced to an individual and corrective action taken. The inspector initiated the card and the NCO in charge of curing collected them and turned them over to the NCO in charge of the shift, who in turn gave the completed cards back to the inspector. This extra "red tape" was resented at first, but it paid dividends in a reduction of poor workmanship.

The combination of the steps taken to reduce the number of rejects had the desired results, and very few jobs failed to pass inspection by the end of the month.

Two corporals and 19 sappers, all low category ex-infantry personnel, arrived from 9 Battalion, 2 CBRG, on 12 April. They were primarily for guard duty, not so much against the enemy, but to discourage theft of tires.

April was a month spent mainly in overcoming technical difficulties. Production increased, and the integrated units returned to Ordnance 3,443 tires (with 5,346 repairs) and 5,285 tubes. The retread plant installation was pretty well completed. The thirteen moulds, two boilers, two 25-kw generators, four air compressors, two spreaders, one of the two buffers, and ancillary items were all operational. The only hold up was lack of matrices for the full circle moulds. The matrices originally received had been the wrong size and had been returned to the UK. Matrices of the correct size had been ordered early in the month.

## The Retread Plant Starts Operating

The great event of May, of course, was VE-Day. However, for 1 CTRU, May was a memorable month for other reasons, primarily because the retread plant commenced operating.

On 3 May, word was received that Major-General EB Rowcroft, DME, War Office, would inspect the unit on 5 May. There was some scurrying to get everything ship-shape for the occasion.

At 1930 hours 4 May, three truckloads of stores arrived, including the matrices for the retread plant. The opportunity to show the DME some retreaded tires was too good to miss, so plans were made to do two. The matrices were uncrated and in the shop by 2200 hours, and six men worked in the retread shop until shortly after midnight preparing two tires (one 9.00x16 conventional tread, and one 9.25x16 conventional tread) for curing. In the meantime one boiler was fired, steam was raised and moulds number 3 and 4 were checked.

At 0055 hours 5 May, the first built-up tire was put into number 4 mould and curing started. At 0140 hours the second built-up tire was put into mould number 3 and curing started. At 0245 hours the 9.00x16 was removed from the mould, and inspection after the tire cooled showed it to be a perfect job - the first tire retreaded for 21 Army Group on the continent. At 0315 hours the second tire was removed from the mould, and it also was a successful job. This success was celebrated by Captain Maclean, QMS Matthews (Cdn), S/Sgt Smith (BR) and Cpl Shelley (BR) splitting a bottle of champagne.

At 1200 hours Major-General Rowcroft, Brigadier Caffyn, Col Weir, and Col Farrar arrived and carried out an inspection of the whole unit, although they were primarily interested in the retread shop. Needless to say they were all very pleased to see the two retreaded tires, and to learn that the plant would now start operating.

Also on 5 May, the only court martial of a member of 1 CTRU was held. One of the Canadian craftsmen was sentenced by the Field General Court Martial to 60 days forfeiture of pay for drunkenness (about the fourth offence). Findings were promulgated on 12 May.

On 6 May a message was received from HQ 20 L of C (formerly 4 L of C) Sub Area stating that all offensive operations of 21 Army Group, excluding Dunkirk, ceased as of 0800 hours 5 May.

Not much work was done on 7 May and the shop was closed on 8 and 9 May for the celebration of VE-Day. QMS Matthews and about 15 men remained on duty during this period and were granted extra leave later.

Normal routine started again with the day shift on 10 May, including the retread plant in which five NCOs and ten civilians were employed.

On Sunday 13 May a church parade through the village of Boortmeerbeek was held, and all but the guards attended. The service took place in a local athletic field, which the unit had taken over for baseball, and was conducted by Captain Begg from 1 ABW. Captain Maclean read the lesson. On return to camp pictures of the unit were taken.

The shop started up in earnest again on the fourteenth after a week of excitement. By the eighteenth, the retread plant was producing about 20 tires per day. Many of the early retreads were mounted on unit vehicles to test them. A set of four 7.00x16 tires were repaired, retreaded, and mounted on the OC's jeep. They were low-pressure tires and made quite a difference in the ride.

On 22 May, Lt-Col Truman visited the unit with Major Meyr, who gave the Canadians a talk on rehabilitation. All ranks were very interested in what was said.

Lt Brunskill-Davis returned on 25 May to supervise the installation of more static plant that had arrived earlier in the month. Included were a Vita Cop Kettle from 1 CBW in England and four cavity repair moulds, to handle repairs for the retread shop.

42 E and M Platoon, RE, left and the quarters they had used were made into a canteen and recreation room.

During May, the integrated unit turned out 172 retreaded and 2,319 repaired tires (with a total of 4,784 repairs) and 3,165 tubes. Most of these were of the priority sizes.

## Regular Routine Commences

The new canteen was opened officially with a smoker on 2 June. The NAAFI in Malines supplied sausage rolls, cakes, and beer. It was a most successful evening.

Brigadier Hatton, Commander, 20 L of C Sub Area, inspected the unit on 4 June. He appeared satisfied with what he saw. Captain Leapman left on the fourth, having been posted to 22 British ABW.

A Belgian E and M section of one S/Sgt and 12 men arrived on the fifth to install the rest of the static plant under the guidance of Lt Brunskill-Davis. While this work was being done, shop routine in both mobile sections and the retread plant carried on as usual.

Production was good, but the supply of raw rubber tread compound was running low, and in fact the stock was exhausted by 1700 hours on 12 June. Tests were run using some synthetic camel-back that was available, and it was found that, with care and using a layer of natural cushion gum between each sheet of the synthetic compound, a satisfactory repair could be made. This procedure was followed until a new supply of tread compound was received. Orders for it were hastened.

General ELM Burns made a lightning half-hour visit to the unit on 16 June.

On 19 June it was decided to change the shop routine. Shift work was continued for the mould operators and the generator, compressor and boiler operators, and the men running the buffers, since these were the equipments that determined the capacity of the shop. All inspection, skiving and building, as well as tube repairs were done on day shift only. This reduced the overhead required on each shift and made more men available for preparation of repairs and retreads. More civilians were hired, and were trained for various jobs in the retread shop.

Finally a second Canadian officer arrived to assist in running the unit. On 23 June, Lt JM Vallance, RCEME, was posted in from 9 CBR Battalion. He was immediately put in charge of unit administration.

On 26 June, Captain GF Bumstead, REME, was posted from the staff of DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> (BR) Army to command 1 MTRU. He in fact acted as 2ic of the integrated unit and prepared himself to take over eventually when the Canadians left. There were now four officers with the unit.

June saw the final installation of the retread plant and the last change in shop routine. The unit reached its maximum strength, and despite problems with the tread gum, etc., production was fairly good. 2,157 repaired and 540 retreaded tires (with 4,010 repairs) and 3,632 tubes were produced.

The shop was closed on Dominion Day, Sunday, 1 July, and four trucks were used to transport a group to the battleground of Waterloo. This type of trip was conducted to various spots within about 150-mile radius every Sunday from this time on. Trips were made to Vimy Ridge, Aachen, Ardennes, Dieppe, Dunkirk, etc.

QMS Turnbull and L/Cpl Wright, RAOC, set about producing an AFG 1098 for the retread plant. This entailed listing all equipment and stores received to date. At the same time, the 1098 equipment of 1 CTRU that wasn't in use, eg, tarpaulins, picks, shovels, AG stores, etc, was collected, checked, and stored in one of the unused vehicles, preparatory to final disposal.

The war establishment of the retread plant was authorized in 21 A Gp/3739/6/A (Org) dated 3 July 45, effective 16 July 45. Thus that section of the unit was legalized. On 11 July, word was received that ten of the British other ranks were to leave the following day for 54 RHU for eventual employment with a tire

repair unit in SEAC [South-east Asia Command]. A farewell party for these chaps was held in the canteen that evening.

Two new buffers were finally installed, and now sufficient buffing could be done on one shift, so, starting 12 July, only curing was done on three shifts, all preparation being done during the day.

Production suffered somewhat because 7-day leaves were started, and up to about ten percent of the unit was away at all times. One of the retread plant boilers had to be shut down and re-bricked. This reduced the capacity of the retread plant to about one-half for a period of a week.

By 16 July, the unit had almost worked itself out of a job. The stock of unserviceable tires had been worked over and the main stock consisted of odd sizes, such as 10.50x16, 0.50x20, 9.00x13 and 9.00x16. The rubber situation was also bad: there was no tread gum, cord or large size patches, and only two sizes of camel-back remained. Orders for stock were hastened and 15 RSD was contacted regarding supply of repairable and retreadable tires. Because of this situation the repair section was shut down and most of the personnel were put on tube repairs. Production of tubes reached about 800 per day.

Brigadier Campbell, the new DME, 21 Army Group, paid the unit a brief visit on 18 July.

### **Canadians Prepare To Leave**

On 25 July a message was received from CANFOR EXFOR REAR stating that 1 October 45 was to be the target disbanding date for 1 CTRU and that all equipment was to be turned over to the British in situ.

Four tons of air freight arrived on 27 July, and contained all needs except tread gum.

On 28 July, an organization chart of the unit was produced for CEME, which pointed out the positions of all the Canadian officers and NCOs, and to show the “holes” that would exist when the Canadians left.

July ended with the Canadians expecting to start for home shortly, and with British replacements gradually arriving. Because of leaves and lack of repair materials, tire production was down, but tube repairs were increased. 1,837 repaired and 842 retreaded tires (with 3,607 repairs) and 5,203 tubes were produced.

On 1 August authority was received to voucher all AFG 1098 equipment and stores from 1 CTRU to 1 MTRU, effective 1 October 45, and WO1 Stokes (BR) and QMS Matthews (Cdn) started working on this. Col Kinchin, the new CEME visited the unit on 1 August.

One case of tread compound arrived on 2 August, and 20 more arrived the next day. Saturday, 4 August was spent in completing tube repairs and getting the shop ready to start normal routine on Monday 6 August.

Normal shop routine continued pretty well throughout August. Stocks of repair material continued to arrive and there were no major breakdowns in the shop. Many Canadian and British personnel left, and a few new British men were posted in. The Retread plant finally got a name, 958 Tyre Retreading Unit, REME, and authority was received from CEME to make it the parent unit effective 1 September.

On 13 August, Captain Maclean left for nine days of what he considered was a well-deserved leave in Paris. On 17 August, Lt Brunskill-Davis left for a reconnaissance to Hamburg to select a new site for 958 Tyre Retreading Unit. Captain Maclean returned on the twenty-second and Brigadier Williams, the new Commander of 20 L of C Sub Area, inspected the unit on the twenty-third.

Production during August dropped, primarily due to loss of personnel, both on posting and leave. 1,489 repaired and 860 retreaded tires (with 3,730 repairs) and 11,180 tubes were produced.

## 958 Tyre Retreading Unit Takes Over

958 Tyre Retreading Unit became the parent unit on 1 September, and all activities were carried on under that name. However, the old organization continued and Captain Maclean remained as OC until he left on 27 September.

Col Kinchin spent most of the fifth with the unit discussing the proposed move of the shop to Hamburg and the reorganization that would take place when the Canadians left. A scheme was worked out whereby one preparation shift and three curing shifts employing only British NCOs would start on Monday 10 September on a training basis. The training programme progressed favourably and the Canadian NCOs were gradually withdrawn from active work in the shop.

A farewell dance for the Canadians was held on 8 September.

On 12 September, all AFG 1098 equipment of 1 CTRU was turned over to 1 MTRU, Captain Bumstead signing for it. Copies of the vouchers were sent to CEME and Canadian Section, GHQ 1 Echelon, 21 Army Group.

Word was received on 13 September that WO2s Turnbull and Matthews would leave on the sixteenth and eighteenth respectively. Their functions in the shop were immediately turned over to WO1 Stokes and WO2 Smith. On the seventeenth, the shop started operating completely under control of British NCOs.

On 18 September, the proposed AFG 1098 for 958 Tyre Retreading Unit was delivered to and discussed with CEME. Captains Maclean and Bumstead and Lt Brunskill-Davis held a meeting to discuss promotion of about ten British junior NCOs. On 21 September about 20 British Pioneer Corps personnel arrived to take over guard duties from the Canadians.

Final posting instructions for all Canadian personnel and the disbandment order for 1 CTRU was received and operation of the unit was turned over to Captain Bumstead on 27 September. The Canadian flag was lowered and the Union Jack raised.

On 28 September, the Canadians said farewell to Boortmeerbeek, after having spent nine memorable months there. Sgt Sherlock with 48 other ranks left at 0900 for 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army Troops Workshop in Arnhem. Captain Maclean, Cpl Budd and Cpl Martin left shortly afterwards after winding up all the affairs of the unit. Captain Bumstead graciously agreed to provide transport and drivers for this last move of the Canadians.

Production in September, while hardly due to the efforts of the personnel of 1 CTRU, was 1,053 repaired and 775 retreaded tires and 3,251 tubes.

### No. 1 Canadian Mobile Tire Repair Unit List of Personnel

Date TOS	No	Rank	Name	Date SOS	Rank
29 Nov 44		Capt	AL Maclean	27 Sep 45	Capt
29 Nov 44	F 92795	Cfn	Banks EC	5 Jul 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 85999	Pte	Bennie JL	9 Mar 45	Pte
29 Nov 44	G 32672	Cfn	Black WJ	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	F 86011	Cfn	Blakeney WG	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 85421	Cfn	Blythe JII	18 Jun 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	A 9868	A/Cpl	Budd NWK	27 Sep 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	H 60459	Cfn	Castle 11V	11 Apr 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 131039	Cfn	Cousins B	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 53082	Cfn	Daniels L	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	L 51198	Cfn	Deroche JE	12 Feb 45	L/Cpl
29 Nov 44	K 98197	Cpl	Dunaway CP	22 Jun 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	K 75937	Cfn	Fisher PR	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	E 5640	Cfn	Gaudet JA	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	G 19179	Cfn	Godsoe EW	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 57207	Cfn	Grant DA	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 63159	Cfn	Griffin RR	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 63122	Cfn	Guziak JJS	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 142106	Cfn	Hamill EB	13 Feb 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 77747	Cfn	Hill W11	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	H 65948	Cfn	Hurd JG	17 Sep 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	K 71679	Cfn	Johnston JH	27 Sep 45	Sgt
29 Nov 44	A 58545	Cfn	Kocher GH	27 Sep 45	Cfn

Date TOS	No	Rank	Name	Date SOS	Rank
29 Nov 44	L 67211	Cfn	Lamon JJ	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 137519	Cfn	Lankester AG	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	C 120844	Cfn	Leonard JK	27 Sep 45	CM
29 Nov 44	M 62404	Cfn	Luchia AR	11 Apr 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	A 64396	Cfn	Margerm HA	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	M 17584	Cfn	Martin R	27 Sep 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	M 563	A/Sgt	Matthews RH	18 Sep 45	W02
29 Nov 44	C 19181	Cfn	McInnis AD	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 58681	Cfn	McKay KC	29 Jul 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 65688	Cfn	Murdock GE	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 53637	Cfn	Offord CD	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 112629	Cfn	Patterson MH	27 Sep 45	L/Cpl
29 Nov 44	F 45608	Cfn	Patton AA	5 Jul 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 65516	Cpl	Peacock SE	27 Sep 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	M 60725	Pte	Portsmouth MJ	27 Sep 45	L/Cpl
29 Nov 44	H 95613	Cfn	Simons AM	27 Sep 45	L/Cpl
?A) Nov 44	B 110969	Cfn	Smith ED	27 Sep 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	G 19165	Cfn	Stairs MD	27 Sep 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	H 20575	Cfn	St. Germain J	11 Apr 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 53350	Cfn	Swann AJ	19 May 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	D 126860	Cfn	Tomachevsky JJ	19 May 45	Cfn
29 Nov 44	B 3892	A/Art/S/Sgt	Turnbull JD	16 Sep 45	WO2
29 Nov 44	K 76903	Cfn	Vandendriessche EJ	27 Sep 45	Cpl
29 Nov 44	K 73698	Cfn	Vint GF	3 Aug 45	L/Cpl
29 Nov 44	B 28431	Cpl	Waugh J	5 Aug 45	Sgt

Date TOS	No	Rank	Name	Date SOS	Rank
29 Nov 44	F 87686	Cfn	Williams AM	27 Sep 45	Cfn
14 Feb 45	F 66803	Pte	Smith KF	27 Sep 45	Pte
10 Mar 45	L 102485	Pte	Berg J	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	B 138672	Pte	Accetti JJV	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	L 102434	Pte	Chrunik C	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	B 126221	Pte	Vogt WG	8 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	B 133255	Spr	Belanger HA	27 Sep 45	Cfn
11 Apr 45	E 11169	Cpl	Bourque A	10 Jul 45	Spr
11 Apr 45	A 49855	Spr	Broad EJ	1 Aug 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	F 2623	Spr	Burke CD	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	D 82603	Spr	Charron A	27 Jul 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	D 135900	Spr	Descary JA	27 Sep 45	Pte.
11 Apr 45	K 53958	Cpl	Gawne TW	19 May 45	Cpl
11 Apr 45	D 139567	Spr	Goupille JAA	10 Jul 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	B 53095	Spr	Gregory AM	22 May 45	Spr
11 Apr 45	D 59444	Spr	Guilbeault L	24 Aug 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	G 57577	Spr	Lanteigne P	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	C 102079	Spr	Larente F	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	E 110136	Spr	LeBlanc A	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	E 110108	Spr	Levesque JL	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	D 62787	Spr	Lusignan M	25 Aug 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	D 157724	Spr	Martin A	27 Sep 45	Cfn
11 Apr 45	A 108645	Spr	McLellan AH	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	K 2106	Spr	Ritchie GR	27 Sep 45	Pte
11 Apr 45	E 35260	Spr	Sinnett M	27 Jul 45	Pte



Date TOS	No	Rank	Name	Date SOS	Rank
11 Apr 45	M50741	Spr	Suprenant L	30 Jul 45	Cfn
11 Apr 45	E 42033	Spr	Vezina A	4 Aug 45	Pte
12 Apr 45	A 64400	Sgt	Sherlock EP	27 Sep 45	Sgt
16 May45	B 157405	Cfn	Cox LG	31 May 45	Cfn
25 May45	A 64258	Cfn	Mines RV	27 Sep 45	Cfn
14 Jun 45	A 58831	Sgt	Ingrey JC	27 Sep 45	Sgt
24 Jun 45		Lt	JM Vallance	24 Aug 45	Lt
30 Jun 45	L 22461	Pte	Sigfuson W	27 Sep 45	Pte
25 Jul 45	A 86804	Cfn	Bastien PJ	27 Sep 45	Cfn
25 Jul 45	B 63314	Cfn	Crawford W	27 Sep 45	Cfn
25 Jul 45	D 128681	Cfn	Murdock K	27 Sep 45	Cfn
25 Jul 45	F 51879	Pte	Schultz RC	15 Sep 45	Pte
25 Jul 45	A 58396	Cfn	Tupanier CT	27 Sep 45	Cfn
25 Jul 45	B 143668	Pte	Wilkes HR	27 Sep 45	Pte

## No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop

### **Summary**

No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 844 called out on active service 6 Nov 41 by G.O. 13/42 1 Apr 42

Partially formed in UK by CMHQ Adm O No. 65, 3 Apr 42

Converted and redesignated, 22 Aug 1943

No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844

HQ No. 1 Base Workshop RCOC, Serial 844B

No. 1 Base Tank Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844C

No. 1 Base Vehicle Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844D

No. 1 Base Armament And General Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844E

No. 1 (Infantry Divisional) Increment to No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844F

No. 2 (Armoured Divisional) Increment to No. 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844G by G.O. 79/44

Redesignated 15 May 44 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Reorganized 27 May 44 by G.O. 463/44

Disbanded 31 Aug 45 by G.O. 401/45

### **History**

At a meeting held on 16 October 1941 at Bordon Camp, Hants, UK, Colonel, the Honourable JL Ralston, Minister of National Defence, Lt General AGL McNaughton, Major General PJ Montague, Major General HDG Crerar, and Brigadier JH MacQueen studied the proposed location for a Canadian base ordnance workshop. In their studies, they also recommended that, in addition to the base workshop, the RCASC revise its establishment to “assist in the whole picture in the matter of vehicle maintenance”. These officers also noted that a large number of vehicles were awaiting repair, and that it would be necessary to hand over these vehicles to the British for repair, as sufficient tradesmen were not available locally from Canadian troops.

Mr Francis Farwell, the assistant to Mr Victor Sifton, the Master General of Ordnance, recommended that the base workshop be staffed by specialists. He advised the base workshop would have to be able to overhaul a minimum of 100 engines per week. He requested that Col GA Secord should be placed in command of the new unit and, if possible, all ranks were to be supplied from Canada.

On 1 November 1941, Mr Sifton, the MGO, announced that Col Secord had been given the task to organize and command Canada’s first Canadian overseas base workshop. Capts DE Mounteer and RG Storms were assigned to assist the new commander.

Col Secord wasted no time in commencing the organization of the Canadian base workshop, which was to become the largest military workshop in the British Empire, capable of handling military equipments of the greatest diversification. The workshop would be capable of sharpening hypodermic needles for the Medical Corps and rebuilding the most complex computer then available for the artillery. From watches to tanks, from voltage control regulators to radar sets, from revolvers to the anti-aircraft guns, nothing

was too light or too heavy, too simple or too complex, or too small or too large to be repaired or rebuilt by the more than 2,000 tradesmen representing more than 100 different trades that staffed the workshop in 1943.

Col Secord selected Maj RH Sloane on 11 November 1941 to be his second-in-command and acting commanding officer in Camp Borden, Ontario, while Col Secord stayed in Ottawa organizing the unit, obtaining the many authorities required for stores, etc., and while visiting the major industrial organizations in Canada to glean from them the necessary data for use in setting up the base workshop. He appointed Capt Mounteer his adjutant.

Under the command of Lieut RN Brooks, the first draft of 50 men arrived in Camp Borden, Ontario, on 12 November 1941. Included in this draft was RSM J Caron. All ranks were temporarily attached to No. 2 Detachment, RCOC, for quarters and rations. From here, they began to take over Area E2, formerly occupied by the Lord Strathcona's Horse.

To Capt Storms was given the responsibility to direct the selection of NCOs and men for the unit, and to draw up the mobilization tables of equipment and stores for the workshop. Col Secord reserved for himself the selection of his officers<sup>23</sup>.

Col Secord visited his unit on 15 November and advised his staff that the unit establishment was to be 1,600 all ranks, and he appointed Lt EW McInnes to be transport officer in charge of the unit's station wagon and three trucks; all borrowed from the RCASC.

By 26 November, arrangements were completed for all training centres and depots in the district to have tradesmen ready for interviews. Interviewing and selecting tradesmen was a big task. Men under instruction and training at specialist schools, such as the 475 men at the Anderson School at London, Ontario, were paraded in classes by their instructors for interview.

By 1 December 1941, the new unit had grown to 135 all ranks. On 9 December, Lt HB McAdam was taken on strength. He had been a member of the 9<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Mechanical Engineering (OME) class at the RCOC Training Centre, Barriefield. He was a man of considerable experience, and held a high engineering position with a pulp and paper company. He told his classmates that he was going overseas to assist in the supervision of the erection of new buildings for the base workshop.

A letter from Col Secord was published on 11 December in Part 1 Orders advising the unit that there would be a surplus of personnel recruited for the base workshop overseas, with the distinct understanding that only the best men would be picked to fill the establishment. The balance would be used to fill in gaps in the units left behind, or to form a nucleus of any ordnance workshop formed immediately after their departure. From this, it will be seen that Col Secord had probably been given considerably more freedom by DND and probably a larger budget (as we shall later see) with which to raise a unit than any other commanding officer during the Second World War.

On Christmas Day 1941, all ranks enjoyed the excellent dinner the cooks had prepared. Many contributions from outside firms were received in the way of extras for this special day.

The Acting Commanding Officer, Maj Sloane was suddenly taken ill on 27 December and temporarily replaced by Lt-Col CF Curtis until 12 February 42.

On 1 January 1942, first official notice was received to form an Advance Party of approximately 400 to be prepared to go overseas immediately.<sup>24</sup> Over 550 personnel were picked out before this draft was filled; some of the reasons for rejections were lack of basic training, lack of physical fitness, and lack of documentation.

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<sup>23</sup> See Annex F to this unit history.

<sup>24</sup> See Annex A to this unit history.

The unit had grown to 1,173 all ranks, with personnel reporting in daily from every part of Canada. The most difficult appointment to fill appeared to be that of bugler.

On 23 February, the unit had a general inspection by Maj-Gen TV Anderson, DSO, accompanied by Maj Allan Garrow and Mr St Clair-Balfour of the MGO Branch. This was the unit's final inspection before proceeding overseas. Consequently morale was high. General Anderson was quite pleased with his inspection.

At the end of February the strength had risen to 1,967 all ranks.

On 6 March 1942, 1,100 all ranks were warned for movement overseas in two drafts. On 10 March two trains left for Halifax with Col Secord in command of one train and Maj Storms in command of the other. They arrived at Halifax on the 12<sup>th</sup> and sailed for overseas on the SS *Orbita*, which normally had a peacetime passenger capacity of 975 persons and, as over 2,400 troops were placed aboard, the "accommodation for sleeping and ablutions were just about as inadequate as possible". The SS *Orbita* landed at Gourock, Scotland on 22 March. They arrived at their destination, Jasper Camp, Witley, Surrey at 1600 hrs on 24 March 1942.

From the troops remaining behind in Canada, 300 were warned for another draft overseas. On 18 March, the third draft in command of Maj AT Field, consisting of 298 troops, left for Halifax. They sailed on the SS *Capetown Castle*.

The *Capetown Castle* carried 1,600 troops. Quarters were exceptionally good, for all troops were quartered either in bunks or berths with a large number being accommodated in cabins. The meals were excellent compared to the SS *Orbita*. The *Capetown Castle* landed at Liverpool on 29 March. The men were taken by train to Milford, where they were met by trucks and taken to the Laurentide section of Camp Witley.

All the personnel arriving from Canada were re-interviewed, given M score tests [*an intelligence/aptitude test – ed*] and allocated to various types of training and trade tests in special fields.

The organization of the unit continued. However, it was greatly complicated by the dispersion of the unit between Bordon Camp, Witley Camp, and the Ordnance Reinforcement Unit.

Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) decided that the Canadian trade qualifications of all Canadian troops overseas had to be confirmed by a new series of trade tests. These new tests were very difficult and many tradesmen failed to pass them. At the time there was considerable resentment - many of the tradesmen who failed, considered themselves qualified tradesmen both in military and civil life in Canada. It was not long, however, before it was generally agreed that the new standards were an improvement, and the tradesmen were better skilled after their additional trades training.

Capt HO McNerney and his staff were literally working night and day in checking equipment for the new shops. His work was complicated by the extra accounting demands created by the difference in regulations between Canada and the UK.

By 17 April 1942, key personnel for the "A" and "B" vehicle shops and the general shops had been interviewed and selected. During this period the unit was hampered in their general training and operations by a series of outbreak of mumps. These outbreaks first started back in Camp Borden, Ontario.

Lieut AE Penny and 27 men, who were previously detached while the unit was in Camp Borden as part of "W" force, arrived from Newfoundland via Canada to rejoin their unit on 21 April.

A review made during the first week of May showed that the shops were nearing completion, but that progress was still slow. The big problem appeared to be in getting authority for a permanent hook-up to the British National Grid for electric power to run the machines. At this time the unit was forced to use temporary hook-ups for power supply from their own and mobile engineer generating units.

Major JR Dunlop accompanied by H/C JA Sweeney, Lieuts ER Ambrose, RN Brooks, AE Esdaile, GL Lodge, WH Wood, and JG Grier and 122 other ranks, arrived at Jasper Camp on 13 May 1942. This was the final detail from Camp Borden, Ont.<sup>25</sup> This brought the total strength to 1,927 all ranks. Preparations for the transfer of the unit to Borden Camp commenced on 15 May.

“Yesterday”, recorded the historian, “a party of officers went over to inspect our new quarters and from their reports, we are in for another fine time. Built in the 1890’s, they have absolutely no ablution facilities and are old broken-down huts, which would not even make good firewood. It is a shame to put the men into such places”.

On 16 May, Col Secord discussed the matter of buildings with Col G Able from CMHQ. There was nothing that could be done, and the move was scheduled to be completed the following week. The unit commenced its move to Gaudaloupe Lines, Bordon Camp on 21 May. In moving into the new lines the following unit organization was set up:

- HQ Coy under comd of Capt DD Campbell
- A Coy under comd of Maj SD Clarke
- B Coy under comd of Capt JC Meredith
- C Coy under comd of Maj JR Dunlop
- D Coy under comd of Capt SM King

A review at the end of the month showed that the completion of the shops was progressing, but not at the rate of speed that was anticipated. Considerable construction still remained to be done and electric power had not yet been supplied to the shops. There were difficulties still being experienced in the accounting system, and there was still a definite shortage of vehicle spare parts.

“Difficulty was experienced in obtaining cleaning material, such as brushes, soap, or antiseptic solutions to work with, and the toilet paper ration was six rolls per week to the unit. In consequence newspapers were frequently used, contrary to regulations, resulting in many plugged toilets. On 15 May, a medical inspection was held at Gaudaloupe Barracks, Bordon, which the unit planned to take over as permanent barrack lines. These were old buildings, which had been previously condemned because of the poor state of repairs and the lack of sanitary accommodation. The main blocks of the latrines and urinals were in open buildings and of very bad repair. The urinals had no flushing system, and the salts of the urine of Empire troops had collected down through the ages. Although exposed to open air, the odour was very high, and in view of the coming fly season and the lack of screening in the messing halls, an attempt was made to mechanically scrape the debris away.”

On 9 June the personnel of 13 Company were moved from Gaudaloupe to Lower Oak Hangers in an endeavour to have the men more conveniently placed.

On 1 July there were still approximately 425 men left at Jasper Camp<sup>26</sup> as there was insufficient accommodation in Bordon Camp.

The first training casualties of the unit occurred on the grenade range when Pte A Henry was killed and Lt Piper and Sgt McLelland were seriously injured. By the end of July, plans were being formulated for taking over the RCASC Heavy Repair Shop at Slough, Bucks, under the command of Lt-Col WL Thompson. This organization, which at the time was called the “Advance Component”, was later to become No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop. The RCASC Heavy Repair Shop and its 600 personnel became part of No. 1 BOW on 27 August 1942.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> See Annex B to this unit history.

<sup>26</sup> See Annex C to this unit history.

<sup>27</sup> See Annex D to this unit history.

The auxiliary generators that supplied power on a temporary basis were gradually withdrawn as the installation of power lines progressed.

Lt-Col FJ Lyle was appointed second-in-command in September.

October 1942 showed progress in solving the difficulties of the workshop. What were formerly problems had been reduced to routine. Assembly lines were working at a faster rate as the supply of spare parts improved. Various departments and sections were approaching their full entitlement of tools, shelving, binning, etc.

The Honourable JL Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, made a hurried inspection of the workshops on 5 October. In the brief time he was there, he was quite complimentary in what he said. During the next week, several more inspections of the shop were made by distinguished senior officers.

Col Secord made the policy of inviting personnel from various field workshops to visit the base workshop in order to acquaint them with the facilities that were available for repair work. The aim of this policy was to discourage base overhauls and rebuilds of equipment in the field as much as possible, and send it to the base workshop where it rightly belonged.

Sir Stafford Cripps, accompanied by General McNaughton, inspected the shop on 23 October. Sir Stafford was greatly impressed with what he saw.

By 30 October, it was necessary to have two shifts working in the tank shop in an effort to reduce the backlog caused by the change over from the 2-pounder to the 6-pounder gun on the Ram tanks. The new work hours were in force until after Armistice Day. On this Memorial Day, work continued without interruption for the traditional service. The men worked intently and with dignity, wearing on their caps the symbolic poppy commemorating the fallen comrades of the First World War, and for the younger mechanics perhaps more personally, those who had already fallen in the Second.

One of the more unusual courts martial to be held in the UK at this time was that of H 57642 Pte Francis W. Francis was in fact L/Cpl Murphy, a member of the 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment (GGFG). After a year and a half of service in Canada with his regiment, he became quite impatient and deserted; re-enlisting at No. 2 District in Toronto under the name of Francis. Subsequently he was transferred to the unit and overseas. In this manner he was overseas ahead of his regiment. On one of his visits to the Base Ordnance Workshops, the Technical Adjutant of the 21 CAR was hailed by Murphy who was operating an overhead crane. Murphy told the Technical Adjutant that he was being court-martialled for desertion. However, inasmuch as he had really only deserted for a day or so, he didn't think anything would become of it. Later reports indicated that Murphy was found guilty, was given a minimum sentence and the option of staying with the workshop or returning to his regiment. Murphy elected to stay with the workshop.

Major Clarke and S/sgt Butler commenced preparing for an extended tour of North Africa to observe the latest techniques in use by RAOC workshops. They were the first of a group of officers and seven NCOs who were sent to North Africa as observers. They left for this assignment on 18 December.

Major General FP Worthington, General Officer Commanding, 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, visited the workshop on 10 December to see the progress of a pilot model of a mounting for a Hispano-Suiza gun being built under the direction of Capt JR McLarnon. Another special job that was in the shop at the time of the General's visit was the 3.7-inch anti-aircraft gun mounted on a Ram tank. The gun was mounted on the tank in place of the turret. Rear Admiral Greathed, RN, was greatly interested in this installation and made a trip to the workshop to see it and at the same time to see his brother Lt AJ Greathed.

The menu for Christmas Day dinner was turkey, breaded pork chops, brussels sprouts, cherry pie, plum pudding, and beer.

A review at the end of the year showed that the unit was well settled down, and was actively engaged in the repair and rebuild of all military equipments. The unit strength was 1,700 all ranks. They had been working in their shops in Bordon Camp for slightly over six months. During these months, the machine

tools required to carry out the many tasks had been installed and put into production under the energetic supervision of Major Bruce McAdam and his staff.

Maj McAdam took on the additional duties of organizing and setting up a vulcanizing plant. This plant got into production in the first part of January.

The Advance Component at Slough, Bucks were rapidly preparing themselves for the approaching day when they would be called upon to move into a theatre of operations.

On 4 January 1943, Lt-Col F.J Lyle, temporarily assumed the command whilst Col Secord returned to Canada on special leave returning the following March.

On 19 January 1943, the pay for lance corporals was increased by ten cents per day! The lance corporals were unable to take immediate advantage of this increase as they were required to increase their dependant's allowances by the same amount.

For nine months, Maj McAdam had been trying to get an establishment approved and personnel in for the purpose of having a maintenance crew whose specific task would be the maintenance of the plant belonging to the workshop. He argued, quite rightly, that it was not enough to have plant tools and men alone, there must be a plant maintenance group to do maintenance and this group must be on the spot. This problem was finally resolved with the arrival of the required personnel in March 1943.

German aircraft made their first appearance over the workshop early in 1943 in what was assumed to be a reconnaissance flight as no bombs were dropped.

At a conference, Col Secord advised them the Advance Component would probably move by mid-April. Col Secord also stressed that a very careful control on the quantity of paper work being done in the workshop must be exercised. The maximum number of men must be employed in production.

By 5 April 1943, the Advance Component holdings of stores and equipment were reduced to their entitlement. The surplus stores were returned to the base workshop - some of which were put in use there and the remainder put in storage for the Second Advance Component.

Exercise *Horn*, designed to test the communications and signals 'set up', started on 1 May and lasted until 3 May. General opinion was that *Horn* showed that communications were not too good, and that there was too great a time lapse in the issue and receipt of messages.

Word was received on 6 May that five more members of the unit were to be sent to North Africa. They were:

Maj CJ Meredith	Capt AE Penny	Capt JG Woodall
Sgt Schurman	S/sgt Coueffin	

On 14 May 1943, the unit historian recorded that: "There will be much to say after this war of the escapades of the Canadian soldiers, who apparently have unlimited powers of persuasion insofar as the English girls are concerned. There is no doubt that they have and in all probability will continue to be remembered in England by their "Bundles for Britain". One very provoked father has written to say that after talking it over with the Vicar and his missus, they have decided that the best arrangement would be to have the lad pay the hospital expenses and let it go at that. Apparently they would rather have an illegitimate child in the family than a Canadian".

In May 1943, "A" Coy started a programme on overhauling gyro-stabilizers for the Ram tanks. The armoured divisions at this time were being equipped with new tanks and the training tanks were being returned to base workshop for complete overhaul. There was some consternation at the base workshop as to whether or not the field workshops would do their share of the repairs before releasing the tanks back to base. Considerable pressure was being exerted on the base workshop at this time to put in more overtime work. As it was, workshop personnel were working long hours. On 1 June, CMHQ instructed

the workshop that they would work four hours overtime one night a week. This was an extension of normal working hours, and did not take into consideration the overtime hours worked by the men by Col Secord's direction, as he adjusted the overtime to meet the load fluctuations of the shops.

On 7 June 1943, Capt Elliott left for the Bristol Channel on a test run with five waterproofed vehicles. The aim of the test was to travel from Bordon to the channel, take the vehicles out into the water and return to Bordon without any break-down. He arrived back on 10 June. The results were conclusive. Waterproofing techniques had to be improved before absolute faith could be placed in them.

Lt-Col LS McGregor arrived on 17 July 1943 to become second-in-command succeeding Lt-Col FJ Lyle. Col Lyle became the new CREME at Army.

A new engine test building was being constructed, and a new instrument and wireless building was scheduled for immediate construction. By the end of September, the new engine test building was nearly completed. This was a great asset in the testing and rebuild of tank engines. The engines were required to have a minimum of 400 hp and checking them out on a dynamometer would guarantee this.

The new building for tank repairs was under construction at this time. The additional buildings created quite a complex, and Col Secord and his staff were quite concerned about it becoming a tempting target for enemy aircraft; they still hadn't had a serious bombing.

Word was received on 2 August 1943 that an establishment had been approved for the Second Advance Base Workshop and they would draw their personnel from No. 1 BOW. This establishment was identical to the First Advance Base Workshop; each with a strength of 12 officers and slightly over 500 men. Col Secord announced on 24 August 1943 that the new establishment had been approved for the base workshop. The new establishment was an exact duplicate of the British fourth echelon shop. The diarist recorded that "the British never expect to follow theirs, as they employ numerous civilians and ATS; on the other hand we have to follow our WE and it makes things a bit difficult".

On 20 August, the workshop commenced waterproofing tanks for the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division. The workshop personnel worked through until they were finished.

Another special project for CMHQ was completed by the end of September. This project consisted of a turret containing four 20-mm guns, mounted on a 60-cwt truck chassis. This vehicle would be used in convoy work to provide AA protection. General McNaughton was pleased with the job, and except for a few minor modifications was approved. Records have shown that from 20 October 1942 until 1 October 1943 that exactly 5,000 engines had passed through the workshop assembly lines. This was the rate predicted by Mr Francis Farwell back in 1941 when he forecast a minimum requirement of 100 engines per week. The workshop took on another special job at this time; it was the construction of a mechanical sound ranging plotter designed by a Canadian officer. A complimentary letter was received from the DDME and the Invention Board saying how pleased they were with the pilot model.

Major McAdam was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and given command of the equipment assembly unit. It was forecast at this time that the equipment assembly unit would eventually become as large as the BOW. Its task primarily was the assembly of vehicles and equipment. The base workshop opened up a new chrome plating plant for the purpose of chrome plating the cylinder barrels of the tank engines. This process became quite successful in reducing the wear of the cylinder barrels.

The instrument shop made a rather unique pilot model of a stapler using stainless steel staples to close incisions instead of sutures or clips. Major Esdaile (Retired) remarked that the artificers on the project would staple a fold of skin on their forearms when trying out the equipment.

No. 2 Advance Base Workshop started to build up by the end of November. Lt-Col JH Fox was in command. A review by the unit showed that November was one of the best production months up to that date. A summary of the production figures for 1943 will be found at Annex E.



While the men were enjoying their Christmas dinner, they were visited by Col HB Keenlyside, DOS, and Col Secord. Cols Keenlyside and Secord addressed the men and complimented them for their excellent cooperation they had shown during the past year. He also told them that the unit had grown to a strength of 70 officers and 1,990 men.

The general feeling of the officers and men on New Years' Day was, perhaps the war may be over before the end of 1944. There was some foundation for their feelings. The weather was clear during the first week of January 1944 and the air was filled with the vibrations of large formations of allied aircraft passing overhead on their way to Europe to soften up the enemies' defences.

On the ground, assault preparations were evident in the base workshop. Capt EM Brignell was placed in charge of the waterproofing of approximately 1,800 vehicles of all descriptions. These vehicles would of course be in addition to those vehicles in the hands of the units. The 1,800 vehicles the base workshop were to waterproof would supply last minute replacements to units requiring them before the invasion and replacement vehicles for those lost in the invasion.

More evidence of the assault to come, appeared in the third week of January 1944 with the arrival of a priority demand for 87 Sherman tanks for active operations. This order was to be given priority over everything else in the tank shop.

The problem of spare parts became acute with the arrival of the first of the 87 Shermans. The workshop was under the impression that the tanks to be modified would be new ones - instead they received tanks that first of all had to be made battle-worthy in the fullest sense. The War office at the same time had 'frozen' the supply of Sherman spare parts in preparation for the invasion. On the 19 January the figure of 87 was increased to 117!

The administrative side of the workshop was in the meantime reviewing the units' nominal roll, checking qualifications, categories, etc, to determine who in the unit were fit for service in field units if so required.

The enemy bombers chose the workshop area for a target on the night of 21 January. Several bombs were dropped but there were no direct hits on the buildings, nor were there any casualties.

During this hectic period, special jobs were still being loaded on the workshop. Their originators really didn't have too much conception of the man-hours involved or of the facilities that would have to be diverted from production for the main war effort.

The general opinion of the OMEs and later the EMEs, was that everybody wanted to be an inventor and when possible, used the nearest workshop facility under their control from the LADs in the forward areas right back to and including the base shop 'to cobble up their ideas in iron'.

It may well be argued that some of these projects would, if successful, make a contribution to the war effort. There is no quarrel about this. What was wrong though is that there were in existence development agencies complete with workshops for this purpose. Such projects belonged there - not in the repair and rebuild facilities of the land army.

By 21 February 1944, the workshop had completed 110 of the 117 Sherman tanks for the Canadians, and in addition, had processed 103 Ram tanks for the British.

Enemy air activity in the vicinity of Bordon Camp had increased sufficiently by 29 February that 'fire-watchers' were posted for the first time.

The issue of coal and coke for living quarters was discontinued on 15 March 1944. "We all hope" said the historian, "that the weather keeps mild and may a warm spring break soon".

A new priority program was introduced on the 20 March 1944. All Sherman tanks had to have extra armour plate welded on the sides of the tanks to give extra protection to ammunition storage bins. Fortunately the kits contained welding rod, which normally was scarce. The only shortage was the

number of welders available. Again the field units made their own modifications and the base shop modified the reserve tanks.

The waterproofing of the assault vehicles started on the 21 March. The assault units brought their vehicles to the shop. They remained at 1 BOW until almost the last minute thus ensuring that everything was in readiness. The shop programmed itself to handle 80 vehicles a day.

As late as 24 March 1944, the workshop received a priority task of equipping forty 3-ton lorries with wireless. As is usual, (things haven't changed much since that time), most of the installation kit was not standard issue and had to be manufactured in the ancillary shops before the main program could commence.

By 10 April, the special modification program of welding extra armour plate on the tanks was completed. There were indications that an additional quantity of tanks would be sent in for this modification. At one time there were in the vicinity of 160 modifications required to be done on the tanks overseas. Some of these were done by contract with a firm known as Jack Olding. What made the field EMEs hostile towards Jack Olding was that the field units were issued with tanks that had passed thru Oldings and the modifications were not done. The modification kits were stuffed inside the turret or tool boxes, etc, and the LADs had to make the installations that Olding had already received credit for. This assumption was made on the basis that Jack Olding's name was stamped on the kits and in some cases on the tank itself. It was quite clear at the time that the kits were not fabricated by Jack Olding. Hence the resentment. At the same time the portable flashlights and other attractive stowage were often missing. The earlier system of issue was much more satisfactory from the unit point of view. A unit would be issued with a sealed box of stowage with each tank. Rarely any shortages when this method was used.

The word "Ordnance" was dropped from all workshops and LAD titles on 15 May 1944. The Engineering or 'E' side of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps became the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. Col Secord, accompanied by his senior officers, attended the ceremony.

The almost weekly receptions and tours for visiting dignitaries had not let up. In many cases these receptions were invaluable from a public relations point of view. Guests were from Canada, allied nations, and the field units of the Canadian Army.

The new War Establishment converting the rank and trade structure from RCOC to RCEME arrived on 5 June.

The following day all ranks were filled with tension and at the same time enthusiasm on hearing that the allied armies had started the Second Front. They felt satisfaction at last in knowing that their years of hard work were now being utilized in an attempt to rapidly shorten the duration of the war. That enigmatic ally, Russia, and her sympathetic propagandists in UK who wrote on the walls of London's public rest rooms, "Russia bleeds while Britain Blancos" could at last find comfort in seeing what was to be one of the most ingenious assaults ever launched in the cause of peace.

Nine hundred volunteers contributed blood to the emergency blood bank the RCAMC were building up to take care of casualties.

Authentic information was sent to BOW regarding the waterproofing jobs they had done. All ranks were anxiously waiting to hear the results of the final trial. Success! Not one Canadian tank had failed because of waterproofing and very few soft-skinned vehicles failed to get ashore.

For the first time one of "Hitler's Secret Weapons" the V-1 commonly called the 'Buzz-Bomb' came close to the shop buildings on the night of 11 July. It flew so low that the duty officer Capt ND King, ordered the night shift into the shelters. The increase of the casualties, both human and material, caused by buzz-bombs falling in the general neighbourhood of Bordon Camp was the cause of a drop of morale of the unit personnel who had married and established homes of their own in the area. The number of compassionate leaves increased sharply with the increase of this type of warfare.

The new RCEME shoulder badge was received with enthusiasm by the unit on the 31 July. It was still to be sometime before troops would receive the RCEME hat badge - some overseas troops were forced to wear Ordnance hat badges to the end of the war while reinforcements arriving from Canada had the new badge. Officers in Europe for instance eventually obtained their new badges by having them made in Belgium.

On 1 August, the first tanks sent back for base overhaul from Europe arrived.

Fifty engines were rebuilt on the engine rebuild lines on 2 August. This figure is a sharp increase from 100 engines a week previously recorded.

Orders were received to convert 100 Ram tanks into personnel carriers by removal of their turrets. This program was urgent as it was to be completed by 22 August 1944. A total of 125 tanks were converted by 28 August and by then some were already in use in Europe. Eighty-four additional Rams were also in the process of being converted to ammunition carriers. The pilot model of a Ram tank converted to a flamethrower equipped with the Wasp II equipment was completed at this time and successfully passed its tests.

In the meantime the instrument shop had completed another special piece of equipment for the RCAMC called a dermatome. The function of this instrument is to remove a predetermined thickness of skin from a person's body for use in skin grafting. There is no record of the instrument mechanics testing the dermatome on their forearms as they did the stapling machine they made to do away with clips and sutures in surgery.

During August and September the shops were busy repairing and rebuilding several thousand "B" vehicles that had accumulated in their backlog. There was no shortage of volunteers for contributions for the blood bank. The shortage of infantry reinforcements however began to be felt. Personnel in the field who stepped out of line were threatened with a transfer to the infantry. This had a better effect than the punishments offered by KR Can except in the case of those who wanted to transfer to the infantry anyway. However the acute shortage resulted, in what everyone expected, a 'comb-out' of personnel from units who were not absolutely essential for the operation of those units. 1 BOW contributed 130 general duty men for training as reinforcements for the field. They were, in many cases, replaced by categorized personnel from reinforcement units, personnel depots and active service in the field. Considerable tact had to be exercised in assisting the latter category in their new way of life.

The anticipated load of about 62 radial engines per month for tanks was increased to about 500 in October 1944. Some were to be subcontracted to a firm in Bristol, and should the shop in Bordon Camp be destroyed, the entire load of engines would be transferred there. The famous Chrysler Multibank engine, which was first built as an expedient by the USA, was subcontracted to another firm for overhaul and rebuild. An evaluation made by the US Ordnance Corps after the war supported the general opinions that the multibank was the best of the tank engines produced during the war. This remarkable engine was made up of five commercial Chrysler engines mounted on a common crankcase with No. 1 and 5 engines just about horizontal and No. 3 engine vertical. Engines No. 2 and 4 fitted in the space between No. 1 and 3 and No. 3 and 5. The engine was cheap, simple, and had the advantage that almost every soldier who had a reasonable knowledge of any straight 6-cylinder engine could maintain it. This was a great contrast to the radial engines that were victims of bad installation and application.

The radial engines were meant to be used at a relatively constant rpm and the torque requirements of the vehicle were varied by means of the transmission. As the average tank driver was loath to change gears, the engines were operated in a much larger rpm range to the detriment of engine life.

A noticeable increase in assemblies and components from Europe for base overhaul was noticed in November. As the workload changed its pattern so did the BOW change its facilities to meet the new demands. The shop organization was kept flexible at all times by Col Secord in order to keep at the best operating efficiency.

From a year or two before the invasion of Europe took place, the Canadian troops in UK were required to answer questionnaires, write tests, etc, it would seem, about every three months or so. Their interrogators were, it would appear rarely psychiatrists but rather junior officers who had somehow or other found themselves in positions where they were expected to supervise written examinations and apply oral tests. One such officer was left in a whirl when he asked a young Lieutenant we shall call Johnson:

“What did you do before the War, Mr Johnson?”

“I was a gentleman” was the reply.

“Yes, yes, I know, but what did you do?”

“I was a gentleman”.

“Of course you were, but perhaps you didn’t understand my question Mr Johnson. What I want to know is what did you do?”

Mr Johnson straightened up in a very dignified manner.

“I’m afraid you don’t understand, sir. I was a gentleman”.

During November 1944, the interrogators hit the road again. This time unit officers were selected to supervise the answering of a rehabilitation questionnaire that was to be given to 20 officers and 275 men.

The flints of Normandy played havoc with the new synthetic tires on the Canadian vehicles. The most serious troubles were experienced with the tires on the Rogers 40-ton trailers used for recovering tanks and used by field workshops to transport supplies of tank track and other heavy stores from the beachhead back in Normandy. The problem was further aggravated by overloading the wheels with extra-heavy loads. This trailer had three axles with a total of 24 running tires and two spares. The tire size (8.25 x 15) was not common. If one tire should go flat on a long haul, and the driver not notice it at once, it would not be long before a second tire would blow. Once this happened and providing the trailer was overloaded the other six tires on that axle would blow out in quick succession. Thus the flats from Rogers trailers usually occurred in eights. It wasn’t long before very strict instructions were issued by the workshop commanders, who depended so greatly on these equipments, requiring frequent halts for tire checks. Instructions had also been issued regarding the removal of flints from the tires every day or so.

The backlog of tires of all sizes to be recapped became so great that eventually the tire maintenance personnel from 1 BOW were sent to Europe under Capt AL Maclean.

The eternal problem of special development projects was still present in December 44. The shop was involved in experiments on a commander’s cupola for a Sherman tank, and on another to do with hospital stores.

The shop’s backlog in motorcycles was in the order of 5,000. Plans were underway to set up a special production line to process 50 per week. Evidently someone was planning for a long war.

Christmas was celebrated well but quietly. Those in 1943 who had visions of Christmas at home in 1944, soberly reflected that at least the end was now in sight and the chances for being home in 1945 were much better.

A dangerous easing off of the pressure of the war effort began to become noticeable at the base shop and in industry. Back home, of course, the leaders of Canada’s economy were trying to head off the collapse of industry that would be caused by the victory Canada was fighting for. A changeover had to be made from a war economy to a peace time economy. Such a change had to be gradual and smooth. Plants producing ammunition for instance were gradually closed down when sufficient stocks were on hand to last the estimated time until Germany would surrender. The carefully-calculated plans by our government planners were suddenly badly upset by Hitler’s counter-offensive at the Ardennes. This counter-offensive used up a large part of the reserves of ammunition.

Professor James A Coote, P. Eng, of McGill University tells a story of this period.

“With the sudden shortage of ammunition, I was called upon to make a survey to determine how a particular shell plant could quickly restore its former output of shells for the 4.5 and 5.5 howitzers. During my preliminary survey I noticed a very large quantity of the scarce shells neatly stacked at the back of one of the company’s buildings.

“Why are these shells stacked here?” I asked my guide.

“These shells failed to pass inspection, Professor”.

“Why?”

“Because they are half a ‘thou’ out of round”.

“I recalled that one of my former pupils, who, when serving as a gunner in North Africa had written to me saying that the luckiest gunners in the desert were the ones that had a large rasp to scrape out the fouling in the chamber! In view of this, I immediately ordered the condemned shells to be shipped to the shell filling plant”.

The publication of His Majesty’s New Year honour List brought a great increase of pride to the unit. Col Secord was honoured by being made an Officer of the Order of the British Empire and QMS HL Lovelace was made a Member.

Lt-Col RL Franklin came to the unit 9 February 45.

Col Secord was promoted to brigadier in March. His promotion was expressed as “well earned” by his unit.

The increase in flow of engines and assemblies from the European theatre were handled without trouble for a while. In one instance 60 carloads of non-serviceable assemblies arrived at one time. However, by the end of March, the backlog began to climb. Although the war was virtually at an end, still large demands for reinforcements were required in Europe. This coupled with the general reduction in incentive, plus the start of a trickle of officers and men being repatriated to Canada, placed a new strain on the workshop.

By a tremendous effort, BOW was able to increase its output so that the statistical records for the four week period ending 26 March showed that all records had been broken.

Colonel DIN Cooke took over as second in command, succeeding Lt-Col LS McGregor who moved to HQ 1 Cdn Army.

The news of VE-Day arrived on 7 May, and on the 8<sup>th</sup>, the day was celebrated by a thanksgiving service. The 10<sup>th</sup> was also spent quietly. The only disturbance being caused by a few prisoners who escaped from near by Headley Detention Barracks and who broke into “D” Coy lines for a change of uniforms.

The unit gradually returned to normal routine.

The latest questionnaire was circulated asking for volunteers for the Far East.

The technical pressures in the shops had drastically decreased, but now the pressures were transferred to the administrative portion of the unit. Lists were now compiled of the names of those members who had been overseas the longest. The outstanding cases, about 100 in number, were returned immediately. Amidst this atmosphere the unit received severe criticism on the maintenance of their bicycles!

The officers of the unit said “good bye” to Brig Secord at a mess dinner on 7 June. The Brigadier announced that Col Cooke was to be his successor and Lt-Col Clarke would be the second-in-command.

News of the Aldershot riots reached the unit on 5 July. However there was no likelihood of a similar occurrence in Bordon Camp. A rehabilitation group had been preparing the men for a long time on their

return to Canada and a new life. The unit had a strong sports program and all who could, participated. The workshop produced army championship teams.

Mr Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of Veterans Affairs, visited the unit on 23 July. His visit was disappointing to the men because he spent so little time at the unit. The men felt quite badly that the Minister didn't stop to talk or to ask them questions.

It came to light on the 31 July that one of the unit's corporals who had been with the unit since its mobilization in Canada turned out to be the son of a titled English family.

The Corporal's mother, Lady --- felt that her son should have a higher rank than corporal and brought pressure to bear in high places. It was necessary for Col Cooke and the corporal to go to CMHQ to discuss the matter. It appeared to be a case of a recruiting officer in Canada making promises that he was in no way able to keep, thereby making the corporal feel that he was not getting an "even break".

The tempo of posting men to the repatriation depot and the organization of a rear party to close down the base workshop increased during August. This maintained a heavy but welcome load on the orderly rooms of the BOW HQ and Coys.

As the drafts moved out, the BOW gave up lines and kept as concentrated as possible in order to reduce fatigues and guard duties. Athletic programs were increased to keep the workshop personnel busy who were not otherwise engaged in the closing down operations.

The last entry reads:

"31 August 45. Well - this is it, the last day of existence, after 1,392 days as a unit. There were lots of changes during our existence. When unit was mobilized there were many guesses as to what its functions would be - now we know. The largest workshop and manufacturing establishment in the UK, entirely manned by military personnel. We have had a turnover of approximately 7,000 personnel and a very few dissatisfied customers. All of us gained a lot of valuable experience and gained many new friends

Signed by  
DN Cooke Col  
CO 1 Canadian Base Workshop, RCEME

## **Annex A Advance Party**

Col Secord announced to his unit on 28 December 1941 that the Advance Party would leave within a few days for Bordon Camp, Hants to prepare for the arrival of the unit.

Major SD Clarke was given command of the Advance Party consisting of Capt WE McInnes, Capt HB McAdam, Lt JW Ferguson, Lt HD Roberts and 395 men. Of these, fifty men were assigned to assist the Royal Engineers in the erection of new shop buildings and 50 men were scheduled to go on courses.

The Advance Party arrived at Halifax on 8 January 1942 and sailed on the 10<sup>th</sup>. They arrived in the Clyde and anchored off Gourock on 19 January, arriving at Bordon Camp, Hants on 20 January.

An additional 46 men arrived from Canada on 10 March to join the Advance Party. These men had arrived after a setback when their original ship was forced to put back into port after developing engine trouble. This group had left Canada on 23 January and on their return to Canada they were sent to Sussex Camp, NB, to await another convoy. During this wait their OC, Lt OH Smith, developed pneumonia and consequently missed the second embarkation. With the arrival of Col Secord and the Main Party there was no longer any requirement for an Advance Party and therefore it ceased to exist after 31 March 1942.

## **Annex B Rear Party, Camp Borden, Ontario, Special Detail**

Lt RN Brooks returned to camp after seeing the Main Party off to Halifax on the morning of 18 March 1942 to find Maj A Sweet, the Camp Ordnance Officer ready to inspect the lines. After Maj Dunlop told him that the inspection was unexpected, Maj Sweet agreed to return the following day.

The Rear Party's main task was to clean up the lines, return barrack stores, court martial the apprehended absentees and to prepare themselves for movement overseas.

There was some delay in the move. The extra time made the routine duties even more monotonous. A well-planned sports program and special leave helped to keep up the morale of the men during this waiting period.

The Rear Party commanded by Maj JR Dunlop, consisting of eight officers and 122 men, left Camp Borden on the 28 April. Two cases of mumps were taken off the train at Joffre, Que. The following day there was another case of mumps and one case of scarlet fever. The MO quarantined all the contacts and had the train remade with the quarantined cars at the end.

The officers and men were given another check over by the embarkation officials and then they boarded the SS *Letitia*. They sailed from Halifax on 3 May arriving at Greenoch, Scotland 11 May. After being taken in tow they tied up at the King George V Docks in Glasgow and disembarked the following day arriving at Milford, Surrey on 13 May and rejoined their Unit at Jasper Camp.

### **Annex C Rear Party, Camp Jasper**

Lt RN Brooks was left in charge of the Jasper Camp Detail when the main body of the unit moved to Bordon Camp, Hants, on 22 May 1942.

Their duties were similar to the ones performed in Camp Borden, Ont. There was one important difference - the troops were now overseas. Thus there was no monotony and any spare time was devoted to serious training on the ranges, both rifle and grenade.

The Jasper group rejoined their unit in Bordon Camp on 1 June 1942.

### **Annex D Advance Component, 1 BOW**

During June and July 1942 rumour persisted in No. 1 Heavy Repair Shop (MT) RCASC, Serial 845, (located in the Weston Biscuit Factor, Slough Bucks) that the unit would be transferring to RCOC.

The rumour was confirmed at a meeting held at 1 HRS on 15 July. The unit became the Advance Component, No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844A on 27 August 1942.<sup>28</sup> Major JR Dunlop was placed in command after a period of handover from 1 HRS. Construction based on plans made by RCASC was retarded in order that the construction planned by 1 BOW could be made with the minimum of disruption.

The following officers transferred from RCASC to RCOC at this time:

Maj EW Coleman	Capt AM Mulligan	Capt WR Burns
Capt LR Perry	Capt WJ Davies	Capt HR Rice
Capt RW McBride	Capt FW Whitlock	

<sup>28</sup> The WD of 1 BOW records this date to be 27 August 42. The WD of 1 HRS records this date to be 31 August 42. GO 95/43 records the official date to be 20 January 43.



## Annex E

### Summary of Operations for 1943<sup>29</sup> 1 Base Workshop RCOC

Note: A check on the detailed calculations found in Appendix E of the original report revealed errors in simple arithmetic. These errors have been corrected and so indicated in Table 4.

The reader is warned that:

- a. The method of calculation used throughout this report in so far as the determination of basic data is concerned does not meet the requirements of the Corps today and therefore a comparison of 1 BOW's operation with that of our Base Workshops of today cannot be made.
- b. It is reasonable to assume that there are arithmetic errors in the balance of the summary. The data has not been confirmed.

**Table 1 - 1 Base Workshop, RCOC, Production & Backlog For 1943<sup>30</sup>**

Item	Backlog 1 January 1943	Completed 1943	Backlog 1 January 1944
Tank Repairs	97	507	227
Tank Modifications	-	1,055	-
Self-propelled Gun Mounts		37	3
“A” Engines - Continental	50	771	225
“A” Engines - G. M. C. (prs)	-	3	1
“A” Engines - Others	-	16	-
“A” Vehicle Components	11	7,961	609
Scout Cars	24	137	99
Armoured Cars	12	39	9
Carriers	12	332	84
Cars & Station Wagons - Ford	189	683	79
Chev	17	65	2
Willys	21	286	33
Others	13	127	10

<sup>29</sup> Unit War Diary, Jan 44.

<sup>30</sup> Condensed from Appendix A to a Summary of Operations for 1943, 1 Base Workshop, Unit WD Jan 1944, Appendix 6.

<b>Item</b>		<b>Backlog 1 January 1943</b>	<b>Completed 1943</b>	<b>Backlog 1 January 1944</b>
Trucks & Lorries	Ford	239	1,545	227
	Chev	174	1,461	188
	Others	68	303	35
Other Vehicles Ford		23	110	69
	Chev	3	21	28
	Others	36	354	71
Motorcycles - Norton		527	2,680	5
Motorcycles - Marley		46	129	691
Motorcycles - Others		4	4	3
Motorcycle Engines - Norton		119	750	270
	Engines - Marley	-	145	259
	Gear Boxes - Norton	-	370	51
	Gear Boxes - Harley	-	291	11
	Assemblies - Others	-	1,626	358
“B” Vehicle & Carrier Engines				
	Ford	127	4,102	124
	Chev	82	1,640	71
	Willys	3	248	64
	Hercules	-	6	8
	Sundry	1	49	28
“B” Vehicle & Carrier Axles		101	2,428	159
Transfer Cases		7	1,185	108
Transmissions		217	2,891	332
Misc Components		914	12,385	311

<b>Item</b>	<b>Backlog 1 January 1943</b>	<b>Completed 1943</b>	<b>Backlog 1 January 1944</b>
Electrical Components	269	55,912	769
Guns	40	729	26
Tank Guns	-	1,055	-
Small Arms	213	10,647	411
Telecommunications	-	11,144	1,723
Radar Equipment	-	37	-
Instruments	467	8,361	462
Vulcanizing Shop	-	25,189	874
Machine Shop	-	15,391	-
Carpenter Shop	-	2,823	-
Blacksmith Shop	-	2,385	-
Welding Shop	-	2,803	-
Sheet Metal Shop	-	3,963	-
Textile Shop	-	2,261	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,126</b>	<b>199,450</b>	<b>9,117</b>

**Table 2 - Summary of Manhours and Work Accomplished For 1943<sup>31</sup>**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Man Hours Expended</b>	<b>Completions</b>	<b>Man Hours Expended Per Item</b>
Tanks & Self-propelled Gun Mounts (Repairs)	141,029	544	243.0
Tanks & SP Mounts (Modifications)	131,775	1,055	125.0
“A” Vehicle Engines	129,255	790	151.2
“A” Vehicle Engine Test	19,445	-	24.3
“A” Vehicle Components	8,000	7,961	1.0
Wheeled “A” Vehicles & Carriers	66,631	408	163.3
“B” Vehicles	316,277	5,055	62.5
“B” Vehicle Engines	148,154	6,053	24.4
“B” Vehicle Engine Test	20,303	-	3.3
“B” Vehicle Mechanical Components	61,863	6,504	9.5
“B” Vehicle Miscellaneous Components	9,710	12,385	.8
Motorcycles	99,925	2,813	35.5
Motorcycle Assemblies	16,731	3,182	5.3
Electrical Components	77,664	65,912	1.15
Armament	78,269	1,784	44.0
Small Arms	18,697	10,647	1.75
Telecommunications	79,284	11,144	7.1
Radio	21,080	37	600.
Instruments	77,970	8,361	9.3
Vulcanizing Shop	58,955	25,189	4.5 (Represents Man Hours for (1) Tire and (1) Tube.)

<sup>31</sup> Condensed from Appendix B to a Summary of Operations for 1943, 1 Base Workshop. Unit WD January 1944, Appendix 6.

<b>Item</b>	<b>Man Hours Expended</b>	<b>Completions</b>	<b>Man Hours Expended Per Item</b>
Machine Shop	217,514	15,391	14.1
Carpenter Shop	66,673	2,823	23.6
Blacksmith Shop	46,690	2,385	20.
Welding Shop	26,085	2,803	9.4
Sheet Metal Shop	38,157	3,963	9.7
Textile Shop	18,492	2,261	7.2
Installation & Maintenance	58,031	-	-
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,052,665</b>	<b>199,450</b>	

**Table 3 - Manhours Expended On Maintenance 1943<sup>32</sup>**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Man Hours</b>
Machine Shop	50,471
Carpenter Shop	28,532
Blacksmith Shop	18,100
Welding Shop	10,754
Sheet Metal Shop	9,846
Textile Shop	1,648
Installation and Maintenance Crews	58,031
<b>Total</b>	<b>177,382</b>

<sup>32</sup> Condensed from Appendix D to a Summary of Operations for 1943, 1 Base Workshop. Unit WI) January 1944, Appendix 6.

**Table 4**  
**Man Hours Required For Complete Overhauls Of Vehicles<sup>33\*</sup>**

	Ram Tanks & SP Mounts	Wheeled “A” Vehicles & Carriers	“B” Vehicles
1. Vehicles completed 1943	554	403	5,055
2. Class “A” Jobs (A)			
a. Number	163	59	1,134
b. Avg man hours	114.5	30	23.7
c. Hours expended (2a x 2b)	18,663	1,770	26,876 (E)
3. Class “B” Jobs (B)			
a. Number	62	20	2150
b. Avg man hours	214.5	79	48.7
c. Hours expended (3a x 3b)	13,299	1,580	104,705
4. Total hours expended (2c + 3c)	31,962	3,350	131,581(E)
5. Man hours expended (exclusive of maintenance)	176,684	68,133	385,822
Less (4)	31,962	3,350	131,591
6. Man hours available Class “C” Jobs	141,722	64,783	244,241(E)
7. Class “C” Jobs (overhaul) (C)			
a. Number	319	329	1,771

<sup>33</sup> Condensed from Appendix E to a Summary of Operations for 1943, 1 Base Workshop, Unit WD January 1944, Appendix 6.

	<b>Ram Tanks &amp; SP Mounts</b>	<b>Wheeled “A” Vehicles &amp; Carriers</b>	<b>“B” Vehicles</b>
b. Avg man hours (less assemblies) (5/7a)	453.7(E)	196 (E)	143.1
c. Add average man hours:			
(1) Engine assembly	231.1	41.4	41.4
(2) Mechanical components		36.3	52.4
(3) Armament	23.2		
(4) Instruments	11.5	2.5	1.0
8. Total man hours per vehicle (7b +7c)	719.5 (D)(E)	277.1 (E)	233.3

## Notes:

- (A) Class “A” represents a minor repair job
- (B) Class “B” represents a major repair job
- (C) Class “C” represents a complete overhaul
- (D) Add 100 man-hours for overhauling a Sherman tank
- (E) Indicates that the original figures had to be revised due to arithmetical errors found on this page of the report.

**Table 5**  
**Breakdown of Man Hours for 1943<sup>34</sup>**

A. Employed On Productive Work		
1. On repair and overhaul of Army Equipment	1,802,432	42.6%
2. On special work for CMHQ in Ancillary Shops	13,103	.3%
3. On special work for Engineers employed on BOW Buildings in Ancillary Shops	6,569	.2%
4. On special work for BOD in Ancillary Shops	18,398	.4%
5. On special work for CEAU in Ancillary Shops	17,133	.4%
6. On work for CRU, LADs and Units	17,648	.4%
Total Employed On Productive Work	1,875,283	43.3%
B. Shop Overhead		
1. Installation and Shop Maintenance	177,382	4.2%
2. Administration - Spare Parts - General Shop Fatigues	434,555	10.3%
Total Shop Overhead	611,937	14.5%
Total Employed At Workshops	2,487,220	58.8%
C. Regimental Employment (Housekeeping)	776,563	18.4%
D. Courses & Training (personnel on Courses - or undergoing Courses at 130W - also Basic Training)	385,163	9.1%
E. Unemployables (Sick - Excused Duties - Hospital)	154,554	3.6%
F. Away From Unit (Attached Out - On Command - Leaves)	416,210	9.8%
G. Miscellaneous (Personnel undergoing Trade Test – and those in Detention)	10,119	.3%
<hr/>		
Total Man Hours Available For 1943	4,229,829	100%

<sup>34</sup> Condensed from Appendix F to a Summary of Operations for 1943, 1 Base Workshop, Unit WD January 1944, Appendix 6.



## Annex F

### Nominal Roll of Officers, 1 Canadian Base Workshop, 1941-1945

Lt	Abel, GC	Lt	Haldane, DE	Capt	Pakenham, KE
Capt	Allen, CC	Lt	Harvey, EJO	Capt	Parker, GH
Maj	Ambrose, ER	Lt	Hepburn, G	Lt	Pawsey, EJ
Lt	Anderson, RA	Lt	Hobbs, CE	Maj	Penney, AEG
Capt	Asliwin , HL, RCAPC	Capt	Inglis, GW	Capt	Perfect, KR
H/Capt	Aubin, LX, RCACHC	Lt	Innes, EP	Capt	Perry, LR
Capt	Bagnall, S	Capt	Judges, WE, RCAPC	Maj	Pfeiffer, WM RCAMC
Capt	Baird, LT	Capt	Kahn, DS, RCAMC	Lt	Phillips, NA
Capt	Beddows, JS	Capt	Katz, AE	Lt	Pinder-Moss, JN
Lt	Beley, JP	Maj	Kerr, JR	Lt	Piper, AD
Lt	Bell, JA	Lt-Col	King, CW	Lt	Piper, WS
Lt	Bernstein, S	Capt	King, GI	Capt	Poulter, LT
Lt	Betts, ?J	Capt	King, ND	Lt	Ransom, GE
Lt	Boire, PC	Maj	King, PC	Lt	Rennie, OWA
Capt	Bradbury, GF	Lt	Lake, AE	Lt	Richards, J
Capt	Branston, WJ	Capt	Lane, RE	Lt	Roberts, RR
Capt	Brignell, EM	Capt	Langstaff, JG	Lt	Roberts, TB
Capt	Brooks, RN	Lt	Lea, SJ	Lt	Robertson, P
Lt	Burton, JA	Capt	Letellier, EH, RCAMC	H/Capt	Rokeby-Thomas, HR, RCACHC
Capt	Butler, AT, RCAPC	Capt	Lewis, WE	Capt	Rose, DJ RCAPC
Maj	Campbell, DD	Capt	Lightfoot, HB	Maj	Ross, HT
Capt	Chorley, H, RCOC	Lt	Little, G	Lt	Rowan, CF
Lt Col	Clarke, SD	Capt	Lodge, GI	Lt	Rowe, EM
Lt	Collins, RL	Lt Col	Lyle, FS	Lt	Russell, RD
Col	Cooke, DN	Capt	MacInnes, WE	Brig	Secord, GA
Capt	Coombe, JH	Lt	Mackay, MD	Capt	Segouin, EA
Capt	Copeland, GO	Capt	Maclean, AL	Capt	Shepherd, IW
Lt	Curtis, CF	Capt	MacLean, HJ	Capt	Sheriff, A
Capt	Davies, CM,	Lt	MacLeod, CW	Maj	Sloane, RH
		Maj	McAdam, HB	Maj	Smith, OH
				H/Capt	Stewart, FC,

	RCASC	Capt	McChesney, W		RCACHC
LA	Dean, JE	Lt Col	McInerney, HO	Lt	Stone, JG
Capt	Donaldson, ED	Capt	McLaren, WHO	Maj	Storms, RG
Maj	Dunlop, JR	Maj	Meredith, CJ	H/Capt	Sweeney, JA, RCACHC
Capt	Elliott, EL	Lt	Milligan, L	Lt	Taylor, RS
Capt	Erb, HHE	Maj	Mitchell, RA	Capt	Thomas, FA
Capt	Esdaile, AE	Lt	Moore, AF	H/Capt	Way, EJ, RCACHC
Lt	Ferguson, DC	Lt	Morissette, WL	Capt	Webber, LE
Capt	Ferguson, JW	Capt	Mounteer, DE	Capt	Wells, LC
Lt Col	Field, AT	Lt	Munro, DD	Capt	Wheatley, TW
Capt	Flint, HT, RCAPC	Capt	Murray, WG	Capt	White, W
Capt	Gallagher, HS	Capt	Niven, RU	Capt	Will, RE
Capt	Goldenberg, L, RCAMC	Maj	Noble, RH	Capt	Williams, EJ
Lt	Graser, CG, RCAPC	Capt	Osler, PE	Lt	Wood, W
Lt	Greated, AG			Lt	Wood, WH
Maj	Grinham, ADI			Capt	Woodall, JG

# 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME

## Summary

Mobilisation serial: 844/1

Advance component, No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, CASF, Serial 844A called out on active service 20 Jan 43 by G. O. 95/43

Converted and redesignated 10 Mar 43 No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCOC, by G.O. 327/43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 43, under supervision HQ CMHQ by Mob O No. 77, 20 Apr 43

Change in Serial Number: For Serial 844/1 Read Serial 913/1 by CMHQ Adm O No. 183, 21 Dec 43

Redesignated 15 May 44 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME, by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded 14 Aug 45 by G. O. 401/45

## History

The history of 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCOC is associated with that of No. 1 Heavy Repair Shop (MT) RCASC, Serial No. 845 in that, in the course of events, 1 HRS was transferred from RCASC to RCOC to form the nucleus of the Advance Component No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC, Serial 844A, which later became No. 1 Advanced Workshop, RCOC.<sup>35</sup>

No. 1 Heavy Repair Shop (MT) RCASC was formed, recruited in Ottawa and came to the UK under the command of Lt-Col GM Parker.

Prior to the unit going overseas, an advance party under command of Capt EW Coleman was formed on 6 January 1942 by RCASC CAO and dispatched from Camp Bordon to Slough, Bucks to commence the design and physical layout of the workshop in buildings requisitioned from the Slough Trading Estate, the principal portion of the workshop being in a building occupied by the Weston Biscuit Co.

The main part of the Unit arrived overseas on 2 May 1942 with the bulk of their AFG 1098 stores arriving shortly after from Canada.

The unit was transferred on 27 August 1942<sup>36</sup> from RCASC to RCOC and named Advanced Component No. 1 Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop, RCOC. The new unit was placed under the command of Major JR Dunlop. See Annex A.

On 10 September, Colonels Secord, Keenleyside, Henderson and Guy inspected the new workshop and camp site.

In October, Maj EW Coleman who had transferred from RCASC to RCOC with his unit was SOS to No. 1 CORU while proceeding on the OME course.

Lt-Col WL Thompson was appointed Commanding Officer on 25 November 1942 and he requested Major JR Dunlop to remain as his second-in-command.

During the months of December 1942, January and February 1943, extensive general military training was carried out, under direction of Lt AJ Greathed. In addition, the tradesmen were trade tested under

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<sup>35</sup> 1 ABW's serial No. 844A was changed to 913 by CMHQ Adm O 183 d/21 Dec 43. This is another example of the many inconsistencies to be found in the records.

<sup>36</sup> See footnote to Annex D of this unit history.

RCCO trade standards. The tradesmen that needed upgrading and those that were allocated to new trades were sent to 1 CORU for trades training.

Christmas Day 1942 was considered as a Sunday. The officers and senior NCOs served the dinner. The YMCA donated a package to each man containing a gift and a package of Canadian cigarettes.

Major Dunlop left 30 January 1943 to organize and command 2 Canadian Corps Troops Workshop. Major LW Thomas, from 2 Army Ordnance Workshop, was appointed second-in-command.

No. 1 Advance Component became No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, 16 April 1943<sup>37</sup> with a new establishment of 11 officers and approximately 500 men.

The workshop output of “B” vehicles, guns, motorcycles, reconditioned engines, and manufactured items was closely scheduled with the production of 1 CBOW in Bordon Camp in order to obtain maximum production. Many irreverent officers said that it wasn’t maximum production that 1 CBOW were interested in, but rather maximum production figures.

All ranks were honoured to be inspected by His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands accompanied by Canada’s distinguished High Commissioner to Great Britain, the Honourable Vincent Massey. The occasion was the “Wings for Victory” parade in Slough held in June.

Lt-Col JH Fox newly appointed Commanding Officer of No. 2 Advanced Base Workshop visited Slough while looking at proposed sites for his new workshop. Col Fox’s new command was identical with Col Thompson’s, consequently the visit and resulting discussions were valuable to him in setting up his organization.

A shakedown exercise was held from 17 December 1943 to 10 January 44. Shakedown exercises were held by all field units to ensure their mobility. See Annex B for Col Thompson’s notes and suggestions on his unit’s move from Slough to the tank hangars in Crookham, Hants.

All production work ceased on 18 December in preparation for the move. Personnel were busily employed packing equipment and their personal belongings. Major Thomas accompanied by Lt W Beddard proceeded to Crookham to inspect the new workshop buildings and to prepare for the arrival of their unit. Here their troops were to be fed by No. 1 Sub-Workshop and housed in Leipzig Barracks. All the officers and men were occupied in the unloading of the equipment and the orderly transportation of this equipment to the sites allocated to the workshop sections in advance. Each crated machine tool was positioned in its proper place on the floor before it was uncrated.

When the shop was completely moved and again in production, every aspect of the move was studied. Adjustments in the entitlement of stores to be carried were recommended and many notes were made to make the next move easier and more efficient.

The dental officer, Major Whitehead, ran a parallel exercise of his own by conducting a dental examination of the officers and men. He also found cause to make notes for the future.

The unit administration was reduced somewhat by setting up a composite mess for the sergeants of the unit, No. 1 Sub-Workshop, and the Return Stores Depot. Thus they were able to pool their talents in obtaining supplies and extra messing in those difficult times.

At the end of January 1944, the strength return showed the strength of the unit to be 13 Officers and 492 men.

One of the changes in administration that affected all units was that officers and men, once admitted to any hospital, no longer returned to their unit, but upon discharge were fed into the reinforcement stream. This system, admittedly efficient, certainly in many cases didn’t help morale.

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<sup>37</sup> 10 Mar 43 by GO 327/43

The shortage of coal resulted in a curtailment in the amount of electricity that was available in the National Grid System. The base workshops of the Corps were heavy users and consequently felt the pinch when a curtailment was ordered in the consumption of electricity during the winter months. The small ration of coke (40 lbs per person per week for all purposes including cooking) became a real problem in March as the continuous cold weather reduced the unit's reserves of fuel.

The irking problem of a reliable supply of spare parts made itself felt at this time with the inevitable reduction of workshop output. The reliability of supply decreased as the U-Boat activity increased. There were other factors of course, but losses on the Atlantic largely contributed to the overall shortages.

With the impending opening of the Second Front, the unit cancelled all leaves. They also moved out of Leipzig lines into Haig lines.

On 26 April 1944 the Unit was placed under command of 21 Army Group.<sup>38</sup>

The receipt of the routine order that the unit would be converted to RCEME effective 15 May 1944 was somewhat of an anticlimax. This big event failed to prompt the unit historian to write more than that "The typewriters will be HOT before the job is done". The new RCEME badges ordered in June 1944 didn't arrive until June 1945!

"The long awaited 'D Day' has arrived" wrote the unit historian, "and after a year of work, training and teaching men for the special jobs they will be called upon to do, the unit is ready and willing to go. The only question", he asked, "is when?" With the increase in tempo of the air raids and the onslaught of the V-ls, Col Thompson increased the training pace in practicing embarking and disembarking on specially built ramps.

The advance party commanded by Major Thomas, surviving a collision at sea resulting in little damage to themselves, sighted their anchorage in France at 1100 hrs 2 July.<sup>39</sup>

They started unloading their equipment on 4 July.

The unit was alerted on 20 July that they would move overseas. They split up into groups for the move and proceeded through staging camps until they embarked at Gosport, Hants. The parties made their separate ways until they were united again at St Andre on 30 July after landing on Juno Beach.

Lt Z Miller and his driver were wounded by falling fragments of burst ack-ack shells.

The unit prepared at once to accept work from the field for repair. The men worked long hours each day and did their turn at guard duty and stand to. Several high-ranking officers inspected their daily activities during a series of visits. These inspections did not interrupt production for Col Thompson had chosen for his motto "A Workshop Works".

The familiar problem of a shortage of spare parts reached such proportions that, by September 1944, only 20% of the demands could be filled by the Ordnance Stores Section.

The approach of the fall season was indicated by rain. Winter clothing wasn't available for issue until 15 November. Three to four men a day were sent to hospital with severe colds. The medical officer did his best to keep the men well. He also went to great lengths to get a rum ration authorized. Even the forward workshops had trouble in this respect and took advantage of every shelling and bombing to issue a tot of rum. Under these circumstances the unit CO was the issuing authority - otherwise higher authority was normally required and rarely received.

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<sup>38</sup> CMHQ Adm 0 No. 73, 26 Apr 44

<sup>39</sup> The WD does not mention the move to the ships and only briefly mentions the events of this period. The Advance Party landed on JuNo. Beach and moved to the vicinity of St Andre about 4 1/2 miles south of Bayeux.

*Belgium by Cpl Forer<sup>40</sup>*

A Belgium, fair, ill-fated land,  
Whom German hordes did twice o'er-run;  
Who silent bore the heavy hand  
Of occupation, life undone;  
Where four long years the spark of hope  
Kept burning bright 'mid foreign foes;  
Where underground your men did cope  
With brutal beasts by mortal blows;  
Where courage never failed or fled;  
Where hate has simmered to a boil;  
Where untold martyrs, heroes bled  
Until the freeing of your soil.  
There find we welcome at your gate,  
We soldiers of a foreign land;  
Who in abeyance long did wait  
So far from fair, familiar strand.  
We came to uproot rotted weeds,  
In Belgium planted breadth and span.  
Applaud ye not, praise not our deeds;  
We did our task for God and man.

In November the unit finally left their hard standings at MR 819753, a site about 2½ miles to the NE from St Andre which was a sea of mud, for a new workshop site in the town of Machelen (MR 680620 Brussels sheet) a small town between Vilvorde (Vilvoorde) and Brussels, arriving there on 16 November 1944. The move was completed by 22 November. This was a popular move with the men as they now had a first class shop to work in, good billets to live in and Brussels to recreate in.

New Years' Day 1945 dawned, bright and clear, all was peaceful until about half past nine when the Luftwaffe suddenly broke the morning's quiet, strafing the area. A nearby ammunition dump was blown up, fortunately for the unit, with no damage to their workshops. This raid was one of many referred to by No. 83 Group RAF as "An extremely well planned and, on the whole, well executed attack on a number of airfields in Holland and Eastern Belgium".<sup>41</sup>

Inspection, production, recreation, aviation, administration, capitulation and repatriation might well express the activities of the unit and provided the main topics of conversation.

Much like the base workshop in Bordon Camp in England, the advanced base workshop received an almost continual stream of distinguished visitors who were greatly impressed by what they saw. A Maple

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<sup>40</sup> The Maple Leaf, 3 Feb 1945.

<sup>41</sup> Stacey, Col CP, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Second World War Vol 3: p 444, 1960.

Leaf reporter's story with the unit was recorded in *The Maple Leaf* of 3 February 1945. See Annex C for a glimpse of the unit through a reporter's eyes.

The unit participated in sports as much as they could, concentrating on inter-unit competitions. Many concerts and shows given by the units of the Canadian Army Show, ENSA, etc, helped in keeping up the morale of the troops. As the end of the war approached, the Officers and men of the unit could not help but be impressed by seeing in the sky strange new aircraft flying at amazing speeds - the jet had made its appearance over the theatre although the censors were reluctant to admit it. "Yes" they said, "there are new kinds of aircraft flying, both allied and enemy, but you are not to talk about them".

The German aircraft, in all probability, were based on the designs and experiments of S. Campini of the Caproni Company in Italy, who were generally recognized as making the first jet flight on 27 August 1940, and of the designs and research of Germany's own Junkers, Heinkel and Messerschmitt. The Italians and some of the German designers used what Sir Frank Whittle refers to as an "up and down engine" to drive the compressor. Sir Frank, who had been working for many years before the war experimenting in search of a suitable power plant for jet propulsion, developed his ideas into a practical fighter aircraft for the British.

Leslie E Simon<sup>42</sup>, in his book, *German Research in World War II*, wrote "although Hitler held back the production of fighters in favour of the production of bombers because he was obsessed with the idea of retaliation upon England, he gave a free hand to the development of fighter craft. German planes were always first rate; the German jet-propelled fighters, despite their short time of flight, were significantly demoralizing to the Allied morale; and the turbo-jet Messerschmitt 262 was a real threat to Allied superiority".

Troops stationed around Farnborough, one of the stations where the RAF had highly classified trials in progress, had occasional glimpses of an aircraft flying without the benefit of a propeller as far back as 1942. This aircraft became known to the troops as "The Squirt" and obviously was one of the earlier British prototypes being tested for Sir Frank.

Col Thompson was unhappy about the number of man-hours lost by his men on dental parades. He reasoned that with the number of men on parade to other dental clinics that his unit could support one dental clinic on a full time basis and at least save the travel time. He put his case to his HQ and it resulted in Capt LJ Archibald being posted to the unit where he set up a dental clinic for the workshop personnel:

On 4 May while the divisions of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps were still advancing northward and still meeting opposition, General Montgomery's headquarters informed General Crerar that negotiations were in progress for the unconditional surrender of all the German forces forming 21 Army Group. Word was immediately passed to all units. "Eleven months, less 2 days since 'D Day' so the greatest war the world will ever see reaches the stage where the final number is ready to go on and then the grand finish", wrote the elated unit historian in his enthusiasm. "Dull, cold and wet but what do we care; the news has completely moved the weather out of the picture. The 21<sup>st</sup> Army Groups' job is finished and it has been an honour' for the unit to have been part of that Army and have always found when the push was on our boys were able to always turn out the work asked of them 'on time'. From Lt-Col WL Thompson down we may not have always used 'approved methods' but who cares, we finished the job and so if we had to sometimes use the back door for parts or equipment, we got them".<sup>43</sup>

The officers and men left the unit in repatriation drafts. Equipments were turned in and everybody's thoughts were on plans for the future. The final 'repat' draft left the unit on 6 August. The unit disbanded on 14 August 1945. "A grand day for the final day of 1 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME. At

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<sup>42</sup> Simon, Col LE, *German Research in World War II*. p178. John Wiley and Sons. 1947.

<sup>43</sup> WD May 1945.

least we did not close on the 13<sup>th</sup> ... And so the final word or ‘kaput’ can be said to the great and splendid work

Good luck to the lads who have shared its glory”, wrote Major AEG Penny in the last entry of the War Diary.<sup>44</sup>

## Annex A

### 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME, Nominal Roll of Officers 1942 – 1945

Capt	Bartlett, RL	Lt	MacFarlane, NM
Lt	Beddard, W	Capt	MacKay, MD
Lt	Betts, HJ	Capt	Mayhew, LE (RCAPC)
Lt	Burns, WR	Capt	McBride, RW
Capt	Clayton, RM (RCAPC)	Lt	McClelland, LE
Lt	Clements, BC	Lt	Miller, Z
Maj	Coleman, EW	Lt	Milligan, AM
Capt	Coombe, TB	Lt	Newson, JA
Capt	Cram, JA	Maj	Penney, AEG
Capt	Crawford, AF (RCAPC)	Lt	Perry, LR
Capt	Davies, WJ	Lt	Pollard, VP
Lt	Dent, JC	Capt	Poulter, LT
Maj	Duncan, J (RCAPC)	Lt	Pritchard, AE
Maj	Dunlop, JR	Capt	Rand, WL (RCAPC)
Lt	Ellis, WE	Capt	Rice, HA
Capt	Fergusson, JW	Capt	Robertson, P
Lt	Findlay, HT	Lt	Shaw, FWB
Lt	Foster, JM	Capt	Simpson, TE (RCOC)
Lt	Grainger, GE	Capt	Struthers, RG
Capt	Hallett, JH	Maj	Thomas, HW
Sup	Hanks, AC (CLES)	Lt-Col	Thompson, WL
Lt	Henderson, DW	Capt	Treadgold, DM (RCAPC)
Lt	Hopwood-Jones, RJ	Capt	Webber, LE
Capt	Jacques, M (RCAMC)	Capt	Whitlock, FH

<sup>44</sup> WD Aug 1945.



## Annex B<sup>45</sup>

### Pack-up, loading, unloading, and set-up of an advanced base workshop.

Memorandum 1 ABW: 7-9 14 January 1944.

**17 December 1943.** Following the decision to move No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, instructions were issued on 17 December 1943 at 0900 hours to commence cleaning up all the work in hand for which parts were available, to return to BOD stores all surplus parts and to pack up AFG 1098 equipment as soon as it became available.

In order to keep a check on the man-hours involved in the pack-up and the contents of each case a packing slip was made out in triplicate on which was recorded the contents of the case, the shop section, i.e. TS - Technical Stores, etc. The size and weight (gross) and the man-hours required to pack-up same. One copy was included in the case; one copy to the WEO and one copy reserved for the officer i/c train party.

**18 - 20 December 1943.** On 18 December 1943, work had proceeded so favourably by 1630 hours that we stopped off until the 20<sup>th</sup> when by 1730 hours we were 90 per cent packed.

**21 December 1943.** By 1730 hours 21 December 1943, we had collected practically all our equipment from the gun shop, instrument shop, blacksmiths, carpenters, welders and sheet metal shop into the main shop.

**22 December 1943.** On 22 December 1943, we had compiled a fairly accurate list of all outsize machines, total bulk in cubic feet and dead weight - which was submitted to Movement Control, CMHQ.

We were visited by the RTO, Slough, and the goods agent of the Great Western Railway (GWR) to check on various items. It was estimated that, including the special cars to carry outsize machines (which consisted of three Landis grinders, three generator sets and two mobile cranes), 55 railway trucks would be required. As it turned out later, a total of 60 would have been required, had all equipment been loaded. Our error, due in part to our not understanding the railway method of gauging loads: of giving outsize dimensions at the base of some items, led to our being advised that Landis grinders and mobile cranes would have to be delivered by road. We did however load and ship one Landis grinder by rail, as during the loading period we became conversant with the railway requirements.

**23 December 1943.** By 1730 hours 23 December 1943, we had collected all items in the main shop and laid them out in standard rail truck lots on the floor.

**24 December 1943 - 30 December 1943.** During the interim following the Christmas weekend and arrival of the rail trucks on 31 December 1943, we completed the hand-over of several shops to the incoming unit, shipment of two Landis grinders by road, and other items.

**31 December 1943.** On 31 December 1943 at 0800 hours, eight standard railway trucks, (19 ft x 8 ft 6 in x 3 ft) were spotted on the siding running alongside our main shop. We commenced loading up three 15-cwts and two 3-ton lorries, and skidding out larger crates alongside the tracks.

Loading commenced at 0900 hours under the supervision of a GWR foreman. We had available, one 2½-ton mobile crane and one 6-ton mobile crane for all cases which could not be readily manhandled, and also one 1 Lister Mobile Floor Truck for small cases.

By 1730 hours, 24 trucks had been loaded. We had available some 200 men so that a steady flow of cases was forthcoming and the distance to be moved from shop to trucks was not over 100 yards.

Our original idea was to load by sections, but experience soon taught us that the railway requirements and the most economical use of available space precluded this idea.

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<sup>45</sup> WD January 1944.

As rail cars varied somewhat in floor plan and side height, our loading programme became a system of loading one or two large-sized cases which, dependent on the height and weight, usually had to be centred, and selecting cases which would fit in the remaining space.

As each rail car was loaded a detail of the car and the contents was recorded on the form attached (Appendix “A”). Experience later at unloading indicated that this form was well worthwhile.

We were fortunate in having a rail siding immediately below our loading area, to which all trucks could be manhandled, loads lashed, and tarpaulins spread.

**1 January 1944.** On 1 January 1944 between 0830 hours and 1730 hours, 22 rail trucks were loaded.

**2 January 1944.** On 2 January 1944, all items for rail shipment making a total of 56 railway trucks were loaded and ready to move off at 1500 hours.

**3 January 1944.** On 3 January 1944, the GWR pulled out all rail trucks, checked the lashing and tarpaulins, passed them through the gauge, made up a special train of 50 trucks and despatched same at 1500 hours. To this train was attached a coach to accommodate our train party, consisting of 1 officer and 23 ORs. These carried personal kit, rations and a special case carrying four foam-type and ten pyrene-type fire extinguishers. This special arrived at destination at 2200 hours.

The remaining six trucks were despatched via regular service and arrived at destination at 1200 hours the following day.

At 0800 hours of this day we also despatched via road transport our advance party of 1 officer and 30 ORs to occupy quarters and W/S accommodation. Included in this convoy was the 6-ton mobile crane, carried in the collapsed position, on the FWD semi-trailer, 16-ton transporter, The 2½-ton crane was delivered on the site in the evening by the same transporter.

**4 January 1944.** The main body of personnel (approximately 225 all ranks) were despatched via road transport at 1330 hours followed by the recovery section and unit transport at 1400 hours. At the new location there was a road haul of approximately three miles from the rail siding to the workshop. The 6-ton crane was assembled, despatched to the rail siding and off-loading commenced at approximately 1100 hours. The 2½-ton crane was stationed at the workshop.

Transport consisted of one FWD 16-ton semi-trailer; two medium breakdowns with 7½-ton light recovery trailers; two 15-cwts and 3-ton GS lorries. Later the 15-cwts and 3-ton GS lorries were augmented to six of each.

We found that details such as guards, fatigues, etc, required to establish suitable quarters, left us only fifteen ORs available for off-loading details out of a total of 55 ORs comprising the advance party and train party,. This was not sufficient and should be increased by another 20 ORs. Only six rail cars were offloaded by 1730 hours.

**5 January 1944.** With plenty of manpower available, offloading proceeded rapidly. Twenty-one trucks were cleared by 1730 hours. At the shop area, as the roadway and shop floor were of concrete and in one plane, use was made of 8-foot sections of 3-inch roller conveyors reversed to move heavier cases into position. As the shop area had been allocated in sections, details of an NCO and six or eight ORs from each section were responsible for removing their equipment from the off-loading area to their section area.

**6 January 1944.** Eighteen trucks were cleared by 1730 hours. Sections in the shop were busy uncrating machines and cleaning up. Generators and distribution boxes were located, cable cut in standard lengths of 50 or 100 ft and wiring up commenced.

**7 January 1944.** All off-loading completed by 1500 hours and by 1730 hours all sections of the shop were in a position to commence operations at 50 per cent capacity.

**8 January 1944.** Spacing of sections was rearranged as required.

**10 January 1944.** Guns arrived for overhaul; ‘B’ vehicles were called in for overhaul and ‘B’ vehicle parts section sorted out the first shipment of parts.

### Details and Suggestions

#### 1. Pack-Up

- a. Time elapsed: 3 days (8 hrs each)
- Man-hours: 2000 approx
- Gross weight: 300 tons approx
- Bulk (cu ft): 36,000 approx

NOTE: All major items of machinery were at hand. Tank section tools and telecom section were not included in above figures. Some items of 1098 equipment not yet received would be balanced out in weight and bulk by surplus items and additional stores presently required until mobilization is completed.

- b. Procedure and Suggestions. Arising out of our experiences the following listed details will be found of great assistance.
  - 1. Blacksmiths, carpenters and welders shops to be held in partial operation until bulk of pack-up completed.
  - 2. Packing cases of a minimum number of standard sizes iron bound and provided with handles or rings.
  - 3. As many items as possible, packed in cases of not more than 250 lb gross weight.
  - 4. Packing cases, containing heavy or large items, beyond the man-handling capacity of a 4-man crew, to be heavily iron bound with quick detachable sides and tops; bottom to be set on substantial iron-shod skids provided with rings at each end of the outside skids, of a size that will take the hook of a standard vehicle tow cable. Provided with large size rings at the top, arranged to give a balanced loading for slings or chains attached to a crane hook.
  - 5. Cases marked with gross weight, length, width and height on all sides and top.
  - 6. Cases marked “Front” and “Rear” on respective sides or ends as required.
  - 7. Cases marked with identification in accordance with attached list or similar layout. (Appendix “B”)
  - 8. Packing list giving details of contents.
  - 9. Nesting of items to conserve bulk. In this connection the bulk tonnage based on the shipping figure of 40 cubic feet to the ton will be approximately double the dead weight in tons.
  - 10. Machine tools to be drained of cutting fluid and oil and exposed surfaces waterproofed (grease or wax).
  - 11. Machines lagged so case floors should be bolted down.

We experimented in carrying items such as additional metal bar stock and sheet bolted to the floor or sides of machinery crates; using heavy workshop benches to form a packing case for other small items; small sections of binning filled with items such as nuts, bolts, drills, taps, dies, etc. and having a piece of

heavy sheet metal bolted to the front, thus making into a packing case. These sections varied in size from 24 in x 12 in x 24 in to 18 in x 9 in x 5 ft 6 in and served their purpose very well.

We found the sectional adjustable steel packing WX No. 9001 2 Section LV6 MT1/RKG to be very difficult to pack and handle. We much prefer the open racking made up from pipe and bolted clamps.

Ingenuity and forethought in this matter may well save 10 per cent of the bulk space required and cut down the handling time as a crane designed for 5 tons will handle a case containing this weight in probably No. longer than 10 seconds more than it will take to handle a load of 4 tons.

## 2. Loading

a. Time elapsed: 3 days (8 hrs each)

Man-hours: 2000

Rail cars (varied sizes): 56

### b. Procedure and Suggestions

1. Accurate knowledge of type and size of railway trucks available.
2. Equipment packed and collected adjacent to the rail siding. (If rail siding is quite close to workshop then loading could commence within 24 to 48 hours of commencement of pack-up as sufficient large cases would be available and manpower released to man-handle small cases to be packed around the large cases).
3. Cases fitted as described in b. 3 of pack-up.
4. Hold out an oxy-acet welding and cutting set; a set of taps and dies; assorted rod, nuts, bolts, and wire; 2 fitter's kits and a carpenter's kit until loading completed.
5. Mobile cranes to be allocated as follows:
  - (a) 6-ton at rail siding.
  - (b) 2 ½-ton at workshop.
6. Cranes equipped with adjustable chains, slings, crowbars, rollers, etc, to cover the range of case sizes.
7. Crane crew of not more than eight men, with training as operator, signalman, two hook-up men and four loaders. All others to be kept clear.
8. Transport. If rail siding is not adjacent to workshop, then additional FWD semi-trailer transporters will be most useful, as at the workshop the larger cases that cannot be handled by the 2½-ton crane can be winched onto the trailer. GS Transport such as 158-in 3-ton or the larger 6-ton vehicles are the most suitable. The number required is dependent on length of haul, rail siding, etc. The 15-cwt GS vehicles are not an economical type of vehicle, except where space for manoeuvring is limited. The 7½-ton light recovery trailers are not particularly suitable unless fitted with a flat platform.
9. Roller conveyor Sections. We experimented with the application of 8-foot sections of 3-inch roller conveyor and found them very useful in loading from lorry to rail truck. We would recommend that at least six of these sections be procured.
10. Lister Mobile Floor Trucks. Found to be very useful for collecting small cases.

11. Record of Rail Truck Load. A form similar to that attached as Appendix “A” will be found helpful in keeping trace of equipment. We have attached as Appendix “C” a list of the rail trucks with details of inside length, width, height of load and dead weight.

### 3. Off-Loading

- a. Elapsed time: 3 days (8 hrs each)  
 Man-hours: 2000  
 Rail cars: 56
- b. Procedure and Suggestions
  1. Suggestions applicable to loading apply equally well to unloading.
  2. If mobile cranes are shipped by rail, the operators should be included in the train party, so that on arrival at destination they can make the cranes ready for operation. If an end ramp is available at the rail siding, the cranes can be off-loaded under their own power.
  3. At least two fitter kits, additional adjustable wrenches and heavy screwdrivers should be carried by the train party.
  4. Officer i/c Train Party, who will also act as officer i/c off-loading at rail to have completed forms (Appendix “A”).
  5. Officer i/c off-loading area at the workshop, to have copies of all case packing lists segregated in workshop sections, and working parties from each section, under his command.

### 4. Set-Up

- a. Elapsed time: 4 days (All sections in partial operation – average 50 per cent)
- b. Procedure and Suggestions
  1. Floor space for each section laid out with machine position allocated.
  2. Operator of each machine at his allocated position so that immediately his machine is delivered by the section working party, he can proceed with uncasing, cleaning up and assembling machine.
  3. Electricians to be allocated to each generator and distribution panel station.
  4. Electrical power cable to be cut in standard lengths and having bolting lugs soldered on ends.
  5. All machines, distribution boxes, etc, to be fitted with short cable leads, having bolting lugs on the outside ends.
  6. All machine crates and packing cases to be examined for damage and reported.

### 5. General

Each section must have packing cases in good order and have details of items to go in each case, decided beforehand.

Personnel must have experience and training in moving and loading equipment if damage to cases and personnel injuries are to be minimized. We fortunately, only had two minor injuries to

personnel, but observations indicated that the personnel generally did not appreciate the dangerous possibilities. Rigid control and supervision must be maintained.

Previous to moving to a new location, the area should be surveyed, Section areas decided upon and a plan given to officer and senior NCOs of sections concerned.

**Appendix “A”**

Four Copies Required

Car no.....  
Type of car.....  
Length.....  
Width.....  
Height.....

List Of Contents

<u>Box No</u>	<u>Section</u>
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....

Distribution

- 1 WEO
- 1 TECH STORES
- 1 Oi/c TRAIN PARTY
- 1 Oi/c SECTION

Total Weight Of Contents .....

**Appendix “B”**

(SECRET)

10 January 1944

Memo: To All Officers And Sections

Subject: Identification Markings: In order to assist in ready Identification of Machines, Tools and Equipments, when boxed for shipment, we will adopt the following code.

(A list showing each section in the workshop follows, with a detailed description of the color code used to mark the boxes is given including subsections and other markings as to size and location).

**Appendix “C”**

14 Jan 44

Movement of Equipment

Detailed Description of Train load

Type of Car	Length	Width	Height	Weight
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Details not shown here. The original data will be found in Unit WD for Jan 1944.

## **Annex C<sup>46</sup>**

### **Mechanical Soup to Nuts is Repaired by No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop**

By A Maple Leaf Reporter

“It looks like it’s true”, this Maple Leaf reporter said, “that you fix anything from soup to nuts”.

“Maybe not soup or nuts”, said Capt HA Rice, Kirkland Lake, of No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME, “but there’s not many things in the way of army equipment that we can’t fix”.

Then, whistling along from workshop to workshop by foot or jeep, Capt Rice proved his point - which incidentally had been made earlier by the CO from Toronto, Lt-Col WL Thompson, and the adjutant, Capt MD MacKay of Victoria.

Capt Rice then conducted a tour through not all, but some, of the many workshops, each of which represents a branch of the work done by this amazing crew of Canadian soldier-tradesmen and Belgian civilians.

In the instrument shop, where the men work under QMS SC Wood of Vancouver, they repair watches, typewriters, binoculars, telescopes, ack-ack predictors - in fact they’ll have a go at any sort of instrument the Canadian Army uses.

#### **A Tank Shop**

This advanced base workshop also has a tank shop under QMS A Lukiwski of Calgary and his crew of strong men. They’ve got to be strong to handle those tanks. “A” and “B” vehicle shops handle the repairs on anything else on wheels. In the engine shops run by QMS Kilpatrick of Toronto, and the machine shop run by QMS FW Howse of Toronto, ace mechanics work on vehicle repairs.

The engine shop is in charge of six NCOs who have Belgian civilians working for them under a lend-lease arrangement by the Belgian government.

But that’s not the half of it. There’s a paint shop, carpenter shop, a radio-signals shop and a blacksmith shop - though horses are not shod. There’s a gun shop and a battery shop and an electrical shop. Most of the men were specialists in civvy street, but many others have learned their business, and learned it well, through Canadian Army trades schools.

#### **Reclamation Sections**

Reclamation sections are attached out to strip down vehicle casualties and remove the useful parts. Another sub-unit is in charge of the inspection of Lines of Communications communications.

Advanced base workshops are a direct development from North African operations. This one landed in Normandy to set up its first camp in a cow pasture near Bayeux. One of the greatest chores now is to keep up with the high priority demands made by an army in action. But it does keep up.

Other officers of the unit are: Major HW Thomas, Winnipeg; Capt JW Ferguson, Toronto; Capt LE Mayhew, paymaster from Ottawa; Capt LT Poulter, Fort William; Capt P Robertson, Toronto; Capt RG Stuthers, Paisley, Ont; Lieut RJ Hopwood-Jones, Montreal; Capt M Jacques, MO, also from Montreal; Capt TE Simpson, ordnance stores officer, of Toronto; Lieut LE McClelland, Kingston; and Lieut AE Pritchard, Ottawa.

#### **A Top-Rank Tenor**

Supervisor AC Hanks of Toronto, who arranged concerts for the men during the long, wet and muddy days near Bayeux, looks after the unit’s entertainment requirements. One of his great stand-bys is Pte Albert Biondi, of Montreal, a top-ranking tenor.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid (1).



Other warrant officers are WO1's JR Boon of Kingston; EP Flinn of Wallace, NS and JL Moyses of Toronto; QMS's FG Allen of Toronto; IB Tucker of Pender Island, BC; JM Birnie of Toronto and S sgt F Partington of Victoria and DW Swift of Clover Bar, Alta.

EC Fitt of Regina is orderly room sergeant and Cpl AG Chapman of Winnipeg is the recovery specialist.

Draughtsman is Cfn JB Garnett, of Port Hope, Ont, and Cfn AJ LeBlanc is one of the welders. Other craftsmen in the unit are A Menzoski, watchmaker, and EW Sturley.

## Rear Party of No. 1 Base Workshop

### Summary

Rear Party of No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, Serial CM 516 called out on active Service 25 Aug 45 by CMHQ Adm O No. 107

Shows formed in UK 31 Aug 45

Disbanded 31 Jan 46 by CMHQ Adm O No. 4, 15 Jan 46

### History

The Rear Party, No. 1 Base Workshop, RCEME, was formed under authority of CMHQ Admin Order No. 107 dated 25 August 1945 with a War Establishment of five officers and 84 other ranks.

Maj HT Ross, formerly of No. 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, was placed in command with Capt AE Katz as 2i/c. The other officers were Capt HS Gallagher, Lt S Bernstein, and Lt RL Collins,

There were still a number of officers and men formerly of 1 BOW attached by 2 CGRU. These included Maj ADL Grinham, Technical QM, Capt JG Langstaff, QM, and Capt GI King, adjutant.

The Rear Party's main function was to dispose of all workshop equipment left behind by 1 BOW and to guard it until disposal instructions were received.

The equipment to be disposed of fell into two categories. About 100 machine tools were to be returned to Canada and the balance was to be turned over to Crown Assets Allocation Corporation (CAAC).

Everyone worked furiously to wind up the 1 BOW account, and to organize the rear party.

Early in September, Capt Katz went to London to obtain information on the shipment of equipment to Canada. There was apparently a lot of work involved in the preparation of the bills of lading, vouchers, etc, and everything possible was done to get the shipments off to Canada.

On 28 September, the last of the shipments left England and one of their main tasks was completed.

Capt Katz was replaced by Capt GI King on 29 September 1945 and assumed the appointment held by his predecessor.

A detachment of British REME personnel from No. 3 Central Workshop under Maj Collins arrived on 5 October to take over the workshop as soon as it could be vacated. In the meantime they were given one building.

Maj-Gen Dewar of CAAC and a party of high-ranking officers inspected the Crown Assets equipment in the buildings to determine how it was to be disposed of, and who should be responsible for looking after it. Included in the party were two RAF officers who were interested in obtaining some "B" vehicle production machinery.

The unit continued to dwindle both in equipment and personnel as the disposal program continued.

A party of Netherlands Army Officers visited the unit on 10 November 1945 to inspect the remaining equipment prior to purchasing it from CAAC. The Canadian liaison officer to the Netherlands accompanying the party was Lt-Col R Sholton, RCEME, a former citizen of Holland.

Grantham Productions Ltd. were engaged in repairing and rebuilding some of the CAAC vehicles prior to sale. The Base Workshop's pride - their crankshaft grinders - were sold to the RAF.

Lt-Col RH Ramsay, ADME, CRU, visited the unit on the 18 December 1945 with the good news that the Rear Party would be disbanding shortly.

Shortly after Col Ramsay's visit, Administrative Instruction No. 83 of 19 December 1945 was received notifying the unit of its official disbandment.

The last Part II Order shows that the unit disbanded 7 January 1946, although CMHQ Adm O No. 4, 15 Jan 46, shows the disbandment date as 31 January 1946.

The Rear Party disbanded upon instructions of CMHQ on 7 January 1946 and the personnel moved to the repatriation depot.

### **Nominal Roll of Officers 1945**

Lt Bernstein, S	Capt Gallagher, HS	Capt King, GI
Lt Collins, EL	Capt Katz, AE	Maj Ross, HT

### **Attached Officers**

Maj Ambrose, ER	Capt Langstaff, JG	Capt Thom, WG, RCAPC
Maj Grinham, ADL	Lt Mikkleborg, GH	Capt Thomas, FA
Capt Jandine, WH		

# **No. 61 Light Aid Detachment (LAD) Attached to 14<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)**

By

Colonel WS Hunt, CD, P Eng

## ***Foreword by Colonel R.H. Hodgson***

The origins of many of the Canadian LADs are somewhat obscure because separate war diaries for LADs were not required until sometime in the latter part of 1942.

In this account, Colonel WS Hunt, CD, has described the origin of his LAD and of the events that took place until he left his command after Dieppe. I have used Colonel Hunt's complete narrative for this portion of 61 LAD's story.

Their war diary starts at Langholm, Scotland, 1 June 1942 and covers the period of their move to the Mediterranean, Sicily, the invasion of Italy, and their advance to Taranto in the latter part of September. The diaries for October and November covering their operations from Taranto to the River Sangro were lost.

RHH

3 September 63

## ***Summary***

No. 61 Light Aid Detachment, RCOC, CASF, Serial 679 called out on active service 11 February 1941 by G.O. 71/41

Converted and redesignated on 15 October 1941 as No. 61 LAD (TYPE C) RCOC by G.O. 14/42 (1)  
Attached 14 CDN TK BN

Reorganized 11 January 1943 by CMHQ Adm O No. 2, Appendix J, 10 January 43

Mobilized for operational duty 1 May 1943 Serial 679/1 under supervision HQ 1<sup>st</sup> CDN CORPS  
by CMHQ Mob O No. 73, 19 April 43

Reorganized 1 April 1944 by CMHQ Adm O No. 84, 15 May 44

Redesignated 15 May 1944 61 LAD (TYPE C) RCEME by CMHQ Adm O No. 85, 16 May 44

Disbanded 11 August 1945 by G.O. 401/45

## ***Early History***

The history of No. 61 Light Aid Detachment would be incomplete if no mention were made of its origin and some background. With no recorded history of its early days, it is a matter of the writer's memory, and after twenty odd years this is not entirely reliable, but I shall try to record the highlights as I can recollect them, aided by some sketchy notes from a personal diary.

No. 61 LAD was born out of 4 Army Field Workshop (CASF) by 3 Army Field Workshop (NPAM). The latter unit was formed in Montreal in the late thirties, but was never mobilized. No. 4 AFW, a completely new unit, was mobilized in August 1940, and the Commanding Officer and majority of officers and men of 3 AFW volunteered to transfer to the CASF to form the nucleus of the new unit. No 4 AFW was located in the Westmount Barracks located on the old Montreal Athletic Association Grounds, (known as

the MAA Grounds) in Westmount, PQ, adjacent to the Hillside Armoury, which housed the Ordnance (E) Workshops of then MD 4 [Military District]. An AFW, designed to support a division, had an establishment of about 800 men and it was necessary to do a lot of recruiting to augment the nucleus, which came from 3 AFW. Various officers and men were detailed to a recruiting team located at No. 4 Personnel Depot in the old Place Viger Station in Montreal. Although the majority of recruits came from the Montreal area, drafts of tradesmen and potential tradesmen did come from many points in Eastern Canada. One draft of about twenty, which came from Kitchener, Ontario, all had very Germanic names. We thought the “SS” were about to take us over, but they turned out to be a very fine group of soldiers and tradesmen.

## ***Training***

No attempt was made to organize the unit into its various tactical sub-units and LADs at this time, rather the emphasis was placed on basic and trades training. In a very short time the Hillside Workshop had absorbed all the trainees it could, and arrangements had to be made with vocational schools and indeed industrial firms to accept and train the very large additional numbers. This latter was a major headache in trying to keep track of who was where, in what they were being trained, and what time they had to be delivered in the morning and picked up in the evening. It is rather amazing that no one got lost in the shuffle, but the results from the trades training point of view were quite gratifying.

## ***1<sup>st</sup> Army Tank Brigade Workshop and LADs Formed***

As time passed and 4 AFW had not been assigned a field role, qualms arose as to its future particularly as rumours came back from Britain that this type organization was going out of vogue. These qualms were heightened when, during the winter of 1940-41, several LADs and a Laundry and Bath unit were formed out of 4 AFW and despatched overseas.

The uncertainties of our future continued until early May 1941 when Major John Portas of New Glasgow, NS, appeared with orders to form the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Tank Brigade Workshop and LADs for each of the Regiments; namely: 11<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment) - 59 LAD; 12<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment (Three Rivers Regiment) - 60 LAD; and the 14<sup>th</sup> Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) - 61 LAD. He had authority and a free hand to choose all his officers and men from 4 AFW. This he did and as a result I found myself as Officer Commanding 61 LAD, destined to support an armoured regiment “without knowledge of where to find the engine in a tank, and not knowing which end of a gun the noise came from”. As a matter of fact it was just before our departure that 4 AFW received its first tank for training purposes; it was a 1917 French Renault, and a non-runner.

## ***1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade, Canada’s First Armoured Formation, Arrives Overseas***

After four or five weeks frenzied preparation the personnel of the LAD, were selected, kitted, inoculated, granted leave, etc, and departed from Montreal on 20 June by train for Halifax. There we were embarked in the SS Windsor Castle and sailed on 22 June in convoy with five other fast passenger ships, accompanied by a battleship and eight old four-stack destroyers acquired from the United States on lease-lend. Our course was to have been a southerly one, but shortly after leaving Halifax word came of danger in that direction and we turned north. We went so far north, in fact, that at that time of year it never got dark, and one night we played quoits on deck all night. The fact that troop ships then still had bars may have accounted for this. It got very chilly in those climes and our ship, built for the South African trade, seemed only capable of pumping cool air into the cabins. It was not until about the last day out we found

a way to switch valves and get some heat. Even the crew was ignorant of this capability. It was on board ship that we first met some of The Calgary Regiment with whom we were to serve.

On 30 June we anchored off Gourock, Scotland, and disembarkation began - but not for us. We did not get off until the evening of 1 July, and in the meantime Scotland was experiencing its greatest heat wave in history. The customs' men had done their duty and all the ship's bars were properly sealed. It was most frustrating to look over the side within sight and smell of the pubs on the quayside and be able to do nothing about it. After two days of agony we were disembarked and put on a train, which after a night's journey deposited us somewhere in Hampshire. From there we were taken by truck to a small village, Tidworth, astride the Hampshire-Wiltshire border line, which was to be our home for a while.

## ***Training Begins In Earnest***

The brigade headquarters, regiments and other supporting units had gone to West Lavington down on Salisbury Plain where they drew their tanks and got down to training without any workshop or LAD support. The latter were located at Tidworth for training at the large British base workshop located there. Our men were immediately put to work in the shops and paired off with civilian technicians as helpers to learn the intricacies of tank maintenance and repair. Unfortunately the most modern tanks there were Matildas, which were at best obsolescent, though still in use in North Africa, and some tanks which dated back to the First World War. In this way the men did gain some knowledge, but no formal training was arranged for the officers. They were merely told where to find the library and to "browse about". Some officers, WOs and NCOs were sent off to tank courses at Bordon and elsewhere. The remaining officers were saddled with an extra administrative load in getting settled in an entirely new environment, which left little time for "browsing". I was one of these.

## ***Salisbury Plain — Our First Field Experience***

We had been in Tidworth only a week or two when, on one very wet, windy Sunday afternoon, Brigadier FF Worthington called to see Major Portas. It was obvious things were not going well from a mechanical point of view on "The Plain", and he wanted some support and quickly. It was arranged that my men who were not on course and I, augmented by a few men from the workshop and other LADs, would proceed to West Lavington that afternoon to be attached to brigade headquarters to service all three regiments. With virtually no knowledge of tanks the "babes in the woods" took off on this adventure. On arrival we found that the Ontario Regiment had been equipped with Churchills - some of the first off the line - with more "bugs" than one could count. However, their Technical Adjutant and his assistant, the Kerr brothers, were automotive men from General Motors in Oshawa, and seemed to have a fair number of good mechanics. The Three Rivers Regiment and Calgarys had been issued with Matildas, and were not so well provided with unit mechanics. For this reason, the decision was made that the ad-hoc LAD would give its main support to the latter two regiments. This was a period of trial and error and learning the hard way with very little assistance. The Brigade Ordnance Mechanical Engineer (OME), Capt Ken Case, was newly appointed and not much more "clued up" than we. For a while Lt (later Lt-Col) Len McGee was attached to the brigade. His knowledge of tanks at that time was not great, but he did much to show us the way around, how to get help, and perhaps most important of all – how to scrounge.

## ***Typical LAD Problems***

In looking back the Matilda seems rather ridiculous – a great deal of metal carrying a two pounder gun. The two diesel engines were very reliable, but our main problems were with the Rackham gearbox and its control linkage. Due to poor linkage adjustment and inexperienced drivers, clutch plates were being burned out at a terrific rate. Permissive Repair Schedules precluded LADs from opening gearboxes, but natural curiosity overcame this hurdle, and before long we were in the nasty business of cannibalization.

Clutch plates were unobtainable through normal channels. Having carried cannibalization to the “nth” degree and with most tanks still off the road, I gathered up all the unserviceable clutch plates and took off for the Ordnance Depot at Chilwell in the hope of getting replacements or repairs. I was received most cordially by the depot officers, but they assured me there were no such parts in the UK as they had all been shipped to the Middle East. It was suggested that the plates be left with “returned stores” for eventual repair. With due care I became ‘lost’, and found my way to the Canadian Base Workshop at Bordon and told my sad story to a most sympathetic OME [Ordnance Mechanical Engineer]. By the following noon the plates were repaired and on their way back to Lavington Downs. The result was that many tanks were put back on the road and morale of the regiments increased accordingly. The sequel to the story is that DDME [Deputy Director Mechanical Engineering] 1 Corps, Col “Spud” Murphy got word of this and a stern rejoinder was sent out to the effect that LAD officers would under no account visit Chilwell, and this applied particularly to Capt Hunt of 61 LAD!

The weather during our stay on Salisbury Plain was ghastly; we were plagued with rain, wind, and the consequential mud. Toward the end of August, word came that the brigade workshop and the other LADs would come under the command of their respective regiments. During the stay at Lavington I had come to know many of the officers of The Calgary Regiment very well, but had not yet met the CO whom I was told was a very reserved individual.

## **Welcome!**

On arrival at the regiment I arranged with the adjutant, Capt Fred Jenner (later Brigadier) to be presented to the CO, Lt-Col Bradbrook. In due course I was ushered into the presence. The CO was still very much the cavalry officer, dressed in breeches, beautifully polished riding boots, long cavalry jacket, a bristling moustache, topped with a monocle. Capt Jenner made the introduction, but I received no recognition from Colonel Bradbrook. Instead he asked: “What in Christ’s name is an LAD, Jennah? We have had farriers, dentists and pay-bobs but for God’s sake tell me what is an LAD.” This took away my composure completely, and embarrassed Jenner no end, however, he tried to explain the functions of an LAD. He was not impressed and indicated that the interview was over. Without recognition or as much as “go to hell” I was about-turned and marched out. Jenner was genuinely embarrassed, but explained that this was about par for the course as the CO had little use for attached types. He further explained that it would take time for the CO to decide whether to keep or fire an attached officer. For the remainder of our stay the CO studiously avoided recognizing me in the mess, but his coolness was more than offset by the warm western hospitality of his officers.

## **Linney Head, Wales**

About the end of August, the regiment and LAD moved to the live-firing ranges at Linney Head at the south-west tip of Wales. Here the officers and men of the regiment were quartered in the “Castle”, the home of a coal baron. The Technical Adjutant and my men and I lived in third-rate quarters at the tank park. It seemed to rain continuously and the ranges and tank park were literally quagmires. The LAD worked all day on the ranges and what seemed like all night in the tank park to get the old crocks ready for the next day. Despite the sweat and mud it was a most rewarding experience and the morale of the LAD was terrific. One evening the Quartermaster, Lt “Stoney” Richardson (later Brigadier), visited the OC LAD with the news that he thought the CO was softening because the latter had liked something he had seen the LAD do that day on the ranges. The result was that the QM had an invitation for me to join the CO for dinner that evening. The CO’s change in attitude is hard to describe. I was greeted most affably, plied with drinks, and occupied the place of honour at table. In a short time it became quite evident that the CO’s technical knowledge of tanks was negligible, but he was impressed by technical terms, whether right or wrong. Having gained his confidence, and with a bit of mechanical jargon, the

position of the LAD was secured. The actual incident that caused this change in attitude is not known for sure, but the story goes as follows:

A tank threw a track on the ranges and got thoroughly bogged down. One of my mechanics, a Canadian of French descent by the name of Metivier, was working madly to repair it when the CO came along and raised particular hell about the situation. Metivier, who was tired, wet, and muddy, took it as long as he could, then in his most voluble French suggested to the CO what he could do with his tanks. Had the CO understood French, Metivier would have been court-martialed. Fortunately he did not; he was impressed by the mechanic's work and spirited actions, and so it came about that the LAD was accepted into the regiment.

### ***Headley, Hants***

With the completion of the exercises in Wales, the regiment returned to a new location at Headley, Hants, just south of Bordon. We had only got settled and bathed, when at dinner the first evening a message came from brigade that I was to proceed forthwith to Lavington to temporarily take over 60 LAD of the Three Rivers Regiment, and accompany them to Linney Head for two weeks, because their OME Lt Schofield was on course. This was very nearly the last straw. In due course I returned to Headley to find that the Calgarys were being re-equipped with Churchills. I still was responsible for 60 LAD, and the Three Rivers Regiment were also receiving the new tanks. This necessitated a retraining programme in driving and maintenance, and troop exercises on Bagshot Common for the regiment, and a very major change and re-education for the LAD.

Late in autumn, Lt-Col Bradbrook was promoted Brigadier, and he was succeeded by the Brigade Major, Johnny Andrews, who was mechanically minded and always a staunch supporter of the LAD. Things were looking up!

### ***Training in the South Downs of Sussex***

A few days before Christmas 1941, the regiment and LAD moved south into Sussex and located on the coast at Seaford, which was to be our home for nearly a year. The winter and spring of 1942 were spent in further familiarization training, which proceeded to the troop, squadron, and regimental level on the South Downs. The new Churchills were infinitely better than those originally received by the Ontarios, but they still had many deficiencies. Over the months these weaknesses became most apparent. The original twelve cylinder horizontally-opposed engine had taken only 98 days from concept on the drawing boards to the tests on the dynamometers. This was a phenomenal effort and bugs could be excused but equally damned. In addition, we had major troubles with the fuel pumps, electrical system, junction boxes, rear bogies, and the 7.92 mm BESA machine gun. Occasionally clutches burst and tended to wreck the after compartment, but as with the Matildas, the most serious problem was with the gearbox and its control linkage. By this time the LAD, who were past masters at cannibalization, did their best to satisfy the CO by keeping him happy, and the DDME in the dark as to what was going on – after all, we had to live with the former.

### ***Maintenance, Inspection, and Repair Reorganized***

It was becoming more evident that there was doubt and conflict over the relative responsibilities of the Technical Adjutant and myself. To obviate this, the CO made what was then considered a major policy change, which was later adopted in other units and indeed is the foundation on which present LAD organization is founded. In effect the Technical Adjutant was made responsible only for driver training and inspection to ensure that crew maintenance was up to standard. All squadron mechanics were placed



at my disposal for employment, and with this group to augment the LAD, I was made solely responsible to the CO for the mechanical condition of the regiment.

### ***Intensive Training For an Assault***

Sometime in late April, the regiment was on a major exercise and the LAD was bivouacked in a woods just west of Pease Pottage, Sussex. It was a delightful spot, raining as usual, lots of trilliums, and signs saying “Beware of Adders”. During the evening the LAD officer was summoned by the CO and directed to prepare a list of all tank parts required for a regiment equipped with Churchills to last for six weeks intensive training. This was to be prepared immediately and the CO had a DR [Despatch Rider] standing by to deliver the list to the War Office. With the help of the Technical Adjutant, AQMS, and the artificers of the LAD, and technical sergeants of the regiment, a prodigious list was prepared. Quite literally it was scary, but no one could seriously question it. It was accepted by the CO and duly despatched to the War Office. It was obvious to us that something out of the ordinary was happening.

The first reaction to the list came from Mr Syd Taylor, Vauxhall’s permanent civilian representative with the Brigade. The list of parts had been received at the War Office and subjected to many adverse criticisms there and then forwarded to Mr Phillips, General Manager of Tank Production of Churchill Tanks at Vauxhall’s Works in Luton. He recalled Mr Taylor and wanted to know who the silly ass was that had submitted such a ludicrous list. Taylor, who had not been privy to this, was astounded but assured Mr Phillips that, though he had not had to make a detailed study to cover such circumstances, he knew the author and would back him up. When the next time I met Syd, it was difficult to persuade him that I had not been smoking opium. The sequel of this will be related later.

Shortly after returning from the exercise just mentioned, Col “Johnny” asked me the maximum number of tanks that could be runners in about seven days. We had our full complement of 62 tanks, but because of mechanical breakdowns and lack of spares, particularly after a strenuous exercise, we were much depleted. With tongue-in-cheek I said 27, without knowing how we would meet this commitment. Shortly thereafter we were ordered to have all mobile tanks loaded on flats by 0600 hrs 18 May. To meet the commitment, I personally installed an electric fuel pump in the 27<sup>th</sup> tank at 0500 hrs and got it loaded at the last minute.

### ***Combined Operations Training***

It was obvious we were on the move, but our destination was unknown. The wheeled transport of the regiment and LAD, with the majority of men, took off for the west that same evening. By the following morning we were at Leamington, west of Bournemouth, and in due course were ferried to Yarmouth on the Isle of Wight, and directed to a campsite in the rhododendron park of the Queen’s Osborne Estate, just east of Cowes overlooking Osborne Bay. The tanks joined the regiment within a day or so, and this signalled the start of most intensive troop and squadron exercises. Shortly thereafter the Navy appeared on the scene and combined exercises started; initially these consisted of intensive drill in loading and off-loading tanks from LCTs [Landing Craft Tank], which culminated in two full-scale exercises involving landing on the south coast of Dorset in the neighbourhood of Bridport on a stretch of coast resembling the Normandy coast. Only a portion of the LAD was permitted to participate in the first exercise. This was not judged a success mainly, I think, because the smoke bombs set fire to the thatched roofs in the town, but this opinion is open to question. The exercise was unsatisfactory, and was repeated in the same area on 22-24 June, and this time was much more to the satisfaction of Lord Louis Mountbatten<sup>47</sup>. The LAD took no part in the second combined exercise because of pressure of work.

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<sup>47</sup> Stacey, Col C.P.; *The Canadian Army 1939-45*; p 59. King’s Printer, Ottawa 1948.

Much to our amazement the spare parts ordered in our list compiled at Pease Pottage began to arrive. Having been starved for parts for years we now found ourselves almost swamped. The British RAOC (REME) Workshop in Newport, Isle of Wight, received all our stores for security reasons, and transported them to our LAD site and loaned us an outsized Aldershot shelter to house them. The sight of all the stores demanded and supplied was always a source of wonderment to the members of the LAD.

### ***Acceptance Tests - 1942 Style***

Shortly after our arrival, the regiment began to receive new Churchill tanks equipped with 6-pounder guns. This was considered, at that time, to be the ultimate in tank armament. Considerable fear was expressed among the armoured personnel that the concussion in the turret due to firing of such a mammoth weapon might explode ammunition carried in racks in the turret. To test this tank, the ammunition racks were filled, the gun loaded and pointed out to sea with a long rope on the trigger, and all personnel in the area took cover behind bunkers. The weapon was fired without mishap and our armoured corps personnel accepted it in a most enthusiastic manner.

### ***My Second-In-Command***

About this time I was informed by Col “Johnny” that I would be receiving a second-in-command. Arguments to the effect that an LAD had no such appointment were met with a twinkling eye and a suggestion that one should not look a gift horse in the mouth. A day or so later I was doing some paper work in my office tent when a figure appeared, saluted smartly, and said in a very English voice “Second-in-command reporting for duty, Sir”. He turned out to be Lt-Col George Reeves, DSO, of the Royal Tank Regiment, then attached to the Tank Design and Development shop at Egham. He was a man of tremendous knowledge, knew all the right people, and was a tower of strength to an ill-trained LAD officer. His sense of humour was terrific and helped us over many hurdles.

### ***Development of Early Waterproofing***

With the arrival of the new tanks, waterproofing became a major operation. Our instructions called for an eight-foot wading capability. The hulls of the new tanks were alleged to be waterproof but, to meet the full requirements, many modifications were necessary. These required completely new air intake louvres with vertical extensions, an air outlet with extension, and two engine exhaust pipe extensions. In addition the turret ring and gun mantlet had to be sealed, as well as the muzzle of the gun.

The new air louvres were of armour plate fitted to the sides of the tank. The air intake and exhaust extensions, about four feet in height, were of light gauge metal fitted to the louvres with a waterproof seal, but with a quick release mechanism operated from the turret. This was necessary to permit all-round traverse of the gun, and there was also some fear of engine overheating if operated too long with these extensions. The engine exhaust extensions did not interfere with the traverse so were permanently fixed. This ironmongery was being manufactured by the well-known engineering firm of Kennedy and Kemp at a shadow factory near Andover, Hants. It was necessary for me to make several trips to this establishment to coordinate delivery schedules, and consult on fitting problems. The fitting of these parts required a great deal of arc welding to armour plate. This was quite beyond the capability of the LAD, and arrangements were made to attach welders and their equipment from various workshops. It is difficult now to remember the exact number, but it was a fact that all movable arc welders in the Canadian Army were under command 61 LAD for a considerable period. Two Aldershot shelters were set up and a production line operation was put into effect, with the regiment being put through by squadrons and the welders working on shift around the clock.

The other facet of this operation concerned the waterproofing of the turret ring and gun mantlet. The development people suggested a cover of balloon fabric attached to the turret and hull with an adhesive. Arrangements were made to obtain the fabric from the Southampton Barrage Balloon Depot, and templates were provided by the Tank Design Establishment. The cutting was done by the world-famous sail-makers, Ratsey and Lapthorne, in their lofts in Cowes. The adhesive known by the trade name of “Bostick” was specified for sealing the fabric to the tank, but it was in short supply and hard to come by. At a clandestine meeting one night at the “White Horse” in Staynes with the managing-director of the firm, known in the trade as “Bostickey Bill”, arrangements were made to obtain our requirements.

To get rid of this fabric on completion of wading and permit free turret traverse, cortex explosive charges were placed at various points under the fabric. These were designed to be electrically detonated by the crew commander from the turret. The fabric covered the driver’s hatch and periscope with the result that the driver was blind and had to take his commands from the crew commander. Had the driver not been blind it is probable that fewer tanks would have drowned on landing in the subsequent operation. The final act in the waterproofing was the covering of the gun muzzle with fabric. To get rid of this the drill was that the tanks would go ashore with an AP round in the chamber. On firing, this would shatter the fabric and permit firing of HE rounds without danger. Though the hulls were supposed to be waterproofed, some seepage was almost inevitable, and difficulty was experienced with salt water getting to the brass slip rings of the turret junction box. It was a laborious maintenance job to strip and dry these. If neglected, corrosion started very quickly and trouble soon developed.

By the last week in June training was completed, the mechanical condition of the regiment was first class, and all waterproofing equipment was installed or ready for installation by the tank crews. This culminated many weeks of extremely hard work by all.

## ***Dieppe***

### **Briefing for Dieppe**

On 27<sup>th</sup> June all officers were taken to the Headquarters Combined Operations in Cowes and briefed by the GOC [General Officer Commanding], Maj-Gen J. H. Roberts, on the details of the operation. No mention was made of the name of the target, but detailed plaster models of the whole area of operations were available for study. The word “Dieppe” had been rumoured for some time and this pretty well confirmed it. Later Lt-Col Andrews held his “O” Group [Orders Group] and detailed his plan. In general, the tanks were to land in the assault wave on the centre beach, and break through the town. One squadron was to move south-west to support the infantry, which was to land at Pourville, another squadron was to move east to support the Royal Regiment of Canada which was to land at Puys, and the third squadron was to support the infantry in the centre. The whole regiment was reduced to the minimum assault scale, but nothing was reduced to the extent that the LAD was. Notes taken by the LAD Officer at the “O” Group are copied hereunder:

“Klondyde

Recovery:

Personnel available -   HQ Squadron – 2 (these were squadron fitters)  
                                   A Squadron - 5 (these were squadron fitters)  
                                   B Squadron - 6 (these were squadron fitters)  
                                   C Squadron - 5 (these were squadron fitters)  
                                   LAD - 4

All above personnel will work under the direction of the OME.

Vehicles available -     A Squadron - 1 TCP  
                                   B Squadron - 1 TCP  
                                   C Squadron - 1 TCP  
                                   LAD 1 Jeep

All the above will be equipped with wireless receivers – NOT to be used for sending.

Tools - Each TCP will carry three (fitters) tool kits, LAD personnel will take two, and HQ Sqn one.

Arms    Disembarking

RV      Beach Signal Stn”

When the CO had given this instruction, he asked me for my plan. Rather naively, I suggested setting up at a prominent crossroad south of town. Fortunately this was not necessary as things transpired, but later experience showed that this would have been an extremely hot spot.

The CO then went on to outline his plan for withdrawal. On a given code word, each squadron would send one troop back to the beach for loading, and the remainder were to withdraw to a shorter perimeter. This was to continue progressively through various code words and perimeters until one troop remained as a rear guard, and the CO said he would command it personally. The MO [Medical Officer] had been told to proceed to the beach at an early code word, but no mention was made of the LAD. When I asked, I was told that when I saw the CO’s tank pass through the crossroad, that would be my signal to withdraw. This came as a mild shock. Not wishing to appear too jaundiced, and least of all not wishing to become a statistic, I finally got up sufficient courage to suggest that there was little armour protection in a jeep. The CO reconsidered and said we would withdraw at an earlier code word, but with the admonishment that it was the LAD Officer’s responsibility to ensure that all tanks were embarked and no casualties were left on the beach. It is fortunate that the LAD was never faced with the problem.

## A False Start

We were now in the picture, had our orders, and were ready to go. The following day, June 28, the regiment was loaded. Each troop was embarked in the LCT with which it had been exercising during the previous six weeks. The LAD jeep with AQMS Seylor, Sgt MacKay, and Privates Hawkes and Metivier, embarked in LCT 303, commanded by Lt Peter Bull<sup>48</sup>, RNVR, whom we had got to know very well. They sailed that evening for an unknown destination. Apparently the operation was not to take place immediately and the CO granted unofficial leave, confined to the Isle of Wight, to some officers and I was fortunate to be one of them, and so escaped cramped shipboard life for a few days. On the evening of 2 July we crossed from Ryde to Portsmouth, then went by rail, arriving in New Haven at 0400 hours on the 3<sup>rd</sup>, and went directly on board our ship. We found the living conditions pretty rough for the troops. The weather had been clear and hot during the days that the ships had been in New Haven. The high cliffs on either side of the port prevented any breeze from getting to the ships lying in the docks. For security reasons army personnel could not go on deck during the day; they were confined to the crowded tank-deck under canvas. Each tank crew or group, such as the LAD, did their own cooking on primus or Coleman-type stoves. The food was primarily canned rations but the Navy did bring aboard potatoes and cabbages for a treat. We all slept in hammocks slung from the stanchions supporting the canvas over the tank deck and about 15 feet above the deck. Getting in and out of these required acrobatic feats never

<sup>48</sup> Peter Bull is now quite a well-known screen and television star in England, and a writer of some standing. I recommend his book “To Sea in a Sieve”. In this he recounts his experiences in small ships, including Dieppe, where he describes Canadians as he saw them.

recorded. To cap it all, the number of ‘heads’ was completely inadequate, and they were frequently plugged. The heat continued for several days; the inactivity and apparent good weather for an operation irked the troops and did little to help morale. Each fine day led to expectations that we would get under way in the evening. We were dependent on parachute troops to drop and take out the large coast artillery emplacements east and west of the town. Each evening a breeze came up, which precluded assurance that they would drop on target, hence the delays. Because of the tide condition, the operation had to take place on the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> of July. When the latter date passed, we were told that the operation was off, and after dark on 7 July we sailed from New Haven bound for the Isle of Wight, where we disembarked the following morning.

The next week was a tidying-up period for the LAD. All unserviceable stores were returned to the RAOC at Newport, as well as the Aldershot shelters and other stores borrowed from them. Personnel attached from units on the mainland were now returned. These, including the welders, had been retained on the island for security reasons.

Having been so severely criticized for the unrealistic request for spare parts prepared some months before at Pease Pottage, it was a matter of extreme gratification that the only major items surplus to requirements were two engines and two gearboxes.

On 13 July, the LAD moved by road to Seaford. During the next month all personnel of the regiment were sent on two weeks leave.

In early August, it was realized we had serious trouble with our Besa machine guns in that they were not ejecting properly and double feeds were frequent. Modifications suggested by S/Sgt Anderson, an armourer attached to the regiment, were carefully reviewed, and a new ACI (Army Council Instruction) was quickly published incorporating them. A crash programme was instituted and all guns were modified by 13 August with performance much improved.

## **Dieppe Remounted**

On 11 August, I was summoned by the CO and told I was to proceed on the 31<sup>st</sup> Field Army Equipment (FAE) Course at the Military College of Science (M C of S). On the 14<sup>th</sup> I was again called in and told I would go on the 32<sup>nd</sup> Course, but in the meantime I would go to Dieppe. Again this was more than a mild shock!

In the meantime Major Sucherov, RCE, appeared on the scene with a modification, which called for rolls of ‘chespaling’ to be suspended just over the front track idlers. A small explosive charge was to release these to roll out under the track to prevent bogging down in the gravel or shale of a beach. This also required arc welding and some of our former friends from the Isle of Wight showed up with their equipment. In addition a lot of welding done on the Isle of Wight required redoing.

My diary for 1942 records in part:

17 August: “Loaded on LCTs at New Haven after dark for operation. Lost one tank enroute from Seaford due to fire.”

18 August: “Welding lugs on louvres all day (on ship). Back to Seaford in pm for final drive oil seals - replaced one on a HQ tank on board ship. Sailed at 2120 hrs.”

In the meantime the LAD party had grown and consisted as follows: OC - myself, 2i/c - Lt-Col Reeve, Major Van Straubensee - an observer from The Ontario Regiment, AQMS Seyler, MQMS Freeman (the regt); S/Sgt MacKay, Privates Hawkes and Metivier. How eight people plus a radio, two fitter kits, stove, food, and small packs were to be transported in a single jeep has yet to be answered. I can only think that, in our well-intentioned naivety, we looked on this as a pre-war day excursion from New Haven to Dieppe and return.

Prior to sailing on the evening of the 19<sup>th</sup>, I found that I shared a set of maps with the same English Officer from MI 5 who had shared them for the abortive 4 - 6 July effort. We were both shaken by the new defence overlays that showed a tremendous improvement in the German de-fences in the interim period. Our concern was that no increase had been made in the RCE complement, and the success of the operation depended so much on this group accomplishing their many jobs. Unfortunately the overlays did not show all improvements; or perhaps fortunately, or we would have been more apprehensive than we were.

## Dieppe Landing

The night 18/19 August was delightful for a cruise - moonlight and a calm sea, but the company not exactly what I would choose for such surroundings. The trip over was quite uneventful, except that a following LCT rammed us, and aside from a damaged davit and a lot of coarse naval jargon by the respective captains, no major damage was done.

With the break of dawn all hell broke loose. Tracers made the sky look like the First of July celebration. The first most sickening thing we saw was one of our Spitfires shot down and explode in the sea near by. From then on there were many horrors, but we fortunately were spared the worst. I was on listening watch when the assault went in and shortly after heard the CO, Col Andrews, call and say “My tank is drowned, I am bailing out, you will hear from me again in a few minutes.” Unfortunately those were probably the last words Johnny ever spoke. Whether he drowned or was shot while swimming to safety has never been established. ‘There are conflicting stories, but in any case we lost a wonderful CO and a staunch friend.

As the hours wore on, it became evident that the progress of the tanks was negligible and few had progressed beyond the beach. We could hear many tanks calling to say that they were bogged down in the shale or had lost tracks and were immobilized. Despite these adversities they kept calling to say they were able to engage the enemy and were doing so with all their might. As time passed, we would hear one say he was running short of ammunition. This became more common, and plans were heard for replenishment. Then we would hear one say he had shot his last round. In time, firing became more desultory and eventually things became relatively quiet compared with the earlier tempo

All through this our senior officer, Major Bob Taylor, who commanded the reserve squadron, kept asking permission to land but with no result. Finally, word came for us to proceed to the beach. We were within a mile of it, when a command craft came alongside and cancelled the order. This was a relief to most of us, as time was running out and we felt we would be reinforcing defeat.

During this time we were for the most part in the boat pool two to four miles off shore. Because of the distance it was hard to distinguish landmarks, let alone see what was happening. We could at first see the Casino and the burning tobacco factory but, in time, with smoke from fires in the town and smoke screens laid by the RAF and Navy, it was difficult to see anything.

We received little or no shelling as all this was saved for those on the beach. The air umbrella provided by the RAF was terrific. However, the odd Jerry was able to sneak in and do some damage. Our ship was straddled with four bombs on one side and four on the other but no direct hits. We were shaken up but that was all.

At 5:20 a.m. on the 19<sup>th</sup> the infantry units touched down on schedule on the long beach in front of Dieppe’s Promenade. The craft carrying the first nine tanks that were scheduled to land in support of the infantry were from ten to fifteen minutes late because of an error in navigation.<sup>49</sup> The Calgary Regiment was the first Canadian Armoured Corps unit ever to go in action. While Capt Hunt and his groups were tensely waiting for their turn to approach the beaches, the ten landing craft carrying 30 Churchill tanks brought their cargo to shore. Only two tanks were lost by leav-

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p 75.

ing their ships in too deep water and thus were drowned. One tank remained aboard and the remaining 27 landed, about half of these crossed the wall at the top of the beach to reach the Promenade. This was as far as they were able to go.<sup>50</sup> [RHH]

## The Withdrawal

At about 1100 hours, orders came for us to return to England. I was stretched out quite exhausted from the strain of it all on the canvas tank deck covering when a sailor came along, saluted smartly, and said “Captain’s compliments, Sir, but he would like to see you on the bridge.” I arrived there to find the Captain, Lt P Bull, prostrate on the chart table. His “arches” had collapsed too. He suggested that a little searching would find a bottle of brandy behind some charts. In due course this was found, and as a result the ship made safe landfall at New Haven again. There we dropped my 2i/c, Lt-Col Reeves, and the others from MI 5. We proceeded and laid off Selsey Bill for the night and landed next morning at Stokes Bay. After passing through a reception centre we proceeded back to Seaford.

WS Hunt  
September 1963

[End of Colonel Hunt’s narration.]

## Aftermath

By the time the Calgarys reached Seaford, their reinforcements had arrived and replacement tanks for the 29 left on the beach (which the LAD were supposed to have recovered) were on their way.

Ten days later the regiment moved to Minehead, Sommerset, for gunnery exercises on the ranges. Capt Hunt left 61 LAD to take the FAE Course turning his command over to Capt Bob Bartlett. “When I went to see Lt-Col Begg, the former 2i/c, and now CO” wrote Colonel Hunt, “John the dour Scot said ‘Well, you and your LAD were just G. D. easterners when you joined us, but now you are all crazy as the rest of us.’ This was indeed a tribute to the LAD.”

## *Operation Husky – The Invasion of Sicily*

### Selected for Operation Husky

General A.G.L. McNaughton, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, was called to the War Office on the afternoon of 23 April 1943, and was presented with a proposal by General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The proposal was to substitute Canadian Troops for the 3<sup>rd</sup> British Division in Operation Husky, the code name given to the invasion of Sicily. The Canadian Government quickly accepted. General McNaughton selected the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army Tank Brigade, and certain other ancillary units to constitute the Force.

### Preparations for Husky

The LAD was kept busy familiarizing themselves with the newly-issued Sherman tanks equipped with 75-mm guns. It soon became apparent that the Shermans required considerably less maintenance in all aspects than the Churchills. The Sherman was a cruiser tank capable of speeds up to 25 mph compared to the slow infantry class tank with which they were first equipped.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, pp 76-77.

The Sherman tank had one serious drawback from the crews' point of view in the matter of protective armour. The Churchill tank was literally a mobile pillbox capable of tremendous frontal protection. The Sherman on the other hand offered considerably less protection.

Last minute modifications were carried out in the field such as the addition of smoke dischargers, extra stowage boxes, and the welding on of extra armour plate outside the tank, to give a little more protection to those areas where the ammunition was stowed inside.

At last all was in readiness, and the LAD under the command of Captain J. Edmond moved to Gourock on the Clyde, boarding their ship the *Cameronia* (Troopship A-13) at noon on 27 June 1943.

## Convoy to Sicily

The moving of the Canadian troops from the United Kingdom required 92 ships in addition to the naval escort vessels. They were organized as a fast assault convoy, a slow convoy, and two "follow-up" convoys, which carried The Calgary Regiment. The fast assault convoy sailed from the Clyde on 28 June; the slow assault convoy sailed in two groups, the first group on the 19 June and the second on 24 June. These two sub-convoys were scheduled to meet off Algiers on D minus five. The two follow-up convoys carrying the Tank Brigade less the Three Rivers Regiment, which was to take part in the assault, sailed on 25 June, followed by ten ships including the *Cameronia* on 1 July - Dominion Day.<sup>51</sup>

Brigadier Wyman, the brigade commander, held Dominion Day services aboard ship. The trip to Gibraltar was quite uneventful. The route took the convoy past The Rock at 0230 hrs on the 8<sup>th</sup> and anchored at Algiers at 1800 hrs for seven hours the following day.

The *Cameronia* sailed close to the African shore passing Bizerta during the night of the 11<sup>th</sup> and then on to Malta arriving during the night of 13/14 July. Here they stayed in the protection of the harbour of this courageous island until 1500 hrs of the 16<sup>th</sup> when they set sail for Syracuse, arriving at 2230 hrs the same night.

## Sicily

Barges came alongside the *Cameronia* and were unloading her by 0200 hrs, ignoring the air raid and the anti-aircraft barrage. While the stores were being unloaded, the LAD marched about six miles to the southwest of Syracuse. After two hours sleep, they were picked up and driven to a camp west of Avola.

## Cassibile to Scordia

The Army Tank Brigade remained in the Cassibile area for a week to adjust itself for combat. Every night enemy aircraft bombed the area. The troops were forced to stand-to, ready to move at a moment's notice by these raids. All tanks and vehicles were kept fully stowed and engines running during these periods, should a move become necessary.

The Brigade moved out of the Cassibile area early on the morning of 21 July and moved northeast of Scordia in the Contrada Cucco, a district lying along the southern escarpment of the Catania Plain, south of the Gornalunga River.

Its role was to cover the ten-mile gap between the two corps of the Eighth Army. The units took up their positions on 23 July. The last action of the Brigade in Sicily was the support given the infantry in the seizing of a bridgehead north of Zafferana Etnea, by the Ontario Regiment on 9 August. The Calgary Regiment was still in position north of Scordia.

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<sup>51</sup> War Diary 61 LAD, June 43.



Late on the evening of 25 July, a dramatic radio announcement was made from Rome:

“His Majesty the King and Emperor has accepted the resignation of the head of the Government, the Chancellor and State Secretary, tendered by His Excellency Cavalier Benito Mussolini.”<sup>52</sup>

The casualty lists for the three tank regiments indicates the different operational roles that they had been called upon to undertake. The Three Rivers Regiment lost 21 killed and 62 wounded, The Ontario Regiment one killed and 13 wounded, and The Calgary Regiment eight wounded.<sup>53</sup>

Two of the injured were Capt Edmond and his driver Cfn [Craftsman] Barnard. They drove their jeep over a land mine in a farm near Catania on 6 August (MR 720/722). Barnard lost his hearing in one ear. Capt Edmond had both ankles badly broken and later became a double amputee. Capt Edmond was replaced by Capt W. D. Schofield on 19 August 1943.

## **Operation Baytown**

At the time the Canadian Government decided to send troops to the Mediterranean it was considered likely that when the Sicilian campaign was over the division and the Army Tank Brigade would be brought back to England so that the knowledge and experience they had acquired could be disseminated throughout the First Canadian Army.<sup>54</sup> This was not to be. Early on the morning of 3 September 1943, British and Canadian troops landed unopposed in Italy near Reggio Calabria.<sup>55</sup> The news that the Italians had signed the military terms of an armistice with the Allies was announced late on the afternoon of the 3<sup>rd</sup>. By this time the Allied landings were well under way. The Calgary Regiment had been assigned to support the 1<sup>st</sup> Division in Operation Baytown, the code name given to the assault on southern Calabria by 13<sup>th</sup> Corps,<sup>56</sup> but although a Calgary Squadron had landed with the assault troops on D Day (3 September) and assisted in the capture of early objectives, no tanks had been able to get farther forward than Terreti.<sup>57</sup>

## **Recovery on the road from Reggio, Melito, Bianco, Locri, Siderno, Monasterace, Soverato, Marina di Catanzaro, Cariati, to the port of Taranto**

The “A” Echelon landed near Reggio the following morning to learn that the Corps Commander’s tank was out of action, An inspection by the LAD showed that there was no specific reason for it not functioning - it was, so to speak, like The One Hoss Shay - just all worn out and needed a complete overhaul.

Capt Schofield and his men carried out many recovery tasks in a most difficult country and the brigade was moving forward with all possible speed. Their progress was hindered by mined roads, blown bridges, and very narrow streets. By the 15 September the LAD had advanced to Catanzaro passing through Melito on the south coast, and then up the east coast through Bianco, Locri, Siderno, Monasterace, Soverato and Marina di Catanzaro.

The regiment found that there were four bridges blown up north of Bianco and it was difficult to find alternate routes because of sandy ground. The entire resources of the LAD were required to get the regiment through.

<sup>52</sup> Nicholson, Lt-Col G.W.L.; *The Canadians In Italy 1943-1945*; p 135. Queen’s Printer, Ottawa 1957.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, pp 166-168.

<sup>54</sup> Stacey, p 92.

<sup>55</sup> Nicholson, p 180.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p 186.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p 209.

The hilly country and soft soil combined to contain the heavy tanks on the few good roads with their treacherous curves.

The LAD stayed close to the tanks on these long moves. On the morning of 13 September, Capt Schofield recorded a typical example of the difficult recovery conditions in his war diary.

“At about 0900 hrs I came across a tank that was leaning very badly over the side of the bank. Tried to pull it out with the recovery vehicle but unable to move it. Put two tanks and the recovery vehicle on it and took it on down the bank. This job took most of the day.”<sup>58</sup>

Another example of the difficulties that Schofield was faced with is recorded by him on the following day.

“I went to the tanks and waited until all the traffic was through (Catanzaro) and then proceeded to pull the tanks through the street which was narrower than the tanks. This took until 0430 hrs the next morning.”<sup>59</sup>

The following day, the 15<sup>th</sup>, the bridge-carrying tank travelling along the road to Cariati threw a track on a curve, slid into the ditch, and burst into flames, becoming a total loss.

The LAD was divided between “A” and “B” Echelons. The “B” Echelon in this period was anywhere from 100 to 150 miles to the rear.

The regiment continued its advance up the east coast of Italy. The tanks reached the Port of Taranto on 20 September. The port had already been cleared of the enemy by British forces. In the meantime “A” Squadron, which was the armoured element of “Boforce”, swung left at Nova Siri Station and captured Potenza on the 20<sup>th</sup>.<sup>60</sup>

“I hope you realize,” wrote the GOC 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps, “what a great achievement the capture of Potenza in sixteen days has been and what a very big effect it has had on [Operation] Avalanche.”<sup>61</sup>

## Road Wheel Failures

By the 19<sup>th</sup>, the hard going the tanks had received, began to show up by the large number of road wheel failures. Capt Schofield had a chance to start tank inspections and soon determined, among other things requiring adjustment, repair, or replacement, that he would need about 100 new road wheels before the regiment moved another 300 miles.<sup>62</sup>

## ***The Military Situation in Italy, 20 September 43***

The general situation in Italy on 20 September 1943 was briefly as follows:

- The bridgehead had been secured at Salerno and Taranto, and was a firm and rapidly growing base. Between these two points the 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps was established in the Potenza-Auletta area.
- The Italian armistice had not seriously prejudiced the German position in Italy. No longer was there hope of a sudden German collapse and the Italians became co-belligerents.

<sup>58</sup> WD, 13 September 43.

<sup>59</sup> WD, 14 September 43.

<sup>60</sup> The Calgary Regiment, p 8; a private publication of the regiment and printed by Printing Works D.C. Jung and Company, Hilversum, Holland.

<sup>61</sup> Nicholson, p 228.

<sup>62</sup> WD, 20 September 43.

- The problem facing Eighth Army was the necessity of building up a firm front and to capture the Port of Naples and the Foggia airfields, one of the most valuable objectives in southern Italy - for their capture meant a base for the Allied strategic air forces from which the Austrian industrial areas and the Romanian oil fields could be attacked.

General Montgomery was faced with two problems. In order to support administratively the Eighth Army's operations into the Plain of Foggia, it was necessary to switch the main supply axis from Calabria to the southeast ports of Taranto, Brindisi and Bari.

The General's second problem was the necessary regrouping of his forces in order to transfer the main weight of the army to the east.

His plan was to advance on Foggia with the 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps, consisting of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry and the 78<sup>th</sup> British Divisions, 4<sup>th</sup> British Armoured and the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Tank Brigades.<sup>63</sup>

### **Motta Montecorvino**

General Guy Simonds, the Canadian Corps Commander, organized a mobile force commanded by Lt-Col Neroutsos, The Calgary Regiment's Commanding Officer, The force consisted of the 4<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, The Calgary Tanks, and The Royal Canadian Regiment as lorried infantry, and the 27<sup>th</sup> Anti-Tank Battery, RCA, with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Regiment, RCA, and the 66<sup>th</sup> Medium Regiment, RA, in support.

This mobile force crossed the start line at Lucera early on the morning of 1 October, led by a strong vanguard well in front. The enemy stubbornly fought for possession of the village of Motta Montecorvino, which crested the first ridge astride the axis of advance. The ridge was strongly defended with enemy anti-tank guns and machine gun posts for a distance of four or five miles on either side of Motta.

With a knowledge of the enemy's defences about Alberona, a village six miles to the south of Motta, a squadron from the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards and Major Vladimir Peniakoff, the founder of Popski's Private Army, combined their forces and captured the town without loss.<sup>64</sup>

The participation of The Calgary Regiment in the Motta battle in support of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division was the first real and bloody battle since the regiment's participation in the futile Dieppe raid. The Calgary's historian recorded that the Motta battle was "the first heavy opposition in the Italian Campaign by 1 CAB".<sup>65</sup>

The LAD and their companions-in-arms, the regimental fitters, had little rest in the support of their regiment. The quick repairs, the recovery of equipment, the never-ending inspections of fighting equipment to determine its battle worthiness, and finally the exhaustive recovery and evacuation of equipment to the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon workshop left little time for other than snatches of sleep. Eat on the move was the order of the day.

### ***River Sangro - The German Winter Line***

These conditions did not improve as the Canadians advanced to the German Winter Line at the River Sangro. The enemy had decided to hold the Allies at this natural barrier. The Sangro was in flood and presented a natural strong position. The level of the water was dependent on the amount of rain falling in the mountains. With great difficulty the Sangro could be forded at certain periods. There is an escarpment

<sup>63</sup> Montgomery, Field Marshal, El Alamein to the River Sangro; pp 109-110.

<sup>64</sup> Nicholson, pp 235-236.

<sup>65</sup> The Calgary Regiment, p 8.

on the south bank of the river, and on the north a low lying plain extends to the Sangro Ridge. The strong points of the enemy defensive position on the ridge were the two villages of Fossacesia to the northeast, and Mozzagrogna about four miles to the south west.

As the time approached when General Montgomery planned to cross the Sangro, the weather became worse. Heavy rain fell heavily for as much as two days at a time followed by a further two days of drizzle and mist. Snow was falling in the mountains. The crossing was postponed several times because the ground hadn't sufficiently dried out enough to be passable.

Between 9-15 November, the 78<sup>th</sup> British Division managed to cross the river and establish a small bridgehead. By the 22<sup>nd</sup> five battalions were in the bridgehead, but reinforcement came to halt with the increase of rain. The general was forced by the weather to modify his plans, and had 5 British Corps reorganize the bridgehead on a two-divisional basis. He planned to capture the Sangro by a series of limited operations each fully supported by the whole corps artillery. The bridgehead was about 2000 yards deep on a 10, 000 yard frontage by the 24<sup>th</sup>.<sup>66</sup>

The main attack went in on the night of 28-29 November with the 2<sup>nd</sup> New Zealand Division on the left flank. By nightfall of the 30<sup>th</sup>, the Eighth Army "after most violent fighting" was in firm command of the Sangro Ridge. By 4 December, the Canadians had taken over the whole right flank of the 5<sup>th</sup> British Corps. The Army Tank Brigade had in the meantime been renamed the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade, and relieved 5<sup>th</sup> British Corps' armour on the 6<sup>th</sup>.

## December 1943

The Calgary Regiment went under command of the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division and the tanks crossed the Sangro on 1 December. One of the regiment's recovery tanks hit a mine and was itself recovered by the LAD on the 5<sup>th</sup>. The LAD and regiment were bombed and strafed - this together with the mud and rain made living conditions almost unbearable. Illness took its toll among the LAD members with two men being sent to hospital in three days, followed by Capt Schofield on the 16<sup>th</sup>.

The following day, Capt H.A.G. "Tony" Kingsmill was sent in to command the LAD. Life continued under these most difficult circumstances - more men left for hospital - the LAD and regimental fitters inspected, repaired, and replaced tank components to the best of their ability - the mud and rain were ever present, and the bombing and strafing continued. "Everyone flooded out of their slit trenches by a very heavy rain. Some New Year's Eve!" wrote Kingsmill for the closing entry in his 1943 War Diary.

Three days later, the unit still had not dried out. Kingsmill managed to get his men rooms in San Leonardo, but although they escaped the rain, they did not escape shell fire. The billets the LAD managed to get were not good. In Villa Jubatti the billets were shell torn - one of which incidentally was formerly a donkey stable.

## Ortona to Villa Grande The Canadian Winter Line January to April 1944

The Eighth Army's offensive came to a halt. The Canadians now held a long salient, their front running from a height of land about two miles northwest of Ortona known as Point 59, and which incidentally overlooked the Adriatic, along the Riccio upstream in a southwesterly direction to the villages of San Tommaso and San Nicola and on to Villa Grande - a front of about three and a half miles.

This line was maintained for three very uncomfortable and miserable months. The mud and rain had to be experienced to be believed.<sup>67</sup> During all this time, patrols were in constant contact with the enemy.

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<sup>66</sup> Montgomery, pp 119-120.

<sup>67</sup> Stacey, p 125.

With the advance grounded, the LAD and regimental fitters started an intensive program of inspections. Tanks were inspected a troop at a time, and the inspection sheets of the first troops quickly showed the wisdom of this decision. Recovery of tanks still was a major effort. Two tanks in front of the infantry were bogged down in full view of the enemy. Kingsmill personally supervised their recovery on 13 and 14 January, employing the technique of using de-ditching logs strapped to the tracks. Both tanks were made mobile. One tank was recovered, but the second became bogged again and was lost by fire due to enemy action.

Dysentery broke out in the LAD and regiment - its source was attributed to the flies in the kitchens. Incidentally, 61 LAD did their own cooking using their general duty men as cooks. It wasn't until April that they were given an RCASC cook from the regiment. It must be kept in mind that the LAD war establishment did not provide a cook although there were cooking utensils issued on the G 1098 equipment list.

The LAD's limited workshop resources were jeopardized on 25 January, when a blowtorch exploded setting fire to the workshop lorry. One man was slightly burned, all the tank inspection papers, three logbooks, half the shelters, and the kit and pup tents of three men were all destroyed.

The regiment moved to the Orsogna front at the beginning of February and the LAD, who had hoped to move to billets in Ortona, moved instead into a fine house just outside of Lanciano. The weather was still so bad that it was necessary to use the recovery tanks to bring in the three RHQ [Regimental Headquarters] tanks for their inspection on the 20<sup>th</sup>.

The weather took a turn for the better by the end of the month as the winter started its retreat. Orders were received from CO on 23 March to clean house and to become fully mobile in preparation of the long moves ahead to come shortly.

### ***Plans for a Spring Offensive to Capture The Eternal City***

Regrouping for an all-out spring offensive was outlined to the Allied Army Commanders on the last day of February. It was decided for ease of maintenance that all British-equipped divisions, which included the Dominion, Indian and Polish forces, would become part of the Eighth Army and the American-equipped United States and French forces would remain with the Fifth US Army.

The regrouping began at the end of March and was carried out by degrees. However, it was not possible to conceal from the enemy that the weight of the Eighth Army was being transferred to the west. Also it would be probable that the enemy would expect a spring offensive to take the form of a thrust up the Liri Valley.

An elaborate plan was conceived to confuse the enemy in this regard. Field-Marshal Kesselring was led to believe that an amphibious landing would be made at Civitavecchio, north of Rome, on 15 May. This deception was made by a carefully planned wireless exercise, and the stage hands were a detachment of Canadian Provost Corps who "planted a small forest of signposts bearing the Maple Leaf to mark the assembly and embarkation areas on the Salerno coast."<sup>68</sup> The task allotted by General Alexander to the Eighth Army was to break or turn the Gustav and Hitler Lines and advance on the axis of Highway No. 6 towards Valmontone. The Canadian Corps' role depended upon the initial success of Eighth Army's attack.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p 131.

## Crossing The Gari

At 2300 hrs on 11 May the attack began with Rome, The Eternal City, as the prize.<sup>69</sup> What followed is best described in Col Stacey's own words.

“At 11 o'clock on the night of 11 May the battle for Rome began, as 1000 guns thundered out in a violent bombardment of the defences of the Gustav Line. On the 13<sup>th</sup> Corps front a storm of shell swept through the heavy ground-mist of the Liri Valley, and fifteen minutes before midnight beach parties launched the first assault boats on the swirling waters of the Gari, while the bridging sappers began their vital race against the clock.

“The 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade had been assigned the task of supporting the brigades of the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Division, which was attacking in the Sant' Angelo sector. As the infantry struggled across the river in their light craft, three troops of tanks of the 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three Rivers Regiment), drawn up on the east bank, covered their passage with high explosive and machine gun fire... In their forward assembly areas squadrons of the 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment) and the 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) awaited the completion of the bridges that would carry them over to join the infantry.

“By half-past eight on the morning of 12 May, the gallant efforts of hard-working Indian sappers completed the first of these - “Oxford” Bridge, a mile south of Sant' Angelo.<sup>70</sup>

“Five hundred yards below “Oxford” Bridge, at a point where the Gari curved close to the lateral road, a third site, “Plymouth”, had been selected; but throughout the night it had remained free from engineer activity. A new experiment in assault-bridging was about to be made. About an hour after the completion of “Oxford” Bridge, two Shermans of The Calgary Regiment approached the Gari, the front one, with turret removed, bearing the weight of a complete 100-foot Bailey span, which had been constructed in relative concealment from the enemy's fire, 600 yards to the rear. An officer walked coolly alongside, controlling their direction and speed by telephone. Without pausing, the leading tank drove down the soft bank into the bed of the river, the crew escaping just before it submerged. The rear tank thrust forward, and the bridge slid across the back of the carrying Sherman to the far bank. The pusher tank disconnected, and fifteen minutes from the time it left its building-site the bridge was in position across the 60-foot water gap.”<sup>71</sup>

The officer mentioned in Stacey's account was Capt Tony Kingsmill, OC 61 Light Aid Detachment.<sup>72</sup> A footnote to this account says:

“This method of launching a Bailey bridge from the backs of tanks was employed, with various modifications, in subsequent operations in Italy. Its initial success was largely due to the ingenuity and courage of Captain H.A. Kingsmill, an officer of the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, attached to The Calgary Regiment, who developed the bridge after many experiments in the Volturno Valley. His cool efficiency in conducting the launching under heavy fire after he had been wounded by a shell, brought him the Military Cross.”<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, pp 134-135.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, pp 134-135.

<sup>71</sup> Nicholson, pp 402-403.

<sup>72</sup> During the interview in which we were discussing this crossing, Tony Kingsmill asked me with a chuckle, “Do you know who were the first to take advantage of this bridge?” Seeing that I hadn't the faintest idea, he said “As soon as the bridge was across, a small group of German Infantry who had remained hidden in the waist high reeds by the river bank, burst out of their hiding place and dashed across our bridge to safety.”

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p 403.

Unluckily, this “triumph of mechanical improvisation” as Colonel Stacey referred to it, was temporarily put out of action by a shell after only four Calgary tanks had crossed. The “Oxford” Bridge now provided the sole tank crossing and before nightfall the greater part of five Canadian squadrons had crossed.<sup>74</sup>

See Annex A for the citation of Captain Kingsmill’s award of the Military Cross; see Annex B for extracts from his War Diary, and Annexes C, D, and E for extracts referring to Plymouth Bridge from the histories of the RCE, RE, and the IE.

The Indian infantry, who were pinned down in their bridgehead positions by accurate enemy fire, were relieved that some Canadian tanks had managed to cross the Gari, for at any moment they expected the German armour to appear. The majority of the tanks became mired in the soggy flats across the Gari. During the afternoon, the 59<sup>th</sup> Light Aid Detachment, attached to The Ontario Regiment, returned fourteen of these tanks to action with the aid of their two recovery tanks.<sup>75</sup> The four Calgary tanks were able to push forward to the village of Panaccioni, destroying many enemy strong points and retreating transport.

The general situation at the end of the day was not as good as hoped for. The struggle went on for the next two days to increase the bridgehead. Not until the evening of the 15<sup>th</sup> did Pignataro fall before a charge of the fierce Pathan tribesmen of frontier fame, supported by the tanks of the Calgarys.

The Gustav Line was completely broken in the Indian Infantry Division’s sector after four days of intense onslaught. Their success was experienced on almost all of the remaining fronts. Field-Marshal Kesselring withdrew to his next defence - The Hitler Line.

After Kingsmill completed his direction of the placement of Plymouth Bridge, he consented to have his wounds properly attended to. Capt E.K. MacEachern from 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop was sent on the 19<sup>th</sup> to replace Kingsmill as LAD officer to the Calgarys.

## **Tank Gun Defects Start to Show Up**

There were still many tanks to recover and the repair teams were kept busy making 1<sup>st</sup> echelon repairs. Minor defects in the tank guns had started to show up about a week before the Gari crossing, and were attributed to the regiment’s attempts at indirect shooting. The most important thing they watched for was the level of the buffer oil in the buffer recuperator system, and the deposit of copper in the bores of the guns. The former, if low, would allow violent recoil and run out of the piece, and the latter could conceivably cause the walls of a high explosive shell to crush and thus cause a pre-mature explosion in the barrel. The Americans ignored coppering in the 75-mm tank guns, and in time most Canadian EMEs followed suit, even though it was against the teachings of the Military College of Science.

## **Tank Replacement System Changed Within The Brigade**

As fast as the regiment’s tanks could be recovered and inspected, they were sent back to the LAD for 1<sup>st</sup> Echelon repairs, or to 1 Armoured Brigade Workshop for 2<sup>nd</sup> Echelon repair, or evacuated further back for the more extensive repairs.

Once a tank left the regiment and entered the 2<sup>nd</sup> Echelon repair system, or was evacuated to the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Echelons, the repaired tank was turned over to the Tank Delivery Squadron who would crew the tank and forward it to the front as a reinforcement tank. Tanks and crews were returned to their own regiments as circumstances permitted.

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<sup>74</sup> Stacey, p 135. Nicholson, p 403.

<sup>75</sup> Stacey, p 135. Nicholson, p 403.

About this time, a change was introduced within the brigade. The repaired tank and its driver and co-driver team were returned to their regiment upon completion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Echelon repairs. The tanks evacuated out of the brigade and their crews, less the turret crews, accompanied it back through the system, with the crews and tanks eventually arriving independently or together at the Tank Delivery Squadron.

Morale was greatly increased by the fast turn around from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Echelon workshop. It was almost impossible though to keep a five-man crew together. They were usually split into turret crew - the loader-operator, gunner and crew commander, and the driving crew of driver and co-driver. Every effort was made to keep entire crews together and to keep the driving crews with their tanks.

Kingsmill, who after being released from hospital on 16 May returned to his LAD for a short visit, and then went on to 1 Armoured Brigade Workshop for a rest and to complete the sketches and drawings of his Plymouth Bridge. At the same time, he successfully persuaded his superiors to return him to action with his LAD, returning to his command now at Pontecorvo on 3 June. Capt MacEachern returned to the workshop.

### **Aquino, River Melfa, to Rome**

After supporting the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Division in defeating the Gustav Line, The Calgarys, after a short rest, were placed in support of the 78<sup>th</sup> British Division in front of Aquino. After the fall of this ancient town, the regiment carried out a pursuit role without infantry to the Melia River.<sup>76</sup>

On the morning of 4 June, the magnificent and almost unscarred Eternal City was entered by troops of the 5<sup>th</sup> US Army.

On 6 June came with its electrifying news that the Second Front had opened in Normandy. Now all took hope that the end of the war was in sight, and that it wouldn't all be fought in Italy.

The LAD moved to a site about five miles to the north of Rome on the 14<sup>th</sup>. The harbour area was hot and treeless. Some of the men swam in the Tiber, and others were sent to buy fresh vegetables. Rome itself was out of bounds. There is nothing so disheartening and demoralizing to troops than travelling through a country on the back roads, improvised routes through fields and forests, rarely seeing a community of any size and then to harbour close to a large city that has been placed out of bounds.

On 17 June they moved again to a position north of Viterbo. Here they stayed until the 23<sup>rd</sup>. Ten members of the LAD were granted permission to visit Rome some 51 miles to the south. The remainder of the LAD were busy repairing the tanks after their long move.

### ***Military Plans to Turn the Gothic Line***

Field-Marshal Kesselring was known to be building strong defences along a line from Pisa to Rimini - known as the Gothic Line. The Allied armies were now directed to advance with all possible speed - the Eighth up the valley of the Tiber to Arezzo and Florence, the US Fifth Army up the west coast to Pisa, of leaning tower fame, and to Pistoia. The Armies would then be in position to launch an attack to the northeast through the Apennines against Bologna in the Lombard Plain, from which the seizure of Turin and Genoa would provide bases for a drive into southern France, on the Venice Padua area.<sup>77</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade went into action again as part of 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps in support of the 4<sup>th</sup> British Division. The Ontarios and The Three Rivers Regiment were in constant action in the difficult country west of Lake Trasimeno. During the second week in July the Canadian tanks reached the Arno.

<sup>76</sup> The Calgary Regiment, p 9.

<sup>77</sup> Stacey, p 145.



The Brigade was placed in support of the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division again and, by early August, the Indian Division reached the Arno east of Empoli.<sup>78</sup>

### **Citta di Pieve, Vaino, Gioielli, Valiano, Folano di Chiana, Marciano to Monte San Savino**

To return to Capt Kingsmill and his men: the LAD moved on 24 May to Citta di Pieve. Here the ground was so soft that movement within the harbour was almost impossible. They were glad to move again on the 29<sup>th</sup> to a site close to Vaino. Many tanks were casualties on the move, but Kingsmill and his men had difficulty in locating them due to the heavy enemy shelling. Recovery under such conditions usually was more successfully done at night, and advantage was taken of the darkness that night to get two tanks back into action.

The following day - Dominion Day for all Canadians and the first anniversary of their sailing from Gourock - the LAD moved to Gioielli for a short stop, and then on to Valiano the same day. Three of the nine tanks requiring recovery or repairs were turned over to the brigade workshop. The recovery tanks were given a thorough going over before the LAD moved to about four miles north of Folano di Chiana for a one day stop on the 4<sup>th</sup>, leaving five tanks in the old harbour near Valiano for the workshop to pick up. The regiment had forgotten to tell Kingsmill of an "A" Squadron tank that had to be recovered, necessitating sending the recovery tanks back some fifteen miles. One of the recovery tanks caught fire. The men battled the fire for two hours before putting it out with remarkably little damage to the ARV.

Again a fast move, this time to a site about five miles north of Marciano and a mile east of Monte San Savino on the 5<sup>th</sup> for about a 12-day stay.

### **Dust Causes Overheating Engines**

The dust was heavy enough to plug the tank radiators, and overheating of tank engines became a problem. An air compressor was borrowed from the advanced workshop detachment (AWD) of the workshop. With high-pressure air, the radiators and clutches of the tanks were blown out. The same problems were being met the same way in Normandy by the armoured units there.

### **Arezzo, Siena, Poggibonsi Empoli to Castelfiorentino**

The LAD moved to Arezzo on the 17<sup>th</sup> and there turned slightly south and west on the 20<sup>th</sup> and moved fifty road miles to Siena in support of the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Division. The regiment's Commanding Officer had a small party to say goodbye to the COs of the 4<sup>th</sup> British Division regiments that the Calgarys had supported in their drive to the Arno River in this sector.

The Canadian Armoured Brigade joined the Indians in the Poggibonsi area on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. The thrust northward began as a two-pronged advance on 23 July, the 21<sup>st</sup> Indian Brigade on the right and the 19<sup>th</sup> Indian Brigade on the left. The Arno was reached near Empoli, 20 miles west of Florence.

The Calgarys supported both of these thrusts. The two axis of advance made it difficult for the LAD to service both advances with any degree of efficiency. The heavy mining by the retreating enemy took a heavy toll of tank suspensions. The LAD moved to Castelfiorentino on 29 July and stayed there until 5 August, when they moved to an area to the north of the town for a period of three days. It was at this site that Capt Kingsmill was told of his award of the Military Cross for his bridging exploit across the Gari River on the previous 11 May.

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p 145.

## Road Wheels and Track Rollers

The LAD made a short move back to Certaldo in preparation for the move to Greve about 15 miles to the east. Considerable track roller trouble now started to appear, as their life expectancy as it is now called, was about reached. Extensive studies have been made since the war to determine life expectancies of components in order to provide for their replacement before their failing in service. During the war, careful records were kept of mileages experienced from tracks, but the obvious disadvantage was that the data was being built up during combat - for the equipment was new. Tank road wheels were deceiving, for their life depended on a good bond between the rubber and steel. Good-looking road wheels sometimes had a life of only 50 to 100 miles, where some that had been badly gouged by running over the end connectors lasted 1800 to 2000 miles in this condition. Some EMEs felt that the gouged rubber permitted better cooling at the higher tank speeds. Sound-looking wheels had been known to virtually explode, stripping the complete tire from its head to the steel. Rubber track blocks of the training tracks could almost be guaranteed to catch on fire if driven above 20 mph for one hour on a hard surface road!

## Greve and an Unexpected Rum Issue

The LAD moved to Greve on 9 August and stayed there till the 24<sup>th</sup>. Kingsmill started another intensive inspection of all the tanks for battle-worthiness.

On the 18<sup>th</sup>, the LAD dressed their best and then waited in vain for three hours in the rain for an expected visit from Prime Minister Churchill. Although the PM spoke to the regiment, he missed the gallant LAD.<sup>79</sup> Their disappointment was eased somewhat by a double rum issue.

Renewed interest in bridging tanks took up a lot of Capt Kingsmill's time, and the bridging tank was sent into the LAD to have the steering repaired.

## Incisa on the River Arno, Sieci to Vicchio

On the 24<sup>th</sup> Kingsmill moved his LAD to Incisa on the Arno River. He moved the ARVs across the river on the 26<sup>th</sup>. The LAD was heavily reinforced with the attachment of an AWD of 38 men and two more ARVs under the command of Lt Taylor from the brigade workshop.

September was a quiet month for the LAD. "B" Vehicle inspections, leaves to Rome and Florence, and preparation for the coming winter took up their time. Kingsmill recorded that his ration strength was 43. The normal type "C" LAD had a strength of 25 all ranks. The extra men were the attached AWD from the brigade workshop. The LAD stayed at Incisa until 4 September and moved to just outside of Sieci on the main road to Florence where they stayed until the 16<sup>th</sup>, and then to Vicchio about fifteen miles northeast of Florence. Here they remained until 10 October.

The lull in operations enabled the RCEME officers of the brigade to have a luxurious mess dinner at the officers' leave hotel in Florence. Opportunities for such a gathering are normally all too infrequent in a campaign and thus all the more valuable to each participant.

## Rain Heralds Another Winter, Borgo, San Lorenzo, Marradi, November - December 1944

The rainy season turned the harbour area into a sea of soupy mud. Kingsmill recorded in his diary that it took three hours to move the LAD out of the harbour, and all the rest of the day to get to their next site near Borgo San Lorenzo, a distance of five road miles, where they remained until the end of the month.

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<sup>79</sup> WD, 18 August 44. The Calgary Regiment, p 10.

On 1 November, the LAD based itself at Marradi on the road to Faenza where it stayed until 30 December.

### ***The Military Situation – August to December, 1944***

To return to the campaign - the impending landing in Southern France, given the code name Operation Anvil, by three United States and four French divisions from the Allied Armies in Italy, was scheduled for 15 August.

Therefore, regrouping of the remaining forces was required. General Alexander directed the Eighth Army to attack on a narrow front on the Adriatic coast in a surprise thrust, which would swing northwest once the advance passed the mountains. The Fifth US Army, with the 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps were to mount an attack northeastwards from Florence to close with the Eighth Army's "right-hook" in the Bologna area - thus it was hoped to trap the German Tenth Army.

Regrouping commenced on 25 August under a mantle of secrecy. Col Stacey wrote:

"The trans-peninsular migration of the previous spring was now reversed, as the weight of the Eighth Army was swiftly and silently transferred once more to the Adriatic...

"It was part of the Allied deception that the Fifth Army should carry out ostentatious preparations to simulate an imminent offensive of both Armies in the Florence area... Through force of circumstances, Canadian troops had already contributed to the creation of such an impression. At the end of July, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps, after nearly two month's recuperation and training in the Volturno Valley, secretly moved northward to the Foligno area preparatory to re-entering the offensive. On 5 August, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division joined the 13 British Corps in the line at Florence... The men of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division threw off their camouflage, put up their divisional signs, and once more pinned on their distinguishing patches. After three days in the southern outskirts of Florence, the identifying insignia came down again as the division was spirited away... to Perugia.

"Not the least remarkable feature of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps' transfer from the centre of Italy to the Adriatic was the construction... of an alternative track to relieve from tank traffic the only available state highway through the mountains. The... track was completed in seven days, and along the 120 tortuous miles... 280 carriers and 650 tanks of the Canadian Corps, crawled safely through the darkness to their destinations."<sup>80</sup>

By 1 September the Gothic Line had been breached on the Adriatic Sector.

Returning to the central part of Italy, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade supported the US 5<sup>th</sup> Division throughout August along the line of the Arno River. Its three armoured regiments were then assigned to support the formations of the 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps. The enemy slowly retreated during the second week of September to their prepared defences in the Gothic Line. The 13<sup>th</sup> Corps closed up to Borgo San Lorenzo and the line of the Sieve River.

The US Fifth Army opened its campaign on 13 September with the Bologna - Faenza - Forli road as its objective. The main blow was delivered by the 2<sup>nd</sup> US Corps on the left, with the 13<sup>th</sup> British Corps advancing on the right in support.

The Corps advanced on three axis with the 1<sup>st</sup> British Infantry Division supported by the Ontario Regiment on the left, the 6<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division on the right, and the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Division supported by The Calgary Regiment attacking over the trackless water shed in the middle. This terrain

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<sup>80</sup> Stacey, pp 146-147.

was completely unsuited to the employment of armour. The Calgarys, unable to keep up with the infantry, could only assist by delivering neutralizing fire on enemy positions on the dominating heights.

The 13<sup>th</sup> Corps now merely applied constant pressure against the enemy in their support of the advance by the US Fifth Army on the left flank. The Canadian Armoured Brigade saw little action during this period. By the end of September, with a shift of divisional axes, the Calgary tanks advanced along the narrow ravine of the Lamone River towards Faenza.<sup>81</sup> The heavy rains of October changed the ungravelled tank routes into riverlets of impassable mud. The US 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps halted its advance nine miles short of Bologna. The Canadian armour was virtually immobilized in the cold wet weeks that followed. Their effectiveness was reduced to indirect fire support to small infantry probes into the enemy's defences.<sup>82</sup>

The winter offensive in the European campaign made it necessary to fight a winter campaign in Italy, in order to contain as many enemy troops on that front as possible. Although the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps returned to the attack on the night of 1-2 December, The Calgary Regiment remained in a defensive role. The 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division, which it had been supporting, was pinched out by the advance of the Polish Corps across 13 Corps front.<sup>83</sup>

Preparations were underway for a planned armoured thrust in the spring offensive in the Adriatic sector. The regiments of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade started to withdraw. Colonel Stacey's graphic account describes the move:

"On 30 December, its (Calgary) tanks left Marradi on what its diary called "one of the most prolonged, difficult, and dangerous moves this regiment has ever experienced." In the first eighteen miles along the glazed, deeply-rutted road that wound over the mountain divide, tank speedometers (odometers) registered up to 70 miles, "tracks revolved without the tanks moving more than inches." Members of each crew trudged behind the rear exhaust of their tank for warmth.

"Those walking would suddenly stop and hold their breath while tons of steel - with a man inside - slid ponderously, helplessly towards a 300-foot drop. It always gathered speed as it went, like loose wreckage on a ship's deck, but something always held at the last second. A frail bank of frozen mud, a little gravel to grip the tracks, an accidental rock. Then everyone would give a low whistle of relief and walk on.

"Miraculously the caravan of frozen steel reached its destination without mishap. "I consider the feat of your regiment one of the finest it has performed," wrote Brigadier Murphy to the Calgary's Commanding Officer, and I bear in mind in saying so the most outstanding work which it has performed in the face of the enemy from Sicily to the Northern Appennines."<sup>84</sup>

Most of the month of January was spent in the vicinity of Florence, to the great satisfaction of the LAD and men of the regiment. Capt Kingsmill took advantage of the regiment's inactivity to spot-check some of the wheeled vehicles in the supply squadron. The results were quite unsatisfactory, and caused quite a stir in the regiment. A program of "B" vehicle inspection and repair was immediately started.

The installation of azimuth indicators in the tanks that was started in December continued. This device permitted gun laying in azimuth to the nearest mil. The elevation in mils was crudely applied by so many turns of the elevating wheel plus so many notches, the required elevation in mils being determined from a range table - the horizontal being determined by a sight level on the gun. This method of putting on elevation was quick, but not as accurate as putting the required elevation on the sight level itself. The main advantage of the hand wheel method was that it was audible and thus an advantage in the dark.

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid, pp 156-157.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p 158.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, p 158.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, pp 163-164.

## **Florence, Dicomano, Forli to Faenza**

The regiment moved to the Forli area at the end of the month. The LAD followed on 29 January. Their route was through Florence, Dicomano, Forli to Faenza. The LAD set up about 6,000 yards behind the front. That night the town had an air raid and was shelled. Enemy machine gun fire was quite audible.

The LAD strength swelled to 73 early in February with the addition of an AWD from the brigade workshop. ‘This number was beyond the capabilities of the LAD’s cook and arrangements were made to serve “casual” meals at “C” Squadron. The workshop balanced its AWD on the 4<sup>th</sup>, thus relieving the strain on the LAD cook. The LAD continued in this location until 28 February.

## **Canada’s Military Policy**

On the political front, it had long been a cherished hope that the Canadian Forces would fight together and not be separated as they now were. General Sir Arthur Currie had fought for this concept in The First World War with reasonable success and General McNaughton had fought for this concept in The Second World War, as it became known, with no success. As already mentioned, the Canadian Government “considered it likely that when the Sicilian Campaign was over, the division and the Army Tank Brigade would be brought back to England...”

The Canadian Government declared that the national policy was for the Canadian Army Overseas to fight as a formation and direction to this effect was sent to General H.D.G. Crerar who had succeeded General McNaughton as GOC-in-C First Canadian Army on 20 March 1944. This policy was not easy to implement, but now the Allied strategy showed the way. The combined Chiefs of Staff met at Malta and decided to send a number of British Divisions and the Canadian Forces in Italy to Northwest Europe.<sup>85</sup> General McNaughton’s dream was at last to come true.

## **The Move to Belgium**

The Calgary tanks moved out of their positions on 20 February and concentrated across the road from the LAD for last minute checks, adjustments and repairs before being transported to Forli that night. The wheeled vehicles followed two days later “leaving the LAD holding the line at Faenza”.

Early on the morning of 1 March, the LAD moved through Forli, Pontassieve, Florence, Empoli and Pontedera to a harbour ten miles northeast of Livorno (Leghorn). All the vehicles were there and their drivers and crews were busy scraping off the mud and washing the vehicles down with fuel oil.

On the 5<sup>th</sup> the vehicles moved off to load aboard four Landing Ships Tank (LSTs), sailed to Marseille on the 6<sup>th</sup>, disembarked in the morning of the 9<sup>th</sup>, and moved off to their staging camp some eighteen miles north of the city. The long trek to Belgium started at 0300 hrs, 10 March when the convoys moved off to their first of many staging camps. Following the valley of the Rhone, the LAD reached St Rambert d’Albon the same night; Macon on the 11<sup>th</sup>, and then turned northwest towards Paris reaching Les Laumes on the 12<sup>th</sup>, where their Mack recovery truck was finally declared beyond local repair (BLR) and left in camp. They harboured 35 miles south of Paris on the 13<sup>th</sup>; ten miles northeast of Cambrai on the 14<sup>th</sup>. No. 61 LAD crossed into Belgium at 1015 hrs on the 15<sup>th</sup> to their destination at Dottignies, about five miles east of the city of Roubaix, some 600 miles by road from Marseille.

Capt Kingsmill summed it up in his war diary:

“The long trip is now over and the men have enjoyed it. The weather was perfect all the way. The move was made with strict security precautions in order to conceal our identity. Our harbour and billets are hard to believe after a year and a half in Italy. We are sleeping in private homes and

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p 164.

every other place is a pub, although the beer is harmless. The people are very friendly - just like England.”<sup>86</sup>

## Dottignies – New Equipment

The regiment’s holdings of combat and soft-skinned vehicles were brought up to date to conform to the holdings of the other armoured regiments in the theatre. They were issued with new Humber scout cars and Sherman tanks mounting 17-pounder guns. These powerful guns, one per troop, narrowed the firepower gap between the Allies and the Germans. The 17-pounder gun was supposed to be able to defeat the heavy class of German tanks. The PzKpfw V, officially designated in February 1944 by its nickname Panther, was a departure from their customary design and was inspired by the design of the Russian T-34 tank. The PzKpfw VI, officially designated Tiger also on the same date, was a return to traditional German design, but all dimensions were increased. The King Tiger, which appeared in Normandy in August 1944, was a development of the Tiger along the lines of the Panther with thicker armour, a better 88-mm gun, and vastly improved protection because of better sloping of the majority of the plates. The King Tiger was essentially a defensive tank, or was used to break through strong lines of defence. See Table 1 for a comparison of Allied, Russian T-34, and German tanks.

The regiment left for the ranges, a distance of some 70 miles, for gunnery training with their new 17-pounder-equipped tanks. Another innovation was the practice of supplementing the tanks’ armour with track welded to the sides and front. This practice was a source of great controversy, which may best be summed as follows:

Advantages:

- Additional protection for at least one hit.
- Acted like spaced armour against shaped charges.

Disadvantages:

- Greatly increased the weight, which directly affected the performance (bhp/ton ratio).
- Overloaded the volute springs in the suspension - particularly those in the two front stations.
- Flying debris from a frontal hit decapitated many a crew commander.

The shaped charges of the Panzerfaust, a 44-mm recoilless anti-tank grenade launcher, capable of penetrating 200 mm (or 7.9 inches) of armour at a 30-yard range, and the Raketenpanzerbüchse of 88-mm calibre, could be defeated by hanging a curtain of logs on the sides of the tank. The first shot admittedly would clean off the logs, leaving the tank vulnerable to a second shot.

The generally accepted practice was to weld extra track on the front and sides, and the LAD took on the task and were busy until 10 April when the tanks moved to Germany. The wheeled vehicles and the light or reconnaissance tanks moved out of Dottignies on the 7<sup>th</sup>. The first concentration area was in the Reichwald Forest some 195 miles from their Belgian harbour area. Kingsmill’s men immediately went back to work welding extra track on the tanks.

It is practically impossible to carry the extra tons of steel required when such a program is interrupted by a move, and Kingsmill had to send back to Belgium for more track.

## The Military Situation in Europe - April 1945

The military situation at the time of the Calgary’s introduction to combat in North West Europe was:

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<sup>86</sup> WD, 15 Mar 45.

“The German commanders could do little to interfere with the development of the Allied strategy. Germany was disintegrating...

“By the beginning of April, a situation was developing which resembled that after the Battle of Normandy. The enemy’s remaining reserves having been consumed in the struggle west of the Rhine, the Allied armies broke out of the bridgehead that they had established on the eastern bank, and drove deep into German territory... The enemy now had no Rhine and no Siegfried Line to fall back upon, nor had he the manpower, the industrial resources, or the communication facilities to rebuild his shattered armies a second time. And in the east the Russians were approaching Vienna, and were almost ready to advance over the Oder against Berlin itself.<sup>87</sup>”

The Canadian Army was directed on 28 March “to open up the supply route to the north through Arnhem, and then to operate to clear Northeast Holland, the coastal belt eastwards to the Elbe, and West Holland.”<sup>88</sup>

### **Back into Combat - Arnhem, Ede, Zetten and Opheusden**

On 12 April, the Calgary’s 75 mm tanks moved north of Bommel on the “Island” to fire their guns in a “Pepperpot” in support of the assault across the Ijssel River by the 49<sup>th</sup> West Riding Division and The Ontario Regiment. The shoot lasted until the fall of Arnhem on the 14<sup>th</sup>. The LAD set up at Lent (just across the De Waal from Nijmegen) on the 13<sup>th</sup>, continuing their task of welding tracks on tanks. The regiment less “B” Squadron moved into Arnhem on the 16<sup>th</sup>, taking with them the new Stuart M5A1 reconnaissance tanks powered with twin Cadillac engines that arrived the day before, and advanced with the 49<sup>th</sup> (WR) Division along the road to Ede about 11½ miles to the northwest. “B” Squadron moved near Zetten, about 8½ miles north east of Lent on the “Island” in support of the 1<sup>st</sup> Belgian Infantry Brigade.<sup>89</sup> Ede fell on the 17<sup>th</sup>, the regiment losing one tank. Fortunately it wasn’t badly damaged and was sent to AWD in Arnhem for repair. These Squadrons returned to the “Island” on the 18<sup>th</sup>, close to Nijmegen.

In the meantime, the Belgians and “B” Squadron captured and held Opheusden in the narrow section of the island. This was The Calgary’s last direct contact with the enemy for a “cease aggressive action” order was received on the 19<sup>th</sup> and a “cease any fire except in direct defence” order was received on the 26<sup>th</sup>.

Capt Kingsmill’s men finished welding extra track on the regiment’s tanks on the 28<sup>th</sup> and turned their attention to a large backlog of trailers and ovens the regiment had been asking for.

### **Andelst Station, VE Day, Buren, Driebergen and Franeker**

The LAD moved on the 30<sup>th</sup> to the railway station at the junction of the railway line and the Zetten Andelst road known as Andelst Station. The long awaited news of German capitulation eventually reached General Crerar at 8:35 p.m. on 4 May by an announcement on the BBC followed immediately by a signal from HQ 21 Army Group. The BBC announcement touched off a spontaneous celebration and a rum issue for all the men in the regiment and the LAD.

The 8<sup>th</sup>, VE Day, dawned warm and cloudy and was a day of celebration. Inspections increased with a vengeance as part of the preparations of the eventual turning in of all the technical equipments.

The regiment and the LAD moved again, this time to a brickyard about a mile southwest of Buren for the purpose of rounding up German soldiers in the area. On the 30<sup>th</sup> they again moved to the village of

<sup>87</sup> Stacey, p 261.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p 260.

<sup>89</sup> The Calgary Regiment, p 12.

Driebergen, seven miles slightly south and to the east of Utrecht. The LAD were given two houses formerly occupied by the Germans. Here they remained until 28 June, continuing inspections of equipment and catching up on foot drill in preparation for various parades. All tank guns were thoroughly cleaned, measured, and put in a state of preservation before the tanks were turned in. The last 42 tanks left for the depot in Nijmegen on the 19<sup>th</sup> - and without regret.

Capt Kingsmill and his men of 61 LAD made one more move as a unit on 28 June to Franeker about seven miles east of Harlingen on the North Sea. Here they moved into a former German Barracks and set up their workshop in a sugar factory. Here they celebrated the second Dominion Day since their departure from Gourock on the *Cameronia* on 1 July 1943. The month was spent in relaxation - sailing at Harlingen and Sneek, cruising and fishing in the canals, and preparing for the disbandment of the unit. At last all arrangements were made, the farewells said and the LAD moved to Leeuwarden where the remaining personnel and equipment were absorbed by 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop on 30 July 1945.

RHH

7 January 1962



**Annex A**  
**The Award of The Military Cross to**  
**Captain Hugh Anthony Gault Kingsmill,**  
**Officer Commanding, 61 Light Aid Detachment, RCEME,**  
**attached to 14 Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment).**

From an original idea that a Bailey bridge could be launched across a river from the backs of tanks, Captain Kingsmill was instrumental in the development and construction of such a bridge used during the 12 May 1944 attack across the Gari River on the Gustav Line (Map Ref 863145). As a result of many rehearsals and careful preparation, the bridge framework was assembled in daylight under heavy enemy concentrations. Then, at once, under direct observation and subject to intense mortar and machine gun fire Captain Kingsmill, with no thought for his own safety, coolly walked backwards over open ground a distance of 500 yards in front of the tank-borne bridge. He directed it successfully into place at the first attempt. Wounded by an exploding shell, he dauntlessly remained at the river crossing during the final securing of the span. When an enemy counterattack developed from the opposite side of the river in a effort to dislodge the bridge, he climbed inside one of the two supporting tanks, methodically proceeding to machine gun the German fire positions. Determined to stem the attack he called for and received artillery support. Not until the counterattack was beaten off and the bridge was firmly in place did Captain Kingsmill consider leaving to have his wounds attended. His courage and determination were at all times beyond praise. His most gallant action contributed directly in the smashing of the Gustav Line.

Canada Gazette No 39 Vol 78, 23 September 1944 CARO 5063, 23 September 44

## **Annex B**

### **Extracts from the 61 LAD War Diary**

27 April 1944. We have been very busy all day working on this special tank. A platoon from the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division has moved in beside us in conjunction with the above tank. They are engineers and are constructing a bridge.

28 April 1944. We are very busy with the special tank. The workshop has lent us a KL Lorry for the day and Tank Troops Workshop also lent us a KL trailer for the afternoon. It is coming along nicely but it is not yet finished.

29 April 1944. We tried out our special tank at 1700 hrs and although we had a bit of a disaster I feel sure that we can modify this secret weapon and make it work. The men have worked very hard and deserve a lot of credit for its success.

30 April 1944. Had another try out with the special tank. Both the Colonel and DADME are quite pleased with it. It still requires a few modifications before it is ready for official trial.

1 May 1944. We had another trial with our bridge-laying tank. This time we actually laid a bridge. The Brigadier was there, but did not stay long enough to comment on it.

2 May 1944. We had another trial with the bridge-laying tank today. I am fast learning the limitations and requirements of the bridge tank for a successful operation. The GOC 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Div is coming tomorrow to see us lay a bridge.

3 May 1944. We put on a demonstration of the bridge laying for Maj-Gen Russel the GOC 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division. The demonstration was a success and it looks as if I will be required to take the thing into action.'

5 May 1944. We were warned to expect the GOC 8<sup>th</sup> Army this morning. We got ready and he didn't show up. I went on a recce with the R. E. Officer I am working with to pick a place to launch our bridge. It was very successful, although I wore myself out from walking. The higher levels want us to have a spare bridging tank prepared.

7 May 1944. Things seemed to be at a standstill all morning and most of the afternoon. I went to workshop and laid on the construction of another bridging tank, to be completed on the morning of the 9<sup>th</sup>.

8 May 1944. We were going to have the final launching of the bridge tonight but the R.E. platoon was recalled to its Company.

9 May 1944. The 15-cwt [truck] went to Brigade today and was netted in on a REME frequency.

10 May 1944. Recovery tanks and regiment tanks moved out at 2000 hrs and went to the forward staging area. Capt Kingsmill and one driver-operator also went with the tanks.

11 May 1944. Zero hour was at 2300 hrs and our bridging tanks were immediately pushed across the Rapido (sic) Gari.

14 May 1944. LAD moved out at 1230 hrs and into harbour just this side of the river at MR 908152 SH 160-11 NE. Capt MacEachern from the brigade workshop is taking Capt Kingsmill's place. The recovery tanks are very busy recovering brewed and mined tanks from along the river.

15 May 1944. The Kingsmill bridge is still standing despite all the attempts of the enemy to knock it out by shell and bomb. It is the only bridge, which was put across on the night of the operation that is still standing without the continuous work of rebuilding by Canadian and Indian Engineers.

16 May 1944. Capt Kingsmill returned from hospital, but he just stayed with the unit overnight and then went to the brigade workshop where he will rest up and complete the full plans for the bridge laying tanks.

3 June 1944. Capt MacEachern was cross-posted to the workshop and Capt Kingsmill returned to the LAD. This regiment was not as fortunate as the other two regiments. It had a tough break from the beginning. The fog and smoke screen were so intense that it was next to impossible to see to work. It was quite late when the bridge was finally across, but once completed the tanks made good progress in getting at the enemy.

12 June 1944. Capt Kingsmill and the driver of the bridging tank were wounded by shrapnel. Capt Kingsmill went to hospital, but the driver was dressed by the regimental aid post and returned to the regiment.

13 June 1944. The remainder of the LAD moved out at 0900 hrs and travelled 15 miles towards Cassino.

## **Annex C**

### ***Extract from History of the Royal Canadian Engineers***

(Unpublished at time of this writing 14 December 1961)  
Volume 11, 1936 – 1946, Chapter X

Italy in 1944: From the Gari to Florence

The Liri Valley

On the night of 11/12 May 1944, as the Allied Air Forces isolated the battlefield in the culmination of almost two months of disruptive bombing, the Fifth and Eighth Armies attacked the Gustav Line behind a heavy barrage. On the XIII Corps front, assault boats pushed out into the swift water before midnight, carrying the forward brigades of the British 4<sup>th</sup> and the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Divisions. During the night, four rafts went into operation and two bridges were put across the river. Both bridges were on the Indian Division's front: the 4<sup>th</sup> Division's bridgehead was not deep enough to permit construction that night.

The most northerly bridge was "Oxford" Bridge, a regularly-launched Bailey. The other bridge, downstream, was a 100-foot double-single class 30, tank-launched Bailey called "Plymouth" Bridge.<sup>90</sup> It was the first of its type built in the field and it was the particular responsibility of Captain H.A.G. Kingsmill, 61<sup>st</sup> LAD, ... attached to the 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment). Kingsmill had been assigned, in April, to oversee the modification of the tanks required. He and his men ran launching tests in the Volturno Valley, near Venafro, in collaboration with a platoon of the 69<sup>th</sup> Field Company....

On 5 May, the RCEME officer and the IE platoon officer went on a reconnaissance together to select a launching site. During the night 11/12 the bridge was built well behind the River. It rested on launching rollers mounted on the forward tank, from which the turret had been removed quite illegally,<sup>91</sup> and was supported by a bracket on the front of the rear tank... both tanks being Sherman's of The Calgary Regiment. When the bridge trundled forward Kingsmill went along to direct the launching operation which, despite a number of mishaps (one of which resulted in a three-hour delay when the front tank bogged in soft ground) was accomplished by 0930 hours on the 12<sup>th</sup>. He was wounded, but stayed on the job to win the Military Cross. Two sappers of the 69<sup>th</sup> Sappers and Miners each received the Military Medal. It is unlikely that another type of bridge could have been used at this point; there were enemy

<sup>90</sup> Reports vary - the term single-double is used and the War Diary of the 14<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (12 May) says 80-foot, class 30. The Chief Engineer recalls it as an 80-foot bridge. (p 402 Vol 11) mentions a 100-foot span. The RE Reconnaissance Pocket Book, 1944, gives a 100-foot double-single bridge as class 30, 80-foot as class 40. A photograph of this tank-launched bridge has not been located.

Capt Kingsmill told me 13 Dec 61 that a photograph was not taken of his equipment. After each rehearsal the bridge was dismantled for security reasons and when the time came to use it crossing the Gari there was not a thought given to it. RHH

<sup>91</sup> Information from Lieut-Colonel CH Neroutsos, DSO, The Calgary Regiment, 19 February 1943. HQS 1453-21-6 (Vol 2).

positions as close as 250 yards. The bridge remained in use for many days, until the approaches became too soft.

## Appendix 1 to Annex C

Letter from Brenton S Brown to Major WA McDill Brenton S Brown 6062 Adera Street, Vancouver, B.C. January 10, 1961.

Dear Bill:

In answer to your question, I had nothing to do with the Plymouth Bridge in any way, shape or form. As you say, all this goes a way back, but my recollection is somewhat as follows. It seemed that in those days just about everyone was figuring out various schemes to launch a Bailey bridge with tanks. I believe I first read somewhere about the Plymouth Bridge and eventually saw it. Incidentally, I trust I am right in thinking that the Plymouth Bridge was a piece of Bailey, mounted on rollers on the forward tank and attached to the rear tank.

It is my recollection that in seeing it, I thought the idea of using Bailey rollers on the forward tank was a good idea, but thought that the rest of it was impracticable for most situations, particularly as the launching called for the forward tank to go down the bank, which in so many cases would have been impossible, and the abrupt type of launching would have been most inefficient and not usable for any size of bridge. I think I swiped the roller idea, using a better type of mount for the forward tank with additional rollers on the nose of the forward tank. This, plus the “turn-up” tail and derrick device on the rear tank, enabled the bridge to be first of all loaded by the tanks themselves without other assistance, permitting precise launching as would a normal Bailey Bridge be launched and finally, permitting recovery of both tanks. As I recall, these were the specifications that appeared to be necessary to me in order to make the thing practical.

As to further recollection, I recall quite a few demonstration launchings, but only one actual operational launching. This was shortly before we left Italy and were up near the town of Roussi. This was a fairly peaceful event as there was not much opposition in the area.

One thing sticks out in my mind in regard to this operational launching. This monstrous device was going along the bridge road, a rather narrow and winding one, and I was probably with some pride walking along with my brain child. We came around a corner and there was an Italian farm house with an old Italian out in front in the tradition-al black hat and coat. When he saw this contraption lumbering up the road, the old boy burst into laughter and kept on laughing as we went by. This was a most deflating experience, but after all, I guess he was right.

All best wishes on the “Corps History” which is a real undertaking. While I see a lot of the old faces from time to time, I confess that in the last few years I have not been around too much and I particularly refer to the M.E.A.C. I seem to have got busy on a few other things, but I do intend to show up more often in the future.

It was kind of Brigadier Connelly to credit me with a couple of bridges, but the right answer is that it was only most of one.

Yours sincerely,

Brent

Major W. A. McDill, RCE,  
Historia Section (G. S. )  
Army Headquarters,  
OTTAWA, Canada.

## **Annex D**

### **Extract from *The History of The Corps of Royal Engineers***

Volume IX, Pages 50-51

W and J Mackay and Co Ltd, Chatham, England

This bridge “Plymouth” was the first Bailey assault bridge built in the field, and some account of its construction is, therefore, of interest. The bridge, a single-double Bailey 100 ft long, was carried forward on two Sherman tanks. It was supported on the front tank by rollers, so that when this tank reached the bridging gap the bridge could be launched by the rear tank pushing it. To complete launching both tanks moved forward, the one in front descending into the gap. There was delay in starting the work owing to the difficulty of finding the selected site in the mist and smoke, and eventually a new site was chosen, which had a 70-foot water gap and 100-foot bridging gap. The lorries arrived at the assembly point at 12.15 a.m. and the tanks at 5 a.m. By 9.15 a.m. the approach ramp had been completed and the bridge assembled and mounted on the tanks. The launching was completed at 9.30 a.m., though the front tank was lost. It toppled into the river and was completely submerged, the driver just managing to escape. By this time the mist had dispersed and the site came under heavy fire. In an effort to launch the landing ramp, the tank officer and one of the crew were wounded, and three sappers killed and five wounded. An improvised ramp was made and tanks were able to cross at 10.30 a.m.

## **Annex E**

### **Extract from *The Indian Engineers, 1939-47***

“Plymouth” bridge was a triumph of mechanical improvisation, the result of collaboration between 69 Field Company and the Canadian Engineers. Built and carried on a tank, with another to push, it was run into place at high speed. With these two bridges as supply routes, the infantry west of the Gari were saved from probable defeat. Work was carried out in smoke and thick mist, but when the mist cleared, the shelling became very severe and bulldozing was dangerously unpleasant. “Plymouth” bridge soon became restricted in use, but at “Cardiff” the prolonged efforts of 7 Field Company were at last successful, and despite further shelling this bridge was able to ease the congestion of traffic. Fierce fighting drove the enemy back, and after the capture of San Angelo, “London” Bridge, built by the Corps Sappers, was taken over. The 8<sup>th</sup> Divisional Engineers then did road maintenance and mine clearance in and around Cassino. Previously, Jemadar Sher Ali of 69 Field Company had won the MC in rafting operations, and now, at the “Oxford” bridge site, Havildar Balkavan Singh of 66 Field Company won the MM and at “Plymouth” bridge Naik Shazada Khan and Sapper Ghosi Khan of the same Company gained similar awards. Shelling caused many casualties, particularly in 66 Field Company while doing maintenance work on the “Oxford” and “Cardiff” bridges, and in 7 Field Company also as the 8<sup>th</sup> Indian Division moved forward to the Liri River, The Battle of Cassino, however, was won, and the bridges began to leap-frog with the Field Companies in close support.

Lt-Col E.W.C. Sandes, Kirkee, India

## **Annex F**

### **List of officers and men who served in or were attached to 61 LAD**

This is based on the available copies of the Part II Orders found in the War Diaries, and is incomplete.

- a - Attached (officers); attached men have no symbols after their names.
- c - Commanded the LAD.
- d - Served with the LAD at its disbandment in August 1945.
- f - Served with the LAD when it disembarked in France, 9 March 1945.
- r - Served with the LAD when it became RCEME 15 May 1944.
- s - Served with the LAD in Sicily (21 July 1943).
- \* - Wounded

#### **Officers**

Capt WS Hunt	(c)	30 August 1941 to 1 September 1942
Capt RL Bartlett	(c)	2 September 1942 to 6 January 1943
Capt J Edmond	(c s) *	11 January 1943 to 6 August 1943
Capt WD Schofield	(c)	19 August 1943 to 16 December 1943
Capt HAG Kingsmill MC	(c f d) *	17 December 1943 to 12 May 1944
Capt EK McEachern	(c r)	14 May 1944 to 3 June 1944
Capt HAG Kingsmill MC	(c f d) *	4 June 1944 to 23 July 1945
Lt CF Starr	(a)	3 September 1943 to 4 September 1943
Capt L Wardman	(a)	9 February 1945 to 12 February 1945
Lt H Taylor	(a)	12 February 1945 to ?

#### **Other Ranks**

K 90050	S/Sgt	Anderson	A	
B 94841	S/Sgt	Atchison	WJ	(f)
H 67252	Cpl	Atkinson	JF	(rs)
B 56834	Cfn	Barnard	RH	(dfrs)*
G 18152	Cfn	Barton	OB	(frs)
C 36885	Cfn	Bedore	CB	(dfrs)
D 117181	Cfn	Belair	H	
A 59496	L/Cpl	Bell	GF	(dfrs)
M 40811	S/Sgt	Berg	SF	
D 124400	Cfn	Bigelow	LV	
B 37595	Cfn	Breckenridge	R	(r)
K 71031	Cfn	Brisco	RW	
B 52826	Cfn	Brown	RA	

M 62416	L/Cpl	Burroughs	WJ	
C 30494	Cfn	Clemens	BA	
A 57468	Cfn	Corbin	JFH	
B 86952	Cfn	Crawford	AE	
L 41321	Cfn	Cripps	FD	
C 94280	Cfn	Cummings	KR	
B 2672	S/Sgt	Davies	CD	
D 117495	Cfn	Davies	H	(dfrs)
G 63377	Cfn	Dawson	DA	
P 35143	WO 2	Dawson	JW	
M 65125	Cpl	Delainey	MJ	
G 12169	Cfn	Dick	JE	(r)
D 117444	Cpl	Donahue	G	(s)
G 45034	L/Cpl	Dunn	KD	
A 21745	Cfn	Ebejer	JD	
H 102957	Cfn	Freeman	DC	
C 15749	Cfn	Foley	JJ	
K 31525	S/Sgt	Galech	W	
II 64996	Cfn	Gledhill	J	
B 68279	Cfn	Golden	EM	
K 52650	Cfn	Gooding	LM	
H 95500	Cfn	Gould	RW	(df)
M103026	Cfn	Graham	GM	(dfr)
K 42302	Cfn	Green	CD	
K 75533	Cfn	Green	TH	
A 49992	Cfn	Greentree	AA	(rs)
K 24141	Sgt	Guppy	AW	
A 58080	Cfn	Hall	GH	
H 37158	S/Sgt	Harcus	H	(a)
M 50434	S/Sgt	Hart	LA	(df)

D 26107	Cpl	Hawkes	CA	(s)
K 16240	Cfn	Hayden	W	
M 67356	Cfn	Hebert	CE	(s)
D 82539	Sgt	Hobson	A	
C 5201	Cfn	Horn	G	
M 100196	Cfn	Hunt	JC	
C 36501	S/Sgt	Jackson	LJ	(a)
B 55422	Cfn	Jardine	DB	(dfr)
L 19335	Cfn	Jermyn	JR	(dfrs)
F 89306	Cfn	Johnston	JT	
D 117206	Cfn	Kane	W	(dfrs)
A 60092	Cfn	Kenny	RS	
H 60174	S/Sgt	Kienitz	EG	(s)
H 66766	Cfn	Kneeshaw	HW	(df)
C 37837	Cfn	Lamirande	OW	
A 59322	Cfn	Lappan	M	
B 39857	Cfn	Larivee	T	(d)
C 874	S/Sgt	Larson	RC	
H 37150	S/Sgt	LeClair	HT	(dfr)
D 117201	L/Cpl	LeGault	R	(dfrs)
H 36784	L/Cpl	Leggett	FT	(frs)
B 75816	Cfn	Leys	JG	
C 37837	Cfn	Lomirenad	OW	
H 63530	Cfn	Lowing	RR	
F 5271	Cfn	MacDonald	CS	
D 117044	WO 2	MacKay	SJ	(dfrs)
K 75541	Cfn	Martin	HR	
D 166288	Cfn	Mayoff	M	(dfrs)
B 130193	Cfn	McCallum	JD	
C 36584	Cpl	McDonald	AC	(dfr)



A 28622	Cfn	McDonald	NK	
D 117234	Cpl	Metivier	R	(s)
K 42214	Cfn	Moore	WH	
C 874	WO 2	Partington	A	
G 45040	Cpl	Peacock	RS	
D 117418	Cfn	Piercy	WT	(dfrs)
D 114777	Cfn	Pominville	PE	
A 55434	Cfn	Poole	GW	
A 59837	Cfn	Roberts	CA	
M 65144	Cfn	Rodewoldt	GH	
A 29571	Cfn	Rolls	AL	
M 66222	Cfn	Rude	CW	
M 50473	Cfn	Simpson	JJ	
B 36886	S/Sgt	Slade	LD	(s)
B 83512	Cfn	Smith	FS	
D 135850	Cfn	Smith	PL	(dfrs)
F 89999	Cfn	Stubbert	WL	
D 166303	Cfn	Sztafirny	S	(dfr)
D 166236	Cfn	Teale	AR	(f)
D 117055	Cfn	Thomas	J	
D 117777	Cfn	Tominville	A	
D 117296	Cfn	Turpin	JAE	
D 117296	Cfn	Turtan	RE	
B 85024	Cfn	Ward	EG	
H 20794	Cfn	Wery	JC	(dfrs)
C 34630	Cfn	White	RW	(s)
M 65400	Cfn	Wood	EH	(dfr)
U 2136	Cfn	Wright	AW	
A 59326	Cfn	Young	WR	

Table 1 - Comparison of the Principle Allied, Russian T 34 and German Tanks

	Allied					Russian	German			
	Stuart V	Sherman		Crusader	Churchill		Panther		Tiger	King Tiger
	M3A3	M4A4	VC M4A4	MK III	MK VII	T34(76)A	PzKpfw V “G”	PzKpfw IV	PzKpfw VI “E”	PzKpfw VI “B”
Gun	37-mm	75-mm	17-pr	6-pr	75-mm	76.2-mm	75-mm	75-mm	88-mm	88-mm
Armour Thickness (not corrected for slope)										
Front	1.125 in	2 in	2 in	1.75 in		1.77 in				
Driver’s Front Plate				2 in	6 in	1.77 in	2.36 in		4 in	
Glacis Plate	The controlled differential and the final drive protect this area.			1.75 in	5.5 in	1.77 in	1 in	3.15 in	2.44 in	5.9 in
Nose Plate							2.36 in	2.36 in	4 in	
Lower Nose Plate									2.44 in	4 in
Side	1 in	1.5 in	1.5 in	1.75 in	3.75 in	1.57-1.77 in	1.18 in	1.58 in	3.23 in	3.15 in
Turret Front	1.5 in	3 in	2 in	2 in	6 in	1.77 (+)	1.58 in	4.34 in	4 in	7.1 in
Turret Sides	1.25 in	2 in	2 in	0.9 in	3.75 in	1.77 in	1.18 in	1.77 in	3.23 in	3.15 in
Weight	15.5 ton	35 ton	39 ton	22 ton	44 ton	29 ton	26 ton	50 ton	62.75 ton	75 ton
Crew	4	5	5	3	5	4	5	5	5	5
Length (Ex Gun)	16.5 ft	19 ft 11 in	19 ft 11 in	20 ft 8 in	24 ft 2 in	19 ft 11 in	19 ft 4 in	22 ft	20 ft 8 in	23 ft 10 in
Width	8 ft 4 in	8 ft 7 in	8 ft 7 in	8 ft 9 in	10 ft 11 in	9 ft 10 in	9 ft 7 in	10 ft 9.5 in	12 ft 3 in	11 ft 11 in
Height	8 ft 5 in	8 ft 10 in	8 ft 10 in	7 ft 4 in	9 ft	7 ft 9 in	8 ft 6 in	9 ft 4 in	9 ft 5 in	10 ft 2 in
Trench Crossing	6 ft	6 ft	6 ft	10 ft	?	9 ft 10 in	9 ft	10 ft	10 ft	?
Road Speed	25-30 mph	16-18 mph	16-18 mph	?	?	?	20 mph	20 mph	15 mph	24 mph
Cross Country Speed	12-18 mph	8-12 mph	8-12 mph	?	?	?	10-15 mph	15 mph	5-10 mph	9-10 mph
Maximum Speed	36 mph	25 mph	25 mph	37.5 mph	12.5 mph	33.5 mph	25 mph	35 mph	25 mph	26 mph
Road Range	135 miles	100 miles	100 miles	110 miles	94 miles	280 miles	130 miles	124 miles	87 miles	106 miles
Cross Country Range	81 miles	60 miles	60 miles	?	?	?	80 miles	62 miles	53 miles	74 miles
Power/Weight Ratio	15.6 bhp/ton	11.4 bhp/ton	10.2 bhp/ton	15.7 bhp/ton	12.8 bhp/ton	17.3 bhp/ton	11.4 bhp/ton	13.8 bhp/ton	11 bhp/ton	7.9 bhp/ton

The data in the above table was compiled from the following sources:

Vehicle Data Book, Canadian Army Overseas, Dec 1944.

TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces, War Department (USA) 15 March 1945.

AFV Recognition Handbook, The War Office (UK) December 1952.

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Note: The table has been checked for errors in conversion and translation. It is hoped that they are at a minimum. RHH

## **131 Light Aid Detachment, RCEME attached to 1 Canadian Rocket Battery, RCA**

*Editors note: This was not part of Colonel Hodgson's history.*

*I found it in an artillery file at DHH and thought this would be a good home for it.*

This unit was formed as 127 LAD "Type 'F' LAD" on 19 January 1945, on a field return basis. The first personnel were posted to the unit on 25 January were Lieutenant W.N. Tripp (OC), Armament S/Sgt Dekelver, Armourer Sgt McClatchey, Cpl Mackin, L/Cpl McPherson, Craftsmen Barker, Ryan, Wall and Smith. Our original equipment was one Diamond T Medium breakdown, one 3-ton stores lorry, one 60-cwt truck, one Willy's jeep and three 10-cwt trailers.

With this equipment, a handful of scrounged hand tools and all the good wishes of First Canadian Army Troops Workshop, the LAD set out for Hilvarenbeek camp, the home of the Rocket Battery, to commence work under the able direction of Lieut. Tripp. The 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Rocket Battery then had some 78 "B" vehicles, 100 artillery instruments of various sorts, and 12 Meyer-Dunford rocket projectors. Our first survey of this equipment showed that the vehicles were in poor condition and the projectors, due to bad design, were a source of continuous trouble. We went to work immediately. We were at a disadvantage in that our men frequently had jobs entirely new to them, few of us having seen a projector before.

We soon developed a plan of action for our job, after watching the operation of the Rocket Battery itself in a few shoots on 3 February 1945. This plan was to have two electricians on the gun site during firing operations, while Lt. Tripp and AQMS Dekelver were in the rear noting the operation of the projectors. After operations, these four discussed their observations, suggesting modifications and improvements. In this way many faults were brought to light and remedied before they could become serious. Two War Office representatives, Lt-Cols Benning and Armitage, gave us invaluable assistance. The projectors were put in 100% firing order.

### **7 February to 9 March 1945**

The LAD saw field action from 7 February to 9 March, often under most adverse conditions. At several places we had to pass through our own forward defense lines in order to reach our destination. We were frequently under enemy fire both from mortar and aircraft. On one occasion, a Jerry mortar bomb exploded close to our prized, new "Tilling Stevens" 30-barrel projector, our only one, several pieces of shrapnel piercing two barrels. This occurred at 0730 hours and by 1700 hours the same day, the damaged barrels had been removed, new ones (taken from a N/S Meyer-Dunford projector) altered, cut to proper length and installed and the projector was back in action. During this period our breakdown was called out on an average of four nights per week, each job taking up to five hours. This recovery work was done on vehicles from other units than the Rocket Battery and frequently included 10-ton Macks and several flame-throwing carriers.

No major repairs were attempted by the LAD except when absolutely necessary due to an accident, as it involved a 125-mile round trip to the workshop in Tilburg. We used plenty of ingenuity and did the best we knew. Up to 9 March we had only 148 jobs, of which only 8 vehicles were evacuated out of a total of 87 and one projector out of a total of 23. It should be stressed that this unit was greatly hampered by the lack of a suitable battery charger and an arc welder, both of which are essential for servicing rocket batteries. Each projector has two 6-volt batteries in its firing mechanism, which must be kept up to full charge for the most efficient operation of the mechanism. Providence came to our aid in the finding of a 6.5 Kw arc welder (double-operator), which was modified by the LAD into a combination welder and battery charger capable of handling 100 six-volt batteries at one time. Up to 9 March we charged 190 batteries of all types and sizes found in a unit like this.

## **9-31 March 1945**

Our complement is now 1 officer and 15 other ranks including 1 armourer sergeant whom we are not able to find much work for. We inspected all the unit vehicles once a month and this policy proved very sound. There were 184 jobs including 80 vehicles and of these 20 were evacuated to the workshop and 12 projectors which were repaired and modified on the basis of our previous observations. For example, the firing switches were mounted on pressed paper panels, which warped badly in poor weather. We replaced the paper panel with a panel of German bakelite which proved highly satisfactory. We charged 70 batteries in this period.

The battery received twenty-four new Tilling-Stevens projectors, which were definitely superior to the Meyer-Dunfords, particularly in the firing circuits. [The TS projectors were the formal production launchers, not the “operational trials” equipments – ed]. These we inspected and modified. This included bracing the back plate to eliminate warping, moving the dial sight bracket up to allow 360 degrees of sight, installing dust covers on the elevating gears and installing a projection rail for the elevating screw to prevent it from bending when the projector was being loaded. Between 13 and 20 March we inspected 37 vehicles, 211 projectors and 65 small arms and machine guns.

The battery saw action again on 20 March. We were unable to accompany them but sent 1 MV fitter, 1 electrician and a small stock of parts for running repairs. At this time the LAD was engaged in readying 12 projectors, 12 gun tractors and fifteen 60-cwts for action with another rocket battery which needed them in a hurry. Our name has now been changed to 131 LAD as of 31 March 1945.

## **1-30 April 1945**

We completed 35 projector jobs, mainly modifications to give greater stability when firing. Fifteen Bedford Light Anti-aircraft Tractors were also modified to enable them to carry one salvo of rockets per truck. This required doors on the back and the removing of the spare barrel rack, which also gave the gun-crew more room. We repaired 40 vehicles, only 8 being evacuated to workshops. Our inspection plan is showing rich dividends already. Our jobs for April totaled 107, ranging from the manufacture of a pancake griddle to the complete overhaul of old and nearly worn out Meyer-Dunford projectors. Our battery charging tapered off to 50 for the month, the battery having acquired a small 2360-32 volt Onan charger of their own.

We had two moves for operations, one of which was cancelled after a journey of 75 miles to the intended scene of action. The LAD, incidentally, had to be prepared to move on twenty minutes notice all the time. During the latter part of the month we accumulated a 2.5-Kva 220-volt AC generator all combined on the one chassis - a trailer we made from a smashed gun tractor chassis - and all powered by a Ford V8 which took care of the whole load very nicely at 1800 RPM's.

## **1-31 May 1945**

The beginning of May found us in the bush with no cover under which to work. Every day we had less work to do, due greatly to our efforts of the preceding three months. We moved to Enschede on the 9th May and for the first time were able to procure a decent building to work in. We made good use of it as the equipment was now rolling back from the front after the German collapse. We called each projector vehicle and instrument in as soon as they arrived for a routine check and found them in very good shape. Total jobs for the month dropped to 75. Our work policy had paid off.

On 14 May we received the sad news from Mr. Tripp, who was in England on leave, that he was in the hospital and did not expect to return to us. At this time we were working on modifying a Tilling-Stevens for greater ease in handling. Originally this projector, weighing 2900 pounds, had to be lifted bodily onto its front pad. By 24 May we had our modification completed and put through its trials. It cut the time of

going into action by over one-half and also the coming out of action by the same amount. Several officers from the Canadian Experimental Branch came down to see our prize model and expressed their satisfaction. The modification was to cut two inches out of frame (rear over-hang) allowing the projector to sit back farther in its action position. This raised the front support permitting the pad to be placed under the elevating support with ease. Thus with this modification, the projector is similar to an ordinary two-wheel trailer in handling. On 30 May, Lieutenant M.B. Crerar arrived as replacement officer for Lieutenant Tripp.

### **1-21 June 1945**

All equipment has been checked and classified and work has almost come to a standstill. The battery turned 37 gun tractors and 24 projectors into the demobilization vehicle park on 13 June. Of this total two were class 3, seven class 2 and twenty-eight class 1. This shows the 100% improvement in the vehicles over their original condition. The OC of the Battery was very pleased with the classification and expressed his surprise at the great change in mechanical condition of these vehicles.

We had worked like Trojans to get the vehicles in this condition. Our activity report for the week ending 15 June 1945 reads like a fairy-tale. All instruments packed, greased and waterproofed, 100 vehicles classified (2 class 3, 18 class 2, 80 class 1) and 24 projectors classified (all class 1).

Apart from this one feverish week and two moves - Enschede to Demobilization Vehicle Park. Park to Utrecht - the month was spent largely in sports and recreation. We knew that disbandment was in the offing and it was a case of waiting for the axe to fall, as it were. According to our latest information the LAD, after 5 months of hard work under all conditions, will be "Kaput" on 21 June. Thus ends the story of the brief and hectic life of the only type "F" LAD in the forces of the Empire.

## Part 3

# The Formation of the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

*Editor's Note. Part 3 formed pages 367 to 397 of the original. The original text has been scanned into MS-Word and the scan errors fixed. No other changes have been made. The context and statements have not been verified. The granting of the prefix "Royal" in Annex E is a scanned image from the original document. Copies of routine orders (Annex F) concerning the formation of RCEME. were provided to the editor by Maj (Ret'd) Doug Townend and did not appear in Col Hodgson's original document.*

It has been traditional for the Canadian Government to support the Government of Great Britain in war. Therefore it is only natural that the Canadian Army be designed along the organizational lines of the British Army, in order that Canadian participation in Joint Operations may be smooth and efficient.

Changes in the organization of the British Army are carefully studied in Canada and if found desirable are modified to suit the Canadian Army.

The British made many studies over the years before they finally grouped the bulk of the electrical and mechanical engineering of the army into a new corps called the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) on the 1st October 1942.

The formation of REME was carefully studied by the senior staff officers of the Canadian Military Headquarters in London (CMHQ) before the bulk of the electrical and mechanical engineering of the Canadian Army overseas field units was grouped in the engineering or "E" side of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC (E)) on the 11th Jan 1943.

Finally, after much study and pressure, both internal and external, the Corps of Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (CEME) was organized on 24 Feb 44, effective 1 Feb 44, and the first transference of units to RCEME - the Corps being granted the designation Royal on the 20th April - was made on the 15th May 44; this date being celebrated as the official birthday. The Corps was redesignated The Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers with the same abbreviation on 13 April 1953.

### ***The Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Services of the British Army before the formation of the REME***

The Electrical and Mechanical Engineering services in the British Army were of two categories:

- a) Maintenance performed by drivers with the simplest of hand tools and cleaning equipment much like the 'owner-driver' maintenance done by the owner on his car, and
- b) All heavy and complicated maintenance demanding high technical skill in a trade or trades and a corresponding requirement for heavy and light tools and appliances not normally available to the owner-driver because of cost, complexity, and availability.

Generally speaking, maintenance of the 'owner-driver' category was carried out by personnel of the unit employing the equipment, and the 'heavy maintenance' was carried out primarily by artificer personnel of the 'technical corps', i.e. Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, Royal Army Service Corps and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. These corps, in a general sense, carried out the maintenance on their own Corps' equipment. The rest of the equipment in use by all other arms and corps received the 'owner-driver' category of maintenance within their corps and the 'heavy maintenance' was done by the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

The Royal Engineers and the Royal Army Service Corps were responsible for the provision, storage and issue of stores belonging to their own equipments. The Royal Army Ordnance Corps was not only responsible in a similar manner for the stores of the remaining arms and corps but had in addition the same responsibilities for the provision of stores common to all arms and corps.

The responsibility of the upkeep of the Army's transport in 1926 was divided between the Royal Army Service Corps and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. The Service Corps retained control over their own vehicle stocks, workshops and stores. The Ordnance Corps took over the responsibility for the provision, storage and repair of vehicles and equipments for the rest of the army.

The decision to form the corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers resulted from a series of enquiries and committees of investigation going back some years before the outbreak of the Second World War.

## ***The events leading up to the formation of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers***

### **Report of the Committee of Royal Engineers - 1928 (1)**

[The numbers in parenthesis (1) refer to the references at the end of this section. Footnotes are identified by a superscript number and are listed at the bottom of each page. – Ed]

In 1928, a Committee, whose Chairman was Field Marshal Sir George F. Milne, Chief of the Imperial General Staff was appointed to “consider the role of the Corps of Royal Engineers in peace and war and to advise whether the present duties of this Corps should be extended...”

The Committee made a comprehensive survey of engineering services in the Army as a whole, thoroughly investigated the recommendations of previous committees, and rather than confining their recommendations to the Royal Engineers, dealt with all military branches of engineering.

In Part III Section B of the report, the Committee states, “We are of the opinion that there are three methods by which unification of control of mechanical engineering in the Army could be attained...

- a) The Royal Engineers to be charged with all the Mechanical Engineering in the Army.
- b) The creation of an additional corps composed of mechanical engineers.
- c) The reorganization of the RAOC and making this branch of the Army primarily a Mechanical Engineering Corps.”

The following recommendations were extracted from Part IV Section A of the report, the Summary of Recommendations:

“5. The RAOC should become a corps of mechanical engineers and should be responsible under the Master-General of the Ordnance for all warlike stores including mechanical vehicles but not including general stores and clothing.”

“6. The RASC should take over under the Quartermaster-General the responsibility for all general stores and clothing.”<sup>1</sup>

Ten years passed before the reorganization of the RASC and RAOC and the allocation of mechanical engineering to one authority were formally studied again by the committee on Supply and Maintenance of Army Material under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General WK Yenning.

<sup>1</sup> It is assumed that these recommendations were not accepted mainly due to financial reasons (the depression of 1928-33).



## Interim Report of the Committee on the Supply and Maintenance of Army Material - 1938 (2)

The Committee's terms of reference were based on the assumption that:

- a) The QMG will be the responsible authority for custody, storeholding, and maintenance of ordnance material after it has been delivered to the Army by the DGMP. (Director-General of Munitions Production).
- b) The design, production and inspection of all mechanical transport vehicles will be transferred from QMG (Quartermaster-General) to the DGMP.

[They were] to consider the implications of these assumptions and to put forward detailed plans for making them effective.

“The following principles will govern the deliberations of the Committee:

- a) That the Royal Army Service Corps and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps should eventually be merged in one Corps which should include a proportion of the Electrical and Mechanical personnel of the Royal Engineers.
- b) That the new Corps should contain within itself:
  - a. Engineering personnel for all mechanical and electrical engineering<sup>2</sup> required by the Army except as stated below.

The Royal Engineers should continue to train engineering personnel for electrical and mechanical engineering in so far as may be required for works construction and field engineering, and in addition, for such specialized work as rail-ways, coast defence, etc. A certain proportion of the officers and men so trained would be transferred to the new Corps.

- c) Storeholding personnel for all material required by the Army.
- d) The necessary personnel for provision duties...
- e) That all mechanical engineers in the reconstituted new Corps should receive a common form of training ...
- f) The DGMP, the principal technical officer of the Army, should be held responsible for the technical training of all mechanical engineering personnel.
- g) That all personnel concerned should rank as Combatant.
- h) That all personnel in the new Corps... should be available... for the higher spheres of direction.”

The Yenning Committee reported strongly against the suggestion of combination. They said:

“...we are satisfied that a common form of training for the personnel of the amalgamated corps is impracticable; and without a common training the direction of the activities of such a corps must suffer. To this we must add that there are administrative and psychological difficulties in the way of the amalgamation, which, though perhaps insufficiently formidable of themselves to warrant its condemnation, nevertheless, provide grave objection to it.”

“In all the circumstances, and after giving our earnest consideration to its advantages and disadvantages, we are unanimously of the opinion that the amalgamation into one corps of The Royal Army Service Corps, The Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and The Electrical and Mechanical portion of the Royal Engineers, is inadvisable and not in the best interest of the Army as a whole nor of the particular purpose for which our Committee was set up.”

<sup>2</sup> This is the first reference to electrical engineering.

The disturbed feelings of many influential people both in and out of the Army about the overlap in repair functions between the corps were crystallized into action by the outbreak of the Second World War.

The two main factors causing this action were (3): “The very severe winter of 1939-40 combined with the issue to the troops of quantities of technical equipment, in the manipulation and maintenance of which they had not had time or opportunity to become proficient, combined to produce by March 1940, an alarming state of unreadiness for active operations in nearly all the units of fighting arms in the BEF (British Expeditionary Force). It was reported ... that only some 40 per cent of the MT (motor transport) in the hands of these units was fit for mobile warfare.” The Bruce Committee was appointed to investigate this situation.

### **Bruce and Lewis Report 1940 (4)**

“A committee of two, Major (later Major General) MJH Bruce, an ex regular officer of the RASC who had become Chief Maintenance Engineer of the LPTB<sup>3</sup> Road Services, and Lieut-Colonel (later Major-General) RH Lewis, RTR, carried out an investigation on the spot and the gist of their recommendations was a closer integration, if not a complete amalgamation of the base workshops of the RE, RASC, and RAOC, coupled with the resort to the system of maintenance by the replacement of complete assemblies in the field, any repair and overhaul work being relegated to base workshops or preferably being evacuated to the United Kingdom.”

The time was not opportune, however, for these changes. The operations became mobile without Britain's volition, and the disaster of Dunkirk, where practically the whole Army's equipment, good, bad or indifferent, was lost, temporarily blurred the sharp outlines of British shortcomings in maintenance. Nevertheless, seeds were sown and thoughts definitely turned towards the reorientation of the Army's electrical and mechanical maintenance policy.

The other factor<sup>4</sup> ...see ref (3)... was the gradual absorption into the army of thousands of technical personnel and the resultant repercussions on production of war material at home. In an endeavour to stem the flow of skilled personnel from civilian shops to the three Services, critics queried the effectiveness of the use of these personnel once called up. To add to the dissatisfaction felt with the maintenance services in the army was the fact that the Germans, in particular, as exemplified by the Afrika Corps, were in 1941-42 giving a very good exhibition of first-class maintenance and extremely rapid repair in the field, particularly of their armour.”

Mr GW Dunkley (5) a prominent engineer with the Iraq Petroleum Company submitted an essay The Mechanics of The British Army to the standing Committee On Army Administration in October 1941.

In his paper Mr Dunkley reviewed the progress of technology in war and the impossibility for one individual “to cover the technical range of more than a limited sphere of modern engineering.” He showed that the inevitable result is specialization. Mr Dunkley reviewed the specialization that has inevitably grown up in the Service from “The Royal Engineers, who once embraced engineering as a whole...” to the specialized roles of The Royal Engineers, The Royal Corps of Signals, The Royal Army Service Corps and The Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

The problem of attracting suitably trained personnel into the RAOC was partially solved... “by commissioning a number of university graduates as Ordnance Mechanical Engineers... The RAOC also suffered under the stigma of being a non-combatant Corps. Its officers are unable to obtain the cachet of psc [passed staff college] and the staff appointments to which it might lead.”

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<sup>3</sup> London Passenger Transport Board.

<sup>4</sup> The footnote had no text in the original - Ed

“The problem of manpower has not left the RAOC untouched...” said Mr Dunkley. “Skilled personnel whom they would hope to draw from civil life into their organization are already fully occupied and indispensable in industry, where they are engaged in the production of vehicles, weapons and equipment, which the RAOC are required to maintain. Further, since rearmament got into its stride. Ordnance establishments have been fighting a losing battle with the armament industries to retain their skilled civilian personnel owing to the higher rates of pay ruling outside. Its not surprising to find, therefore, that the war which has opened up supplies of skilled technicians and artisans for other branches of the Service has failed to do the same for the mechanical aide of the RAOC.”

Mr Dunkley then reviewed the organization of the RAOC and discussed the difficulties of an OME to rise to a position at the top. In support of his contention that an engineer should rise to the top, Mr Dunkley said:

“While on this subject of-the status of the mechanical engineer, we would not be thought to imply that only the highest qualified specialist is competent to control and administer specialists of his kind. In general, that will not be found to be so. The prime pre-requisites of managerial control are breadth of view and a sound understanding of the subject with which specialists deal; in other words the administrator must be capable of appreciating the arguments and appraising the schemes put forward by the technicians, but must, in addition, have a wider view and be able to take due account of difficulties and circumstances of which highly specialized technicians are probably unaware. It is no disparagement of the non-engineering staff of the RAOC, whose difficulties on their side are insufficiently understood by the troops generally, to say that it is not to be expected, in view of the separation of duties that has always existed as between the two sides, that they should in practice produce the best administrative heads to fill the senior posts which control the engineering side. The present organization of the RAOC, therefore, solves no difficulties in this connection, but rather tends to create them as the pairing of stores and mechanical engineering results in juxtaposition but no real fusion.”

In Mr Dunkley’s opinion there was room, and in fact a vital need, for what might be called a Royal Mechanical Corps or Royal Corps of Mechanical Engineers, to be primarily responsible for the whole mechanical maintenance of the British Army. The foundation would be laid in the mechanical side of the RAOC leaving the store-keeping side to continue to handle stores.

Mr Dunkley then pointed out “...the desirability of rationalizing the electrical and radio services.” He suggested that this should “...focus round the Royal Corps of Signals...” He further considered transferring the power generating and distributing activities of the Royal Engineers to Signals.

Another high level committee outside the Services under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge was set up to investigate the use of technical manpower in the three Services.

### **Committee on Skilled Men in the Services, 1941 Interim Report (6)**

The terms of reference given on the 9 June 1941 by the Rt Hon Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service to this Committee were:

- a) Whether the skilled manpower already at the disposal of the Services is being used with due economy and effect:
- b) Whether the Service arrangements for training skilled men are such as to meet to the greatest practicable extent the Service requirements for skilled men:
- c) Whether the demands of the Services for skilled men as recruits to Service trades during the period ending 31st March 1942, should in any respect be modified.

The Beveridge report (6)(7), in general, emphasized the following:

- a) That every engineer and skilled trades-man, in light of his training and previous experience, should be employed where he will be of maximum use to the war effort in general.
- b) The advantages to be gained in the pooling of resources of skilled manpower.
- c) The value of close co-operation between the Services and war Industry.
- d) The differences in organization between and within the Services and resulting difficulties in the efficient use of skilled manpower.
- e) The advantages of enlisting men for the Army as a whole and not for Corps.

The Beveridge Committee studied the employment in the Services of the engineering and allied tradesmen of two important electrical engineering firms, They found that of the men entering the Navy that-nearly three quarters were in responsible or skilled engineering posts; of the men entering the Air Force, the proportion was much less than the Navy, and “among those entering the Army, the proportion advanced to skilled engineering posts is only one in seven, and at the end of two years of war more than half those men whose civil occupations were engineering, had not been mustered in an engineering trade.” (8)

There are many valid reasons for this situation and all are discussed in detail in the Report and will not be dealt with here.

The Committee observed that it was doubtful whether any large number of highly skilled men will ever be needed in the RE, RA or the RAC.

Their contention was that “maintenance and repair of war machines in the field must, to a large extent, take the form of assembly and replacement, ie, of using men of moderate skill familiar with these machines to take out damaged parts and replace them.” (9)

The Committee felt that the mechanical resources of the Army should be pooled. They argued: “The Army is based upon Corps and upon Units; we do not undervalue the importance of seeing that each unit is closely-knit and self-reliant. But neither Unit nor Corps should seek to be self-contained. Break-up of the engineering work of the Army, between Corps and Units, to the extent to which it is carried today, involves duplication of workshops and multiplication of reserves of skilled men and special equipment. The most economical use of scarce resources depends upon pooling them as fully as possible.” (10)

The Committee after presenting a host of facts and arguments made two proposals based on their enquiries:

- a) Their first proposal was that men should be enlisted into the Army as a single Service as is done in the Navy and the Air Force and not enlisted for this or that Corps or Unit.
- b) Their second proposal was the formation of a Corps of Mechanical Engineers. They said:

“The success of the Navy in making good use of mechanical engineers is not due solely to the fact that the naval problems are simpler than those of the Army. It is due also to the fact that the Navy has had for so long an engineering branch of high authority and has had other technical branches specialized on torpedoes and electricity or ordnance. The Navy is machine minded. The Army cannot afford to be less so. The Navy sets engineers to catch, test, train and use engineers. Until the Army gives to mechanical and electrical engineers, as distinct from civil engineers, their appropriate place and influence in the Army System, such engineers are not likely to be caught, tested and trained so well as in the Navy; there is danger that they will be misused by men whose main interests and duties be in other fields.” (11)

The second proposal was commented on by the War Office in their memorandum.

“The increasing mechanization of the Army has forced to the front the question whether all mechanical maintenance should not be concentrated in one corps. This problem, which was explored more than once in peacetime, but is one of increasing urgency in an army where armoured divisions are assuming an ever-larger role. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind whether the major changes in army organization, which would be involved, inter-alia,<sup>5</sup> the concentration of the mechanical maintenance duties of all existing corps in one corps, can be undertaken in the middle of a war. Further the fact that large parts of the British Army are engaged in active operations overseas renders the concentration of all mechanical maintenance duties into one corps a matter of great difficulty. That is a matter of high policy. In the meantime, the pros and cons of the question have been remitted to a committee of three senior members of the War Office staff who are themselves of high standing and long experience in the business world. Their report, which will shortly be made, will have to be considered in the light of practical considerations just mentioned.” (12)

The Army Council reacted to the Beveridge report as already indicated in the War Office memorandum by appointing yet another committee consisting of Sir Robert Sinclair of the Imperial Tobacco Company and holding the appointment at the time of Director General of Army Requirements (DGAR) as Chairman and Major-General RM Weeks of the glass firm of Pilkingtons and holding the appointment of Director-General of Army Equipment (DGAE) and Mr GW Dunkley already referred to above.

### **Committee on the Higher Organization of the War Office, Feb 42 (13)**

Mr Dunkley had previously circulated his paper *The Mechanics of the British Army* to the QMG and DGAE for comment and then passed it to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Army Administration (SCAA) who in turn passed it to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Army Council. Thus it is not surprising to find Mr Dunkley on Sir Robert’s Committee.

Lt Col EC Mayhew (14) in his study at the time commented “It might be mentioned ... as far as could be ascertained, no connection existed between this Committee and the Committee on Skilled Men in the Services, although their investigations took place at approximately the same time,”

The Sinclair-Weeks-Dunkley Committee deliberated the question of the creation of a separate Maintenance Corps.

They acknowledged that the importance of engineering maintenance had not been sufficiently recognized and appreciated “the variety, volume and complexity of the equipment of the modern army - ranging from the most delicate and complicated scientific instruments ... to the heavy tank”. In their opinion the expansion of a trained maintenance staff for the Army was two years “behind the clock.”

The Committee drew a distinction between the operator tradesman and the service tradesman. “The former”, they said, “is part of the fighting machine, the latter is part of the administrative service. The former must belong to the Corps in which he fights, but we consider that the latter should, in the ideal system, belong to a Corps of Maintenance Specialists.” (15)

They reviewed the various proposals that had been put forward which were:

- a) The simultaneous creation of a Supply Corps, a Transport Corps and a Repair Corps,
- b) The amalgamation of the RASC and RAOC,
- c) The absorption by the RASC of part of the RAOC, and
- d) The absorption by a new Maintenance Corps of the Warlike Stores Section of the RAOC.

<sup>5</sup> Among other things.

Although the Committee was against any of these proposals as being practicable during time of war, they nevertheless were convinced that a unified Corps of Engineering Maintenance would lead to increased efficiency and further that some immediate reform was necessary.

Their detailed study led them to the decision that the desirable lay somewhere between two extremes:

- a) To group in one Corps all tradesmen whose duties are solely or predominantly the maintenance of technical equipment;

This would mean the inclusion of all such trades-men whether in units of all arms (for example, in an RAC Regiment all such unit tradesmen would belong to the new Corps) or in 2nd, 3rd or 4th echelons;

- b) To include in the Corps only those tradesmen whose duties are solely or predominantly the maintenance of technical equipment, other than first line maintenance;

This would thus allow units to run their own first line maintenance, eg, all the tradesmen, including the LAD, of a RAC Regiment would belong to the RAC and the RASC would retain their workshop platoons as RASC. (16)

The Committee came to several conclusions after careful consideration of the wide range of possibilities. They believed that a new corps of engineering maintenance should be formed that would absorb the “E” side of the RAOC and the maintenance side of the RASC except the workshop platoons in their formations and in-dependent companies.

The Committee suggested further in this respect that unless experience proves that the absorption of Unit tradesmen into the LAD is wrong, we would recommend that the complete reform suggested (the grouping in one corps all tradesmen whose duties are ... the maintenance of technical equipment mentioned above) should be given further consideration as soon as a new corps should be formed. Thus was introduced the Phase I and Phase II aspects of the absorption by a new corps of the maintenance responsibilities of other corps.

They believed that all provision and storage of vehicles, including spare parts should be the responsibility of the RAOC. Their argument was: “There appears to be no logical reason why the RAOC should not provide the RASC with vehicles, if they provide the RAC with tanks.” (17)

They saw no objection and in fact a good many advantages in the new corps absorbing certain mechanical maintenance functions of the RE.

They were of two minds about the absorption of unit tradesmen into the LAD but there was doubt in their minds as to who was responsible for the LAD when they said “whether it remains as it is now or whether it is augmented by the addition of Unit tradesmen (it) must be regarded by the OC Unit as his “child” just as much as the other parts of the Unit.” (18)

The Committee recognized the hostility that would be encountered by their “scheme” but remarked “We do not however regard this as a valid argument against our proposals.” (19)

“We have, at the moment”, they said “the anomalous situation of UK, Indian, S. African, Australian and Canadian forces operating on different systems of repair and maintenance. Our proposals go some way towards achieving uniformity of organization between ourselves and the Dominions, and in Part III <sup>6</sup> we refer to the desirability of the Dominion adopting our organization.” (20)

The Sinclair, Weeks, Dunkley recommendations may be summarized (21) as “recommending the transference from RASC to the RAOC of the whole of the responsibility for provision, storage, and issue of MT vehicles and spares. It also advised the transfer of the responsibility for electrical and mechanical

<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately Part III of the Report was not available at the time of writing. Only pages 27 to 32 incl were available covering Repair Maintenance. HQS 20-1-X, Vol 3,

services covering the whole of the, Army's equipment, from the RE, RASC and RAOC to a new corps, together with the personnel who were employed at this task, but with the important proviso that the RASC were to retain their own workshop platoons in their Transport and Motor Boat Companies."

"At the same time the artificers of the RAC, RA, RE and R Signals were to remain within their regiments and corps to continue the work of 'owner driver maintenance' which they already carried out, and to assist the first line artificers of the new Corps in their task, as they already did in regard to the RAOC(E) LADs. This was styled Phase I of the organization of the new Corps."

"The Committee recommended a close study of the results of these changes with the view to the implementation as early as possible of Phase II, a phase wherein the whole of the technical personnel passed from their own units to the new corps and every artificer in the Army (apart from the civil engineering personnel of the RE) would be in this new Corps."

The evidence produced by the Sinclair, Weeks, Dunkley Committee provided the "straw" that finally broke the "back" of the resistance to reform. In the black period of May 1942 vigorous steps were taken to set up the new organization for maintenance and repair throughout the British Army.

Army Council Instruction, No 1605 and 1608, published 1 Aug 42 (22) recorded that the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers was authorized by Army Order 70 of 1942 and that Army Order 71 declared that the Officers and men of the Corps were combatant in the fullest sense, subject to certain provisions of King's Regulations, 1940, para 189 regarding powers of command.

The ACI defined the responsibilities of REME as follows:

"The REME will be responsible for the repair and inspection of electrical and mechanical equipment and will assume:

- a) The complete responsibilities of the engineering side of the RAOC.
- b) Responsibility for the repair and inspection of all WD vehicles except those in operation by the RASC for which inspection and repair facilities are provided under RASC arrangements.

RASC repair facilities are limited to those provided in workshop platoons or sections in the various types of RASC companies.

Repairs beyond the capacity of these platoons or sections are the responsibility of the 4th Echelon workshop organization of the REME, and on evacuation of the RASC for repair and inspection ceases in respect of the vehicles concerned.

- c) Certain responsibilities from the RE..."

The new Corps absorbed from the RE "precision work", the repair of mechanical equipment of engineer origin such as tunnelling equipment, pumping sets, prime movers, the erection and maintenance of coast artillery and power-operated heavy AA machinery with its ancillaries.

## ***The events leading up to the formation of RCEME***

The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps traces its own historical development from the time of the formation of a Canadian Militia in 1775. The evolution of the RCOC closely followed the RAOC. Up to 1855 Canadian needs of military stores were supplied by British Ordnance depots in Canada. After 1855 a period of independent development began. The Canadian supply system either paralleled the British or in some ways was modified to meet Canadian requirements. (23)

The electrical and mechanical engineering services in the Canadian Army paralleled to a considerable extent these services in the British Army already described with one important difference - the amount of

equipment in the Canadian Army before the outbreak of The Second World War was just a tiny fraction of the holdings of the British Army.

By the outbreak of The Second World War, Canada's Army was faced with a tremendous expansion both in strength and in holdings of electrical and mechanical equipment.

Canada in all probability was faced with a relatively more severe problem in finding men trained in the care and repair of equipment than was Great Britain.

The RCASC controlled and repaired their own transport as did the RASC. The RCOC paralleled the RAOC in the provision, storage, issue and repair of vehicles and weapons.

The events leading up to the formation of REME were followed with interest by the Canadian Army. After 1939 every argument back to 1928 leading up to the formation of REME was carefully evaluated by the Canadian Military Headquarters in London (CMHQ) and these evaluations were sent back to the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa. Committees were formed in CMHQ and NDHQ to form top-level opinions of the reorganization of the repair services in the British Army.

### **The events leading up to the adoption on 11 January 1943 of the REME organization and terminology in the "E" side of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps for the field units of the Canadian Army Overseas**

Lt-Gen AGL McNaughton held a conference with his senior staff officers<sup>7</sup> to discuss the reorganization of army equipment and the maintenance services in his office on 13 May 1942.

The chief arguments and decisions at Army Council level, which led up to the formation of REME in the British Army, were discussed. The memorandum (24) of this conference recorded:

“General McNaughton then explained that although the War Office had decided to set up a separate Corps to carry out repair and maintenance services, some of the reasons which caused the British to form a separate Corps were not applicable to the Canadian Army. He therefore asked the various officers concerned to consider our problem on fundamentals with a view to arriving at the best solution for our own purposes. He pointed out that factors, which must be considered in arriving at this solution, were the importance of keeping our organization as similar as possible to the British; and, for operational reasons, of keeping to a minimum the changes to be made. Gen McNaughton then referred to the recommendation that the Cdn Army should not create this new Corps but should transfer to the RCOC the issue, repair and maintenance of vehicle functions of the RCASC with the important exception of Workshop Platoons of RCASC Coys, which would continue to be part of that Corps as a permanent arrangement. It was also intended that rear echelon maintenance functions of RCE and RC Sigs should be transferred to RCOC.”

Discussion developed on the retention of the workshop platoons of the RCASC remaining as part of the Corps. All agreed that their retention by the RCASC should be adopted as a permanent arrangement for the Canadian Army.

The memorandum records that General McNaughton concurred in the Chief Signals Officer's (CSO) proposal to use Corps and Army Signals Parks to supply and maintain signal equipment until such time as Ordnance were prepared to take that responsibility.

The composition and the future<sup>8</sup> of RCOC was discussed and it was agreed among the officers present that “the three main subdivisions<sup>9</sup> should continue and lists of officers be maintained on that basis, but

<sup>7</sup> In attendance were: Lt Gen AGL McNaughton, GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army, Maj Gen PJ Montague, Senior Officer, CMHQ, Maj Gen GR Turner, DA & QMG First Cdn Army, Brig JH MacQueen, DGMG, CMHQ, Col PR Shields, DDST, 1 Cdn Corps, Col NB MacDonald, AQMG, CMHQ, Col HB Keenleyside, DOS, CMHQ, Col HQ Guy, DDOS(E), CMHQ, Lt Col NE Rodger, PA to GOC-in-C First Cdn Army who acted as secretary.



that officers from any of those lists would be equally eligible to fill administrative ordnance appointments, particularly as the senior RCOC officer of a formation. It was not intended that there should be a senior OO and a senior OME in each formation, but rather that there should be one Director (or assistant Director, etc) of Ordnance Services, who would co-ordinate all the ordnance services in that formation. For that appointment, the best qualified officer available would be selected.”

Channels of communication between OMEs of formations came under discussion and it was agreed that direct channels of communications would be set up limited to engineering matters. There would not be a direct channel of command.

The General also stressed the necessity of the RCOC being made a fully combatant Corps.

A summary (25) of the agreements made by the meeting and Gen McNaughton’s request to consolidate the repair and maintenance in the Canadian Army overseas was cabled on the 19th May 40 to Gen Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff at NDHQ. (See Annex A)

Gen McNaughton received concurrence (26) to his request 27 May. He was asked to advise NDHQ as soon as possible the details of the new establishments and the phasing in of the new organization in order that NDHQ could take parallel action. The General was also advised that NDHQ would clear up the combatant question.

CMHQ replied (27) on the 7 June 42 that they were, in general, taking similar action to the War Office. The first phase was to be completed by 15 June 42. In this phase, RCOC would assume only control of all vehicles and certain 3rd and 4th echelon RCASC workshops. The second phase was to be completed by 1 Aug 42. In this phase the changeover was to be completed and new or adjusted establishments were to be in force including the redistribution and transfer of personnel. (See Annex B)

As already described the British formed REME. The Canadian Army overseas implemented the REME system on 11 Jan 43 in the Field but did not form a separate Corps or a new EME Directorate at CMHQ.<sup>10</sup> REME titles were adopted together with British War Establishments. The following changes (28) took place:

- a) RCOC assumed control of all RCASC MT and maintenance behind 2nd Echelon. RCASC Workshop Platoons continued to function as RCASC.
- b) REME Workshop Sections were formed
- c) The DDOS(E), the DDOS(E), DADOS (E) and OME took over completely the engineering side of Ordnance and were redesignated as DDME, ADME, DADME, and EME. A new appointment of Commander (CREME) for each Corps, Army and Divisional troops was authorized. The DDOS(O), ADOS(O), DADOS(O) continued to carry on in their ... capacities dealing with the Ordnance end of the Service.
- d) RCASC personnel of Heavy Repair Depots and MT VRDs and other Workshops performing repairs behind 2nd Echelon were transferred to the RCOC - ORs compulsory - Officers voluntari-

<sup>8</sup> The memorandum does not indicate the meeting’s views of the future formation of a new Corps to be responsible for the electrical and mechanical engineering of the Canadian Army. Notwithstanding, Canmilitary wire GS 1700 sent on the 19 May to NDHQ clearly stated that the consolidation of the engineering of the Canadian Army in the “E” side of RCOC would not prejudice the formation of a separate corps of electrical and mechanical engineers in the CDN Army at a later date should British experience with separate corps indicate last course more advantageous.

<sup>9</sup> Ordnance Officer (OO), Ordnance Mechanical Engineer (OME), and Ordnance Executive Officer (OEO)

<sup>10</sup> CMHQ ADM Order No 2, 10 Jan 43 described in detail the reorganization of the First Canadian Army effective from 0001 hrs 11 Jan 43 said in para 7: “The British REME organization, nomenclature and distribution of duties will be adopted but separate REME Corps will NOT be created. Personnel filling appointments or belonging to units which are REME in the British organization will be RCOC”.

ly.”

The “EME” and the “O” sections acted independently of each other and both had their own direct channel of communication with the senior formations and with CMHQ. The British differed in this respect because they had formed a separate Corps.

The adoption of this system resulted in a Canadian REME in function located in the “E” side of RCOC field units of the Canadian Army Overseas.

### **The events leading up to the absorption of the DEME functions in the home war establishments - 7 Aug 43**

The new system drifted along without further serious consideration (other than by the EMEs) to the formation of a separate corps until 30th of March 1943. On this date Colonel HA Guy, DDOS(E) at CMHQ submitted a memorandum (29) to the DQMG. In his memorandum Col Guy reviewed the events from May 1942 when Gen McNaughton held his conference up to 30 March 43. He stressed the point that the General had not ruled out the possibility of forming a separate corps at a later date “...should British experience with a separate Corps indicate that course more advantageous.” He presented the well-recognized arguments for the necessity of efficient repair and maintenance and then attacked the problem from an administrative point of view by pointing out to the DQMG that the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch of the RCOC at one time was a comparatively small section of the Corps. The situation had changed in the past few months in which this Section had grown rapidly without corresponding improvements in the Administration of this part of the Corps. He said (30)

“In consequence, an administrative system grew up, in which the administration was largely in the hands of Ordnance Officers, with the result that the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch has no real control over its own organization, although most administrative matters in connection with it contain technical aspects, which have to be referred at some stage to the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch. When such reference does not occur, the significance behind an apparently innocuous point is often missed, with repercussions at a later date.”

Col Guy drew the DQMG’s attention to the actions taken in this regard by all the other Dominions and India and pointed out how accentuated the differences in the repair and maintenance systems between the rest of the Commonwealth and Canada would be after the Second Phase of the formation of REME has been completed. In this, Col Guy was alluding to the absorption of the whole of the technical personnel of the British Army from their own units into REME. The attainment of Phase II, as it became known, would mean the REME had every artificer in the Army, apart from the civil engineering personnel of the RE, in its fold.

The memorandum recognized the time element and recommended that as an interim measure that a separate Engineering Directorate be set up within the RCOC and that suitable EME officers be posted to the Adjutant General’s Branch.

Suggested organizations were submitted with a discussion of the principal functions of each position.

Col Guy ended his memorandum with a request that an officer be appointed who would “be charged with preparing ...a suitable sub-mission...”

The proposal met with little success.<sup>11</sup> Col HA Campbell, Executive Assistant to the MGO at NDHQ commented:

<sup>11</sup> In a covering letter to Col HG Thompson at First Canadian Army forwarding a copy of his memorandum to the DQMG, Col Guy wrote: As you know, my hands are tied. Subjects that are thoroughly thrashed out between us have to be re-explained and re-argued up here with endless delays, so that we have in effect an administrative bottleneck.

“The proposal in regard to the formation of a separate Corps was evidently turned down, as to date (8 Oct 43) no information has been received whether it is intended to form a separate Corps. It is, however, known that there has been appointed a DDME at CMHQ. It is understood that this officer still comes under the DOS and it is assumed that the designation of this appointment was changed from the DDOS (E) to DDME.” (31)

Gen McNaughton was criticized in Canada as well as abroad for not making a complete break between RCOE and the RCOE (E). The General felt that the organization was operating efficiently and by having workshops and stores sections staffed by personnel of the same Corps, interchange was possible and the “diversity factor”,<sup>12</sup> was appreciable. To form a new Corps would also mean a slight increase in overhead. The Canadian formations were working as integral parts of the British Corps with Canadian Ordnance units working side-by-side British units wearing REME badges.<sup>13</sup>

Mr OTG Williamson (33) in discussing whether Canada should have a REME Corps wrote in Saturday Night:

“The opportunity to form a RCEME before our forces are fully engaged should not be missed. The British, with a much larger organization to deal with and in contact with the enemy, did it in three months.<sup>14</sup> We might do the same and with the same beneficial result. There can be little doubt that the present setup of the RCOE is causing some trouble to the Commanding Officer of our First Division.<sup>15</sup> That Division is part of the 8th British Army to which units of REME are attached. To function smoothly, we should be organized on similar lines.

“That the public may not be misled, it is well known that the question of the formation of a new mechanical engineering corps has been discussed in England with Lt-Gen McNaughton. These discussions have resulted in some changes of name but nothing else. The “E” Branch is still, as formerly, part of the RCOE. The reasons given for refusing to adopt the British system are not convincing, It is argued that setting up a new Corps would require the services of additional officers. It might be expected, with reorganization, that certain Stores Officers could be retired or used on other duties. The adverse decision also rests in part on the fact that the Canadian Corps would be smaller than its British Counterpart and no would not have officers of sufficient rank and prestige to deal with senior officers of the Army. Since the majority of the senior officers of the RCOE are not at present competent to discuss technical questions this excuse has little weight

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“I feel certain that the proposals will be misconstrued by some who will see in it only an effort of a few senior EMEs to obtain self-advancing opportunities, even though I shall not be here long, so it will probably be necessary to stress frequently that the essence of these changes lies in the self-administrative powers that accompany them.” (32)

<sup>12</sup> Gen McNaughton frequently used this expression. It is an engineering term meaning the ratio between the simultaneous demand of a number of individual services for a specific period, and the sum of the individual demands of those services for the same period.

<sup>13</sup> Col HA Campbell (34) recorded in a report of an interview with Maj LD McBride regarding his six month attachment to the British 1st Army in North Africa, a most interesting highlight on the wearing of badges. “I might mention” wrote Col Campbell, “that Maj McBride stated that both in North Africa and in the UK in visiting various formations, he was constantly embarrassed somewhat by the necessity of explaining why as an EME he was still wearing RCOE badges and red backing on his rank badges instead of blue. In North Africa particularly this caused so much unnecessary trouble that on the advice of the British, he adopted a beret with an REME cap badge.” Maj Gen JV Young, while MGO recorded in a memorandum of 10 Dec 43 about his visit to UK, “... a new Corps would be a step forward... there were certain disadvantages in working with British formations who wore the REME badge ... instances being quoted of personnel of the 1st Division on proceeding to Italy taking down RCOE badges and putting up REME badges on leaving England,” (35)

<sup>14</sup> Mr Williamson’s figure of three months is not accurate. The reorganization of the electrical and mechanical services of the British Army was introduced over a series of three Nine Month Plans (36) the first of which was completed by 1 Oct 1942.

<sup>15</sup> In a talk to the United Services Branch, No 1, Canadian Corps Association (in Toronto) at the invitation of the Secretary - Mr OTG Williamson, Col HG Thompson denied this when he said ... “I should like to mention that... an article appeared... supporting the formation of a Canadian REME Corps which suggested that our troops in Italy might have difficulty in working with (37) their British associates. Let me assure you ... that this was definitely not the case.”

from the preponderance of Stores Officers in the higher ranks, it would appear that loss of prestige on the Socks and Shirts side may have been the determining factor.”

Mr Williamson in closing his article emphasises the necessity of having technical units commanded by qualified engineers - a point that was the subject of much discussion by the Engineering Institute of Canada (EIC) who took an active part in trying to convince NDHQ to better the lot of the professional engineer in the Services.

On Mar 43, Mr L Austin Wright the General Secretary of the EIC cabled General McNaughton to ascertain the General's views regarding the establishment of a corps in the Canadian Army similar to REME and on the controversial subject of professional allowance.<sup>16</sup> General McNaughton cabled the CGS, Lt Gen Stuart, the contents of Mr Wright's cable and suggested that subject to the CGS's approval NDHQ should wire Mr Wright to the effect that "...when War Office adopted proposal organization REME whole matter was given most careful and detailed consideration in relation to Canadian Army. Our present set up was adopted on the unanimous advice of both the Engineering and Administrative branches of Ordnance and experience since has confirmed correctness of decision." In a moment of candour, the General added "For your private information many officers of British REME, have told me that they consider our organization is better and if they had not had to consider personalities and other special conditions which forced them, but not us, they would have proceeded similarly. The General ended his cable to the CGS by adding that the status of the professional engineer was under constant observation and that their professional interests would be protected. (38) A few days later, Col HG Thompson who had seen Gen McNaughton's wire to the CGS and later was given a copy of it, wrote with the General's permission, a personal letter, to Mr Wright giving him a brief outline of the status of the "E" Branch of RCOC. In this letter, Col Thompson revealed that the formation of REME was not without Service conflicts.

"...the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers came into being at the beginning of October (1942) under the direction of Maj-Gen Rowcroft. It is interesting to note that the latter was formerly in the RASC and that the then Director of Mechanical Maintenance in the RAOC resigned, - without going into detail, - this will give you an indication of the extent to which personalities, vested rights, etc, were in conflict." (39)

Col Thompson completely supported General McNaughton's contention that it was advantageous to have all the electrical and mechanical engineering services in the "E" side of Ordnance. (See Annex C).

In the meantime, The Engineering Journal, the voice of the EIC, with Mr Wright as Editor commenced publishing a series of articles<sup>17</sup> on the new Corps in the British Army early in 1943. The Editor, in introducing an appreciation of REME entitled Repair Work In The Heat of Battle, suggested to the profession:

"This revolutionary development seems to justify some study by members of the profession in Canada, both military and civil, and therefore the Journal plans to produce similar articles from time to time, as an aid to such a study." (40)

Although Mr Wright was trying to determine Gen McNaughton's policy for the formation of a Canadian REME as we have already seen, it is doubtful if the General Secretary realized at the time (June 43) what

<sup>16</sup> In a personal letter of 27 Mar 43, to Mr Wright, Col Thompson wrote; "While it is true that the British Army have been able to retain professional pay for electrical and mechanical engineers, it would be practically impossible to introduce any such measure in the Canadian Army at this or any other time, since normally all technical officers of the RCCS, RCE and RCOC are required to be engineering graduates."

<sup>17</sup> The first of these articles appeared in the Journal Mar 43, See Annex D for a review of the Journal articles relating to REME (RCOC), RCEME in UK and RCOC (E), CEME and RCEME in Canada.

a militant campaign<sup>18</sup> for the efficient employment and proper recognition of the professional engineers in the Services had been heralded by this seemingly innocent shot. Two more articles were published reporting on REME without comment before the first dissenting voices were raised in the Journal about the situation in the Canadian Services.

One of the dissenters (anonymous) in a letter to the General Secretary criticized the Canadian Army's hesitancy in changing/its organization.

“Last fall or early winter”, wrote the critic, “as a result of accumulated evidence, the Canadian Army Overseas adopted the REME set-up, but WITHIN ORDNANCE. This has meant very little change and leaves the top and administrative positions in the hands of the non-technical side of Ordnance. As far as the Canadian Army in Canada is concerned, no discernable move has been made, and the mechanical and electrical engineering and maintenance remains an appendage of Ordnance.” (41)

This letter and many others similar in content received by the EIC probably were responsible for the quickening of the campaign. In an editorial, Engineers in Ordnance in the same Issue (42) the Editor reiterated that the Journal published informative articles on REME “...that in some way its appearance ... might support Canadian Officials in initiating a similar setup in the Canadian forces.”

The Editor quoted figures from the University of Toronto's Monthly that showed that only five out of 402<sup>19</sup> members of the University's Contingent (presumably all 402 were engineering students) were being considered by the Army for advanced training as Ordnance Mechanical Engineers.

“Surely there is something wrong as far as Ordnance is concerned”, wrote the Editor, “and the answer isn't that men are not needed”

“Frequently in articles and addresses on REME both in Canada and Great Britain” he continued, “one can now detect the implication that the refusal of Canada to follow the proven course of the British authorities is based on the selfish interest of non-technical persons in the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. For instance, in Saturday Night of Aug 21st<sup>20</sup> is an article dealing with REME and Ordnance, it is said, “Unfortunately in Canada, where it is one jump from a department store to a full colonelcy and where the Permanent Force is intent on holding all it has and getting more, military efficiency has not always been the prime consideration ... If this is true,” said the Editor, “a serious condition is indicated and should not be passed over lightly.

“The Journal's interest in these matters is based not so much on the interests of the engineer as on the national interest. The engineer is in great demand in all three Services and he doesn't need to go to Ordnance if he doesn't want to. However, this is the kind of work he is specially qualified to do and in many instances desires to do.

<sup>18</sup> Before the EIC was to rest its pen, the EIC carried its arguments directly to the Prime Minister in Ottawa. (Told to RHH by Dr L Austin Wright, 23 Jan 61).

<sup>19</sup> The Contingents figures were:

Navy Technical Officers	39
RCAF Technical Officers	35
Armoured Corps	48
Artillery	82
Engineers	79
OMEs	5
Signals	82
Infantry	36
Machine Guns	6
Chemical Warfare	9
Camouflage	1
Total	402

<sup>20</sup> Already cited above.

“If the supply has not been equal to the demand, the blame cannot be placed on the engineers.”

At this point it is advisable to review the studies and the opinions made at NDHQ with regard to the events leading up to Aug 43<sup>21</sup> that prompted the Canadian Press and The Engineering Journal to editorially bombard the Hon Col Ralston, the Minister of National Defence and the Master General of the Ordnance.

The War Office advised CMHQ on 16 Apr 42 that a new corps, as yet unnamed, was approved to assume the responsibilities for mechanical maintenance. (43)

A memorandum (44) prepared for DSD, Col LM Chesley on 23 May 42 summarized the system of maintenance in the Canadian Army.

“It has long been apparent that the system whereby some vehicles are maintained by the RCASC and others by the RCOC has outlived its usefulness and efficiency. The system was devised initially, I<sup>22</sup> believe, when the RCASC operated the great majority of MT in the Army. The RCOC was at that time responsible for the repair and maintenance of all other military equipment. With the advent of the MGO vehicle<sup>23</sup> ...it was found necessary to organize a system of repairs and maintenance. It would have been appropriate, at that time, to concentrate the repair and maintenance of all mechanical transport in a new Corps.

“Consequently, the Army has been burdened with a cumbersome system in which the supply of assemblies and parts, as well as the actual workshop installations have been duplicated.”

The memorandum continued “It is noted that it is proposed to concentrate all repair in the RCOC in the Canadian Army overseas, and to await an opportunity of assessing the value of the British experiment before forming a new Corps.” “I suggest”, said Col Anderson “that this course has the disadvantages of losing the benefit of the publicity, which a new Corps would engender.

“Furthermore, the RCOC has been connected, through no fault of its own, with the in-different success which has attended repair and maintenance in the field. We would seem to be losing an excellent opportunity of organizing a new Corps which would be infused with a realization of the highly important part which would play in the successful employment of the forces in the field.”

Col Chesley sent a memorandum (45) to all the Directors on 16 Jun outlining a brief resume of what the British plans were regarding the formation of REME and that the new British reorganization had been recommended by Gen McNaughton and approved in principle by the Minister for adoption in the Canadian Army Overseas with the exception that all the functions of REME were to be “vested” in the RCOC.

The Directors<sup>24</sup> were requested to present their views at a conference 22 June.

The Directors met with Col Chesley as chairman. The minutes (46) show that the meeting was opened by DSD who requested that the Directors should make known their “views as to the desirability of adopting for the Army in Canada the practice proposed by the Army overseas in regard to the changes in responsibility as between RCOC and RCASC and the desirability of setting up in Canada a Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

<sup>21</sup> CARO 3493 was published in Aug 43 dealing with the provision and maintenance of vehicles.

<sup>22</sup> Lt Col WAB Anderson SD 1

<sup>23</sup> The vehicle that was used principally for the fighting troops rather than purely for administration.

<sup>24</sup> Attending this meeting were: Col LM Chesley, DSD, Chairman, Col H Kennedy, DTT, Col HT Cook, DOEA, Col ND Lambert, DES, Col HJB Keating, DST, Col GM Grant, DMM, Lt Col WAB Anderson, SD 1, Lt Col HA Sparling, Rep DMT, Lt Col GM Morrison, Rep DM & R, Lt Col RP Saunders, Rep DOS(A) Maj E Lisle, Rep DMO & I, Maj CMR Elmsley, Rep DMM, Maj DM Harvey, Rep D of Mech

He pointed out that the British proposals had been recommended<sup>25</sup> by the GOC-in-C, First Canadian Army, with the exception that all repair and maintenance, except RCASC 1st and 2nd Echelon, would be vested in the RCOC.”

Under the impression that a new corps was to be organized the following views were expressed:

- a) DMM - Col GM Grant agreed with the reorganization but stressed the need for a clear cut understanding where RCASC 2nd Echelon repairs ended and RCOC began.
- b) DES - Col ND Lambert pointed out that the fortress companies were organized as “E” and “M” companies responsible for electrical and mechanical maintenance of fortress areas and thus could not be transferred in their entirety.
- c) DST - Col JHB Keating postponed any official views until the return of Col NB MacDonald from overseas on 1 July 42.

The meeting decided not to recommend the formation of a separate corps until further word was received from CMHQ and instead recommended the following:

- a) The transfer to the RCOC of all RCASC vehicle maintenance and responsibilities, except those for which RCASC workshop platoons or Sections are provided in WEs (war establishments) of transport companies, RCASC.
- b) The absorption within the organization of the RCOC of provision, storage, and issue of all vehicles, including spare parts.”

This Director’s meeting, it will be noted, did not recommend any electrical responsibilities beyond automotive and their recommendations “ ... applied mainly to repair and maintenance in the field.”<sup>26</sup>

There were no corps units in Canada, therefore the changes recommended were in effect largely a change of ownership of the vehicles carried on RCASC charge and the determination of the limits of responsibility of the RCOC with regard to storage and issue.

From a maintenance point of view there were no workshops in the mobile forces in Canada that would be taken over by RCOC. The problem was primarily to what extent the RCOC should assume MT repair workshops operated on the Home War Establishments (HWE) by RCASC. The nearest thing to 3rd and 4th RCASC Echelon repair units in Canada in this period were the HWE repair garages. (48)

The VCGS, Maj Gen JC Murchie, (49) summarized the minutes and discussions of the Director’s Meeting into a series of recommendations in which he concurred and suggested that the organization be put into effect “forth-with” to the AG, QMG and the MGO as follows:

- a) That no separate Corps should be formed pending a definite recommendation from CMHQ.
- b) That all RCASC maintenance, except workshop platoons in Transport companies, should be transferred to RCOC.
- c) That in the case of RCASC HWEs, all repair, other than what is known in the RCOC as Unit preventative maintenance should be done in RCOC HWE workshops.
- d) That the provision, storage and issue of vehicles, including spare parts, should be concentrated in RCOC.
- e) That no change be made in the relative existing responsibilities between RCOC and RCE insofar

<sup>25</sup> Col HA Campbell (47) who was unable to attend the conference wrote DSD on 3 July drawing to his attention that the Directors were under the impression that Gen McNaughton actually recommended the formation of a new Corps and quoted extracts from GS 1700 to substantiate that this was not the case at this time. See Annex A.

<sup>26</sup> The recommendations apparently were arrived at and recorded quite early in the meeting to be followed by considerable discussion on the effect their recommendations would have on the HWE of RCASC and then the Directors discussed the division of responsibility between RCE and RCOC.

as electrical and mechanical maintenance is concerned.”

The MGO concurred and stressed the importance of eliminating duplication of maintenance and repair services as emphasized by the D of MM at the Director’s conference. The AG, Maj Gen HFG Letson concurred without comment. However the QMG Maj Gen JP MacKenzie submitted a detailed paper of dissent.

The QMG (50) claimed that the proposal (3) above, went farther than anything contemplated in England either by the British or the Canadians. He did not believe that the change would “produce the best possible standard of maintenance in the RCASC vehicles or provide any saving in manpower considered in relation to turnover or output of repaired vehicles.”

The QMG advocated that, insofar as changes in Canada are concerned, as the maintenance of the Canadian Army Overseas is one of the functions, we must be organized in Canada on the same level as in the Canadian Army Overseas...”

He was quite concerned with the inspection of vehicles and recommended that the RCASC retain their separate MT inspection branches in Canada as they had done in UK.

The VCGS, the DQMG (ST), Brig NB MacDonald, and the D of MM, Col GM Grant all suggested that a meeting should be held between the QMG and MGO with DQMG (ST) and D of MM attending.

Col Grant (51) in reporting to the MGO of a meeting he had with Brig MacDonald<sup>27</sup> (a) put for-ward the following points they had agreed upon.

- a) That the provision, storage and issue of vehicles including spare parts and assemblies be concentrated in RCOC.
- b) That there be a separate system of maintenance and repair of RCASC vehicles in Canada.

Col Grant went on to say: “Having in mind the fact that the maintenance and repair system as decided by both the British and the Canadian Army Overseas was formulated with a view to economy of personnel and equipment the following plan of repair for the Army in Canada is suggested for consideration of yourself and the QMG.

- a) That field formations of the RCASC in Canada continue to function as do field formations Overseas, that is, do 1st, 2nd and 3rd echelon repairs covered by the RCOC Permissive Repair Schedule (and) that complete overhauls be evacuated to the RCOC 4th echelon shops.
- b) That RCASC training centres at Borden (Ont) and Red Deer (Alta) continue as at present.
- c) That as CMTS (Landsdowne Park, Ottawa) is the QMG experimental workshop for all special equipments, it should be retained under present arrangements.
- d) In Military Districts where they now have garages, that the HWE of the RCASC continue to do 1st, 2nd and 3rd echelon repairs (as covered by the RCOC Permissive Repair Schedule) 4th echelon repairs to be done in RCOC Workshops. At points where RCASC do not now have garages, all 2nd, 3rd and 4th echelon of repairs will be done in RCOC Workshops.”

Col Grant recommended that the mechanical inspection of RCASC operated vehicles should continue to be inspected by that Service and that RCOC inspectors would inspect RCASC vehicle tires and report their findings to them.

The MGO agreed with Col Grant’s proposals and submitted them to the Military Members of the Army Council who approved them on 17 Dec 42. (53)

<sup>27</sup> Brig MacDonald (52) wrote a letter to the QMG recommending essentially the same points.



Canadian Army Routine Order 3493<sup>28</sup> covering these points was published 7 Aug 1943. Two main reasons for the delay<sup>29</sup> was the loss of the file, (54) the subject being reopened 8 Dec 42 and the writing and obtaining agreement of the clauses covering the transportation of ammunition and explosives, which for some undetermined reason was included.

The provisions of CARO 3493 did not affect the RCASC set up in the Army in Canada. The main point stressed by the MGO in his concurrence to the VCGS's letter of 29 June 42, the importance of eliminating duplication of maintenance and repair services (55), was lost sight of in the power plays of reorganization.

### **The events leading up to the separation of the “E” side of RCOC and the formation of the new corps**

Col HA Campbell, the executive assistant to the MGO, although not in the “E” side of his Corps, was nevertheless strongly in favour of the formation of a Canadian REME, On 16 Oct 43 he prepared a detailed report on the advisability of forming such a corps in the Canadian Army. (56)

The report briefly reviewed all the previous reports available on the formation of REME in the British Army and the collecting of the engineering functions of the Canadian Army, abroad and at home, into the “E” side of Ordnance.

In reviewing the Canadian scene he said: “There is undoubtedly room for further integration of MT Maintenance within one Corps ... The present situation is not healthy. The DOME naturally regards himself as very much the junior partner in a somewhat ill sorted union. Although OMEs are eligible for appointment as DOOs none have so far been appointed.”

Col Campbell stressed the overriding principle “It is imperative to secure that the machines of war, on which the lives of the fighting men and the safety of the country depend, shall never fail because of inadequate maintenance and repairs.”<sup>30</sup> “From this”, wrote Col Campbell, “it follows that the best possible organization must be adopted irrespective of inter-corps rivalry or internal function within a Corps. While an adequate organization is vital, the over-provision of maintenance facilities cannot be tolerated.”

As a result of his study of the various committee reports and with his personal discussions with various officers, Col Campbell was convinced that the formation of REME in the British Army was justified. He went so far in his thinking that he advocated “The adoption of the second phase, ie, the absorption of unit maintenance tradesmen should follow, which should include taking over maintenance service in all echelons of the RCASC.”

In discussing the development of the Engineering side of Ordnance, Col Campbell explains how the “E” side was junior to the Stores side. “Due to its later... development, the engineering side has always been regarded as the junior partner and its officers treated as specialists not concerned with administrative functions. In fact, the forerunner of the OME was the Inspector of Ordnance Machinery, who held honorary rank only and was almost in-variably a former Armament Sergeant Major. Thus the higher administration has been controlled from the Stores side.”

The “E” side is now of such paramount importance to the whole future of the Army,” wrote Col Campbell, “that everything possible must be done to increase its prestige including representation on the highest levels.”

<sup>28</sup> Readers interested in a detailed comparison between the recommendations made at the Director's Meeting of 22 June 42 and CARO 3493 are referred to a study to be found in HQS-20-1-X Vol 3.

<sup>29</sup> The Director's Meeting that initiated this action, it will be remembered, was held on the 22nd June 42. It certainly would appear that delaying influences were at work, ie, there is no valid reason for including the clauses on the carrying of explosives, which in itself considerably delayed the publication of the Order, nor was the “burying” of the file likely to have been accidental.

<sup>30</sup> Maj Gen Massey (57) was expressing in lucid language a statement to be found in the Beveridge Reports.

In regard to the attitude of the EIC he said “The present organization has not got the active support of the Engineering Institute similar to the backing given to the REME in the UK by the Institutions of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. This lack of support probably means more than is realized.”

In discussing the relative strengths of the “O” or stores side and the “E” or engineering side of RCOC Col Campbell presented the following table.

Relative Strengths “E” Side and “O” Side in the RCOC

	Overseas		
	Officers	ORs	%
“E” Side	412	11330	88
“O” Side	531	5357	32
	Canada		
	Officers	ORs	%
“E” Side	440	6585	38
“O” Side	828	10748	82

He pointed out that the tendency overseas will be for the “E” side to increase with the formation of Advanced Base Ordnance Workshop, and the disbandment of the sub-depots of the Base Ordnance Workshop.

Col Campbell disagreed with the intimation in Col GM Grant’s (58) (D of MM) paper that the visualized strength of a Canadian EME Corps overseas would not justify the appointment of officers with the rank and prestige required to deal with senior officers of the Army.<sup>31</sup> He rebutted by saying “As far as the strength of a Canadian REME is concerned ... the figures (in the table above) speak for themselves, while in regard to high ranking officers the necessary appointments in all formations have already been created and filled presumably by officers of the required prestige.”

Col Campbell concluded his report by recommending:

- a) that the Army Commander overseas be requested to make a definite re-commendation on the advisability of forming the new Corps of RCEME.
- b) that the Army Commander and the Senior Officer at CMHQ should consider creating the appointment of DME reporting directly to the DQMG.
- c) that the appointment of DDEM (CMHQ) should be abolished and the functions should be split between the DOS and DME.
- d) that in Canada the HWEs should be revised to provide for a division between the “E” side and the “O” side on parallel lines with the EME officers in charge of their own administration and in command of their own personnel.
- e) that at NDHQ, the appointment of D of MM should be changed to DME and the appointment of an ADME (pers) under DOS (A) to co-ordinate administration of “E” personnel.
- f) that if the new Corps of RCEME is formed, the administration of personnel should be placed directly under the DME by transfer of ADME (Pers) and records from DOS (A).

<sup>31</sup> This general statement appears in several documents and I do not believe it to be the belief of the D of MM but rather the belief of some of the senior officers in CMHQ. Col Grant included this in his reasons for the apparent non-acceptance of REME by the Cdn Army Overseas. (RHH)

Brig JH MacQueen, (59) DQMG, CMHQ, tabled a memorandum at a conference held to discuss 4th echelon repair in the event of *Overlord* and the reorganization of army equipment maintenance services held at HQ First Canadian Army on the 12 Nov 43<sup>32</sup> in which he reviewed the situation and then went on to say that the present Canadian organization has been generally satisfactory, in that we are practically on the same basis as REME within field formations...” He believed though “...that the time has come when we should reorganize the repair and maintenance services as a separate RCEME Corps.”

The transition overseas would not involve any major changes of establishment. He suggested that as the DQMG establishment allowed for one of three colonels to be a brigadier that this brigadier should be designated ADQMG (E) and that this appointment would co-ordinate the RCOC and RCEME Services at CMHQ. The heads of these Services would be deputy directors in the rank of colonel. A separate EME reinforcement unit would be required and the organization and administrative sections of the DOS Branch would have to be split.

Brig MacQueen noted that the British had postponed their intention of taking over, for the present, of the 1st and 2nd Echelon of the RASC. They were, however, taking over certain maintenance functions from the RE. Brig MacQueen ended his memorandum with the recommendation that the Canadian Services should parallel the British Service in these two respects

The memorandum of the conference (60) records that “General McNaughton felt that the advantages of continuing on our present basis are that the present organization in the Army itself is operating efficiently, and by having workshops and stores sections staffed by personnel of the same Corps, interchange is possible, and the diversity factor is appreciable. ...However, Canadian formations are now working as integral parts of British Corps with Canadian Ordnance units working aide by side British units wearing REME badges. Also, although this situation is not so evident in the Canadian Army Overseas, in the Canadian Army in Canada the “O” side of the RCOC is so much larger than the “E” side, and the more senior appointments in the corps are held by “O” personnel. The result is a certain amount of dissatisfaction and an unattractive future to young engineer officers.”

The memorandum records that General McNaughton concluded his remarks on this subject by stating “that in the best interests of all concerned, he agreed to the formation of a separate corps, even in view of the resulting slight loss in the diversity factor and the slight increase in personnel.”

General Young (61) in his report of the conference said:

“I am of the opinion that there should be given to the “E” side complete control of all repair and maintenance, eliminating any possible domination from the Stores side; that it would be a distinct advantage to have one organization completely responsible for all repair and maintenance. This would entail some expense as to extra personnel but would open up higher ranks and more opportunities for advancement for mechanical and electrical engineer officers than in the past and would encourage the highest grade of officer to go into this side of the Army, particularly in peace-time. This position could be cemented for the future better by having a new Corps than if there were two distinct sides incorporated in one Corps, the RCOC.”

A sub committee<sup>33</sup> was appointed by the MGO under the chairmanship of Lt Col RL Franklin (62) to examine in detail the problems involved in the split up of the “E” side of RCOC. The Franklin committee showed that the increase in overall personnel required to form a new Corps would be negligible.

Five weeks later (after the Franklin report was due) the military members directed that a committee (63) be formed under the Chairmanship of Brig RB Gibson<sup>34</sup> and to report back on:

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<sup>32</sup> Present were: Lt Gen AGL McNaughton, GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army, Maj Gen JV Young, MGO, NDHQ, Brig JH MacQueen, DQMG, CMHQ, Col ED James, D of Mech, NDHQ, Maj DW Cunningham, PA to GOC-in-C.

<sup>33</sup> The Committee was formed (65) and instructed to report on or before 7 Mar 43. It was composed of: Lt Col RL Franklin, Chairman, Lt Col EW Brown, Maj LP Corbett, Maj RA Roberts, Capt CB Farnham.

1. Whether any reorganization of Army equipment maintenance services is warranted:
  - a. In Military Districts in Canada.
  - b. At NDHQ.
  - c. In Canadian Army Overseas.
  - d. At CMHQ.
2. To set forth in detail such reorganizations as are recommended.”

The committee reported back on the 20th Jan 44 as follows (64):

“We recommend:

- a) That the Corps of Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers be organized in the Canadian Army, Active and Reserve.
- b) That permission be obtained for this Corps to be a Royal Corps, and that subsequently it be named the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.”<sup>35</sup> (h)

The report was concurred in by the Military members. A submission to organize<sup>36</sup> the Corps was put forward to His Excellency, the Governor General in Council on 21 Jan 44. The Submission was approved on 24 Feb 44, effective 1 Feb 44, by PC 70/1185 and the Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers came into being on the same date.

His Majesty the King approved the grant of the designation “Royal” to the new Corps and the official title became Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and the abbreviation became RCEME.<sup>37</sup>

Canadian Army Routine Order (CARO) 4229 based on Army Council Instruction 1605 announced the organization of the Corps and CARO 4230<sup>38</sup> announced the formation of and the transference to the Corps.

The first units<sup>39</sup> to be called out in this phase of the reorganization were approved by PC 67/3735 on the 19 May 44, effective the 15 May 44, The Corps’ official birthday.

<sup>34</sup> The Committee consisted of: Brig RB Gibson, DCGS(A), Chairman, Col LM Chesley, DSD, Col HM Wallis, D Org(R), Col GM Grant, D of MM, Col RP Saunders, DOS(A), Col HT Fairs, D Tpt, Col EC Thorne, DED.

<sup>35</sup> There were three more recommendations of a technical nature concerning the sub-mission to his Excellency, The Governor-in-Council; the publishing of a CARO, and, if the Military members approved the report that CMHQ be notified that the formation of CEME was approved in principle.

<sup>36</sup> PC No/1185 authorized only the organization of the Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and not the calling out of units.

<sup>37</sup> GO 196/44, see Annex E.

<sup>38</sup> The Engineering Journal welcomed the Public announcement made on 27 Mar 44 by the Department of National Defence of the formation of CEME. The Journal criticized this CARO by saying: “It is too bad that in drawing up CARO 4230 nothing was included to indicate that the officers of the new engineering corps were to be professional engineers.” (66)

<sup>39</sup> GO 263/44 Records these units to be:

Serial	Unit
3901	Ottawa Workshop Coy, RCEME
3902	No 1 Company, RCEME
3903	No 2 Company, RCEME
3904	No 3 Company, RCEME
3905	No 4 Company, RCEME
3906	No 5 Company, RCEME
3907	No 6 Company, RCEME
3908	No 7 Company, RCEME
3909	No 10 Company, RCEME
3910	No 12 Company, RCEME
3911	No 13 Company, RCEME
3912	No 14 Company, RCEME

## **Annex A to Part 3**

### **Telegram**

From: Canadian Military Headquarters, Great Britain

To: National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa

LONDON, England.

DEFENSOR, Ottawa.

1954/19/5/42

GS 1700

Following for Stuart from McNaughton

Para. 1 Information relative organization Corps Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in British Army is given in telegrams QMG 2195 and GS 1391 and in SDD 5 Report No. 90. The question of that reorganization of the Army equipment and maintenance service and its applications to the Cdn Army was discussed at a Conference on 13 May 1942 at First Cdn Army at which were present heads of services affected and other senior officers concerned.

Para. 2 The considered views of that conference with which I am in full agreement are that we should (not)<sup>40</sup> form a separate corps as in British army but should consolidate within RCOC the functions of provision supply and maintenance of Mechanical Transport (now) carried out by that Corps and by RCASC behind Second Echelon. The workshop Pie of RCASC would remain RCASC responsibility so that first and second echelon maintenance of its own transport would be controlled by that Corps. This I regard as most important. RCOC would in future be responsible also for provision and rear echelon maintenance of RCE and RC Sigs equipment. This consolidation would not prejudice the formation of a separate corps of electrical and mechanical engineers in Cdn Army at later date should British experience with separate corps indicate last course more advantageous.

Para. 3 Personnel of RCOC should be fully combatant and any paragraphs of KR and O (Canada), which are derogatory to this principle, should be corrected. Similarly present restrictions in War Establishments as to category officers eligible for senior ordnance appointments in formations should be eliminated so that such appointments may be filled from along<sup>41</sup> all RCOC officers.

Para. 4 Request your approval in principle of above proposals so that early action may be taken to implement by transfer to RCOC of all RCASC vehicles together with heavy repair shop and MTRD and certain other RCASC personnel and equipment concerned with functions indicated above. No existing RCE or RC Sigs Units would be transferred to RCOC and only very minor changes will later be required such as decrease in establishment signal parks when RCOC becomes able to take over its full responsibility in maintenance wireless equipment.

Para. 5 Now that the British have at last consolidated provision repair and maintenance MT I am anxious to effect this in Cdn Army at earliest practicable date.

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3913

No 15 Company, RCEME

A Corps Headquarters to administer these Units was authorized the same day by PC 82/3900.

<sup>40</sup> The original wire was queried by NDHQ because the last half of the message was in conflict with the first half. The amendments shown in brackets were received on the 22 May. The unamended wire was given wide distribution at the top staff level and this is why the DSD and the Directors thought that. General McNaughton was recommending the formation of a new corps at this time. The amended wire shows that this was not the case.

<sup>41</sup> Apparently a typographical error: "among" was probably intended.

## ***Annex B to Part 3***

### **Telegram**

From: Canadian Military Headquarters, Great Britain

To: National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa

LONDON, England.

DEFENSOR, Ottawa

1700/7/6/42

#### GS 1932

Para. 1 your GSG 1056 attached propose implement changes in 2 phases as follows:

Phase 1 To be completed by 15 June 1942 RCOC assume control only of all vehicles and 3 and 4 echelon units RCASC affected under new policy. Units to remain in present corps pending detailed consideration of changes and adjustments required in establishments.

Phase 2 Completion of changeover by 1 August 1942 at the latest including application of new or adjusted establishments together with any redistribution and transfer of personnel involved.

Para. 2 Two committees have been set up to consider and advise on all matters involved in applications new policy as follows.

“A” Committee changes and adjustments in establishments for sub-mission to WEC GSO 1 staff duties CMHQ GSO 1 staff duties first Cdn Army DDOS first Cdn Army AAG (Org) CMHQ DOS CMHQ DQS CMHQ.

“B” Committee detailed by DAG CMHQ to consider all AG and related matters such as pay records badges etc except selection of officers which will be in accordance with existing procedure.

Para. 3 Above procedure follows generally similar action by troopers dealing with formation new corps royal electrical and mechanical engineers.

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### **Annex C to Part 3**

Personal and Confidential

H. Q. First Cdn Army. 27 March 1943.

Dear Austin:

I have been delayed in replying to your letter of 18 December, due to the recent re-organization of our Service, which kept me pretty fully occupied.

The Army Commander sent me over a copy of your recent cable together with a copy of his reply and in order to give you the picture a bit more fully, I suggested that I would write to you personally. To this he has very kindly agreed.

In order to give you the story of our status, speaking for the Mechanical Engineering Branch of the RCOE, I will go back to the time of my return from the Middle East last June. The Army Commander in setting up his Headquarters, stipulated that there should be a DDOS and a DDOS (E), the latter to have equal status with the DDOS in his respective field and the DDOS acted as Administrative Head of the Corps as a whole. I was then appointed

DDOS (E) and by working in close co-operation with the DDOS, we were able to smooth out most of the rough spots without any serious difficulty.

In the meantime, the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers came into being at the beginning of October under the direction of Maj-Gen. Rowcroft. It is interesting to note that the latter was formerly in the R. A. S. C. and that the then Director of Mechanical Maintenance in the R.A.O. C. resigned, - without going into detail -. This will give you an indication of the extent to which personalities, vested rights, etc., were in conflict.

At the end of 1942, it was considered essential that the organization of the Canadian Army in the Field should correspond in detail so far as possible with that of the British Army in England. Canada agreed to the Army Commander's recommendations in this connection and the necessary changes were put into effect at the first of the year. Under the terms of this re-organization, the Mechanical Engineering Branch of the RCOE in the First Canadian Army adopted the organization and titles of the REME. All personnel, however, remain in the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps and continue to wear its badges. It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to form a completely separate Corps in the short time available, besides which there are a number of very definite advantages in remaining as one.

As General McNaughton mentioned in his cable to you, full information is available in the files at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and I think it would be a very good thing if you could arrange to give the matter a certain amount of publicity. I am sure it would help if the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers at home knew a bit more about what we are doing here. It will, of course, be necessary to clear through official channels as to how much information can be made public,

Please convey my very best regards to any friends you may see and hoping to hear from you again shortly, I remain

Yours

(H. G. Thompson) Colonel, DDME First Cdn Army.

L. Austin Wright, Esq., M.E.I.C.,  
General Secretary, The Engineering Institute of Canada,  
2050 Mansfield Street, Montreal, Canada.

Copy to: Lt-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO, GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army, England.

## **Annex D to Part 3**

### **The Professional Engineer in the Services**

A review of the articles published in The Engineering Journal concerning the dispute between the Engineering Institute of Canada and the Department of National Defence of the employment of professional engineers by the Services

Mr L Austin Wright,<sup>42</sup> the General Secretary of The Engineering Institute of Canada and Editor of The Engineering Journal, jealously guarded the rights of the professional engineer in industry and naturally was equally concerned about their rights when they became citizen soldiers in time of war.

The EIC followed the events leading to the formation of REME in the British Army with great interest and showed its official approval by publishing in The Journal (67) a detailed description of its formation, organization and functions reprinted from The Journal of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in London. This was followed up two months later with a further appreciation of the newly formed Corps and an account of REME working in the heat of battle. The Editor said of the formation of REME in his introduction “This revolutionary development seems to justify some study by members of the profession in Canada, both military and civil, and therefore The Journal plans to produce similar articles from time to time, as an aid to such study.” (68)

In July, the Editor reprinted an article by John L Young entitled “REME’s Contribution to African Victory.” Mr Young describes the operation of Light Aid Detachment (LADs) in North Africa.

The August issue contained portions of an address about REME of particular interest to Canadians made by Col RB Maxwell<sup>43</sup> before the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in London.

The chairman of this meeting was Maj-Gen EB Rowcroft, the Director of REME. Col Maxwell (69) discussed the relationship of the professional engineer to REME.

In the first half of the address Col Maxwell delved deeply into the Beveridge Report and discussed its many aspects. He then continued by presenting a brief outline of the REME Field Organization.

The first indication of the militant actions that were to come appeared in the same Issue under the title “The Engineer, The Army, and Hansard” (70). The Editor was contemplating throwing his gauntlet on the ground when he opened his remarks with:

“From the record, it is apparent that it is no part of Institute policy to participate in matters of a political nature, but it is a part of Institute policy to do everything possible to aid engineers when it is thought that injustices are being done. It is also a part of Institute policy to do everything possible within the field in which it is competent to act, which may aid in the successful prosecution of the war. Both these points of policy would seem to be served by reviewing some questions and answers that were exchanged on the floor of the House of Commons not long ago.”<sup>44</sup>

The questions related to the use of technical personnel by the Government were asked by Mr AR Adamson (West York) and answered by Mr WC Macdonald (Halifax).

Mr Adamson asked, regarding the Army Technical Development Board, for the names of the director-general and deputy director-general and for details of their technical qualifications.

Mr Macdonald gave the names and technical qualifications of director-general and his deputy.

<sup>42</sup> Later Dr L Austin Wright.

<sup>43</sup> Assistant Adjutant General, REME, British Army

<sup>44</sup> Hansard 21 and 22 July 43.



The Editor commenting on Mr MacDonald's replies said of the Deputy Director, "The Canadian WHO's WHO makes no mention of any business connection other than brokerage and provides no evidence of training in technical matters or in firearms, other than to lint 'shooting' among his recreations. It is a well-known fact that up to the time of his appointment to the technical board, he had no business experience of any kind except as a stockbroker.

"The work of the Army Technical Development Board (ATDB) includes design of new weapons, improvement of existing weapons and equipment, and a study of armament used by the Allies and the enemies for possible adoption in the Canadian Army."

Mr Adamson asked regarding Ordnance Officers how many District Ordnance Officer were qualified engineers, how many Ordnance stores officers had reached the rank of colonel, of brigadier, how many Ordnance engineer officers had reached these ranks and how many stores and engineer officers had been given the Canadian War Staff Course.

Mr Macdonald's answers were revealing.<sup>45</sup> No District Ordnance Officers (DOOs) were engineers, there were 17 colonels and five stores brigadiers; there were nine colonels and one engineer brigadier and that eight stores officers and only two engineer officers had been given the Staff Course.

The Editor commented:

"Regulations provide that the Senior Ordnance Officer in a district can be on the stores (O) side or the engineering (E) side. It is interesting to see that there is not even one DOO in a District who is an engineer. The Journal understands that there has never been one. This seems strange in a service whose most important work is of an engineering nature.

"In a highly mechanized war it seems strange, too, that the staff course is given to four times as many stores men as to engineers." The Editor asked "How are engineers going to qualify for administrative positions in their own services if they are not given the necessary courses? And how can such services be carried out with the maximum of efficiency if the senior officers have no technical knowledge or experience?"

Mr Adamson asked regarding REME vs Ordnance if any steps had been taken by the Canadian Army Overseas to establish a separate corps similar to REME and if so what steps had been taken - upon whose advice and had similar steps been taken for the Army in Canada.

Mr Macdonald replied "...Consideration of the formation of such a separate unit will await the observations of responsible officers of the Canadian Overseas Army after experience gained regarding its operation in the British organization."

The Editor commenting on the negative answers given Mr Adamson said:

"The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers have been in existence since May 1942, and have had a great part in the successful North Africa and Sicily campaigns. After these wonderful exhibitions there should be plenty 'observations of responsible officers' readily available."

"Mr Adamson also asked questions as to the qualifications of the two senior officers at the Ordnance Training Center. The answers indicated that the CO had had an engineering training. The statement that he had 'studied civil engineering at the University of Toronto' is misleading" wrote the Editor. "The information that The Journal gets is that he attended the University for only one year, and that he has been a stockbroker for his entire business career ... are there no engineers available or competent for such a position?"

In an editorial, "Engineers in Ordnance", (71) the General Secretary wrote: "The Institute, through its Committee on the Engineer in the Services, has made many direct inquiries as to the merits of the REME

<sup>45</sup> The figures given included officers at Home and Abroad.

setup. These inquiries have included cables and letters to members overseas - both in military and civilian circles - conversations with REME officers who have been in this country, and communications direct from REME headquarters in England. An interview has been had also with the Master-General of the Ordnance at Ottawa. All these sources of information although not always in agreement, have combined to give the definite impression that the present Canadian arrangement in comparison to REME is inefficient, inadequate and indefensible.

“Frequently in articles and addresses on the REME, both in Canada and England, one can now detect the implication that the refusal of Canada to follow the proven course of the British authorities is based on the selfish interests of non-technical persons, in the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps.”<sup>46</sup>

The Department of National Defence made a Public announcement on 27 Mar 44 that the engineering services formerly included in the RCOC (E) were to be taken over by a new corps to be known as Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (CEME).

Canadian Army Routine Order 4230, which published the details, was criticized by The Journal (72) because of the lack of any positive statement that the officers were required to be professional engineers. The Editor maintained if the senior officers were to be given to non-technical persons, “the situation may well be no better than it was when the work was carried out in Ordnance. The Journal compared the British requirements for a commission in REME with the provisions of CARO 4230.”

The Editor also released the text of a brief that had been presented<sup>47</sup> to the Minister, the Hon Col JL Ralston, on the engineers in the Active Services stressing three items for the Minister’s attention:

“Item No 1. The failure of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps to give engineers senior appointments whereby they might be in charge of the engineering work done by the Corps,

“Item No 2. The appointment of non-technical persons to positions, which call for technical knowledge and experience.

“Item No 3. The failure to give engineers rank or pay as a professional recognition, as contrasted with the treatment given certain other professions.”

The Editor, who was a signatory<sup>48</sup> of the brief commented as follows: “Point number one ... has now been gained, number two ... may never be achieved fully but it should be pressed continually. Number three ... has been turned down flat! No one argues against the logic of it. Engineers resent discrimination against their profession. To overcome this particular example it looks as though dignified but persistent policy will have to be followed until someone sees the sense of it and has the courage to grant equality of recognition for equality of service.”

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<sup>46</sup> The same issue of The Journal carried the Annual Report of the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel; two letters to the Secretary under the heading “Engineers in the Services Complain” and a Rose Munro dispatch: “With Canadians in Italy, Sep 8 (CP cable) - Even repair unit formations of the Canadian Army - Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers - have taken prisoners in this strange advance through the Italian toe...”

Of this the Editor wrote “This is very interesting and will be good news if true.” It is suggested that Mr Wright was not completely aware that CMHQ Adm Order 2 of 10 Jan 43 authorized the adoption of REME organizations nomenclature etc, for the Canadian field units but within the framework of “E” side of RCOC and these units sometimes used just the abbreviation REME after their designation instead of REME (RCOC).

<sup>47</sup> 13 Mar 1944

<sup>48</sup> Others were: Lt Col DS Ellis (late RCE), Dean of Engineering, Queen’s University Chairman Grievance Committee for engineers in the Active Services, Lt Col DM Jemmett (late RCE), Hon Lt Col CC Lindsay, RCE, Maj ED Gray-Donald, RCOC (R), L Austin Wright, General Secretary, The Engineering Institute of Canada.

The General Secretary wrote<sup>49</sup> to the Minister, thanking him for his courtesy in receiving the delegation and accepting their brief. After seeing the Minister they called on the MGO, Maj Gen Young who explained the new organization in detail and told them that a public announcement would be made soon.<sup>50</sup>

Mr Wright in discussing professional pay in his letter said to the Minister: (73)

“We regret that there will be no professional allowance for engineering officers ... Such an allowance is made in the British setup. As long as this allowance is made to doctors and dentists in the Canadian services and not to engineers, the engineers are going to complain of discrimination.”

Mr Wright made reference to CARO 4230 and said “...I am quite disturbed to see that no specification is included which limits the commissioned officers to persons with professional qualifications ... If the senior appointments in the new CEME are not going to be engineers the situation will not be much different from that which presently exists in the Ordnance Corps and about which so much adverse comment has been made.”

Mr Wright then offered the services of the EIC. “We do not want to ask the impossible and we realize that sufficient technical personnel may be difficult to get at this time... We believe satisfactory persons could be located through the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel or through... The Engineering Institute of Canada. Certainly we would all be glad to help.”

The Minister replied<sup>51</sup> that CARO 4230 dealt “with the general information of the Corps and the transfer of personnel, their duties, etc, and therefore does not handle in detail the matter of qualifications for RCEME officers. The academic and practical qualifications of RCEME Officers will remain the same as they are at present for officers on the “E” side of Ordnance. These qualifications are and have always been equal to those demanded by REME with the exception that they do not require candidates for OME appointments to serve three years apprenticeship in electrical and mechanical engineering. This is an additional qualification of REME which we believe is very valuable but our demands are such that... we are forced to accept students from universities immediately upon graduation and prior to their having had any apprenticeship in the engineering world.”<sup>52</sup>

The Minister’s reply was too much for the General Secretary. Open War was declared in the following issue of The Journal.

WHEN IS AN ENGINEER NOT AN ENGINEER?” was the title of the editorial (74). “The answer seems to be” said the Editor, “when he is in the new Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Corps.” In commenting on an article in the Montreal Star of 13 May announcing the establishment of a local unit of the “Newest Corps in the Canadian Army” the Editor said of the six commissioned officers” ... only one of the entire lot has any engineering education or experience. Apparently one of the qualifications for a commission in the new corps is that one MUST NOT be an engineer!”

As near as one can judge from the sketchy information so far released, all that is new about the RCEME is the title. After all the complaints about non-technical persons on the engineering side of Ordnance, one can be excused for having expected a different set-up for the new Corps, but apparently the same philosophy is followed, ie, engineers are not administrators, and therefore all the senior appointments must go to salesmen, brokers, service men and so on,<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup> 27 Mar 44

<sup>50</sup> 27 Mar 44

<sup>51</sup> 8 Apr 44

<sup>52</sup> It is apparent that the Minister’s letter shows a lack of understanding of the educational system in UK and a lack of understanding of the qualifications of the professional Engineer in Canada when he misused the word apprenticeship.

<sup>53</sup> The Journal describes the qualifications of the six officer’s named in the Montreal Star as follows; “The Officer commanding the Montreal Unit is or was president of a “drive-yourself” taxi company. He is not an engineer and has never done engineering work. The second in command is an engineer and a member of the Institute. Of the two Captains appointed, one was a district service representative for a motor car company and the other was in the service department of a motor car agency. The civilian work of the two lieutenants was in one case, tire sales and, in the other, insurance.”

“How long must this sort of thing go on?” asked the Editor. “For years the Institute has been pleading POLITELY for fair treatment of the engineers. It has been pressing COURTEOUSLY, though firmly, for over a year for the formation of an electrical and mechanical engineers corps, and has called official attention to the need of taking this new corps seriously. Apparently these methods are not the ones for producing results.”

The EIC held a regional meeting of Council in Toronto on 17 June and fully discussed the apparent policy of giving the majority of commissions in RCEME to non-technical persons. The Council decided to send<sup>54</sup> a protest to the Minister of National Defence.

The protest (75) reviewed the stand taken by the EIC regarding non-professional officers being given senior appointments in RCOC (E) and later RCEME, then said:

“Council’s knowledge of appointments to the new corps has been limited to those reported in the press, although a request was made to the Master-General of the Ordnance for an official list or lists. This information is so at variance with the Minister’s statement that Council desires to bring it to his attention and to enquire if this type of selection has been adopted as a standard policy or if there is some chance that the work of the corps, both at Headquarters and in the districts, will be carried out under the administration and control of engineers.

“The seriousness of assigning control of engineering work to non-engineers is a matter of concern to all engineers, their best opportunities to serve their country.”

The July Editorial and the protest to the Minister resulted in Mr de Gaspé Beaubien, the President of the EIC receiving a letter from Maj Gen Young, the MGO “stating that the Institute’s protests indicated a lack of ‘a complete knowledge of the situation and the related problems’, and inviting him to call at NDHQ ‘so that we can have a complete and frank discussion of the matter’.”

The President accepted the invitation and on July 25th with Lt Col LF Grant of Kingston, his Vice President and Mr Wright, called upon the MGO. Brig W Mavor (DMGO) and Col RL Franklin the officer administering RCEME and Director of Mechanical Engineering attended the interview.

General Young outlined the personnel set up of RCEME and compared it to REME. He explained the Corps policy permitting the advancement to commissioned rank and technical officer appointments of selected tradesmen from other rank personnel.

The Editor had no quarrel about officers coming from the ranks. He wrote (76):

“It is agreed that, when examining the overall picture, consideration must be given to those who by merit have risen from the ranks, but this does not explain the original appointment of so many non-professional people to higher ranks who did not rise from the ranks.”

The Editor’s remarks about discussions related to the scarcity of engineers for the Corps wrote:

“The most important thought expressed to the Institute Officers was that the reason there were not more engineers in the Corps was that more engineers were not available, which is not difficult to understand in view of the treatment of engineers in the Ordnance Corps, the predecessor of RCEME. It was stated that engineers who had the qualifications would be given an appointment without hesitation, and that there were still a number of openings available right now for such persons. This was a great surprise and the President expressed the opinion that engineers did not know of these openings. He was advised that the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel was reorganized as the Official source of engineering candidates and, as the Institute is one of the sponsors of the Bureau, it was considered that it need not be approached separately on the matter. In reply the President stated he was confident that had such information been given to the

<sup>54</sup> 22 June 44

Institute as well as to the Bureau many additional candidates could have been found. He pointed out that his appearance before every branch of the Institute and every university at which engineering is taught gave him unusual opportunities to disseminate such information.”

Peace appeared to have been declared as there were no more verbal barrages<sup>55</sup> (b) in The Journal until Sep 45. Letters were received from officers in Petawawa and published under the heading “Idle Engineers,”

Mr Wright was also upset by the publication of CARO 5612 dealing with “Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Classifications and Qualifications.” In an editorial RCEME OFFICERS - ENGINEERS OR TRADESMEN? he wrote: (77)

“At one stage in the Institute’s earlier negotiations with the Department of National Defence, the Master-General of the Ordnance stated that no more non-professional people would be given engineer appointments in the Corps as long as engineers were available. This is what the Institute had been asking for, and so a certain amount of satisfaction was enjoyed for a few fleeting weeks. This ‘fool’s paradise’ blew up suddenly when Canadian Army Routine Order No 5612 appeared last Spring.

The Order described the EME, the Electrical and Mechanical Assistant Engineer (EMAE), the Mechanical Officer (Mech Offr) and the Executive Officer (EO). The EMAE ‘will be appointed from the ranks of qualified Warrant Officers, etc’, and the Mech Offr and the EO ‘will be a tradesman appointed from the ranks ... or a person from civilian life, etc.’

The last paragraph of the order says ‘... notwithstanding the above noted classifications, Electrical and Mechanical Assistant Engineers, Mechanical Officers and Executive Officers may be posted to any Electrical and Mechanical Engineer vacancy in authorised War Establishments.’ “In other words”, said the Editor, “a tradesman appointed from the ranks or a person from civilian life could become an Electrical and Mechanical Engineer!”

Representations made by the EIC resulted in CARO 5612 being amended by CARO 5831 which cancelled para 3 of CARO 5612 and substituted the following:

“Officers of the above classifications will be posted in accordance with establishment requirements.” The DND letter to the EIC explaining the amendment said, “... the intention being that the classification of the officer posted will depend on the functional demand of the establishment. It is an accepted principle of the Corps, however, that Officers Classified as Electrical Mechanical Engineers can fill any and all appointments of the Corps.”

The following March (78) carried an Editorial “RCEME”. The Editor said that in his role of General Secretary he had been given an opportunity to examine the plans for the Corps peacetime establishment.’ “It is apparent”, he said, “that the present officials intend to make the Corps one of engineers in fact and not only in title. Of the existing senior personnel and proposed additions to it, the proportion of University graduates in engineering is high, there being only three who are not so qualified and they have other qualifications that sent them to their special appointments.”

The article closed with an article outlining the career opportunities for young graduates in RCEME under the direction of the Corps Director, Col JW Bishop.<sup>56</sup>

The war between the EIC and the Department of National Defence had ended.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> The December issue of The Journal carried a brief history of RCEME written by Lt Col AO Monk and Maj RT Boyle of the Directorate of Mechanical Engineering.

<sup>56</sup> Later to become the only brigadier from the Corps up to the time of writing, 10 Feb 61. RHH

<sup>57</sup> There was however one more shot to be fired in 1947 on the shortage of professional engineers. See Appendix I. (79)

## Appendix 1 to Annex D

The Engineering Institute of Canada

Copy for Col. H. G. Thompson, M.E.I.C. G. W. Beecroft, M.E.I.C.

February 11th, 1947

Victor Sifton, Esq., Winnipeg Free. Press, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Dear Mr. Sifton:

Not long ago there appeared in the Montreal papers an account of your visit to the Ordnance demonstration in Montreal, at which time you were presented with an illuminated address on behalf of the RCOC.

I was absent from the city at the time, but upon my return my attention was called to the newspaper account of your address on that occasion. I was particularly intrigued with the statement that, among other things, you had “emphasized the need of more technically trained officers”. You may or may not know of the war-long efforts of the Engineering Institute of Canada to get recognition in the R. C.O. C. for professional engineers. The RCEME Corps record with regard to engineers was no better than that of the Ordnance Corps.

We had a committee appointed at that time whose purpose was to bring to the attention of the officers in charge the fact that they were putting non-professional people in technical appointments, and that they were not giving senior appointments to professionally qualified persons. The records of the investigations and the efforts of that committee constitute a strong indictment of the Department for its failure to use the professionally qualified men that were available.

In the light of these experiences, I find your observations - providing you are correctly quoted - rather difficult to understand. During the time when you were M.G.O., and subsequent to that time, we were waging a strong campaign in many quarters to have technically qualified people used for the work that seemed to be most suited to them. At one time in our negotiations we were told by an MGO who followed after you that the only reason they had not used more engineers was that they were not available. I was in a position to know that every request for an engineer from the Ordnance Corps or the RCEME was met without any delay. I know of many cases of well-qualified men that we sent in deliberately to the Ordnance Corps who were offered jobs as Second Lieutenants but nothing higher. In some cases these were men under forty years of age who were earning very high salaries in industry, and who would seem to have excellent qualifications for the work.

In the light of all these matters, I still find it difficult to believe that the policy during the war was to use technically trained officers. If your statement indicates a change of policy, we engineers who are in a position to keep before us the full national picture, will be delighted.

There are definite indications that the Department now desires to have properly qualified engineers, but such indications were sadly lacking during the period of the war, which included the short period during which you were MGO.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) L. Austin Wright General Secretary

Annex E to Part 3



GOVERNMENT HOUSE.  
OTTAWA



Office of the Secretary  
to the Governor General

3rd April, 1944.

My dear Mr. Minister,

Referring to your letter of the 16th ultimo, I wish to inform you that a letter has been received to-day from the Private Secretary to the King, informing us that His Majesty is glad to approve the grant of the designation "Royal" to the new Corps of Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. This information was communicated to your Private Secretary by telephone to-day.



Yours sincerely,

*L. C. Keenan*

Assistant Secretary to the  
Governor General.

*Notified M.G.O. by  
tel 1245 hrs. today  
DWH*

H. P. G. LESTER  
Major - C.E.F.C.  
1914-1918

The Honourable APR 7 1944  
The Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa.

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## **Annex F to Part 3**

### **Overseas routine orders concerning the formation of RCEME**

#### **Overseas Routine Order No 4604 - Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Formation of and Transfer to**

1. The formation of the Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers has been authorized by Order-in Council PC 70/1185 of 24 Feb 44, as notified in GO 127 of 1944, which declares that all officers and ORs of this corps are combatant in the fullest sense, except that for the purpose of restricting the exercise of command, officers will be limited to military command over such officers and men as may be especially placed under their command or attached to their corps for duty in accordance with the provisions of Para 220, King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1939, which for the present will continue to apply. Subsequent to the above Order-in-Council, authority has been granted for the use of the prefix "Royal" in the title of this corps.
2. Amendments to King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1939, and other publications made necessary by the formation of this new corps will be made in due course, pending which rules and regulations applicable to the RCOC overseas will apply to the RCEME.

#### 3. *Titles*

The official full and abbreviated titles for the corps will be:

- a. Full title - Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.
- b. Abbreviated title - RCEME.

#### 4. *Organization*

- a. *General* - The RCEME will be responsible for the inspection, maintenance and repair of electrical and mechanical equipment and will assume:
  - i. the complete responsibilities of the engineering side of the RCOC, and
  - ii. responsibility for the inspection, maintenance and repair of all Army vehicles except those in operation by the RCASC or driven by RCASC personnel for which inspection and repair facilities are provided under RCASC arrangements.
  - iii. Certain responsibilities from the RCE and RC Sigs as covered by Appendix "A" to this Order.
- b. *RCASC repair facilities*
  - i. RCASC repair facilities will be limited to those facilities provided in workshop platoons or sections in the various types of RCASC companies.
  - ii. Repairs beyond the capacity of RCASC responsibilities as detailed in the foregoing sub-para are the responsibility of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Echelon Workshop Organization of the RCEME and, upon evacuation of the RCASC operated vehicles to such workshops, the responsibility of the RCASC for repair and inspection ceases in respect of the vehicles concerned.
- c. *Officers* - RCEME officers will consist of electrical and mechanical engineers and ungraded engineering officers of appropriate ranks, and also electrical and mechanical assistant engineers, assistant inspectors of armourers, workshop executive officers, and



quartermasters. RCEME officers will be fully responsible for the command and administration of their personnel, in addition to their technical responsibility. As a temporary measure, officers from other arms and services, including RCOC will be attached as required to RCEME units for regimental duties.

- d. *ORs* - ORs of the RCEME will consist of both tradesmen (including armament artificers, armourers, artisans, clerks, and storemen) and non-tradesmen (drivers, IC and general duty men). Tradesmen below NCO rank in the RCEME will hold the rank of “Craftsmen” (abbreviation “Cfn”), non-tradesmen below NCO rank will hold the rank of “Pte”.
5. *Control* - The RCEME overseas will function under the branch of the Quartermaster-General.
  6. *Conditions of service and transfer* - The conditions of service and transfer, voluntary or compulsory, of both officers and ORs will be on the basis of existing regulations or as amended from time to time.
  7. *War Establishments - ranks, appointments and trades applicable to the RCEME*
    - a. Appendix “B” to this Order sets out types of units belonging to other corps which it is intended will be affected by the formation of the RCEME. The current War Establishment applicable to those units which are to be transferred in toto (or appropriate portions in the case of units which are not being transferred complete, will apply for all purposes of promotions, postings, etc, pending the issue of revised or amended War Establishments for the RCEME.
    - b. All ranks and appointments provided in the War Establishments concerned will apply to the RCEME except that certain appointments will be re-designated from 15 May 44 as follows :
      - i. *Officers*  
 OME becomes EME  
 AOME becomes EMAE  
 Mechanical officer becomes officer engineering ungraded.
      - ii. *ORs*  
 Ranks and appointments of ORs of the RCEME are given in Appendix “D” to this Order. The new designation will replace those now shown in War Establishments concerned.
    - c. Trades now applicable to other corps and which become applicable to the RCEME pending such revision as is necessary will be determined separately and War Establishments amended accordingly.
    - d. As among the types of units covered by Appendix “B”, the War Establishments of headquarters of formations and establishments which include RCOC officers of mechanical engineers staff, such appointments therein will be re-designated as follows:  
 DDOS(E) becomes DDME  
 ADOS(E) becomes ADME  
 DADOS(E) becomes DADME  
 OME becomes EME

Similarly in the War Establishments of headquarters of formations, establishments and units of all arms which include ORs, of the RCOC, such ORs will become “RCEME” as detailed in Appendix “D”.

8. *Arrangements for transfer of personnel to the RCEME from the RCOC*

With effect 15 May 44 the units or appropriate parts or personnel of combined units, covered by Appendix “B”, Parts I and II, will become RCEME. On the same date, all RCOC personnel concerned including those with HQ of formations, or who are serving with, or on strength of other arms (e.g., armourers and fitters MV on the establishments of infantry battalions) will be transferred to the RCEME. Transfer of both officers and ORs from the RCOC to the RCEME will be effected as follows:

a. *Officers*

RCOC - All officers including serving Permanent Force officers of the following categories will be transferred to the RCEME in their substantive or temporary ranks, retaining any acting ranks held in the units concerned, subject to the proviso that acting rank in accordance with the normal rules must be dependent on War Establishments which may be subject to alterations due to reorganization.

- i. OMEs who will become electrical and mechanical engineers (EME, including officers of the rank of colonel and above).
- ii. Mechanical officers who will become ungraded engineering officers.
- iii. AOME (who will become EMAE), Assistant Inspectors of Armourers (AIA) and Workshop Executive Officers (WEO).

b. *ORs*

ORs of the following groups who are to be transferred to RCEME will be transferred in their substantive or temporary ranks (including lance appointments).

- i. All ORs both tradesmen and non-tradesmen of the RCOC who are serving with the units as covered by Appendix “B”, Part I and II.
- ii. All ORs of the RCOC of the trades specified in Appendix “C” to this Order as applicable in toto to the RCEME and no longer applicable to the RCOC including those who are serving with or on the strength of HQ of formations, establishments, or units of other arms.
- iii. All ORs of the RCOC of the trades referred to in (ii) above who are non-effective (e.g., personnel on “X” Lists, etc).

- c. ORs holding acting ranks or appointments on War Establishments will, on transfer, retain such acting ranks or appointments.

The appointment of conductor or sub-conductor will not apply to the RCEME and any warrant officer holding such appointment who is transferred from the RCOC to the RCEME will, with effect from date of transfer, be appointed “Superintending Clerk, Warrant Officer Class I”.

9. *Combined RCOC and RCEME units.*

It is intended that certain units having roles applicable to both the RCOC and RCEME will be so organized that each corps will have a separate company or sub-unit, although located together. In such cases the CO of the combined unit will exercise power of command over companies and sub-units of both corps. Technical or department instructions will be issued separately to

combined units through the appropriate channels either ordnance or mechanical engineers. (See Appendix “B”, Part II.)

10. Where units are divided, the funds and assets of such units will be apportioned in accordance with existing instructions.
11. Revision of Pulhems Profiles where necessary will be published separately as amendments to the pamphlet “Physical Standards and Instructions”; meanwhile, those applicable to RCOC will apply. . .
12. Instructions regarding uniforms, badges and personal equipment will be notified later.
13. Overseas RO 3220 and 4198 are hereby cancelled.

(GO 196 of 44)

(ACI 1605 of 42)

(CARO 4230)

(6/CEME/1)

### **Appendix “A” to Overseas RO 4604**

Definition of Responsibilities of the RCE, RC Sigs and the RCEME

(See para 4(a)(iii) of this Order)

#### *1. Royal Canadian Engineers*

- a. Constructional and productive engineering, such as power transmission, power stations, pumping stations, ice factories, saw-mills or wood machine shops, and their maintenance except as specified below, will remain the responsibility of the RCE.
- b. The workshop capacity to deal with the following will be retained by the RCE:
  - i. Repair and maintenance of structural steel work such as girder bridges.
  - ii. Components of hutting or shedding.

If, however, precision work is required for maintenance of equipment, as covered by paras (a) and (b) above, it will be carried out in RCEME workshops which will provide the necessary capacity.

- c. Repair of mechanical equipment of engineer origin, e.g., tunnelling equipment, pumping sets or prime movers will be taken over by the RCEME. (This to include mechanical equipment of Works Services.)
- d. The RCE will retain responsibility up to the junction box of the lead-in of the outside power supply.

#### *Application of these principles to existing units*

- e. Army troops companies and electrical and mechanical companies will remain RCE units.
- f. Workshop sections of tunnelling units and mechanical equipment companies will remain RCE at present.
- g. In the case of workshop and park companies, RCE, the function of quick repair of miscellaneous machinery such as pumps, concrete mixers and other simple machinery required for RCE work in the field and in Works Services, will be taken over by the RCEME.
- h. In the case of Engineer (Base) Workshops, RCE, the responsibility for repair of miscellaneous machinery will be taken over by the RCEME.

2. *Royal Canadian Corps of Signals*

The inspection and maintenance and repair of signal equipment, formerly a RCOC responsibility, will be taken over by RCEME. First Echelon maintenance will continue to be carried out by RC Sigs and units carrying signal equipment.

**Appendix “B” to Overseas RO 4604**

Types of Units and Establishments affected by the Formation of RCEME  
(See paras 7, 8 and 9 of this Order)

Part I

RCOC units which convert completely to RCEME and remain provisionally on their current War Establishments:

Light Aid Detachments (all types)	Light Anti-Aircraft Workshops
Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshops	Recovery Companies
Advanced Base Workshops	Port Workshops
Engineer Equipment Workshops	Base Workshops
Sub-Workshops	MT Inspectorate
Small Arms Inspectorate	HQ, Commander RCEME
Armd Tps Workshop	Inf Tps Workshop
Tank Tps Workshop	Armd Bde Workshop
Inf Bde Workshop	Army Tps Workshop
Corps Tps Workshop	

Part II

1. RCOC units which become provisionally combined RCOC and RCEME (see footnote).
2. All posts for engineering personnel on the War Establishment of these units will apply to the RCEME together with all posts for personnel employed on administrative and general duties with the engineering parts of such units, except, for personnel of other corps as specifically designated in War Establishments.
3. All other posts will apply to the RCOC.

Central Ordnance Depots

Ordnance Reinforcement Unit

Note: In the case of combined\_ units, certain establishments, such as Central Ordnance Depot and Ordnance Reinforcement Units, are included in Part II as a temporary measure only, pending the issue of new War Establishments separately for RCOC and RCEME.

**Appendix “C” to Overseas RO 4604**

List of Trades Applicable to the RCEME (See paras 7(d) and 8(b) (ii) of this Order)

Armament Artificer (AA)	Armament Artificer (AFV)	Armament Artificer (Electrical)
Armament Artificer (Fd)	Armament Artificer (Inst AA)	Armament Artificer (Inst Fd)
Armament Artificer (MV)	Armament Artificer (Wireless)	Armament Artificer (Radio)
Armourer	Blacksmith	Carpenter
Coach Painter	Coach Trimmer & Upholsterer	Draughtsman (Mechanical)
*Driver Mechanic	*Driver Mechanic (AFV)	Driver Operator
Electrician	Electro Plater	Fitter
Fitter (AFV)	Fitter (MV)	Grinder (Precision)
Hammerman	Instrument Mechanic	Machinist (Metal)
Machinist (Wood)	Mechanic Radio	Mechanic Wireless
Motor Mechanic	Millwright	Moulder
Painter & Decorator	Pattern Maker	Panel Beater
Push Cycle Repairer	Riveter	Saddler
Sawyer	Sheet Metal Worker	Textile Refitter
Toolmaker	Turner	Vulcanizer
Watchmaker	Welder (G & E)	*Clerk
*Clerk (Superintending)	*Storeman (T & D)	

*Notes*

1. With the exception of those marked with an asterisk, all tradesmen now shown in War Establishments of RCOC units not converted to the RCEME or in War Establishments of other arms as “RCOC” will become “RCEME”.
2. In the case of RCOC clerks (excluding substantive conductors and sub-conductors) and non-tradesmen now shown as attached or part of a War Establishment of another arm or HQ, etc, such RCOC personnel will be transferred to the RCEME in cases where they are doing duty in connection with electrical and mechanical maintenance.
3. In addition to tradesmen of the trades listed above, the RCEME will include non-tradesmen such as Drivers IC and personnel for general and regimental duties.

**Appendix “D” to Overseas RO 4604**

Table showing Designations of Relative Ranks and Appointments applicable to Warrant Officers, NCOs and men of the RCOC and RCEME. The RCEME Designations will be adopted in the case of all Other Ranks transferred to the RCEME.

Rank	RCEME Appointments or Ranks	RCOC Appointments or Ranks
Warrant Officer Class I	RSM (A) Armament SM Armourer SM Artisan SM Superintending Clerk	RSM Armament SM Armourer SM Artisan SM  Conductor Sub-Conductor
Warrant Officer Class II	RQMS (a) Armament QMS Armourer QMS Artisan QMS SQMS (clerk or storeman) CSM (a)	RQMS Armament QMS Armourer QMS SQMS (Artisan) SQMS (clerk or storeman) CSM
CQMS	CQMS (a)	CQMS
Staff Sergeant	Armament Staff Sergeant Armourer Staff Sergeant Artisan Staff Sergeant Staff Sergeant (clerk or storeman) Staff Sergeant (d)	Armament Staff Sergeant Armourer Staff Sergeant Staff Sergeant (Artisan) Staff Sergeant (clerk or storeman) Staff Sergeant (d)
Sergeant	Sergeant (a) Armourer Sergeant	Sergeant Sergeant Armourer
Corporal	Lance Sergeant Armourer (a) Lance Sergeant Corporal (a) Armourer Corporal	Lance Sergeant Armourer Lance Sergeant Corporal (a) Armourer Corporal
Craftsman (c)	Lance Corporal (c) Lance Corporal Armourer Craftsman	Lance Corporal (c) Lance Corporal Armourer Private (c) or Armourer Private
Private (d)	Lance Corporal (d) Private (d)	Lance Corporal (d) Private (d)

- (a) Either tradesmen or non-tradesmen.
- (b) Will only be transferred under special CMHQ instructions.
- (c) Tradesmen only.
- (d) Non-tradesmen only.

### **Overseas Routine Order 4919 - Designation of RCEME Officers**

1. With reference to Overseas RO 4604, effective 1 Aug 44, the use of the RCEME officer category of EME, and the accompanying departmental gradings of 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> class will be discontinued. Thereafter EME officers will be referred to according to their rank only.
2. All reference to the category of EME and the accompanying departmental gradings, in WEs of the Cdn Army Overseas, shall be deemed to have been deleted and RCEME inserted where necessary to designate a requirement for an RCEME officer of the EME category.
3. “Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Standing Orders 1939” Section IV Para 51 (b) will no longer apply to RCEME officers serving with the Cdn Army Overseas.
4. RCEME officers of the Quartermaster categories, namely EMAE, AIA and WEO, will continue to be so designated.

(Ref Army Order 172 of 43)

(9/RCEME/1)

### **Overseas Routine Order 4908 - Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Formation of and Transfer to**

Overseas RO 4604 is hereby amended as follows:

Para 8(a) (ii) *delete* - “Mechanical officers who will become ungraded engineering officers”.

*Substitute* - “Mechanical officers and all other RCEME officers who are not qualified for any of the classifications listed within this sub-para, will become ungraded engineering officers”.

Para 8 *delete* “(b)” *substitute* “(c)” *insert* new sub-para. “(b) - Warrant Officer Class 1

- i. The appointment of Conductor will not apply to RCEME.
- ii. Any Warrant Officer Class I holding appointment as Conductor or Sub-Conductor, who is transferred from the RCOE to RCEME, will with effect from date of transfer, be granted an equivalent appointment in the RCEME, provided such equivalent appointment is within the RCEME establishment”.

Para 8 *delete* “(c)” *substitute* “(d)” - *delete* - whole sentence commencing “The appointment of Conductor” to “Warrant Officer Class I”.

Appendix “B” Part I - Below Corps Tps Workshop -

*Add* - “Note: Units having stores sections will ensure that personnel employed against the WE of the stores sections are NOT transferred to RCEME, but remain RCOE.”

Appendix “C” - *delete* - “Textile Refitter”. *Beside* “Saddler” *insert* “\*”

Appendix “D” - Under column headed “RCEME Appointments or Ranks” in Warrant Officer Class I block - *delete* - “Superintending Clerk” *substitute* - “Staff Sergeant-Major 1<sup>st</sup> Class”

Immediately thereunder and opposite Sub-Conductor *add* - “Superintending Clerk”

In the “Craftsman” block - *delete* - all entries in the two columns headed “RCEME Appointments or Ranks” and “RCOC Appointments or Ranks” - *substitute* - under

RCEME Appointments or Ranks	RCOC Appointments or Ranks
“(c) Lance-Corporal	“(c) Lance-Corporal
Armourer Lance-Corporal	Armourer Lance-Corporal
Armourer Craftsman	Armourer Private
Craftsman”	© Private”

(6 /RCEME/ 1)

P.J. Montague  
Major-General  
In Charge of Administration.

### **Overseas Routine Order 5158 - Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps, Corps of “Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers”, Status**

1. For the information of all concerned, GO 72 of 1942 concerning the status of Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps and GO 127 of 1944 concerning the status and organization of “Canadian! Electrical and Mechanical Engineers”, both as amended by Order-in-Council PC 136/7505 of 27 Sep 44 are repeated herewith.
2. **“GO 72 1942 Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps - Status**

It is hereby declared that all officers and other ranks of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps are combatant in the fullest possible sense, and will be so recognized in future, subject to the following provisions:

- a) The conditions of service at present laid down will continue in force with the exception that as a temporary war measure the first appointment of Ordnance Mechanical Engineers will be in the rank of 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant, with advancement to lieutenant on qualification.
- b) Officers of the rank of colonel will not be removed from the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps.

(Effective 25 Nov 41)  
(PC 45/1450 of 24 Feb 42)”

3. **“GO 127 1944 Corps of Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’ - Organization**

1. His Excellency, the Governor-General-in-Council hereby authorizes the organization of a Corps of ‘Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’.
2. The Corps of ‘Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’ shall be composed of :
  - a) Such units and formations named or hereafter named as Corps of the Active Militia pursuant to Section 20 of the Militia Act, as may be formed as a part thereof or as may be allocated thereto from time to time by the Minister of National Defence.
  - b) A Corps Reserve of Officers.



Any unit or formation formed as a part of, or allocated to, the Corps of ‘Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’ may be withdrawn or transferred therefrom at any time by the Minister of National Defence.

3. A General List shall be maintained for the Corps of ‘Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’ on which shall be placed all officers and other ranks of units and formations allocated to or formed as part of said Corps, and personnel so placed on such General Lists may be posted and reposted to such units and formations and, in the case of officers to the Corps Reserve of Officers as the exigencies of the Service may require.
4. Officers and other ranks of the Corps of ‘Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’ shall be combatant in the fullest possible sense.

Effective 1 Feb 44  
(PC 70/1185 of 24 Feb 44)”

4. Overseas RO 1785 is hereby *cancelled*.
5. Overseas RO 4604 is hereby amended as follows:

Para 1, line 3 - delete the following:

“except that for the purpose of restricting the exercise of command, officers will be limited to military command over such officers and men as may be especially placed under their command or attached to their corps for duty in accordance with the provisions of para 220, King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1939, which for the present will continue to apply.”

(Published as NBI)

(6/RCOC/1)

## **Annex G to Part 3**

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## Part 4 Organization

### ***The Growth of the Military Organization From Early Times to the First World War***

Ever since man has learned to live together in communities, there is every likelihood that it was understood by all, that the able-bodied members of the community were required to band together, bringing with them their weapons of defence for the mutual protection of their property.

In early times in England, liability for service in the defence of the country rather than small communities and tribal areas was introduced by the conquering Normans. William the Conqueror rewarded his followers with grants of land, and each man so rewarded was obliged to provide a given number of equipped fighting men.

The earliest known example of a list of minimum standard of arms and equipment to be maintained on behalf of the King dates back to the year 1181. The Assize of Arms, which authorized these holdings, was replaced by the Statute of Westminster in 1285. This Statute contains what is probably the earliest known reference to a planned inspection of the arms held.

Maj-Gen Forbes<sup>1</sup> in writing of these early times wrote: “A review of these arms was to be made twice a year by two Constables in every Hundred, who were to report the defaulters to the Justices and present them to the King in Parliament”.

The church was the centre of life in these early years, a heritage from the earliest of times. It was to the church that the people turned to for sanctuary in dangerous times, bringing with them such possessions as they could gather together.

From this arose the practice of offering for sale, in the churchyards, the items that the soldier was likely to want before going to war.

The earliest known Ordnance of War refers to this procedure in the reign of King John.<sup>2</sup>

Although there are many historical documents available detailing the purchase of weapons or the hiring of men to convert supplies of raw materials into weapons, there is very little reference made regarding their repair. In many cases there is no doubt that the user repaired his own weapons or they were repaired by the master-bowyers, master-fletchers, master-smiths, and other mechanics in the services of the Governors of the various strongholds in the Kingdom.

By the time of the Black Prince, the “cornerstones of our military structure were laid”. The King was responsible for the safety of his country. He delegated powers to the Lieutenant of Counties known as the Constables of Hundreds, already referred to, who in turn were responsible for raising a militia for the defence of the realm.

The first attempt to standardize the soldiers’ equipment was made in the reign of Charles I. In the year 1627, weapons issued by the officers of the Crown were identified by C. R. (Carolus Rex) and if for sea service, an anchor was added.

Determining the holdings of weapons and their condition of serviceability proved difficult. Commissioners were appointed to work under the Lord Lieutenants of the counties to determine the holdings and to inspect these holdings for unserviceable and repairable items.

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<sup>1</sup> Forbes, Mal-Gen A, A History of The Army Ordnance Services; Volume 1, p 3: The Medici Society, Ltd, 1929.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p 5.

From the writings of the times, it would appear that the hiring of qualified tradesmen was a problem then too. In an effort to obtain qualified men it was directed “that whereas certain cutters, smiths, tynkers, and other botchers of arms” have carried out repairs unsatisfactorily in the past, in future no one is to be allowed to do such work until he has served an apprenticeship of seven years at the trade and understands the mysteries of making arms, pikes, guns, or bandoliers”.<sup>3</sup>

The Government provided very little in the way of stores and supplies except camp equipment in the time of war during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The regiment had to keep itself equipped on the soldiers’ daily pay of eight pence. The regiment bought its weapons and ammunition from the Master General of Ordnance. Should the equipment be subjected to extra wear and tear on service, the regiment was obliged to replace it if they could not repair it.

Regulations for cavalry, published in 1759, required the captain to provide cover-locks and hammer-stalls for the muskets. He was also required to pay all the costs of repairs to arms, swords, bayonets and accoutrements. His colonel was responsible for all the rest.<sup>4</sup>

During the Napoleonic Wars, repairs in the field were limited. It was the custom of attaching “a few civilian artificers such as wheelers, smiths, and saddlers” to batteries. At home, repairs were made by contract.<sup>5</sup>

In the 1840’s, regimental armourers were required to make new components when required for a musket because of the lack of standardization in their manufacture. Parts were not necessarily interchangeable.

The scandals connected with the supply and maintenance of all equipments for the Crimean War resulted in a reform<sup>6</sup> that made the Commander-in-Chief responsible for the maintenance of equipment under his command. The War Office became solely responsible for the provision of equipment from either government or civilian sources.

In 1893, the War Office created a committee to inquire into the maintenance services of the Army. This committee made a thorough review of every branch concerned with the maintenance of the Army. They found that the Ordnance Store Department warehoused and issued equipment, but had no technical duties. Woolwich Dockyard had the inspectors on their staff who inspected general stores. However, the technical stores were inspected by a totally different agency known as the Warlike Stores Inspection Branch. The small arms were inspected by the Inspection Board at Enfield, who incidentally trained and administered the Corps of Armourers. Finally, the steam-operated fortress guns weighing 81 and 100-tons<sup>7</sup> were maintained by a team of three mechanical engineers, who were specially commissioned in the Artillery and known as inspectors of ordnance machinery (IOMs) assisted by a staff of specially trained ordnance artificers and gunner artisans.<sup>8</sup>

This bewildering array of inspectors and maintenance teams caused the Committee to recommend that these five agencies should be grouped into one. This recommendation was adopted in July 1896<sup>9</sup> when the Army Ordnance Department and Corps was formed. The examination of all gun equipment now passed into the hands of the IOMs who in later years became the ordnance mechanical engineers (OMEs) and then today’s electrical and mechanical engineers (EMEs).

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p 56.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p 145.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p 175.

<sup>6</sup> 1861.

<sup>7</sup> There were two 81-ton guns mounted in a turret at Dover. The 100-ton guns were located at Gibraltar and Malta.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid (1), Volume 2, p 50.

<sup>9</sup> Later in Ref (8), p 156, Gen Forbes records the date to be 1894.

The practice of sending ordnance companies to theatres of war had become commonplace in the South African War. However these companies did not have armament artificers or armourers in their composition. These specialized tradesmen were sent on service independently as required.

Colonel AS Buttenshaw, who was appointed an IOM in the Ordnance Stores Corps in Canada's Permanent Forces on 1 August 1910 with the rank of Honourary Lieutenant, in speaking before a meeting of Dominion representatives early in the Second World War made an interesting reference to the South Africa War. Apparently a group of armament artificers and armourers were sent to this campaign, for he said in opening his address:

“So far as I have been able to ascertain, the first ordnance workshop ever to take part in a campaign was one which operated in South Africa during the war of 1899-1902. The equipment of the British Army of those days was very simple judged by modern standards, nevertheless the need for making good the wear and tear on small arms, guns, wagons, etc, became apparent and the workshop which was provided fully justified itself and demonstrated the need and practicability of mobile workshops.”<sup>10</sup>

Gen Forbes adds yet another comment of these times in Volume 3 of his History in his introduction of Major Davies, an IOM of The First World War, when he wrote: “... who had served in the South African Campaign, where the extemporized shops were notoriously poor and inadequate”.

About this period, the self-governing Dominions began to take steps to organize their own defences. Canada founded its Regular Army Ordnance Services on Dominion Day 1903 and named it the Ordnance Stores Corps<sup>11</sup>. It was formed from the officers and men employed in the Military Stores Branch of the Department of Militia and Defence<sup>12</sup> with a strength of 20 officers and 86 men.<sup>13</sup>

The armourers and the artificers were ranked as staff sergeants. The senior armourer at headquarters was ranked as sergeant major of Armourers.

There were no IOMs in the Canadian Army at this time. The inspection of guns, ammunition, stores and artillery formed part of the many duties of the Inspector of Artillery. In 1898, for example, Lt-Col CE Montizambert, RCA, the Senior Inspector of Artillery also commanded Military Districts No. 3 and 4 and his assistant, Lt-Col CW Drury, RCA, performed his duties in Ontario and Manitoba.<sup>14</sup>

In 1907, General Order (G. O.) 24 laid down the qualifications of “all officers before appointment to ... positions in the Ordnance Stores Corps, which demand special technical and scientific qualifications...” namely an appropriate certificate from the Ordnance College in England granting qualification as:

Inspector of Ordnance Machinery  
 Inspector of Explosives  
 Inspecting Ordnance Officer

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December of the same year a further change took place when the Corps' name was changed to the Canadian Ordnance Corps (COC).<sup>15</sup>

On 1 April 1912, the non-permanent component of the Corps was organized with its headquarters in Ottawa and three detachments:

No. 1 Detachment located in London,

<sup>10</sup> Campbell, Col HA; Estate Papers. Col AS Buttenshaw, Remarks made by Col ASB, ADMM, at a meeting of Dominion representatives on the 4th November (about 1940).

<sup>11</sup> G.O. 166, Nov 1903, as amended by G.O. 10/04.

<sup>12</sup> G.O. 168/03. The Militia's first independent development in relation to an Ordnance Corps in Canada began in 1855.

<sup>13</sup> G.O. 168/03.

<sup>14</sup> G.O. 111/1898.

<sup>15</sup> G.O. 194/07.

- No. 2 Detachment located in Toronto, and
- No. 3 Detachment located in Kingston.<sup>16</sup>

Eight additional detachments were created before the First World War.

The absorption of the armament quartermaster sergeants by Ordnance was reflected in a change of establishment published in January of 1908 when the Royal Canadian Artillery establishment of AQMSs [artificer quartermaster sergeants] was reduced from five to two and the COC establishment was increased from two to five.<sup>17</sup>

The Agadir crisis of 1911, when for a month or more, Great Britain hovered on the brink of war with Germany, stimulated the thinking of British and Canadian military planners towards a more efficient repair organization and for a possible mobilization. They remembered that the supply lines from Great Britain and her Dominions to South Africa were long and arduous; that the length of time from the raising of the indent until the stores arrived at their destination made it necessary to organize a few impromptu workshops to repair unserviceable stores; and that although their output was small, the impact of the reduced time in reissuing the stores to the troops stressed the need for forward repair.<sup>18</sup>

In war, efficiency must not be dominated by financial or material economy, for war is uneconomical, whereas a high degree of efficiency must be maintained to ensure maximum utilization of the materials of war in the struggle to gain ultimate victory.<sup>19</sup>

The War Office realized that a large supply base attended by a workshop had to be located in the theatre and capable of repairing every type of equipment in use by the army it supported.

It is regrettable that their plans were shelved and the centralized workshop never came into being, for this was the last chance for such an organization to exist before dispersal became mandatory with the introduction of long range guns, aerial bombardment and rockets.

England sent her expeditionary force to France with the outbreak of the First World War. In September it came to a halt at the Marne. During this period, it became apparent that there was need for an organization capable of repairing the guns close to their batteries. The field guns were more complicated than those used in South Africa, and they had to be continually withdrawn from the line for repairs to the buffers.

The War Office was asked to equip a workshop lorry to be stationed at the front, and it was so successful in operation that it wasn't long before two more mobile units were sent out in November and three more were requested in December 1914. Their success may well have inspired the concept of the Light Aid Detachments or LADs as they became known in The Second World War.

The wastage of war was so great in France that in 1915 there was serious concern that newly formed units would have their departures from England delayed for the lack of rifles.

“Every reinforcement arrived at the front armed, and the rifles of casualties, that should have been returned to the base, were apt to be scandalously misused, even to the extent of being employed as flooring for trenches...” wrote General Forbes in describing the critical situation. “Finally, at the urgent solicitation of the War Office, the Commander-in-Chief was reluctantly compelled to agree to accept unarmed drafts, pools of rifles being formed in France for issue to reinforcement camps.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> G.O. 60/12.

<sup>17</sup> G.O. 2/08.

<sup>18</sup> It is almost axiomatic that repairs to the materials of war should be performed as far forward as circumstances demand.

<sup>19</sup> This statement must not be construed to mean that economy is unimportant.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid (1), Volume 3, p 48.



The lessons of South Africa were being relearned. Allied industry was busy converting their plants for war production and had not yet built up their output to meet the demands of resupply. It was only natural, then, that an organized collection of all stores discarded in the theatre be collected into dumps, classified, issued where possible, repaired, or stripped of useable components when unrepairable.

The credit for the first regularly organized salvage operation belongs to the 4<sup>th</sup> Division, which during the Second Battle of Ypres in May 1915, sent out a party at daybreak every morning under the command of its DADOS [Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services] or other officer to collect any stores on which it could lay hands. The collections were sent to dumps at the Division's rear and here were sorted, reissued, repaired, or scrapped.<sup>21</sup>

Closely connected with this salvage activity of Ordnance “were the repair establishments which, though not officially recognized, existed in every formation that took any interest in self-help, sometimes on a corps, brigade, or even unit basis, though more usually as divisional organizations supervised by DADOS.”<sup>22</sup> One of the most important of these repair shops was the Armourer's Shop.

## ***The Repair Organization of the First World War***

### **Divisional Rifle Repair Shops**

The armourer had little to do while the battalion was in the line. He was apt to be employed on various battalion duties such as carrying rations or ammunition to the trenches.

An impromptu workshop was organized, staffed by all the armourers in the division less one armourer per brigade. They brought with them their tools, equipment and whatever components they had on hand.

The individual armourers could do little beyond light repairs on their own, but were able to make much more extensive repairs when all their resources were pooled. In addition to rifles, these small arms shops would repair the division's machine guns, bicycles, replace rivets in helmets and even in some cases attempted local manufacture of parts on a limited scale.

Canada followed this practice, and each workshop made the division it served self-supporting by repairing the salvaged rifles and obtaining its supply of spare parts by cannibalization and reclamation.

### **Mobile Workshops**

The success of the workshop lorries sent to the Marne for repairing guns close to their batteries in September and November 1914 was the beginning of three classes of mobile workshops provided for the repair of guns and their equipment.

The light workshop consisted of one Inspector of Ordnance Machinery (IOM) and 21 men. Its equipment was carried in two vehicles. One vehicle was fitted out as a workshop and the other was used to carry the stores. Eventually additional holdings of machine tools were carried in a third vehicle.

So successful were these workshops that the scale was increased from one to two per corps in May 1915.

By 1916, the numbers of heavy artillery had increased so greatly that it was necessary to introduce the medium workshop on a scale of one per corps, consisting of one IOM and 31 men. Their equipment was carried in five vehicles.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p 75.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p 74.

With the introduction of large-calibre siege howitzers, it was necessary to create a heavy workshop in 1915 on the scale of one per army. It had an establishment of two IOMs and 89 men.

The light workshops were employed as far forward as possible in the same manner as the first workshop lorries on the Marne in 1914. Due to the requirement to keep the guns in action, inspections and repairs were made in or as close to the firing lines as possible.

The light and medium workshops had a tendency to become immobile if the front was inactive for long periods of time. The heavy workshop, because it did stay in one spot for much longer periods, was in fact more of a static shop than a mobile one.

Hard standings were usually found in evacuated warehouses or factories for the light and medium workshops. Hard standings were essential for the heavy workshops, which had a wide assortment of machine tools including a steam hammer.

Davidson<sup>23</sup> recorded that, in the First World War, the COC (CEF) contained one ordnance workshop that he suspected was staffed by the British, and three ordnance mobile workshops that were formed in France. Snell<sup>24</sup> mentioned a reinforcement unit to reinforce the ordnance field units in France. According to Davidson, the Canadian Ordnance Travelling Workshop was formed in Halifax 13 October 1915 and staffed by the Permanent Force. Three days later it sailed for England, and after training there it arrived in France 5 March 1916. Eleven days later it was renamed and became No. 26 Canadian Ordnance Mobile Workshop (Light).

Two workshops were taken over from the British in France, and became No. 8 Canadian Ordnance Mobile Workshop (Light) and No. 8 Canadian Ordnance Mobile Workshop (Medium).

On 11 May 1916, the three workshops were redesignated No. 81, No. 82 and No. 83 Canadian Ordnance Mobile Workshop, respectively.

## **The Repair of Military Vehicles**

A Motor Transport Section of the Army Service Corps (ASC) was created with the introduction of motor cars and trucks. The War Office planners decided that Ordnance was to be given the responsibility for heavy repairs and base overhauls in the proposed centralized workshops. Because the army had so few vehicles, the majority of this class of repair was not done in the existing workshops but was done by contract. The ASC who provided the vehicles and their components were charged with making light repairs.

With the heavy demand for transport in France, the lack of a clear division of responsibility between the two Corps, and a lack of definition of light and heavy repairs, there was a natural reluctance of the forward troops to part with any vehicle that could be kept running. Thus, the vehicles at the front were kept patched up until patching was no longer effective. The vehicles became derelicts, stripped of any component that would be useful in keeping the remaining vehicles operating, and then turned over to Ordnance.

The ASC preferred to supply their vehicle repair shops at the front with spare parts and components rather than to Ordnance who were trying to rebuild the derelicts at base. Thus, the Ordnance mechanics spent considerable time in manufacturing an assortment of spare parts.

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<sup>23</sup> Davidson, W: Administrative and Tactical Formations and Units of CEF; Historical Section GS. This list also records the Ordnance units in England and Canada.

<sup>24</sup> Snell, Col AE; The CAMC with the Canadian Corps during the last 100 days of the Great War; pp 280, 291: The King's Printer, Ottawa, 1924. The strength of the reinforcement depot was based on 10 per cent of the war establishments of the units supported.

This situation continued until January 1915 when it was decided to hand over all repairs from start to finish to the Motor Transport Section of the Army Service Corps.

The ambulances and motor transport of the Canadians were repaired by the Canadian Army Service Corps in their one Cavalry Brigade and four Canadian Divisional Ambulance Workshop Units, and the Canadian Corps Second Echelon Workshop, CASC.

“To make one branch responsible for repair, and another for the materials wherewith to carry it out, wrote General Forbes, “had been a thoroughly unsound policy, and at the time there was no other way of putting matters right.”<sup>25</sup> A comment not unknown today!

### **Principle Inspector of Ordnance Machinery’s Branch in France**

Three officers and five men constituted the staff of the Ordnance Services at the outbreak of the war. This small group rapidly expanded, setting up a headquarters in France, which in turn expanded and divided into four separate branches to meet the demands of supply and repair of the spreading conflict.

One branch was responsible for stores and ammunition, one for clothing and Indian affairs, and one for personnel.

The fourth branch, headed by the Principle Inspector of Ordnance Machinery (PIOM) was responsible for workshops and artillery.

In peacetime, the role of an IOM was primarily the inspection, modification, and repairs to artillery equipments. In war the IOM’s role had to expand. For example, a field gun in France fired more rounds in one day than did a 6-gun battery of field guns during a year in peacetime. The gun, more complicated than those used in South Africa, developed a host of defects that up to then were unknown.

Defects were reported to the War Office, but remedies were applied by IOMs in the field and if successful, drawings and specifications were prepared and distributed for local application.

An immense amount of gun data was collected, sifted, organized, and studied to produce basic data from which better guns were designed, and from which accurate forecasts were made of the gun replacements required at any given period because of erosion and wear.

Incidentally, 34,000 bore measurements were made in 1917 in the preparation of vital gun statistics. Thus the forerunner of the memorandum of examination came into its own, and made enormous contributions to the better understanding of gun design and the wear patterns of the bore with the introduction of new propellants.

### ***Brief Outline of the Reorganization of the Militia from 1918 To 1939***

Canada’s defence forces were reorganized after the First World War. General Sir William Otter was appointed chairman of a committee to consider and report upon the reconstitution of the Militia.<sup>26</sup>

The Permanent Force was reorganized with a manpower ceiling of 10,000, although the force was never recruited to this number for financial reasons.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p 31.

<sup>26</sup> Preliminary Narratives: History of Military Policy and Canadian Military Forces in Canada and Adjacent Regions 1939 - 45, chap 1, p 4. D Hist.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p 6.

Proposals were again put forward from 1931 to 1935 for another reorganization of the Militia. Mr Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of National Defence, announced in the House of Commons on 19 May 1936 that the Militia was undergoing a complete reorganization. He said:

“The reorganization of the Militia has been under consideration for a number of years. The request for the reorganization became definite in 1932, it was submitted to a subcommittee of the former government in 1933, because Canada at that time was making certain representations to the disarmament conference in Europe, and the suggestion was made that the strength of our militia forces should be reduced from the post-war figure of eleven infantry and four cavalry divisions to a composite strength of six infantry divisions and one cavalry ...”<sup>28</sup>

The Minister authorized the reorganization on 5 June, and by the end of the year the reorganization was virtually complete.

On Sunday, 10 September 39, a proclamation in the King’s name was published in the Canada Gazette. This proclamation contained the fateful words:

“Now, therefore, we do hereby declare and proclaim a state of War with the German Reich exists and has existed in our Dominion of Canada as from the tenth day of September 1939.”<sup>29</sup>

The Canadian defence forces were composed at the outbreak of the Second World War, of an Active and Reserve Militia. The Active Militia consisted of a small permanent cadre. Its strength in March 1939 was 4,169 officers and men. The duties of the Permanent Active Militia (PAM) were primarily to provide the staff for NDHQ in Ottawa and for the HQs in the Military Districts. The staffs of the Royal Schools of Instruction and the training depots for the Non-permanent Active Militia (NPAM) were also Permanent Force.<sup>30</sup>

The RCO organization in September 1939 consisted of a headquarters and twelve detachments with limited workshop facilities in the Permanent Force, and of the following types of workshops in the NPAM, some of which were ‘paper’ units:

- 5 fortress workshops
- 4 army field workshops
- 1 cavalry divisional ordnance workshop
- 1 anti-aircraft group workshop
- 1 ordnance workshop company<sup>31</sup>

## ***The Repair Organizations of the Second World War***

### **RCE (Royal Canadian Engineers)**

The maintenance systems in the field of the RCE, RCASC and RCO (Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps) all differed.

With no evidence to the contrary available, the RCE policy of maintenance in the field followed that of the RE who divided their maintenance into three echelons: unit maintenance, carried out by the operator or driver of the equipment; light and heavy running repairs, carried out in the electrical and mechanical

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p 16.

<sup>29</sup> Canada Gazette, 10 Sep 39.

<sup>30</sup> Report of the Department of National Defence, 1939, p 70.

<sup>31</sup> Defence Forces List, Canada, Part I, Nov 39.

workshop equipment companies; and heavy repairs carried out at base or advanced base workshops. The trend was towards running equipment to a state of unserviceability calling for evacuation and complete overhaul or possible condemnation.<sup>32</sup>

### **RCASC (Royal Canadian Army Service Corps)**

The RCASC also followed the RASC policy of a three-echelon system of repair. Unit maintenance was carried out by the drivers under the supervision of the transport platoon commanders. Light and heavy running repairs were carried out in the Corps' workshop platoons, and the complete overhaul of the vehicles and assemblies were carried out in the heavy repair shop at the base.<sup>33</sup>

### **RCOC Repair Organization in the Field<sup>34</sup>**

Selected RCOC units had been authorized to mobilize by General Order (G. O.) 135 of 1939. These units subsequently proceeded overseas with the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Divisions and the non-divisional troops. British war establishments had been followed in the organization of these units. However, during the fighting in the Low Countries and France in May and June 1940 it became obvious that the RAOC field repair organization possessed a number of fundamental weaknesses. A committee was therefore appointed in the latter part of 1940 to consider the lessons of the Battle of France and suggest modifications to the repair organization, bearing in mind the following conditions: a European theatre of operations, a short campaign, and a good line of communication.

After due deliberation, agreement was reached by the committee on certain general principles, chief of which was that repairs should be carried out on a system of progressive maintenance, where each part of an assembly would receive attention as required and the complete equipment would seldom require a thorough stripping down or overhaul.<sup>35</sup> To accomplish this object, the repair organization was to be divided into four echelons, progressively increasing in complexity from front to rear and broken down as follows:

- a) First echelon repair was to be by replacement of external parts and minor assemblies and such other repairs and adjustments as could be done quickly with the aid of hand tools.
- b) Second echelon repair was to be by replacement of complete assemblies and sub-assemblies, and such other repairs as could be done with hand tools and by simple machining operations or welding.
- c) Third echelon repair was to be confined almost entirely to the reconditioning of assemblies (passed back from 1<sup>st</sup> and second echelons) by the replacement of parts. A limited amount of machinery was to be provided, but no elaborate machining operations such as crankshaft grinding or cylinder boring would be undertaken. Overhaul of complete vehicles or other large equipment would not normally be undertaken by this echelon.
- d) Fourth echelon was to be complete overhauls of equipments and vehicles, and the complete reconditioning of assemblies and parts by welding, machining, etc. This echelon was to be

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<sup>32</sup> The Second World War 1939 -45. Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Volume 1, Organization and Operations: p 7: The War Office 1951. I discussed this point with Brig HW Love who was responsible at the time to organize a repair system in the field for the rapidly expanding RCE. RHH (14 Jun 61).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> This account is based on the unpublished study contained in the Preliminary Narrative, The History of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, 1941 - 42, pp 48 - 56. Historical Section, Canadian Army.

<sup>35</sup> 1/Conf/3/4: Proceedings of the twentieth monthly meeting with Dominion Representatives held in Room 219, War Office, at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 4 Nov 41. Appendix 144A to this document gives a short history of the RAOC repair organization in the field.

capable of undertaking the heaviest types of repair and even a limited amount of emergency manufacture.

In all cases, the maximum possible use was to be made of repair by the replacement of assemblies and sub-assemblies. Flexibility and adjustability were to be achieved by building up a number of specialist sections in the larger units, each capable of being transferred complete to another workshop. As far as possible, tradesmen were to be kept employed at their particular trades and - in this respect the new organization differed from the old - general duty men were to be provided for all regimental and unskilled work.

The unit provided for first echelon repairs was the Light Aid Detachment (more commonly known as LAD), which was attached permanently to a unit and was composed of an armament artificer and either fourteen or twelve tradesmen, depending on whether it was type “A” or “B” LAD. The second echelon comprised a divisional ordnance workshop, provided on the scale of one per division, with a corresponding ordnance field park to supply it with assemblies and spare parts. A non-divisional ordnance workshop and a field park were to be provided for corps troops on a scale of one per corps. The third echelon consisted of one army ordnance workshop per corps, with a corresponding army ordnance field park to supply spares to the workshop and to issue assemblies to divisional field parks in the corps area. A base ordnance workshop and base ordnance depot were to make up the fourth echelon, with the addition of port workshop detachments when applicable. A similar chain of workshop and field park units was provided for armoured formations and army tank brigades. These differed from the above organizations largely in their establishments of tradesmen and in their nomenclature. Due to the fact that tanks require an extensive overhaul after about six months of normal operation, it was laid down that this work should be carried out in the third and fourth echelons rather than in the second echelon; battle casualties and running repairs were to be the chief functions of the second echelon.

The reasons for the delay in implementing this new repair organization by the RCOC were the shortage of tradesmen and the time required to obtain approval for new war establishments by the Army Council and then by NDHQ. The two existing army field workshops, and the MT (Mechanical Transport) workshop at Borden were completely inadequate. However, until the proposed organization could be put into operation, it was possible only to stress preventative maintenance and hope that the volume of repairs would be thus somewhat curtailed.

In order to prevent undue wear and tear, instructions were issued by Headquarters, Canadian Corps, on 8 March 1941, that every Monday thereafter should be treated as a vehicle holiday for all vehicles including motorcycles, except those required for essential services, in order “to afford an adequate opportunity for unit inspection and maintenance.” Many of the Canadian drivers had assumed a somewhat carefree attitude towards their vehicles, and insufficient attention had been paid to maintenance. To quote from the instruction referred to above:

“The transport situation in the Corps has become serious as a consequence of the heavy wear and tear to which all vehicles in the Canadian Corps have been subjected as a consequence of training and other uses, combined with a low standard of maintenance in some units, a high accident rate, limited repair facilities, and a restricted supply of spare parts and replacement vehicles.”<sup>36</sup>

The prospect of obtaining the required skilled tradesmen for the new repair organization began to improve slightly in the early summer of 1941. A meeting was held at Headquarters, Canadian Corps, on 26 June to discuss the new RCOC repair organization, which had been approved by NDHQ. Brigadier MacQueen (DQMG, CMHQ) told General McNaughton and Brigadier Turner that it should be possible to obtain most of the tradesmen for the four echelon type repair organization from personnel with the two army field workshops, which had no place in the new organization, from the transfer of personnel from the

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<sup>36</sup> W. D., [War Diary] A/Q Branch, HQ Canadian Corps, Mar 41, Appendix "G", circular letter by Brig Murison on Maintenance of Vehicles, 8 Mar 41.

several holding units, and from tradesmen enlisted in Canada.<sup>37</sup> The situation regarding driver mechanics and drivers I. C. (internal combustion) was not so promising, but steps were taken to remedy this when driving and maintenance courses were started on 23 June 1941 at No. 2 Detachment, RCOC, Borden. General McNaughton emphasized the necessity for establishing the Army Ordnance Workshop (third echelon) at Borden at the earliest possible date in order to cope with MT repairs, even if it should mean drawing personnel from the existing workshop of the RCOC MT Depot. It was finally agreed that the repair echelons, including both workshops and field parks, should be completed in the priority of third, second, first, and fourth (base) echelons.

The whole matter of repair and maintenance was brought up again by General McNaughton during the visit of Mr Victor Sifton, Master-General of the Ordnance, to the United Kingdom during the summer. As the result of discussions held on 18 and 22 July 1941, it was agreed that base workshops should be mobilized in Canada for service overseas, and that their commanding officers should attempt to arrange with Canadian industry for the release of certain officers and skilled tradesmen to serve under them.<sup>38</sup>

### ***The Formation of the Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop***<sup>39</sup>

The War Office had been unable to supply satisfactory facilities in the United Kingdom for the increasing amount of third echelon and base repairs for Canadian “A”, “B”, and RCASC vehicles, owing to their lack of workshop accommodation and the shortage of skilled manpower. [“A” vehicles are armoured fighting vehicles – both wheeled and tracked – and “B” vehicles are unarmoured vehicles]. They suggested, therefore, that “it would be preferable if such facilities were to be provided from Canadian sources.”<sup>40</sup> This information was sent to Canada on 29 August 1941 with the suggestion, supported by Generals McNaughton and Montague, that the Canadian Army Overseas provide all its own repair services and facilities. A telegram from CMHQ on 12 September suggested that, although such a step would be a departure from the approved army programme for 1941, the War Office would provide suitable buildings on a rental basis for a Canadian base ordnance workshop and:

“As the value of Canadian mechanical transport and armoured fighting vehicles overseas will approximate twenty-three million dollars, it is wise economy to provide maintenance and repair facilities under our own control.”<sup>41</sup>

Mr Victor Sifton was definitely sympathetic with this proposed development and on his return to Canada had made arrangements to send Mr Francis Farwell, a civilian holding the appointment of Director of Mechanical Maintenance at NDHQ, to England to investigate thoroughly the repair situation through the eyes of an expert.<sup>42</sup> In civilian life Mr Farwell had been connected with Canada Coach Lines Ltd, an organization that in the past had to solve repair and maintenance problems for its own large number of commercial vehicles.<sup>43</sup> Accompanying him were Colonel RA MacFarlane, DSO, Director of Mechanization at NDHQ, who had been the senior representative of the Ford Motor Company in Australia for some years, and Colonel JC Chapell, formerly of General Motors of Canada. They arrived in

<sup>37</sup> 6/Ordnance Re-Org/1. Memo by Brig Turner on Reorganization RCOC in UK, 27 Jun 41.

<sup>38</sup> W. D., "G" Branch, HQ Canadian Corps, Jul 41: Appendix 33, Memo by Brig Turner of meeting held at CMHQ, 18 Jul 41 to discuss the provision of equipment, 22 Jul 41. Also see Appendix 32, Memo by Brig Turner of meeting held at CMHQ on 22 Jul 41 to discuss the provision of equipment, 22 Jul 41.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid (34). 42/DMM/1: DMM (War Office) to MacQueen, 29 Aug 41.

<sup>40</sup> 42/DMM/1: DMM (War Office) to MacQueen, 29 Aug 41.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid: GS 1870 Canmilitary to Defensor, 12 Sep 41.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid: GS 1738, Canmilitary to Defensor, 29 Aug 41 and 6/CCOD/1: GS 2256, Canmilitary to Defensor for Associate Minister from Ralston, 20 Oct 41. See also 42/NDHQ/1: Minutes of conference at CMHQ 13 Aug 41, which notes that the MGO had been advised verbally during his visit overseas of the need for a Base Ordnance Workshop. Maj-Gen BW Browne (AG at NDHQ) stated at this meeting that he would discuss the matter with the MGO on his return to Ottawa.

<sup>43</sup> 24/Narratives/3/2: Memo of an interview given by Mr Victor Sifton.

the United Kingdom on 27 September 1941 and remained until the latter part of November, visiting all the larger RAOC base workshops, depots, trades training centres, the Chilwell and Derby spare parts depots, and the London Passenger Transport Board repair shops.<sup>44</sup> The results of Mr Farwell's investigations were embodied in a series of telegrams sent to the MGO, and in a report that he gave to Mr Sifton after his return to Canada.

Mr Farwell attributed the unsatisfactory state of the overseas repair and maintenance facilities to three main factors.<sup>45</sup> In the first place, the shipment overseas of shop tool equipment, including machinery lorries, had been held up owing to the long delays in the delivery of equipment from manufacturers in the early days of the war, and to the continual changes in war establishments and equipment which were deemed necessary following actual use in the field. Again, in the early stages of the war little emphasis had been placed upon the importance of preventative maintenance. Finally, the British had been unable to give proper attention to Canadian major repairs and overhauls as originally contemplated, owing to lack of skilled personnel. RAOC repair establishments were so congested with their own repair jobs that only "A" vehicles could be attended to. Repair work on practically all British "B" vehicles had been transferred to small civilian garages, under arrangements made with the Ministry of Supply. There were some instances of Canadian vehicles waiting up to nine months for repair.

Lack of spare parts was a further factor crippling British and Canadian repair and maintenance. The productive capacity of industry was primarily engaged in turning out the largest number of tanks and MT vehicles possible, and had reduced to a minimum the production of spare parts required for replacement purposes. In his report to the MGO, Mr Farwell expressed the view that "our greatest weakness in maintenance and repair in 1942 will result from lack of spare parts."<sup>46</sup> The lack of standardization of vehicles also contributed to the difficulty of maintaining stocks of spare parts: for example, there were four different models of 15-cwt trucks in use. "If the Allies used standardized vehicles", Mr Farwell had been told by Major-General RM Weeks, Director-General of Army Equipment at the War Office, "hundreds of problems would be overcome."<sup>47</sup>

Some idea of the magnitude and importance of the repair problem facing the Canadian Corps may be gathered from the following facts taken from Mr Farwell's several reports.<sup>48</sup> There were, in the autumn of 1941, 450 Canadian "B" vehicles and a large number of motorcycles awaiting repair at Borden. With these numbers continually increasing, a base ordnance workshop, even if established at once, could not catch up on a backlog of an estimated 42,200 man-hours of work. There were approximately 4,000 "B" vehicles of 15 months' age in the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division, and a like number which had been in service for a year with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division, all of which would shortly require complete overhauls. In view of the limited workshop facilities, the course that had been followed consisted simply of carrying out minor repairs first and postponing major jobs. Breakdowns of British "A" vehicles were very frequent, and on the assumption that a Canadian armoured division and army tank brigade would be equipped at first with British tanks, workshop accommodation for 12½ per cent of their tanks would have to be provided at any one time. British tanks had a minimum operational range of 500 miles and a maximum of 1,200-1,500 miles. The routine overhaul would require 1,000-1,200 man-hours, excluding the engine, and a tank would require 600 square feet of floor space in a workshop. It was unlikely, according to a memorandum Mr Farwell had sent to the Minister of National Defence on 14 October, that this situation would improve, since:

"... in the development of new and unproven "A" vehicles, as happens with all manufacturers of tanks and trucks, engineering weaknesses continually present themselves, which can be discovered and corrected

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<sup>44</sup> 42/DMM/1: Farwell to MGO (Secret), 31 Dec 41.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, See also Farwell to DQMG, CMHQ, 22 Oct 41, and Farwell to the Minister and CGS, 14 Oct 41.



only by the trial and error method. This will result in almost impossible demands being thrown on all maintenance and repair facilities both British and the proposed Canadian base ordnance workshop.”<sup>49</sup>

Mr Farwell recommended, therefore, that a Canadian base ordnance workshop should be established immediately, and that as soon as it was in operation, steps should be taken to mobilize a second workshop of equal size.<sup>50</sup> The War Office had been approached and had agreed to bear the cost of the erection of the necessary buildings, which would be allocated to the Canadians on a rental basis. The actual Canadian capital expenditure would be \$450,000 for tools for each workshop, which would have an operating cost of \$2,500 a day. This policy, it was pointed out, would be less expensive than that of having repair work done through the Ministry of Supply, as the British Army was doing, and would be far quicker. Mr Farwell contended that, if immediate action was taken, the first base ordnance workshop could be put into operation within ninety days. This conclusion was based on the assumption that General McNaughton would release Canadian Engineer personnel to carry out the actual construction. Tools could be found by drawing on the ordnance workshops in Canada; otherwise, the best delivery date, for larger tools, which would have to be obtained from manufacturers in England, the United States or Canada, would be 18 - 24 months.<sup>51</sup>

Mr Ralston, Minister of National Defence, had arrived in the United Kingdom with General Crerar in October and one of the principal topics discussed with Generals McNaughton and Montague was the organization of ordnance services overseas. Owing to the fact that Mr Farwell was at that time conducting his investigations into the repair organization of the Canadian Army in England, it was possible for him to present his views to the Minister personally. During the course of a conference held at CMHQ on 15 October 1941, he urged upon Mr Ralston the arguments embodied in his reports, which have been noted in preceding paragraphs.<sup>52</sup> He further stated that a second workshop would be essential should the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian (Armoured) Division be equipped with British tanks, and expressed the opinion that it would likely be needed in any case. He recommended that the tools for a second Canadian base workshop should be ordered at once since they could be used elsewhere if it was decided later that an additional workshop was not needed. The Minister gave his authorization to order tools for the first workshop and key tools for the second, owing to the fact that they were in short supply, but was unwilling to give his approval to the larger scheme without further consideration.

Several days later Mr Ralston gave his approval for the formation of No. 1 Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop, and in a lengthy telegram to NDHQ dated 20 October 1941 he outlined the position already described.<sup>53</sup> Owing to the urgent demands for immediate repair work and the approach of inclement weather, he authorized CMHQ to approach the War Office officially with the proposal, without waiting for approval from Canada. Shop equipment was to be ordered in Canada at once, and Mr Ralston asked that his telegram should be shown to Mr JA Ilsley (Minister of Finance) in order to indicate the nature of the financial commitment. Justifying his haste, Mr Ralston pointed out that:

“Fortunately, through our foresight in Canada in materially expanding our training facilities, together with the priority that General McNaughton ... promises to give in withdrawing from other units the necessary personnel, it will be possible to complete this establishment within ninety days.”<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid: Farwell to the Minister and CGS, 14 Oct 41. Also see 6/CCOD/1: GS2256 Canmilitary to Defensor, for Associate Minister from Ralston, 20 Oct 41.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid: Also see First Canadian Army PA5-3-1: Minutes of Conference with Minister of National Defence at CMHQ, 15 Oct 41 at 0930 hrs.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid: Also see First Canadian Army PA 5-3-1, Minutes of Conference with Minister of National Defence at CMHQ, 15 Oct 41 at 0900 hrs.

<sup>53</sup> 6/CCOD/1: GS2256, Canmilitary to Defensor for Associate Minister from Ralston, 20 Oct 41.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

Before Mr Farwell returned to Canada, it was decided that the formation of a second base ordnance workshop would not be necessary. Instead it was agreed, as a result of a meeting at Corps Headquarters on 6 November 1941, that the second and third echelon repair services should be increased since, although the Canadian Corps was nearly equal in size to two standard British corps, it possessed workshop facilities only on a scale of a standard two-division corps.<sup>55</sup> By increasing the second and third echelon repair services the danger of overloading the base ordnance workshop would be obviated. General McNaughton therefore requested that the following types of unit be mobilized in Canada for this work and sent overseas not later than March 1942:<sup>56</sup>

Non-Divisional Ordnance Workshop

Non-Divisional Ordnance Field Park

Army Ordnance Workshop

Army Ordnance Field Park

Heavy Repair Shop, RCASC, with one increment.

The establishment of a heavy repair shop, RCASC, would balance out and distribute on a more equitable basis the volume of work to be undertaken, and provide the lacking third line repair services for RCASC vehicles.<sup>57</sup> Authority for such a step was sought on 14 November 1941. Fourth line repairs to the latter would be carried out in the base ordnance workshop.

Under Mr Sifton's direction, steps were taken to organize the proposed Canadian base workshop at Camp Borden, Ontario, under the command of Lt-Col GA Secord, who served as an assistant to Mr Farwell in Ottawa, and who had had considerable experience in civilian life operating a large repair and maintenance organization.<sup>58</sup> A recruiting campaign was undertaken in Canada to enlist tradesmen especially for the base ordnance workshop and RCOC officers interviewed potential tradesmen at the trades schools and basic training centres. More than 1,000 men were assembled at Camp Borden by 19 December and, while recruiting still went on for additional key men, the actual establishment was soon reached. An advance party, composed of six officers and 395 other ranks, arrived in the United Kingdom on 20 January 1942.<sup>59</sup>

While the base ordnance workshop was being organized at Camp Borden, a small staff of technical experts, working in the MGO Branch at NDHQ, was evolving a suitable war establishment and mobilization stores table for the unit.<sup>60</sup> The similar, but smaller, British war establishment and the AFG 1098 scale were considered unsatisfactory, and Mr Farwell was insistent that the success of the workshop would depend upon the full utilization of up-to-date civilian repair methods. On his return to Ottawa he had reported to the Master-General of the Ordnance:

“The advantages of our special tools for the maintenance and repair of “A” and “B” vehicles, as compared with the English general duty tools, cannot be too strongly emphasized. Without violating the military principle of mobility, flexibility, and standardization with the British, we should adopt the policy, in principle, of leading and not following.”<sup>61</sup>

<sup>55</sup> 42/DMM/1: Memo by Farwell of a meeting held at HQ, Canadian Corps, 6 Nov 41; also see I/Formations/4/6; Rodger to Senior Officer, CMHQ, 13 Nov 41.

<sup>56</sup> I/Formations/4/6: Rodger to Senior Officer, CMHQ, 13 Nov 41.

<sup>57</sup> 42/DMM/1: Memo by Farwell of a meeting held at HQ, Canadian Corps, 6 Nov 41.

<sup>58</sup> 24/Narratives/3/2: Memo of an interview given by Mr Victor Sifton. Also see WD, 1 Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop, Nov-Dec 41.

<sup>59</sup> WD, 1 Base Ordnance Workshop, Advance Party, 20 Jan 42.

<sup>60</sup> 24/Narratives/3/2: Memo of an interview given by Mr Victor Sifton, also see WD 1 Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop, 11 Nov 41.

<sup>61</sup> 42/DMM/1: Farwell to MGO (Secret) 31 Dec 41.

For instance, it was considered that the addition of a foundry would be invaluable, although one did not appear in the British organization.<sup>62</sup> Certain other changes and modifications made necessary an increase in strength from the approximate 1,100 all ranks for the British war establishment to over 1,500 all ranks for the Canadian base ordnance workshop.

The actual construction of the base ordnance workshop at Borden, Hants, was commenced on 26 November 1941 and the first concrete was poured on 3 December.<sup>63</sup> The work was carried on under the direction of the Works Directorate, CMHQ, by the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion, RCE, No. 1 Canadian Road Construction Company, RCE, the Special Equipment Section of the Canadian Corps Field Park Company, RCE, a detachment of No. 1 Canadian Tunnelling Company, RCE, and working parties composed of three officers and about 200 men provided from RCA, RCE, RCASC and infantry holding units. Only one and one-third working days were lost through inclement weather during January and February and the steel work was 98 per cent complete by 13 February 1942. General McNaughton laid the cornerstone on 8 April 1942. Further delays were occasioned by the difficulty in obtaining materials and the delay in receiving the machinery and tools to be installed.

The main party of the base ordnance workshop arrived overseas towards the end of March 1942, and personnel were concentrated at Borden and Witley Camps.<sup>64</sup> Basic training was given to those men who had enlisted with the units straight from civil life, while others were sent on trades courses. Although some construction work remained to be done, the unit took possession on 22 May 1942 and, by the end of the month, work was being done in some of the shops, using a temporary power hook-up.<sup>65</sup> By the end of June, the unit had completely moved into its new quarters and a start had been made towards catching up on the great backlog of repair work to be done.<sup>66</sup>

### ***Consolidation of Repair Services***<sup>67</sup>

During 1941 the War Office toyed with the idea that the third and fourth echelon repair of Army Service Corps vehicles should be combined with the Ordnance chain of repair services. In fact, the whole question of the repair and maintenance of technical equipment and vehicles was being discussed, but no solution, acceptable to the several corps concerned, could be found.<sup>68</sup> During the visit of Mr Sifton (MGO) to the United Kingdom the question of similarly amalgamating the repair of MGO and RCASC vehicles into one fourth echelon organization was discussed. In this connection, it was suggested during the course of a conference at Headquarters, Canadian Corps, on 1 August 1941 that the RCASC should enlarge No 1 MTRD at Borden and perform all the duties connected with the receipt and issue of new and returned vehicles, while base repairs became an Ordnance responsibility.<sup>69</sup> Brigadier MacQueen expressed the view that no real saving would result, since by far the greater number of vehicles issued to the Canadian Army Overseas were MGO "A" and "B" vehicles. In a memorandum to the Senior Officer, CM11Q, he pointed out that:

“While I am in the firm agreement that amalgamation of QMG and MGO vehicles at all points beyond the third echelon is desirable, we are now dependent on British services for supply of MT

<sup>62</sup> 24/Narratives/3/2: Memo of an interview given by Mr Victor Sifton.

<sup>63</sup> W. D. 2 Det, RCOC, MT Depot, Apr 42, Appendix 6; BOW Cornerstone Ceremony 8 Apr 42.

<sup>64</sup> W. D., 1 Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop, 30 Mar 42.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid: 31 May 42.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid: 30 Jun 42.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid (34). Also see DEME Narrative file 1-2: The Corps of RCEME, A History to 1 Oct 46, pp 367-396.

<sup>68</sup> Martell, Lt-Gen Sir Gifford, Our Armoured Forces, London, 1945. Contains some relevant remarks by the then Commander, Royal Armoured Corps.

<sup>69</sup> W. D., "G" Branch, HQ Canadian Corps, Aug 41, Minutes of a meeting held at HQ Canadian Corps on 1 Aug 41 to discuss the proposed organization of an MT Reception and Issue Depot for the Canadian Army Overseas.

parts, and we should conform to the British system as this under present conditions will give a more flexible and diverse service, which will be especially important in active operations, when Canadian units would presumably be operating in areas where they would at least partially be dependent on British establishments for supplies.”<sup>70</sup>

By March 1942 a decision had been reached at the War Office, however, to form a new corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers to take over the Engineering side of Ordnance and all RASC maintenance (except workshop platoons); in addition, this new corps of REME would take over certain mechanical maintenance functions of the Royal Engineers.<sup>71</sup>

On 13 May 1942 a meeting was held in General McNaughton’s office to discuss the desirability of conforming to the new British repair setup. General McNaughton pointed out that some of the reasons that had caused the British change were not applicable to the Canadian Army Overseas.<sup>72</sup> It was necessary to keep Canadian organization as similar as possible to the British Army but, for operational reasons, changes must be kept to a minimum. After discussion it was agreed to recommend to Ottawa that a new corps should NOT be formed within the Canadian Army. Instead, it was proposed to transfer to the RCOC the issue, repair, and maintenance of vehicles functions of the RCASC, with the important exception that workshop platoons would be retained in the RCASC, Although he questioned whether there would be any saving in manpower, Colonel NB MacDonald agreed that the Heavy Repair Shop and No. 1 MTVRD should be transferred to the RCOC. It was also proposed that rear echelon maintenance functions of RCE and RC Signals should be transferred to the RCOC although neither of these corps as yet had included such units in their overseas composition.

At a subsequent meeting on 29 June 1942, General McNaughton told Colonels JAW Bennett and HG Thompson, respectively, the DDOS and DDOS (E) of First Canadian Army that he wished to bring about a clear distinction between the Engineering and Stores functions of the RCOC. The DDOS (E) was to have full control of the Engineering side, with a clear channel from top to bottom, and the “Stores (O) side must cooperate and assist loyally.” General McNaughton stated that “cooperation” and “correlation” were more appropriate terms than “coordination” for application to activities within the Ordnance Corps itself; priorities would be established in general terms by the General Staff and any coordination necessary would be effected by the “Q” Staff. He did not further wish to see the “E” side bothered with administrative detail, and it was up to the DDOS to see that it received “prompt and adequate service.”<sup>73</sup> In practice, Ordnance Services were reorganized in lower formations so that “O” and “E” officers held equal rank. With the decision to follow British war establishments at the beginning of 1943, it proved necessary to adopt certain features of the REME organization and to form, during early 1944, a corps of RCEME.

### ***The Four Echelons of Repair***

The four echelons of repair defined by the British committee appointed to consider the lessons of the Battle of France (1940) were restated in 1943 by Col Max Meighan, DDME 2 Canadian Corps<sup>74</sup> as:

**First Echelon** (minor repairs) is the first stage of repair of equipment and in this stage, work is limited to minor repairs, replacements and adjustments, which can be carried out in unit lines with the troops

<sup>70</sup> 6/MTSD/1: MacQueen to Senior Officer, CMHQ, 7 Aug 41.

<sup>71</sup> General McNaughton's Personal War Diary, 30 Mar 42.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, May 42, Memo of a Conference on Reorganization of Army Equipment, Maintenance Services held in Gen McNaughton's Office at 1100 hrs, 13 May 42.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, Jun 42, Memo Ordnance Services, 30 Jun 42.

<sup>74</sup> D Hist file, 142 82A 2009 (D5): Precis, Organization Employment and Characteristics of LADs, Armoured Brigade Workshops and Inf Brigade Workshops, p2 - Col Max Meighan, DDME 2 Canadian Corps, Dec 43.

provided in the (AFG) 1098 table of equipment of the unit and with the tools of the RCEME personnel attached to the unit.

**Second Echelon** (replacement of assemblies) is the second stage of repair of equipment, and in this stage the main function is the replacement of defective assemblies by new or reconditioned assemblies. In addition, repairs are carried out to certain assemblies, and to items not dealt with as assemblies, so far as they can be completed satisfactorily in the time available, with the equipment and personnel available in the workshop. Generally an assembly should only be repaired in second echelon when it can be repaired quicker and more satisfactorily than it can be replaced.

**Third Echelon** (repair of assemblies) is a stage in which the main function is complementary to that of second echelon. The work is mainly the repair of assemblies that have been replaced by second echelon workshops. The repair of an assembly is normally carried out by replacing the defective components or items of the assembly with new or reconditioned components. The repair of defective components is also undertaken in third echelon workshops when the repairs involved do not require extensive or elaborate plant. Third echelon work also includes the replacement of certain assemblies that are not conveniently replaceable in second echelon workshops on account of the time, labour or special apparatus required.

**Fourth Echelon** (major repairs) is the final stage of repair of equipment and, in this stage, repairs are only limited by the personnel, stores, workshop facilities, and time that can be made available for the work to be carried out, and by consideration of the extent to which repairs are worth while in the prevailing circumstances.

## ***Mobility***

As a result of the classifications of repairs into echelons and the equipping of the workshops to make these repairs according to classification, the units formed to carry out first echelon work were sufficiently mobile to keep pace with the moves of the formations they serviced. Similarly a second and third echelon workshop unit was sufficiently mobile to keep up with the formation they serviced, while the fourth echelon workshop unit, which by the nature of its work was static and located in the base area and was a base unit.

In the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, the RCEME repair facilities were primarily first and second echelon units. First echelon repairs were made by unit tradesmen, assisted by the first echelon RCEME units, which were the type “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, and “F” LADs, and the type “A” light anti-aircraft workshop. Second echelon units were the armoured and infantry brigade workshops and the corps troops workshops. Although their principles were identical, their employment varied.

## ***Permissive Repair Schedules***

To better understand the Second World War organization for field repairs, it is necessary to know that workshop establishments were designed to perform their functions in one of the four echelons of repair described. In practice, it was necessary to allow a limited amount of overlap of work undertaken between echelons of repair, the least being allowed between first and second echelons.

The limit of work was expressed in terms of maximum time allowed for any one job. This limit was to some degree governed by the tactical situation such as the frequency and rapidity of the moves of the formation being served.

Many factors tended to increase the work taken on by the four echelons, which in turn led to difficulties in estimating the quantities and types of stores to be carried by the RCOC spare parts organizations.

“Lists were prepared for each echelon termed Permissive Repair Schedules (PRS) which laid down in detail the jobs which would be undertaken there for each type of vehicle and equipment.”<sup>75</sup>

Although the definitions of the four echelons of repair were rewritten periodically, the time element remained an important basis of determining the work that would be undertaken in each echelon, or in modern terminology, “line” workshop and the PRS was designed accordingly.

Effective control and adherence to the general repair policy of the Canadian Army was exerted through the medium of the PRS on the echelon workshops by indicating the workshop’s eligibility to draw or hold spare parts necessary to complete the repairs undertaken.

The first PRS used by the Canadian Army was British, designed for equipments on issue to the British Army. The Canadian EME, in order to determine if his workshop should make a repair to a Canadian vehicle compared, as best he could, his repair problem to the closest British equivalent - which under these circumstances was only a guide. Eventually, Canadian pages were issued for equipments on issue to the Canadian Army.

In the case of an LAD wanting to make repairs unauthorized by the PRS, the matter was settled between the LAD and the brigade workshop who, if agreeable, would issue the stores required from their own stores section.

## **Workshop Organization**

In keeping with the principles of standardization the types of workshops were kept to a minimum and where possible workshop personnel and equipment structures were built from standard components or “bricks”. The LADs were too small to consist of separate components, but four standard and two special types were available to service all the units or formations for which individual workshop service was considered necessary. On the other hand, the second, third, and fourth echelon workshops were made up of standard bricks, which were interchangeable in workshops of the same type. For example, the armament brick in the infantry brigade workshops of 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Divisions were identical. This feature made possible the rapid construction of a special workshop (ad hoc) to meet unusual conditions, or the quick relief of an overloaded workshop section by the dispatch of a suitable brick from a lightly loaded workshop.<sup>76</sup>

## **The Mission of RCEME<sup>77</sup>**

Although the following was written in 1948, it is reasonable to assume that it represented the feeling of the Corps’ role at the end of The Second World War.

“RCEME is responsible for the recovery and repair of all damaged or defective mechanical, electrical, optical, wireless, line and radar equipment beyond repair by unit resources, with certain exceptions.

The exceptions are:

- a) RCASC units carry out recovery and repair of their unit vehicles within the capacity of their workshop platoons. (Normally first, second, and limited third echelon repairs).

<sup>75</sup> Ibid (32), p 186. The background material used in this portion of the narrative is contained in chapter 10 of this ref.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid (74), p 3.

<sup>77</sup> Operational Manual, RCEME, 1948; Part II, p 3. I prefer to call the Responsibilities of RCEME the Mission of RCEME. A mission is the goal or objective. Missions are assigned to organizations and the organization's assigned mission is the end result that the organization is responsible for achieving or producing. [This endnote is number 76A in the original. From this point on all endnotes are one number higher than the originals. - ed]

- b) RCE squadrons carry out first and second echelon repairs to RCE-operated engineer equipment.
- c) RCAC units equipped with armoured recovery vehicles carry out first line recovery, assisted by RCEME.”

This statement originally written by REME in 1948 must be modified by the fact that, in 1945, the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS) made first echelon repairs to wireless equipment. Defective wireless equipment entered the RCEME repair System at the second echelon level.

The 1948 statement continued:

“RCEME officers at all levels are responsible for:

- a) Advising their formation, force or unit commanders on all measures connected with servicing, repair and recovery of unit technical equipment.
- b) Reporting through RCEME channels any defects in manufacture and functioning of equipment and making suggestions for improvements.
- c) Direct control of RCEME units immediately under command.”

## ***First Echelon Workshops***

### **The Light Aid Detachment**

The RCOC (NPAM) was reorganized 15 December 1936.<sup>78</sup> The army field workshop (AFW) and the anti-aircraft group workshop were introduced at this time.

The AFW consisted of a main workshop and three recovery sections. One LAD was added to the establishment the following February<sup>79</sup> consisting of one OME and 10 men.

The establishment was increased to three LADs in 1938.<sup>80</sup> A notation to the establishment read:

“Light aid detachments are provided normally for attachment to other mechanized formations and units as required at the discretion of the District Officer Commanding, but the training of the personnel of these detachments at unit headquarters should be carried out, as far as possible, with the remainder of the personnel of the ordnance field workshop.

Another note read:

“The three light aid detachments authorized for ‘peace’ are to be organized principally for training purposes, but in all emergency the number would, of necessity, be increased to meet the needs of the various authorized formations, etc.”

G.O. 244/40 records that, when the “emergency” arrived, No. 1 AFW mobilized with nine LADs, No. 2 AFW with fifteen, No. 3 AFW with ten, and No. 4 AFW with ten.<sup>81</sup>

The first mention of an LAD being actually formed and used in Canada appears in the Report titled “Permanent Force Collective Training Camp Borden, 1938 (8 August to 3 September).<sup>82</sup>

<sup>78</sup> G.O. 181/36.

<sup>79</sup> G.O. 40/37.

<sup>80</sup> G.O. 146/38.

<sup>81</sup> G.O. 245/40.

<sup>82</sup> AHQ file HQ 9801-4-10. See page 1 of the report.

This LAD was staffed by one officer and nine men from Military District 3, and reinforced by five officers and 30 men, of which one officer and five men were members of the NPAM.

The report said:

“A base workshop was established in No. 1 Hanger at Camp Borden. The Light Aid Detachment and vehicle section moved with the force in the field.

“A considerable amount of work was undertaken both at the shop and in the field, some of the latter being carried out successfully during the hours of darkness. Casualties to field kitchens and water carts provided a considerable amount of additional work for the detachment.”

In Appendix 1 to the report, it is noted that these equipments were steel-tired as there was no money left to put on rubber. Their speed was limited to 8 mph, and because of this it was necessary to allow the field kitchens and water wagons to take short cuts to their daily destinations in order that they would arrive in sufficient time to feed the troops on exercise.

From this humble beginning sprang 150 LADS of all types to serve the Canadian Army during the Second World War and the occupation of Germany.

During his command, Maj-Gen FF Worthington, GOC 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division was in favour of forming the “hundred man LAD” for attachment to armoured regiments. The EMEs of the division generally did not understand that, in fact, what the GOC advocated was the Phase II of RCEME, which was postponed until after the war.

To look at this problem briefly, in 1944 at least 75 persons were devoted to the care of the technical equipments of an armoured regiment, in addition to the services of an attached Type “C” LAD, RCEME and a “Z” Troop, RCCS, provided by Signals to make first echelon repairs to wireless sets. The regimental establishment<sup>83</sup> showed that 75 positions could be charged directly to the recovery and repair of the regiments’ technical equipments:

Technical adjutant	1
Armourers	3 (a)
Clerks	1
Driver Mechanics (MV)	16
Electricians’	5
Fitters (AFV)	22 (b) (c)
Mechanists	5
Motor mechanics	22 (b)
Total	75 (d)

<sup>83</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment War Establishment Canadian 11/151/3, 12 Jan 44, published Sep 44. The figures from this establishment are sufficiently close to the establishment in force during Gen Worthington's command overseas.



Notes:

- (a) Positions same corps as LAD.
- (b) Three positions same corps as LAD.
- (c) Six of the troopers were to be qualified on a course of gun fitting.
- (d) This figure does not take into consideration any contributions made by the regiment's 97 driver mechanics, AFV, provided to drive the regiment's 97 "A" vehicles.<sup>84</sup>

At the time of writing (July 1961), there are several wartime commanders who appear to have forgotten the large numbers of personnel on their regimental establishments for the sole purpose of keeping their regiments mechanically and electrically fit for combat.

The role of the LAD was defined:<sup>85</sup>

- a) To assist personnel of the parent unit (the unit serviced by the LAD and to which it is attached) in first echelon repair of its equipment, in so far as that repair is outside the capacity of the unit.
- b) To inspect unit equipment and supervise and advise on unit maintenance.
- c) To assist the unit in recovering its equipment when damaged or stranded.
- d) To assist liaison between the unit and second echelon workshops.
- e) To advise the unit on technical matters.

The allotment of the four standard types of LAD will be found in the notes to the LAD war establishments. See establishment Canadian 111/100/3 for types "A" and "B", Canadian H/340/2 for type "C", and Canadian 11/340/3 for type "D". [see section 4C of this version – ed]

Two special types of LADs, known as the type "E" and type "F" were introduced in October and December 1944; the type "E" to service the 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment, CAC, and the type "F" to service the 1<sup>st</sup> Rocket Battery RCA.

## The Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop

The first anti-aircraft workshop establishment in the Canadian Army appeared after the reorganization of No. 4 Detachment, RCOC (NPAM), on 15 December 1936.<sup>86</sup> This establishment gave way to what later became the light anti-aircraft workshop Type "A" and "B". The type "A" was for attachment to light anti-aircraft regiments in a division or corps, and the type "B" was a similar attachment in army troops.<sup>87</sup>

The remarks already written about an LAD apply equally to the light anti-aircraft workshops.

Well-run first echelon workshops were responsible for keeping to a minimum the evacuation of equipments from the regiments lines, thus the LADs and LAA workshops were reinforced with well-trained and highly skilled tradesmen, who prided themselves on their native ingenuity and ability to scrounge.

<sup>84</sup> The "A" vehicles in question were: 61 cruiser tanks, 11 light tanks, 6 anti-aircraft tanks, 3 recovery tanks, 9 scout cars, 7 15-cwt armoured trucks for a total of 97.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid (74), p 4.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid (77).

<sup>87</sup> CMHQ file 5/LAA Workshop "A"/1 (SD2) 27 Jul 43.

## **Second Echelon Workshops**

### **Army Field Workshops**

The army field workshops establishment introduced in the reorganization of the Militia in 1936 was the forerunner of many establishments developed during 1939 - 45 for the field repair organization.

The AFWs were reorganized and redesignated Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshops on 10 July 1941 and then were disbanded, their personnel and equipment forming the smaller infantry and armoured brigade workshops.<sup>88</sup>

### **Brigade Workshops**

The brigade workshops provided the backbone of the repair organization in the division. They were fed the work beyond the capabilities of the regimental fitters who made unit repairs, the attached RCCS who made first echelon repairs to wireless sets, and the LADs who made first echelon repairs to almost all the rest of the regiment's technical equipment.

In an infantry division there were three infantry brigade workshops, and in an armoured division there were one armoured and one infantry brigade workshop. The divisional artillery and divisional troops also had to have the services of a second echelon workshop, and mainly for this reason the brigade workshops were not brigade troops but divisional troops. The CREME allotted second echelon facilities to all the divisional troops not in brigades.

### **Movement of Second Echelon Workshops**

In order to minimize the loss of productive capacity during recovery the workshop used a technique known as leapfrogging. As the term would indicate, the workshop would advance, or withdraw, by sending out an advanced workshop detachment (AWD) in the intended direction of movement.

The AWD usually took up its position at the brigade's recovery post or at one of the LAD collecting sites. In Europe, the advance of the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, at one time, was so fast during the period of the pursuit that the workshop was strung out like beads on a string along the axis of advance. The workshop had two AWDs forward, and two AWDs behind, and was itself reduced to the strength of an AWD by the abnormal extension of its capabilities. During this hectic period, the bypassed AWDs were jokingly referred to as the Rear AWDs.

The role of the second echelon workshops was defined as:

- a) Assist the AWD in backloading from the AWD site or forward recovery post to the brigade workshop.
- b) Recover casualties in vicinity of their site.

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<sup>88</sup> Briefly: No 1 AFW became 2nd Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, 10 Jul 41; disbanded 7 Jan 43. Its personnel provided 4, 5 and 6 Canadian Inf Brigade Workshops and HQ RCEME, 2 Canadian Div.

No 2 AFW became 1st Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, 10 Jul 41; disbanded 7 Jan 43. Its personnel provided 1, 2 and 3 Canadian Inf Brigade Workshops and HQ RCEME, 1 Canadian Div.

No 3 AFW became 3rd Canadian Divisional Ordnance Workshop, 10 Jul 41; disbanded 7 Jan 43. Its personnel provided 7, 8 and 9 Canadian Inf Brigade Workshops and HQ RCEME, 3 Canadian Div.

No 4 AFW became 4th Canadian Armoured Divisional Ordnance Workshop, 26 Jan 42; disbanded 31 Mar 42. Its personnel provided 3 and 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Ordnance Coys. The 3rd Canadian Armoured Brigade Ordnance Coy was disbanded 14 Jan 43 and the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade Ordnance Coy became the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop.

- c) Classify casualties.
- d) Make second echelon repairs on all equipments in the formation.<sup>89</sup>

The role of the AWD<sup>90</sup> was described as:

- a) Assist LADs in recovery to LAD sites.
- b) Recovery casualties beyond the scope of LADs to the AWD site or to a forward Reconnaissance Post.
- c) Make first echelon repairs and second echelon repairs within their scope.
- d) Backload casualties beyond their scope requiring second echelon repairs to second echelon workshops.
- e) Classify casualties.

The CREME of 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division instructed his LAD officers, particularly in the case of the 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade, that the LAD collecting sites should be chosen as if they were the next site of the brigade workshop. The workshop commander selected the most suitable of these sites, and then either recovered from the remaining sites to the new workshop or put out an AWD to take care of the casualties.

The casualties were classified as:

“X” - repairs that can be done by the crew of the vehicle or equipment.

“Y” - repairs needing the services of RCEME facilities of the division.

“Z” - repairs which cannot be done by divisional RCEME units.

“W” - the casualty was beyond economical repair ...<sup>91</sup>

## **Corps Troops and Army Troops Workshops**

The corps troops and army troops workshops as the name implies provided second echelon repairs for corps and army. The corps troops workshop, in addition to corps commitments absorbed the overflow of work from the brigade workshops. The army troops workshop was provided to make second echelon repairs for army troops.

## ***Third Echelon Workshops***

### **Armoured Troops, Infantry Troops, and Tank Troops Workshops**

The armoured troops, infantry troops and tank troops workshops were semi-mobile workshops, which normally carried out the repairs that overflowed from second echelon workshops in the divisions and the tank brigades because of heavy casualties, or were outside the time limit to which the second echelon workshops were working.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Operational Manual, RCEME, 1948; Pt I, Appendix D, p 7. This manual contains a brief collection of historical data of the operation of RCEME in The Second World War.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid (88): Pt I, Appendix D, p 3. The British terms have been changed to Canadian.

<sup>92</sup> British Machine Tool Engineering, Volume 26, No 139, Jan, Feb, Mar, 1944, p 3. Associated British Machine Tool Makers Ltd. The Manor House, Claygate, ESHER, Surrey; the entire issue is devoted to REME. It is well illustrated. The text covers first, second, and fourth echelon repairs, recovery in the field; technical training, regimental and corps training and the Holding Battalions. Third echelon repair is not covered in this otherwise excellent issue.

These workshops normally were considered as corps troops. Provision was made that they could be placed under army control should the occasion warrant it.<sup>93</sup>

These workshops were a larger edition of the armoured and infantry brigade workshops. They were well equipped with a wide variety of machinery lorries and wreckers that doubled as mobile cranes. The British made strong attempts to make the third echelon workshops fully mobile, but were unsuccessful owing to a shortage of the necessary vehicles.<sup>94</sup>

### **Engineer Equipment Workshops Types “A” and “B”**

On 1 December 1943, the engineer equipment workshop type “A” and “B” were introduced. The type “A”, one officer and 38 men, was provided to make third echelon repairs to engineer equipment handled by a workshop and park company, RCE. The type “B”, two officers and 97 men, was provided to make third echelon repairs to engineer equipment handled by a mechanical equipment park company, RCE.

The third echelon workshop fulfilled a vital role, especially where the line of communication (L of C) was long or difficult, and when abnormally heavy tasks had to be carried out in army or corps areas.

### ***The Base and Advanced Base Workshops***

The events surrounding the formation of the base workshop have already been told. The base workshop establishment published in April 1942 and effective the previous 7 November<sup>95</sup> showed the authorized strength as:

	Unit	Attached	Total
Officers	53	5	58
Men	1644		1644
Total	1697	5	1702

A new establishment was published in February 1944.<sup>96</sup> There were two remarkable features about this establishment; there were only 39 officers, although the strength was over 2,000 and the workshop components each had their own establishment, summarized as:

Component	Officers	Men	Total
Headquarters	8	39	47
Tank Workshop	6	390	396
Vehicle Workshop	12	698	710
Armament and General Workshop	9	456	465
Armament Divisional Increment	3	333	336
Infantry Divisional Increment	1	187	188
Total	39	2103	2142

<sup>93</sup> Ibid (88), Pt I, Appendix C, p 11.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid (32), p 16.

<sup>95</sup> Establishment Canadian IV/1940/52A/1.

<sup>96</sup> Establishments, Canadian IV/49/1, IV/49A/1, IV/49B/1, IV/49C/2, IV/49D/1 and IV/49E/1.

The advanced base workshops were sited in permanent buildings, usually requisitioned factories that had rail, road, and when possible, water access. The strength of the two advanced base workshops were 12 officers and 492 men each.<sup>97</sup>

It was in the base workshop in England and the two advanced base workshops in Europe that complete overhauls of badly damaged and worn equipments were carried out, unserviceable major assemblies were restored to specifications, components were repaired if in short supply, and parts unobtainable from RCOG sources were manufactured. A typical example of the base workshop's ability to overcome the shortage of motorcycle engine pistons during the winter of 1942/43 was that they melted down the unserviceable aluminium pistons from the motorcycle engine rebuild line, cast them into new pistons, machined them, and reissued them back to the rebuild line. Over 3,000 motorcycles were rebuilt on this line in 1943.<sup>98</sup>

## **Special Workshops**

### **Port Workshops**

Two port workshops were provided to make first echelon repairs and recover vehicles and equipment disembarked at ports. These workshops also carried out emergency second echelon repairs. They had a strength of one officer and 24 men.

### **Sub-Workshop**

A sub-workshop establishment was published February 1944, effective 20 September 1943, consisting of six officers and 246 men. This workshop made second echelon repairs for the Canadian reinforcement units in England.

### **Heavy Anti-Aircraft Workshop, Type "B"**

The REME repair organization had heavy anti-aircraft workshops of two types: type "A" and type "B". The Canadian Army mobilized only one type "B" with a strength of three officers and 95 men. This workshop was attached to No. 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, to make second echelon repairs. This workshop contained a telecommunications section with a strength of one officer and 25 men.

### **Lines of Communication (L of C) Telecommunications Workshop**

The second echelon repairs of telecommunication equipment belonging to First Canadian Army and L of C Troops were carried out by a detachment of one officer and 20 men from each of the advanced base workshops. These detachments and their valuable equipment were far enough away from their parent units that the COs of the advanced base workshops were unable to exercise direct control.

This administrative problem was eliminated by the deletion of the second echelon telecommunication repair element from the workshop establishment and the introduction of the L of C Telecommunication Workshop on 16 May 1945. The type "A", consisting of a HQ and two sections with a strength of two

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<sup>97</sup> Establishment Canadian IV/51/I.

<sup>98</sup> WD 1 Base Workshop, Jan 44, Appendix 6.

officers and 18 men, served First Canadian Army. The type “B”, consisting of a 11Q and three sections with a strength of two officers and 21 men, served L of C Troops.<sup>99</sup>

### **Mobile Tire Repair Unit**

The small tire repair component at the Canadian Base Workshop plus the facilities of REME and the Ministry of Supply were considered to be adequate to handle the repair and retreading of tires expected from the British and the Canadian units in North West Europe.

However the sharp flints of Normandy and the flying shrapnel in the combat zones readily pierced the newly introduced synthetic rubber tires.

The shrapnel damage made the tires immediately unserviceable, but at the same time they could be repaired if facilities were available in the theatre. As a temporary measure, small repair equipments were located in the UK and rushed to the field workshops. A specialist was sent with them to give instructions in their use.

The British experienced the same trouble and formed two mobile tire repair units for themselves, but were unable to provide a third for the Canadians, nor were they able to repair tires from Canadian units as their own tire load was so great.

In order to keep the Canadian vehicles functioning, a mobile tire repair unit, with a slightly different establishment than the British, was authorized 17 November 1944. This unit consisted of one officer and 48 men.

The recapping of tires was done in England and special tires were repaired by the Canadian base workshop that retained their 15-man tire repair element for this purpose.<sup>100</sup>

### **Radar Battery Workshop**

This workshop was designed to operate with a radar battery. It was unique in that it was a workshop that had one second echelon repair detachment (of two sections) for each radar troop headquarters, and three first echelon repair detachments (of two sections each) for each radar section. The workshop had a strength of three officers and 36 men.

### ***Difference between Line and Echelon***<sup>101</sup>

The term first echelon, second echelon, etc, used to designate a workshop by the type of repairs it made, was replaced by the term “Line”. Considerable confusion was caused by the assumption that the terms were synonymous.

Under the Line terminology:

1<sup>st</sup> Line workshops (LADS and LAA workshops) made first echelon repairs.

2<sup>nd</sup> Line workshops (armoured and infantry brigade workshops) made second echelon repairs.

3<sup>rd</sup> Line workshops (armoured troops and infantry troops workshops) made second echelon and limited third echelon repairs.

<sup>99</sup> CMHQ file 5/L of C Tele Workshop/1 (folio 14): 1 Org RCEME/1/2 (SD la) d, 15 May 45.

<sup>100</sup> CMHQ file 5/Mob Tire Rep U/1 (folio 4): 1/Org RCEME/1, (ME 1) Nov 44. The British eventually organized a total of eight units, six of which were sent to 21 Army Group and two to SEAC. For a detailed technical description see: The Second World War 39-45, Army; REME, Volume II Technical: pp 15 and 22. The War Office, 1951.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid 88, Pt II, p 5. By 1948 some second line workshops were described as having first line elements. See Pt H, p 6.

4<sup>th</sup> Line workshops (base and advanced base workshops) made fourth echelon repairs.

## **Recovery and Backloading**

It has been stated that the aims of recovery and backloading, which are two stages of the same process, are:<sup>102</sup>

To unditch or otherwise extricate any piece of equipment that has become a casualty from any cause whatever, and,

To convey, to the appropriate workshop or to its expected future location, any equipment casualty requiring repairs.

The RCEME recovery organization provided recovery elements throughout the various repair echelons for this purpose.

### **First Echelon Recovery**

The units and their LAD had recovery equipment and personnel on their establishments. In the case of the armoured regiment and its Type “C” LAD, it was considerable. The regiment had three track type armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs), and the LAD had two wreckers.

The OC LAD and the regiment’s technical adjutant usually recommended regimental recovery policy on how the equipment would be used. For example, some armoured regiments placed the ARVs and their crews under the command of the OC LAD, while other regiments left their ARVs under the command of the technical adjutant and recovered from RHQ forward, and the LAD recovered from RHQ back. If an ARV was needed too far behind RHQ, then the LAD arranged with the armoured brigade workshop for assistance.

The LAD recovered all wheeled vehicles. LADs normally travelled last when its regiment moved, thus being in a position to effect quick repairs. In the European campaign, particularly in the pursuit period, it was found to be more efficient if the LAD did not leave the harbour area for about an hour after the regiment departed. Thus the LAD recovery vehicles could tow several vehicles, if need be, to the next harbour area without interfering with the division order of no recovery permitted during moves.<sup>103</sup>

Unit and LAD recovery teams recovered to a unit or LAD location selected as a potential site for an AWD or the second echelon workshop.

### **Second Echelon Recovery**

The brigade workshops recovery crews normally collected the equipment from the LAD sites and took them to the AWDs or brigade workshops, or, if beyond the capacity of these, to a collecting point further back. They also provided recovery posts in the divisional area.

The armoured brigade workshops recovery sections were equipped with 17 motorcycles, one medium and four heavy breakdown tractors (wreckers), six 40-ton transporters, and two light 7-ton recovery trailers. The section of 64 all ranks was commanded by a staff sergeant.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid 88, Pt H, p 14.

<sup>103</sup> The ease in point was the operation of 75 LAD attached to 21 CAR (GGFG). The AAQMG of 4 Canadian Arm'd Division was noted for his ruthlessness in ordering vehicles to be ditched without regard to their function. He would not permit important vehicles to be towed on the approach march. The hour delay inevitably insured his departure from a check point on the route and the important vehicles were brought into harbour to function (stores, cook trucks, etc) while the tradesmen repaired them.

The infantry brigade workshop recovery section was much smaller. It was equipped with two motorcycles, one light, one medium, and one heavy wrecker, one 4-ton transporter and two 7-ton recovery trailers. The section of 15 all ranks was commanded by a sergeant.

### **Third Echelon Recovery**

A recovery company was organized for each corps to provide recovery services to their divisions and the tank brigades.

Each company consisted of a headquarters, a light recovery section for each infantry division, and a heavy section for each armoured division in the corps, plus a heavy section for the tank brigade.

A heavy section was comparable to the total recovery facilities of the armoured brigade workshop recovery section. The heavy section had a medium and a heavy crawler type commercial tractor, and four 40-ton transporters instead of the workshop's six transporters. The light section was, however, much stronger than its second echelon equivalent.

The heavy section had a strength of two officers and 65 men, and the light section had two officers and 50 men.

The recovery company brought the equipments from the divisional collecting points to the third echelon workshops and to the corps collecting points.

### **Fourth Echelon Recovery**

The recovery company (L of C)<sup>104</sup> was organized on 24 May 1944. It consisted of a headquarters, two heavy and two light recovery sections and a railhead evacuation section.

The railhead section, with a section of pioneers, was placed directly under command of the Army Railhead Group. The section commander was given full responsibility of recovery officer for the railhead area.

The two light and two heavy sections operated from the rear of the corps areas to the rear of the Army area, collecting and consolidating the various army collecting points for the advanced base workshops. They also were responsible to keep the L of Cs clear.

The establishment normally had a strength of seven officers and 200 men. Provision was made to add or delete sections as required. The unit was equipped with 21 40-ton transporters, nine heavy and 10 medium breakdown tractors, and one mobile crane (for the railhead section), plus a good selection of crawler tractors, transport and trailers.

---

<sup>104</sup> CMHQ file 5/Recov Coy/1, folio 163.





LIST OF ORGANIZATION CHARTS

The following organization diagrams attempt to show how the overseas complex of workshops and recovery units were controlled.

NOTES1. SOURCES:

In many cases the organization chart with its accompanying data is a compilation of information taken from many sources. These sources are indicated in the references at the foot of each chart.

2. WAR ESTABLISHMENTS

(a) Almost all of the charts are supported by representative war establishments in the accompanying annexes. The identifying number of the applicable war establishment will be found inside the appropriate rectangle for all units other than LADs. The WEs for the LADs are indicated by a letter outside the rectangle directing the reader's attention to the notes below the chart.

(b) The Canadian War Establishments for The Second World War were divided into five volumes as follows:

## VOLUME I

Units of an armoured division or corps

## VOLUME II

Units of a division

## VOLUME III

- Part 1 - Headquarters and fighting units of G. H. Q., army and corps troops
- Part 2 - Fighting units of G. H. Q., army and corps troops
- Part 3 - Services of G. H. Q., army and corps troops

## VOLUME IV

- Part 1 - Line of communication headquarters and units
- Part 2 - Line of communication services and units
- Part 3 - Canadian overseas headquarters and headquarter units, Canadian base and reinforcement units and services. Overseas training units
- Part 4 - Headquarters of special formations or forces, units and services

## VOLUME V

- Part 1 - Training units (home)
- Part 2 - Commands, military districts and coast defence units
- Part 3 - Corps and services, internment camps,

military prisons and miscellaneous units

(c) To illustrate the WE number by an example let us examine the following notation for the Headquarters of 1 Cdn Base Workshop RCEME:

IV/49/1 The IV represents the volume. The figure 49 indicates the establishment number, and the figure 1 indicates the issue.

(d) Thus the important numbers are IV/49/-. This must be kept in mind because the WE numbers in force on 4 Jul 45 are shown on the charts whereas in almost every case the supporting representative WEs are of earlier, un-amended issues.

(e) Some of the earlier WEs indicated the year in the number. This may be illustrated in the WE number of "A Mechanical Transport Inspectorate IV/1940/85H/1". In later notation, the WE number would have been written IV/85H/1.

(f) WE numbers followed by an asterisk indicate that the establishments are not included in the annexes.

(g) In some cases WE numbers are given followed by the notation "see" and then followed by a totally different number, for example, in the case of 4 Cdn Armd Bde:  
"11/385/5\* see 1/53/1"

In such a case the same principal has been followed. The latest known WE number has been shown but the only available representative WE for inclusion in the annexes was of an earlier date. In some cases, because the numbering system was inconsistent, the earlier establishment had a totally different number and was thus located in a different volume.


(h) Two different WEs were in use for the Type "A" & "B" LAD in different formations at the same time. For example: On 4 Jul 45, the WE for LADs Type "A" & "B" in 2nd Cdn Corps Tps was Cdn 111/100/5 while the WE for the same LADs in 1 Cdn Inf Div was Cdn 11/317/4\*.

3. FUNCTIONS

The functions, those major areas of work to be done in order that the missions could be accomplished, are included for all the workshops and also for a few of the headquarters organizations.

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
PRINCIPAL ORDNANCE MECHANICAL ENGINEER'S OFFICE  
FRANCE - FIRST WORLD WAR (a)




NOTES (a) Adapted from Appx 3 in ref: "Eventual sub-division of duties in the office of DOS France."  
(b) The instruments in question were AA height finding and indicating equipments.

REF: Forbes, Maj Gen A: A History of the Army Ordnance Service; Vol III, appx 3, pp 342-343. London: The Medici Society, Ltd, 1929.

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
CMHQ (12 FEB 1944)




REF: 1D Hist File: 312, 045 (D4) Org Chart 12 Feb 45 forwarded by Capt JB Conacher. 2D Hist File 112, 3S2009 (D203) CMHQ Org & Comp

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
CMHQ (12 FEB 1944)  
(Continued from page 416)




REF: D Hist File: 312,045 (D4) Org Chart 12 Feb 45 forwarded by Capt JB Conacher

NOTE (a) Each division of a sub-section was headed by a captain.

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
CMHQ UNITS  
4 JUL 45




REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) p 97, 4 Jul 45  
2. WEs CDN IV/49/1  
IV/49A/1  
IV/49B/1  
IV/49C/2  
IV/52/1  
3. REME Vol 1, Org and Ops chart facing p 13, The War Office 1951

Note (a) Ref (4) does not show this section

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Issue 1




Page 419

REF: CARO 5941 (Sec) p 101, 4 Jul 45  
Based on Cdn WE IV/90/4\*

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
HQ CANADIAN REINFORCEMENT UNITS  
AND  
CANADIAN REINFORCEMENT UNIT TROOPS  
4 JUL 45  
(Continued from page 419)

*Handwritten notes:*  
 124 LAD "A" 14 TRG BDE  
 CIRU - Genl  
 CSRU - Gp  
 GGRU - Genl  
 CFRU - Gp  
 CARU - Genl  
 CACRU - 7  
 CCRU - 7



NOTE (a) 124 LAD was a temporary unit. See entry in Appx # 41 of HQ CRU WD for Jan 45.


(b) LAD WEs Type "A" & "B" 111/100/5  
"C" 11/340/4

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REF: CARO 5941 (Sec) p 103, p 112, 4 Jul 45

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
CANADIAN SECTION  
1ST ECHELON, 21 ARMY GROUP  
22 NOV 44



Duties of ADME


1. Tech advisor to OIC CDN Sec GHQ, 1 Ech 21 Army Gp on all matters pertaining to RCEME Corps.
2. Maintain close liaison with ME Directorate 21 Army Gp and with DDME First Cdn Army.
3. Vetting of orders pertaining to RCEME for publication in Cdn ROs (21 Army Gp).
4. Control of all work passing through 2 Cdn Rft Gp Wksp P1 (serial CM 808 on WE Cdn 11/268/1 and supervision of trg and trades testing of personnel passing through it.
5. Liaison with units under direct Brit comd with regard to RCEME or REME wksp requirements.
6. Upon the request of DDME HQ First Cdn Army, to act as his agent to deal with RCEME matters which fall outside the Army area.

- REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) p 64, 4 Jul 45  
 2. D Hist File: 215A21.009 (D43) Org & functions-1, folios 100 and 126 (Cdn Sec GHQ 1 Ech 21 Armp Gp file 501/1 Ech/1 (Adm) d 22 Nov 44 entitled Org and functions).  
 3. CD WE 111/2D/4\*

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
GHQ, L OF C TROOPS AND BASE UNITS  
21 ARMY GROUP  
4 JUL 45  
(Continued from page 421)




- REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) pp 72, 73 4 Jul 45  
 2. REME Vol 1 Org & Ops, chart facing p 13, The War Office 1951.

- NOTES: (a) No 12 RH Evac Sec was placed under command of 1 Cdn L of C Terminal.  
 (b) Cdn WE does not show this section.  
 (c) LAD WEs Type "A" & "B" Cdn 111/100/5

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Issue 1  
Page 423

ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ FIRST CANADIAN ARMY




Page 423

REF:1 CARO 5941 (Sec) p 45, 4 Jul 45  
2 Based on D Hist File 215C1,043 (6) HQ First Cdn Army;  
Memo on the Org of comd, etc.

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
HQ FIRST CANADIAN ARMY  
1 FEB 45  
(Continued from page 423)



Page 424

REF: 1. D Hist File 215C1,043 (6). HQ First Cdn Army, "Memo on  
The Org of Comd, The Function of the Staff, Services, etc.  
Part XIII, pp 1 & 2. 1 Feb 45.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING  
AND HIS STAFF AT HQ FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

SECTION ONE

General

1. The Mechanical Engineering Service is controlled by the QMG's Branch of the Staff at Army HQ which carries out the functions of the MGO's Branch (see FSR Vol I, Chap XII, Sec 82).
2. The DDME has the following responsibilities:
  - (a) Advice to the Commander and the Staff.
  - (b) Executive Duties.
  - (c) Supervisory Duties.
  - (d) Co-ordinating Duties.

Advice

3. The DDME advises the Commander and the Staff regarding:
  - (a) All matters concerning RCEME policy in First Canadian Army.
  - (b) All questions of unit maintenance, repair and modification of equipments for which RCEME is responsible.
  - (c) The employment of RCEME units.

Executive Duties

- (a) Allocation of 3rd line RCEME Workshops, Recovery Companies, and other Army RCEME units, to produce maximum efficiency, in keeping with tactical situation.
- (b) Initiation or approval and the implementing of RCEME technical instructions.
- (c) Officer Administering duties affecting RCEME.

Supervisory Duties

5. The DDME is responsible for the efficiency of the RCEME repair and recovery services in the Army.

Co-ordinating Duties

6.
  - (a) The DDME maintains direct liaison with the DME 21 Army Group.
  - (b) The DDME must maintain close liaison with the Staff, and the RCEME Services throughout the Army.
  - (c) The DDME arranges, through the Staff, for the movement of RCEME personnel in order to maintain the highest efficiency of his Service.
  - (d) The DDME represents the RCEME services of the Army when and as required by the Staff Selection Committees.

Representation at Lower Formations

7.	Army Troops	CREME
	Corps	DDME
	Corps Troops	CREME
	Division	CREME
	Armoured Brigade (Independent)	DADME
	Armoured Brigade	DADME
	Anti Aircraft Brigade	EME (Major)
	Infantry Brigade	EME (Capt)
	Army Group RA	EME (Capt)



SECTION TWO

## DDME's STAFF

- B. The allocation of duties between the various members of the DDME Staff is as follows:
- (a) ADME  
Acts for the DDME in his absence. Assists DDME in policy and planning matters. Supervises work of the branch staff.
  - (b) DADME (General)  
Technical officer on workshop operation and procedure. Supervises workshop returns and inspections. Exercises supervision of junior technical officers specializing in Armament, Small Arms, Anti-aircraft and Fire Control Instruments. Preparation, editing and distribution of technical instructions and directions. Detailed study of organization and War Establishment problems.
  - (c) Captain EME (Personnel and Administration)  
Responsible to DDME for maintaining of officers records, postings, courses, training generally and office administration.
  - (d) DADME (Telecommunications)  
Technical officer on Telecommunication equipment. Responsible for modifications and investigation of defects.
  - (e) Captain EME (Armament)  
Technical officer on Field Armament. Responsible for modifications and investigation of defects.
  - (f) Captain EME (AA Armament and Instruments)  
Technical officer on Anti-aircraft and Fire Control Instruments. Responsible for modifications and investigation of defects.
  - (g) Assistant Inspector of Armourers  
Technical officer on Small Arms. Supervises armourers services.
  - (h) DADME (Recovery)  
Acts as Army Recovery Officer and is responsible for all RCEME recovery and backloading within Army area as well as for arranging recovery assistance to lower formations. Liaison officer to RCASC on use of their facilities for backloading.
  - (j) DADME (Vehicles)  
Technical officer on "A" and "B" Vehicles and related equipments. Responsible for modifications and investigation of defects.
  - (k) Captain EME ("A" Vehicles)  
Assistant to DADME (Vehicles) on matters pertaining to "A" vehicles.
  - (l) Lieutenant EME ("B" Vehicles)  
Assistant to DADME (Vehicles) on matters pertaining to "B" vehicles.

Issue 2 - Feb 63

REF: 1.


D Hist File 215C1.043 (6). HQ First Cdn Army, "Memo on The Org of Comd, The Function of the Staff, Services, etc. Part XIII, pp 1 & 2, 1 Feb 45, as amended by 5-1-0/ME, Adm HQ First Cdn Army, d, 31 Mar 45 entitled "Chief of Staff memo on Org of Comd etc. HQ First Cdn Army". (It is to be noted that in the original documents that para 8 of the "Functions" is the chart and para 9 contains the "Allocation of Duties". I have extracted the org chart and re-numbered para 9 of the original document para 8 in my paper. RHH).

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
HQ FIRST CANADIAN ARMY  
MARCH 1945

NOTES

(a) The Org Chart on p 424 and "SECTION TWO, DDME's STAFF," p 426 are superseded by p 426 a and 426 b. At the time of writing of pp 424 and 426, the information available was considered correct, however a year later, research in an other area uncovered an amendment that was not on file and that showed a reorganization had taken place shortly after Ref 1 had gone to press.

The changes reflect the material development of an organization that was capable of responding to a change of emphasis, for example, the DADME previously allocated to recovery, so important for the support of the invasion forces and the fast moving pursuit out of Normandy was downgraded to a captains level and the DADME was reallocated to meet the severe problems of AFV Servicing (the repair and servicing of reinforcement AFVs), that reached a climax in December 1944.



(b) The DDME Staff consisted of:

Brigadier	- 1	Learners	- 2	Total Staff	- 20
Lt Col	- 1	Brits attached	- 1	Plus sub-staff	
Majors	- 5	Cdns attached	- 1		
Cpts	- 5	DDEM (Civs)	- 3		
Lts	- 1				
					7
					13

(c) The three civilians from the Directorate of Design Equipment and Mechanization (DDEM) were granted captain status.


Page 426 a

SECTION TWODDME's STAFF

8. The allocation of duties between the various members of the DDME Branch are as follows:
- (a) ADME  
Acts for the DDME in his absence. Assists DDME in policy and planning matters. Supervises work of branch staff.
  - (b) DADME (AFV Servicing)  
Co-ordinates all aspects of AFV Servicing at HQ 25 Cdn Armd Del Regt.
  - (c) DADME (Organization)  
WE and 1098 revisions, org REME services, tech and adm instrs, publications, wksp accn, planning and recovery.
  - (d) EME (Organization)  
Assists the DADME (Org) in WE and 1098 revisions, tech and adm instrs, publications etc.
  - (e) EME (Org) Learner  
Assists the DADME (Org).
  - (f) EME (Recovery)  
Responsible to the DADME (Org) for all matters concerning org of recovery and backloading.
  - (g) EME (Pers Canadian)  
Responsible for matters concerning Cdn personnel, trg, trade tests, branch local adm and War Diary.
  - (h) EME (Pers British)  
Responsible for matters concerning Brit personnel, trg and trade tests.
  - (i) DADME (Workshops)  
Supervises wksp programs, production and returns, deals with tech problems relating to Armt, SA & MG, wksp tools and eqpt, instruments and engr eqpts.
  - (j) EME (Wksp Learner)  
Assists the DADME (Wksp).
  - (k) EME (Armament and FCI)  
Responsible to the DADME (Wksp) for tech matters pertaining to armt and instruments incl the investigation of defects, mods, etc.
  - (l) Assistant Inspector of Armourers  
Responsible to the DADME (Wksp) for tech matters pertaining to SA, MG and Mortars, incl the investigation of defects, mods, etc.
  - (m) DADME (Telecommunications)  
Investigates tech problems relating to Radar, wireless and line eqpt incl mods and defects on such eqpt.
  - (n) EME (Tele)  
Assists the DADME (Tele).
  - (o) DADME (Vehicles)  
Investigates tech problems on "A" and "B" vehicles incl mods and defects.
  - (p) EME (Vehicles)  
Assists DADME (Vehs).
  - (q) Civilian Technical Representatives  
Represent manufacturers of A and B Vehs and advise on tech problems relating to their particular product.
  - (r) DDEM  
Represents CMHQ and advises and assists DADME (Vehs) on tech problems regarding vehs.

Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
FIRST CANADIAN ARMY TROOPS  
4 JUL 45



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Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
FIRST CANADIAN ARMY TROOPS  
4 JUL 45  
(Continued from page 427)



Page 427A

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ OF A CDN CORPS (a)  
1944




Page 428

NOTE (a) Based on CDN WE 111/5/2\*  
REF: CARO 5941 (Sec) p 31 & p 36

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ DDME OF A CANADIAN CORPS (a)  
1944  
(Continued from page 428)




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NOTE (a) Based on CDN WE 111/5/2\*  
REF: CARO 5941 (Sec) p 34 & p 40.

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
1ST CDN CORPS TROOPS  
4 JUL 45




- NOTES: (a) For Org CREME see page 432  
 (b) Army and Corps Tps Wksps were based on either an Inf or Armd Tps Wksp depending on location.  
 (c) CDN WE 111/22/1\*, "A Cdn Corps HQ Signals" Jan 1943 shows a capt provided "to supervise LADs attached to corps headquarters signals, corps field park company and auxiliary units."  
 (d) LAD WEs Type "A" & "B" CDN 111/100/5  
                   "C"           11/340/4  
                   "D"           11/340A/5

- REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) p 34, 4 Jul 45.  
 2. D Hist File 040,045 (Org Charts)  
 3. REME Vol 1 Org and Ops, chart facing page 13, The War Office 1951.  
 4. D Hist File: 112-3S2009 (D 212) RCEME Org & Comp (Chart at top folio).

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
2ND CDN CORPS TROOPS  
4 JUL 45




- NOTES: (a) For Org HQ CREME see page 432  
 (b) Army and Corps Tps Wksps were based on either an Inf or Armd Tps Wksp depending on location.  
 (c) CDN WE 111/22/1\*, "A Cdn Corps HQ Signals," Jan 1943 shows a capt provided to supervise LADs attached "to corps headquarters signals, corps field park company and auxiliary units."  
 (d) LAD WEs Type "A" & "B" CDN 111/100/5  
                   "C"           11/340/4  
                   "D"           11/340A/5

- REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) p 40, 4 Jul 45.  
 2. D Hist File 040,045 (Org Charts).  
 3. REME Vol 1 - Org and Ops, chart facing page 13, The War Office, 1951.  
 4. D Hist File: 112.3S2009 (D 212) RCEME Org & Comp (Chart at top folio).


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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ OF A CANADIAN DIVISION (a)  
1945



ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ RCEME SERVICES (b)  
11/50/3




NOTES: (a) Basically the org of an armd and inf div HQ were the same. This org based on CDN 11/100/2\* & 11/116/1\*; latest WE were Inf Div 11/116/3\*, armd div 11/100/3\*  
(b) The same HQ RCEME services organization was used at army troop corps troops, armd div and at inf div HQs. This org is based on CDN WE 11/50/2  
REF: CARO 5941 (Sec) p 1 & p 19. 4 Jul 45  
CDN WEs 11/100/2, 11/116/1, 11/50/2

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
1 CDN INF DIV  
4 JUL 45




NOTES: (a) For Org HQ CREME see page 432.  
(b) Div Tps were based on nearest workshop  
(c) For Org HQ Inf Bde see page 433.  
(d) LAD WEs Type "A" & "B" CDN 11/317/4\*, see 11/100/5  
"D" 11/340A/5

REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) p 5. 4 Jul 45  
2. D Hist File 040,045 (Org Charts)  
3. REME Vol 1 - Org and Ops, chart facing p 13  
The War Office, 1951.  
4. D Hist File: 112.3S 2009 (D 212) RCEME  
Org & Comp (Chart at top folio)

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Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
2 CDN INF DIV  
4 JUL 45



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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
3 CDN INF DIV  
4 JUL 45




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Figure 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
4 CDN ARMD DIV  
4 JUL 45



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Figure 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
5 CDN ARMD DIV  
4 JUL 45



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
Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ OF AN INFANTRY BRIGADE (a)  
1945



NOTE (a) Based on CDN WE 11/141/2\*

ORGANIZATION CHART  
HQ OF AN ARMoured BRIGADE (a)  
1945




NOTE (a) Based on CDN WE 11/101/1\*  
An independent arm'd bde used the same WE.

REF: 1 CARO 5941 (Sec) p 3 & 41.  
4 Jul 45  
2. CDN WEs 11/101/4,  
11/141/3

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Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
1ST CDN ARMD BDE (INDEPENDENT)  
4 JUL 45



NOTES: (a) When the Bde was placed under command of ... formation the DADME reported to that formation's CREME.  
(b) For Org HQ arm'd bde see page 438  
(c) LAD WE CDN 111/155/4\* see 11/340/2

REF: 1. CARO 5941 (Sec) p 42, 4 Jul 45.  
2. D Hist File 040.045 (Org Charts)  
3. REME Vol 1 Org and Ops, chart facing p 13.  
The War Office 1951.

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# War Establishments of RCEME Units

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ANNEX A

AN ARMOURED BRIGADE WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn I/53/1

Notified in G. O. 144/43  
Effective 1st January, 1943

Published April, 1943

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	RCOC Stores Section	Total
Major (electrical and mechanical engineer 2nd class)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Captains and lieutenants, (electrical and mechanical engineers 3rd or 4th class)	5	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	6
Captains, (ordnance officer 4th class)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Total, officers	6	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	8
Warrant officer, class I	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officers, class II	3	2	..	1	..	2	..	..	8
Staff-sergeants	..	5	2	4	1	6	..	1	19
Sergeants	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	13
Total, WOs, s/sgts and sgts	8	9	4	6	2	9	1	2	41
Corporals	4	2	4	3	4	2	1	2	22
Lance-corporals	1	3	..	7	4	4	..	2	21
Privates	19	30	9	43	54	32	9	18	214
Total, rank and file	24	35	13	53	62	38	10	22	257
Total, other ranks	32	44	17	59	64	47	11	24	298
Total, all ranks	38	44	17	59	64	47	12	25	306

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN									
Batmen	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Drivers, I. C.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates	4	3	1	..	..	3	1	1	13
General duties	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Corporal	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Privates	1	3	1	5	13	4	..	2	29
Motorcyclists	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Corporal	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Privates	2	..	..	1	16	..	..	..	19
Regimental duties	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Company-sergeant-major (WO II)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen	13	6	2	6	31	7	1	3	69
TRADESMEN									
Trade group									
Armourers	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Quartermaster-sergeant (WO II)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
Sergeants	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
Corporals	..	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	4
Privates	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	..	7
Artificer, armament instrument (field)	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Artificer, armament (A. F. V.)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sergeant-major (WO I)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Quartermaster-sergeants (WO II)	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Staff-sergeants	..	..	..	1	..	6	..	..	7
Artificer, armament (field)	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Quartermaster-sergeants (WO II)	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
Staff-sergeants	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	4

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (Cont'd)

Detail	Trade group	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	RCOC Stores Section	Total
TRADESMEN (Cont'd)										
Artificer, armament (MV)		..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Quartermaster-sergeant (WO II)	"A"	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Staff-sergeants	"A"	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	6
Blacksmiths ...	"B"	..	4	..	1	..	1	..	..	3
Blacksmiths ...	"C"	..	2	..	..	..	1	..	..	3
Carpenters ...	"B"	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	2
Clerks										
Company-sergeant-major (WO II)	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ...	"C"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Sergeant ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Privates ...	"C"	2	1	..	2	1	1	..	3	10
Cooks										
Sergeant ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	"C"	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Driver mechanics ...	"C"	..	2	..	18	20	8	1	..	49
Electricians ...	"A"	..	..	..	4	..	2	..	..	6
Fitters										
Sergeants ...	"A"	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Privates ...	"A"	..	11	..	..	..	..	..	..	11
Fitters (M.V.)										
Staff-sergeants ...	"A"	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	2
Sergeants (1 trained in AFV)	"A"	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	2
Privates (14 trained in AFV)	"A"	..	..	..	14	..	14	..	..	28
Mechanic instrument (1 trained for field, 1 trained for A.A.) ...	"A"	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Mechanics, motor										
Sergeant ...	"B"	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	"B"	..	..	..	..	9	..	..	..	9
Mechanics, wireless										
Sergeant ...	"B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Privates ...	"B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	7
Refitters, textile ...	"B"	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	2
Sheet metal workers ...	"B"	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Shoemaker ...	"B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Storemen (technical and departmental)										
Sergeants ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Corporals ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Privates ...	"C"	2	1	..	2	1	1	1	13	21
Turners ...	"B"	..	1	..	1	..	1	..	..	3
Welders (gas and electric)	"B"	..	1	..	1	..	2	..	..	4
Total, tradesmen ...	...	19	(a)38	15	(a)53	(a)33	(a)40	(a)10	21	229
Total, other ranks ...	...	32	44	17	59	64	47	11	24	298

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, heavy ...	2	..	1	1	17	1	..	..	..	22
Cars, 5 cwt ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Trucks, heavy utility										
Personnel ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "ZL" ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Trucks, 15 cwt										
G.S. ...	2	1	..	2	1	3	..	..	..	9
Machinery "KI" ...	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton										
G.S. ...	13	2	1	4	1	3	..	..	..	24
G.S. (stores) ...	9	1	1	1	..	1	1	..	..	14
Machinery "I-30" ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "J" ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

(iii) Transport (Cont'd)

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	RCOC Stores Section	Total
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wheel									
Machinery "A" ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "Z" ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Lorries, 4 ton, 6 wheel									
Machinery "M" ... ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Tractors breakdown									
Medium ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Heavy ... ..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	4
Transporters recovery (40 ton)	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	6
Trailers 15 cwt, 2 wheel									
Water ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Generator 9 KW ... ..	..	(b)1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Gas Welding ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Trailers 4 wheel									
Machinery "M" ... ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers 6 wheel, 7 ton									
Light recovery ... ..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch ... ..	(c) 32
Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	260
Machine carbines .45 inch ... ..	14
L.M.Gs, .303 inch ... ..	3
A.Tk, rifles, .55 inch ... ..	7

(a) The tradesmen, other than clerks, and storemen, technical and departmental shown as privates will include corporals as follows:

Armament section	2	Tank section	2
Vehicle section	3	Telecommunication section	1
Recovery section	2		

(b) Required only if old type machinery lorries are issued.

(c) Pistols for officers, WO I, motorcyclists, No 1 L.M.G.

## ANNEX B

## HEADQUARTERS OF A COMMANDER, RCEME

(This headquarters is designed for use with army troops, corps troops, an infantry division and an armoured division)

War Establishment Cdn II/50/2

Notified in G.O. 254/44  
Effective 21st February, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel			
Lieutenant-colonel Commander (EME)	...	...	1
Major 2 i/c (EME)	...	...	1
Captains (wireless specialist) (EME)	...	...	1
Adjutant (EME)	...	...	1
Paymaster (RCAPC)	...	...	1
Total, officers	...	...	5
Warrant officers, class I	...	...	1
Sergeants	...	...	2
Total, WOs, and sgts	...	...	3
Corporal	...	...	1
Lance-corporal	...	...	1
Privates	...	...	11
Privates, RCASC	...	...	2
Total, rank and file	...	...	15
Total, other ranks	...	...	18
Total, all ranks	...	...	23
(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties			
NON-TRADESMEN			
Batmen-drivers	...	...	3
Drivers, IC	...	...	6
Total, non-tradesmen	...	...	(a) 9
TRADESMEN			
Clerk superintending	...	...	1
Warrant officer, class I (sub-conductor)	...	...	1
Clerks	...	...	2
Sergeants, (includes 1) for pay duties	...	...	1
Corporal	...	...	1
Privates	...	...	1
Cooks RCASC (includes 1) for officers' mess	...	...	2
Driver operators	...	...	(a) 2
Total, tradesmen	...	...	9
Total, other ranks	...	...	18
(iii) Transport			
Motorcycles, solo	...	...	6
Cars, 5 cwt	...	...	1
Truck, heavy utility, computer (with penthouse) (for paymaster)	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, G.S.	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, command (LP) (b)	...	...	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel, G.S.	...	...	1
(iv) Weapons			
Pistols .38 inch	...	...	5
Rifles .303 inch	...	...	7
Machine carbines	...	...	11

(a) Of the batmen-drivers, drivers I. C. and driver-operators, one may be lance-corporal.

(b) When serving with armoured formations an "Armoured command vehicle (LP) will be issued in lieu.

ANNEX C

## A LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT WORKSHOP; TYPE "A", RCEME

Consisting of:

Headquarters, with sections on a scale of one per battery in a light A. A. regiment, RCA, and one telecommunication section when the regiment is equipped with radar.

War Establishment Cdn II/51/2

Notified in G.O. 300/44  
Effective 22 Feb 44.

Published June, 1944

## (i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	3 LAA Battery sections (each)	Total Headquarters & 3 LAA sections	Increment for tele-communication section
Captain (EME 3rd class) ... ..	1	..	1	..
Staff-sergeants ... ..	2	1	5	1
Sergeants ... ..	1	..	1	..
Total, s/sgts and sgts ... ..	3	1	7	1
Corporals ... ..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals ... ..	..	1	3	..
Privates ... ..	10	5	25	4
Total, rank and file ... ..	10	6	28	5
Total, other ranks ... ..	13	7	34	6
Total, all ranks ... ..	14	7	35	6

## (ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>				
Drivers, I. C. ... ..	2	..	2	1
Total, non-tradesmen ... ..	2	..	2	1
<b>TRADESMEN</b>				
Artificers, armament (AA) (staff-sergeants) ... ..	1	1	4	..
(Radio) (staff-sergeant) ... ..	..	..	..	1
Armourer, staff-sergeant ... ..	1	..	1	..
Artizans (incl 1 sgt in HQ)				
Driver mechanics ... ..	2	1	5	..
Electricians ... ..	1	1	4	..
Fitters ... ..	2	1	5	..
Fitters (MV) ... ..	1	2	7	..
Mechanics instrument ... ..	1	1	4	..
Mechanics (radio or wireless) (incl 1 corporal) ... ..	..	..	..	4
Clerk ... ..	1	..	1	..
Storemen(for vehicles) ... ..	1	..	1	..
Total, tradesmen ... ..	11	7	32	5
Total, other ranks ... ..	13	7	34	6

## (iii) Transport

Motorcycle, solo ... ..	1	..	1	..
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	1	1	4	..
Truck, H. U., machinery "ZL" ... ..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS (flat floor type) ... ..	1	..	1	..
Lorries, 3 ton, GS, stores ... ..	..	1	3	..
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wh, machinery "M" ... ..	1	..	1	..
Tractor, breakdown, medium ... ..	1	..	1	..

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## (iii) Transport (Cont'd)

Detail	Headquarters	3 LAA Battery Sections (each)	Total Headquarters & 3 LAA sections	Increment for tele-communication section
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wh, GS ...	1	1	4	..
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wh, water ...	1	..	1	..
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wh, gas welding ...	1	..	1	..

## (iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch ...	1	..	1	..
Rifles, .303 inch ...	8	5	23	5
Machine carbines ...	5	2	11	1

## NOTES

1. Drivers have not been provided for static vehicles (stores, lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers, I.C. under unit arrangements.
2. Personnel and stores for which unit transport is not available will be carried in transport of the formation of which this unit forms a part.

## ANNEX D

## INFANTRY BRIGADE WORKSHOP, RCEME

For infantry or armoured divisions

War Establishment Cdn II/339/3

Notified in G.O. 379/44  
Effective 10 Mar 44

Published October 1944

## (i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Telecommunication Section	RCOC Stores Section	Total
Major (electrical & mechanical engineer, 2nd class) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Captain (ordnance officer, 4th class) ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Captains or lieutenants (electrical & mechanical engineers 3rd or 4th class)	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
Total officers ...	5	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
Warrant officer, class I ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II ...	1	1	..	1	..	1	..	4
Staff-sergeants ...	3	3	1	6	..	..	1	14
Sergeants ...	2	1	..	2	1	1	1	8
Total, WOs, Ssgts & Sgts ...	7	5	1	9	1	2	2	27
Corporals ...	2	2	..	5	1	..	2	12
Corporal, (RCASC) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals ...	2	2	1	7	2	..	2	16
Privates ...	11	19	3	58	11	5	16	123
Privates, (RCASC) ...	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Total, rank and file ...	21	23	4	70	14	5	20	157
Total, other ranks ...	28	28	5	79	15	7	22	184
Total, all ranks ...	33	28	5	79	15	7	23	190

## (ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN								
Batmen ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Drivers, IC ...	5	..	..	1	1	..	1	8
General dutymen ...	..	3	1	6	2	..	1	13
Regimental dutyman (Ssgt) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Transport sergeant ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen ...	9	3	1	(e) 7	3	..	2	25
TRADESMEN								
Artificers Armament (a) (Field) ...	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
(Field) ...	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Instruments, (Field) ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
(AFV) or (MV) Warrant Officer class I, Armament Sgt-Major ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant Officer class II Armament QMS ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants ...	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	5
(Wireless) WO II Armament Quartermaster-sergeant ...	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Armourers								
Staff-sergeants ...	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	2
Privates ...	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	3
Artizans (a)								
Blacksmiths ...	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	3
Carpenters ...	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	2
Driver mechanics ...	1	2	..	12	3	1	..	19
Driver mechanics (AFV) ...	..	..	..	12	3	..	..	15
Driver operators ...	2	..	..	..	2	..	..	4

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (Cont'd)

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Telecommunication Section	RCOC Stores Section	Total
<b>TRADESMEN (Cont'd)</b>								
<b>Artizans (a) (Cont'd)</b>								
Electricians ... ..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	4
Fitters ... ..	..	9	..	..	..	..	..	9
Fitters (Mv) ... ..	..	..	..	14	(b)1	..	..	15
Fitters (AFV) ... ..	..	..	..	13	3	..	..	16
<b>Mechanics Instrument for -</b>								
Anti-aircraft ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Field ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Type X cipher ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Mechanics wireless ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	4
Sheet Metal Workers ... ..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	2
Trimmers and Upholsterers (coach) ... ..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Turners ... ..	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	3
Welders (G & E) ... ..	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	3
<b>Clerks -</b>								
Warrant Officer, class II	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Quartermaster-sergeant ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Sergeant ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Privates ... ..	2	..	..	1	..	..	2	5
<b>Cooks, (RCASC) (includes one for officers' mess - Cpl</b>								
Privates ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... ..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
<b>Storemen (T &amp; D) (a) for -</b>								
Armament & General Stores ... ..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	2
Instrument & Telecommunications	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Vehicles ... ..	2	..	..	1	..	..	..	3
<b>RCOC Stores -</b>								
Sergeant ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Corporal ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Privates ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	14	14
Total, tradesmen ... ..	19	25	4	72	12	7	20	159
Total, other ranks ... ..	28	28	5	79	15	7	22	184

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo ... ..	4	1	1	1	2	..	..	9
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Truck, Heavy, Utility, Machinery "ZL" ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Trucks, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	1	2	..	1	..	..	..	4
Trucks, 15 cwt, Machinery "KL" ... ..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Trucks, 15 cwt, Fitted for Wireless ... ..	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	2
Lorries, 3 ton, GS (13 to be flat floor type)	2	2	1	6	..	..	9	20
Lorries, 3 ton, GS, stores ... ..	1	1	(c)1	1	..	(d)1	9	14
Lorry, 3 ton, Instrument Repair ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, Machinery "I" ... ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, Machinery "J" ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel, Machinery "A" ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel, Machinery "Z" ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel, Machinery "M" ... ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, light ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, medium ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, heavy ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Transporter, Recovery, 4 ton ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Trailers, 2 cwt, 2 wheel, GS ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Trailers, 2 cwt, 2 wheel, Water ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Trailer, 2 cwt, 2 wheel, Workshop Servicing	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 2 cwt, 2 wheel, Generator, 9 KW	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 2 cwt, 2 wheel, Gas Welding	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Trailers, 6 wheel, 7 ton, Light Recovery	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2

(iv) Table of Weapons

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Telecommunication Section	RCOC Stores Section	Total
Pistols .38 inch ... ..	5	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
Rifles .303 inch ... ..	11	20	2	66	8	4	4	115
Machine Carbines ... ..	13	8	3	13	7	3	18	65
LMGs .303 inch ... ..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
PIATs ... ..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5

(a) Ranks and appointments not specified in part (ii) will be distributed according to the following table: -

Armament Artificers								
Warrant officer, class II								
Armament quartermaster-sergeant	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Artizans								
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Sergeants ... ..	..	1	..	2	..	1	..	4
Corporals ... ..	..	2	..	4	1	..	..	7
Storemen (T & D) -								
Staff-sergeant (also for QM Duties)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

(b) Includes one sergeant.

(c) Fitted with two "Z" bins only.

(d) Specially binned to carry spares and assemblies for the telecommunication section.

(e) Includes one corporal.

NOTES

1. Drivers have not been included for static vehicles (store lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers, IC, under unit arrangements.
2. All personnel in recovery section will be trained in recovery duties.

## ANNEX E

## A LIGHT AID DÉTACHMENT, TYPE "C" RCEME

War Establishment Cdn II/340/2

Notified in G.O. 300/44  
Effective 6 Mar 44

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel					
Captain (EME 3rd class)	...	...	...	...	1
Warrant officer, class II	...	...	...	...	1
Staff-sergeants	...	...	...	...	3
Corporal	...	...	...	...	1
Lance-corporals	...	...	...	...	2
Privates	...	...	...	...	17
Total, rank and file	...	...	...	...	20
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	...	24
Total, all ranks	...	...	...	...	25
(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties					
NON-TRADESMEN					
Batman driver	...	...	...	...	1
Driver, IC	...	...	...	...	1
General duties	...	...	...	...	2
Total, non-tradesmen	...	...	...	...	4
TRADESMEN					
Artificers armament (AFV)					
W. O. II, armament QMS	...	...	...	...	1
Staff-sergeants	...	...	...	...	3
Artizans (a)					
Driver mechanics (AFV)	...	...	...	...	3
Driver operators	...	...	...	...	2
Electrician	...	...	...	...	1
Fitter	...	...	...	...	1
Fitters (AFV)	...	...	...	...	3
Mechanics, motor	...	...	...	...	2
Welder (G & E)	...	...	...	...	1
Clerk	...	...	...	...	1
Storeman (T & D) for vehicles					
Lance-corporal	...	...	...	...	1
Private	...	...	...	...	1
Total, tradesmen	...	...	...	...	20
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	...	24
(iii) Transport					
Motorcycle, solo	...	...	...	...	1
Car, 5 cwt	...	...	...	...	1
Truck, 15 cwt, G.S.	...	...	...	...	1
Truck, 15 cwt, machinery "KL"	...	...	...	...	1
Truck, 15 cwt, fitted for wireless	...	...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, G.S., stores	...	...	...	...	1
Tractors, breakdown, heavy	...	...	...	...	2
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel, G.S.	...	...	...	...	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel gas welding	...	...	...	...	1
(iv) Table of weapons					
Pistol, .38 inch	...	...	...	...	1
Rifles, .303 inch	...	...	...	...	16
Machine carbines	...	...	...	...	8

(a) Includes one corporal and one lance-corporal.

NOTES

1. When this detachment is serving an armoured regiment, tank battalion or an armoured reconnaissance regiment equipped with Churchill, Ram or Sherman tanks, the following additions are authorized:

Driver, IC	...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS, Stores	...	...	...	1

2. When this detachment is serving an armoured reconnaissance regiment, the addition of one trailer, 6 wheel, 7 ton, light recovery, is authorized.

3. Allotment of light aid detachments to formations & units

(For LAD, Types "A" and "B" see WE Cdn. II/317/2  
Cdn. III/100/3)  
(For LAD, type "D", see WE Cdn. II/340A/3)

Headquarters units:

Headquarters of an armoured division	...	...	...	...	B
Headquarters of an armoured corps	...	...	...	...	C
Headquarters of an infantry brigade	...	...	...	...	A
Headquarters of an independent brigade group	...	...	...	...	(one A)
					(one B)
GHQ liaison regiment	...	...	...	...	A

Armoured corps:

Armoured car regiment	...	...	...	...	A
Armoured regiment	...	...	...	...	C
Tank battalion	...	...	...	...	C

Artillery:

Anti-tank regiment (infantry division)	...	...	...	...	A
Anti-tank regiment (self-propelled)	...	...	...	...	D
Regiment, RCHA, or field regiment (armoured division)	...	...	...	...	B
Regiment, RCHA, or field regiment (infantry division)	...	...	...	...	B
Field regiment (self-propelled)	...	...	...	...	D
Heavy regiment	...	...	...	...	B
Medium regiment	...	...	...	...	B
Survey regiment	...	...	...	...	A

Engineers:

Field park squadron or company (armoured division)	...	...	...	...	B
Field park squadron or company (infantry division)	GHQ, Army & Corps)	...	...	...	B
Headquarters, airfield construction group	...	...	...	...	B
Engineer assault troops	...	...	...	...	C

Signals:

Armoured divisional signals	...	...	...	...	B
Infantry divisional signals	...	...	...	...	B
Corps headquarters signals	...	...	...	...	A
Headquarters signals	...	...	...	...	A
Air formation signals	...	...	...	...	A
I of C signals	...	...	...	...	A

Infantry:

Machine gun battalion	...	...	...	...	B
Motor battalion	...	...	...	...	B

Reconnaissance corps:

Reconnaissance regiment	...	...	...	...	A
Armoured reconnaissance regiment	...	...	...	...	C

ANNEX F

A LIGHT AID DETACHMENT, TYPE "D", RCEME

(To serve RCHA, field or anti-tank regiments, RCA, with one or more batteries equipped with S. P. mountings. It will consist of a headquarters and battery sections of the appropriate types to correspond with the batteries comprising the regiment, RCA).

War Establishment Cdn II/340A/3

Notified in G.O. 300/44  
Effective 22 Feb 44.

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	T. D. Bty section	S. P. Bty section
Captain or lieutenant (EME 3rd or 4th class) ...	1	..	..
Warrant officer, class II ...	1	..	..
Sergeant ...	..	1	1
Lance-corporal ...	1	1	1
Privates ...	8	5	7
Total, rank and file ...	9	6	8
Total, other ranks ...	10	7	9
Total, all ranks ...	11	7	9

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>			
Batman driver ...	1	..	..
Driver, IC ...	1	..	..
General dutyman ...	1	..	..
Total, non-tradesmen ...	3	..	..
<b>TRADESMEN</b>			
Artificer armament (field)			
Warrant officer, class II			
Armament quartermaster-sergeant ...	1	..	..
Artizans			
Driver mechanics ...	1	2	..
Driver mechanics (AFV) ...	..	..	2
Electrician ...	1	..	1
Fitters ...	..	(a) { 1	{ 1
Fitters (MV) ...	..	{ 4	(a) { 4
Fitters (AFV) ...	1	..	1
Welder (G. & E.) ...	1	..	1
Clerk ...	1	..	1
Storeman (T. & D.) for vehicles ...	1	..	..
Total, tradesmen ...	(b) 7	(b) 7	(b) 9
Total, other ranks ...	10	7	9

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo ...	2	..	..
Cars, 5 cwt ...	..	1	1
Trucks, 15 cwt, G.S. ...	..	1	1
Truck, 15 cwt, machinery "KL" ...	1	..	..
Lorry, 3 ton, G.S. ...	1	..	..
Tractors, breakdown, heavy ...	1	..	..
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wh, G.S. ...	1	1	1
Trailer, 20 cwt 2 wh, gas welding ...	1	..	..

(iv) Table of weapons

Detail	Headquarters	T. D. Bty section	S. P. Bty section
Pistol, .38 inch ... ..	1	..	..
Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	7	5	7
Machine carbines ... ..	3	2	2

- (a) Includes 1 sergeant
- (b) Includes 1 lance-corporal

Allotment of light aid detachments to formation and units.  
 (For LAD Type "A" and "B" see WE Cdn II/317/2  
 Cdn III/100/3)  
 (For LAD Type "C" see WE Cdn II/340/2  
 Cdn III/155/2)

Headquarters units:

Headquarters of an armoured division	...	...	...	B
Headquarters of an armoured corps	...	...	...	C
Headquarters of an infantry brigade	...	...	...	A
Headquarters of an independent brigade group (one)	...	...	...	A
(one)	...	...	...	B
G. H. Q. liaison regiment	...	...	...	A

Armoured corps:

Armoured car regiment	...	...	...	A
Armoured regiment	...	...	...	C
Tank battalion	...	...	...	C

Artillery:

Anti-tank regiment (infantry division)	...	...	...	A
Anti-tank regiment (self-propelled)	...	...	...	D
Regiment, RCHA or field regiment (armoured division)	...	...	...	B
Regiment, RCHA or field regiment (infantry division)	...	...	...	B
Field regiment (self propelled)	...	...	...	D
Heavy regiment	...	...	...	B
Medium regiment	...	...	...	B
Survey regiment	...	...	...	A

Engineers:

Field park squadron or company (armoured division)	...	...	...	B
Field park squadron or company (infantry division, GHQ, Army & Corps)	...	...	...	B
HQ airfield construction group	...	...	...	B
Engineer assault troops	...	...	...	C

Signals:

Armoured divisional signals	...	...	...	B
Infantry divisional signals	...	...	...	B
Corps headquarters signals	...	...	...	A
Headquarters signals	...	...	...	A
Air formation signals	...	...	...	A
L. of C. signals	...	...	...	A

Infantry:

Machine gun battalion	...	...	...	B
Motor battalion	...	...	...	B

Reconnaissance Corps:

Reconnaissance regiment	...	...	...	A
Armoured reconnaissance regiment	...	...	...	C



## ANNEX G

## A LIGHT AID DETACHMENT, TYPE "E", RCEME

(To serve a Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment)

War Establishment Cdn II/340B/2

Promulgated in GO 107/45  
Effective 15 Jan 45

Published February, 1945

(i) Personnel			
Detail	Headquarters	2 Sections (each)	Total
Captain (officer commanding) ... ..	1	..	1
Total, officers ... ..	1	..	1
Warrant officers class II ... ..	..	1	2
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	1	2
Sergeants ... ..	1	1	3
Total warrant officers, staff-sergeants and sergeants	1	3	7
Corporals ... ..	..	1	2
Lance-corporals ... ..	1	2	5
Craftsmen and privates ... ..	7	15	37
Private (RCASC) ... ..	1	..	1
Total, rank and file ... ..	9	18	45
Total, other ranks ... ..	10	21	52
Total, all ranks ... ..	11	21	53
(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties			
NON-TRADESMEN			
Drivers IC ... ..	(a) 2	..	2
General dutymen (trained as drivers IC) ... ..	2	..	2
Total, non-tradesmen ... ..	4	..	4
TRADESMEN			
Armament artificers (vehicle)			
Warrant officers class II - (armament quartermaster-sergeants) ... ..	..	1	2
Armament staff-sergeants ... ..	..	1	2
Artizans			
Driver mechanics (tank) ... ..	..	6	12
Driver operators ... ..	2	1	4
Electricians (Vehicle and Plant) ... ..	..	2	4
Vehicle mechanics (AFV) ... ..	..	7	14
Welders (acetylene or electric) ... ..	..	2	4
Clerks ... ..	1	..	1
Cook (RCASC) ... ..	1	..	1
Storemen (T & D)			
Sergeant ... ..	1	..	1
Craftsmen ... ..	1	1	3
Total, tradesmen ... ..	6	21	48
Total, other ranks ... ..	10	21	52

(iii) Transport				
Detail	Headquarters	2 Sections (each)	Total	
Motorcycle, solo ... ..	1	..	1	
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	1	1	3	
Truck, 15 cwt, armoured ... ..	1	..	1	
Trucks, 15 cwt, machinery "KL" ... ..	..	1	2	
Truck, 15 cwt, fitted for wireless ... ..	1	..	1	
Trucks, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	1	1	3	
Lorries, 3 ton, GS ... ..	1	1	3	
Lorries, 3 ton, GS stores ... ..	1	1	3	
Tractors, breakdown, heavy ... ..	..	1	2	
Trailers, 20 cwt, GS ... ..	1	1	3	
Trailers, gas welding ... ..	..	1	2	
Tanks, recovery ... ..	..	1	2	
(iv) Weapons				
Pistol ... ..	1	..	1	
Rifles ,303 inch ... ..	3	14	31	
Machine carbines ... ..	7	7	21	

(a) One driver IC will also perform batman duties.

ANNEX H

A LIGHT AID DETACHMENT TYPE "A" AND "B" RCEME

War, Establishment Cdn III/100/3

Notified in G.O. 300/44  
Effective 22nd February, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Type "A" (armoured)	Type "B" (armoured)
Captains or lieutenants (EMEs 3rd or 4th class) ...	1	1
Total officers ...	1	1
Warrant officer, class II ...	1	1
Sergeant ...	1	1
Total, WOs, and sergeants ...	2	2
Corporal ...	1	1
Lance-corporals ...	2	2
Privates ...	10	8
Total, rank and file ...	13	11
Total, other ranks ...	15	13
Total, all ranks ...	16	14

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN				
Batman-drivers ...			1	1
Total, non-tradesmen ...			1	1
TRADESMEN				
Artificers, armament (MV) (a)				
Warrant officer, class II, armament quartermaster-sergeant			1	1
Artizans (b)				
Driver mechanics (AFV) ...			3	3
Electrician ...			1	1
Fitters (AFV)				
Sergeant ...			1	1
Privates ...			(a) 5	(a) 3
Welder (G. & E.) ...			1	1
Storemen (T. & D.) for Vehicles				
Lance-corporal ...			1	1
Private (trained as motorcyclist) ...			1	1
Total, tradesmen ...			14	12
Total, other ranks ...			15	13

(iii) Transport

Motorcycle, solo ...			1	1
Car, 5 cwt ...			1	1
Lorry, 3 ton, G.S. ...			1	1
G.S. stores ...			1	1
Tractor breakdown (light, medium or heavy) (c) ...			1	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel, G.S. ...			1	1

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch ...			1	1
Rifles, .303 inch ...			10	8
Machine carbines ...			5	5

(a) In light aid detachments attached to artillery units other than survey regiments, RCA the artificer, armament (MV) will be an artificer, armament (field) and 3 of the fitters (AFV) in type "A" or 2 in type "B" will be fitters.

(b) Includes 1 corporal and 1 lance-corporal in each type.

(c) Tractor, breakdown, light to be issued to LADs attached to units with vehicles not larger than a lorry 3 ton, G.S. Tractors, breakdown heavy, will be issued to LADs attached to medium regiments, or armoured car regiments. Remainder of LADs to have tractors breakdown medium.

**NOTES:**

1. Units not provided with LADs will be served by LADs or RCOC workshop formations in the vicinity under arrangements by DDME.

2. When LADs are serving units of the reconnaissance corps, the addition of one "Trailer, 6 wheel, 7 ton light recovery" is authorized.

Allotment of light aid detachments to formation and units:  
 (for LAD type "C" see W.E. Cdn II/340/2 - Cdn III/153/2)  
 (for LAD type "D" see W.E. Cdn II/340A/3)

<u>Headquarters units -</u>			
Headquarters of an armoured division	...	...	B
Headquarters of an armoured corps	...	...	C
Headquarters of an infantry brigade	...	...	A
Headquarters of an independent brigade group	...	...	(one A one B)
G. H. Q. (home) liaison regiment	...	...	A
<u>Armoured corps -</u>			
Armoured car regiment	...	...	A
Armoured regiment	...	...	C
Tank battalion	...	...	C
<u>Artillery -</u>			
Anti-tank regiment (infantry division)	...	...	A
Anti-tank regiment (self propelled)	...	...	D
Regiment, RHA or field regiment (armoured division)	...	...	B
Regiment, RHA or field regiment (infantry division)	...	...	B
Field regiment (self propelled)	...	...	D
Heavy regiment	...	...	B
Medium regiment	...	...	B
Survey regiment	...	...	A
<u>Engineers -</u>			
Field park squadron or company (armoured division)	...	...	B
Field park squadron or company (infantry division, GHQ, army and corps)	...	...	B
Headquarters airfield construction group	...	...	B
Engineer assault troops	...	...	C
<u>Signals -</u>			
Armoured divisional signals	...	...	B
Infantry divisional signals	...	...	B
Corps headquarters signals	...	...	A
Headquarters signals	...	...	A
Air formation signals	...	...	A
L. of C. signals	...	...	A
<u>Infantry -</u>			
Machine gun battalion	...	...	B
Motor battalion	...	...	B
<u>Reconnaissance corps -</u>			
Reconnaissance Regiment	...	...	A
Armoured reconnaissance regiment	...	...	C

## ANNEX I

## A HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT WORKSHOP, TYPE "B" RCEME

War Establishment Cdn III/107/4

Notified in G.O. 254/44  
Effective 22nd February, 1944

Published June, 1944

## (i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters & General Section	Telecommunication Section	Total
Captains or Lieutenants (EME 3rd or 4th class)	2	1	3
Total Officers ... ..	2	1	3
Warrant Officer, Class I ... ..	1	..	1
Warrant Officer, Class II ... ..	1	..	1
Staff-sergeants ... ..	4	2	6
Sergeants ... ..	3	3	6
Total WOs, staff-sergeants and sergeants ...	9	5	14
Corporals ... ..	7	..	7
Lance-corporals ... ..	4	3	7
Privates ... ..	47	17	64
Privates, RCASC ... ..	3	..	3
Total rank and file ... ..	61	20	81
Total other ranks ... ..	70	25	95
Total all ranks ... ..	72	26	98

## (ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN (Includes 1 Corporal in Headquarters and General Section)			
Batman ... ..	1	..	1
Batman-drivers ... ..	1	1	2
Drivers, IC ... ..	11	1	12
General dutymen ... ..	4	..	4
Regimental dutyman (Staff-sergeant) ...	1	..	1
Total non-tradesmen ... ..	18	2	20
TRADESMEN			
Armament Artificers (a)			
(AA) ... ..	2	..	2
(Instruments, AA) ... ..	1	..	1
(Radio) (Staff-sergeants) ... ..	..	2	2
(M. V.) ... ..	1	..	1
Armourer, Staff-sergeant ... ..	1	..	1
Artizans (a)			
Blacksmiths ... ..	2	..	2
Carpenter ... ..	1	..	1
Coach Trimmer - Upholsterer ... ..	1	..	1
Driver Mechanics ... ..	8	1	9
Electricians ... ..	3	..	3
Fitters ... ..	6	..	6
Fitters M. V. ... ..	8	..	8
Mechanic Instrument (for AA) ... ..	4	..	4
Mechanic (Radio) ... ..	..	20	20
Sheet Metal Worker ... ..	1	..	1
Turners ... ..	2	..	2
Welders ( G & E) ... ..	2	..	2
Clerks			
Sergeant ... ..	1	..	1
Privates ... ..	2	..	2
Cooks RCASC (1 for officers' mess) ... ..	3	..	3
Storemen (T & D) for: - (Includes 1 corporal)			
Armament and General Stores ... ..	1	..	1
Instruments and Telecommunications ... ..	1	..	1
Vehicles ... ..	1	..	1
Total tradesmen ... ..	52	23	75
Total other ranks ... ..	70	25	95

(iii) Transport				
Detail	Headquarters & General Section	Telecommunication Section	Total	
Motorcycles, solo ... ..	3	..	3	
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	1	..	1	
Truck, heavy utility machinery "ZL"	..	1	1	
Trucks, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	2	..	2	
Trucks, 15 cwt, Machinery "KL"	1	..	1	
Lorries, 3 ton GS ... ..	6	(b)1	7	
Lorries, 3 ton GS Stores ... ..	3	..	3	
Lorries, 3 ton, Machinery "D-1"	1	..	1	
Lorries, 3 ton, Machinery "1-30"	2	..	2	
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wh Stores ... ..	2	..	2	
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wh Machinery "Z"	..	1	1	
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wh Machinery "M"	1	..	1	
Tractor, Breakdown, Medium ... ..	1	..	1	
Tractor, Breakdown, Heavy ... ..	1	..	1	
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wh GS ... ..	2	..	2	
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wh Gas Welding	1	..	1	
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wh Water ... ..	1	..	1	
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wh Generator, 9 KW	1	..	1	

(iv) Weapons				
Pistols 38 inch ... ..	2	1	3	
Rifles, 303 inch ... ..	40	22	62	
Machine carbines ... ..	26	3	29	
Pists. ... ..	6	..	6	
LMGs 303 inch ... ..	4	..	4	

(a) Except where otherwise specified in Part (ii), rank and appointments will be allotted according to the following table:

Armament Artificers				
Warrant officer, class I				
Armament sergeant-major ... ..	1	..	1	
Warrant officer, class II				
Armament quartermaster-sergeant ... ..	1	..	1	
Staff-sergeants ... ..	2	..	2	
Artizans				
Sergeants ... ..	2	3	5	
Corporals ... ..	5	..	5	

(b) To be equipped with winch, and fittings to carry Hydrogen cylinders.

#### NOTES

1. Drivers have not been provided for all static vehicles, (Store lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers I. C. under unit arrangements.
2. Personnel and stores for which transport is not available, will be carried in the transport of the formation of which this unit forms part.

ANNEX J

A LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT WORKSHOP, TYPE "B", RCEME

Consisting of:

Headquarters, with sections on a scale of one per battery in a light anti-aircraft regiment, R. C. A., and one telecommunication section when the regiment is equipped with radar.

War Establishment Cdn. III/151B/2

Notified in G. O. 199/44  
Effective 26 Feb 44.

Published April, 1944.

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	3 LAA Battery sections (each)	Total HQ and 3 LAA Battery sections	Increment for telecommunication section
Captain (EME) (3rd class)	1	..	1	..
Warrant officer (class II)	1	..	1	..
Staff-sergeants ... ..	1	1	4	1
Sergeants..... ..	2	..	2	..
Total, WOs., s/sgts & sgts	4	1	7	1
Corporals ... ..	1	..	1	1
Lance-corporals ... ..	3	1	6	..
Privates ... ..	20	5	35	4
Privates (RCASC) ... ..	2	..	2	..
Total rank and file ...	26	6	44	5
Total, other ranks ...	30	7	51	6
Total, all ranks ...	31	7	52	6

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>				
Drivers, IC (includes 1 1/cpl)	5	..	5	1
General duty men... ..	2	..	2	1
Total, non-tradesmen	7	..	7	1
<b>TRADESMEN</b>				
Armament, artificers (AA) (staff-sergeants	..	1	3	..
(Instruments AA) (includes ) one WO II ) armament ) QMS and one ) s/sgt)	1	..	1	..
(MV) ... ) ...	1	..	1	..
(Radio) (s/sgt) ...	..	..	..	1
Armourer (sergeant) ...	1	..	1	..

Detail	Headquarters	3 LAA Battery sections (each)	Total HQ and 3 LAA Battery sections	Increment for telecommunication section
Artizans (includes 1 sgt & 1 cpl in HQ)				
Blacksmith ... ..	1	..	1	..
Carpenter ... ..	1	..	1	..
Driver mechanics ... ..	3	1	6	..
Electricians ... ..	1	1	4	..
Fitters ... ..	2	1	5	..
Fitters (MV) ... ..	2	2	8	..
Instrument mechanics ... ..	1	1	4	..
Mechanics (radio or Wireless) ... ..	..	..	..	4
Motor mechanics ... ..	3	..	3	..
Sheet metal worker ... ..	1	..	1	..
Welder (G. & E.) ... ..	1	..	1	..
Clerk ... ..	1	..	1	..
Cooks, RCASC ... ..	2	..	2	..
Storemen (T. & D.) (For vehicles) ... ..	1	..	1	..
Total, tradesmen ... ..	23	7	44	5
Total, other ranks ... ..	30	7	51	6

## (iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo ... ..	4	..	4	..
Cars, 5-cwt ... ..	1	1	4	..
Truck, heavy utility, Machinery "ZL" ... ..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, GS (One to be flat floor type)	3	..	3	..
Lorries 3 ton, GS stores ... ..	..	1	3	..
Lorries 4 ton, 6 wheel Machinery "M" ... ..	1	..	1	..
Tractors, breakdown, medium	1	..	1	..
Trailer, 20 cwt., 2 wheel water	1	..	1	..

## (iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch ... ..	1	..	1	..
Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	19	5	34	5
Machine carbines ... ..	10	2	16	1
LMG., .303 inch ... ..	1	..	1	..
PIAT ... ..	1	..	1	..

## NOTES

1. Drivers have not been provided for static vehicles (store lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers, IC under unit arrangements.
2. Personnel and stores for which unit transport is not available will be carried in the transport of the formation of which this unit forms a part.



## ANNEX K

## A LIGHT AID DETACHMENT, TYPE "F", RCEME

(To serve a Rocket Unit, RCA)

War Establishment Cdn III/156/1

Notified in G.O. 179/45  
Effective 23 Dec 44

Published February, 1945

(i) Personnel					
Captain or lieutenant	...	...	...	...	1
Total, officers	...	...	...	...	1
Warrant officer class II	...	...	...	...	1
Staff-sergeants	...	...	...	...	2
Sergeant	...	...	...	...	1
Total, warrant officers, staff-sergeants and sergeants	...	...	...	...	4
Corporal	...	...	...	...	1
Lance corporals	...	...	...	...	2
Craftsmen and privates	...	...	...	...	12
Total, rank and file	...	...	...	...	15
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	...	19
Total, all ranks	...	...	...	...	20
(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties					
NON-TRADESMEN					
Batman-driver	...	...	...	...	1
Total, non-tradesmen	...	...	...	...	1
TRADESMEN					
Armament artificer (vehicle)					
Warrant officer class II armament quartermaster-sergeant	...	...	...	...	1
Armourer, armourer staff-sergeant	...	...	...	...	1
Artizans					
Driver mechanics (MV)	...	...	...	...	3
Electricians (Vehicle and Plant)					
Staff-sergeant	...	...	...	...	1
Craftsmen	...	...	...	...	4
Fitter	...	...	...	...	1
Vehicle mechanics (MV)					
Sergeant	...	...	...	...	1
Craftsmen	...	...	...	...	3
Welder (acetylene or electric)	...	...	...	...	1
Storemen (T & D) for vehicles					
Lance-corporal	...	...	...	...	1
Craftsmen (trained as motorcyclist)	...	...	...	...	1
Total, tradesmen	...	...	...	...	18
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	...	19
(iii) Transport					
Motorcycle, solo	...	...	...	...	1
Car, 5 cwt	...	...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS	...	...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS, Stores	...	...	...	...	1
Tractor, breakdown, medium	...	...	...	...	1
Trailers, 10 cwt, GS	...	...	...	...	3
(iv) Weapons					
Pistol	...	...	...	...	1
Rifles, .303 inch	...	...	...	...	14
Machine carbines	...	...	...	...	5

ANNEX L

A CORPS TROOPS WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdh. III/157/3

Notified in G. O. 300/44  
Effective 14th March, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	Small Arms section	Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	Telecommunication section	Stores section	Total, Corps Troops Workshop RCEME
Major (EME) (2nd class) . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Captains or lieutenants (EME) (3rd or 4th class) . . . . .	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
Captain (EME) (4th class) . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Total, officers . . . . .	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
Warrant officer, class I . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officers, class II . . . . .	2	2	..	1	..	1	1	..	7
Staff-sergeants . . . . .	1	6	2	7	..	4	..	1	21
Sergeants . . . . .	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	11
Total, WOs, s/sgts and sgts . . . . .	7	9	3	10	1	6	2	2	40
Corporals . . . . .	2	2	3	5	1	2	..	3	18
Corporal, RCASC . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals . . . . .	1	3	..	9	2	2	1	2	20
Privates . . . . .	9	31	9	73	14	12	4	20	172
Privates, RCASC . . . . .	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Total, rank and file . . . . .	19	36	12	87	17	16	5	25	217
Total, other ranks . . . . .	26	45	15	97	18	22	7	27	257
Total, all ranks . . . . .	31	45	15	97	18	22	7	28	263

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN (d)</b>									
Batmen . . . . .	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Drivers, IC . . . . .	6	4	2	3	2	3	1	..	21
General dutymen . . . . .	..	..	1	6	2	..	..	1	10
<b>Regimental duties:-</b>									
Staff-sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Transport sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen . . . . .	10	4	3	(a)9	4	3	1	1	35
<b>TRADESMEN</b>									
<b>Armourers:-</b>									
Warrant officer, class II									
Armourer-quartermaster-sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants . . . . .	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
Sergeant . . . . .	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals . . . . .	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Privates . . . . .	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	6
<b>Artificers Armament (b)</b>									
(AA)	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
(Field)	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Instruments (AA)	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Instruments (field)	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	3
(MV)	1	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	8
(Wireless)	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
<b>Artizans (b)</b>									
Blacksmiths . . . . .	..	4	..	3	..	..	..	..	7

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	Small Arms section	Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	Telecommunication section	Stores Section	Total, Corps Troops, Workshop, RCEME
Carpenters . . . . .	..	2	..	2	..	..	..	..	4
Driver mechanics . . . . .	..	2	..	14	5	..	..	..	22
Driver mechanics (AFV) . . . . .	..	..	..	13	6	..	1	..	19
Electricians . . . . .	..	..	..	10	..	..	..	..	10
Fitters . . . . .	..	16	..	..	..	..	..	..	16
Fitters (AFV) . . . . .	..	..	..	13	1	..	..	..	14
Fitters (MV) . . . . .	..	..	..	13	2	..	..	..	15
Mechanics, instrument for:-									
AA . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Field . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	9	..	..	9
Survey . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Type X cipher . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Mechanics, wireless . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	4
Sheet metal workers . . . . .	..	2	..	3	..	..	..	..	5
Trimmers and upholsterers (coach) . . . . .	..	2	..	2	..	..	..	..	4
Turners . . . . .	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Welders (G & E) . . . . .	..	3	..	3	..	..	..	..	6
Clerks:-									
Warrant officers, class II									
Quartermaster-sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Privates . . . . .	1	1	..	1	..	..	..	5	8
Cooks, (RCASC) (one for officers' mess)									
Corporals . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates . . . . .	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Storemen (T & D) for: - (b)									
Armament and general stores . . . . .	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Instruments and telecommunication . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
RCEME stores (includes one sgt and two cpls)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	19	19
Vehicles . . . . .	1	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Total, tradesmen . . . . .	16	41	12	88	14	19	6	26	222
Total, other ranks . . . . .	26	45	15	97	18	22	7	27	257

(iii) Table of transport

Motorcycles, solo . . . . .	2	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	4
Cars, 5 cwt . . . . .	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Truck, heavy utility, machinery ZL . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Trucks, 15 cwt, GS . . . . .	1	1	1	4	1	..	..	..	8
Truck, 15 cwt., machinery KL . . . . .	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, GS (18 to be flat floor type)	4	3	1	5	..	2	..	10	25
Lorries, 3 ton, GS stores . . . . .	1	1	..	1	..	1	..	5	9
Lorry, 3 ton machinery "I" . . . . .	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton machinery "J" . . . . .	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton instrument repair . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wheel, stores . . . . .	..	..	(c)1	1	..	..	1	3	6
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel machinery "A" . . . . .	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel, machinery "Z" . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wheel machinery "M" . . . . .	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, light . . . . .	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium . . . . .	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Tractors, breakdown, heavy . . . . .	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	3
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel, water . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel, workshop servicing	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel, generator 9 KW	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 6 wheel, 7 ton, light recovery	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	Small Arms section	Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	Telecommunication section	Stores section	Total, Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME
Pistols .38 inch	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
Rifles .303 inch	10	38	12	82	10	19	4	9	184
Machine carbines	12	7	3	15	8	3	3	18	69
LMGs .303 inch	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
PIATs	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5

(a) Includes 1 corporal

(b) Ranks and appointments not specified in part (ii) will be distributed according to the following table:-

Artificers, Armament									
Warrant officer, class I									
Armament-sergeant-major	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II									
Armament-quartermaster-sergeant	..	2	..	1	..	1	1	..	5
Staff-sergeants	..	5	..	6	..	4	..	..	15
Artizans									
Staff-sergeants	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	2
Sergeants	..	1	..	2	1	1	1	..	6
Corporals	..	2	..	4	1	2	..	..	9
Storemen (T & D)									
Sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

(c) Fitted with two "Z" bins only.

(d) One non-tradesmen to be trained at boot repairs and when qualified may draw tradesmens rates of pay as shoemaker.

**NOTES:-**

1. Drivers have not been provided for static vehicles (store lorries etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers IC under unit arrangements.
2. Personnel and stores for which unit transport is not available will be carried in transport of the formation of which this unit forms/part.

ANNEX M

AN INFANTRY TROOPS WORKSHOP TYPE "A" RCEME

(For an infantry division of 3 infantry brigades)

War Establishment Cdn III/158/2

Notified in G.O. 7/44  
Effective 5th October, 1943

Published February, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Vehicle Section	Instrument Section	RCOC Storage Section	Total
Major - (EME) (2nd class) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Captain or lieutenants (EME) (3rd or 4th class)	2	..	..	..	..	2
Captain (OO) (4th class) ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Lieutenant - Workshop executive officer ...	1	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Total officers</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>
Warrant officer, class I Artificer armament (armament sergeant-major) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II Artificers armament (armament quartermaster-sergeant) ...	..	1	1	1	..	3
Armourer (quartermaster-sergeant) ...	1	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Staff sergeants:-</b>						
Artificers, armament ... ..	..	1	4	5	..	10
Armourer ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Artizans ... ..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Clerks ... ..	1	..	..	..	1	2
Storeman ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Non-tradesmen ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Sergeants:-</b>						
Armourer ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Artizans ... ..	1	..	1	1	..	3
Storeman ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	1
<b>Total WOs, s/sgts and sgts</b> ...	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Corporals</b>						
Artizans ... ..	..	1	2	1	..	4
Clerks ... ..	1	..	..	..	1	2
Storemen ... ..	1	..	..	..	1	2
Non-tradesmen ... ..	1	..	1	..	..	2
Cook (RCASC) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals ... ..	3	1	5	1	2	12
<b>Privates:-</b>						
Craftsmen and drivers ... ..	28	13	40	17	23	121
Privates (RCASC) ... ..	5	..	..	..	..	5
<b>Total, rank and file</b> ... ..	<b>40</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>149</b>
<b>Total, other ranks</b> ... ..	<b>46</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>175</b>
<b>Total, all ranks</b> ... ..	<b>50</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>180</b>

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN									
Batmen	...	...		2	..	..	..	..	2
Drivers, I. C.	...	...		9	3	3	2	..	17
General duties	...	...		1	..	6	1	1	9
Motorcyclists	...	...		4	..	..	..	..	4
Regimental duties:-									
(staff-sergeant)	...	...		1	..	..	..	..	1
Transport corporal	...	...		1	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen				18	3	9	3	1	34
TRADESMEN Trade Group									
Artificers, armament:-									
(Electrical)	...	"A"		..	..	..	1	..	1
(Field)	...	"A"		..	2	..	..	..	2
(A. F. V.)	...	"A"		1	..	5	..	..	6
Artificers, armament, Instruments:-									
(A. A.)	...	"A"		..	..	..	2	..	2
(Field)	...	"A"		..	..	..	3	..	3
Armourers	...	"B"		1	2	..	..	..	3
Artizans:-									
Blacksmith	...	"B"		..	1	2	..	..	3
Carpenters	...	"B"		..	1	1	..	..	2
Driver mechanics	...	"C"		8	..	..	..	..	8
Electricians	...	"A"		..	..	2	..	..	2
Fitters	...	"A"		..	8	..	..	..	8
Fitters, (M. V.)	...	"A"		..	..	15	..	..	15
Mechanics, instrument:-									
(A. A.)	...	"A"		..	..	..	4	..	4
(Field)	...	"A"		..	..	..	8	..	8
(Survey)	...	"A"		..	..	..	1	..	1
(Type-ex-cipher)	...	"A"		..	..	..	1	..	1
Machinist (metal)	...	"B"		1	..	..	..	..	1
Mechanics, motor	...	"B"		..	..	15	..	..	15
Sheetmetal worker	...	"B"		..	..	1	..	..	1
Trimmers and upholsterers (coach)	...	"B"		..	1	1	..	..	2
Turners	...	"B"		3	..	..	..	..	3
Watchmaker	...	"B"		..	..	..	1	..	1
Welders (G & E)	...	"B"		..	1	2	..	..	3
Clerks (General duty)	...	"C"		5	..	1	1	6	13
Cooks (RCASC)									
(including 1 for officers' mess)	...	"C"		6	..	..	..	..	6
Shoemaker	...	"B"		..	..	..	..	1	1
Storemen (T & D)									
Armament and general stores	...	"C"		..	..	..	..	21	21
Instruments & telecommunication	...	"C"		1	..	..	..	..	1
Vehicles	...	"C"		..	..	..	1	..	1
				2	..	1	..	..	3
Total, tradesmen				28	16	46	23	28	141
Total, other ranks				46	19	55	26	29	175

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, heavy	...		4	..	..	..	..	..	4
Car, 5 cwt	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trucks, 15 cwt	...								
G. S.	...		1	1	1	1	..	..	4
Machinery "KL"	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton	...								
G. S.	...		3	1	1	..	12	..	17
G. S. (stores)	...		1	1	1	1	10	..	14
Machinery "D-1"	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6-wheel	...								
Machinery "A"	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "B"	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "F"	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "L"	...		1	..	..	..	..	..	1

Lorries, 4 ton, 6-wheel							
Machinery "M"	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium	...	...	2	..	..	..	2
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2-wheel:-							
Water	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
Generator 9 KW	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
Gas Welding	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
Workshop servicing	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
2-wheel generator 22 KW	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
4-wheel machinery grind and brake	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
4-wheel machinery 60 ton press	...	...	1	..	..	..	1
7 ton, 6-wheel light recovery	...	...	1	..	..	..	1

(iv) Table of Weapons

Pistols .38 inch	...	...	...	5
Rifles .303 inch	...	...	...	116
Machine carbines	...	...	...	49
L.M.Gs. .303 inch	...	...	...	10
PIATS	...	...	...	4
Guns 20 mm	...	...	...	4

NOTES

1. At least one officer and six men will be trained in anti-gas duties and decontamination work.
2. Drivers have not been provided for static vehicles (stores, lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as driver under unit arrangements.
3. Personnel and stores, for which unit transport is not available will be carried in the transport of the formation of which this unit forms part.

ANNEX N

AN ARMoured TROOPS WORKSHOP, RCEME

Consisting of:

Headquarters, one armoured workshop, one infantry workshop and one telecommunication section.

War Establishment Cdn. III/159/3

Notified in G. O. 300/44  
Effective 4th March, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armoured Workshop					Infantry Workshop					Telecommunication section	Total, armoured troops workshop, RCEME	
		Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	Tank section	RCOC stores section	Total, armoured workshop	Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	RCOC stores section			Total, infantry workshop
Major, (EME 2nd class) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Captains or lieutenants (EME 3rd or 4th class) (includes 2 for armoured workshop and 2 for infantry workshop)	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	5
Captain (OO 4th class) ...	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lieutenant (workshop executive officer) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Paymaster (RCAPC) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, officers ...	7	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	9
Warrant officer, class I ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officers, class II ...	3	..	1	1	2	..	4	1	..	1	..	2	..	9
Staff-sergeants ...	1	1	2	3	8	1	15	1	2	3	..	6	..	22
Sergeants ...	3	1	1	1	2	1	6	..	1	1	..	2	1	12
Sergeants (RCASC) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, WOs, S/sgts & sgts ...	9	2	4	5	12	2	25	2	3	5	..	10	1	45
Corporals ...	3	1	2	1	6	2	12	1	1	1	2	5	1	21
Corporals RCASC ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals ...	6	1	3	2	8	..	14	1	1	2	..	4	..	24
Privates ...	33	5	19	9	91	(c)14	138	9	22	12	(c)9	52	8	231
Privates, RCASC ...	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Total, rank and file ...	49	7	24	12	105	16	164	11	24	15	11	61	9	283
Total, other ranks ...	58	9	28	17	117	18	189	13	27	20	11	71	10	328
Total, all ranks ...	65	9	28	17	117	19	190	13	27	20	11	71	11	337

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN (a) (b)														
Batmen ...	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Batman-driver ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Drivers, IC ...	11	1	1	1	3	..	6	1	1	2	..	4	..	21
General duties (include 1 for regimental stores ...)	2	..	3	1	19	(c)1	24	2	3	1	(c)1	7	..	33
Regimental duties														
Warrant officer, class II														
Company sergeant-major ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Transport sergeant ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen ...	19	1	4	2	22	1	30	3	4	3	1	11	..	60



Detail	Headquarters	Armoured Workshop					Infantry Workshop					Telecommunication section	Total, armoured troops workshop, RCEME	
		Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	Tank section	RCOC stores section	Total, armoured section	Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	RCOC stores section			Total, infantry section
<b>TRADESMEN</b>														
Armament artificers (a)														
(electrical) ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	2
(field) ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	1	..	2
(instruments AA) ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	2
(instruments field) ...	..	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	2	..	4
(MV or AFV) ...	1	..	3	..	7	..	10	..	2	..	..	2	..	13
Armourers														
Warrant officers, class II														
Armourer quartermaster-sergeant ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1	..	1
Sergeant ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Artizans (a)														
Blacksmiths ...	..	..	..	..	4	..	4	2	1	..	..	3	..	7
Carpenters ...	..	..	1	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	1	..	2
Coach trimmers and upholsterers ...	..	..	1	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	1	..	2
Driver mechanics ...	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
Driver mechanics (AFV)	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Electricians ...	..	..	1	..	6	..	7	..	1	..	..	1	..	8
Fitters ...	..	6	..	..	1	..	7	3	..	..	..	3	..	10
Fitters (AFV) ...	..	..	..	..	65	..	65	..	..	..	..	..	..	65
Fitters (MV) ...	1	..	17	..	..	..	17	..	15	..	..	15	..	33
Instrument mechanics for														
Anti-aircraft ...	..	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	2	..	4
Field ...	..	..	..	6	..	..	6	..	..	6	..	6	..	12
Survey ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	2
Type X cipher ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	2
Machinist, metal ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Mechanics, wireless ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	8
Sheet metal workers ...	..	..	..	..	3	..	3	..	1	..	..	1	..	4
Turners ...	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
Watchmakers ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	2
Welders (G & E) ...	..	..	1	..	5	..	6	1	1	..	..	2	..	8
Clerks														
Warrant officer, class II														
Quartermaster-sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ...	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant (for pay duties)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ...	1	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	3
Privates ...	5	..	..	..	1	(e)2	3	..	1	1	2	4	..	12
Cooks RCASC (includes one for officers mess)														
Sergeant ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Storemen (T & D) (a) for														
Armament and general stores	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Instruments and telecommunications ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	1	2
Vehicles ...	3	..	..	..	2	..	2	..	1	..	..	1	..	6
RCOC stores ...	..	..	..	..	(e)4	..	14	..	..	7	..	7	..	21
Total, tradesmen	39	8	24	15	95	17	159	10	23	17	10	60	10	268
Total, other ranks	58	9	28	17	117	18	189	13	27	20	11	71	10	328

(iii) Table of transport

Motorcycles, solo ...	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
Cars, 5 cwt ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2

Detail	Headquarters	Armoured Workshop					Infantry Workshop					Telecommunication section	Total, armoured troops workshop, RCEME	
		Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	Tank section	RCOC stores section	Total, armoured workshop	Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	RCOC stores section			Total, infantry workshop
Truck, heavy utility, computer (with penthouse) (for paymaster)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trucks, heavy utility, machinery "ZL"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Trucks, 15 cwt., G.S. Machinery "KL"	1	1	1	..	1	..	3	..	..	1	..	..	1	5
Lorries, 3 ton, G.S. (18 to be flat floor type)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, G.S. stores	3	..	..	1	2	6	9	..	1	..	6	7	..	19
Lorries, 3 ton, G.S. stores Machinery "DL"	1	..	..	..	..	3	3	..	1	1	3	5	..	9
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wheeled stores	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wheeled stores	..	..	1	..	2	2	5	..	..	..	2	2	1	8
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wheeled machinery "A"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
"B"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
"F"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
"L"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
"Z"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wheeled, machinery "M"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium heavy	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, heavy	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 20 cwt., 2 wheeled, water	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Trailers, 20 cwt., 2 wheeled, gas welding	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 20 cwt., 2 wheeled workshop servicing	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	1	..	..	1	..	2
Trailers, 20 cwt., 2 wheeled generator 9 KW	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 2 wheeled, generator 22KW	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 4 ton, 4 wheeled machinery, grind and brake	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 4 ton, 4 wheeled machinery 60 ton press	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 6 wheeled, 7 ton, light recovery	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch	7	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	9
Rifles, .303 inch	28	8	26	16	112	7	169	13	25	18	..	..	7	260
Machine carbines	22	1	2	1	5	11	20	..	2	2	11	15	3	60
LMGs .303 inch	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8
PIAT	9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9

(a) Ranks and appointments not specified in part (ii) will be distributed according to the following table.

Armament artificers														
Warrant officer class I														
Armament sergeant-major	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer class II														
Armament quartermaster-sergeants	..	..	1	1	1	..	3	1	..	1	..	2	..	5
Staff-sergeants	..	1	2	3	6	..	12	..	2	3	..	5	..	17

Detail	Headquarters	Armoured Workshop					Infantry Workshop					Telecommunication section	Total armoured troops workshop, RCEME	
		Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	Tank section	RCOC stores section	Total armoured section	Armament section	Vehicle section	Instrument section	RCOC stores section			Total, infantry workshop
Artizans														
Warrant officer, class II	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Quartermaster-sergeant	..	..	..	..	2	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Staff-sergeants	1	..	1	1	2	..	4	..	1	1	..	2	1	8
Sergeants	1	1	2	1	4	..	8	1	1	1	..	3	1	13
Corporals														
Storemen (T & D)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant	..	..	..	..	..	2	2	..	..	..	..	1	1	3
Corporals														
Non-tradesmen	1	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Corporals														

(b) One non-tradesman may be trained at boat repairs and when qualified may draw tradesmen rates of pay as shoemaker.

(c) Of the total number of clerks, storemen and general dutymen, 5 will be lance-corporals.

NOTES -

1. Drivers have not been provided for all static vehicles (store lorries etc.) Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers, IC, under unit arrangements.

2. Personnel and stores for whom unit transport is not available will be carried in transport allotted by the formation to which this unit is attached.

3. In the event of the armoured and infantry workshops functioning as independent units the telecommunication section may be attached to either workshop and the headquarters personnel and transport in this war establishment will be allocated as follows:

(i) Personnel

Detail	Armoured Workshop	Infantry Workshop
Major (EME 2nd class)	1	..
Captains or lieutenants (EME 3rd or 4th class)	2	2
Lieutenant (workshop executive officer)	..	1
Paymaster, RCAPC	1	..
Non-tradesmen		
Batmen	2	1
Batmen driver	1	..
Drivers, IC	6	5
General dutymen	..	2
Regimental dutyman, WO II, CSM	1	..
Transport sergeant	1	..
Tradesmen		
Armament artificer, WO I, armament S/M	1	..
Armourer, WO II, armourer, QMS	..	1
Driver mechanics	..	5
Driver mechanics (AFV)	5	..
Fitters (MV)	1	..
Machinist (metal)	1	..
Turners	2	2
Clerks	5	3
Cooks, RCASC	5	3
Storemen (T&D) for armament and general stores	1	1
vehicles	2	1
<b>Total, personnel</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>27</b>

(ii) Table of transport

Detail	Armoured Armoured Workshop	Infantry Workshop
Motorcycles, solo	2	2
Cars, 5 cwt	1	1
Truck, heavy utility, computer (with penthouse)	1	..
Truck, 15 cwt, GS	..	1
Truck, 15 cwt, machinery "KL"	1	..
Lorries, 3 ton, GS	3	..
Lorry, 3 ton GS stores	1	..
Lorry, 3 ton, machinery "DI"	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6-wheeled, machinery "A"	..	1
"B"	1	..
"F"	1	..
"L"	..	1
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wheeled, machinery "M"	1	..
Tractor, breakdown, medium	..	1
heavy	1	..
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2 wheeled, water	1	1
gas welding	..	..
generator 9 KW	..	1
Trailer, 2 wheeled, generator, 22 KW	1	1
Trailer, 4 wheeled, 4 ton, machinery, grind and brakes	1	..
Trailer, 4 wheeled, 4 ton, machinery 60 ton press	1	..
Trailer, 6 wheeled, 7 ton light recovery	1	1

ANNEX O

CANADIAN SECTION AFV INSPECTORATE, 21 ARMY GROUP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn. III/201/1

Notified in G. O. 457/44  
Effective 21 May 44

Published October, 1944

(i) Personnel	
Majors (EME) (2nd class) . . . . .	2
Total, officers . . . . .	2
Warrant officers, class II . . . . .	2
Sergeants . . . . .	2
Total, WOs, and Sergeants . . . . .	4
Privates . . . . .	2
Total, rank and file . . . . .	2
Total, other ranks . . . . .	6
Total, all ranks . . . . .	8

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

Non-Tradesmen . . . . .	2
Batmen-drivers . . . . .	2
Total, non-tradesmen . . . . .	4
Tradesmen . . . . .	2
Artificer Armament (MV) . . . . .	2
Warrant officer, class II Armament Quartermaster-sergeant . . . . .	2
Fitters, (MV) Sergeants . . . . .	4
Total, tradesmen . . . . .	6
Total, other ranks . . . . .	6

(iii) Transport

Trucks, 15 cwt, GS . . . . .	2
------------------------------	---

(iv) Weapons

Pistols .38 inch . . . . .	2
Rifles .303 inch . . . . .	4
Machine carbines . . . . .	2

ANNEX P

A RADAR BATTERY WORKSHOP, RCEME

(Designed to operate with a Canadian Radar Battery - one 2nd Echelon repair detachment with each Radar Troop HQ and one 1st Echelon repair detachment with each Radar section).

War/Establishment Cdn III/202/I

Notified in G. O. 48/45  
Effective 22 Sep 44.

Published February, 1945

(i) Personnel						
Detail	Headquarters	Two Sections (each)			Total Section	Total
		One Second Echelon Repair Det	Three First Echelon Repair Det (each)			
Captain or lieutenant ... ..	1	1	..	1	3	
Total officers ... ..	1	1	..	1	3	
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	1	1	4	8	
Total staff-sergeants ... ..	..	1	1	4	8	
Corporals ... ..	..	1	..	1	2	
Lance-corporals ... ..	1	..	..	..	1	
Craftsmen and privates ... ..	3	5	2	11	25	
Total, rank and file ... ..	4	6	2	12	28	
Total, other ranks ... ..	4	7	3	16	36	
Total, all ranks ... ..	5	8	3	17	39	

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN						
Batmen drivers ... ..	1	1	..	1	3	
Total, non-tradesmen ... ..	1	1	..	1	3	
TRADESMEN						
Armament Artificer (Radio) Armament s/sgt ... ..	..	1	1	4	8	
Artizans						
Driver Mechanic, (MV) ... ..	..	..	1	3	6	
Electrician ... ..	..	1	..	1	2	
Fitters (MV) (a) ... ..	..	1	..	1	2	
Telecommunication Mechanics (for HAA) ... ..	..	2	1	5	10	
Clerks (a) ... ..	2	..	..	..	2	
Cook (RCASC) ... ..	1	..	..	..	1	
Storeman (T & D) (a) ... ..	..	1	..	1	2	
Total, tradesmen ... ..	3	6	3	15	33	
Total, other ranks ... ..	4	7	3	16	36	

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo ... ..	..	..	1	3	6
Car, 5 cwt ... ..	1	1	..	1	3
Trucks, heavy utility machinery "ZL" ... ..	..	..	1	3	6
Lorry, 3 ton, GS ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wh, machinery "Z" ... ..	..	1	..	1	2
Lorries, 3 ton, GS stores ... ..	..	1	..	1	2

(iv) Weapons

Pistols ... ..	..	..	3
Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	..	..	15
Machine carbines ... ..	..	..	21

(a) Also to be trained as drivers, IC.

ANNEX Q

## A MOBILE TIRE REPAIR UNIT, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IH/203/1

Notified in G. O. 95/45  
Effective 17 Nov 44

Published March, 1945

(i) Personnel			
Captain	...	...	1
Total, officers	...	...	1
Warrant officers, class I	...	...	2
Sergeants	...	...	2
Total, WOs and sergeants	...	...	4
Corporals	...	...	8
Lance-corporals	...	...	6
Craftsmen and privates	...	...	28
Privates (RCASC)	...	...	2
Total, rank and file	...	...	44
Total, other ranks	...	...	48
Total, all ranks	...	...	49
(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties			
NON-TRADESMEN			
Drivers, IC	...	...	(c)4
Total, non-tradesmen	...	...	4
TRADESMEN			
Artizans (a)			
Electricians (Vehicle and Plant)	...	...	2
Fitters	...	...	2
Vehicle Mechanics (MV)	...	...	2
Mechanics (tire maintenance)			
Warrant officers class I, artizan	...	...	2
Sergeant-majors	...	...	2
Sergeants	...	...	2
Craftsmen	...	...	(b)30
Clerks, corporals	...	...	2
Cooks (RCASC)	...	...	2
Total, tradesmen	...	...	44
Total, other ranks	...	...	48
(iii) Transport			
Cars, 5 cwt	...	...	2
Lorries, 3 ton, GS	...	...	2
Lorries, 3 ton, Machinery, Tire Repair Plant,			
First Preparation	...	...	2
Lorries, 3 ton, Machinery, Tire Repair Plant,			
Second Preparation	...	...	2
Lorries, 3 ton, Machinery, Vulcanizing	...	...	2
Trailers, water	...	...	2
Trailers, 4 wh, Machinery, Tire Vulcanizing	...	...	2
Trailers, Generator, 22 KW	...	...	4
(iv) Weapons			
Pistol	...	...	1
Rifle, .303 inch	...	...	36
Machine carbines	...	...	12

(a) Ranks and appointments not specified in Part (ii) will be allotted according to the following table:

Corporals	6
Lance-corporals	6

(b) Six to be trained as Drivers, IC.

(c) One will also perform batman duties.

NOTES

1. This war establishment is designed so that the unit may be deployed in two sections when necessary.



ANNEX R

RECOVERY COMPANY, RCEME

The recovery company, RCEME, consists of a headquarters, a light recovery section for each infantry division and a heavy recovery section for each armoured division in a corps, and a heavy recovery section for a tank brigade. Depending on the composition of the corps, and the allotment of tank brigades, appropriate sections will be allocated accordingly.

War Establishment Cdn. III/205/4

Notified in G. O. 254/44  
Effective 26th February, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Heavy recovery section	Light recovery section
Major, electrical and mechanical engineer, 2nd class ... ..	1	..	..
Captains, electrical and mechanical engineers, 3rd class ... ..	..	1	1
Lieutenants, electrical and mechanical engineers, 4th class ... ..	..	1	1
Total, officers ... ..	1	2	2
Warrant officer, class II ... ..	..	1	..
Staff-sergeants ... ..	1	1	1
Sergeants ... ..	2	4	2
Total, WOs, s/sgts & sgts ... ..	3	6	3
Corporals ... ..	1	8	4
Lance-corporals ... ..	1	6	6
Privates ... ..	6	43	33
Privates (RCASC) ... ..	1	2	2
Total, rank and file ... ..	9	59	45
Total, other ranks ... ..	12	65	48
Total, all ranks ... ..	13	67	50

1 HQ 1 7 5 13  
2 NW 4 20 24 124  
2 LI 4 72 24 100  
9 178 63 100

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>			
Batmen drivers ... ..	1	1	1
Drivers, IC ... ..	3	12	8
General dutymen ... ..	..	4	3
Regimental duties (sergeant) ... ..	1	..	..
Total, non-tradesmen ... ..	5	17	12
<b>TRADESMEN</b>			
Armament artificers, AFV			
Warrant officer, class II			
Armament quartermaster-sergeant ... ..	..	1	..
Staff-sergeant ... ..	..	1	..
Armament artificer, MV			
Staff-sergeant ... ..	..	..	1
Artizans (a)			
Driver mechanics, AFV ... ..	..	27	..
Driver mechanics ... ..	1	..	18
Driver operators ... ..	2	..	..
Electricians ... ..	..	1	1
Fitters, AFV ... ..	..	11	..
Fitters, MV ... ..	..	..	11
Welders (C & E) ... ..	..	2	1

	Headquarters	Heavy recovery section	Light recovery section
Clerks			
Staff-sergeant	1	..	..
Corporal	1	..	..
Privates	..	2	1
Cooks, (RCASC)	1	2	2
Storemen (T & D) for Armament and general stores			
Sergeant	1	..	..
Vehicles	..	1	1
Total, tradesmen	7	48	36
Total, other ranks	12	65	48

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo	3	9	5
Cars, 5 cwt	1	1	1
Trucks, 15cwt, GS	..	1	1
Truck, 15cwt, fitted for wireless	1	..	..
Lorries, 3 ton, GS	1	2	2
Tractors, breakdown, medium	..	2	3
Tractors, breakdown, heavy	..	6	6
Tractors, D-4	..	..	1
Tractors, D-8	..	1	..
Transporters, 20 ton	..	1	1
Transporters, recovery, 40 ton	..	4	..
Carrier, universal	..	1	..
Trailers			
20 cwt, 2 wheel, GS	1	2	2
20 cwt, 2 wheel, water	..	1	1
6 wheel, 4 ton, light recovery	..	3	4

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch	1	2	2
Rifles, .303 inch	5	33	25
Machine carbines	6	28	20
LMGs., .303 inch	1	4	3
PIATs	1	3	2
Guns, 20 mm	4	..	..

(a) Includes sergeants and corporals distributed as follows:

Sergeants	..	4	8
Corporals	..	8	4

NOTE - Allotment of crews to recovery vehicles included in this establishment will be as follows:

	Driver mechanics or driver mechanics AFV	Fitters AFV or fitters MV	General duties
Tractors, breakdown, medium	2	..	..
Tractors, breakdown, heavy	1	1	..
Tractors, D-4	1	1	1
Tractors, D-8	2	1	1
Transporters, recovery, 40 ton	2	1	1
Carrier, universal	1	..	..

ANNEX S

AN ARMY TROOPS WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn. III/206/3

Notified in G. O. 254/44  
Effective 6th March, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	Small Arms section	Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	Telecommunication section	Stores section	Total
Major (EME 2nd class) . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Captain (OO 4th class) . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Captains or lieutenants (EME 3rd or 4th class)	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
<b>Total, officers</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
Warrant officer, class I . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II . . . . .	2	1	..	1	..	1	1	..	6
Staff-sergeants . . . . .	1	4	2	7	..	1	..	1	16
Sergeants . . . . .	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	11
<b>Total, WOs, s/sgts &amp; sgts</b> . . . . .	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>34</b>
Corporals . . . . .	2	2	3	6	1	1	..	2	17
Corporal (RCASC) . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals . . . . .	1	2	..	11	2	..	1	2	19
Privates . . . . .	13	25	7	75	10	7	5	21	163
Privates (RCASC) . . . . .	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
<b>Total, rank and file</b> . . . . .	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>206</b>
<b>Total, other ranks</b> . . . . .	<b>30</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>240</b>
<b>Total, all ranks</b> . . . . .	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>246</b>

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN (d)</b>									
Batmen . . . . .	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Drivers, IC . . . . .	9	3	1	3	1	2	1	..	20
General dutymen . . . . .	..	..	..	6	2	1	..	1	10
Regimental dutymen (staff sergeant) . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Transport sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Total, non-tradesmen</b> . . . . .	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>(a) 9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>TRADESMEN</b>									
Artificer armament (b) . . . . .	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
(field) . . . . .	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Instruments, (field) . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
(MV) . . . . .	1	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	8
(Wireless) . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
<b>Armourers</b>									
<b>WO II</b>									
Armourer quartermaster-sergeant . . . . .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants . . . . .	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
Sergeant . . . . .	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals . . . . .	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Privates . . . . .	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	6
<b>Artizans (b)</b>									
Blacksmiths . . . . .	..	6	..	3	..	..	..	..	9
Carpenters . . . . .	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Trimmers and upholsters (coach) . . . . .	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	3

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	Small Arms section	Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	Telecommunication section	Stores section	Total
Driver mechanics ... ..	..	2	..	25	8	..	1	..	36
Driver mechanics (tank) .. ..	..	..	..	7	1	..	..	..	8
Electricians .. ..	..	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	7
Fitters .. ..	..	12	..	..	..	..	..	..	12
Fitters (AFV) .. ..	..	..	..	9	1	..	..	..	10
Fitters (MV) .. ..	..	..	..	19	1	..	..	..	20
Mechanics, instrument for ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Field .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	..	5
Type X cipher .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Mechanics, wireless .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	4
Sheet metal workers .. ..	..	1	..	4	..	..	..	..	5
Turners .. ..	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Welders (G & E) .. ..	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Clerks									
Warrant Officer, class II									
Wuartermaster-sergeant .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Sergeant .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Privates .. ..	2	1	..	2	..	..	..	5	10
Cooks (RCASC) (includes 1 for officers' mess)									
Corporal .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates .. ..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Storemen (T & D) for (b)									
Armament and general stores .. ..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Instruments and telecommunication	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2
RCOC stores (include 1 sergeant and 1 corporal)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	19	19
Vehicles .. ..	1	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	3
Total, tradesmen .. ..	17	32	12	93	11	8	7	26	206
Total, other ranks .. ..	30	35	13	102	14	11	8	27	240

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo .. ..	2	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	4
Cars, 5-cwt .. ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Trucks, heavy utility, machinery "ZL" .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Trucks, 15-cwt, GS .. ..	3	1	1	2	1	..	..	..	8
Trucks, 15-cwt, machinery "KL" .. ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3-ton, GS (16 to be flat floor type)	4	2	..	2	..	1	..	10	19
Lorries, 3-ton, GS stores .. ..	1	1	..	1	..	1	..	5	9
Lorries, 3-ton, instrument repair .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3-ton, machinery "I" .. ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3-ton machinery "J" .. ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3-ton, 6 wheel stores .. ..	..	..	1	1	..	..	(c) 1	3	6
Lorry, 3-ton, 6 wheel, machinery "A" .. ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3-ton, 6 wheel, machinery "Z" .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Lorry, 4-ton, 6 wheel, machinery "M" .. ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, medium .. ..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	3
Tractor, breakdown, heavy .. ..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 20-cwt, 2-wheel, water .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 20-cwt, 2-wheel generator 9KW	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 20-cwt, 2-wheel, workshop servicing	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 6-wheel, 7 ton, light recovery	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38-inch .. ..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
Rifles, .303-inch .. ..	12	29	11	92	8	9	5	9	175
Machine carbines .. ..	14	6	2	10	6	2	3	18	61
LMGs .303-inch .. ..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
PIAT .. ..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4

- (a) Includes one corporal  
 (b) Rank and appointments not specified in part (ii) will be distributed according to the following table:

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	Small arms section	Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	Telecommunication section	Total
Artificers, armament								
Warrant officer, class I								
Armament sergeant-major	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II								
Armament quartermaster-sergeant	..	1	..	1	..	1	1	4
Staff-sergeants	..	4	..	6	..	1	..	11
Artizans								
Staff-sergeant	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Sergeants	..	1	..	2	1	1	1	6
Corporals	..	2	..	5	1	1	..	9
Storemen (T & D)								
Sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

- (c) Fitted with two "Z" bins only.  
 (d) One non-tradesmen may be employed at boot repairs and when qualified may receive tradesmens' rates of pay as shoemaker.

NOTES: -

- Drivers have not been provided for all static vehicles (store lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers IC under unit arrangements.
- Personnel and stores for which unit transport is not available will be carried in transport of the formation of which this unit forms part.

ANNEX T  
A TANK TROOPS WORKSHOP, RCEME  
War Establishment Cdn III/273/1

Notified in G.O. 254/44  
Effective 22nd February, 1944

Published June, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament and General Section	Vehicle and Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	Store Section	Total, Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
Major (EME 2nd class) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Captain (OO 4th class) ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Captains or Lieutenants (EME 3rd or 4th class) Captain or Lieutenant (for regimental duties)	..	..	2	1	..	3
1	1	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Total, officers</b> ... ..	<b>2</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
Warrant officers, class I ... ..	2	1	..	..	..	3
Warrant officers, class II ... ..	1	..	3	..	..	4
Staff-sergeants ... ..	1	3	8	..	1	13
Sergeants ... ..	3	1	4	1	1	10
<b>Total, WOs, Ssgts and sgts</b> ... ..	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>30</b>
Corporals ... ..	4	2	8	1	1	16
Corporal, RCASC ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporal ... ..	2	2	10	..	3	17
Privates ... ..	19	19	101	9	12	160
Privates, RCASC ... ..	5	..	..	..	..	5
<b>Total, rank and file</b> ... ..	<b>31</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>Total, other ranks</b> ... ..	<b>38</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>229</b>
<b>Total, all ranks</b> ... ..	<b>40</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>235</b>

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN (a)</b>						
Batman ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Batmen-drivers ... ..	1	..	..	1	..	2
Drivers, I. C. ... ..	5	1	1	..	..	7
General duties ... ..	3	4	18	..	1	26
Regimental duties (W. O. II - C. S. M) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Regimental police (corporal) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Transport (sergeant) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Total, non-tradesmen</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>TRADESMEN</b>						
<b>Artificers armament (a)</b>						
(Electrical) ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1
(Field) W. O. I Armament S. M. ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1
(Instruments, field) ... ..	..	2	..	..	..	2
(M. V.) ... ..	1	..	8	..	..	9
<b>Armourers</b>						
Sergeant ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Private ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)

Detail	Headquarters	Armament and General Section	Vehicle and Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	Store Section	Total, Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
<b>Artizans (a)</b>						
Blacksmiths ... ..	..	2	4	..	..	6
Carpenter ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Trimmer and upholsterer (coach) ...	..	1	..	..	..	1
Driver-mechanics ... ..	3	..	..	1	..	4
Driver-mechanics (A. F. V.)... ..	4	..	..	..	..	4
Electricians ... ..	..	..	7	..	..	7
Fitters ... ..	..	4	2	..	..	6
Fitters M. V. ... ..	..	..	12	..	..	12
Fitters A. F. V. ... ..	1	..	70	..	..	71
Mechanics instrument for (field) ...	..	4	..	..	..	4
(type X cipher) ... ..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Machinist (metal)... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Mechanics (wireless) ... ..	..	..	..	8	..	8
Sheet metal workers ... ..	..	..	3	..	..	3
Turners ... ..	3	..	..	..	..	3
Welders (G & E) ... ..	..	1	5	..	..	6
<b>Clerks superintending</b>						
Warrant officer, class II (Sub-conductor)	1	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Clerks</b>						
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Sergeants ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ... ..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Privates ... ..	2	1	1	..	2	6
<b>Cooks, RCASC</b>						
Corporal ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates (includes 1 for officers' mess)	5	..	..	..	..	5
<b>Storemen (T &amp; D) for:-</b>						
(a)						
Armament & general stores... ..	1	1	..	..	..	2
Instruments & telecommunications ...	1	..	..	1	..	2
Technical stores (includes 1 sgt, 1 cpl and 1 l/cpl) ... ..	..	..	..	..	14	14
Vehicles ... ..	..	..	2	..	..	2
<b>Total, tradesmen</b> ... ..	25	23	115	10	17	190
<b>Total, other ranks</b> ... ..	38	28	134	11	18	229

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Truck, heavy utility machinery "ZL" ...	..	..	..	1	..	1
Truck, 15 cwt, G.S. ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "KL" ... ..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton G. S. (8 will be flat floor type)	1	1	1	..	6	9
G. S. stores ... ..	..	..	..	..	4	4
Lorries, 3 ton, 6-wheel Machinery "A" ...	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6-wheel Machinery "B" ...	1	..	..	..	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6-wheel Machinery "Z" ...	..	..	..	1	..	1
Lorries, 3 ton, 6-wheel stores ... ..	..	..	1	1	2	4
Lorries, 4 ton, 6-wheel Machinery "A" ...	1	..	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, Heavy ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2-wheel G. S. ... ..	4	..	..	..	..	4
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2-wheel Gas welding ...	..	..	1	..	..	1
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2-wheel Generator 9 KW	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2-wheel Water ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 20 cwt, 2-wheel Workshop servicing	..	..	1	..	..	1
Trailers, 2-wheel Generator 22 KW ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Trailers, 4 ton, 4-wheel Machinery Grind & Brake	1	..	..	..	..	1

(iii) Transport (cont'd)							
Detail	Headquarters	Armament and General Section	Vehicle and Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	Store Section	Total, Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME	
Trailer, 4 ton, 4-wheel Machinery, 60 ton press	1	..	..	..	..	1	
Trailer, 6-wheel, 7 ton Light Recovery ...	1	..	..	..	..	1	
(iv) Weapons							
Pistols .38 inch ...	2	..	2	1	1	6	
Rifles .303 inch ...	20	26	131	8	6	191	
Machine carbines ...	12	2	3	3	12	32	
L. M. G. .303 inch ...	6	..	..	..	..	6	
P. I. A. Ts ...	5	..	..	..	..	5	
Guns 20 mm ...	2	..	..	..	..	2	

Footnotes

(a) Except where otherwise specified in part (ii), ranks and appointments will be allotted according to the following table:

NON-TRADESMEN							
Corporals ...	1	..	1	..	..	2	
Artificers Armament ...	1	..	..	..	..	1	
Warrant officer, class I (armament S. M.) ...	..	..	2	..	..	2	
Warrant officer, class II (armament quartermaster-sergeant ...)	..	3	6	..	..	9	
Staff-sergeants ...	..	..	1	..	..	1	
Artizans	..	..	2	..	..	2	
Warrant officer, class II (Quartermaster-sergeants)	1	..	4	1	..	6	
Staff-sergeants ...	1	2	5	1	..	9	
Sergeants ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Corporals ...	1	..	1	..	..	1	
Storemen (T. & D.)	1	..	1	..	..	2	
Company-quartermaster-sgt	1	..	..	..	..	1	
Corporals ...	1	..	1	..	..	2	

NOTES

1. Drivers have not been provided for static vehicles (store lorries, etc). Sufficient personnel will be trained as drivers I. C. under unit arrangements.
2. Personnel and stores for whom unit transport is not available will be carried in transport allotted by the formation to which this unit is attached.



ANNEX U

HEADQUARTERS BASE WORKSHOP, RCEME

This HQ is allotted to command and administer a Base Workshop RCEME, serving an army of:

- Army Troops
- G. H. Q. L of C Troops
- 2 Corps Troops
- 2 Army Tank Brigades
- 2 Armoured Divisions
- 3 Infantry Divisions

The composition of the unit is as follows:

- Headquarters, Base Workshop
- A Base Tank Workshop
- Base Vehicle Workshops
- Base Armament and General Workshop
- Infantry Divisional Increment
- Armoured Divisional Increment

War Establishment Cdn IV/49/1

Notified in G. O. 81/44  
Effective 1 Aug 43.

Published February, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Officers	Warrant Officers	Sgts and sergeants	Rank and file	Total
Commandant, EME					
1st class (colonel) ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
EME 1st class (lt-col) ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
EME 3rd class (captain					
Adjutant ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
Quartermaster, EME ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
A/EME (fitter) ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
Medical officer (RCAMC) ... ..	1	..	..	..	1
Paymasters, (RCAPC) ... ..	2	..	..	..	2
Total, officers ... ..	8	..	..	..	8
Warrant officer, class I ... ..	..	2	..	..	2
Warrant officer, class II ... ..	..	1	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ... ..	..	..	1	..	1
Sergeants ... ..	..	..	4	..	4
Total, W. Os, s/sgts and sgts ... ..	..	3	5	..	8
Corporals ... ..	..	..	..	4	4
Privates (includes 3 l/cpls) ... ..	..	..	..	25	25
Privates, (RCASC) ... ..	..	..	..	2	2
Total, rank and file ... ..	..	..	..	31	31
Total, other ranks ... ..	..	3	5	31	39
Total, all ranks ... ..	8	3	5	31	47

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

Detail	Officers	Warrant Officers	Sgts and sergeants	Rank and file	Total
<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>					
Batmen, privates ... ..	..	..	..	2	2
Batmen-driver, private ... ..	..	..	..	1	1
Drivers, I. C. privates ... ..	..	..	..	3	3
General duties, sergeant ... ..	..	..	1	..	1
Privates ... ..	..	..	..	7	7
Motorcyclists, privates ... ..	..	..	..	2	2
<b>Regimental duties</b>					
Warrant officer, class I RSM ... ..	..	1	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II RQMS ... ..	..	1	..	..	1
<b>Total, non-tradesmen ... ..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>TRADESMEN Trade Group</b>					
Clerk, warrant officer, Class I conductor (clerk superintending) ... .. "A"	..	1	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ... .. "B"	..	..	1	..	1
Sergeant ... .. "B"	..	..	1	..	1
Sergeants (for pay duty) ... .. "C"	..	..	2	..	2
Corporals, (includes 2 for Pay duties) ... .. "C"	..	..	..	3	3
Privates, (includes 1 for Pay duties) ... .. "C"	..	..	..	9	9
<b>Storemen (T &amp; D)</b>					
Corporal ... .. "C"	..	..	..	1	1
Cook, (RCASC) privates ... .. "C"	..	..	..	2	2
Shoemaker, private ... .. "C"	..	..	..	1	1
<b>Total, tradesmen ... ..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Total, other ranks ... ..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>39</b>

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, heavy ... ..	..	2
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	..	2
Truck, 15 cwt, G.S. ... ..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, G.S. ... ..	..	1

(iv) Table of weapons

Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	..	20
Pistols, .38 inch ... ..	..	8
Machine carbines ... ..	..	19

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX U  
**A BASE TANK WORKSHOP, RCEME**  
 War Establishment Cdn IV/49A/1

Notified in G.O. 81/44  
 Effective 1st August, 1943

Published February, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Tank Section	Recovery Section	Machinery Section	Total
EME 1st class (lieutenant-colonel) ...	1	..	..	..	1
EME 2nd class (major) ...	1	..	..	..	1
EME 3rd or 4th class (captain or lieutenant) ...	..	1	..	..	1
Regimental duties (captain or lieutenant) ...	1	..	..	..	1
A/EME (fitter) ...	1	..	..	..	1
W. E. O. ...	1	..	..	..	1
Total, officers ...	5	1	..	..	6
Warrant officers, class I ...	1	..	..	..	1
Warrant officers, class II ...	2	4	..	..	6
Staff-sergeants ...	2	15	1	1	19
Sergeants ...	3	9	2	2	16
Sergeant (RCASC) ...	1	..	..	..	1
Total, W.Os, Ssgts, and sgts ...	9	28	3	3	43
Corporals ...	3	14	2	2	21
Corporal (RCASC) ...	1	..	..	..	1
Privates (including 29 lance-corporals) ...	20	241	19	38	318
Privates (RCASC) ...	7	..	..	..	7
Total, rank and file ...	31	255	21	40	347
Total, other ranks ...	40	283	24	43	390
Total, all ranks ...	45	284	24	43	396

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>					
Batmen privates ...	2	..	..	..	2
Batmen drivers, privates ...	2	..	..	..	2
Drivers, I. C. privates ...	3	..	2	..	5
General duties privates ...	4	50	4	5	63
Medical orderly private ...	1	..	..	..	1
Motorcyclists ...	1	..	5	..	6
Regimental duties:-					
Warrant officer, class II Company-sergeant-major	1	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen ...	(e) 14	(g) 50	11	5	80
<b>TRADESMEN</b>					
Trade Group					
<b>Artificers armament (a)</b>					
A. F. V. ...	1	14	..	..	15
Electrical ...	..	3	..	..	3
<b>Artizans (c)</b>					
Fitter (MV) ...	..	..	1	..	1
Blacksmith ...	..	5	..	..	5
Carpenter ...	..	5	..	..	5
Draughtsmen (mechanical) ...	4	..	..	..	4
Driver mechanic ...	..	..	7	..	7
Electrician ...	..	8	..	..	8
Fitter ...	..	5	..	..	5
Fitter (A. F. V.) ...	..	80	..	..	80

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)

Detail	Trade Group	Headquarters	Tank Section	Recovery Section	Machinery Section	Total
<b>TRADESMEN (Cont'd)</b>						
Grinder (precision) ...	"B"	..	..	..	5	5
Strikers and hammermen						
Blacksmiths ...	"C"	..	5	..	..	5
Machinist (metal) ...	"B"	..	..	..	15	15
Assemblers motor ...	"C"	..	40	..	..	40
Mechanics motor ...	"B"	..	40	5	..	45
Painter and decorator ...	"B"	..	3	..	..	3
Riveters ...	"B"	..	5	..	..	5
Sawyer ...	"B"	..	..	..	2	2
Sheet metal worker ...	"B"	..	8	..	..	8
Turner ...	"B"	..	..	..	14	14
Welder (G & E) ...	"B"	..	5	..	..	5
<b>Clerks</b>						
(W.O. II) S. Q. M. S. (Clerk superintendant)	"A"	1	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ...	"B"	1	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ...	"B"	1	..	..	..	1
Corporal ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	"C"	2	2	..	1	5
<b>Cooks (RCASC)</b>						
Sergeant ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	1
Corporal ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	"C"	7	..	..	..	7
<b>Storemen (T &amp; D)</b>						
Staff-sergeant (f) ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	1
Corporal ...	"C"	1	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	"C"	3	5	..	1	9
Total, tradesmen ...		26	233	13	38	310
Total, other ranks ...		40	283	24	43	390

(iii) Table of Transport

Motorcycles solo heavy ...	1	..	5	..	6
Cars, 5 cwt ...	2	..	..	..	2
Trucks, 15 cwt, G.S. ...	2	..	1	..	3
Lorries, 3 ton, G.S. ...	1	..	1	..	2
Lorries, 3 ton, G.S. (stores)	1	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium	..	..	2	..	2
Tractor tracked, D. 8 ...	..	..	1	..	1
Transporter recovery 40 ton (tractor) (trailer)	..	..	1	..	1
Transporter 20 ton (tractor) (trailer) ...	..	..	1	..	1
Trailers, 7 ton light recovery 6-wheeled	..	..	2	..	2
Trailer 20 cwt, 2-wheeled workshop servicing	1	..	..	..	1
Carrier wheeled ...	..	..	1	..	1

(iv) Table of Weapons

Pistols .38 inch ...	5	1	..	..	6
Rifles .303 inch ...	19	140	12	22	193
Machine carbines ...	18	140	12	21	191
Anti-tank rifles .55 inch ...	1	3	1	1	6
L.M.Gs. .303 inch ...	1	3	..	1	5

Increment to be added to base tank workshop when two divisional increments are added:

EME 2nd class (major) ... 1  
Pistol .38 inch ... 1

Increment to be added to base tank workshop when four divisional increments are added:

EME 3rd or 4th class  
captain or lieutenant ... 1  
Pistol .38 inch ... 1

(a) Table of ranks and appointments of armament artificers

Detail	Headquarters	Tank Section	Recovery Section	Machinery Section	Total
Warrant officer, Class I Armament S. M. ...	1	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, Class II Armament QMS ...	..	(b) 4	..	..	4
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	13	..	..	13
Total ... ..	1	17	..	..	18

(b) One armament artificer A. F. V. may be W. O. I armament S. M. when Base Tank Workshop includes two Divisional Increments.

(c) Table of ranks of artisans:

Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	2	1	1	4
Sergeants ... ..	..	..	2	2	11
Corporals ... ..	..	12	2	2	16
Privates ... ..	4	188	8	31	231
Total ... ..	4	209	13	36	262

(e) Includes one sergeant and one corporal.

(f) Also to perform duties of C. Q. M. S.

(g) Includes 2 sergeants and 2 corporals.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX U

BASE VEHICLE WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IV/49B/1

Notified in G. O. 81/44  
Effective 1 Aug 43.

Published February, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	HQ vehicle W/S	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Machinery Section	Tire Maintenance Section	Total
EME 1st class (lt-col) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
EME 2nd class (major) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
EME 3rd or 4th class (Captain or lieutenant) Regimental duties (Captain or lieutenant)	3	1	..	..	(a) 2	6
A/EME (fitter) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
W. E. O. ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Medical officer, (RCAMC) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Total, officers ... ..	9	1	..	..	2	12
Warrant officer, class I ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officers, class II ... ..	2	5	..	..	1	8
Staff-sergeants ... ..	2	20	..	1	..	23
Sergeants ... ..	3	17	1	2	3	26
Sergeants (RCASC) ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Total, W.Os, Ssgts & sgts ... ..	10	42	1	3	4	60
Corporals ... ..	5	27	1	3	4	40
Corporal (RCASC) ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates (includes 53 l/cpls ... ..	33	437	13	43	61	587
Privates (RCASC) ... ..	10	..	..	..	..	10
Total, rank and file ... ..	49	464	14	46	65	638
Total, other ranks ... ..	59	506	15	49	69	698
Total, all ranks ... ..	68	507	15	49	71	710

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>						
Batmen, privates ... ..	3	..	..	..	..	3
Batmen drivers, privates ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Drivers, I. C. privates ... ..	5	..	..	..	..	5
General duty						
Sergeants ... ..	..	3	..	..	..	3
Corporals ... ..	..	3	..	..	..	3
Privates ... ..	8	76	2	7	(b) 7	100
Medical orderly, RCAMC						
Corporal ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Private ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Motorcyclists, privates ... ..	1	..	1	..	..	2
Regimental duties						
Warrant officer, class II CSM ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen	(e) 22	82	3	7	7	121
<b>TRADESMEN</b>						
Trade Group						
Armament artificers (a)						
Electrical ... .. "A"	..	5	..	..	..	5
M. V. ... .. "A"	1	17	..	..	..	18

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)

Detail		HQ Vehicle W/S	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Machinery Section	Tire Maintenance Section	Total
TRADESMEN (cont'd)	Trade Group						
Artizans (d)							
Blacksmith ... ..	"B"	..	8	..	..	..	8
Carpenter ... ..	"B"	..	15	..	..	..	15
Draughtsmen (mechanical) ... ..	"A"	2	..	..	..	..	2
Driver mechanic ... ..	"C"	..	..	11	..	..	11
Electricians ... ..	"A"	..	12	..	..	..	12
Fitter (M.V.) ... ..	"A"	..	110	1	..	..	111
Grinder (precision) ... ..	"B"	..	..	..	5	..	5
Strikers and hammermen							
Blacksmiths ... ..	"C"	..	8	..	..	..	8
Machinist (metal) ... ..	"B"	..	..	..	14	..	14
Machinist (wood) ... ..	"B"	..	..	..	1	..	1
Motor assembler ... ..	"C"	..	82	..	..	..	82
Motor mechanic ... ..	"B"	..	119	..	..	..	119
Painter & decorator ... ..	"B"	..	5	..	..	..	5
Riveter ... ..	"B"	..	5	..	..	..	5
Sawyer ... ..	"B"	..	..	..	4	..	4
Sheet metal worker ... ..	"B"	..	11	..	..	..	11
Textile refitter ... ..	"B"	..	5	..	..	..	5
Turner ... ..	"B"	..	..	..	16	..	16
Vulcanizer ... ..	"C"	..	..	..	..	61	61
Welder (gas & electric) ... ..	"B"	..	8	..	..	..	8
Clerks							
Warrant officer class II S.Q.M.S.	"B"	1	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant ... ..	"B"	1	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ... ..	"B"	1	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal ... ..	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... ..	"C"	7	5	..	1	..	13
Cooks (RCASC)							
Sergeants ... ..	"C"	2	..	..	..	..	2
Corporal ... ..	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... ..	"C"	10	..	..	..	..	10
Storemen (T. & D.)							
Staff-sergeant ... ..	"C"	(f) 1	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ... ..	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ... ..	"C"	2	..	..	..	..	2
Privates ... ..	"C"	6	9	..	1	1	17
Total, tradesmen ... ..		37	424	12	42	62	577
Total, other ranks ... ..		59	506	15	49	69	698

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, heavy ... ..	..	1	..	1	..	..	2
Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Trucks, 15 cwt, G.S. ... ..	..	3	..	1	..	..	4
Lorries, 3 ton, G.S. ... ..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
3 ton, G.S. (stores) ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium ... ..	..	..	..	3	..	..	3
breakdown, heavy ... ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Trailers, 6 wheeled, 7 ton							
Light recovery ... ..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
20 cwt, 2 wheeled, w/s servicing ... ..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1

(iv) Table of weapons

Detail	HQ Vehicle W/S	Vehicle Section	Recovery Section	Machinery Section	Tire Maintenance Section	Total
Pistols, .38 inch ...	9	1	..	..	2	12
Rifles, .303 inch ...	28	251	8	24	34	345
Machine carbines ...	28	250	7	24	34	343
Anti-Tank rifles, .55 inch ...	1	8	1	1	1	12
L. M. Gs., .303 inch ...	1	5	..	1	1	8

Increment to be added to Base Vehicle Workshop when two divisional increments are added:

E. M. E. 2nd class (major) 1  
Pistol, .38 inch 1

Increment to be added to Base Vehicle Workshop when three divisional increments are added:

E. M. E. 3rd or 4th class (Captain or lieutenant) 1  
Pistol, .38 inch 1

Increment to be added to Base Vehicle Workshop when four divisional increments are added:

E. M. E. 3rd or 4th class (Captain or lieutenant) 1  
W. O. II armament Q. M. S. Armament artificer "A" 1  
Pistol, .38 inch 1

- (a) Tire specialists may be E. M. Es. ungraded.
- (b) Includes 1 maintenance man and 2 boilermen.

(c) Table of ranks and appointments of armament artificer

Warrant officer, class I Armament Sergeant Major ...	1	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, class II Armament, Q. M. S. ...	..	(g) 5	..	..	..	5
Staff-sergeants ...	..	17	..	..	..	17
Total ...	1	22	..	..	..	23

(d) Table of rank and appointments of artisans

Warrant officer, class II S. Q. M. S. ...	..	..	..	..	1	1
Staff-sergeants ...	..	3	..	1	..	4
Sergeants ...	..	14	1	2	3	20
Corporals ...	..	24	1	3	4	32
Privates ...	2	347	10	34	53	446
Total ...	2	388	12	40	61	503

- (e) Includes 1 sergeant and 1 corporal.
- (f) Also for C. Q. M. S. duties.
- (g) One may be W. O. I Armament S. M., when three divisional increments are added.



APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX U

A BASE ARMAMENT AND GENERAL WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IV/49C/2

Notified in G. O. 438/44  
Effective 27th January 1944

Published October, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	S. A. Section	Instrument Section	Machinery Section	Engineer Equipment Section	Telecommunication Section	Total
Lieutenant-Colonel (EME 1st class) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Major, (EME 2nd class) ...	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	2
Captain or Lieutenant, (EME 3rd or 4th class) ...	(a) 1	..	..	..	..	..	(b) 3	4
Assistant EME (fitter) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Assistant, EME (instruments) ...	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
<b>Total, officers</b> ...	<b>4</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>
Warrant officers, class I ...	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Warrant officers, class II ...	2	2	1	3	..	1	2	11
Staff-sergeants ...	1	6	1	10	..	2	5	25
Sergeants ...	3	5	1	2	1	2	8	22
Sergeants, RCASC ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
<b>Total, WOs, Ssgts &amp; Sgts</b> ...	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>62</b>
Corporals ...	4	8	2	2	2	4	5	27
Corporals, RCASC ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals ...	2	9	2	4	2	6	7	32
Privates ...	20	92	27	41	22	51	73	326
Privates, RCASC ...	7	..	..	..	..	1	..	8
<b>Total, rank and file</b> ...	<b>34</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>394</b>
<b>Total, other ranks</b> ...	<b>44</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>456</b>
<b>Total, all ranks</b> ...	<b>48</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>465</b>

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>								
Batmen ...	1	..	..	1	..	..	..	2
Batmen drivers ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	2	4
Drivers IC ...	3	..	..	..	..	..	11	14
General duties ...	..	30	6	5	3	1	6	51
Medical orderly ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Motorcyclist ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Orderlies for -								
Officers' Mess ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeants' Mess ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Regimental duties								
Warrant officer class II CSM ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Storeman ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
<b>Total, non-tradesmen</b> ...	<b>(j) 13</b>	<b>(k) 30</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>TRADESMEN</b>								
Artificers, Armament (c)								
Anti-aircraft ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Electrical ...	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	2
Field ...	1	6	..	..	..	..	..	7
Instruments -								
Anti-aircraft ...	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	5
Field ...	1	..	..	7	..	..	..	8

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)

	Headquarters	Armament Section	S. A. Section	Instrument Section	Machinery Section	Engineer Equipment Section	Telecommunication Section	Total
TRADESMEN (cont'd)								
Motor vehicle	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
Radio	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Wireless	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	6
Armourers -								
Warrant officer, class I								
armourer-sergeant-major	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Warrant officer, class II								
armourer-quartermaster-sergeant	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeant	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates	..	..	15	..	..	..	..	15
Artizans (d) -								
Blacksmiths	..	16	..	..	..	..	..	16
Carpenter	..	3	..	..	..	2	..	5
Draughtsman (mechanical)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Driver mechanic	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	2
Electricians	..	..	..	..	..	17	..	17
Electroplaters	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	6
Fitters	..	37	..	..	..	27	..	64
Fitters (MV)	..	..	..	..	..	8	..	8
Grinder (precision)	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Mechanic Instrument -								
Field	..	..	..	18	..	..	..	18
Anti-aircraft	..	..	..	10	..	..	..	10
Survey	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	3
Type ex-cipher	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	3
Machinist (metal)	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	4
(wood)	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	4
Mechanic (radio)	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	8
(wireless)	..	..	..	..	..	(e)60	..	60
Moulder	2	..	..	..	..	1	..	3
Painter and decorator	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Pattern makers	2	..	..	..	..	1	..	3
Repairer, push cycle	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	7
Riveter	..	3	..	..	..	2	..	5
Saddler	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
Saw-doctor	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Sawyer	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Sheetmetal worker	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Refitter textile	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Tool-maker	..	3	..	..	..	1	..	4
Turner	..	..	..	..	9	3	..	12
Watchmaker	..	..	..	7	..	..	..	7
Welder (G & E)	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Clerks								
Warrant officer, class II SQMS	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates	4	1	1	1	1	..	1	9
Cooks, RCASC								
Other ranks mess								
Sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates	6	..	..	..	..	1	..	7
Officers' Mess								
Private	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Storemen (T & D)-								
Staff-sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)

Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	S. A. Section	Instrument Section	Machinery Section	Engineer Equipment Section	Telecommunication Section	Total
<b>TRADESMEN (cont'd)</b>								
<b>Storemen (T &amp; D) - (Cont'd)</b>								
Sergeant ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Privates ...	3	2	1	1	1	..	3	11
Total, tradesmen ...	31	92	28	56	24	66	81	378
Total, other ranks ...	44	122	34	62	27	67	100	456

(iii) Transport

Motorcycle, solo ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Car, 5 cwt ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	2	4
Truck, heavy utility machinery ZL ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	(f)9	9
Truck, 15 cwt, GS ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Lorry, 3 ton, GS ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
GS (stores) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	2	3
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel machinery Z ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	2
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel workshop servicing	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

(iv) Table of Weapons

Pistols .38 inch ...	4	..	..	1	..	1	3	9
Rifles .303 inch ...	33	120	33	61	27	66	83	423
Machine carbines ...	10	..	..	..	..	..	15	25
LMGs .303 inch ...	1	2	1	1	..	1	2	8
PIATs ...	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	9

- (a) For regimental duties.
- (b) For wireless.
- (c) Table of rank and appointments of artificers armament

Warrant officer, class I armament sergeant-major ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Warrant officer, class II armament QMS ...	..	(g) 2	..	(1) 3	..	1	(h) 2	8
Staff-sergeants ...	..	5	..	10	..	2	5	22
Total, WOs, Ssgts ...	2	7	..	13	..	3	7	32
<b>(d) Table of ranks of artisans</b>								
Staff-sergeant ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ...	..	4	..	2	1	2	8	17
Corporals ...	..	6	1	2	2	4	5	20
Total, Ssgts, Sgts & Cpls ...	..	11	1	4	3	6	13	38

- (e) Eight to be trained in teleprinter repairs.
- (f) One specially equipped for wireless testing and eight for telecommunication repairs and testing.
- (g) One may be W. O. I armament sergeant-major when a base armament and general workshop includes two increments.
- (h) Includes one artificer armament (radio) and one artificer armament (wireless).
- (j) Includes one sergeant and one corporal.
- (k) Includes one sergeant and two corporals.

- (1) Includes one armament artificer (instruments AA) who may be W.O. I., armament sergeant-major when a base armament and general workshop includes two increments.
1. The telecommunications section is designed to provide two detachments comprising the following personnel and vehicles for 2nd echelon maintenance of L of C equipment.

These detachments will be placed under the administrative control of officer commanding a general troops workshop.

Electrical and mechanical engineer (wireless)	1
Mechanics wireless (includes 4 sergeants)	11
Batmen-driver ... ..	1
Drivers, IC ... ..	5
Driver-mechanic ... ..	1
General dutymen ... ..	1
Storemen, (T & D) ... ..	1
Car, 5 cwt ... ..	5
Lorry, 3 ton, GS ... ..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6-wheel machinery Z ...	1

2. Two electrical and mechanical engineers, 2nd class (majors)(includes 1 for wireless) will be added when the base armament and general workshop includes three increments.
3. One workshop executive officer and one assistant inspector of armourers will be added when the base armament and general workshop includes two increments.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX U  
 A BASE WORKSHOP, RCEME  
 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL INCREMENT  
 War Establishment Cdn IV/49D/1

Notified in G. O. 81/44  
 Effective 1st August, 1943

Published February, 1944

Detail	Armament and General Workshop	Vehicle Workshop	Total
EME 3rd or 4th class (captain or lieutenant) ...	..	1	1
Warrant officer, class II ...	1	1	2
Staff-sergeants ...	4	4	8
Sergeants ...	2	3	5
Total, W.Os. Ssgts, and sgts ...	7	8	15
Corporals ...	2	7	9
Privates, (including 14 l/cpls) ...	60	100	160
Privates (RCASC) ...	1	2	3
Total, rank and file ...	63	109	172
Total, other ranks ...	70	117	187
Total, all ranks ...	70	118	188

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>			
General duty:-			
Sergeant ...	..	1	1
Corporal ...	..	1	1
Privates ...	11	19	30
Total, non-tradesmen ...	11	21	32
<b>TRADESMEN</b>			
	<b>Trade Group</b>		
<b>Armament artificers (a)</b>			
Electrical ...	"A"	1	1
Field ...	"A"	..	1
Instruments A. A. ...	"A"	1	1
Instruments field ...	"A"	..	1
M. V. ...	"A"	3	3
Radio ...	"A"	1	1
Wireless ...	"A"	..	1
<b>Armourer</b>			
Privates ...	"B"	3	3
<b>Artizans (b)</b>			
Blacksmith ...	"B"	1	2
Carpenter ...	"B"	1	1
Electrician ...	"A"	..	2
Fitter ...	"A"	7	7
Fitter (M. V.) ...	"A"	..	(c) 20
Grinder (precision) ...	"B"	..	2
Strikers and hammermen blacksmiths	"C"	1	2
<b>Instrument mechanics</b>			
Field ...	"A"	3	3
A. A. ...	"A"	2	2
Survey ...	"A"	1	1
Machinist (metal) ...	"B"	2	4
Machinist (wood) ...	"B"	1	2
Mechanic (radio) ...	"B"	(c) 4	4
Mechanic (wireless) ...	"B"	(c) 11	11

Detail			Armament and General Workshop	Vehicle Workshop	Total
Motor assembler	...	"C"	..	15	15
Motor mechanics	...	"B"	..	20	20
Painter & decorator	...	"B"	1	1	2
Push cycle repairer	...	"C"	2	..	2
Riveter	...	"B"	1	1	2
Sawyer	...	"B"	1	1	2
Sheet metal worker	...	"B"	..	2	2
Textile refitter	...	"B"	1	1	2
Toolmaker	...	"A"	1	..	1
Turner	...	"B"	2	4	6
Typewriter mechanic	...	"B"	1	..	1
Watchmaker	...	"B"	1	..	1
Welder (gas and electric)	...	"B"	1	2	3
Clerks:-					
Privates	...	"C"	2	4	6
Cooks, (RCASC)					
Privates	...	"C"	1	2	3
Storemen (T. & D.)					
Privates	...	"C"	2	4	6
Total, tradesmen	...		59	96	155
Total, other ranks	...		70	117	187

(iii) Table of Weapons

Pistols .38 inch	...	...	..	1	1
Rifles .303 inch	...	...	35	58	93
Machine carbines	...	...	34	58	92
L. M. Gs., .303 inch	...	...	1	1	2

(a) Table of ranks and appointments of armament artificers

Warrant officer, class II Quartermaster-sergeant			1	1	2
Staff-sergeants	...	...	4	3	7

(b) Table of ranks of artisans

Staff-sergeants	...	...	..	1	1
Sergeants	...	...	2	2	4
Corporals	...	...	2	6	8
Privates	...	...	42	73	115

(c) Includes one corporal as in note (b)

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX U

A BASE WORKSHOP, RCEME  
 ARMOUR'D DIVISIONAL INCREMENT

War Establishment Cdn IV/49E/1

Notified in G.O. 81/44  
 Effective 1st August, 1943

Published February

(i) Personnel

Detail	Armament and General Section Workshop	Vehicle Section Workshop	Tank Section Workshop	Total
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 3rd or 4th class (captains or lieutenants) ... ..	..	1	2	3
Warrant officers, class II ... ..	1	1	2	4
Staff-sergeants ... ..	4	4	7	15
Sergeants ... ..	2	2	5	9
Total, W. Os., Ssgts and sgts ... ..	7	7	14	28
Corporals ... ..	2	5	9	16
Privates (includes 25 lance corporals) ... ..	53	77	155	285
Privates (RCASC) ... ..	1	1	2	4
Total, rank and file ... ..	56	83	166	305
Total, other ranks ... ..	63	90	180	333
Total, all ranks ... ..	63	91	182	336

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>					
General duty					
Sergeant ... ..	..	..	1	1	
Corporal ... ..	..	..	1	1	
Privates ... ..	8	14	28	50	
Total, non-tradesmen ... ..	8	14	30	52	
<b>TRADESMEN</b>					
		Trade Group			
Artificers, armament (a)					
(Electrical) ... ..	"A"	..	1	2	3
(Field) ... ..	"A"	1	..	..	1
Instruments (A. A.) ... ..	"A"	1	..	..	1
Instruments (field)					
(M. V.) ... ..	"A"	..	3	6	9
(Radio) ... ..	"A"	1	..	..	1
(Wireless) ... ..	"A"	1	..	..	1
Armourers (privates) ... ..	"B"	3	..	..	3
Artizans (b)					
Blacksmiths ... ..	"B"	2	1	3	6
Carpenters ... ..	"B"	..	1	2	3
Electricians ... ..	"A"	..	1	5	6
Fitters, M. V. ... ..	"A"	..	18	..	18
Fitters, A. F. V. ... ..	"A"	..	..	44	44
Grinders (precision) ... ..	"B"	1	1	2	4
Mechanics, instrument					
Field ... ..	"A"	3	..	..	3
A. A. ... ..	"A"	2	..	..	2
Survey ... ..	"A"	1	..	..	1
T. C. ... ..	"A"	1	..	..	1

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)						
Detail			Armament and General Section Workshop	Vehicle Section Workshop	Tank Section Workshop	Total
Machinists (metal) ...	"B"		2	2	5	9
Machinists (wood) ...	"B"		1	2	..	3
Mechanic (radio) ...	"B"	(d) 4	..	..	..	4
Mechanic (wireless) ...	"B"	(d) 11	..	..	..	11
Assembler, motor	"C"		..	12	22	34
Strikers and hammermen						
Blacksmiths ...	"C"		2	1	3	6
Mechanics, motor ...	"B"		..	18	22	40
Painter and decorator ...	"B"		..	1	2	3
Repairer, push cycle ...	"C"		1	..	..	1
Riveters ...	"B"		..	1	3	4
Saddler ...	"B"		..	1	..	1
Sheetmetal workers ...	"B"		..	2	4	6
Refitter, textile ...	"B"		..	1	..	1
Turner ...	"B"		1	3	7	11
Watchmaker ...	"B"		1	..	..	1
Welders (gas & electric) ...	"B"		..	1	3	4
Clerks:-						
Corporal ...	"C"		..	..	1	1
Privates (one in A. & G. Workshop for pay duties) ...	"C"		3	2	5	10
Cooks:-						
(RCASC) (privates) ...	"C"		1	1	2	4
Storemen (T. & D.) privates ...	"C"		2	2	6	10
Total, tradesmen ...			55	76	150	281
Total, other ranks ...			63	90	180	333

(iii) Table of Weapons

Pistols .38 inch ...	..	1	2	3
Rifles .303 inch ...	31	45	89	165
Machine carbines ...	31	44	89	164
L.M.G. .303 inch ...	1	1	2	4

(a) Table of ranks and appointments of artificers, armament

Warrant officers, class II				
Armament quartermaster-sergeant ...	1	1	2	4
Staff-sergeants ...	4	3	6	13
Total ...	5	4	8	17

(b) Table of ranks of artisans

Staff-sergeants ...	..	1	1	2
Sergeants ...	2	2	4	8
Corporals ...	2	5	7	14
Privates ...	37	59	116	212
Total ...	41	67	128	236

(c) Includes one corporal as in (b).



ANNEX V

A CANADIAN ADVANCED BASE WORKSHOP RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IV/51/1

Notified in G. O. 314/43  
Effective 10th March, 1943

Published August, 1943

(i) Personnel										
Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Instrument Section	Machinery Section	Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	Recovery Section	Total
Electrical and mechanical engineering										
1st class (lieutenant-colonel) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
2nd class (major) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
3rd and 4th class (captains & lieutenants)	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Instrument specialist (may be A. E. M. E.)	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Radio and wireless ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
Regimental officer (captain) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Assistant electrical and mechanical engineer (fitter) ...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Assistant Inspector of armourers ...	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Workshop executive officer ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Paymaster, RCAPC ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, officers ...	5	1	1	1	1	..	1	2	..	12
Warrant officers, class I										
Artificer, armament ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Clerk ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officers, class II										
Armourer ...	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Artificers, armament ...	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	1	..	8
Artizans ...	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	2
Company sergeant-major ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Staff-sergeants										
Artificers, armament ...	..	2	..	4	3	..	5	3	..	17
Artizans ...	..	1	..	1	..	1	1	..	1	5
Clerk ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Storeman (technical & departmental) (CQMS) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeants										
Armourer ...	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Artizans ...	..	1	..	6	1	3	5	4	2	22
Clerks ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Cook ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Storeman (technical & departmental)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Non-tradesmen ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals										
Armourer ...	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Artizans ...	..	2	..	8	2	4	6	3	2	27
Clerks ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	2
Cook ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Storemen (technical & departmental)	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Non-tradesmen ...	1	1	..	1	..	1	2	1	..	7
Lance-corporals ...	2	2	1	9	2	5	9	2	1	33
Privates ...	28	25	7	94	17	53	88	23	18	353
Total, rank and file ...	35	30	9	112	21	63	106	29	21	426
Total, other ranks ...	45	35	11	126	27	68	119	37	24	492
Total, all ranks ...	50	36	12	127	28	68	120	39	24	504

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties										
Detail	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Instrument Section	Machinery Section	Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	Recovery Section	Total
<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>										
Batmen ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Batmen-drivers (includes 1 for paymaster)	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	4
Drivers, I. C. ...	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	2	12
General duties ...	7	6	2	18	1	9	24	2	4	73
Motorcyclists ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	6
Regimental duty										
Company-sergeant-major (WO II) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen ...	18	6	2	18	1	9	24	9	11	98
<b>TRADESMEN</b>										
	Trade group									
<b>Armourers</b>										
Quartermaster-sergeant (WO II) "B"	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant "B"	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal "B"	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates "B"	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
<b>Artificers, armament</b>										
Anti-aircraft ... "A"	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
AFVs (sergeant-major WO I in HQ) "A"	1	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	7
Electrical ... "A"	..	..	..	1	1	..	1	..	..	3
Field ... "A"	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Motor vehicles "A"	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	5
Instrument A. A. "A"	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Field "A"	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Radio (armament staff-sergeant) "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Wireless, (armament QMS(WO II) "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
(armanent staff-sergeants) "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
<b>Artizans</b>										
Blacksmiths ... "B"	..	3	..	2	..	..	3	..	..	8
Blacksmiths ... "C"	..	3	..	2	..	..	3	..	..	8
Carpenters ... "B"	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	2
Draughtsman (mechanical) "A"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Driver mechanics "C"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	7	9
Electricians ... "A"	..	..	..	3	..	..	4	..	..	7
Fitters ... "A"	..	12	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	14
Fitters, M. V. "A"	..	..	..	45	..	..	(a)40	..	1	86
Grinders, precision "B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	..	7
Machinists, metal "B"	..	..	..	..	..	16	..	..	..	16
Machinists, wood "B"	..	..	..	..	..	8	..	..	..	8
<b>Mechanics, instrument</b>										
Anti-aircraft "A"	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	6
Field ... "A"	..	..	..	..	9	..	..	..	..	9
Survey ... "A"	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
T. C. ... "A"	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Mechanics, motor "B"	..	..	..	36	..	..	20	..	5	61
Mechanics, radio (includes 1 cpl) "B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	4
<b>Mechanics, wireless</b>										
Sergeants ... "B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	4
Corporals ... "B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
Privates ... "B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	11
Painters and decorators "B"	..	1	..	1	..	..	2	..	..	4
Refitters, textile "B"	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	2
Repairers, push cycle "C"	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Riveters ... "B"	..	1	..	1	..	..	3	..	..	5
Sawyers ... "B"	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	4
Sheet metal workers "B"	..	..	..	4	..	..	4	..	..	8
Toolmaker ... "A"	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Turners ... "B"	..	..	..	..	..	22	..	..	..	22
Watchmakers ... "B"	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
Welders (G. & E.) "B"	..	1	..	2	..	..	3	..	..	6

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (Cont'd)

Detail	Trade group	Headquarters	Armament Section	Small Arms Section	Vehicle Section	Instrument Section	Machinery Section	Tank Section	Telecommunication Section	Recovery Section	Total
<b>TRADESMEN (cont'd)</b>											
Clerks (b)											
Pay duties (sergeant)	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Regimental duties	B/C	5	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	7
Superintending (WO I)	"A"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Technical duties	B/C	2	1	..	1	..	1	1	..	..	6
Cooks											
Officers' mess	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Other ranks' mess (includes 1 sgt and 1 cpl)	"C"	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8
Storemen (technical & departmental)											
Staff-sergeant (C. Q. M. S.)	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant	"C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals	"C"	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Privates	"C"	3	1	..	2	1	1	2	1	..	11
Total, tradesmen	...	27	29	9	108	26	59	95	28	13	394
Total, other ranks	...	45	35	11	126	27	68	119	37	24	492

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, heavy	...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	6
Cars, 5 cwt	...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2
Trucks, heavy utility	...										
Personnel, (computer)	...	(c)1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Personnel	...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Machinery "ZL"	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	5
Trucks, 15 cwt	...										
G.S.	...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	3
Lorries, 3 ton	...										
G.S.	...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
G.S. (stores)	...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2
Lorries, 3 ton, 6 wheel	...										
Machinery "Z"	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Machinery "CZ" (radio)	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Tractors, breakdown	...										
Medium	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	2
Tractors, tracked "D-8"	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Transporters	...										
20 ton	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Recovery 40 ton	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Trailers 2 wheel	...										
Workshop servicing	...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Carriers, wheeled	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch	...	9	2	1	3	1	3	2	6	28
Rifles, .303 inch	...	36	32	10	118	25	64	111	28	434
Machine carbines	...	5	2	1	6	2	3	6	9	42
A. Tk. rifles, .55 inch	...	1	1	..	2	1	1	2	1	10
L. M. G. .303 inch	...	1	1	..	2	..	1	2	..	8

(a) Trained in A. F. V.

(b) Of the clerks shown in trade group B/C 5 may be trade group "B"

(c) For paymaster.

**NOTE:**

Personnel in this establishment may be of low medical category but fit for service overseas.

ANNEX W

A PORT WORKSHOP RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IV/51A/2

Promulgated in G. O. 300/44  
Effective 23 Mar 44

Published June 1944

(i) Personnel

Captain (EME 3rd class) ... ..	1
Total officers ... ..	1
Warrant officer, class I ... ..	1
Staff-sergeant ... ..	2
Sergeants ... ..	2
Total WOs, staff-sgts and sgts ... ..	5
Corporals ... ..	3
Lance-corporals ... ..	2
Privates ... ..	13
Private, RCASC ... ..	1
Total rank and file ... ..	19
Total other ranks ... ..	24
Total all ranks ... ..	25

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>	
Batmen-driver ... ..	1
Drivers IC ... ..	4
Total non-tradesmen ... ..	(a) 5
<b>TRADESMEN</b>	
Artificer armanent (MV or AFV)	
Warrant officer, class I	
Armament sergeant-major ... ..	1
Armament staff-sergeants ... ..	2
Artizans (b)	
Blacksmith ... ..	1
Carpenter ... ..	1
Driver-mechanics ... ..	4
Driver-mechanics (AFV) ... ..	1
Electricians ... ..	2
Fitters (MV) ... ..	3
Fitters (AFV) ... ..	1
Clerk ... ..	1
Cook, RCASC ... ..	1
Storeman (T & D) for:	
Vehicles ... ..	1
Total tradesmen ... ..	11
Total other ranks ... ..	24

(iii) Transport

Motorcycle, solo ... ..	1
Car, 5 cwt ... ..	1
Truck, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	1
Lorry, 3 ton 6 wh stores ... ..	1
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wh machinery "N" ... ..	1
Tractor, breakdown, medium ... ..	1
heavy ... ..	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wh water ... ..	1
workshop and servicing ... ..	1
Trailer, 4 wh, motor-boat ... ..	1

(iv) Weapons

Pistols .38 inch	...	1
Rifles .303 inch	...	12
Machine carbines	...	11
LMG .303 inch	...	1

(a) Includes 1 corporal

(b) Includes 2 sergeants and 2 corporals.

NOTES

1. When this unit ceases to function as a workshop it will be added to the nearest base workshop, RCEME.
2. Of the total personnel two men will be trained in anti-gas duties and decontamination duties.

ANNEX X

NO. 1 SUB-WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn. IV/52/1

Notified in GO 489/43  
Effective 20 Sep 43

Published February, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	S. A. & M. G. section	"B" Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	"A" Vehicle section	Telegraph section	Stores section	Total
Major (EME 2nd class) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Captains (EME 3rd class)...	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Captain (OO 4th class) ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lieutenants (EME 4th class) ...	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Total, officers ...	2	1	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	6
Warrant officer, (class I)...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Warrant officer, (class II)..	1	1	1	2	..	..	2	..	..	7
Staff-sergeants ...	1	4	..	8	..	2	8	1	..	24
Sergeants ...	3	1	1	2	..	..	3	..	1	11
Total, WOs, s/sgts, sgts ...	5	7	2	12	..	2	13	1	1	43
Corporals ...	7	1	1	3	1	1	5	1	1	21
Corporal (RCASC) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporals ...	7	2	1	3	2	1	3	1	..	20
Privates ...	30	22	8	32	9	7	36	5	6	155
Privates (RCASC) ...	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Total, rank and file ...	51	25	10	38	12	9	44	7	7	203
Total, other ranks ...	56	32	12	50	12	11	57	8	8	246
Total, all ranks ...	58	33	12	51	12	11	58	8	9	252

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>										
Batmen ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Driver, IC	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Motorcyclists (privates) ...	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
<b>Regimental duties:-</b>										
Company sergeant-major (WO II) ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Company quartermaster-sergeant	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ...	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
Lance-corporals ...	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Privates ...	18	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	18
Sergeants' mess caterer (Sergeant) ...	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen ...	38	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	38
<b>TRADESMEN</b>										
<b>Trade Group</b>										
Artificers, armament (field)	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
WO I (armt sergeant-major) "A" ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
WO II (armt QMS) ... "A" ...	..	4	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	5
Staff-sergeant ... "A" ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Artificers armament (AFV)	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
WO II (armt QMS) ... "A" ...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	SA & MG section	"B" Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	"A" Vehicle section	Telegraph section	Stores section	Total
Staff-sergeants ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	..	5
Artificers, armament (MV)	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
WOs II (armt QMS) ... "A"	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	6
Staff-sergeants ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Artificers, armament (instruments field)	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Staff-sergeants ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Artificers, armament (wireless)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Staff-sergeant ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Armourers:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
WO II (QMS) ... "B"	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ... "B"	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporal	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporal ... "B"	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Blacksmiths (privates) ... "B"	1	1	1	1	..	..	1	..	..	5
Sergeant ... "C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ... "C"	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Lance-corporals ... "C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... "C"	1	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	4
Cooks (RCASC):-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Corporal (men's mess) ... "C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates (men's mess) ... "C"	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Privates (officers' mess) ... "C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates (sergeants mess) ... "C"	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Driver mechanics:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lance-corporal ... "C"	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... "C"	2	2	2	2	7	2	2	2	2	23
Electricians:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Staff-sergeants ... "A"	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Corporals ... "A"	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Lance-corporals ... "A"	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Privates ... "A"	..	..	..	2	1	..	2	..	..	5
Fitters:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
WO II (SQMS) ... "A"	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeants ... "A"	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	2
Corporals ... "A"	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporal ... "A"	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... "A"	..	8	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	12
Fitters (AFV):-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Staff-sergeant ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Sergeant ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Corporals ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Lance-corporals ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2
Privates ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	..	..	15
Fitters, (MV):-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Staff-sergeant ... "A"	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sergeant ... "A"	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Corporals ... "A"	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	2
Lance-corporals ... "A"	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2
Privates ... "A"	..	..	..	15	..	..	..	..	..	15
Mechanics, instrument:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Corporal ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Lance-corporal ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Privates ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	4
Mechanics, motor:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sergeants ... "B"	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2
Lance-corporal ... "B"	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... "B"	..	..	..	3	1	..	3	..	..	7
Mechanics, wireless:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Corporal ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Lance-corporal ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1
Privates ... "A"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	3
Painter and decorator:-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Privates ... "B"	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	2

Detail	Headquarters	Armament section	SA & MG section	"B" Vehicle section	Recovery section	Instrument section	"A" Vehicle section	Telegraph section	Stores section	Total
Refitter, textile:-										
Lance-corporal ... .. "B"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... .. "B"	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
Repairer, push cycle:-										
Privates ... .. "C"	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Rivetter - (private) ... .. "B"	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Sheet metal worker (privates) "B"	..	2	..	2	..	..	1	..	..	5
Striker & hammerman blacksmiths - Privates ... .. "C"	..	2	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	4
Storemen (T & D):-										
Sergeant ... .. "C"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Corporals ... .. "C"	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Privates ... .. "C"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	3
Turners:-										
Lance-corporal ... .. "B"	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Privates ... .. "B"	..	2	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	4
Welders G & E:-										
Privates ... .. "B"	..	1	..	2	..	..	2	..	..	5
Total, tradesmen ... ..	18	32	12	50	12	11	57	8	8	208
Total, other ranks ... ..	56	32	12	50	12	11	57	8	8	246

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, light ... ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Car, 5 cwt ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Truck, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS ... ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, medium ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Tractor, breakdown, heavy ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Trailer, 6 wheel, 7 ton, light recovery transporter, recovery, 40 ton tractor trailer ... ..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1

(iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch ... ..	6
Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	122
Machine carbines ... ..	122
LMGs, .303 inch ... ..	2



ANNEX Y

A RECOVERY COMPANY (L OF C), RCEME

This establishment normally consists of:

- Headquarters
- Two heavy recovery sections
- Two light recovery sections
- One railhead evacuation section

(The allotment of sections may be altered to suit requirements in any theatre)

War Establishment Cdn IV/59/2

Notified in G.O. 148/45  
Effective 15 February 45

Published March, 1945

(i) Personnel				
Detail	Headquarters 1	Heavy Recovery Section 2	Light Recovery Section 2	Railhead Evacuation Section
Major (officer commanding) ...	1	..	..	..
Captains ...	..	1	..	1
Lieutenants ...	1	..	1	..
Total, officers ...	2	1	1	1
Warrant officer, class I ...	..	1	..	..
Warrant officers, class II ...	1	..	1	1
Staff-sergeants ...	1	1	1	1
Sergeants ...	..	8	..	..
Total, warrant officers, staff-sergeants and sergeants ...	2	10	2	2
Corporals ...	1	1	3	8
Lance-corporals ...	1	8	5	..
Craftsmen and privates ...	5	27	21	21
Privates (RCASC) ...	1	1	1	1
Total, rank and file ...	8	37	30	30
Total, other ranks ...	10	47	32	32
Total, all ranks ...	12	48	33	33

10  
 2  
 2  
 28  
 2  
 12  
 16  
 1  
 1  
 5  
 26  
 18  
 10  
 59  
 12  
 46  
 33  
 33  
 207

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties				
<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>				
Drivers, IC (a) ...	4	7	6	5
General dutymen ...	1	6	3	5
Total, non-tradesmen ...	5	13	9	10
<b>TRADESMEN</b>				
Armament artificers (vehicle)				
Warrant officer, class I, armament sergeant-major ...	..	1	..	..
Warrant officers, class II, armament quartermaster-sergeants ...	..	..	1	1
Armament staff-sergeants ...	..	1	1	1
Artizans (b)				
Blacksmiths ...	..	2	2	..
Driver mechanics (MV) ...	..	18	..	..
Driver mechanics (Tank) ...	..	..	13	9
Electricians ...	..	1	1	1
Vehicle mechanics (AFV) ...	..	9	..	..
Vehicle mechanics (MV) ...	..	..	3	6
Clerks ...	..	..	13	9

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (Cont'd)

Detail	Headquarters	Heavy Recovery Section	Light Recovery Section	Railhead Evacuation Section
<b>TRADESMEN (Cont'd)</b>				
Warrant officer, class II, staff quartermaster-sergeant ...	1	..	..	..
Corporals ...	1	..	..	1
Craftsman ...	1	..	..	..
Cooks (RCASC) ...	1	1	1	1
<b>Storemen (T &amp; D)</b>				
Staff-sergeant ...	1	..	..	..
Corporal ...	..	..	..	1
Craftsmen ...	..	1	1	1
<b>Total, tradesmen ...</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Total, other ranks ...</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>32</b>

(iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo ...	2	1	1	1
Cars, 5 cwt ...	1	1	1	1
Trucks, 15 cwt, GS ...	..	1	1	1
Lorries, 3 ton, GS ...	1	3	2	2
Lorries, 3 ton, GS, stores ...	..	1	1	..
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wh, crane MK VII ...	..	..	..	1
Tractors, breakdown, medium ...	..	..	5	..
Tractors, breakdown, heavy ...	..	..	3	3
Tractors, "D-8" ...	..	1	..	3
Transporters, recovery, 40 ton ...	..	9	..	3
Trailers, water ...	..	1	1	1
Trailers, 6 wh, 7 ton, light recovery ...	..	..	5	..

(iv) Weapons

Pistols ...	2	1	1	1
Rifles .303 inch ...	5	18	10	16
Machine carbines ...	4	26	19	14
LMGs .303 inch ...	1	3	3	2
PIATs ...	..	3	2	2
Guns 20 mm ...	4	..	..	..

(a) Two Drivers, IC in Headquarters and one in each Section will also perform batman duties.

(b) Ranks and appointments not specified in Part (ii) will be allotted according to the following table:-

<b>Artizans</b>				
Sergeants ...	..	8	..	..
Corporals ...	..	1	3	6

NOTES

1. One pioneer section will normally be provided for work with the railhead evacuation section.

ANNEX Z

L OF C TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORKSHOP, RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IV/60/1

Notified in G.O. 322/45  
Effective 16 May 45

Published June, 1945

(1) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	Each Section	TOTALS	
			Type "A"	Type "B"
			HQ and Two Sections	HQ and Three Sections
Captains or Lieutenants (Telecommunication Specialists) ... ..	2	..	2	2
Total officers ... ..	2	..	2	2
Warrant Officer, Class II ... ..	1	..	1	1
Sergeants ... ..	1	1	3	4
Total warrant officers and sergeants	2	1	4	5
Corporals ... ..	2	..	2	2
Lance-corporals ... ..	1	..	1	1
Craftsmen and Privates ... ..	6	2	10	12
Privates, (RCASC) ... ..	1	..	1	1
Total rank and file ... ..	10	2	14	16
Total other ranks ... ..	12	3	18	21
Total all ranks ... ..	14	3	20	23

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>				
Drivers IC ... ..	(a)4	..	4	4
General dutymen ... ..	(b)1	..	1	1
Total non-tradesmen ... ..	(c)5	..	5	5
<b>TRADESMEN</b>				
Armament Artificer (Radar)				
Warrant Officer Class II,				
Armament Quartermaster-sergeant	1	..	1	1
Clerk (Corporal) ... ..	1	..	1	1
Cook, RCASC ... ..	1	..	1	1
Storeman (T & D) for				
Instruments and Telecommunications				
(Corporal) ... ..	(b)1	..	1	1
Telecommunication Mechanics (d)				
(Field) ... ..	..	1	2	3
(L of C) ... ..	3	2	7	9
Total Tradesmen ... ..	7	3	13	16
Total other ranks ... ..	12	3	18	21

(iii) Transport

Motorcycle, Solo ... ..	1	..	1	1
Car, 5 cwt ... ..	1	..	1	1
Trucks, Heavy Utility Machinery "ZL"		1	2	3
Truck, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	1	..	1	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS ... ..	1	..	1	1
Lorry, 3 ton, GS Stores ... ..	(e)1	..	1	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wh, Machinery "Z"	1	..	1	1
Trailers, 10 cwt, GS ... ..	1	1	3	4

(iv) Weapons				
Detail	Headquarters	Each Section	TOTALS	
			Type "A"	Type "B"
			HQ and Two Sections	HQ and Three Sections
Pistols ... ..	2	..	2	2
Rifles .303 inch ... ..	6	2	10	12
Machine carbines ... ..	6	1	8	9

- (a) One will also perform batman duties.
- (b) To be trained as Drivers IC.
- (c) Includes one Lance-corporal.
- (d) Of the total Telecommunication Mechanics, one in Headquarters and one in each Section will be a sergeant.
- (e) Specially binned to carry spares and assemblies.

**ANNEX AA**

**A SERVICING UNIT, RCEME**

War Establishment Cdn. IV/61/1

Notified in G. O. 449/44  
Effective 27 Apr 44

Published October, 1944

(i) Personnel

Detail	Headquarters	6 sections (each)	Total
Captain (EME third class) ... ..	1	..	1
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	1	6
Corporals ... ..	1	1	7
Privates ... ..	2	5	32
Total, rank and file ... ..	3	6	39
Total, other ranks ... ..	3	7	45
Total, all ranks ... ..	4	7	46

(ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

<b>NON-TRADESMEN</b>			
Batmen-driver ... ..	1	..	1
Total, non-tradesmen ... ..	1	..	1
<b>TRADESMEN</b>			
Clerk ... ..	1	..	1
Driver-mechanics ... ..	..	2	12
Fitters (MV)			
Staff-sergeants ... ..	..	1	6
Corporals ... ..	..	1	6
Privates ... ..	..	2	12
Storemen (T & D)			
Corporals ... ..	1	..	1
Privates ... ..	..	1	6
Total, tradesmen ... ..	2	7	44
Total, other ranks ... ..	3	7	45

(iii) Transport

Cars, 5 cwt ... ..	1	1	7
Trucks, 15 cwt, GS ... ..	..	1	6
Trailer, 10 cwt, 2 wheel, GS ... ..	1	1	7

(iv) Weapons

Pistol, .38 inch ... ..	1	..	1
Rifles, .303 inch ... ..	2	1	8
Machine carbines ... ..	1	6	37

ANNEX BB

## ENGINEER EQUIPMENT WORKSHOP, TYPE A, RCEME

(for 3rd line repair of engineer equipment handled by a workshop and park company, RCE)

War Establishment Cdn IV/135E/1

Notified in G.O. 90/44  
Effective 27th November, 1943

Published March, 1944

## (i) Personnel

Electrical and mechanical engineer 3rd or 4th class (captain or lieutenant)	...	...	...	...	...	1
Total, officers	...	...	...	...	...	1
Artificer, armament, warrant officer class II (armament quartermaster-sergeant)	...	...	...	...	...	1
Artizans	...	...	...	...	...	2
Total, warrant officers and sergeants	...	...	...	...	...	3
Corporals						
Artizan	...	...	...	...	...	1
Clerk	...	...	...	...	...	1
Lance-corporals						
Artizans	...	...	...	...	...	3
Storemen	...	...	...	...	...	1
Privates	...	...	...	...	...	27
Privates, RCASC	...	...	...	...	...	2
Total, rank and file	...	...	...	...	...	35
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	...	...	38
Total, all ranks	...	...	...	...	...	39

## (ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN						
General duties (a)	...	...	...	...	...	3
Total, non-tradesmen	...	...	...	...	...	3
TRADESMEN						
Artificer armament, (M. V.)	...	...	...	Trade Group "A"	...	1
Artizans	...	...	...	"B"	...	1
Blacksmith	...	...	...	"C"	...	6
Driver mechanics	...	...	...	"A"	...	2
Electricians	...	...	...	"A"	...	6
Fitters	...	...	...	"A"	...	7
Fitters (M. V.)	...	...	...	"B"	...	3
Sheetmetal worker	...	...	...	"B"	...	2
Turners	...	...	...	"B"	...	3
Welders (gas and electric)	...	...	...	"C"	...	1
Clerk (a)	...	...	...	"C"	...	2
Cooks (RCASC)	...	...	...	"C"	...	1
Storemen (T & D) armament and general stores	...	...	...	"C"	...	35
Total, tradesmen	...	...	...	...	...	38
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	...	...	

## (iii) Transport

Motorcycles, solo, light	...	...	...	...	...	1
Truck, 15 cwt machinery KL	...	...	...	...	...	1
Lorry 3 ton G. S.	...	...	...	...	...	1
Lorry 3 ton, 6 wheel machinery "A"	...	...	...	...	...	1
Lorry 4 ton, 6 wheel machinery "M"	...	...	...	...	...	1

## (iv) Table of weapons

Pistols .38 inch	...	...	...	...	1
Rifles .303 inch	...	...	...	...	27
Machine carbines	...	...	...	...	11
L. M. Gs. .303 inch	...	...	...	...	2
PIAT	...	...	...	...	1

(a) Will be trained as drivers I. C.

NOTE:

This unit (or detachments therefrom) will be attached for administration and assistance as regards repair capacity to the most convenient RCEME workshop (or workshops), depending on the location of the workshop and park company, RCE, (or sections thereof) to be served.

## ANNEX CC

## ENGINEER EQUIPMENT WORKSHOP, TYPE B, RCEME

(for 3rd line repair to engineer equipment handled  
by a mechanical equipment park company RCE)

War Establishment Cdn IV/135F/1

Notified in G.O. 90/44  
Effective 27th November, 1943

Published March, 1944

## (i) Personnel

Captain				
Electrical and mechanical engineer, 3rd class	...	...	...	1
Lieutenant				
Electrical and mechanical engineer, 4th class	...	...	...	1
Total, officers	...	...	...	2
Artificer armament, W.O. 1				
Armament sergeant-major	...	...	...	1
Artizans, W.O. class II				
Quartermaster-sergeants	...	...	...	3
Artizans, (staff-sergeants)				
Artizan	...	...	...	2
Non-tradesman	...	...	...	1
W.Os s/sgts and sgts	...	...	...	1
Corporals -				
Artizans	...	...	...	3
Clerks	...	...	...	1
Cook (RCASC)	...	...	...	1
Non-tradesman	...	...	...	1
Storeman	...	...	...	1
Lance-corporals				
Artizans	...	...	...	7
Non-tradesman	...	...	...	1
Privates				
Privates (RCASC)	...	...	...	72
Total, rank and file	...	...	...	2
Total, other ranks	...	...	...	89
Total, all ranks	...	...	...	97
Total, all ranks				
99				

## (ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties

NON-TRADESMEN				
Batman-driver	...	...	...	1
General duties	...	...	...	8
Motorcyclist	...	...	...	1
Regimental duties - sergeant	...	...	...	1
Total, non-tradesmen	...	...	...	11
TRADESMEN				
Artificer armament, (M.V.)	...	...	Trade group "A"	1
Artizans				
Blacksmiths	...	...	"B"	6
Carpenter	...	...	"B"	1
Draughtsman, (mechanical)	...	...	"A"	1
Driver mechanics	...	...	"C"	18
Electricians	...	...	"A"	4
Fitters	...	...	"A"	19
Fitters (M.V.)	...	...	"A"	18
Sheet metal workers	...	...	"B"	3
Turners	...	...	"B"	3
Welders (G. & E.)	...	...	"B"	4



## (ii) Distribution of other ranks by trades and duties (cont'd)

TRADESMEN (cont'd)		Trade group	
Clerks ...	...	"C"	3
Cooks, (RCASC) ...	...	"C"	3
Storemen (T. & D.) for -			
Armament and general stores ...	...	"C"	1
Vehicles ...	...	"C"	1
Total, tradesmen ...	...	...	86
Total, other ranks ...	...	...	97

## (iii) Transport

Motorcycle, solo light ...	...	...	1
Trucks, 15 cwt G.S. ...	...	...	1
Truck machinery KL ...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton G.S. ...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel, machinery "A" ...	...	...	1
Lorry, 3 ton, 6 wheel, machinery "B" ...	...	...	1
Lorry, 4 ton, 6 wheel, machinery "M" ...	...	...	1
Trailer, 20 cwt, 2 wheel gas welding ...	...	...	1

## (iv) Table of weapons

Pistols, .38 inch ...	...	...	2
Rifles, .303 inch ...	...	...	76
Machine carbines ...	...	...	21
L. M. Gs, .303 inch ...	...	...	3
P. I. A. Ts ...	...	...	2

ANNEX DD

MECHANICAL TRANSPORT INSPECTORATE RCEME

War Establishment Cdn IV/1940/85H/1

Notified in G.O. 255/41  
Effective 1st October, 1941

Published November, 1941

(i) Personnel						
Detail		Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sgts & Sgts	Rank and File	Total
Major, EME ... ..		1	..	..	..	1
AEME (MT) captains ... ..		6	..	..	..	(b) 6
AEME (MT) lieutenants ... ..		5	..	..	..	(b) 5
Warrant officer class II						
Clerk trade group	B/C	..	1	..	..	(a) 1
Staff sergeants						
Armament artificer M. V. trade group "A"		..	..	1	..	1
Fitters M. V. ... trade group "B"		..	..	3	..	3
Sergeants						
Fitters M. V. ... trade group "B"		..	..	8	..	8
Clerk ... trade group B/C		..	..	1	..	(a) 1
Corporals ... ..		..	..	..	2	2
Privates						
Batmen drivers ... ..		..	..	..	12	12
Clerks ... trade group B/C		..	..	..	11	(a) 11
Total ... ..		12	(c) 1	(c) 13	(c) 25	51

(ii) Transport

Cars light ... ..	..	..	6
Station wagons ... ..	..	..	6

(iii) Weapons and ammunition

Detail	Number	Ammunition - rounds		
		On man or with gun	Reserve	Total
Pistols .38 inch	12	6	144	216
Rifles .303 inch	39	50	1950	3900

- (a) Of total clerks seven may be group "B", remainder group "C"
- (b) Of 11 officers 4 may be M. T. inspectors RCASC.
- (c) Of 39 other ranks 13 may be RCASC.

ANNEX EE

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT  
IN THE GERMAN ARMY

(1 March 1945)

The fundamental German principle of repair and maintenance was that equipment should be repaired as far forward as possible.

Practically all the installations that dealt with repair and maintenance of equipment also participated in the flow of supplies, both in the return of repaired equipments and in transport of newly manufactured equipment to the units.

Motor Transport

Maintenance of an individual vehicle was the responsibility of the driver and crew, but for repairs it was sent to one of a number of repair centres. The main considerations that governed the German repair procedures were the number of working hours and the facilities required to make the repair. Thus maintenance (Instandsetzungs) detachments and sections carried out repairs requiring less than four working hours with the tools at their disposal, while mobile field workshops (Werkstatt) units carried out repairs requiring less than 12 working hours. If the damage inflicted was too extensive for the facilities of the mobile workshops, the vehicle was sent to an Army Motor Transport Park (AKP) or to a Field Army Motor Transport Park (HeKP). The more difficult repair jobs were sent to the HeKP, while the AKP handled repairs that could be completed in less than 24 working hours. The disposition of the vehicle from these centres was as follows: repaired or scrapped; forwarded to a Home Motor Transport Park (HKP) which was capable of carrying out all types of repairs, or in the case of an AKP, the vehicle might have been forwarded to a HeKP.

Armoured Fighting Vehicles and  
Self Propelled Guns

War Office Weekly Commentary No 67 suggested that the secret of the fighting efficiency of the Panzer Divisions was the thorough organization of the system for the replacement and repair of the damaged AFVs in the shortest possible time. (104)


Minor repairs to armoured vehicles were made by unit mechanics who carried in their motorcycle side cars a quantity of spare parts most frequently required in order that minor running repairs could be carried out without loss of time. The unit mechanic's supply of parts was backed up by a medium sized tracked vehicle carrying a further stock of parts located at each of the squadron and battalion headquarters.

Mobile tank workshops consisted of two identical platoons, one of which was attached to each battalion of the regiment. In practice, they leap frogged behind the regiment so as to ensure continuity of repair work. The mobile workshop also had a recovery platoon which recovered stranded tanks to the workshop or other site. The mobile workshop also had signal and armament sections. (105)

If the repairs could not be completed in the division area within three days, the vehicles were sent to a semi-permanent army tank workshop, a Field Army Tank Park or to Base. When AFVs were so badly damaged that they could not be repaired in the field, they were cannibalized or sent to tank equipment depots or factories in the home area. In the latter case the AFVs were no longer under Field Army control and were not returned to the units to which they were originally issued.

AFVs were repaired on the spot if at all possible. Otherwise they were moved to the rear under their own power. Tank transporters were used only when long moves were contemplated or when vehicles could not move under their own power. (106)

ORGANIZATION  
GERMAN REPAIR SYSTEM  
IN THE FIELD FOR  
MOTOR TRANSPORT  
1 MAR 45  
(107)



ANNEX FF

LIST OF NPAM OFFICERS BY UNITS  
AND A LIST OF NPAM PAPER UNITS FROM  
THE DEFENCE FORCE LIST, PART I,  
CORRECTED TO 1 NOVEMBER 1939

ARMY FIELD WORKSHOPSNO 1, LONDON, Ont

Maj	CF	Curtis
Capt	EH	Smith
Lt	CH	Hillier
Lt	RA	Campbell
Lt	EM	Shields

NO 2, TORONTO, Ont

Maj	HG	Thompson	DFC
Lt	GW	Beecroft	
Lt	AS	Barber	
Lt	JK	Bradford	
Lt	WL	Thompson	
Lt	NH	Spearing	
Lt	TC	Smith	

NO 3, MONTREAL, Que

Maj	CM	Benett
Capt	FG	Ferrabee
Lt	WFS	Carter
Lt	AL	Wright
Lt	JM	Fairbairn
Lt	CJ	Rankin
Lt	LM	Boyd

NO 6, DRUMHELLER, Alta

Lt-Col	PR	Shields, MC, ED
Maj	MD	McDonald
Maj	AC	Macaulay, MC
Lt	SG	McMullen
Lt	WE	Frame, MC
Lt	GH	Parker
Lt	AL	Schrag
Lt	SH	Morrison
Lt	L	Patrick

NO 4, HALIFAX, NS

Maj	SJ	Montgomery, VD
Lt	ML	Baker
Lt	AG	Greene
Lt	HA	Ripley
Lt	AL	Wood
Lt	WA	Williams
Lt	JS	Hillis

ORDNANCE WORKSHOP COMPANYNO 1, KINGSTON, Ont

Capt	HJ	Styles
Lt	P	Roy
Lt	JR	Henderson
Lt	KL	Murray
Lt	ML	Dolan
Lt	HG	Conn
Lt	A	Monk
Lt	L	Atack
Lt	WD	Gilbert

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GROUP WORKSHOPNO 1, MONTREAL, Que

Maj	RR	Jackson
Lt	GM	Young
Lt	AP	Loomis
Lt	JR	Johnson
Lt	GRS	Henry
Lt	GM	Hunter
Lt	CF	Payan
Lt	JA	Roncarelli
Lt	OB	Barber

RCOC FORTRESS WORKSHOPSNO 1, ESQUIMALT, BC

Lt-Col	HE	Goodman	VD
Maj	AS	Parkes	
Lt	HA	Sturrock	
Lt	JA	Mackay	
Lt	GW	Branston	
Lt	JA	Bennell	
Lt	AD	Clelland	
Lt	TGS	Robinson	

PAPER UNITS

NO 2	RCOC FORTRESS WORKSHOP, QUEBEC, QUE
NO 3	RCOC FORTRESS WORKSHOP, SAINT JOHN, NB
NO 5	RCOC FORTRESS WORKSHOP, HALIFAX, NS
1	CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ORDNANCE WORKSHOP, WINNIPEG, MAN

ANNEX GG

LIST OF ORDNANCE MECHANICAL ENGINEERS  
WITH DATE OF APPOINTMENT  
FROM  
THE QUARTERLY MILITIA LIST  
(INCOMPLETE)

Robinson, EH (Hon Capt)	1 Apr 09		
Rodd, WJP (Hon Capt) (Attached)	20 Aug 09	Jolley, MP (Lt)	9 Apr 34
Buttenshaw, AS (Hon Lt)	1 Aug 10	Mayhew, EC (Lt)	14 Jun 34
Sherman, NC (Hon Lt)	1 Aug 10	McKibbin, KH (Lt)	9 Jun 36
Mills, JJ (Hon Capt) (Attached)	16 Feb 12	Elmsley, CMR (Lt)	1 Sep 37
Gibson, JN (Hon Lt)	9 Feb 15	King, PC (Lt)	15 Dec 37
Morton, NT (Hon Lt)	8 Sep 16	Mason, HLK (Lt)	15 Jun 38
Ball, GEJ (Hon Lt)	8 Sep 16	Ward, KR (Lt)	14 Jun 39
Franklin, RL (Lt)	10 Jun 33	Fleming, FA (Lt)	29 Aug 39
Houghton, WC (Lt)	14 Jun 33	Jones, CW (Lt)	31 Aug 39

ANNEX HH

ORDNANCE STORES CORPS  
ESTABLISHMENT UPON FORMATION  
GO 168/03

Commanding Officer	1
Second-in-command	1
Lieutenant-colonels	3
Majors	5
Captains	6
Lieutenants	4
Total	20
Conductor of Stores	5
Sub-conductor of Stores	8
Sergeant Major of Armourer	1
Total	14
Armourers	10
Artificers	3
Staff-sergeants	5
Sergeants	20
Rank and file	34
Total	72
Grand total	106

ANNEX II

CANADIAN ORDNANCE CORPS  
ESTABLISHMENT 30 SEP 14

Principle Ordnance Officer	1
Lieutenant-colonels	3
Majors	7
Captains	7
Lieutenants	3
Deputy Commissaries of Ordnance	1
Asst Deputy Commissaries of Ordnance	6
Inspectors of Ordnance Machinery	3
Inspecting Ordnance Officer	2
Total	33

ANNEX JJTHE AIM, ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF THE CORPS OF RCEME  
(CAMT 11-2, 1960)AIM

- a. The aim of the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers is:
- (1) To train for war.
  - (2) To assist other arms and services to train for war by maintaining their equipment in serviceable condition.

ROLE IN WAR

- a. The role of RCEME in war is to ensure the operational fitness of the technical equipment of the army. This role is achieved by:
- (1) Effective command and control of RCEME units.
  - (2) Organizing and co-ordinating efficient recovery, inspection and repair facilities at all levels.
  - (3) Adequate technical advice to the staff and units.
  - (4) Maintaining the technical efficiency of equipment.

RESPONSIBILITIES

- a. RCEME is responsible in the field for:
- (1) Policy, standards and techniques of servicing and repair for electrical and mechanical equipment.
  - (2) Providing personnel for the repair of electrical and mechanical equipment with the following exceptions:
    - (a) Unit repairs to RCE special engineer equipment and plant which are carried out by RCE.
    - (b) Unit repairs to communications equipment held by all user units except RCOC and RCEME. This is done by RC SIGS.
    - (c) Unit and field repairs and recovery of vehicles in RCASC and CFMS units. This is done by RCASC.
  - (3) Recovery of military equipment except in a (2) (c) above.
  - (4) Inspection of military equipment to determine servicing standards and condition classifications.
  - (5) Condemnation of technical equipment of RCOC supply.
  - (6) Modification and conversion of technical equipment.
  - (7) Assembly of new technical equipment.
  - (8) Limited manufacture of items of equipment in short supply.
  - (9) Preparation of equipment for special conditions of usage.
  - (10) Dissemination of technical information.
-

# RCEME in Italy and the Canadian Army Occupation Force

## ORGANIZATION

(SUPPLEMENT ONE)

### THE CANADIAN ARMY IN ITALY THE CANADIAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION FORCE

THE CANADIAN ARMY IN ITALY  
30 NOV 1944

Lt-Gen AGL McNaughton, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, First Canadian Army was called to the War Office on the afternoon of 23 April 1943 for a meeting with General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

General Brooke invited General McNaughton to provide Canadian troops to participate in "certain operations based on Tunisia."

The Canadian Government agreed within 48 hours of receiving the request forwarded by CMHQ. General McNaughton initially selected the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade and certain ancillary units.

These initial forces were later supplemented and the charts on pages 531-535 portray the RCEME services for the Canadian Forces on 30 November 1944.

THE CANADIAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION FORCE  
MAY 1945-JUNE 1946

On 11 December 1944, the Canadian Government approved the participation of Canadian troops in the British Army of Occupation in Germany.

The code name ECLIPSE was given to the planning and preparation for the occupation of Germany.

All offensive action ceased on the 4 May and the cease fire went into effect at 0800 hrs, Saturday 5 May 1945 on the 21 Army Group front.

Units of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division were located in the most important cities and towns, while mobile units were strategically placed to control wide areas.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in the meantime was reorganizing for its role as Canada's official contribution to the Allied occupation forces in Germany.


The charts on pages 536-537 portray the RCEME, REME services for the Canadian Forces on 11 July 1945, the first day they assumed their new duties.

The Canadian units of the reorganized Division bore the distinguishing prefix "2" before their respective numbers to distinguish them from their wartime counterparts.

See Annex A for Order of Battle.

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
1ST CDN CORPS TROOPS  
(ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY)  
30 NOV 44




- NOTES: (a) For Org of HQ DDME, see page 429  
 (b) For Org of a Cdn Corps HQ, see page 428  
 (c) For Org of a HQ CREME, see page 432  
 (d) Cdn WE 111/22/1\*, "A Cdn Corps HQ Signals" Jan 43 shows a capt provided "to supervise LADs attached to corps headquarters signals, corps field park company and auxiliary units".  
 (e) Army and Corps Tps Wkspns were based on either an Inf or Armd Tps Wksp depending on location.  
 (f) LAD WEs Type "A" & "B" Cdn 111/100/4  
 "D" 11/340A/4

Page 532

- REF: 1. CARO 5391 (Sec) p 17, 30 Nov 44  
 2. D Hist file 040.045 (Org Charts)  
 3. REME, Vol 1, Org and Ops, chart facing p 13, The War Office 1951  
 4. D Hist file: 112-3S2009 (D212) RCEME Org & Comp (Chart at top folio)

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
FIRST CANADIAN ARMY TROOPS  
UNDER CONTROL (a) (b)  
1ST CDN CORPS HQ  
(ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY)  
30 NOV 44



- NOTES: (a) See 3rd Ech Wkspns, p 409  
 (b) "The decision to detach the 1st Canadian Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade to take part in assault on Sicily was made in April 1943... Early in October, however, a further and far reaching decision was taken, when it was arranged that not only should these troops remain in Italy, but the Headquarters of the 1st Canadian Corps and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division should move thither... Army Headquarters, one Corps Headquarters, three Divisions and an Armoured Brigade remained in the United Kingdom; the other Corps Headquarters, two Divisions and the remaining Armoured Brigade were to operate in Italy." Stacey, Col CP in The Canadian Army 1939-45, pp 92-93, King's Printer, Ottawa 1948.  
 (c) For Org HQ CREME, see page 432  
 (d) Ref 3 shows a different structure  
 (e) LAD WE 111/100/4


Page 533

- REF: 1. CARO 5391 (Sec) p 24, 30 Nov 44  
 2. D Hist File 040.045 (Org Charts)  
 3. REME, Vol 1, Org and Ops, chart facing p 13; The War Office, 1951  
 4. D Hist File: 112-3S2009 (D212) RCEME Org & Comp (Chart at top folio)



Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
1 CDN INF DIV  
(ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY)  
30 NOV 44



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Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
5 CDN ARMD DIV  
(ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY)  
30 NOV 44



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Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
1ST CDN ARMD BDE (INDEPENDENT)  
(ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY)  
30 NOV 44



Page 536

Issue 1


ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
THE CANADIAN ARMY OCCUPATION FORCE  
3 CDN INF DIV (a)  
11 JULY 45



Page 537

Issue 1

ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME AND REME SERVICES  
CORPS, ARMY GHQ AND L OF C DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS  
AND  
BRITISH FORMATIONS AND UNITS UNDER COMMAND  
THE CANADIAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION FORCE  
11 JULY 1945



REF: 1. Report No 174; The Cdn Army Occupation Forces in Germany, May 1945 to June 1946. Historical Section, CMHQ.  
2. REME Vol I, Org and Ops, charts facing pp 13 and 200, and table on p 195. The War Office, 1951.

NOTES: (a) For org of a Cdn Div HQ, see p 432.  
(b) For org of HQ CREME, see p 432.  
(c) The prefix "2" distinguishes COF units from units of war time 3 Cdn Inf Div.  
(d) WE number unavailable at time of writing.  
(e) Org chart facing p 200 of Ref (2) shows only armament, vehicles and stores sections, whereas the table on p 195 shows more sections, hence shown here. Date of chart and table are both 25 Apr 48.

(f) WE shows one light and one heavy increment and one light and one heavy detachment for each regt in the bde. There were four regiments. See p 540.  
(g) LAD WEs (BRIT) XV/768/1\*  
(h) Under command 30 British Corps for administration.  
(i) Unable to determine at time of writing if this unit was a Type "A" or "B". Type "A" WE (BRIT) XIV/1681/1\* consisted of one section. Type "B" WE (BRIT) XIV/1683/1\* consisted of three LAA sections and one tels section.

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ANNEX A

## ORDER OF BATTLE - 3 CDN INF DIV COF

(WD, HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div (CAOF), July 1945: Appx 25)

Appx 'A' to  
201/0 of B/1 G  
dated 14 Jul 45PART I (Div Element)HEADQUARTERS UNITS

HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div  
1 Increment (A) - Adm  
2 Increment (D) - PT  
3 Increment ( ) - Occupation

ARMoured CORPS

2/7 Cdn Recce Regt

ARTILLERY

HQ RCA, 3 Cdn Inf Div  
2/12 Cdn Fd Regt  
HQ 2/12 Cdn Fd Regt  
2/16 Cdn Fd Bty  
2/11 Cdn Fd Bty  
2/43 Cdn Fd Bty

2/13 Cdn Fd Regt  
HQ 2/13 Cdn Fd Regt  
2/44 Cdn Fd Bty  
2/22 Cdn Fd Bty  
2/78 Cdn Fd Bty

2/14 Cdn Fd Regt  
HQ 2/14 Cdn Fd Regt  
2/34 Cdn Fd Bty  
2/66 Cdn Fd Bty  
2/87 Cdn Fd Bty

2/3 Cdn A Tk Regt  
HQ 2/3 Cdn A Tk Regt  
2/4 Cdn A Tk Bty  
2/94 Cdn A Tk Bty  
2/52 Cdn A Tk Bty  
2/105 Cdn A Tk Bty

2/4 Cdn LAA Regt  
HQ 2/4 Cdn LAA Regt  
2/69 Cdn LAA Bty  
2/32 Cdn LAA Bty  
2/100 Cdn LAA Bty

ENGINEERS

HQ RCE, 3 Cdn Inf Div  
2/3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy  
2/3 Cdn Div Br P1

2/6 Cdn Fd Coy  
2/16 Cdn Fd Coy  
2/18 Cdn Fd Coy

SIGNALS

Sigs 3 Cdn Inf Div

INFANTRY

3 CH of O (MG)  
Increment (A)  
2/3 Cdn Def and Emp P1  
HQ 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde  
2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Ground Def P1  
4 R Wpg R  
4 Regina Rif  
4 QOR of C  
HQ 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde  
2/8 Inf Bde Ground Def P1  
4 C Scot R  
3 R de Chaud  
3 N Shore R  
HQ 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde  
2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Ground Def P1  
3 HLI of C  
3 SD & G Highrs  
3 Nth NS Highrs

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

HQ RCASC 3 Cdn Inf Div  
2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Coy  
2/8 Cdn Inf Bde Coy  
2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Coy  
2/3 Cdn Inf Div Tps Coy

MEDICAL

2/5 Cdn FDS  
2/7 Cdn FDS  
6 Cdn FDS  
10 Cdn FDS  
2/7 Cdn Fd Hyg Sec

ORDNANCE

2/3 Cdn Inf Div Ord Fd Pk  
1 Cdn Offrs Shop (Mob)

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL  
ENGINEERS

HQ RCEME 3 Cdn Inf Div  
 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp  
 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp  
 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp  
 2/62 Cdn LAD (A) (7 Cdn Recce Regt)  
 2/32 Cdn LAD (B) (Arty Units)  
 2/33 Cdn LAD (B)  
 2/30 Cdn LAD (B) (2/3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy)  
 2/31 Cdn LAD (B) (Sigs)  
 2/36 Cdn LAD (A) (2/7 Cdn Inf Bde)  
 2/37 Cdn LAD (A) (2/8 Cdn Inf Bde)  
 2/38 Cdn LAD (A) (2/9 Cdn Inf Bde)

POSTAL

2/3 Cdn Inf Div Postal Unit

Increment (A)

Increment (A) two

PROVOST

2/4 Cdn Pro Coy

INTELLIGENCE

3 Cdn FS Sec Incl Incr (A) )  
 2 Cdn FS Sec Incl Incr (A) )  
 4 Cdn FS Sec Incl Incr (A) )  
 1 Cdn Area Security Office ) under comd  
 2 Cdn Area Security Office ) for local  
 3 Cdn Area Security Office ) adm only  
 1 Cdn ARIT )  
 20 Cdn FS Sec )  
 Cdn CSI (b) Det )

PART II (Brit Fmns and Units Under Comd)4 Brit AGRA

3 Med Regt RA  
 13 Med Regt RA  
 65 Med Regt RA  
 68 Med Regt RA  
 79 (Scottish Horse) Med Regt RA  
 51 Hy Regt RA  
 356 Indep SL Bty RA  
 400 Indep SL Bty RA  
 4 LAA SL Bty RA  
 4 AGRA Wksp REME

31 Brit AA Bde

64 HAA Regt RA  
 98 HAA Regt RA  
 174 HAA Regt RA  
 102 LAA Regt RA  
 105 AA Bde Wksp REME

301 Brit Inf Bde

616 Regt RA  
 617 Regt RA  
 619 Regt RA  
 301 Brit Inf Bde Sigs Sec  
 301 Brit Inf Bde LAD (A)

305 Brit Inf Bde

639 HAA Regt RA )  
 7 Belg Fus Bn )  
 9 Belg Fus Bn )  
 80 LAA Wksp REME ) under comd  
 305 LAD REME ) 30 Brit Corps  
 220 BIS ) for Adm  
 645 Coy RASC )

557 SL Bty RA (ML)

101 Control Sec

PART III (Corps, Army GHQ and L of C  
Increments to the Div Element)ENGINEERS

1 Cdn CRE Wks  
 1 Cdn Wks Sec  
 2 Cdn Wks Sec  
 3 Cdn Wks Sec  
 1 Cdn Engrs Stores P1

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

2 Cdn MAC  
 3 Cdn Inf Div Sec (Army Catering Pool)  
 5 Base Tpt P1

MEDICAL

7 Cdn Gen Hosp  
 16 Cdn Gen Hosp  
 50 Brit FDS

ORDNANCE

2/203 Cdn Inf Ord Sub Pk  
 3 Cdn MLBU (A)  
 7 Cdn MLBU (B)  
 1 Cdn Sal Unit

1 Cdn Fwd Maint Stores Sec  
 2 Cdn Fwd Maint Stores Sec

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL  
ENGINEERS

2/3 Cdn Inf Tps Wksp

PAY

3 Cdn Fd Cash Office

DENTAL

5 Cdn Dental Coy

MISCELLANEOUS

6 Cdn Aux Services Sec (C)  
 6 Cdn Fd Edu Sec (B)  
 3 Div Det 1 Cdn Fd Historical Sec  
 1 CIC Band  
 2 CIC Band  
 3 CIC Band  
 4 CIC Band  
 3 Cdn Inf Div Reception Camp

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL  
ENGINEERS

HQ RCEME 3 Cdn Inf Div  
 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp  
 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp  
 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp  
 2/62 Cdn LAD (A) (7 Cdn Recce Regt)  
 2/32 Cdn LAD (B) ) (Arty Units)  
 2/33 Cdn LAD (B) )  
 2/30 Cdn LAD (B) (2/3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy)  
 2/31 Cdn LAD (B) (Sigs)  
 2/36 Cdn LAD (A) (2/7 Cdn Inf Bde)  
 2/37 Cdn LAD (A) (2/8 Cdn Inf Bde)  
 2/38 Cdn LAD (A) (2/9 Cdn Inf Bde)

POSTAL

2/3 Cdn Inf Div Postal Unit

Increment (A)

Increment (A) two

PROVOST

2/4 Cdn Pro Coy

INTELLIGENCE

3 Cdn FS Sec Incl Incr (A) )  
 2 Cdn FS Sec Incl Incr (A) )  
 4 Cdn FS Sec Incl Incr (A) )  
 1 Cdn Area Security Office ) under comd  
 2 Cdn Area Security Office ) for local  
 3 Cdn Area Security Office ) adm only  
 1 Cdn ARIT )  
 20 Cdn FS Sec )  
 Cdn CSI (b) Det )

PART II (Brit Fmns and Units Under Comd)4 Brit AGRA

3 Med Regt RA  
 13 Med Regt RA  
 65 Med Regt RA  
 68 Med Regt RA  
 79 (Scottish Horse) Med Regt RA  
 51 Hy Regt RA  
 356 Indep SL Bty RA  
 400 Indep SL Bty RA  
 4 LAA SL Bty RA  
 4 AGRA Wksp REME

31 Brit AA Bde

64 HAA Regt RA  
 98 HAA Regt RA  
 174 HAA Regt RA  
 102 LAA Regt RA  
 105 AA Bde Wksp REME

301 Brit Inf Bde

616 Regt RA  
 617 Regt RA  
 619 Regt RA  
 301 Brit Inf Bde Sigs Sec  
 301 Brit Inf Bde LAD (A)

305 Brit Inf Bde

639 HAA Regt RA )  
 7 Belg Fus Bn )  
 9 Belg Fus Bn )  
 80 LAA Wksp REME ) under comd  
 305 LAD REME ) 30 Brit Corps  
 220 BIS ) for Adm  
 645 Coy RASC )

557 SL Bty RA (ML)

101 Control Sec

PART III (Corps, Army GHQ and L of C  
Increments to the Div Element)ENGINEERS

1 Cdn CRE Wks  
 1 Cdn Wks Sec  
 2 Cdn Wks Sec  
 3 Cdn Wks Sec  
 1 Cdn Engrs Stores P1

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

2 Cdn MAC  
 3 Cdn Inf Div Sec (Army Catering Pool)  
 5 Base Tpt P1

MEDICAL

7 Cdn Gen Hosp  
 16 Cdn Gen Hosp  
 50 Brit FDS

ORDNANCE

2/203 Cdn Inf Ord Sub Pk  
 3 Cdn MLBU (A)  
 7 Cdn MLBU (B)  
 1 Cdn Sal Unit

1 Cdn Fwd Maint Stores Sec  
 2 Cdn Fwd Maint Stores Sec

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL  
ENGINEERS

2/3 Cdn Inf Tps Wksp

PAY

3 Cdn Fd Cash Office

DENTAL

5 Cdn Dental Coy

MISCELLANEOUS

6 Cdn Aux Services Sec (C)  
 6 Cdn Fd Edu Sec (B)  
 3 Div Det 1 Cdn Fd Historical Sec  
 1 CIC Band  
 2 CIC Band  
 3 CIC Band  
 4 CIC Band  
 3 Cdn Inf Div Reception Camp

## Part 5

# The North-west Europe Campaign

*This digital edition edited by LCol (ret'd) Lucas Hellemans Editor's Note*

### **Editors Note to Part 5**

Part 5 is the story of RCEME in the Normandy campaign in 1944-45. Readers should keep in mind that this was written more than 45 years ago, long before the release of classified documents in the 1970s and 1980s that have kept historians focussed in recent years. On the other hand, it provides a rare view of the maintenance, repair, and recovery problems encountered in supporting the campaign. The editor thanks LCol (ret'd) Lucas Hellemans for an outstanding job in cleaning up and editing a very messy output from the optical character reader. The account has been slightly edited for clarity, punctuation, and to remove abbreviations. The glossary has been added to assist a modern audience. It did not exist in the original. Editorial comments are in square brackets [].

### **Foreword to Part 5 by Col RH Hodgson**

My readers are asked to keep in mind when they read the story of our Corps (done in the chronological groupings appearing in the narrative, starting on 6 June) that our normal role of recovery and repair was greatly restricted during the assault phase. Gradually, as the second line workshops arrived on the beachhead, our facilities improved and our repair capacity increased.

At the beginning of the assault phase, the emphasis of The Corps was on beach recovery, in order to expedite the landings of the assault troops, their equipment, and supplies. Equally important was the task of keeping the beach exits clear, to enable the men and equipment to reach their destinations with all possible speed.

All the non-runners and derelicts blocking the progress of the assault were removed to the drowned vehicle parks (DVPs), where The Corps did what they could with the resources at hand to make them runners again.

In the following pages, I have adopted the point of view that our fundamental role was performed by supporting the arms and services, and by doing our job diligently, consistently, and conscientiously. We can take pride in our contribution to their successes, and claim no more than that.

Our shortcomings and failures point to the areas of our operation or philosophy that require analysis and correction to prevent their reoccurrence. The divergence of opinion between the British and ourselves regarding the movement and control of the third line workshops reflects conflicting philosophies. Our failure to properly balance the quality and quantity of our workshop production gives us cause for serious reflection on our inability to work to uniform standards throughout our repair system.

Because we are what we are, those of us with a flair for improvisation and expediency provided seeming miracles in the field. In so doing, they laid the foundations for our Corps accepting every challenge given to us by the general staff.

Thus, in these pages are examples of our problems, our failures, and our successes. They reflect the story of our Corps, and bring to light facets outside our normal role as it is generally understood by the services, rarely by the arms, and seldom, if ever, by the public.

## Command, Organization, and Plans


The statement “Russia bleeds while Britain Blancos” crudely painted on a rough wall in London’s West End brought tears to the eyes of Saul Tolmasky, 75 LAD’s Russian-born corporal. “When are we going to start the Second Front?” he asked upon his return from a weekend leave late in 1943. Many people were asking the same question. Little did they appreciate the vast preparations required for success of such a venture. A very secret and relatively small group of experienced officers had also asked themselves this question, and were making determined efforts to answer it.

Lieutenant-General FE Morgan was appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) in April 1943, and was directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare detailed plans for the invasion of France under the code name Operation *Overlord*, tentatively set for 1 May 1944.<sup>1</sup> General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander. General Montgomery was selected to be Commander-in-Chief of the 21<sup>st</sup> Group of Armies, and at the same time would be General Eisenhower’s military commander-in-chief.<sup>2</sup> The Generals took up their appointments and examined General Morgan’s plan in detail in January 1944.

The code name *Overlord*, as already mentioned, was the name given to the invasion of Europe, and in reality covered much more, because it included the overall strategic plan for the invasion of France and for operations up to D+90.<sup>3</sup>

The Allied Command for *Overlord* is diagrammed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Chart Showing the Allied Command of Operation *Overlord*, 1944



REF: (1) WILMOT, CHESTER, *The Struggle for Europe*, p 732; Collins, 1952.

(2) STACEY, Col CP, *The Canadian Army 1939-1945*; p 316; King's Printer, 1948.

(3) *Administrative History of 21 Army Group* 6 June 1944. 8 May 1945, p 2; Germany Nov 1945.

NOTE: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with the 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade under command fought as part of 1st British Corps in the Second British Army in the assault on Normandy.

Figure 1

<sup>1</sup> Stacey, Col CP; *The Canadian Army 1939-45*; p 169; King's Printer, Ottawa, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Norman, Albert; *Operation Overlord*; p 216; The Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Penn, 1952.



## Composition of the British Force

When General Eisenhower gave the order to start Operation *Overlord*, the First Canadian Army and the Second British Army, both of which remained throughout the campaign under the command of 21 Army Group consisted of:

- Six armoured divisions, including one Polish armoured division
- Ten infantry divisions
- Two airborne divisions
- Nine independent brigades
- Two commando brigades
- General Headquarters (GHQ), Army, and Corps troops
- Certain Allied contingents.<sup>4</sup>

## Composition of the First Canadian Army

The Canadian Forces for the initial phase of *Overlord* were made up of the Canadian and British units shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – ORBAT of First Canadian Army for the Initial Phase of Operation *Overlord*<sup>5</sup>




Figure 2

<sup>4</sup> Administrative History of 21 Army Group, 6 Jun 1944 to 8 May 1945; p 2; published by 21 AG, Germany, Nov 1955.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Appendix B.

## Brief Outline of the Operational Plan for the Assault

The initial plan for *Overlord* provided for an assault on the Normandy coast from immediately north of the Carentan estuary to the River Orne, with the object of securing as a base for further operations a lodgement area that included the airfield sites and the port of Cherbourg. The operation was a combined Canadian, American, and British undertaking by all three services of the three nations.

The army's part in the operation was:

- (1) To carry out airborne landings on the night of D-1/D with the object of protecting the flanks of the assault area.
- (2) To assault the Normandy coast between Varreville and Ouistreham on a five-divisional front, from landing ships and landing craft (using the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, the 3<sup>rd</sup> British Infantry Division, the 50<sup>th</sup> British Infantry Division, and two American divisions).

The initial objectives were the towns of Caen, Bayeux, Isigny, Carentan, and the airfields in the vicinity. The Second British Army was to protect the left flank of the US First Army while it captured Cherbourg, Angers, Nantes, and the Brittany ports.<sup>6</sup> See Figure 3 for the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of 1 British Corps.

*Figure 3 - ORBAT of 1 British Corps for the Initial Phase of Operation Overlord<sup>7</sup>*




Figure 3

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. Appendix B.

## Brief Outline of the Maintenance Plan

The assaulting divisions were to be maintained over the beaches until such time as sufficient ports were captured and developed. The Canadian and British sectors contained only the four small ports of Port-en-Bessin, Courseulles-sur-mer, Caen, and Ouistreham. However, even if captured intact, they would not have sufficient capacity to handle the required tonnages. Therefore, it was decided to build an artificial port at Arromanches, known by the code word “*Mulberry B*.”<sup>8</sup> A similar artificial port, “*Mulberry A*”, was built in the American sector near Vierville.<sup>9</sup> In addition, small havens of sheltered water (Gooseberries) for the discharge and protection of ferry craft were to be formed by sinking chains of blockships (“corncocks”) off the coast prior to building the Mulberries. “There were five Gooseberries, two of which grew into Mulberries - no mean horticultural feat”, wrote Rear-Admiral H Hickling in “*The Prefabricated Harbour*.”<sup>10</sup>

## Replacement of Vehicles

For “A” (armoured) vehicles, the general staff required that 25% of the unit entitlement should be available behind the armoured formations at all times. This figure was greater than the so-called “contact rate of wastage” for “A” vehicles, but until the RCEME/REME workshops were established and their output compensated for the difference between the rates, the 25% figure was used.

For “B” (soft-skinned) vehicles, in the beachhead between D-day and D+42, there had to be the calculated rate of wastage for that period, plus one month’s reserve as insurance to cover unexpected losses, and to enable the creation of a repair pool.

All vehicles scheduled to land up to D+42 were to be waterproofed.<sup>11</sup>

Clearly, for such a considerable force, the recovery and repair organization required to keep the maximum number of technical equipments battle worthy required, in itself, a small army of highly skilled officers and men.

## The Canadian Repair and Recovery Organization Overseas

The British collected their electrical and mechanical engineering resources, with certain notable exceptions, into a new corps on 1 October 1942, and called it the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME).<sup>12</sup>

The Canadian Army Overseas watched this reorganization very carefully. Lt-Gen AGL McNaughton, the senior combatant officer, agreed with the principle behind the British reorganization, but disagreed with the formation of a special Canadian corps for this purpose. However, in order to facilitate cooperation between units of the Canadian and British Armies, on 11 January 1943 the Canadian Army adopted British organizations and establishments. This resulted in the REME organization and nomenclature being adopted for the engineering side of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. Up to this time, the RCOC (E) had provided mechanical, and certain types of electrical engineering, to the Canadian Army.

The headquarters of the First Canadian Army had been formed in April 1942. The January 1943 reorganization of the Canadian Army also brought into existence Headquarters 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps and the appointment of Colonel HG Thompson as the first Deputy Director of Mechanical Engineering

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. pp 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. (3), p 150; and Montgomery, FM, The Viscount of Alamein, Despatch submitted by, p 8; British Information Services, New York, Dec 1946.

<sup>10</sup> Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Aug 1945.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. (4), p 6.

<sup>12</sup> Army Council Instruction, Numbers 1605 and 1606; The War Office, 1 Aug 1942.

(DDME) and ranking Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) officer. Later, Colonel MCG Meighen was appointed DDME of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps. (Colonel Meighen's father was the former Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen, sometime Prime Minister of Canada.)

## **Preparation for Overlord**

General HDG Crerar, on 7 June 1944, the day following D-Day, spoke these words to a large group of officers:

“... I think it is most important that all of you should realize what a vital part the gallant and hazardous operation of the raid in force on Dieppe, by 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, has played in the conception, planning and execution of the vast “*Overlord*” operation...

“Until the evidence of Dieppe proved otherwise, it had been the opinion in highest command and staff circles in this country that an assault against a heavily defended coast could be carried out on a basis of securing tactical surprise, and without dependence on overwhelming fire support, in the critical phases of closing the beaches and over-running the beach defences.

“If tactical surprise was to be the basis of the plan, their bombardment prior to imminent “touchdown” was obviously required to be ruled out. Dependence on tactical surprise also implied an approach under cover of darkness and landing at first light. Adequate air superiority, after surprise had been achieved and throughout the operation, was of course, considered essential, and required to be assured.

“Very briefly, such were the conceptions held by those on the highest levels concerned with planning the operation against Dieppe, and however hazardous the operation, it was natural, and proper, that after nearly three years of war, without any fighting by Canadian troops, the responsibility for carrying out this essential preliminary to future large scale invasion should come to a Canadian Division...

“I am not going to take up your time by analyzing the results and lessons of Dieppe... I will, however, make it clear that from the study of those experiences emerged the technique and tactics first demonstrated by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division in *Pirate* exercise last October, and that this technique and these tactics, were those adopted for the vast combined operation which took place yesterday...

“One more point in the nature of a personal opinion. Although at the time the heavy cost to Canada, and the non-success of the Dieppe operation seemed hard to bear, I believe that, when the war is examined in proper perspective, it will be seen that the sobering influence of that operation on existing Allied strategical conceptions, with the enforced realization by the Allied Governments of the lengthy and tremendous preparations necessary before invasion could be attempted, was a Canadian contribution of the greatest significance to final victory.”<sup>13</sup>

In Exercise *Spartan* in March 1943, the Canadian Army had the role of breaking out from an established bridgehead. General McNaughton had reported to Ottawa on 2 January 1943 that the Canadian Army was expected to play this part in the forthcoming invasion. Later, there was some discussion whether the Canadian Army would participate in the invasion, as such, with its own assault divisions. General Montgomery returned from Italy in January 1944 and finally confirmed that “...the Canadian Army

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. (1), p 85.

would be used as a follow-up army as originally planned”. The Second British Army would have the responsibility for the initial phase; the First Canadian Army would break out from the bridgehead.

Canada, however, was not to be left out of the initial assault, because as early as July 1943 it had been decided that at least one Canadian division would take part. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division was chosen for this task.

The early stages of the specialized training was carried out under 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps. However, with the departure of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps to Italy, the responsibility for training was transferred to the 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps on 1 December 1943. The training of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division began with preliminary operations at the division’s station in Southern England, followed by advanced training at combined training centres in Scotland.

After extensive training and participating in many exercises, culminating in Exercise *Pirate* at Studland Bay on the Dorset coast in October 1943, sound techniques and tactics were arrived at, which were put into practice on the Normandy beaches eight months later.

Colonel Stacey [the official Canadian Army historian] recorded that, “During the intervening period, many details were worked out, but it is fair to say that, in these early exercises, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division established the technique of the *Overlord* assault, and that they founded it upon the experience so dearly bought by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division at Dieppe.”<sup>14</sup>

## Waterproofing of Vehicles

Waterproofing of “A” and “B” vehicles was a major REME/RCEME commitment without which, it has been justly written, “there would have been no D-Day.” The task was to develop and install a system that would produce 90% successful results with “B” vehicles in four-foot-deep water, or with “A” vehicles in six-foot-deep water, plus 18-inch waves for six minutes duration.<sup>15 16</sup>

The reader must keep in mind that the military characteristics of the “A” and “B” vehicles of the Second World War did not cover wade-ability or floatation. Considerable ingenuity was required to rapidly modify a “Car, 5-cwt” (i.e. a Jeep) to become capable of being driven completely under water by a driver who sat on the top of the seat-back, immersed in water up to his waist, with only the air intake and exhaust extension pipes knifing through the water like twin periscopes on a submarine.

Attachments were designed for ducting the air in, and the exhaust gases out of, the tanks. The hull hatches were closed and sealed. The turret was locked with the gun pointing forward and the turret ring was sealed. Quick release gear, supplemented with explosive cord and electric detonators, were installed to enable the tank to shed its attachments (which were welded on), and clear the turret ring, muzzle covers and hatches, thus making the tank completely combatant within seconds of reaching shallow water.

The sides of the turret baskets had been cut away to enable the driver and co-driver to enter and exit via the turret, instead of their normal route through their now-sealed driver’s and co-driver’s hatches.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp 170-172.

<sup>15</sup> There were several agencies involved in the design of the waterproof kits and their applications such as the Directorate of Tank Design Special Devices Branch, The War Office, The Ministry of Supply, and Combined Operations who carried out tests of their own on any vehicle or equipment they were interested in. All of these activities were placed under the coordination of the DME by the War Office in June 1943. See Note (17), p 186.

<sup>16</sup> Rowcroft, Maj-Gen, Sir EB; *The Second World War 1939-45*, Army, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Vol 1, p 141; The War Office, 1951.

## The Technical Aspects of Waterproofing

An immense amount of work had been devoted to solving the technical problems that arose in waterproofing equipment. In the Second World War, this meant waterproofing components and equipment that were vulnerable to water, and which had never been designed in the first place for the use that they were put to.

Waterproofing equipment today is a permanent solution to the same problem. The depth of wade is simply increased by the installation of a wade-kit from stores. Individual components that are vulnerable to water are sealed during manufacture, which in turn introduces a host of new problems, such as how to test without breaking the permanent seals.

The problems of waterproofing in the Second World War may be grouped into three classes: vehicles needing sealed hulls, vehicles without sealed hulls (mostly “B” vehicles), and miscellaneous equipment.

### Vehicles Needing Sealed Hulls

The main problems that had to be solved were:

- Sealing the hull to prevent the entry of water to the power, fighting, and driving compartments.
- Allowing the air intakes and exhaust to continue functioning when wading.
- Waterproofing exposed assemblies.
- How to become combat ready as soon as the beaches had been reached.<sup>17</sup>

### “B” Vehicles and Certain Classes of “A” Vehicles

In this group of vehicle, the whole chassis was totally immersed during wading, and the task was more difficult because it involved sealing the engines so that they could operate under water. This meant that air intakes and exhaust ducts had to reach above the surface of the water, and that the electrical and fuel systems had to be fully insulated and waterproofed. Mud and sand had to be kept out of the mechanisms, and special driving techniques worked out. For instance, the clutch had to be left engaged and the engine kept at a high rpm while the vehicle was immersed, otherwise - disaster. Drivers had to be taught not to involuntarily take their feet off the gas pedal due to shock as cold water rose around their thighs.

Each type of vehicle presented its own problem of tractive efficiency, cooling and contracting, wave pressure, bow wave pattern, and a host of other difficulties.

Driving a fully loaded vehicle down a steep ramp into four feet of cold salt water, creating an 18-inch wave and flying spray, set up strains in the vehicle that were completely outside the designer's conception, and bore no relation to highway or cross-country operation. The chilling of the engine from 150°F to 60°F at the precise moment the engine was called upon to produce maximum torque, the sealing of the crankcase breather, and the excellent conditions for a short circuit of the high and low tension electrical circuits provided by the salt water washing into every crevice, presented enough problems without the added losses of a poorly maintained vehicle. Thus, every vehicle had to be put into first class condition before waterproofing was started.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Bloor, Brig FR; The Second World War 1939-45, Army, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Vol II, p 189; The War Office, 1951.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. pp 189-190.

### Miscellaneous Equipment

This class included any items that lacked power units that operated while immersed, such as mobile radar stations, machinery lorries, etc. The problem was to prevent water, sand, or mud from entering or adhering to components.

Two approaches were taken to this problem. The first merely sealed the cabin or van, which introduced the problem of floatation. If the centre of gravity was too high under these conditions, wave action was apt to upset the vehicle or it would broach too readily. This problem was solved by the second approach, which was to leave the van or cab doors open and seal the load and internal fittings.

Armament presented many problems. One was ensuring that salt water didn't get inside the trail of the gun. The 3.7-inch HAA (heavy anti-aircraft) gun presented special problems, because of its numerous recording instruments and its general complexity.

Smaller equipments such as wireless sets were placed in waterproofing bags.<sup>19</sup>

### Materials used for Waterproofing

There were four main categories of materials:

- a) Hardware - ventilation stacks, air intake tubes, etc.
- b) Plastics - prepared compounds.
- c) Adhesives - synthetic rubber base components in a solvent,
- d) Preservation - hard and soft film paints, varnishes, greases, waterproof cloth, etc.

Thousands of tons of these materials were made up into kits, each designed for a specific vehicle or equipment. Each kit was complete with an illustrated set of directions for waterproofing.<sup>20</sup>

### The Organization for Carrying Out Waterproofing

It will never be known accurately how many hours were spent on waterproofing. Within each brigade, the regiments were responsible to get on with the job, with all the assistance that their Light Aid Detachments (LADs) could give them, backed up by the second echelon workshop.

Lt-Col EM Shields, CREME 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, wrote as early as November 1943 in his war diary that, "...the organization (RCEME) in this division, has at the present time, more commitments than it can handle. Waterproofing is taxing its resources with the result that normal maintenance and repair is suffering."<sup>21</sup> This situation was to become more pronounced until the exercises and waterproofing were completed, and the division was ready in its concentration area.

The COs of the armoured regiments knew their regiments' role in *Overlord*. The LADs knew that their regiments had to be waterproofed. The kits began to arrive in the tank parks and the scramble was on. Basic fixtures had to be fitted and welded to the tanks. These fixtures provided the means of fastening the huge ducts for air intake and exhaust to the hulls. The LAD's electric welding equipment was in constant use in this phase, and when required was supplemented by the welding equipment and men at the brigade workshop. After a certain date, reinforcement tanks arrived with their fixtures in place.

The waterproofing was carried out to given stages, and then the work was tested in a bath that had been prepared close by. The tanks were only checked for leaks in the hull because there was an insufficient

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p 190.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p 191.

<sup>21</sup> WD (War Diary), CREME, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, 15 Nov 1943.

depth of water, but the wheeled vehicles were given a complete tryout. Each failure was carefully studied to determine the cause and, if the engine was undamaged, it was re-waterproofed and rechecked.

Each waterproofing instruction was developed on a task system to be carried out in a number of staging areas. These in turn were sited to ensure that the distances from the port of embarkation were such that the particular stage of waterproofing could be carried out without harm during movement towards the port. See Figure 4 for the stages of waterproofing, and Figure 5 for the mileage limits vehicles could be driven between stages.<sup>22</sup>

At the completion of each of the three main stages, the vehicles were inspected and the inspection recorded by painting vertically rather than horizontally, one of the three colour bars of the RCEME tactical sign on the vehicles front fenders. Stage one was indicated by royal blue, stage two by gold, and stage three by scarlet. Thus a fully inspected vehicle could be identified at a glance while approaching the last checkpoint before boarding the ships. All that was left to do was the final lubrication of the “A” vehicles’ tracks, and the fitting of the radiator sheets and tow ropes on the “B” vehicles.

The only vehicle that wasn’t waterproofed to any degree was the motorcycle. When 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop landed, the sailors lowered the ramp and with a loud cheer sent the motorcyclists down the ramp in what they (the drivers) thought were a couple of inches of water but which the sailors knew to be three feet, much to the merriment of all except the surprised drivers.

Figure 4 - Operation Overlord Showing the Stages of Waterproofing and the Areas Where These Stages Were Carried Out<sup>23</sup>


EQUIPMENT	STAGE	BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF WORK INVOLVED	TACTICAL LOCATION	MAXIMUM SUBSEQUENT MILEAGE	AVERAGE MAN-HRS. REQD.	AVERAGE TOTAL MAN-HRS.	REMARKS
HEAVY "A" VEHICLES	1	Inspection and Maintenance Sealing Hull and Turret Fitting Hardware Hull test in fresh water	Concentration	100	190	220	* May vary as to stage for final erection and release gear adjustment.
	2	Final erection of Hardware* Adjustments Completion of Sealing Fixtures	Marshalling Area	20	25		
	3	Final erection of Hardware Sealing Access Ports Lubrication of Tracks	Embarkation Hard or Craft		5		
LIGHT "A" VEHICLES (A. C.S. CARRIERS, SCOUT CARS)	1	Inspection and Maintenance General internal and external sealing Check Hardware fitment	Concentration Area	150	120	135	* Stage 2 is only divided for this class where a particular task would render vehicle liable to damage if carried out in marshalling area and subsequently run 20 miles.
	2(a)	Erection of Hardware Completion of Sealing Fixtures	Marshalling Area	20	12		
	2(b)	Sealing Breathers*	Embarkation Hard or Craft	1	3		
	3	Sealing Lubricating Tracks if fitted					
"B" VEHICLES R.E. EQUIPT. RADAR. GUNS. ETC.	A	Inspection and Maintenance Sealing of fixtures Check fitting of Hardware Anti-corrosion treatment	Concentration Area	200	50	55	
	Bi	Fitting of Hardware Completion of Software Sealing except Breathers	Marshalling Area	20	41		
	Bii	Sealing of Breathers Fitting Radiator Sheet and tow rope	Embarkation Hard or Craft	1	1		

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. (17), pp 191-193.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p 192.



Figure 5 - Operation Overlord Showing Mileage Limits Between Stages of Waterproofing<sup>24</sup>



### Moving to the Ports - The REME Organization in Southern Command

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade under command, were aboard their various landing ships and craft in the waters about the Isle of Wight awaiting General Eisenhower's decision to launch the assault.

The responsibility of Southern Command was, "To provide, in conjunction with the United States Army, a complete static organization to administer the formations and units of 21 Army Group from completion of concentration to time of embarkation" (in the case of the Assault Force, to the time of sailing).<sup>25</sup>

The magnitude of this task may be appreciated when it is understood that, during this period, the units were unable to administer themselves as their stores and equipment were packed up, they were divorced from their parent formations, and in the later stages were themselves split up into landing craft loads.

Southern Command's organization included the provision of camps, accommodation, stores, hard standings for vehicles, depots, and all necessary administrative services and installations, plus the provision of personnel for staffing, security duties, etc.

### Principal REME/RCEME Tasks

The principal REME/RCEME tasks were:

- Recovering vehicles in transit.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. (17), p 193.

<sup>25</sup> Bullard, Brig C, DDME; Operation *Overlord*, Role of REME, (Secret); HQ South Eastern Command, Reigate; Oct 44, and, Lane (?), Brig JSU, DDME; Notes on Southern Command Organization for the move of 21 Army Group to the Continent, (Secret); HQ Southern Command, Salisbury; 1944 (?).

- Repairing vehicles during marshalling.
- Clearing roads, hard standings, and the concrete surfaces laid on the sloping beaches to enable vehicles to run onto landing craft.
- Assisting in loading and unloading landing craft.
- Testing and maintenance of vehicle and wireless (radio) batteries.
- The responsibility for effective waterproofing.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to these principal tasks, the following additional services had to be undertaken:

- Removing surplus vehicles left behind by units.
- Providing motorcycle patrols to contact drivers in difficulty.
- Providing fast-moving spare parts to units.
- Authorizing replacements.
- Maintaining public address systems in camps.
- Providing for testing and, if necessary, recharging all batteries of the assault force in the event of a long postponement that necessitated vehicles remaining in their craft for over 14 days.<sup>27</sup>

Operational control for this entire operation was delegated by Headquarters, Southern Command, to the Hampshire and Dorset District (H and D District). The ADME (Assistant Director Mechanical Engineering), H and D District, was thus in immediate control of the REME organization<sup>28</sup> (see figure 6).


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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p 1.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p 1.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p 1.

Figure 6 - Chart Showing The Corps' Organization and Division of Responsibility in Southern Command for Operation Overlord



DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY

- DDME:** Provision arrangements, policy, planning, organization, liaison with War Office and branches of Southern Command HQ, repairs by Ministry of Supply. Repairs beyond Command capacity and general direction and supervision of the organization as a whole.
- SEME:** Reception, distribution, posting, documentation and ultimate disposal of personnel and vehicles. Liaison with AG21 (pers REME War Office). Repair within the capacity, of casualties beyond the scope of the special Corps organization for Overlord. Control of the two subworkshops (2nd Ech Wksps) of the Overlord organization except during operations. Recovery outside the areas served by the RPs.
- ADME H & D District:** The carrying out of the Plan. Technical and operation control of the special Corps organization except for the 2nd Echelon Workshops during non-operational periods. Recovery and repair (within the capacity of the resources provided) of all casualties in the marshalling areas. Responsibility for the activities of the waterprooferers. Liaison with District HQ and Area Commanders.
- EME WP H & D District:** Controlled all the waterproofing (WP) activities in the organization.
- NOTES:**
- (a) More details shown for Area A because 3rd Cdn Inf Div and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde were processed in this Area.
  - (b) One hundred Canadians qualified in the vehicle repair trades plus waterproofing techniques were distributed throughout the REME organization.
  - (c) There was one LRS in Area A.
  - (d) There were eight RPs in Area A.
  - (e) There were two PWDs in Area A.
  - (f) There were 19 camps in Area A.
  - (g) There were 2 Embarkation Areas in Area A.
  - (h) Area D was reserved for US Army units.

REF: Operation Overlord, notes on Southern Command  
REME organization for the move of 21 Army Group  
to the Continent, p 11 and Appendix B, C and D.

It must be remembered that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade were assault troops, and formed part of the 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps. The REME organization of Southern Command was supplemented by 100 Canadian technicians with their tool kits. In addition to their trades, these men were also thoroughly trained in waterproofing. Canadian vehicles were treated as though they were British.<sup>29</sup>

Joint planning took place at all levels between the Americans and British. Joint sites were arranged for recovery posts (RP), light repair sections (LRS), and port workshop detachments (PWD). However, American advanced workshops, equivalent to our second echelon workshops, were established separately. Units from both armies arranged to share accommodation, pool their resources, and turn themselves as far as possible into combat teams. Though each unit's primary objective was the servicing of its own casualties, the plan was for mutual assistance to be rendered to any casualty of either army.<sup>30</sup>

The setup evolved from experience gained in a series of exercises (*Harlequin*, *Pirate*, etc) held in the autumn of 1943. A dress rehearsal (Exercise *Fabius*) with troops who were to take part in the invasion of Europe took place in April 1944. This was intended to practice all the static staffs in their duties but, as far as REME was concerned, only a portion of their personnel were in position so the experience gained was limited.<sup>31</sup>

### Geographical Layout

Between Portsmouth and Portland were four marshalling areas:

- Area A served Portsmouth, Gosport, and Stokes Bay.
- Area B served Lymington, Lepe, and Stanswood Bay.
- Area C served Southampton.
- Area D served Poole, Weymouth and Portland.<sup>32</sup>

### Flow of Vehicles

The units travelled from their camps to concentration areas, and then on to the marshalling areas. Here they were divided into landing craft loads, moved to the embarkation areas, and loaded on their craft. Area A was designated for the British, including the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade. Areas B and C were designated for British and US units, and area D was designated for the exclusive use of US units. See Figure 7 showing the marshalling areas in Southern Command.

### Planning for Repair and Recovery

Many factors had to be considered in planning the repair and recovery organization. Some of these factors were:

- Units in transit would be unable to do any repairs, thus “X”, “Y”, and “Z” casualties would have to be provided for.
- Casualties that could not be repaired in the marshalling areas would be replaced (this meant that the vehicle's load would have to be transferred).

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p 11.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. (24), p 11.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p 1.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p 2.

- Twenty-four hour service was to be maintained.
- Layouts of traffic routes and hard standings had to be created. (See Table 1 for vehicle capacities of hard standings in Areas A, B, and C.
- Areas A, B, and C were to be self-contained, with repair and recovery facilities to meet estimated requirements.
- Second echelon workshops were to be established independent of marshalling areas.
- Recovery and repair facilities were to be available at every post.

Figure 7 – Southern Command’s Marshalling Areas for Operation Overlord




Table 1 - Capacity of Camps and Hard Standings in Southern Command<sup>33</sup>

Marshalling Area	Number of Camps	Capacity of Vehicle Standings		
		“A” Vehicles	“B” Vehicles	Total
A	19	3,407	1,137	4,544

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. Appendix C.

B	8	1,200	396	1,596
C	22	5,018	1,672	6,690
Total	49	9,625	3,205	12,830

In addition to local headquarters, the number and function of each type of installation were:

**Recovery Posts (RPs).** The aim was to provide one RP for each camp (or group of camps) while dividing the traffic routes throughout the area as evenly as possible. Area A (which looked after the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade) had eight out of the seventeen RPs. Vehicles requiring repair beyond the capabilities of the RPs were evacuated to the area Light Repair Section.

**Light Repair Sections (LRS).** LRS were required where they could best serve the RPs and the area as a whole. The aim was to set them as near as possible to the centre of gravity of the camp, taking into account ease of access. There was one LRS for each of the three areas.

**Port Workshop Detachments (PWDs).** Most of the work was expected to take place on the hard stands. A central location was selected as a HQ to serve all the hard stands in the local area. Clearing of the hard stands and approaches, assistance in loading, and repair within the limit of time available, were the function of the PWDs. There was one PWD for each embarkation area. There were two PWDs in Area A.

**Second Echelon Workshops.** These workshops represented the last echelon of repair in Southern Command's organization for assisting 21 Army Group. There were two of these workshops, sited off the main traffic routes, yet easily accessible. They were set up at Bishop's Waltham in Area A and Cadnam in Area B.<sup>34</sup>

### Statistics

The casualties dealt with by this organization are shown in Table 2.

*Table 2 - "A" and "B" Vehicle Casualties to 21 Army Group Units Handled by Southern Command's Repair and Recovery Organization to 25 July 1944<sup>35</sup>*

Vehicle Type	Casualty Type			Total
	X	Y	Z	
Tracked	217	323	119	659
Wheeled	1,280	1,760	438	3,478
Motorcycles	173	249	132	554
Total:	1,670	2,332	689	4,691 (a)
Vehicles repaired and returned to units or vehicles returned to depots (VRDs)				4,615
British (including Canadian) vehicles passing through Areas A, B, and C				148,472

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. pp 4-5.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p 13.

Percentage of vehicles requiring REME/RCEME service	3.16%
Note: (a) This figure does not include 809 vehicles requiring service that belonged to the static staffs.	

### Southern Command's Responsibility for Waterproofing

The Corp's responsibility for waterproofing the British and Canadian elements of 21 Army Group were:

- a. Waterproofing the assault force vehicles.
- b. Waterproofing of the replacement vehicles in the sub-vehicle replacement depots (Sub-VRD).
- c. Waterproofing of the reserve vehicles shipped independently after the Sub-VRDs closed.
- d. Generally assisting "Residues" and units doing Stage "A" waterproofing in the concentration areas.

Southern Command's responsibility for waterproofing did not include "A" vehicles. Stage "A" of waterproofing for the "B" vehicles, which had been carried out in the concentration areas (see Figure 4) was checked upon arrival in the marshalling areas. RCEME then supervised and checked the unit drivers doing stage "B1" before they moved to the embarkation areas, and again supervised and checked stage "B2" before the wheeled vehicles boarded their craft.

The Assault Force was issued with vehicles pre-waterproofed to Stage "A". Stages "B1" and "B2" were done by special waterproofing squads organized specifically for that purpose.

The personnel requirements for waterproofing were calculated based on a daily flow of vehicles and the time necessary for checking and movement of waterproofing parties between camps and a pool of reserves (see Table 3).

### In Retrospect

The percentage of the 148,472 British and Canadian waterproofed vehicles that passed through Areas A, B, and C (including embarkation) without requiring repair or recovery was an astounding 96.84%!

This figure is even more surprising when it is realized that there were several last minute decisions and changes in policy. For example:

- A late change in War Office policy shifted the responsibility for waterproofing the Assault Force vehicles from the War Office to Southern Command REME.
- Certain formations decided at the last minute to include vehicles in the Assault Force that were not waterproofed.
- Due to deterioration of the original waterproofing, it was necessary to completely re-waterproof all the vehicles issued to the Assault Force that had been pre-waterproofed to stage "A" in the VRDs.
- At the last minute, one unit exchanged 100 British 3-tonners for new unwaterproofed Canadian vehicles. Because they had been in storage for so long, the replacements needed considerable

adjustment and repair to become roadworthy, and this stretched the resources of The Corps to the utmost.<sup>36</sup>

There is no doubt that many casualties were due to overheating of the waterproofed vehicles. When waterproofing ceased on D+47, there was an immediate drop of about 40% in the number of casualties reported.<sup>37</sup>

It may be recalled that the waterproofing system was required to produce 90% successful results. In fact, less than 5% of the vehicles that landed in Normandy were drowned, and even these were due not so much to faulty waterproofing, but to the tendency of the craft carrying them to be in more than four feet of water.<sup>38</sup>

The total losses between craft and shore in landing 21 Army Group were made up as follows:

- 1.5 per cent disembarked into greater than operation depth.
- 1.3 per cent bogged in clay or were wrecked by enemy action.
- 0.15 per cent were lost due to either inefficient waterproofing or bad driving.<sup>39</sup>

These losses amounted to 2.95%, compared to the permissible 10%.

*Table 3 - Operation Overlord Assumptions Made in Determining Personnel and Vehicle Requirements for Waterproofing "B" Vehicles in Southern Command Marshalling and Embarkation Areas<sup>40</sup>*

<b>Personnel</b>	
Maximum flow, vehicles per day	7,000
Time checking Stages "A" and "B" (i) in the Marshalling Areas, minutes per vehicle	30
Time check "B" (ii) in the embarkation areas, minutes per vehicle	6
Hours to be worked in 12 hour shifts	24
Allowance for reserve	20%
Allowance for splitting into small parties	10%
Estimated staff for above, waterproofers	460
Of which 100 were RCEME, % Canadian	21.8%
Liaison staff for Area D, US area	17
<b>Total personnel</b>	<b>477</b>
At a later period, RCEME became responsible for complete waterproofing of replacement vehicles in Sub-VRDs requiring extra waterproofers	60
<b>Grand Total of waterproofers</b>	<b>537</b>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p 16.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p 18.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. (4), p 20.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. (17), p 188.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. pp 14-15 and Appendix G.



In addition 60 drivers, 4 clerks, and 44 specialists (from various Schools) were made available	108
<b>Grand Total personnel</b>	<b>654</b>
Vehicles	
15-cwt trucks	44
Utilities	16
<b>Total vehicles</b>	<b>60</b>

### Other Pre-Invasion Preparations

As already indicated, 21 Army Group was very well equipped, and this entailed a great deal of modifications and other work by static and field RCEME units. At one time, there were almost two hundred modifications approved for the Sherman tank after its arrival overseas. Some of these, of course, were essential, but others represented the whims of dedicated officers who wanted an “ultimate” tank. The Allies had a tendency to go beyond purely functional improvements and include modifications that were “nice to have”, whereas the Russian’s T-34 tank represented the opposite extreme. The cut-off point is difficult to determine, particularly if sentiment is allowed to influence the decision. This observation is equally true today.

One of the few modifications that applied to every “B” vehicle was the fitting of hip rings. This was a circular emplacement in the cab roof over the co-drivers seat to accommodate an anti-aircraft light machine gunner. The Corps arranged for electric metal shears to be loaned to the brigade workshops and LADs for cutting out the circular openings. These electric powered shears made short work out of what would have been a most exasperating and time-consuming job.

### Operation Neptune - The Tactical Plan

Very briefly, the Allies were to land on a five-division front, with the Americans on the right. The Anglo-Canadian front would be between Asnelles, north-east of Bayeux, and Ouistreham at the mouth of the Orne River, north-east of Caen. The Canadians were to attack on a two-brigade front in the centre of the British Sector.

The Canadian zone was given the code name *Juno*, and the beaches named *Mike* and *Nan* (see Figure 9). The 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Group would assault the beaches astride the mouth of the Seulles River at and about Courseulles-sur-Mer. The 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Group would assault the beaches between Courseulles and St Aubin-sur-Mer. The 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was held in reserve, and was prepared to land behind either brigade as the situation demanded.

The two leading brigades, after capturing the shore defences, were to capture a beachhead including the coastal towns. After this was secure, they were to push inland and occupy objectives south-east of Creully on high ground midway between Courseulles and Caen. Unless needed elsewhere, the 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade were to pass through the 8<sup>th</sup> Brigade, and capture the high ground overlooking Caen from the north-west, which included the village of Authie and the airfield of Carpiquet. Meanwhile 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade would advance to a position astride the road and railway from Bayeux to Caen.<sup>41</sup>


<sup>41</sup> Stacey, Col CP; *The Canadian Army at War, Canada’s Battle in Normandy*, pp 44-45; King’s Printer, Ottawa, 1946.

Beyond *Neptune*, the allied plan for continuing the invasion was hypothetical, and dependent on the enemy's reaction. Above all else, to support the invasion the Allies required ports to supply and maintain their forces. The reader is referred to Stacey<sup>42</sup> for a detailed presentation of the proposed conduct of the invasion after *Neptune*.

## The Naming of Areas, Sectors, and Beaches

The world's largest concentrated invasion was about to begin. On the Allied war maps, the entire Normandy coastline from the eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsula to the mouth of the River Orne was divided into lettered sectors, each having within its limits two or three beaches designated by the colours Green, White and Red. (See Figure 8)

Figure 8 – Normandy Invasion Beaches



The portion affecting Second British Army, from Port-en-Bessin to Ouistreham, contained Sectors *How* to *Rodger*. Three or more of these sectors were allotted to a naval assault force. Each area was given a code name corresponding to the name of the force. Thus:

*Gold* (Force "G", 50<sup>th</sup> British Infantry Division) contained Sectors *How* to *King*.

*Juno* (Force "J", 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division) contained Sectors *Love* to *Nan*.

*Sword* (Force "S", 3<sup>rd</sup> British Infantry Division) contained Sectors *Oboe* to *Rodger*.

Similarly, to the west:

*Utah* (Force "U", 1<sup>st</sup> US Infantry Division) contained Sectors *Peter* to *William*.

*Omaha* (Force "O", 4<sup>th</sup> US Infantry Division) contained Sectors *Able* to *George*.

Within the Second British Army's area, the particular sectors through which the assaulting divisions were to pass were:

Sectors *Jig* and *King* - 50<sup>th</sup> British Infantry Division.

Sectors *Mike* and *Nan* - 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division.

<sup>42</sup> Stacey, Col CP; The Victory Campaign, pp 82-85; Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1960.

Sector *Queen* - 3<sup>rd</sup> British Infantry Division.<sup>43</sup>

## Topography

The general area assigned to the Canadians lay within the agricultural plain of Caen. It consisted of two regions, the Pays de Bessin (a Norman word referring to a Roman governmental district around Bayeux), a marshy clay plain west of the River Seulles, and the Campagne de Caen, a region of limestone east of the Seulles.

The beach sectors allotted to the Canadian Force identified as *Mike* and *Nan* (Figure 9) lay on either side of the western breakwater at the mouth of the River Seulles. *Mike* Sector, on the west, was 2,100 yards in length and contained two beaches, *Green* and *Red*. *Nan* Sector was 5,600 yards in length and contained three beaches, *Green*, *White*, and *Red*.<sup>44</sup> The sea approach was complicated by a series of rocky ledges (Figure 9) that were uncovered at low tide. In the case of Les Essarts de Lagrune, these ledges extended several miles parallel to the shore. These rocks would be covered at high tide, but were sufficiently dangerous to warrant a careful selection of H-Hour for the Canadian attack.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the natural simplicity of the areas' topography, in addition to the poor trafficability of the beaches, there were certain serious problems that affected vehicle mobility.<sup>46</sup> The term "vehicle trafficability" means the ability of the soil to support a vehicle and allow it to move over the soil surface. *Mike* Sector beaches had only two exits, and these required widening and surfacing before vehicles could use them. *Nan* Sector beaches had nine potential exits, nearly all of which required surfacing or demolition of obstacles. Offshore, there were scattered rocky outcroppings and sand flats that made the underwater approaches treacherous, except near high tide.

To prevent erosion and flooding, a six to ten-foot sea wall had been built at the back of the beach, running most of the length of *Nan* Sector. Immediately behind the beaches there was extensive inundation, leaving the land in the form of soft, marshy ground completely unsuitable for vehicle cross-country movement. There was, however, a good network of roads.<sup>47</sup>

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
<sup>43</sup> Report 54; Canadian Participation in the Operations in North West Europe, 1944, Part 1, The Assault and Subsequent Operations of 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division and 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade, 6-30 June 1944, p 12; The Canadian Army Historical Section (GS), 30 June 1952.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. pp 48-49.

<sup>45</sup> H.O. Chart 4324, Cap Levi to Fecamp.

<sup>46</sup> Dekker, Lt-Col, MG; An Introduction to Research on Vehicle Mobility, 1st Report, Chap 2, p 13; Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland: 1951.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. (43), p 50.

Figure 9 – 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Assault Beaches

## The Fire Plan

### Air Plan

The nature of the forces and equipment at their disposal forced the army, and to a lesser extent, the navy, to plan for *Overlord* in terms of moving a vast body of men and their firepower from a non-effective, concentrated, and static position to one where the men and firepower would combine to breach Hitler's Atlantic Wall. The Allied air forces, however, were not limited to a static role until D-Day to unleash their destructive forces. Indeed the air plan for *Overlord* was no more than an intensification and reorientation of the air attacks against "Festung Europa" that had been in progress since the dark days of the Battle of Britain.<sup>48</sup>


### Naval Plan

The naval fire plan was timed to overlap the air attacks on the coastal defences, and thus to keep an almost steady rain of fire on the Atlantic Wall. The fleet class destroyers were to bombard the flanking beaches starting at H-Hour minus 40 minutes, while at the same time *Hunt* class destroyers engaged *Mike* and *Nan* Sectors. Cruisers, directed by air spotting sorties, were to engage the Ver-sur-Mer and Beny-sur-Mer batteries. After H-Hour, certain of these ships would be available on call to forward observers (bombardment) accompanying the assaulting troops. The tasks of the naval support craft are summarized as follows (see the description of ships and landing craft of Force "J" in Annex A):

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p 17.

- The LCG (L) [Landing Craft Gun (Light)], disposed on the flanks of assaulting battalions, were required to close to 1,000 yards and open fire with their 4.7-inch guns on targets of opportunity.
- The LCT (R), [Landing Craft Tank (Rocket)], approaching the beaches in two waves, were to fire their patterns of rockets just prior to touch-down on the strong points at Courseulles, Bernières, and St Aubin.
- The AVRE [Armoured Vehicle, Royal Engineers] teams, touching down at H-Hour, were to be accompanied on the run-in by LCA (HR), which would fire when within range so as to create blast lanes through the mines and wire at the eight points where it was intended that exits should be constructed.<sup>49</sup> [Landing Craft Assault (Hedgerow). This was a conversion of the British LCA, which carried 24 Royal Navy Hedgehog anti-submarine weapons instead of personnel. The Hedgehogs were fired as a barrage onto the beach to clear mines and other obstructions.] (See Figure 10)

Figure 10 – Proposed Plan for Nan Beach



### Army Plan

The expanded divisional artillery was divided into two groups for the assault phase, with one group in support of each assault brigade. Each group was made up of two field regiments of artillery and one battery of two Centaurs. (The Centaurs were cruiser tanks with 95-mm guns that were originally intended as gun turrets in the LCT to compensate for a shortage of LCG. Their original role was to engage targets that had escaped the main bombardment).

Each regiment was to bring down a concentration on one of four principal strong points in *Juno* sector. This firepower was to complement the fire delivered against the same targets by LCT(R).<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. p 79.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. pp 79-81.

Anti-aircraft protection for the ships and craft was to be provided by LCF [Landing Craft, Flak] and LBF [Landing Barge, Flak]. Two anti-aircraft groups, made up from several British batteries, a searchlight troop, a smoke company, and four LBF were entrusted with the beachhead area.<sup>51</sup>

The order in which 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Divisional Assault Groups were to approach the beaches was:

H minus 5 minutes	DD Tanks
H-Hour	Centaur, AVRE, and RE bulldozers
H plus 5 minutes	Infantry assault companies
H plus 20 minutes	Infantry reserve companies
H plus 45 minutes	Reserve battalions <sup>52</sup>

## The Recovery and Repair Plan

### Landing Conditions

The responsibilities of RCEME in Operation *Neptune* differed from the normal RCEME field responsibilities only in such special aspects as the recovery of vehicles from the water and beaches.

The process of landing vehicles in the early stages of *Neptune* was complicated for two reasons. Firstly, because the beaches were not steep and because of the sand bars, the landing ships and craft were unable to land their vehicles dry-shod. Secondly, there would be no roads until the beaches could be swept for mines and a temporary roadway laid across the beaches and connecting to the existing road network.

In addition to waterproofing defects and faulty driving, casualties to vehicles occurred for many reasons. In leaving the landing craft, these included enemy fire and driving into holes made by the bombardment, or by the scouring of the sand by the beaching and unbeaching of ships and craft. In the water, the hazards included drowning, rough water, underwater defences, collision, and enemy fire. On the beaches, some vehicles bogged in soft sand and, being unable to extricate themselves, became casualties from gunfire.

Those casualties that interfered with the landing of other vehicles from landing craft, or caused congestion in the limited number of beach exits available in the early stages of the assault, had to be removed quickly. Casualties left in the water, or at the water's edge, sank rapidly into the sand after the tide had washed around or over them.

### Recovery, Evacuation and Repair Policy<sup>53</sup>

Good road communication was considered vital. During the first 48 hours, recovery would be limited to the clearing vehicles from craft, water, beaches, and beach exits. Roads would not be used for recovery or evacuation of vehicle casualties. Recovery on the roads was limited to road clearance.

AFVs were not to be backloaded to workshops, but collected off the road at a divisional or corps backloading point (BPs). Vehicles and equipment beyond the capacity of a third line workshop would be backloaded to a corps backloading point (CBP) by recovery companies.

During the first 48 hours, repairs would be limited to “repair on the spot”. It was anticipated that repair by reclamation (cannibalization) would supplement the limited quantity of spare parts in the First Aid Motor

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p 82.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p 83.

<sup>53</sup> 3 Canadian Infantry Division Adm Plans, Section XV, RCEME; 19 May 1944.

Transportation Outfits (FAMTO) carried ashore by the LADs and unit fitters. Normal repair of assemblies would be carried out after the arrival and set up of the second and third line workshops.

Major assemblies were to be boxed and overhauled in England, until the arrival and set up of the advanced base workshops (ABWs).

### **Repair and Recovery on the Beaches**

As Colonel HDME Maitland, DDME 1<sup>st</sup> (British) Corps, noted in his directive to the officers of the Beach Recovery Sections, the assault phase of *Neptune* was highly complex and one of the first jobs was to secure a beachhead. An organization was needed to control the immediate landing area after the beach had been captured and troops poured in to enlarge the perimeter.<sup>54</sup> This was the job of 102 (British) Sub Area consisting of 7 and 8 Beach Groups. Each of these groups had a Beach Recovery Section (BRS), No. 22 and 23 respectively. In turn, two detachments of one officer and 19 men each, provided by the four RCEME brigade workshops supporting the assault, were attached to each BRS.

Each BRS was to establish a drowned vehicle park (DVP) in its beach group area. The DVP would be the collecting point to which the recovery elements of the BRS would bring all the vehicle casualties. It would therefore become the centre of RCEME/ REME activity on the beaches, including the cutting and welding equipment so essential to the recovery function.

Recovery of naval craft was the responsibility of the navy. RCEME assistance would only be given under direction of CREME or the OC of the BRS. For example, this could be help in shoving off craft with the beach armoured recovery vehicles (BARV). Repairs to craft were the responsibility of the naval mobile recovery units (NMRU). There was one NMRU in 102 Beach Sub Area.

### **Third Echelon Repairs**

The advance parties of the advanced base workshops were to land with their trailer-borne equipment after the rear maintenance area (RMA) began to operate.

### **Engineer Plant Equipment**

A small detachment of REME for the repair of engineer equipment on the beaches, ie, armoured bulldozers, was to land with each BRS. It was to be assisted by RCEME when possible.

### **Miscellaneous Instructions**

The administrative plan finished its instructions by stating that the Canadians would not be responsible for RAF [Royal Air Force] vehicles. Special engineer assault equipment such as AVREs and Flails [tanks fitted with revolving chains on the front to breach minefields] would be repaired by the engineer unit's LADs and, until their own workshops arrived (about D+4), they would be sent to the tank troops workshops for second echelon repairs. "Z" lorries for the repair of wireless equipment were to land with the brigade workshops, and three telecommunication mechanics would be sent to each DVP by the ABWs to repair mine detectors.

## **3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, Assault Group, Force "J"**

The term "3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division and attached troops" constituted a very large force. In addition to 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade, it embraced corps, army, and other groups of "externals" embarking

<sup>54</sup> Beach Recovery, DDME 1 British Corps; REME/18, 1 Feb 1944.

and landing as part of the divisional assault group. These externals were “in support” and “under command for landing only.”

The division retained its normal organization of three brigade groups corresponding to the three naval assault groups: “J. 1” (or G. J. 1), 8<sup>th</sup> Brigade in “G. J. 2”, and 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade in “G. J. 3”.<sup>55</sup>

In addition a fourth unit was attached to Force “J” known as “J4”. This was an administrative unit comprising twelve tactically-independent naval units, trained and organized so that each carried one Commando.<sup>56</sup>

Since shipping space was at a premium, and it was imperative that the beaches and beachhead not be congested with non-essentials, Force “J” was trimmed to assault scales. This meant that the numbers of vehicles had to be cut, and that certain units had to be excluded altogether from the assault force.<sup>57</sup> For example, 54 LAD accompanying the 6<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment (1<sup>st</sup> Hussars) in the assault was stripped down to one recovery tank, under the command of the LAD’s OC, Capt Proctor Neil.<sup>58</sup> See Table 4 for the order of battle of the RCEME units in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group.

### Phasing-in of the RCEME/REME Units

The BRS were scheduled to land starting at H-Hour plus 15 minutes, and were expected to have their entire unit plus attachments ashore by H+9 [hours]. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Administrative plan required Lt-Col EM Shields, CREME 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, to land on D-Day at H+7 to coordinate the work of 22 and 23 BRS, and to advise the commander of 102 Beach Sub Area on RCEME matters. See Table 4.

Ten of the fourteen LADs supporting the assault were to land five men and one recovery vehicle, and one LAD was to land ten men and two recovery vehicles at H+4. These were wheeled vehicles, except for the Type “C” LADs with the armoured regiments. Six of these LADs were to be reinforced at H+7 or later. One LAD was scheduled to arrive complete at H+7, and one LAD with five men and a recovery vehicle was scheduled to land at H+9. The fourteenth and last LAD of the Assault Group was scheduled to land at D+17.

The remainder of HQ RCEME, consisting of seventeen men and three vehicles, were scheduled to arrive on shore with the 3<sup>rd</sup> tide.

No. 4 LAA Workshop was scheduled to land seventeen men and three vehicles at H+7, with the remainder landing on D+3 and later.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop was scheduled to land 60 men and twelve vehicles with the 3<sup>rd</sup> tide, with a further fifteen men and three vehicles arriving on the 4<sup>th</sup> tide (2248 hrs D+1 to 0135 hrs D+2). A further 132 men and 43 vehicles were to land on D+2.

The 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshops were to start landing on D+3, D+8, and D+10 respectively.

Any units leaving “residuals” behind could not expect them earlier than D+5 or D+6 in the case of the LADs, and later for the other units. The residuals for the four brigade workshops were not scheduled before D+17.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. (43), p 59.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p 8.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p 59.

<sup>58</sup> WD, 54 LAD, Jun 44.



## The Beach Recovery Sections

It is advantageous to examine the BRS more closely at this point of our story. The recovery of vehicles from the assault craft, the water, and the beaches required a high degree of specialized training. BRS personnel were required, as far as their trade capabilities would allow, to carry out any of the duties, because they might be split between beaches, and casualties and reliefs had to be allowed for.

These men were required to have a good basic knowledge of ordinary landing-recovery procedures, and be able to drive ARVs and the largest of the armoured crawler tractors, as well as the special equipment such as the BARV (capable of operating in water to a depth of nine feet with an 18-inch wave). In order to repair 'drowned' vehicles, they were taught the most common causes of waterproofing failures peculiar to various equipments, and the drill for rapid diagnosis and repair in each case. All these men were trained in air and ground defence, camouflage, bivouacking, field cookery, and the lifting of mines and booby traps. They were required to be in top physical condition, in order to endure their long hours of work on the beaches and in the water.

In connection with beach recovery operations, it was essential that divers (wearing the Davis Escape Apparatus and a diving suit which covered the body up to the neck, leaving the hands and feet free) be used under water for connecting tow cables and inspecting under water damage. This type of diving was limited to a depth of about ten feet.

In common with all 3<sup>rd</sup> Division units, the BRS men were able to drive off the ramps of landing craft, and were skilled in deep water wading and driving on all kinds of beaches.

Because the communications between the craft, lookout men, recovery crews, etc, were expected to be entirely visual, the BRS men were trained in semaphore for daytime, and a light signal system for night use. This signal training was limited to the ability to send, receive, and acknowledge the letter "R", which meant that recovery was required by the sender.

The priority for recovery was specified as:

1. Clearing vehicle casualties from the ramps of major landing craft.
2. Clearing vehicle casualties from the beach exits.
3. Clearing vehicle casualties between ramps and beach.

The attached RCEME personnel were required for their specialized knowledge of the Canadian assault equipment, and wheeled and tracked vehicles. They were attached to 22 and 23 BRS several weeks ahead of D-Day in order to train and participate in the rehearsals.<sup>59</sup>

### BRS Order of Landing Plan

The first BRS vehicle to land would be an ARV with the OC of the BRS. The remaining ARVs and crawler tractors were to land soon after, followed by the wheeled recovery vehicles somewhat later.

At the earliest stage, a crawler tractor would be placed on the landward side of each tracked and wheeled vehicle exit, in such a position that it could winch up any casualty in the exit. As soon as possible, a wheeled recovery vehicle would replace the tractor at the wheeled vehicle exit, and the tractor returned to the beach to recover vehicles between the landing craft and the water's edge.

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<sup>59</sup> Directive on Beach Recovery, 1 British Corps, Mar 44.

## ***The Tactical Situation, 6 June - 25 July***

Because of adverse weather conditions, D-Day was postponed 24 hours. During the night of 5/6 June, the 6<sup>th</sup> Airborne Division made successful landings, seized two bridges intact, and held a limited bridgehead across the River Orne. At H-Hour, the assaulting divisions went ashore on the beaches with 50<sup>th</sup> British Infantry Division on the right, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division in the centre, and 3<sup>rd</sup> British Division on the left. Despite a considerable amount of mortar and shellfire on the beaches, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division advanced inland in the centre zone to reach the line Creully to Beny-sur-Mer.

From 16 to 30 June, operations were directed towards the capture of Caen, so that a strong left flank could be provided for the bridgehead. Although important gains were made, any move by 3<sup>rd</sup> British Division in the direction of Caen met with the fiercest resistance until 7 July, when 450 heavy bombers attacked. Caen fell on 9 July. From 10 to 17 July, only limited progress was made, but on 18 July a powerful thrust was launched east of Caen. This was preceded by an air bombardment by more than 2,000 heavy and medium bombers. At first, excellent progress was made by the armour but, after three days heavy fighting, a strong enemy anti-tank screen brought the advance to a halt. The Caen suburbs east of the Orne River had been cleared, and the advance had reached the general line St Martin-de-Fontenay, Bourguebus, and Cagny facing the enemy's armour concentrated east of the Orne River.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid. (4), p 8.

*Table 4 - Showing Phasing-in of RCEME/REME Units, 3 Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group, Operation Neptune, D-Day to D+17 onwards, D-Day 6 June 44*

[Note: because of the size and complexity of the original table (on a double-size 11 x 17 fold-out), I have broken the table down into three parts. Inconsistencies existing in the original have been reproduced here – ed]

## Part 1

Unit Serial No	Order of Battle, 3 Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group	Notes	6 June (D-Day) (2)						7 June (D+1) (3)				8 June		9 June	
			H+4		H+7		H+9		3 <sup>rd</sup> Tide		4 <sup>th</sup> Tide		D+2 (3)		D+3 (3)	
			Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh
<b>3 Canadian Infantry Division</b>																
1503	HQ RCEME 3 Infantry Div				3	1			17	3						
636	36 LAD (7 Infantry Brigade)	a k l	5	1	11	4										
637	37 LAD (8 Infantry Brigade)	c	5	1	11	3										
638	38 LAD (9 Infantry Brigade)	g	5	1	11	3										
680	62 LAD (7 Recce Regiment)															
635	35 LAD (3 Atk Regiment)	e			11 36	2 15										
632	32 LAD (12 Fd Regiment)	b m	5	1			20	3								
633	33 LAD (13 Fd Regiment)	b e m x	5 5	1 1	20	3	11	4								
634	34 LAD (14 Fd Regiment)	d m	5	1			20	3								
630	30 LAD (3 Fd Park Coy)															
620	6 LAD (CH of O)															
631	31 LAD (3 Division Sigs)	e					5	1								
611E	4 LAA Workshop	h			17	3										
255B	7 Infantry Brigade Workshop	o													41	12
255C	8 Infantry Brigade Workshop	p														
255D	9 Infantry Brigade Workshop	q														
<b>2 Canadian Armoured Brigade</b>																
959	2 Cdn Armd Bde Workshop								60	12	15	3	132	43		
672	54 LAD (6 CAR)	b	5	1			9	2	8	2						
673	55 LAD (10 CAR)	d	5	1	9	2			8	2						
1091	85 LAD (27 CAR)	g	5	1	9	2			8	2						
<b>GHQ, Army, and Corps Tps under command LAD (REME) for 22 Dgns</b>																
626	12 LAD (19 A Fd Regt)	d	5	1			20	3								

## Part 2

Order of Battle, 3 Canadian Infantry Division Aslt Group	10 June		11 June		12 June		13 June		14 June		15 June		16 June plus		WE (3)	Landed		
	D+4 (3)		D+5 (3)		D+6 (3)		D+7 (3)		D+8 (3)		D+9 (3)		D+17 (3) onwards					
RCEME/REME Units (1)	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	(6)	
<b>3 Canadian Infantry Div</b>																		
HQ RCEME 3 Infantry Div									3	1					23	5	7 June	
36 LAD (7 Inf Brigade)															16	4	6 June	
37 LAD (8 Inf Brigade)															16	4	6 June	
38 LAD (9 Inf Brigade)															16	4	6 June	
62 LAD (7 Recce Regt)									16	7					16	7	15 June	
35 LAD (3 Atk Regt)															47	17	7 June	
32 LAD (12 Fd Regt)			13	8											38	15	8 June	
33 LAD (13 Fd Regt)			13	8											38	15	6 June	
34 LAD (14 Fd Regt)			13	8											38	15	6 June	
30 LAD (3 Fd Park Coy)					14	5									14	5	17 June	
6 LAD (CH of O)													14	5	14	5	12 June	
31 LAD (3 Division Sigs)			9	4											14	5	16 June	
4 LAA Workshop											18	10			35	13	7 June	
7 Inf Bde Workshop	61	23	39	14									29	19	190	65	11 June	
8 Inf Bde Workshop							105	30	36	22			29	19	190	65	21 June	
9 Inf Bde Workshop												141	56	29	19	190	65	23 June
<b>2 Canadian Armoured Brigade</b>																		
2 Cdn Armd Bde Wksp														59	25	286	83	7 June
54 LAD (6 CAR)					4	5									26	10	6 June	
55 LAD (10 CAR)					4	5									26	10	6 June	
85 LAD (7 CAR)					4	5									26	10	7 June	
<b>GHQ, Army and Corps Tps under command</b>																		
12 LAD (19 Fd Regt)			13	8											38	15	8 June	

**Part 3**

	Notes	D-Day (4)												
		H+15 Minutes		H+1		H+2		H+3 to 4 (j)		H+9		WE		Landed
		Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	Pers	Veh	
LAD REME For 4 SS Brigade 9 Airlanding LAD (REME) 6 Airborne Division	f f	7	1	13	2	17	4	10	3	81	10	128	20	8 June
102 Beach Sub Area 7 Beach Group 22 Beach Recovery Section	b i s t w													
8 Beach Group 23 Beach Recovery Section	d e s t w	12	2	23	6	12	2			81	10	128	20	8 June
11 L of C Troops Workshop REME	s													
3 L Of C Recovery Company REME	s													

**References:**

1. Extracted from “Order of Battle” (ORBAT), 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group” issued in conjunction with Operation Order No. 1, 13 May 1944.
2. Extracted from “Outline of Landing Tables for 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division and Overheads up to H plus 9.” From HQ 102 Beach Sub-Area Operation Instruction, Part I, Section IIB, Appendix A, 14 May 1944.
3. Extracted from “Summary of Administrative Units (excluding Beach Recovery Sections) showing phasing from inclusive D-Day to inclusive D+12 and balance to War Establishment, D+17 and later.” Ibid ref 2.
4. Ibid ref 2, Part III, Appendices “B”, “C”, and “E”.
5. Ibid ref 2, Section XII REME.
6. “ORBAT of the RCEME units, First Canadian Army and the dates these units arrived in their theatres of operation”, compiled by Cpl GA Cook, RCEME. Unpublished manuscript for the RCEME history. To appear as an annex. Dates shown indicate earliest landing date shown in the unit’s Part II orders, adjusted by the war diary entry if different.
7. Stacey, Col CP, The Victory Campaign, p 100, Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1960.
8. Annex 5 to Appendix C to ONEAST/J.2. (Operation *Neptune* East Force J.2.) Naval Operation Order issued from the office of Naval Commander Force J, HMS VECTIS, Cowes, Isle of Wight, 19 May 1944 by GN Oliver, Commodore, Naval Commander Force J. Copy No. 60, Top Secret, Office Naval Historian NDHQ.

**Notes:**

General - this table is a compilation of the above references.

- a. Order of Battle (ORBAT) 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Assault Group.
- b. Troops in support and under command for landing only, of (a).
- c. ORBAT 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Assault Group.
- d. Troops in support and under command for landing only, of (c).
- e. Troops under command for landing only, of (c).
- f. External overheads, of (c).
- g. ORBAT 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Assault Group.
- h. Troops in support and under command for landing only, of (g).
- i. Troops under command for landing only, of (g).
- j. Phase I, H to H+4; Phase II, H+4 to H+16. Ibid ref 2.
- k. One vehicle over establishment.
- l. 36 LAD is not shown in reference 2. Sixteen men and five vehicles were scheduled ashore on D-Day, first tide, in reference 3. Therefore, I have assumed that 36 LAD was scheduled the same as 37 and 38 LADs.
- m. Three vehicles with 8 Brigade Workshop.
- n. Reference 2 shows 33 LAD landing 54 men and 17 vehicles (WE is 38 men and 15 vehicles). Reference 3 shows 25 men and four vehicles scheduled on D-Day, First Tide, and 13 men and eight vehicles scheduled for D+5, and three vehicles with 8 Brigade Workshop for a total equal to the WE. Reference 2 also shows two listings for 33 LAD of five men and one vehicle at H+4. There is no war diary for June 1944. Unless 33 LAD was reinforced, the schedule shown for LADs 32 and 34 may be assumed.
- o. Twenty personnel attached to 23 BRS. Three trailers above WE.
- p. Twenty personnel attached to 22 BRS. Six trailers above WE.
- q. Twenty personnel attached to 22 BRS. Ten trailers above WE.
- r. Twenty personnel attached to 23 BRS. Three trailers with 7 Brigade Workshop.
- s. Reference 5 says under “Phasing in of units”:

“22 BRS will land *Mike* Sector on D-Day as follows: 47 personnel plus 10 vehicles on the First Tide, and 32 personnel plus 10 vehicles on the Second Tide. In addition, 49 RCEME will land on the Second Tide to assist in beach recovery. Six personnel, one Jeep, four trailers, and one water trailer will be phased in later.”

“23 BRS will land *Nan* Sector on D-Day as follows: 47 personnel plus 10 vehicles on the First Tide, and 32 personnel plus 10 vehicles on the Second Tide. In addition, 49 RCEME will land on the Second Tide to assist in beach recovery. Six personnel, one Jeep, four trailers, and one water trailer will be phased in later.”

“Two Lines of Communication workshops and two Lines of Communication recovery sections to land D+3 to D+5. (I can account for only four workshop detachments of one officer and 19 men each, for a total of 80 all ranks, leaving a balance of 18 all ranks RCEME if the above is correct. Reference 4 shows the schedule used in this table.

- t. The landing date is based on Canadian war diaries of participating RCEME workshop detachments.
- u. Juno Area Tide Table, 6, 7, and 8 June 1944. (8)

<b>Tide</b>	<b>Low Water</b>	<b>High Water</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>First</b>	0520	0948 to 1248	D-Day
<b>Second</b>	1745	2210 to 0110	D-Day, D+1
<b>Third</b>	0605	1030 to 1330	D+1
<b>Fourth</b>	1835	2248 to 0135	D+1, D+2
Times shown are MST (Zone “B” minus 2, or GMT plus 2)			

- v. H Hour *Mike* Beach (7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade) 0745. (7)  
H-Hour *Nan* Beach (8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade) 0755.
- w. A conflict is revealed between references 1 and 4 by notes “b” and “i” applied to 22 BRS and by notes “d” and “e” applied to 23 BRS. RHH 24 September 1963.
- x. There is no June 1944 war diary. The unit war diary mentions a self-propelled recovery being done on 6 June by the MT Section. There is no direct evidence of a D-Day landing. RHH 31 October 1963.

## Operation Neptune 6 June 1944

“WIND - West, force 15 knots,  
SEA - Moderate - waves 3 to 4 feet,  
SKY - Fair to cloudy with cloud increasing”.

These few words summarized the weather conditions off the assault beaches at dawn on 6 June.<sup>1</sup>

The time set for H-Hour varied across the front, being earlier for the *Utah* area on the western end of the assault front, and progressively set later towards *Sword* area at the eastern end, to allow for the delay in the rise of the tide. The weather caused the late arrival of certain craft groups, and this delayed the original H-Hours for *Mike* and *Nan* Beaches by ten minutes in each case. Thus the final H-Hours were 0745 for *Mike* Beach and 0755 for *Nan* Beach.

This delay meant that the assault craft landed among the beach obstacles (hedgehogs) instead of before them. “Although no difficulty was experienced in steering the craft in through them, going astern out of them proved more difficult” wrote the commander of Assault Group J-2, “Clearance of the outer obstacles would have to await the fall of tide.”

As the photographic records testify, these obstacles with their attached mines caused many casualties. The losses in craft experienced by Force “J” were the highest (by a margin of one) in the Eastern Task Force.

*Table 5 - Force “J” Losses of Assault Craft in Operation Neptune<sup>2</sup>*

Craft	Sunk	Badly Damaged	Damaged or Disabled	Total
LCA		14	22	
LCI (S)		5	2	
LCS (M)		2		
LCT (A)	3			
LCT (3)		2		
LCT (4)		7	18	
LCT (5)		7	8	
Totals	3	37	50	90

### The Assault on Mike Sector Beaches (The 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade Beaches)

First High Tide 0948-1248

H-Hour 0745

The rough and unruly weather caused a 20-minute delay in the agreed assault time of 0735 hrs<sup>3</sup> and was responsible for the LCT bearing the brigade’s AVREs to enter the wrong channel.<sup>4</sup>

The decision not to launch 1<sup>st</sup> Hussar’s DD tanks because of the roughness of the water was reversed when the LCTs were within 2,500 yards of the beach. Two squadrons were launched. The rough waves almost defeated the run in of these tanks, as the waves slapping the canvas screens caused the struts to bend and the screens were in danger of collapsing. Most of the tank commanders called their turret crews

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. (42), p 96.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p 101; Force “G” lost 89 and Force “S” lost 79.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p 100; The original H-Hour of 0735 was delayed 10 minutes.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. (43), p 110.



to stand with them on the decks to support the screens. Seven DD tanks were lost on the run-in due to enemy fire, and one was run down by a rocket craft, presumably an LCT(R).<sup>5</sup>

### 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade's Light Aid Detachments

Of the four LADs scheduled to land at H+4, three landed on D-Day.

Capt Proctor Neil, OC of 54 LAD attached to the First Hussars, had stripped his LAD down to the basic element of one recovery tank. While waiting the assault, Neil wagered five pounds with Capt Robinson, the Hussars technical adjutant, that he would be first ashore. By doing so, 54 LAD was probably the first RCEME unit to land in Normandy (H+75 minutes, 0900 hrs). However, awaiting their arrival at the water's edge was Robinson who demanded his winnings. Neil recorded this in his war diary:

“Although we were still feeling groggy from our ocean trip, it was a pleasure to touch land. Our recovery tank had the honour of being the first ... to land in our sector in France. After landing, we set out to look for any of the regiment's tanks that had bogged down or had been put out of commission.”

After examining all the disabled DD tanks in the water and on the beach, this small group recovered, repaired, and returned to action, those tanks that they could before moving inland to their assembly area.<sup>6</sup>

### The Assault on Nan Sector Beaches (The 8<sup>th</sup> Brigade Beaches)

First High Tide 0948-1248

H-Hour 0755

The state of the sea that interfered with the assault by First Hussars' DD tanks on *Mike* beaches prevented the launching of the Fort Garry's DD tanks for the assault on *Nan* beaches. The LCTs carrying them brought them into the shore and they disembarked after the infantry landed. The self-propelled artillery regiments assigned to this front had no difficulty in landing and getting off the beaches.

### 8<sup>th</sup> Brigade's Light Aid Detachments

Of the 4 LADs that were scheduled to land at H+4, three landed on D-Day.

Capt RG Struthers, OC of 55 LAD landed his recovery tank in relatively better circumstances than did Capt Neil of 54 LAD by landing dry, but had the misfortune of being wounded by shrapnel on 10 June. Capt JP Lunderville succeeded him.

Lt GR Belton's 37 LAD (8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade) landed their recovery vehicle under the command of AQMS DB Harrison at H+7. The main party in another ship were not able to land because there were not enough Rhino ferries available. The Captain tried beaching his craft, but was unable to get close enough to shore. On the following day, three attempts were made to land by beaching with no success. The third attempt left them grounded on a sand bar. Finally, at 0300 hours on the 8<sup>th</sup>, another attempt was made to beach the ship. This time they were successful, but rammed into the stern of an LST, thus preventing the lowering of the ramp. Their ship pulled out on the next tide. The main party landed by Rhinos in the afternoon.

Lt FB Munroe's 34 LAD (14<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment, RCA) landed their recovery vehicle and crew on D-Day.

<sup>5</sup> Stark, Lt (?), A History of the First Hussars Regiment 1856-1945, p 54: London, Canada; 1951.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. (58), Jun 44. Capt Neil wrote in reply to my query regarding the different times recorded for his landing - his WD records 1430 hrs and Ibid. (65), p 2, chap XI, records 0900. "I landed at 9 a.m. and left the beach at 2.30 p.m. We had a few diversions in between. Capt Robinson (Technical Adjutant) and I had a 5-quad [5 pounds] bet on who would make it first. He won and demanded payment on the spot. This is why I remember the time." Neil to Hodgson 12 Sep 63.

Capt DC Little's 12 LAD, scheduled to land at H+4, landed at 0300 hours on the 8<sup>th</sup> in support of 19<sup>th</sup> Army Field Regiment, RCA.

Capt JA Bourne's 35 LAD was scheduled to land at H+7 and landed on the 7<sup>th</sup> in support of 3<sup>rd</sup> Anti-tank Regiment, RCA.

Lt HG Ambrose's 31 LAD was scheduled to land at H+9 and landed on the 16<sup>th</sup> in support of 3<sup>rd</sup> Division Signals.

## The Follow-up Assault Units

### 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade's Light Aid Detachments

While the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Brigades were pushing forward, the 9<sup>th</sup> was waiting off shore for its turn.

Lt WI Mills and his 38 LAD attached to Headquarters, 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade, anchored off shore at 1400 hours, about two hours after he was scheduled to be ashore with one recovery vehicle. He was told that the landings had been delayed. His first vehicle (a 3-ton truck) left the ship aboard a Rhino landing craft at 1920, and touched down two hours and ten minutes later. The beach was in bad shape, and some of the brigade's vehicles had considerable trouble getting to the beach exits. (Strips [perforated steel mats] were not laid on the beach until later).

Capt CH Neil's 85 LAD, scheduled to land at H+4, landed on the 7<sup>th</sup> in support of 27 CAR (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers).

### The Remaining Light Aid Detachments

The last three of the fifteen LADs supporting the Assault Group were scheduled to land as follows:

Lt LG Marks' 30 LAD, scheduled to land on D+6, landed on the 17<sup>th</sup> in support of 3 Field Park Company.

Capt LC West's 62 LAD, scheduled to land on D+9, landed on the 15<sup>th</sup> in support of the 7<sup>th</sup> Recce Regiment (17<sup>th</sup> Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars).

Lt WR Merryweather's 6 LAD, scheduled to land on D+17 onwards, landed on 12 July in support of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)

## 22 Beach Recovery Section

The RCEME workshop detachments were scheduled to land with the Phase II BRS personnel (see Table 4, Note (j)) at H-Hour plus 7. Capt ES Newman and his men from 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop and Capt T Bromage and his men from 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop boarded their LST with the Phase II REME personnel of 22 BRS. They anchored from one to two miles off Courseulles-sur-Mer about four hours after they were scheduled to be on shore. They landed on *Mike* sector almost 39 hours behind schedule, and joined their Phase I group in the crowded beach DVP who, up until then, had been unable to arrange a main DVP. That same afternoon, the engineers declared the field for the main DVP clear of mines, and they moved into it that night. With all their recovery equipment ashore, and a mine-swept area for the DVP available, the immense task of beach clearance, collection, classification, and repair could be carried out as planned. The heavy losses of spare parts in transit to the beaches, and the difficulty of rapidly locating spare parts in crates scattered on the shore, hampered production. For example, electrical spares were in short supply, and it was necessary to improvise, cannibalize, and as a last resort to bypass many of the electrical components in order to get the vehicles forward.

By 12 July, the number of wet landings had decreased and the recovery and repair load slackened off. Capt Newman recorded in his war diary that the vehicle drownings in *Mike* sector were mainly British equipments, and that the main cause of failure was from water seeping into the distributors.

At the end of ten days, in which over 400 vehicles had been forwarded from the Main DVP, the RCEME workshop detachments left 22 BRS to rejoin their units inland.

*Table 6 - RCEME Workshop Detachments (a) for 22 and 23 Beach Recovery Sections (b)*

Parent Unit	Attached to	OC	Embarked (c)	Landed (c)	Returned to Unit (c)
2 CAB Workshop	23 BRS	Lt AJ Agnew	2 Jun	6 Jun	12 Jun
7 CIB Workshop	23 BRS	Capt WJ Sutherland	2 Jun	8 Jun	12 Jun
8 CIB Workshop (d)	22 BRS	Capt FS Newman	2 Jun	8 Jun	21 Jun
9 CIB Workshop (d)	22 BRS	Capt T Bromage	2 Jun	8 Jun	23 Jun

Notes:

(a) One officer and 19 men

(b) REME

(c) Unit Pt II Orders

(d) Detachments of 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> CIB Workshops were augmented by nine men from 7<sup>th</sup> CIB Workshop on 13 June.

### 23 Beach Recovery Section

Capt WJ Sutherland and Lt AJ Agnew and their detachments from 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop and 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop sailed from England for *Nan* Sector with the Phase II personnel of 23 BRS. They too arrived late off shore from their destination. WO 2 BAJ Hunder of Agnew's group and some men were ashore on D-Day, but returned to their ship until they were able to land their equipment during the early hours of the 8<sup>th</sup>. Because there were so few Canadian equipment casualties in this sector, the workshop detachments returned to their units on the 12<sup>th</sup>.

### 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop

Capt GR Currie's 4 LAA Workshop, attached to the 4<sup>th</sup> LAA Regiment, RCA, was scheduled to start landing their equipment and men at H+7 under command of 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade "for landing only".

Instead they were anchored about three-quarters of a mile offshore from Courseulles-sur-Mer, along with countless other craft impatiently waiting for calmer waters in order to unload their cargos into the Rhino ferries. Two warships nearby added to the din by adding the weight of their shells to the barrage ashore.

After the apprehension of air raids during the night and watching a strafing of the beaches the following morning, Currie and his men were glad when the orders came for their LST to get under way and to head for the beaches. Their ship beached at 1300 hours and disembarked her passengers an hour later into three and a half feet of water. After successfully wading ashore, 4 LAA Workshop moved to their rendezvous with their regiment and then on to a quarry near Reniers where they set up shop. Because of landing delays, very few RCEME or REME units were beyond the beaches in this area and 4 LAA Workshop, the

first RCEME unit of any size to go into operation in the beachhead, was called upon to support many units until their own repair organizations caught up with them.

### Headquarters RCEME Arrives

It will be recalled that the assault plan called for the CREME, Lt-Col EM Shields, Capt MF Carriere, his adjutant, and a driver to land at H+7 to co-ordinate the work of 22 and 23 Beach Recovery Sections, and to advise on the progress of repair and recovery to the commander of 102 Beach Sub-Area. However, because of the rough seas, it was 1500 hours on the 7<sup>th</sup> before they were able to disembark into a Rhino ferry and be taken ashore, landing opposite Graye-sur-Mer.

In the meantime, because the combined port capacity of the Southampton and Portsmouth facilities was insufficient to handle all of 3<sup>rd</sup> Division's men and equipment to the required sailing schedule, certain elements sailed from the Thames Estuary on the east side of London. Among these were Maj WG Hamilton, second-in-command to Colonel Shields, Capt NM Kogan, EME Tels, WO 1 VH Houlton, Chief Clerk, and fourteen men.

Late in May they boarded ship. Their fellow passengers were veterans from North Africa – the 51<sup>st</sup> Highland Division. In later years Colonel Hamilton recalled:

“On the morning of D-Day, in brilliant sunshine, our ships passed through the Straits of Dover. We formed part of a convoy, which I believe was the first to sail the channel since the fall of France in 1940. Suddenly the long-range guns at Calais started firing at us. The North African veterans quickly hit the deck leaving the rest of us standing around with open mouths.”

“I was sitting on deck, eating my lunch and enjoying the sun” recalled Houlton, “when the ship ahead was struck by one of their shells. A geyser of brilliant orange flame shot from the depths of the ship. Uncontrollably my eyes followed the flame high in the skies. By the time they returned to focus on the ship, the port and starboard decks were two steel-helmeted streams formed by the closely packed troops running to the safety of the stern. Then all was obliterated by heavy clouds of smoke laid down by the destroyers as the stricken ship lost way, falling astern of us in her protective cover, no longer a target.”

During the early hours of D+1, the ship carrying Hamilton and his men arrived off the Normandy coast and took its position in the *Juno* anchorage. At noon they climbed over the ship's side and made their way down the cargo nets into small landing craft.

“This was a difficult operation,” recalled Colonel Hamilton, “because of the heavy seas, one moment our craft was level with us, and then in the next it would be many feet below. We had to get our timing just right before we let go, or we would have been in serious trouble.”

“Our skipper was making his first trip to the beaches. After he sailed around for some time looking for his designated landing area, I asked him to head straight in and to land us anywhere. This he did, grounding his craft off shore in shallow water. Down went the ramp and off we waded in knee-deep water. Too late we realized that we were on a sand bar. With our kit held high by aching arms, we waded in water chest deep before reaching shore.”

“Once there, we paused to get our breath” recalled Houlton. “Around us the beaches were littered with wrecked landing craft, disabled vehicles and equipment of every description. Our welcoming committee were the burial parties picking their way through the litter and debris, collecting the dead and laying them out in neat rows beneath the sea wall for identification and burial.”

From the burial parties, Hamilton eventually gathered enough information to lead his party into Graye-sur-Mer on the way to their assembly area near Banville given the code name *Elbow-Frankie*. A Provost pointed out their road with a warning that their way was under rifle and machine gun fire.

“It was an uncomfortable march in sodden clothing and equipment” recalled Houlton.

“We passed long lines of prisoners on their way to the beaches. As we passed through the villages, French civilians stood around, most unconcerned as we approached the areas under fire. We advanced in a crouched position confined to the road for the fields and the edges of the road were mined. We reached our assembly area at 1630 hours and it appeared that we were the first to arrive. Numerous snipers were in the vicinity and shots rang out continually.

“There was evidence that the French underground had already handed out harsh justice to traitors, for, hanging from the trees were the bodies of five or six women, their heads shaven, the symbol of collaborators and co-habitors.”

Hamilton and his men settled down in their new surroundings – dug slit trenches and prepared for a long night. Much to their surprise Colonel Shields and his party joined them at 1800 hours – they too, had just come ashore.

It was a sleepless night spent watching the red tracers of the anti-aircraft shells arch lazily through the sky at the strafing aircraft that flew up and down the beaches. At dawn the Luftwaffe returned to their bases and HQ RCEME started an uneasy day in Normandy. Col Shields went back to the beaches to look for the commander of 102 Beach Sub-Area and Maj Hamilton went forward with his group to join HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division.<sup>7</sup>

## The Assault Force's Second Line Workshops

### 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop under the command of Maj DF Cornish was split up into five separate independent groups. The role played by these groups were:

**Roger Group:** This group, under command of Lt AJ Agnew, which had been attached for some time to 23 Beach Recovery Company were, as we have seen, scheduled to land at H-Hour plus 7 and were to be responsible for the drowned vehicle park from which operated the recovery company. Instead of being on the beaches by the afternoon of D-Day as planned, assisting in the important task of keeping the beachhead and its approaches clear of drowned and other disabled vehicles, Lt Agnew and his group were off shore by 4 p.m. and despite every effort to get ashore, they were left aboard another 39 hours before being landed.

**Peter and Sugar Groups:** Capt WV MacInnes' Peter Group of 60 tradesmen and twelve vehicles and Capt HJ Murphy's Sugar Group of fifteen men and three vehicles were to land on D+1, combine and form the only second line workshop available for the Canadian forces. The Peter-Sugar Groups arrived off shore as scheduled, but like Roger Group were unable to land.

**Tare Group:** Capt GW Wilson commanded the main body of the workshop consisting of four officers, 128 men and 43 vehicles. They were scheduled to land on D+2 and combine with the Peter-Sugar Group, which would increase the Canadian forces second line workshop to assault scale. Tare Group sailed from Gosport and arrived off the beaches well in advance of their scheduled arrival to see the area “glutted with ships”, which were scattered in their hundreds from

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. (21), Jun 44; Lt-Col WG Hamilton to Hodgson, 13 Sep 63 and interview WO1 VH Houlton, 20 Nov 63.

the beaches to the horizon. There, in the congestion, they waited with their other groups for orders to land.

**Queen Group:** S/Sgt WH MacKendrick was given command of the residue of the workshop. They were to stay in England until such time as there was room for them in France, expected to be in three or four weeks' time. They landed in France on 20 July.

**The Landing, 7 and 8 June:** By mid afternoon on 7 June, all the groups were “off shore” waiting to land, and it was apparent that this event would be dictated by fortune rather than by plan. Maj Cornish wrote in his war diary for 8 June: “Landing operations began, and continued throughout the night of the 7<sup>th</sup>, during which time the majority of workshop personnel came under direct enemy air assault for the first time. Roger Group, led by Sgt LH Vigne, was the first ... to set foot on French soil, landing at 7.30 p.m. on the 7<sup>th</sup>, and it was not until well into the morning of the 8<sup>th</sup> that ... the last trucks arrived in the assembly area. Roger, Peter and Sugar Groups had to do some wading... Tare Group spent six hours on Rhinos, under constant air attack.” One of these Rhinos had a ramp blown off by a mine, which complicated landing attempts until a more favourable time at 3 a.m. in the morning. After successfully collecting at the assembly area, which incidentally had been mined by the enemy, the workshop moved to its first site and was in full operation by nightfall.<sup>8</sup>

### 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

Maj RG Storms' 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop was scheduled to move to France in five groups and to commence landing on D+3. Capt WJ Sutherland and nineteen men had left their unit earlier to start training on 12 April with 23 BRS at East Strand, West Wittering.<sup>9</sup> They were to be released to return to their unit when the beach situation permitted. Storms with 40 men and twelve vehicles sailed on the night of 10 June from Southampton on an LST instead of the LCT they had expected, after a delay in loading caused by a broken hoist. The following morning, with the coast of France in sight, German “E” Boats attacked their convoy. A torpedo narrowly missed their ship. After the attack was driven off, the convoy dropped anchor off *Mike* Beach. They made a dry landing at 5 p.m. on the 11<sup>th</sup>. Capts AM Mulligan, GA Charett, and Lt I Malcom, 58 men and 23 vehicles arrived later than their scheduled D+4 date. Lt JL Laing, 37 men and fourteen vehicles, scheduled for D+6 landed on 15 June.<sup>10</sup> The rear party, or residuals, arrived in two sections of nine men and two vehicles on the 14<sup>th</sup>, and twenty men and seventeen vehicles on 22 July thus completing the move of their unit from England to France.<sup>11</sup>

### 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop

Maj JB Butterill's main party of 105 men and 30 vehicles was scheduled to land in Normandy on D+8. Earlier, he had detached Capt EJ Newman and nineteen men to train with 22 BRS for their D-Day role on the beaches. The main party sailed from the Southampton Area on Phase II and III. Air raids and bad weather hindered both groups scheduled to land on D+8. Their convoy sailed on the 18<sup>th</sup>. The following day was too rough to land. The LST carrying Phase II was unable to hold her assigned position in the anchorage by anchors alone, and had to use her engines to keep headed into the wind. In the darkness of the early hours of the 20<sup>th</sup>, their LST grounded on a sand bar. In freeing herself, one engine broke down and the other was badly damaged. With her hull leaking, her captain obtained permission to go inshore. As the LST beached, her limping engine gave out. The troops and equipment were disembarked on dry land. Without stopping at the transit area they drove to the assembly area – removed their waterproofing

<sup>8</sup> WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, 6-8 Jun 44 and Appendix 4.

<sup>9</sup> Shields, Lt-Col, to DADME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade and COs 7, 8 and 9 Infantry Brigade Workshops, File TS-C3D/4-0, dated 3 Apr 44.

<sup>10</sup> WD 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, Jun 44.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. Jun-Jul 44.

and moved inland to the divisional administrative area where they were met by their advance party and set up shop.<sup>12</sup>

### **9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop**

Maj LP Baker detached Capt T Bromage and nineteen men earlier to train with 22 BRS and to accompany them to Normandy on D-Day. The main party sailed from the Southampton Area on four LCTs on the 23<sup>rd</sup>. They landed late the same night and were met by Capt Bromage who had been there since D+2. The workshop moved inland to their site with the other workshops in the divisional administrative area.<sup>13</sup>

## **The Third Line Workshops**

### **2 Canadian Army Tank Troops Workshop**

The workshop, under command of Maj GA Wiggan sailed from the South of England in an LST on 16 June. They landed dry the following afternoon without incident. They moved to their workshop site and were in production by the 18<sup>th</sup>.<sup>14</sup>

### **3 Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop**

The workshop, under command of Maj JB Annand was split between two LSTs. After a twelve-day wait in the staging area, the workshop boarded their ships and sailed from Southampton on 27 June arriving off the beaches the same night. Both parties landed without incident and united, setting up their workshop in an open field. The workshop had plenty of time to set up before their first job came in on the 30<sup>th</sup>.<sup>15</sup>

## **The Advanced Base Workshops**

### **1 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop**

The advance party commanded by Maj HW Thomas sailed from England on 1 July for France. Crossing the channel, their ship survived a collision at sea which resulted in little damage to themselves, they sighted their anchorage at 1100 hours on 2 July, commenced unloading on the 4<sup>th</sup>, and moved to the vicinity of St André, about four and a half miles south of Bayeux. The remainder of the unit under command of Lt-Col WL Thompson split into four groups for the move. They sailed from Gosport, Hants, joining the advance party on the 30<sup>th</sup>. They stayed in Bayeux area until November, when they moved to Machelen, a small town between Vilvoorde and Brussels, arriving there on the 16<sup>th</sup>.<sup>16</sup>

### **2 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop**

The advance party, commanded by Maj JR McLarnon, sailed from Tilbury docks on 5 August 1944 and arrived in France on the 8<sup>th</sup>. The main party under command of Lt-Col JH Fox was divided into two groups, sailing on the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> from Portsmouth and Gosport, and arriving in France on the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup>, where they were met by their advance party. Their workshop site at La Delivrande, about two miles

<sup>12</sup> WD 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, Jun 44.

<sup>13</sup> WD 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, Jun 44.

<sup>14</sup> WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Army Tank Troops Workshop, Jun 44.

<sup>15</sup> WD 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop, Jun 44.

<sup>16</sup> WD 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Advanced Base Workshop, Jun-Jul 44.

inland from the beaches, was set up and the unit quickly went to work.<sup>17</sup> They remained in this area until September, when they moved to Antwerp, arriving there on the 21<sup>st</sup>.

## ***The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Builds Up***

The violent resistance put up by the German forces in and around Caen, and the limited space of an already overcrowded bridgehead, caused a delay in the movements of the Canadian formations still poised in England until such time as there was physical room to spread out the units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry and 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Divisions. General Crerar crossed to Normandy on 18 June, setting up his small tactical headquarters at Amblie. His main headquarters did not reach Amblie until 24 July.

The headquarters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps and 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division crossed the channel on 6 and 7 July. Later in the month, 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division arrived. All the Canadian forces came under command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps for the first time in France.<sup>18</sup>

## **RCEME Operations 6 June - 31 July**

Capt Proctor Neil's 54 LAD (1 Hussars), reduced to one fully manned recovery tank with himself in command, provided the first heavy recovery in his sector of the beach. The elements of Maj Cornish's 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, which were scheduled to land in stages and provide the only second line workshop, were delayed by 39 hours from assuming their vital roles.

The crowding of the bridgehead, the slowness of its expansion, and the worsening of the weather combined to delay the arrival schedules of all the RCEME units. An indication of these conditions for the very early period is shown in Table 4 by the difference in arrival and landing dates. Later, the units were held back in their concentration and marshalling areas.

## **A Self-propelled Gun is Returned to Action**

Capt Bourne's 35 LAD, after landing on 7 June, pushed inland to a location just north of Beny-sur-Mer. He then met up with their first big job. Two of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Anti-tank Regiment's 3-inch M10 self-propelled guns (SPs) had been put out of action. The gun on one SP had been struck by a high velocity projectile at a point about one third the length of the barrel from the muzzle. A piece of the barrel, about eight inches long by two inches wide, was punched into the bore and slid down and out of the breech, knocking a round out of the loader's hands. It continued on to the back of the platform, where it crushed the coils and fins of the engine oil cooler mounted on the bulkhead.

The second SP had received a hit on the turret ring at the junction of the turret and the hull. The heat of impact effectively welded the turret to the hull. Bourne's men set about to salvage one SP out of the two. By rigging a large tree to lift the gun and mantle clear of the turret (because the lifting booms on the breakdown had neither the lifting capacity nor the necessary height) they were able to exchange the guns. The SPs had been knocked out that morning and by mid afternoon one rebuilt SP was returned to action.

The drafters of the Permissive Repair Schedule did not envisage this type of service. The type of tasks normally allotted to an LAD were purely unit and light first echelon repairs, and were limited by the hand tools available and a maximum time limit of two hours.

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<sup>17</sup> WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Advanced Base Workshop, Aug 44.

<sup>18</sup> Stacey, Col CP, *The Canadian Army At War No. 3, Canada's Battle in Normandy*; pp 82, 84, 98-99; King's Printer, Ottawa, 1946.



The good name earned by many LADs was due to their effectiveness in using initiative and ingenuity, such as shown by Capt Bourne and his men when their back-up resources were not available, and when the tactical situation demanded every possible weapon to perform its role.<sup>19</sup>

### **High Losses of Tires and Radiators**

Ashore in Normandy, anti-personnel bombs and shell splinters caused considerable damage to tires and radiators. It was early realized that something had to be done locally before the resupply problem became insurmountable. Local garages were surveyed to gather up vulcanizing equipment and rubber in an effort to increase the workshop's capacity for these repairs. Regrettably, this was not successful for the larger garages located in Caen, for instance, had been completely destroyed by bombing.

### **The CO of 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop Killed by Mine**

On 21 July, at St Germain la Blanche-Herbe, Cfn EA Corcoran drove his heavy breakdown over a mine. The explosion blew off a front wheel. Part of the tire broke through the windshield of a passing vehicle.

The following day, Maj R Johnson, while supervising the recovery of the damaged equipment, was killed when an undetected mine exploded under a trailer wheel. Corcoran and his co-driver, Cfn CH Herron, were both seriously injured. Capt TD Wallace, the second-in-command, was promoted to major and appointed commanding officer.<sup>20</sup>

### **Serviceable Components Are Reclaimed From “W” Cocks**

In order to bolster up the supply of serviceable assemblies for the repair of tanks, Maj Annand's 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop was assigned to remove all such components from the “W” Cocks – those tanks that were declared beyond repair. It has been estimated that 20 per cent of all the spares used in the early stages of the campaign came from this source.<sup>21</sup> The hulks were placed in a “Help Yourself Park” which not only helped to clean up the bridgehead, but also provided a source of souvenirs for those hunters who were determined to have a souvenir of the campaign.

### **DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Assumes Command of RCEME Units in Normandy**

Control of the RCEME units of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group and of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, which had been under the control of Colonel HDC Maitland, DDME 1 British Corps, reverted to Colonel MCG Meighen, DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps. The Canadian Corps entered the line at 3 p.m. on 11 July, 8,000 yards in front of Caen under command of the British Second Army.<sup>22</sup>

### **Recovery is Restricted**

Recovery in the beachhead area was severely restricted by the late arrival of the various detachments that were to provide these important facilities. Recovery was also severely restricted by Operation *Atlantic*, the code name given to the crossing of the River Orne by 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps. For a period, recovery was limited to clearance of the main routes, and transporters were only allowed on these roads at night. They were, however, allowed on the tracks through the fields at any time. This really wasn't practicable, because the transporters were not off-the-road equipments.

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<sup>19</sup> WD 35 LAD, Jun 44 and Bourne to Hodgson, 8 Jan 64.

<sup>20</sup> WD 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Workshop, Jul 44.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. (4), p 21.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. (42), p 165.

Maj Cornish of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop was seriously concerned that he was unable to send an AWD in support of the requirements across the Orne, because of lack of space in the bridgehead until 19 July, when conditions allowed him to send over four ARVs.

## Cannibalization

Under such restrictions, cannibalization became essential, in view of the urgent necessity of getting fighting vehicles back into action. Cannibalization, so necessary at this stage became the LAD commanders' not-so-secret, secret weapon of the North-west European Campaign, even though it had severe repercussion in the spare parts supply system by giving false usage figures to the Ordnance Field Parks –the LADs' legitimate source of spares.

## The Corps Delivery Squadron's Backlog of Tanks

The delay due to bad weather of the AFV servicing units who were to service the reserve AFVs before they were passed to the Armoured Replacement Group was responsible for the accumulation of a considerable number of unserviced tanks.

In fact, the consumption of tanks was so high in 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade that Maj Cornish sent an AWD back to assist in the inspection of the tanks awaiting release to the regiments. His procedure apparently didn't work too well, because Cornish wrote in his diary:

“Lt Agnew and his men of the AWD did everything possible to help. However, the arrangement has not proved entirely satisfactory. It has been proposed that, should this situation arise again, our AWD will be allowed to install its own inspection line, thus doing a complete job on all tanks handled, rather than act as an auxiliary to the fitters and LAD of the Corps Delivery Squadron.”<sup>23</sup>

In July, Brigadier Grant, DDME First Canadian Army, discussed the policy for modification to vehicles in the theatre with the DDME Second British Army. It may be remembered that there were a host of modifications to the Sherman tank (about two hundred at this time). Needless to say, it was difficult for those who were concerned with this problem in the field to decide where to start without direction.

The policy in vogue at the end of July was to select, at army level, those modifications that were considered vital, and stress them one or two at a time after ensuring the availability of the necessary stores. If it was found essential to introduce a new modification to a vehicle in order to increase its fighting efficiency, the following procedure was to be used.

- (a) A prototype was made up and tried out.
- (b) If it was successful, the details complete with working drawings were sent through channels eventually reaching 21 Army Group, who submitted it to the War Office.
- (c) If the modification was urgently needed, instructions were issued by the DDME Army to proceed without waiting for higher approval.

## The Modification Policy in Field Units

This procedure was in fact used right down to commanding officers (at least (a) above and given the urgency, a portion of (c) above). To be very blunt, it appeared that among other pursuits of interest, commanding officers delighted in exploring the fields of redesign and modification of their equipments. The

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid. (68), 28 Jul 44.

COs were not altogether to blame for this activity, because they were expected to create and build, within local resources, such items as kitchen trucks, caravans, etc.

## **Bocage Cutters**

First Canadian Army interested itself in an American development for clearing the hedgerows and undergrowth from the paths of the tanks in the heavily-wooded Bocage country. The Canadian Base Workshop in England was ordered to make up 100 bocage cutters for delivery to the BRAC [Brigadier, Royal Armoured Corps], HQ First Canadian Army, for initial trial.<sup>24</sup>

The 11<sup>th</sup> British Armoured Troops Workshop manufactured 22 units that the US developers considered slightly better than their own, consisting of heavy 23- to 29-inch long fork-like attachments fitted in front of Sherman tanks. The blades or forks were made from the steel girders forming part of the German underwater obstacles in the beach defence system.

## **The British 21<sup>st</sup> Advanced Base Workshop Arrives**

The British brought in their 21<sup>st</sup> Advanced Base Workshop in over the beaches by 16 July and had it in production four days later. The 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Advanced Base Workshop joined their advance party, which had arrived in Normandy on 4 July, by the 30<sup>th</sup>.

## **A Daring Recovery**

Lt-Col Shields, CREME of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division Assault Group reported to his DDME that the armoured brigade commander and regimental COs had issued orders, which in fact did not slow down the enthusiasm of the armoured LAD COs for recovering tanks that were in enemy held territory.<sup>25</sup> [This paragraph is confusing but is in the original – ed].

## ***RCEME from July to September 1944***

### **The Canadian Tactical Situation, from 27 July to September**

Shortly after a 450-bomber attack and the fall of CAEN in the early part of July, and an even larger 2,000-plus-bomber air bombardment in support of a thrust across the River Orne in the eastern suburbs, the advance reached the general line of Saint-Martinde-Fontenay, Bourguebus, Cagny. In order to oppose the allied attack, the enemy concentrated his armour east of the River Orne.<sup>26</sup>

On 25 July, the breakout from the bridgehead began. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps attacked across the road Caen-Falaise. The attack was supported by a 1,000-bomber raid on 7 August heralding Operation *Totalize*, the code name given to a three-phase attack to break through the German positions astride the Caen-Falaise axis.<sup>27</sup> On 12 August, a junction was made between 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps and 12<sup>th</sup> British Corps. Falaise was entered on 16 August, but in the meantime the enemy had launched a heavy counter attack against the First US Army in the vicinity of Mortain. On 19 August, the American Forces met the Canadians, and the so-called Falaise “pocket” was closed.

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<sup>24</sup> WD DDME, First Canadian Army, Aug 44. Bocage or boscage: Woodland, mass of growing trees or shrubs, a thicket, etc. (The Universal Oxford Dictionary).

<sup>25</sup> WD DDME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, 3 Jul 44.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. (4), p 8.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. (42), p 207-209.

By 25 August, the Second British and the First Canadian Armies were closing in on the River Seine, and the mopping up of the Falaise pocket was completed. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps crossed the Seine the following day near Elbeuf. By the 30<sup>th</sup>, Rouen and Fleury were captured,<sup>28</sup> thus ending the month that witnessed the climax of the campaign in Normandy and of which Colonel Stacey wrote “...an allied victory which was one of the great military triumphs of modern times.”<sup>29</sup>

## The “Kangaroo” Armoured Personnel Carrier

Colonel Stacey, in discussing the idea of using some form of armoured vehicle to carry assaulting infantry through the fire zone, mentions that the Canadians in Italy suggested experiments, which were made with the hulks of burned out universal carriers and towed by tanks.

General GG Simonds, commanding 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, was the spark behind the crash action program of producing APCs in Normandy.<sup>30</sup> In 1947, he was recommended to the Inter-Departmental Committee on Awards to Inventors for an award for suggesting the introduction of armoured personnel carriers. The recommendation was denied.

On the evening of 31 July, the general staff of First Canadian Army instructed Brigadier Grant to set up an organization for the purpose of converting 72 US M7 self-propelled 105-mm guns, popularly known as Priests, into APCs. Some people referred to them as “unfrocked” priests, a term which was supplanted by the code name of the AWD, and they became known as “*Kangaroos*”.

He immediately set up a conference with Colonel HDC Maitland, DDME 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps, Colonel Max Meighen, DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, and Lt-Col Pat Lyle, CREME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Troops to discuss the ways and means and production rates to meet the demand.

In the small hours of the morning of 1 August, it was decided that the job would be carried out by a composite AWD given the code name “*Kangaroos*”, under the command of Maj George Wiggan, OC No. 2 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop. The job consisting of removing the 105-mm gun with mount and mantlet, welding armour plate across the resulting gap, overhauling the radial engine (the 100-hour check), and generally ensuring the serviceability of the transmission, the controlled differential brake linings, and the running gear. It was determined the project would take seven days.

*Kangaroo* was set up in two fields near Bayeaux with the campsite in the protection of a neighbouring orchard. Plans called for production to start by noon on 1 August, but the executive order to make the modifications, which incidentally were to be made in such a way that the M7s could be converted back into SPs, was not released until 2 August.<sup>31</sup>

## British Participation in *Kangaroos*

At this time 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps was under command of First Canadian Army.<sup>32</sup> Fourteen Canadian and British units contributed and pooled their efforts and skills in *Kangaroo*. The units represented were:<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. (4), p 31.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. (42), p 203.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. footnote p 210.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. (85), 3 Aug 44.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. (78), p 38.

<sup>33</sup> There is some conflict on the number of units participating. Colonel Stacey quotes Maj Wiggan’s letter of 6 Aug 44 to the CO 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop in which Wiggan says “... thirteen”. Appendix 1 to WD DDME First Canadian Army, Aug 44, lists the above 14 Units as participants. The Tank Troops Howler, News Bulletin No. 56, Monday 7 Aug 44 published by 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Tank Troops Workshop records that Brigadier Grant, when extending the thanks of General Crerar and himself, did so to 14 Units that made up the AWD. (WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Tank Troops Workshop, Appendix 5). It would appear that the number 14 is correct.

- 2 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop, RCEME
- 1 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop, RCEME
- 1 Canadian Engineer Equipment Workshop, RCEME
- 2 Canadian Engineer Equipment Workshop, RCEME
- 1 Canadian Army Troops Workshop, RCEME
- 4 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME
- 2 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME
- 35 Canadian LAD, RCEME
- 1 Canadian Ordnance Maintenance Company, RCOC
- 21 British Advanced Base Workshop, REME
- 4 British General Troops Workshop, REME
- 20 British Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 27 British Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 115 British Company, RASC

### **Organization of AWD Kangaroo**

Maj Wiggan set up his organization with Capt HT Hargrave in charge of production, Capt AB Otto in charge of engine overhaul, Lt Forge (REME) in charge of gun and mantlet removal, Lt HB Charters in charge of armour plating, and Capt GF Grainger in charge of stores and equipment. Brigadier Grant appointed Capt HW Royle as liaison officer to his headquarters.

Records are too sketchy to determine with accuracy exactly how many men were involved, but it would appear that Colonel Stacey's estimate of 250 is of the correct order. All the RCEME/REME units were canvassed for electric and gas welding equipments, and the tradesmen to use them. Again, the records available do not give an accurate list. The original equipment list, if anything, was probably exceeded and consisted of breakdown trucks, electric welding trucks, and transport.

Almost unlimited access to welding rod, armour plate, radial engine parts, oxy-acetylene welding sets and gases, and radial engine overhaul stands was required.

### **Sources of Steel Plate**

The armour plate came from the "Help Yourself Park" of "W" corks. After this source ran out, mild steel was used from the steel mills in the south of Caen. According to Colonel Stacey's account, "General Mann recalls that the navy complained at this time that Canadian soldiers were cutting pieces of plating out of craft stranded on the beaches."<sup>34</sup> Maj Wiggan recorded in his war diary that "An examination of steel plate in wrecked naval vessels and from the Schneider Steel Works in Caen was considered unsuitable."<sup>35</sup>

Despite this early opinion made on 1 August, it was necessary to fall back on mild steel plate as already noted, welded over the openings in the form of spaced armour, which consisted of one plate welded over

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. (42), p 210.

<sup>35</sup> WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Tank Troops Workshop, 1 Aug 44.

the opening from the outside and a second plate welded over the opening from the inside. The gap between the plates was filled with sand.

### The Target Date is Advanced

The original schedule called for the conversion of 72 equipments by 9 August. Shortly after the job was started, the delivery date was advanced to the 6<sup>th</sup> with a somewhat meaningless rider added that as many equipments as possible were to be completed by the night of the 5<sup>th</sup>. “This was indeed a drastic reduction in available time, but in spite of all this, the 72 equipments were completed by 2000 hours, 5 August, and six additional vehicles were finished before noon on the 6<sup>th</sup>.”<sup>36</sup>

### Hours of Work

The first crew arrived at the *Kangaroo* site late on the afternoon of 2 August and had fourteen equipments stripped before dark that night. The hours of work were 0500 to 1100, 1230 to 1700 and 1800 to 2200.<sup>37</sup>

### A Job Well Done

Lt-Gen HDG Crerar, GOC First Canadian Army, telephoned his thanks and congratulations to Brigadier Grant in the afternoon of the 5<sup>th</sup>, and asked him to convey them to all the officers and men responsible for doing such a splendid job in so short a time. Brigadier Grant had breakfast with the AWD men the following morning and told them of the General’s praise for their efforts. The DA and QMG who had requested that his thanks be added to the General’s said “that the work done was more important than had the same personnel captured a fortified village.”<sup>38</sup>

The British press and the BBC on their 9 p.m. news on the 8<sup>th</sup> announced that, in the latest attack, the Canadians used APCs specially made in the field for the operation.

In his letter to the OC 4 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop, in which he recommended 48 hours excused duty for their men who were on *Kangaroo*, Maj Wiggan wrote:

“There were 13 units (actually 14) represented in this AWD, but in spite of long hours and exhausting work, there was not only no friction but a wonderful spirit of co-operation from the first to last.”

This was a wonderful tribute to Anglo-Canadian cooperation. In particular, the leadership by Maj Wiggan was recognized by his being awarded the Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop, Appendix 1, Aug 44. One point is quite unclear: this reference, which is a copy of an article in the RCEME Bulletin No. 4, 11 Aug 44 says in part, “This remarkable effort ... of the AWD which did the majority of the vehicles, i.e. 62. Similarly, 1 British Corps did a remarkable job of the 16 vehicles they undertook to modify.” I have been unable to find any other reference that would imply that all 78 conversions were not made by the AWD *Kangaroo*. The British definitely sent men to the AWD, i.e., 41 men under Lt Forge, REME, from 21 Advanced Base Workshop (WD 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Tank Troops Workshop 2 Aug 44, and p 2 Army Troops Howler of 4 Aug 44).

<sup>37</sup> Tank Troops Howler, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Tank Troops Workshop, 4 Aug 44.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. (84), 5 Aug 44.

<sup>39</sup> The award of the Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire to Maj George Alfred Wiggan, Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers states: “During the period 2 August 1944 to 6 August 1944 at Aunay, France, this officer was in command of a special workshop detachment made up from fourteen Canadian and British units for the purpose of overhauling and converting into armoured personnel carriers “kangaroos”, seventy-eight M7 self propelled armoured vehicles. His enthusiasm, initiative, and driving force contributed very materially to completing in three and one half days what appeared to be an impossible task in the time available. On occasions subsequent to the above he has demonstrated resourcefulness that has increased tank production in his shop beyond what was considered possible.”

### First and Second Line Maintenance for Kangaroos

The Kangaroos were used by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry and the 51<sup>st</sup> (H) Infantry Divisions. First and second line maintenance were to be provided by specially arranged LADs, backed up by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian and the 33<sup>rd</sup> British Armoured Brigade Workshop.

The hurriedly-organized Canadian LAD was named “Light Aid Detachment, RCEME (attached 1 Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, CAC)”. It wasn’t dignified by a proper title until 24 October 1944, when the LAD was disbanded, and Capt WTE Duncan and his men were transferred the following day to 123 LAD, Type “E”, RCEME. No. 123 LAD was attached to the newly formed 1 Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier [APC] Squadron, the forerunner of 1 Canadian APC Regiment commanded by Lt-Col GM Churchill (Lt-Col, The Honourable GM Churchill, PC, DSO, MP) and part of General Hobart’s 79<sup>th</sup> British Armoured Division.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop provided the second line support.

During the period, while 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps were under command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, Colonel Meighen instructed their REME to organize similar arrangements for the Kangaroos operating with the 51<sup>st</sup> (Highland) Division.

Both the Canadian and British arrangements were far from satisfactory, but for different reasons. Capt Duncan understated his administrative difficulties when he summarized his feelings in his August diary:

“Since LAD and Kangaroos are not attached to any regiment and have no parent unit, a great amount of difficulty has been experienced with rations, petrol, mail, medical services, and general administration.”<sup>40</sup>

Lt-Col CR Boehm, ADME First Canadian Army, passed extracts and the above summary from Duncan’s diary to the GSO1 (Staff Duties) on 2 September with the comment, “It is hoped that never again will this unit be left on its own.”<sup>41</sup>

Evidently Duncan’s plight caused enquiries to be made. Colonel Meighen in replying to queries made by Brigadier HVD Laing, DA & QMG 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps wrote on the 15 September:

“Army SD ordered the forming of two AWDs to service these equipments (kangaroos), one half of which was to operate with a Canadian division, the other half with 51 (H) Division, both under 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps at the time. The Canadian AWD was formed under Army auspices with personnel formerly looking after these equipments ... when they were SPs... of the... artillery of 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division.

“1<sup>st</sup> British Corps was ordered to supply an AWD to service those equipments with 51 (H) Div. This, 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps did not do, despite the fact that the third line shops for 51 (H) Division and a British Armoured Brigade, both under 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps were still under 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps. DDME 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps sent a message to this Armoured Brigade to supply this AWD. This of course was flagrant non-compliance with the order. DDME Army suggested that DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps should press DADME of the armoured brigade for the AWD such that he in turn would bring pressure on DDME 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps. This Colonel Meighen refused to do. Instead he referred the matter to Lt-Col Moncel, G1, and he in turn to SD at Army. The latter offered to force the issue with 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps, but by this time it was much too late. So no AWD was ever formed for these equipments.

“Subsequent to this initial operation of the Kangaroos, the Canadian AWD had been servicing the Kangaroos as a whole.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. (84), Appendix I: WD Kangaroo LAD, 12-29 Aug 44.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. Sep 44 Appendix I.

“The following facts are enumerated below to demonstrate why it was impossible to adequately look after these equipments.

- a. The equipments had, in some cases, drivers that had never driven a tank or similar equipment or maintained same.
- b. There were no co-drivers.
- c. In the rush of initial production, many equipments were deficient servicing tools.
- d. The equipments were never formed into a unit, there was no OC, and there was no administrative transport.

“Kangaroos were the only vehicles with which to draw supplies, water, petrol, etc. The OC of the AWD, Capt Duncan, endeavoured to “mother” this mass of equipment and really did an admirable job. He attempted to draw rations and recover broken-down equipments. These equipments were jumped from formation to formation, split between formations and rarely, if ever, was the AWD informed where they were. When hopelessly confused, Capt Duncan would report to Colonel Meighen who would in turn appeal to SD.

“Eventually these equipments were ordered to concentrate just east of the River Dives. The AWD was told they were to base themselves on “E” Squadron of the Armoured Delivery Regiment. Colonel Meighen appealed to SD for administrative transport for the equipments.” Colonel Meighen ended his report with this comment:

“It cannot be seen how any other results could have been expected when all we were dealing with was a great number of tank-like equipments, a driver each, no OC, and no administrative transport.”<sup>42</sup>

### **RCEME Armoured Cars and Drivers in Operation Totalize**

Lt-Col JW Proctor, AA& QMG 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, told the officers attending his AQ conference late in the afternoon of 6 August that all the armoured vehicles that could be used to carry infantry into combat were to be loaned to 10<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade at once for the pending attack. Lt-Col RH Noble, CREME 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division ordered the armoured 15-cwts [trucks], twelve in number, on RCEME establishments (mostly LADs) to report at once with drivers to the brigade.<sup>43</sup> Colonel Noble recorded in his war diary on 11 August,

“...survivors of the twelve RCEME scout cars used to transport infantry in the attack, were reporting back to RCEME units. Three cars had received direct hits, one driver was killed. This driver after returning from a seventh trip of driving wounded soldiers through hazardous territory left his vehicle to escort some prisoners, and was killed by the accidental discharge of a Sten gun [sub-machine gun] carried by a member of a passing Universal carrier. The splendid performance of RCEME personnel and vehicles in front line action has had a marked effect upon morale in the formation.”<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> WD DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, Sep 44; Annex 2, (58/8/Veh Gen, 1/ME Rear HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, Col Meighen to DAAG Rear HQ, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps).

<sup>43</sup> WD CREME 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, 6 Aug 44.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 11 Aug 44.



## Wasp Flamethrowers

Just after lunch on Saturday, 12 August, Brigadier Grant received a request from the general staff to arrange for the immediate installation of Wasp flamethrowers on 36 Universal carriers. The deadline was 6 p.m. the following day.

After consultation with Lt-Col FJ Lyle, CREME 1 Canadian Army Troops, arrangements were made to carry out this work in Maj CMR Elmsley's 2 Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop supplemented by Capt Anderson and 36 men from Maj WD Schofield's 1 Canadian General Troops Workshop. The Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke (DCW & S), part of the Master-General of Ordnance Branch, sent Capt H Sorenson, RCE, to be the technical advisor, and it was he who supplied the time estimates and the technical data used in organizing the production line. DDOS had the responsibility of providing the 36 carriers and Wasp kits to the work site, and to issue the converted carriers, after testing by DCW & S personnel, to the designated users.

The kits arrived early that evening, but the carriers were not delivered until 11 p.m. and then only 34. (The remaining two were delivered at 7 a.m. the following morning). At 11:30 p.m. Brigadier Grant received word that only twelve carriers would be required by the 6 o'clock deadline. It was stipulated, though, that additional armour must be added to the front of the carriers. This armour was to be used in lieu of the plastic armour that was to have been supplied with the kits, and which incidentally did not arrive in the theatre until later in the month. Colonel Lyle received these changes in plans by 9 a.m. the following morning (Sunday), and immediately started out for the worksite.

In the meantime, 2 Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop started work according to the original plan as soon as there was sufficient light at 7 a.m. The production line was organized in two sections of eighteen carriers each, with a crew of two tradesmen assigned to each vehicle. Team No. 1 under Capt JL Elder removed the required components from the carriers in No. 1 section in preparation for the Wasp installation. Team No. 2 under Capt Anderson inspected and test-drove the carriers in No. 2 Section for battle worthiness. After each team completed their tasks they were to change sections and repeat their tasks.

By 9 a.m. the first phase of the work was completed, and the teams were ready to change sections when Maj RA Klaehn, RCE, from DCW & S arrived with the news of another change in plans. Now only twelve completed carriers were required, but the deadline was advanced to noon!

Colonel Lyle arrived from his HQ with his latest instructions received, as already described, from Brigadier Grant. He realized at once the urgency of the program, and immediately arranged for Maj GA Wiggan's 2 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop to make a template and cut the required armour for the carriers. He rearranged the organization of the tradesmen in order to concentrate on producing twelve vehicles by the noon deadline. The remaining tradesmen were put to work on the remaining 24 vehicles.

It was at this point that unforeseen technical problems slowed the momentum that the challenge of the project had built up. The tradesmen checking oil levels of the engines, transmissions and differentials discovered that the lubrication charts had not been followed and, as a result, all these components contained oils that were not chemically compatible with the standard oil specified for field use. The tradesmen checking the tracks found that a large number of them had an incorrect number of track links. The majority of the carriers were Mk II's instead of Mk I's causing considerable extra drilling and cutting of armour plate before the Wasp kits (that were designed for Mk I carriers) could be installed. The final, and probably the most exasperating, difficulty was the discovery that the nuts and bolts supplied with the kits were a mixture of American and British thread systems.

These combined difficulties made it impossible to meet the deadline. The first three conversions were ready by 3 p.m. and immediately DCW & S personnel began to train user personnel in their operation. Word was received at 5 p.m. that an additional four conversions were required that day, raising the total

to sixteen. The first twelve were completed and tested by 6:30 p.m. and the additional four an hour later. The remainder were delivered by 5 o'clock, Monday afternoon, 14 August.

Brigadier Grant wrote in his War Diary:

“The number of conflicting orders and the manner in which they affected the workshop slowed production materially. It clearly shows the necessity for using the proper channels of communications. Had SD (Staff Duties, meaning the General Staff) cleared all requirements through DDME (First Canadian Army) instead of relaying it to the workshop through personnel of DCW & S, much confusion and resulting delay would have been avoided.”<sup>45</sup>

### **An AWD for 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian and 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRAS**

The Commander, Corps Royal Canadian Artillery (CCRA), Brigadier A Bruce Mathews wrote a letter to Colonel Meighen expressing the appreciation of the gunners for the excellent work that was being done by a special AWD that had been organized on 16 July in anticipation of a heavy workload in the AGRA [Army Group, Royal Artillery] area.

No. 1 AWD, as it later became known, was made up of the armament section of 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Troops Workshop under the command of Lt BO Dick. Colonel Meighen arranged with Brigadier Suttie, Brigadier Royal Artillery (BRA) 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian AGRA, for his HQ to administer them.<sup>46</sup>

The 7<sup>th</sup> British Armoured Division and the 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRA came under command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps on 21 July. The heavy workload of supporting the 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRA, superimposed on the load already carried by the AWD, resulted in the formation of a second AWD on 5 August, with a strength of 45 all ranks under the command of Capt AO Drysdale. This AWD was provided by First Canadian Army Troops Workshop, and was composed of six armament artificers and 20 fitters, together with supporting tradesmen. No. 2 Canadian Infantry Troops and No. 1 Canadian General Troops Workshops each sent five fitters to the AWD. [This paragraph, as originally written, did not make a lot of sense. I rewrote it based on comments in the histories of the units that were involved – ed].

After that, No. 2 AWD directly supported the 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRA, and assisted No. 1 AWD with the overflow of work from 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian AGRA.<sup>47</sup>

Arrangements were made with Colonel McAvoy, DDME 8<sup>th</sup> British Corps, to send any overflow of work from the AWD to the workshops of 8<sup>th</sup> British Corps.

Prior to this time, on 20 July, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian AGRA HQ and units were south of the River Orne in what was considered to be a forward position. Colonel Meighen decided that, although the AGRA was rather far forward, in order for the AWD to be effective, it had to move with the AGRA it supported. Thus the AWD with its compliment of machinery lorries set up shop and operated in a closed street in Faubourg de Vaucelles.

The DDME's assessment of the dangers of the location proved to be entirely correct, because on 25 July a Type "A" machinery lorry containing a lathe, drill press, battery charger, etc., was destroyed by a direct hit, with flying metal wounding two tradesmen.<sup>48</sup>

The AWD strength was slightly over 40 tradesmen, and they were able to turn out four guns a day and, in addition, repaired a limited number of wireless sets and instruments.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. (84), Aug 44.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. (102), Jul 44.

<sup>47</sup> WD 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop, Aug 44.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. (102), Jul 44.

H-Hour for Phase II of Operation *Totalize* was set after much discussion for 1:55 p.m. on 8 August. The offensive would open up with visual bombing by United States bombers. The start line (that line to the rear of which no bombing would take place and our troops would not cross until the bombing was completed) ran north of Robertmesnil and Gaumesnil and south of the quarry east of Caillouet.<sup>49</sup>

The US Eighth Air Force's bombers made their runs over their targets at Brettville-sur-Laitte on the right, St Sylvain on the left, a group including Hautmenil on the main road and Cauvicourt to the east, and Gouvix.<sup>50</sup> The bombing was marred by what has since been recorded as "gross errors on the part of two twelve-plane groups." In one instance, faulty identification caused bombs to be dropped near Caen, and in another instance a damaged bomber jettisoned his bombs short of the target – the remainder of the formation following suit.<sup>51</sup>

Both the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian and 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRAs suffered from the bombing. The deaths, injuries, and damage to the Canadian and Polish Forces were estimated three days later as approximately 65 killed and 250 wounded, with four medium or heavy guns, 55 vehicles, and a substantial amount of ammunition lost.<sup>52</sup> Four hundred and ninety-two bombers dropped 1,488 tons of bombs; fortunately most of them fell on their designated targets.

Shortly after the bombing, Maj HB Mattson, OC No. 2 Canadian Recovery Company reported to Colonel Meighen that 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian AGRA and forward ammunition dump areas were bombed by Allied bombers.<sup>53</sup> The DDME's scepticism of Mattson's report was removed when he joined Lt-Col HB Miller, CREME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Troops to visit Capt SJ Wallace at No. 1 AWD and found Mattson's "story was in accordance with facts."<sup>54</sup>

Capt Wallace and his men had been working strenuously for a very long time and under very trying conditions, which incidentally had not gone unnoticed by Brigadier Suttie. Wallace had planned to give his men a bit of a rest and a chance to clean up. The bombing changed all that, and both AWDs had to work harder than ever. All the guns were inspected, repaired, or replaced by the following day.

Operation *Tractable*, the code name given to First Canadian Army's swing to the east around Falaise and then south towards Argentan, at which point it was proposed to link up with the Third US Army, was marred by another bombing by Allied bombers remarkably similar to the 8 August bombing. At 2 p.m. on 14 August, Bomber Command was to strike at six targets in the area of Quesnay, Fontaine-le-pin, Bons-Tassily. Eight hundred and eleven bombers dropped 723 tons of bombs.<sup>55</sup> The bombing was unfortunately short of the target area and landed chiefly in the area of St Aignan and about the quarry at Hautmesnil on the Falaise Road.

Capt LB Screaton, EME (Armoured Field) was on his way to visit Capt Monty Cranston, EME Arty at 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian AGRA HQ when he witnessed the bombing of the AGRA area. This second bombing was much more disastrous, for Colonel Stacey records that a report prepared at HQ First Canadian Army the next day showed that 65 were killed, 241 were wounded, and 91 were reported missing. He went on to write that the Canadian artillery regiments east of Hautmesnil suffered heavily.<sup>56</sup> Among the wounded was Capt Cranston.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. (42), p 222.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p 223.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. (102), Aug 44.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. (42), pp 236-243.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p 243.

The two AWDs were combined on 25 August when the 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRA ceased to be under command. Colonel Meighen's order regarding the withdrawal of the AWD was misunderstood for No. 2 AWD was all packed and ready to move off with the 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRA, when Lt-Col Miller was instructed to get the AWD back, much to his embarrassment as he had inadvertently agreed to allow the AWD to accompany their new-found friends.<sup>57</sup>

## Rail Lorries

At the end of August, The Corps was requested by the DA&QMG HQ First Canadian Army to convert a standard military vehicle for rail use. A 3-ton GS [general service] 4x4 truck was fitted with flanged rail wheels obtained from the railroad yards at Mezidon. The trials held by 181 Railway Operating Company on 26 August at Courseulles were considered successful.

The letter report from Brigadier Grant to the DA&QMG notes that “work has discontinued on the Diamond T tractor, as it was found that the modification could not be made without spoiling the vehicle for future road work” thus implying that the project was a temporary expedient.<sup>58</sup>

## Workshop Movement and Control

### Fourth Line Workshops

The Canadian Base Workshop did not leave Bordon Hants. No. 1 and No. 2 Advanced Base Workshops, RCEME, provided fourth line service in the field. These two workshops were placed under the control of the DME, 21 Army Group, thus placing all the fourth line shops under one command.

The successful movement of an advanced base workshop required a maximum of skill and planning, for it was as every bit complex as the moving the equipment of a factory from one site to another, with the additional hazards of sabotage and perilous transportation.

The two Canadian workshops moved from Normandy to Belgium after suitable locations were found. No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop set up in a factory in Machelen, a small town between Vilvorde and Brussels, and No. 2 set up in a factory in Antwerp. They remained in these sites for the remainder of their stay in Europe.

### Third Line Workshops

The increase in tempo of the campaign, the increase in the frequency of workshop movement, and the increase in the rate of advance, resulted in a corresponding increase in the rate of wear, particularly in the running gear of the combat vehicles. This, in turn, increased the demand for recovery of vehicles and equipments of all kinds, and increased the length of the lines of communication. All of these in turn caused a reduced availability of spare parts and, from The Corps' point of view, focused attention on the re-occurring problem of workshop productivity in the field that dated back to Exercise *Spartan*.

Fundamentally, the problem was how to get the maximum output from a third line workshop and keep it close to the formation it supported during a rapid advance. In order to get a good output, the workshop had to remain on its site for a reasonable period. If this was done, the distance between the workshop and the formation supported became too great for effective administration by corps headquarters.

The British solution to this vexing problem was to keep their third line workshops “every bit as mobile as brigade workshops. Second (British) Army's third line workshop had been fully mobile since the early

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid. (102), Jul 44.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. (84), Appendix 4, Aug 44.

days and able to move without help, given thirty-six hours notice. A recovery section always moved with them carrying forward as many spares as possible to counteract the difficulty Ordnance (RAOC) was experiencing in making issues over such distances.”<sup>59</sup>

Brigadier Grant was not satisfied with the British solution. His third line workshops in fact were fully mobile, although they were not so by establishment. Mobility had been achieved by overloading vehicles and appropriating others. This practice enabled a workshop to move as an entity, even though the load included items unauthorized by the equipment entitlement committees. Canadian third line workshops were capable of moving on twelve hours notice, and were ready to operate from six to eight hours after reaching a new site. Increased mobility was only a partial answer.<sup>60</sup>

Grant objected to the British approach because, at the best, it was only an answer and not the solution to the problem. Analysing the British approach reveals that it consisted of short, thus inefficient, work periods sandwiched between moves. This inefficiency added to the lost time caused by the frequent closing, moving, and reopening of a workshop in a new site.

The stumbling block in the Second (British) Army would appear to be the corps commanders’ natural reluctance to move without their third line workshops. This natural reluctance was not exclusive to the British, and was reinforced by a certain amount of reluctance in the First Canadian Army to adopt a policy of leading and not following.

The overall rate of increase in the workload experienced in the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead, and the predicted continued rate of increase, made it obvious that the third line workshops had to remain longer at each site if their potential productivity was to be obtained. The resulting distances between the workshops and their formations made them difficult to be administered by Corps during a rapid advance. The third line workshops thus would find themselves in the army area and thus logically should be administered by army.

On 1 September Brigadier Grant and Lt-Col CR Boehn, his ADME, who was the instigator and advocate of the plan, went to Colonel Meighen [DDME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps] and discussed the question again. Colonel Meighen stated “that he did not want a third line workshop under his command at that time, as he could not handle them to advantage in so swift an advance.”

Brigadier Grant recorded in his war diary: “This, at long last, was the favourable end of an argument that had started with Exercise *Spartan* and had flared up at many discussions on the handling of REME units. It is now finally decided in RCEME circles that all third line workshops should be retained under army command, unless required for a specific and limited task by Corps.” He went on to observe, “the British are becoming more inclined to agree to this, as we have demonstrated in the campaign that by leap-frogging these units from rear army to rear corps area... production receives a minimum of interruption.”<sup>61</sup>

The Canadian solution gave increase flexibility. First Canadian Army now could move its third line workshops. The Administrative History of 21 Army Group records, “In fact they (the Canadians) never had more than fifty per cent of their third line workshops under corps control even under static conditions.”<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid. (4), p 51.

<sup>60</sup> Interview Lt-Col CMR Elmsley, 10 Oct 61 and 24 May 62.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. (84), Sep 44.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. (4), p 51.

## Second Line Workshops

The second line or brigade workshops within a division were fully mobile, but their productive capacities were not readily available to the brigade commanders. The normal brigade workshop site in the Normandy campaign was located in the divisional administrative area many miles to the rear of the rapidly advancing brigades. For example, 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop was as much as sixty miles behind 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade. Such great distances made it impractical, if not impossible, to move the brigade's tank casualties to the rear. Alternatively, the brigade area was too far away for the efficient operation of an advanced workshop detachment (AWD).

Lt-Col RH Noble, CREME 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, wrote of these difficulties. "During the recent rapid advance it had proved very unsatisfactory to have workshops up to sixty miles in the rear."<sup>63</sup> Consequently he arranged to have his brigade workshop brought forward to the brigade "A" echelon areas, and left a "rear workshop detachment" (RWD) to service the "B" echelon equipment in the divisional administrative area. The RWD was constituted as a normal AWD. Tank casualties were recovered to suitable sites in the forward positions and repaired or backloaded as required. These sites were selected with the parent workshop in mind, so that the AWD could leapfrog with the workshop or a second AWD if in a clean-up role.

With the new policy approved, Colonel Noble's two brigade workshops moved forward adjacent to the Rear Headquarters of 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division (Rear Div) for the first time in the campaign when the workshops crossed the Somme at Pont Remy to sites near Ballancourt on 4 September. During the static role of the division in the winter months ahead, the brigade workshops were within a mile or two of the regiments they served.

The addition of the second line workshops to the already massive brigade "A" echelon made movement cumbersome. Therefore, Colonel Noble decided that his workshops would move independently and twenty-four hours after the departure of the brigade "A" echelon.

The DADEME of 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade and the BEME of 10<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade were now able to move their workshops independently between their "A" echelons and the administrative groups on instructions by CREME.<sup>64</sup>

The new system of control fully met the operational requirements. Colonel Noble wrote in his war diary on 18 September that, "The system of moving workshops independently between "A" echelon and the administrative area group is proving extremely satisfactory. The moves are well disciplined, and little time is lost. Administrative groups at present are still sixty miles to the rear in the Dixmude area." At the time he wrote these words, his headquarters was near Eecloo, Belgium.

The infantry divisions each had three brigade workshops. Their problems were essentially the same as those of the armoured division. The infantry divisions placed one workshop up ahead of the divisional administrative area to support all the units in its vicinity, and kept two workshops back in the administrative area to clean up behind the advancing divisions.

## Second Line Services for Army Groups, Royal Artillery

The problem encountered supplying satisfactory second line maintenance to the AGRAs has already been indicated in the section describing the provision of RCEME Services to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian and 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRAs during the months of July and August. Lt-Col Miller, CREME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps indicated the way it improved service when he inadvertently approved the accompaniment of No. 2 AWD with the 9<sup>th</sup> British AGRA when they left the command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid. (103), Sep 44.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

At the army level, Brigadier Grant was not at all satisfied with the principle of providing temporary AWDs to give second line maintenance support to the AGRAs. His main objections were the inherent supply and administration problems that arose each time the AGRAs moved from formation to formation.

In giving his opinion of these inherent problems to Brigadier ER Caffyn, DME 21 Army Group, Brigadier Grant summarized the problems in these words:

“When AGRAs are under command of corps, it is normal to send out an AWD from the corps troops workshop, or when sufficiently close the work is carried out in the corps troops workshop. If additional help is required, as when more than one AGRA is under command of corps, the resources of the army troops workshop are normally used to form another AWD to be sent forward under command of corps.

“When one AGRA is under command of army, the army troops workshop facilities suffice, but when there is more than one AGRA under command of army, difficulty arises in obtaining the required second line personnel, while at the same time the corps troops workshop personnel are not heavily committed. It is not normal to withdraw corps troops to operate under army.

“A more serious problem arises when additional AGRAs are placed under command of army from the army group reserve or from another army. Second line resources do not accompany such formations.”

From the problems and circumstances described in his summary, Brigadier Grant inferred that:

“The corps troops workshop is overstaffed in gun personnel for second line repairs when an AGRA is not under command (corps) and that:

“The army troops workshop is understaffed when more than one AGRA is under command of army or more than one AGRA per corps is under the command of army.”

Brigadier Grant then suggested to Brigadier Caffyn that he should review the entire system of providing second line maintenance to the AGRAs, and to consider the formation of AGRA second line workshops to support and accompany each of the AGRAs. If this was not possible, then he suggested that establishments of the army and corps troops workshops should be adjusted in favour of the army troops workshop, in order that the personnel may be allotted where required. He enlarged this suggestion to include the provision of personnel from GHQ troops, to be made available for second line work when AGRAs were placed under command of army from GHQ troops.<sup>65</sup>

Until such time a decision would be made on his recommendations, Brigadier Grant put forward a temporary proposal that AWDs should be formed specifically for attachment to, and travel with, the AGRAs. These AWDs were to belong to their parent units and the parent units had the right to rotate their personnel through their AWDs.<sup>66</sup>

### **First Line Workshops (LADS)**

For the sake of completeness, the problem of availability and productivity of the mobile workshops is carried right to the first line shops or LADs.

In fairness to these units, it must be understood that the movement and control of the LADs cannot be generalized because they were to a large extent influenced by the resultant of a triangle of forces representing the compatibility and personality of the regiment's commander, his technical officer, and the

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. (84); Brig GM Grant to Brig Coffyn, 4 Sep 44.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. Sep 44.

LAD commander. However, for illustration, the problems faced by one Type “C” LAD attached to an armoured regiment, and how they were solved, are recorded here.

Initially the stores portion of the LAD was required to travel with “B” echelon in the divisional administrative area, and the remainder of the LAD was placed in the regimental “A2” echelon. This was the main support group for the fighting or “F” echelon, which consisted of the combat elements of the three squadrons and regimental headquarters.

Between “A2” and “F” echelon was a small group of trucks (A1 echelon) loaded with ammunition, rations, petrol, oil and lubricants (POL), and the technical adjutant with his crew of regimental fitters. The latter of course spent most of their time with the tanks prior to crossing start lines and then rendering aid as required.

From such a setup, it can readily be seen that the LAD contributed absolutely nothing to the combat fitness of its regiment. However, this statement does not apply to RCEME as a whole. There were two armourers and three armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs) driven by RCEME personnel who did not come under the command of the LAD. These were on the regimental establishment and were “part and parcel” of the regiment, whereas the LAD had its own establishment and was attached to the regiment for all purposes. These technical differences played an out-of-proportion part in the triangle of forces.

In very short order, the regimental commander saw the wisdom of allowing the LAD’s supply of spare parts to be carried in the “A2” echelon. This was a help, but again not the answer.

CREME in his constant review of RCEME services quickly decided that the “A2” echelon was too far back from “F” echelon for the LAD to be effective, and advocated that the LAD move to the “A1” echelon. If necessary, he would concede that the LAD’s store of spare parts would remain in “A2” echelon. Before this could be put into effect, the regimental organization was changed. The “A1” echelon was eliminated, and “A2” echelon moved up to its position and was renamed “A” echelon. “A1” echelon moved to RHQ, was renamed the battle lorry group (BLG), and limited to eleven ‘soft-skinned’ vehicles, left-out-of-battle (LOB) tanks, ARVs, and the bulldozer tanks. Permission was sought and obtained to increase the soft-skinned vehicles to twelve to accommodate the LAD’s “KL” truck, on which was mounted the regiment’s only source of electric welding. The KL also carried oxyacetylene cutting torches, as did the ARVs and wheeled recovery vehicles. The KL truck, incidentally, was the most vulnerable vehicle in the regiment, because it had a radiator at the back as well as the one at the front. It is interesting to note that this vehicle was not damaged at any time during the campaign, although daily it worked in exposed positions.

These new arrangements worked well. The addition of the KL truck to the BLG placed the most important equipment the LAD possessed in the battle line where it made a tremendous contribution.

The LAD commander and the technical adjutant divided the work between them. All the duties, reports, returns, etc., that were done by the LAD’s OC and the regimental technical adjutant (RTA) were listed, defined and detailed in file folders. The OC LAD and RTA took those files that were their personal obligation, and then divided the remaining files between them in such a way that each officer had equal responsibilities.

The main advantages were:

- a. Elimination of duplication of duties, responsibilities and interference.
- b. An equitable division of duties and responsibilities.
- c. The OC LAD and the RTA were able to take over the other’s job in a minimum of time thus increasing the flexibility of the regiment’s total repair resources.

The technical adjutant controlled the regimental fitters, ARVs, and the KL truck, and assumed responsibility for repair and recovery of all regimental tanks ahead of the BLG. The LAD assumed the re-



sponsibility of the repair and recovery of all wheeled and tracked vehicles back of the BLG. In the rapid advance of the campaign, it sometimes meant searching as far back as twenty or thirty miles along the regimental centre line for casualties, repairing them, and driving them forward.

The LAD also took on the responsibility of keeping the regiment's stocks of vehicle spare parts replenished in addition to its own. The regiment cooperated by giving the LAD one of its heavy six-wheeled stores trucks to carry the heavy spares. Thus all the vehicle spare parts came under the control of the LAD. With the division of duties, the ready accessibility of the spare parts, and the maintenance, the battle worthiness of the regiment rapidly improved.

The LAD vehicle artificers and tradesmen took over the responsibility of inspecting all the reinforcement vehicles. The LAD commander divided his time between visits to the brigade workshop, the selection of suitable collecting points for battle casualties, supervising recovery behind BLG, and accompanying the technical adjutant for talks with each tank driver about the condition of his tank prior to going into action.

The OC LAD and the RTA had the authority to withdraw a tank from a pending action if they were of the opinion that the crew's complaints were justified. Rarely did a driver suggest that his vehicle was not battle worthy. However, if he felt that he was jeopardizing the crew because he couldn't shift his transmission quickly because of a worn syncro-mesh in the transmission, or that the engine was too sluggish when the tank was driven up a slope, the tank was withdrawn without question or criticism of the crew. In every case, examination of the tank supported the drivers' complaints.

On moves, the LAD travelled at the rear of "A" echelon. The rigidly-enforced ban on recovery, defeated any usefulness the LAD might have on the move. Suspended tows, even of vitally important vehicles such as kitchen and stores trucks, were prohibited. They were to be pushed off the road!

The LAD adopted the policy of leaving two hours after the echelons' departure, bringing with it all the vehicles that had fallen out on the move.

Thus in the short time from landing in Normandy to the early part of September, an entirely new doctrine of movement and control of mobile workshops was created in the heat of battle, by the arm of experience, wielding the hammer of necessity, on the anvil of fact.

## ***RCEME from October to December 1944***

### **The Canadian Tactical Situation - October to December, 1944**

On 1 October, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division crossed the Antwerp-Turnhout canal and thrust west towards the southern suburbs of Antwerp, then past the northern outskirts of the city and quickly clearing the area up to the Dutch frontier.

By the 20<sup>th</sup>, the land route to South Beveland was sealed off and the division was ready to advance to the west.

On the 24<sup>th</sup>, the division advanced into the peninsula and, despite heavy opposition, reached the Beveland Canal by the 27<sup>th</sup> and started to bridge it. The newly-arrived 156 British Brigade joined the division after sailing in LVTs from Terneuzen and a successful landing near Baarland. The joint advance came to a halt by 30 October at the causeway leading to Walcheren Island.

The division and 156 British Brigade formed one group of a three-assault-group plan to capture the island. Their attack from the east was not successful. However, the other two assault groups were more fortunate and the island was cleared of the enemy by 8 November.

Meanwhile, on 6 October, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division started clearing the south bank of the Scheldt against bitter opposition. After crossing the Leopold Canal north of Maldegem with the aid of

flamethrowers, it took four days for the 7<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade to build up a sufficient bridgehead to enable bridges to be built.

The 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade were transported by “Terrapins” and “Buffaloes” (LVTs) on an amphibious assault across the mouth of the Braakman inlet to land east of Hoofdplaat to the rear of the German pocket on 9 October, obtaining complete surprise and quickly established a bridgehead. On 19 October, after fierce fighting, contact was made with the troops from the Leopold Canal bridgehead near St Kruis, and Breskens was cleared on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. After the fall of Breskens, the enemy were defeated and by 3 November, the canal areas between Zeebrugge, Sluis, and Brugge were cleared of enemy troops.

The First Canadian Army and its three Canadian divisions in particular were exhausted, and welcomed the static period that followed the Battle of the Scheldt. The Canadians’ first winter in Europe was approaching. During this period the units refitted, trained, patrolled and fought in some severe skirmishes while plans were being made for the coming offensive into Germany.<sup>67</sup>

## Cannibalization

After many years of controversy, RCEME defined cannibalization as: “The removal of serviceable components or assemblies from one equipment casualty in exchange for unserviceable components from another.” The explanation given for this definition is stated as: “This obviates the necessity of backloading repairable equipment because of the shortage of spare parts.”<sup>68</sup>

The term cannibal implies “feeding on its own species.” The weakness of the term using today’s definition is obvious. However, during the Second World War, the term was closer to the truth for it was quite common to remove serviceable parts and avoid replacing them with the unserviceable ones. In many cases it wasn’t practical to make the replacements, and the field units ‘scrounged’ serviceable parts from derelicts to such a degree that it became mandatory for crews of unserviceable and knocked out tanks to stay with their equipment in the first instance, and if humanly possible to stay within small arms range in the second. The latter case served a two-fold purpose, protection against our own scroungers and protection against enemy demolition teams.

Colonel Meighen, in writing to Brigadier Grant in October 1944, analyzed the problem from “first principles”. He wrote:

“For over four years we have been listening to, and greatly concerned with, the universal vice of cannibalization. Countless orders have been issued, disciplinary action taken and little results observed.

“It is my belief that the approach to this problem has been fundamentally wrong. Drivers do not carry extra generators and carburettors for the fun of it. Armoured regiments, LAD’s, and even second line workshops do not remove tracks, bogies, etc, from one derelict tank to enable another tank to operate, simply because they are lazy or mischievous.

“The driver carries a carburettor and a generator because he feels he is going to need one, and has no confidence that normal supply will make these available when required. Tracks, bogies, etc, are removed from one tank to make a runner of another, so that a regiment can keep up to reasonable fighting strength. They would obviously prefer to get these articles from Ordnance if such were available.

“Is not the answer to increase the supply of those articles most frequently cannibalized? Orders and disciplinary action will never be as effective as a better source of supply. For

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. (4), pp 62, 63, and Montgomery, FM, The Viscount of Alamein; Normandy to the Baltic, pp 151-166; Hutchinson, 1947.

<sup>68</sup> RCEME Pam 11-5, RCEME Terminology, Army HQ, Ottawa, 1962.

four years we have been building up knowledge of those parts and assemblies that first break down. Similarly, they are the articles and assemblies most frequently cannibalized. Should not production have been correspondingly increased?

“We are in no sense attempting to minimize the insidious effects of cannibalization, nor to condone the disobeying of orders. But orders, to have reasonable compliance, must be based on sound principles and common sense. It is confidently believed that if a careful watch was kept on those things most frequently cannibalized and their availability immediately increased, that the resultant demands for these articles would be less than that now obtaining. This, of course, would necessarily entail flexible control of production schedules. But surely the cumulative story of four years demands should have prepared us for what we are now experiencing.”<sup>69</sup>

Meighen did not cover one aspect of this problem in his letter. The Corps contributed in no small measure in creating shortages of spare parts. For example, the Ram tanks of the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division had many assemblies that had short working lives. Among these were clutches, voltage control regulators (VCRs), and the gasoline motor-generator charging plant. The clutches were marginal in their ability to transmit full power, and consequently driver training or heavy going caused many burned out clutches. The VCRs high rate of failure was probably due to the high charging rates. The charging plant was driven by a two-cycle gas engine. The unit was in a relatively inaccessible location with the consequent penalty of the minimum of maintenance.

The Ordnance Field Park (OFP) was initially underscaled on these assemblies, and consequently the LAD officers took whatever means they could to keep their regiment’s tanks operational.

This usually meant trading the items on a one-for-one basis at the workshop, or as happened so often in England, trading the items at the base workshop on the “old boy net”.

This meant that the usage figures being compiled at the OFP did not reflect the true demand of these items in the field. Fortunately one LAD officer overstepped the mark and the base workshop was placed out of bounds to all LAD officers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division. This eventually helped to increase the supply of clutches and VCRs at the OFP by the time the division was in Europe, however, the supply of motor-generators never improved, no doubt because each workshop had an expert who kept the brigade’s motor-generator sets operating, and cannibalization contributed a vital supply of spare parts.

One big disadvantage to legal cannibalization is the lost time of replacing the defective parts and their eventual removal again for repair. This is somewhat offset by ensuring that all the bits and pieces go back for repair, and also it is a better way to transport equipment to the repair depot than sending back the pieces in a bushel basket.

## 4.2-Inch Mortars

The infantry in the European Theatre experienced considerable difficulty with the 4.2-inch mortars. This weapon made its first appearance as a support weapon using high explosive (HE) in the North African campaign. The British had originally designed it as a chemical warfare weapon. On the conclusion of the North African campaign, the weapon was taken in use by the infantry and used with good effect in the Italian campaign.

The British experienced many failures of the base plate.<sup>70</sup> The Canadians in Europe experienced these same failures and sought a suitable modification. Essentially the problem in Europe was that after firing approximately one hundred rounds of HE, the base plate sank about a foot into the ground, with the result

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid. (102), Oct 44, Appendix I; Weighen to Grant, 58/8/Veh A/1/ME, 3 Oct 44.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. (17), pp 273-274.

that mud accumulated in the bearing of the rebound socket, causing it to seize. This seizure resulted in damage to the rebound sockets, which caused them to splay, and so prevented them revolving in their central sockets during traverse of the barrel in its mounting.

Troubles were also experienced with the base plates bending. Eventually, after many design changes, modifications were made that kept these weapons in serviceable condition by strengthening the base plate and fitting a device which locked the breech in the rebound socket.<sup>71</sup>

## Recovery Operations

Maj WM Dalrymple landed in Europe with his No. 3 Canadian Recovery Company on 2 August to provide recovery services for general headquarters, the line of communication troops, and the base units. Until that time, Maj HB Mattson's No. 2 Canadian Recovery Company was responsible for all the Canadian collecting points and traffic commitments in the theatre.

Recovery in the First Canadian Army area did not develop into an organized system until after the closing of the Falaise Gap on 21 August.<sup>72</sup> Thereafter, Dalrymple progressively took over the corps collecting points and traffic commitments from Mattson, thus releasing his equipment for operations closer to the front.

Prior to the breakout of the Normandy beachhead and later during the pursuit periods, there was little recovery allowed other than at brigade and regimental levels. During these critical periods, in order to keep the routes clear for the forward movement of the formations and their supplies, no backloading or evacuation of vehicle equipment casualties (crocks) was permitted until semi-static conditions were achieved.

In the Italian campaign, a different approach to the problem of keeping the roads clear for the advance of essential transport was used, which also permitted recovery and backloading. Recovery was restricted to "road clearance" in heavy traffic areas, with "limited recovery" and "complete recovery" in the less-congested areas. The gathering of crocks to backloading points, and the transporting of these crocks to workshops to the rear was limited to a daily "crock-time," generally from midnight to six o'clock in the morning.<sup>73</sup>

Dalrymple, who was brought back from Italy because of his recovery experience while in command of No. 1 Recovery Company, and given command of the newly-formed No. 3 Recovery Company on 12 June 1944, wrote after the war, "...it is my opinion that the procedure and policy employed in Italy was more efficient and practical ... as far as organized recovery was concerned."<sup>74</sup>

In France, the crowded conditions of the Normandy bridgehead and, after the breakthrough, the rapid advance of the Allied formations as they raced across Europe, lengthened the supply lines to such an extent that, by the middle of September, 21 Army Group's lines of communication had lengthened to three hundred miles. This was double the distance on which the allotment of transport had been calculated. Therefore, until port (especially Antwerp) and rail facilities were developed, the road maintenance lift had to be increased by every possible means.<sup>75</sup>

The consumption of gasoline was so enormous that the greater part of the supply transport was used to bring it forward from the rear installations. Air transport was used to the maximum, and some units had to

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<sup>71</sup> WD CREME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps Troops, Oct 44 and Ibid. (17), pp 273-274.

<sup>72</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade, Europe July 1944 to May 1945; p 16: West Brothers, Mitcham, UK, 1945.

<sup>73</sup> Operational Manual, RCEME, Part I, Appendix A, p 1: Ottawa, 1948.

<sup>74</sup> HQ DEME Hist 2526, Dalrymple to DME; 11 Company RCEME RO (V) 5-0, d, 28 Sep 46.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. (4), p 47.

be temporarily stripped of part of their transport in order to support the forward units, whose momentum of advance had to be maintained.<sup>76</sup>

Incidentally, pipelines were also laid to carry gasoline forward. Capt GH Marton, Officer Commanding 125 Light Aid Detachment attached to 1 Canadian Line of Communication Signals, and his men turned out in an attempt to stop a leak in one of these pipelines near Canon, France, on 5 September.

“The French people for miles around were filling pitchers, pails, cider barrels, and other containers with petrol” wrote Capt Marton. “The petrol was knee deep for a considerable distance. The neighbouring streams were filled, and looked like rivers of petrol. Warnings were issued of the dangers of fire.”

The LAD managed to stop the leak until the arrival of the Royal Engineers, who were to make repairs. The inevitable happened – the gasoline was set afire. “The creek beside the mess was a wall of flame at least forty feet high” continued Marton. “The QM lost all his personal clothing and equipment. The villagers were very frightened and a couple of women became quite hysterical.”<sup>77</sup>

This rapid advance also required an increased number of airfields to be built to permit short-range aircraft to operate further forward for longer periods, thus increasing the demand for the transportation of big awkward loads such as airfield construction equipment.<sup>78</sup>

By the first week of October there were nine tank transporter companies, the full entitlement for 21 Army Group, in Europe. One company of three platoons, No. 65 Canadian Tank Transporter Company, RCASC, was allotted to the First Canadian Army, three to the Second British Army, and five were placed under General Headquarters control. The Corps had an establishment of forty-three 40-ton tank transporters in the theatre at this time. These transporters were located as follows:

2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop	6
4 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop	6
No. 2 Canadian Recovery Company	8
No. 3 Canadian Recovery Company	21
No. 1 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop	1
No. 2 Canadian Advanced Base Workshop	1
Total:	43 <sup>79</sup>

The eventual conversion by No. 2 Advanced Base Workshop of over a hundred of these tank transporters into load carriers was essential to the support of the Canadian advance.

In August, the Second British Army followed the Canadian example when they converted one company of ninety 40-ton tank transporters into load carriers. Earlier No. 65 Canadian Transporter Company had arranged for one platoon of thirty transporters to be converted into load carriers by the addition of removable flooring and two-foot high sidewalls made out of airfield track.<sup>80</sup>

These thirty converted transporters were not enough to meet the Canadian commitments. Additional transporters were required to supplement the fleet and these came from the RCEME establishment. Maj HB Mattson was instructed to send his eight 40-ton transporters from No. 4 and 5 Heavy Recovery

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. (3), p 204.

<sup>77</sup> WD 125 LAD, Sep 44.

<sup>78</sup> Warren, Arnold: Wait For The Waggon, p 305, McClelland and Stewart, 1961.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. (77), Oct 44.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. (4), p 47.

Sections, which had been transporting tanks from the Seine to Antwerp and were converted to load carriers only the week before, to No. 65 Tank Transporter Company<sup>81 82</sup> for employment on priority airfield construction work. These transporters were sent on 22 September and did not return to their unit until 14 October. During this period they were running between Bayeux and Antwerp.<sup>83</sup>

These modified transporters could lift sixteen and a half tons of supplies, thirty-six tons of ammunition,<sup>84</sup> ten tons of POL, or five hundred jerricans of gasoline, which meant a very considerable increase in lift for a three-platoon company.<sup>85</sup>

At this period, almost all of The Corps' tank transporters were employed in transporting heavy unit stores, such as tank engine assemblies and transmissions in the case of the armoured brigade workshops, and the movement of supply dumps and other heavy loads in the case of the two recovery companies. In December, No. 2 Recovery Company supplied a fleet of seven transporters from No. 5 Heavy Recovery Section for the shipment of coal from Eindhoven to Nijmegen for use in civilian power plants.<sup>86</sup>

It was this employment of tank transporters that probably made Dalrymple feel that recovery in Italy was more efficient than in Europe and caused Colonel Meighen to write in his war diary:

“...by October 1944, there was a critical shortage of 40-ton tank transporters available for recovery. These transporters are on RCEME establishments for recovery and backloading purposes, but they are being used for airfield construction and tank transporting.”<sup>87</sup>

Such a complaint is understandable but unjustified. First things must come first and at this time maintaining the momentum of the advancing formations was paramount.

## Caravans, Shelters, Cook Trucks, and Heaters

### Caravans

“An Englishman thinks he is moral when he is only uncomfortable”. These words written by George Bernard Shaw in 1903 gave way to the blunt “any damn fool can be uncomfortable” attitude that permeated the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Its attainment was a matter of degree, depending at the top upon rank and materiel, and descending rapidly changing to a combination of opportunity and ingenuity.

The knowledge that the user prefers to influence the design of his personal comforts, coupled with the hurdle of the general acceptance of a standard design, was not overlooked by the development agencies responsible for caravans and kitchen trucks.

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid. (84), Oct 44.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. (131), Sep 44.

<sup>83</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Recovery Company, Sep - Oct 44.

<sup>84</sup> Arnold Warren wrote: “The trailer could take twenty tons and, by off-loading the ballast, the prime mover could carry another ten tons”. (Page 305, *Wait For The Waggon*). The specifications (Vehicle Data Book, Canadian Army Overseas, pp 23-24 and 149-150, CMHQ, Dec 44.) for the Transporter, Recovery, 40-Ton (Tractor) states under Body Details: “Steel, cab seats, two, body is special design with box for 7 tons ballast”. The specifications for the Transporter, Recovery, 40-Ton (Trailer) show that, by subtracting the curb weight from the laden weight of the axles, the trailer capacity was 91,000 lbs. The heaviest tank carried was the Tank, Cruiser (Sherman VC, M4A4) weighing 78,000 lbs fully equipped. The Sherman M4A2 or M4A4, the most common tank carried in the cruiser class, weighed 70,000 lbs fully equipped.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. (4), p 47.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. (143), Dec 44.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. (131), Oct 44.

Thus very senior officers had much to say about the design of their personal caravans, although perhaps not so much as did their staffs, who thought they knew better (and sometimes they did) what their superiors wanted, and issued instructions in their names without their superior's knowledge or approval.

In describing one lot of six caravans authorized for a GOC's camp, the war diary of Headquarters, DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps records:

“Colonel Meighen was able to have his own design principles adopted. Most people in designing a caravan forget that the body must be long and narrow, and that it is square areas that give the most room, therefore beds and desks should be at either end with as little as possible along the side walls. The entrance should be on the side.”

The diary continues with a description of the basic changes made to the standard 3-ton GS truck that was used for most caravans.

“We are moving the body of the 3-tonner up to the cab, and lengthening the back end out over the rear axle by welding on a five-foot section cut off from the front of a 3-ton “W” crock. This makes the total body length 17 feet 6 inches, or an overall length of about one foot longer than a standard 3-ton truck with its tailgate lowered to a horizontal position. This design is five feet longer than the present caravans, and will have about twice the working space available.

“All the steel work, including the 6 foot 9 inch high superstructure, will be done by RCEME. The wood panelling, cabinetwork, and finishing will be done by the firm of FR and L Stevens in Ghent to detailed drawings and specifications provided by this office, and who will also make the daily inspections. We are providing issue beds, English lights, German desks, and RCEME light proof ventilators.”<sup>88</sup>

Other lots of caravans were authorized for construction and built in RCEME workshops. Sappers loaned from the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers did the wood panelling and cabinetwork.

At this time (October and November) there was enough authorized caravan construction at the divisional level that the CREMEs either brought in an officer or appointed their EME Telecommunications as a coordinator of caravan construction. These unhappy officers were usually referred to by their colleagues as the DADME<sup>89</sup> Caravans.”

The brigade workshop, of course, constructed caravans of various ingenious designs for themselves and the regiments they served. These caravans were primarily constructed using light gauge sheet metal that was a lot easier to find than plywood.

## Shelters

The officers and men of the brigade workshops were generally accommodated by workshop sections. With the facilities and skills available, it was not difficult for them to make up safari-type beds<sup>90</sup> for all the men. Although the safari bed was popular because of its light weight (seven and a half pounds) and portability (it rolled up and could be packed in the middle of a bed roll) it nevertheless was described by one senior officer as “a bed guaranteed to prevent one from sleeping in past 5 o'clock in the morning.”

Accommodation arrangements for the third and fourth line workshops were supplemented by billeting the men in civilian homes.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. (102), Oct 44.

<sup>89</sup> Pronounced “Dad-me”. Today's (1963) abbreviation is DADEME given the pronunciation of “Dad-me” or Dad-eh-me”.

<sup>90</sup> The sale of the Safari Bed by the Hounsfield Bed Company of London was limited to one per officer.

In the field, the LADs sheltered their men in natural groups based on their trade, employment, or mode of travel. For example, in one Type “C” LAD, the sergeant-major and the clerk slept on the desk and in the aisle of the office trailer. The recovery crews each had their own shelters and took them wherever they went. The storemen slept in the aisles of their stores trucks. The remaining tradesmen arranged themselves into shelter groups identical to the vehicle groups they usually travelled in.

### **Kitchen Trucks**

The same development agencies that shirked their design responsibilities for caravans had earlier, with equal success avoided the development of a satisfactory kitchen truck. They had provided an unimaginative set of drawings to accompany the 3-ton GS trucks that were issued to units for conversion to kitchen trucks “within unit resources” because they suspected, it has been said, that “welders (as was true in some cases) made the best cooks.”

“In modern military operations” wrote Maj NA Shackleton,<sup>91</sup> ammunition and fuel impose the greatest burden upon the supply system of the Army. But the most vital component of the military machine runs on food.” Although the methods of war have greatly changed over the last few hundred years, there has been little corresponding change in the basic needs for the sustenance of the individual. For this reason alone, greater emphasis should have been placed on the design, development, and issue of a mobile, efficient, field kitchen to the units.

The issue of special pack rations for use by the combat troop probably re-emphasized the need for centralized cooking, and started the need for individual or group mess-tin cooking. However, the supporting troops and the combat troops, when brought out of combat, normally were fed from a company or echelon kitchen. Thus there was a requirement for both systems of feeding, and only one was satisfactorily developed by the responsible development agencies.

Preparing three appetizing meals a day for a company or a squadron in the field, in the limited confines of the back of a truck, was a challenge that many cooks were unable to meet. This warranted that every consideration should be given to their preference in lighting, equipment, and layout of storage and working areas. Thus many kitchen trucks of excellent design were created. The more ambitious cooks had bake and warming ovens and, in at least one instance, had a marble slab countersunk into the workbench on which to roll pastry.<sup>92</sup>

### **Heaters and Cookers**

Various types of heaters were designed in the field to replace and to supplement the limited supply of the smoky contaminated-air kerosene-burning space heaters. The field-designed heaters were of the fuel-water drip type. The fuel varied from crank case oil through various mixtures of oil and gasoline to pure gasoline. The fuel was dripped on a preheated plate that vaporized and burned it in such a manner as to keep the plate hot enough to maintain the cycle. The water, controlled separately, dropped on the same plate and flashed into steam, improving the combustion. Other heaters merely dripped the water and fuel into a cup of sand. One of the dangers of using an oil-gasoline mixture was that the more flammable gasoline burned at a faster rate leaving behind a pool of flaming oil, which after a few hours operation was apt to overflow and set the shelter afire.

One interesting space heater was developed in the field that dripped pure gasoline on a preheated plate. This was unique in that opening a steel drawer in the combustion chamber controlled the amount of air for combustion. The drawer also caught any surplus of fuel that ran off the plate, which incidentally projected

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<sup>91</sup> Shackleton, Maj NA; Food and the Fighting Man; Canadian Army Journal, Vol XVI, No. 2, 1962.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. Shackleton’s article presents an interesting review of the importance of diet, cooking methods, and cookers upon the success of an army from the Napoleonic Wars until 1962.



into the drawer. Placing a flaming wad of paper in the open drawer before the fuel was turned on ignited the stove. This stove had two drawbacks: it operated with a roar, and flames shot from the stack when it was turned up, for the stack (by design) then became part of the combustion chamber. However, it was not necessary to operate under these conditions as it gave ample heat at a low burning rate and made a caravan or shelter quite comfortable.

A modern descendent of these drip type stoves was developed by the Canadian Army Development Establishment to meet the heating requirements of bunkers in Korea. The Korean campaign was over before the development was completed. The stove burns any solid or liquid fuel and is quiet and portable. The tubing, burners, stove pipes, etc, may be dismantled and stowed away inside the stove, which measures 6" x 7 3/4" x 18 1/2". Liquid fuel is supplied by a jerrican. The output varies from 10,000 to 20,000 BTUs.

The standard issue cooker was an oversized gasoline blowtorch that weighed 60 pounds. The food was partially cooked, then placed in insulated containers where the process was completed without further use of the cooker. Seven containers and insulators with miscellaneous utensils met the needs of a company.<sup>93</sup>

The fuel was vaporized by passing through a ring shaped pipe heated by the flame. This vaporizing ring blocked up after a few hours use by deposits from the fuel. The easiest way to clean the ring was to cut it off, heat it to dull red, and force pure oxygen through the ring to oxidize the deposits. These rings lasted through about three such cleaning treatments.

Maj Dalrymple introduced a much better cooker from the Italian theatre. In his cooker, he retained the pressurized fuel tank of the standard cooker and connected it to a long bent tube fitted with three or four burners on it. Resembling a trombone, it became known as the trombone cooker. In Dalrymple's design, fuel oil was used and the plumbing had provisions for clean-out for ease of maintenance.

The trombone heater was used in the kitchens by almost every RCEME workshop. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop made a shower bath heated by a trombone. It took only three quarters of an hour to heat 120 gallons of water.

An interesting water heater that came to North-west Europe from North Africa by way of Italy was the Benghazi heater, which it has been said was introduced to North Africa by the Indian Army. It was simple and quick, consisting of a hollow truncated cone, the larger end of which was welded to the inside and bottom of a slightly shorter cylinder, fitted with stubby legs and a pitcher handle and spout. The hollow cone provided the large heat transfer surface required for fast boiling of water. The heater was in fact a miniature fire-tube boiler (mostly fire-tube).

The Benghazi was very useful for a fast brew up of tea particularly during the frequent short halts of a convoy. Under these circumstances, the driver or the co-driver of a jeep would run ahead of their halted vehicle, place the Benghazi over a container of sand and gasoline, light the fire and hurry back to his vehicle. Usually by the time the convoy moved on again, the water was boiling. The passenger, leaning out of the vehicle, retrieved the heater while on the move and had enough boiling water for two mugs of tea.

If the heater was made from the light gauge metal of the expendable gasoline cans, a rolled up ball of flaming paper gave off enough heat for one mug of tea.

Larger models boiled a gallon of water in about four minutes using a cup of gasoline; The Benghazi's inefficiency was compensated for by its speed.

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

### **Misuse of RCEME Field Facilities**

The role in war of the RCEME field organization, as executed in The Corps' widespread facilities, was (and still is) to ensure the operational fitness of the technical equipment of the army.<sup>94</sup> However, the uncounted hundreds of thousands of man-hours spent on the projects already described, multiplied by a huge number of similar projects involving other equipment in every RCEME facility in the theatre, diluted the effectiveness of The Corps' mission.

The enormous development and construction effort carried out in The Corps' workshops, primarily as a matter of principle, belonged to the development agencies. In fairness to these agencies, it must be stressed that many field commanders deliberately used the workshop facilities under their command as their private agencies to develop and build their pet projects, justifying their action that the official agency would take too long to produce results.

The workshop generally welcomed this work to fill in slack periods, and for a stimulating diversion from routine, but they were not staffed to design and build new equipments to a given deadline. Nor could they provide the search parties to locate the materiel necessary for their construction without, as often was the case, serious interference to the workshops official role of keeping their formations' fighting equipment battle worthy.

### **Armoured Fighting Vehicle Servicing and Repair**

Reinforcements for the Canadian Armoured Corps were sent forward by Lt-Col GC Stewart's 25 Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment). The Elgin's 'forward delivery squadrons' moved both the tanks and crews to their ultimate destination – the armoured regiments in the field. In North-west Europe, "F" Squadron reinforced First Canadian Army Units; "E" Squadron reinforced 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps; "C" Squadron reinforced 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade and "D" Squadron reinforced 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division.<sup>95 96</sup>

### **No. 1 Canadian Section AFV Inspectorate (21 Army Group)**

The AFV Inspectorate contained two identical groups, each commanded by a major. One group under the command of Maj EA Perry was attached to "F" Squadron, and the other under the command of Maj AS Olver was attached to "E" Squadron. They were responsible to see that the reinforcement tanks were up to standard before being forwarded to the regiments. These inspection groups were formed on 31 May 1944 and joined their Squadrons on 19 June.<sup>97</sup>

### **The Shortage of Wireless Sets**

In theory, new and repaired reinforcement AFVs were to be completely serviced, kitted, and crewed before they were delivered to the regiments.

In fact, for several reasons, such as shortages, workshop production rates, etc., this did not happen. One item in short supply was wireless sets. By the time a tank casualty reached the third line workshop after being abandoned on the battlefield, from a few hours to perhaps a few days, it had been exposed to complete destruction by enemy saboteurs, looting, and cannibalization by the 'friendly forces'. The most attractive item to the friendly forces, not counting liquor (frequently the liquor bottle was found shattered in the ration box under the turret), was the wireless set. These sets were used either to build up a

<sup>94</sup> Canadian Army Manual of Training (CAMT 11-2) RCEME In The Field; 1960, Revised May 1962; AHQ, Ottawa.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. (42), p 631.

<sup>96</sup> Baker, Lt-Col HF (GGFG) notes from his notebook when he was on the staff of HQ 2 ARG, RAC; 21 Army Gp, 22 Feb 45: located in RCEME historical files.

<sup>97</sup> WD 1 Canadian Section AFV Inspectorate (21 Army Group) 31 May 1944; also Pt II Order No. 1, 9 Jun 44.

regimental pool for reinstallation in reinforcement tanks arriving without a wireless or for personal use by small groups of troops to listen to the BBC. This situation was further aggravated by a preference for the Canadian-made No. 19 Wireless Set Mark III. The Canadian Mk III's seemed to stay serviceable longer than the British-made Mk III, and therefore the armoured regiments tried to secure, by fair means or foul, a reserve of Canadian Mk III's for installation or exchange in their own tanks. The LAD officer or regimental technical adjutant also traded sets with the armoured brigade workshop for Canadian Mk III's. The workshops usually carried a pool or float of serviceable sets. Thus it is not hard to understand that, by the time the tank casualties reached the third line workshops, they could be and often were badly depleted in addition to being damaged.<sup>98</sup>

The shortage of wireless sets was recognized by First Canadian Army because they issued instructions to the third line workshops allowing them to place repaired tanks in the reinforcement stream without wireless sets. It then fell upon "F" Squadron to provide the sets if they could, and so on down the line with the receiving regiment installing hoarded sets when necessary from their private pools, with the accompanying scurry in the battle areas to acquire more sets to replenish their regimental holdings. Thus was added another twist to this vicious spiral.

The depressive effect on the quality of the workshop output that was caused by a strong demand for a high production rate must not be disregarded. Quality of output was hard to maintain and inevitably gave way to quantity until the stabilizing counter-forces in the nature of a sufficient volume of complaints and weight of criticism from the users focused the attention of the DDME on the lowered standards in RCEME third line workshops. On the other hand, the forward workshops kept their standards high, at times sacrificing a high production rate, for they were close to their users and their relationships with the regiments were more personal. These corrective forces freed by the tide of complaints forced First Canadian Army to cancel their letter allowing the third line workshop to release tanks without wireless sets. Brigadier Grant instructed his third line workshops on 21 October to equip the tanks with wireless sets if at all possible, and it was to be a CO's decision rather than the rule that would allow a tank to go forward without a set. Under these circumstances, the third line workshops were to assist "F" Squadron to install the sets when it was beyond their capability or capacity. Sets that reached the third line workshops were to be completely inspected, repaired, and reinstalled in the tanks. Brigadier Grant also made arrangements to provide a reserve of eight wireless set stations and installation kits at each of the second line workshops. As a result of this action plus a careful comb-out of the unauthorized sets in use by the troops for listening to the BBC, the wireless set shortage was slowly corrected.<sup>99</sup>

## General Repairs

Much of the same situation existed in the state of repair of the tanks, mainly because of the continuing reluctance of the third and second line workshops to do any first echelon repairs. Each step forward that a repaired tank took towards its eventual arrival at the battlefield was preceded by a check. The demand for tanks was high, for the regiments were endeavouring to get back to full strength in preparation for the spring offensive. The demand for a high production rate created sufficient pressure for the quality of the output from the third line workshops to drop below a level acceptable to Maj Perry and his AFV inspectors, who inspected all the reinforcement AFVs sent to "F" Squadron for kitting and crewing.

A lowering of the quality of output in the third line workshops also resulted in an increased demand on the repair capability and spare parts supply in the forward workshops. If the repair capability is exceeded and the supply of spare parts is unable to satisfy the demand, high-level complaints are the results.

On 7 November 1944, the BRAC visited Brig Grant to discuss methods of improving the output of the third line workshops. Large numbers of unserviceable tanks were being sent to "F" Squadron, and the

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<sup>98</sup> Author's personal recollection.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. (84), Oct 44 and author's personal recollection.

squadron could not keep up with the work of repairing these tanks. Brig Grant quickly agreed with the BRAC that tanks leaving the third line workshops must be completely repaired and fully serviced, and that the best way to do this would be under base rather than field conditions. Thus the Armoured Reinforcement Group (ARG) should direct their control efforts towards development of base resources, in order to prevent this work of servicing and modifying tanks from being carried out under field conditions in the army area.<sup>100</sup> A series of meetings resulted from the 7 November conference and are briefly described below.

**8 November.** Maj DF Cornish, DADME (Vehicles) attended a meeting at the HQ of No. 2 ARG. Again it was readily agreed in principle that every effort must be made to completely service each tank before delivery. Unfortunately it was not possible to reach this high ideal, and a compromise was made to the effect that, “if, due to operational reasons, this is not possible, each tank will be given a comprehensive road test, and if it does not perform satisfactorily, it will not be sent forward until it is in good condition.” This compromise obviously excluded the functioning of the gun and probably the “A” portion of the wireless set.<sup>101</sup>

The No. 19 Wireless Set Canadian Mk III was really two sets, identified as the “A” Set and the “B” Set. The “A” set was a medium power HF [high frequency] transceiver with a range of ten miles (RT) [voice] or twenty miles (CW) [morse code]. The “B” set was a low power VHF [very high frequency] transceiver with a 1,000 yard line-of-sight range. The “A” set was used for regimental and squadron communication. The “B” set for troop communication.

**29 November.** Lt-Col Boehm, the BRAC, the Q (AE) [Quartermaster (Armoured Equipment)], the GSO 1 (SD) [General Staff Office, Grade 1 (Staff Duties)], and the Colonel GS [General Staff], all from HQ First Canadian Army, met to discuss a proposal from 21 Army Group that an AFV Servicing Unit be placed under command, to service all of First Canadian Army’s reinforcement tanks. It was admitted that such a unit could completely service the number of tanks involved, but:

- The flexibility of output would be sacrificed through small daily production.
- Efficiency would be lost through having to site the workshop in the field within the army area, under working conditions much less favourable than they were at base.
- The kitting problem, which would remain with ARG (and was always a bottleneck in deliveries) might require considerable organization on the part of the Elgins [the armoured delivery regiment].”

This obscure and verbose statement was intended to support the recommendation made at the 7 November meeting already referred to, and to prepare the way for a counter-proposal to be discussed on 7 December. Thus the meeting ended without any decision being reached.<sup>102</sup>

**1 December.** Lt-Col Boehm participated in a conference chaired by the DA & QMG. Here groundwork was prepared to shift the responsibility for the delivery of completely serviced and equipped tanks to 21 Army Group.<sup>103</sup>

In the meantime, complaints were coming to Brig Grant from 824 British Tank Troops Workshop, which serviced “F” Squadron, that all their tank production was lost because the large AWD they had set up were doing first echelon repairs for the squadron. On 2 December, he sent Boehm and Lt-Col McKinlay, CREME First Canadian Army Troops, to investigate 824 Workshop’s claim “that a large number of tanks had been received from “F” Squadron, all of which required only minor repairs.”

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. Nov 44.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. (84), Dec 44.

Boehm requested the CO of 824 Workshop to withdraw his AWD from “F” Squadron, and to confine their duties to the overflow work from 43 LAD. This consisted of heavy first and second echelon repairs for “F” Squadron, plus full responsibility as a third line workshop in support of 1<sup>st</sup> Polish Armoured Division.

McKinlay was asked to look into the operation and relationship of 43 LAD attached to “F” Squadron. His investigation showed that the LAD, under command of Capt EWE Parker had lost sight of its aim, and most of its identity, by integrating with the squadron’s tradesmen. The LAD’s productive capacity was being absorbed by doing unit maintenance and repairs. The reinforced squadron tradesmen were still unable to keep abreast of maintenance and unit repairs, and consequently tanks requiring maintenance, unit repairs, and first echelon repairs were sent back to 824 Army Troops Workshop.

Lt-Col Boehm held a meeting with Lt-Colonels McKinlay and Stewart, Maj OLG Atkey, OC “F” Squadron, the BRAC, and the DAQMG(AE). They agreed that this state of affairs could not continue. Stewart agreed to undertake the submission of an establishment proposal that would enable his regiment to carry out the unit repairs and maintenance that had been done by the LAD. Capt AB Otto replaced Parker on 6 December, and immediately separated the LAD from the squadron tradesmen, thus allowing 43 LAD to function in its normal role, and to assume its normal responsibilities.<sup>104 105</sup>

**7 December.** Returning to the series of meetings that were held to try to find a solution to the continuing problem of servicing reinforcement tanks, Brig Grant met with the Q(A) 21 Army Group to discuss the introduction of a new organization for servicing the AFV equipments. Grant proposed that 21 Army Group assume complete responsibility for servicing all of First Canadian Army’s reinforcement tanks. His proposal was rejected. The Q(A) 21 Army Group ruled that for the next two months First Canadian Army and Second British Army would be responsible for servicing their own equipments and, if this proved a failure, then servicing and kitting would be placed under the centralized control of the Q(A) 21 Army Group.

Following the meeting, Boehm and McKinlay visited the 2<sup>nd</sup> British Armoured Delivery Regiment’s 256 and RA Detachment, which serviced and forwarded reinforcement self-propelled artillery to Second British Army. This detachment had been entirely remodelled, and bore little resemblance to the original concept of a squadron. A REME armoured brigade workshop had been superimposed on the squadron. The combined unit resembled a static “Chilwell AFV Depot”. This reorganization resulted in a unit that produced equipments in excellent condition for the Second British Army.<sup>106 107</sup>

**12 December.** With 824 British Tank Troops workshop now supporting “F” Squadron by accepting second and heavy first echelon repairs from 43 LAD (who in the meantime had returned to their designed functions and responsibilities), and influenced by the example of the good work being done by 2 ARG’s organization, Brig Grant agreed that No. 3 British AFV Servicing Unit in Antwerp, under the command of Maj Ken Case, RCEME, and on loan to First Canadian Army, would be superimposed on “F” Squadron. This would bring to bear the strength of the RCEME repair organization, and attempt to put new and repaired equipment into a battle worthy state.<sup>108 109</sup> Case moved his unit to Eindhoven on 28 December, and received his first tank for servicing on 2 January 1945.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>104</sup> WD HQ CREME First Canadian Army Troops, Dec 44.

<sup>105</sup> WD 43 LAD, Dec 44.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. (164).

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. (156).


<sup>108</sup> Ibid. (164).

<sup>109</sup> Boehm, Col CR to RHH 5 Feb 63.

<sup>110</sup> WD 3 British AFV Servicing Unit, REME, Dec 44 and Jan 45.

Lt-Col Boehm accompanied by his DADME Workshop, Maj EG Pallister, called on Maj Case the next day to arrange for 3 AFV Servicing Unit to use Canadian control procedures and returns. Because Maj EA Perry's AFV Inspectorate and "F" Squadron were also in Eindhoven, Case agreed to drop his out-inspection because Perry's in-inspection covered the same work. Pallister spent several days with Case in co-ordinating and smoothing out the flow of work. The arrangement arrived at is shown in Figure 11.<sup>111</sup>

Figure 11 - Diagram Showing Location of 3 AFV Servicing Unit, REME, in the AFV Reinforcement Stream<sup>112 113</sup> 28 Dec 44 – 31 May 45



The role of the servicing unit was primarily inspection, tuning and adjusting, modifying, and making first echelon repairs. Their daily quota of serviced tanks delivered to "F" Squadron was set at a minimum of ten.

Brig Grant, the Colonel A/Q, and the BRAC inspected the new system on 8 January 1945. They were not satisfied with the production rate or with what they saw, and sent Boehm to visit Case and Maj Perry of the AFV Inspectorate on the 12<sup>th</sup> to discuss methods of increasing production. Additional workshop space was made available.

A few days later, on 17 January, Pallister visited Eindhoven, and found that the additional workshop space had not been vacated by its military tenants, and that 4 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop's AWD was still working in the street.<sup>114</sup> He quickly rectified the situation and production slowly

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. (84), Jan 45.

<sup>112</sup> Case, Maj Ken, RCEME to RHH, 2 Jul 63.

<sup>113</sup> 3 AFV Servicing Unit's "Out-Inspection" was dropped because it duplicated 1 Canadian Section AFV Inspectorate's "In-Inspection".

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. (164), Jan 45.

improved. (See Table 7) The desired minimum of ten tanks was reached for only one day during the month, on 30 January.<sup>115</sup>

The following day, the 31<sup>st</sup>, Brig Grant met with the Colonel A/Q and Lt-Col Stewart, the CO of the armoured delivery regiment, to discuss ways of ensuring that the servicing unit would maintain the minimum production.<sup>116</sup> At this meeting it was agreed to add six tradesmen to Perry's inspectorate and sixteen tradesmen to Case's servicing unit for a 60-day period. It was also agreed that Pallister would spend from two to three weeks at the Elgin's headquarters to co-ordinate all servicing activities. However events did not allow him to stay for more than a few days, because his services were needed as CREME 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division.

On the 15<sup>th</sup>, Maj DC Ferguson, DADME AFV Servicing, was called in by Boehm and given one week to get the servicing unit's daily production rate up to ten.

The same day, Case went to Brig Grant to request changes in personnel, and the right to select the tanks to be serviced by his unit by rejecting tanks that required second echelon repairs. A decision was delayed until four days later, when Grant and McKinlay, visited Case at Eindhoven. Case showed his visitors that the work content of the incoming tanks was far in excess of that for which his unit was designed. Case was granted permission to select his tanks from the delivery squadron "within the unit's schedule". (This presumably means the Permissive Repair Schedule.) Case was then instructed to proceed on leave pending his replacement.<sup>117 118 119</sup>

Maj Case was posted to the British AFV Inspectorate on the 20<sup>th</sup>. Maj WV MacInnes, who took over on 29 February, succeeded him.

Meanwhile, on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, McKinlay discussed with McAdam measures to increase the production of the AFV servicing unit. It was "discovered" that the poor results hitherto achieved by that unit were due, in the main, to the fact that repairs of too heavy a nature were being attempted. At the conclusion of the discussion it was decided to put the following measures into effect:

- a. Two men were to be attached to vehicle company (AOD) to inspect tanks scheduled for delivery to 25 Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment and reject any requiring major repairs.
- b. Tanks were to be inspected on delivery to 25 Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment, and those requiring heavier repairs were to be segregated for repair by a workshop.
- c. All suspension repairs were to be completed before a tank reached 3 AFV SU."<sup>120</sup>

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. (170), Dec 44 - May 45.

<sup>116</sup> While Brig Grant was discussing the vexing problem of production with Lt-Col Stewart, Lt-Col McKinlay, CREME 1 Canadian Army Troops was discussing low through-put with the CO of 231 (British) Infantry Brigade Workshop, REME. McKinlay said "The only way in which production can be increased is by lowering the specification of what constitutes a vehicle 'fit for issue', and it is desired not to adopt this course except as a last resort". (WD HQ RCEME 1 Canadian Army Troops, Jan 45).

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. Feb 45.

<sup>118</sup> 3 AFV Servicing Unit, REME, was placed "under command CREME 1 Canadian A Troops (Lt-Col McKinlay) and under CO 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop (Lt-Col H Bruce McAdam) for local supervision".

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. (164), Feb 45.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

*Table 7 - 3 AFV SU'S Production of Serviced AFVS<sup>121</sup> Dec 1944 - May 1945*

DAY	DEC 1944	JAN 1945	FEB 1945	MAR 1945	APR 1945	MAY 1945
1	7		10	6		
2	4		4	11	7	
3	1		10	10	10	
4	5		3		8	4
5	2		8	7	7	9
6	5	2	6	10	6	
7	2		7	8	5	
8	3		9	11		
9	6	3	9	10		6
10	2	3	10	9		5
11	2	5	4		5	5
12	4	1	4	5	5	3
13	9	2	8	12	6	
14	8	5	5	6	6	4
15	7	4	4	9		5
16	7	1	4	9	7	6
17	4	5	9	10	2	4
18	4	5	4		9	3
19	7	4	5	6	7	2
20	9	4	10	7	9	
21		4	7	6	16	2
22	8	8	9	6		
23		8	10	4	7	
24		6	9		3	
25		5				
26		6	10			
27		3	10	2		
28		6	10	9		
29		7		9		
30		10		9		
31		6		9		
Totals 106		113	198	200	125	58

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. (170), Dec 44 – May 45.



Average 5.0	4.7	7.3	8	6.9	4.5
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Total Tanks Serviced in NWE – 1,715

At the same time, Grant discussed with Lt-Col Stewart of the Elgins the poor condition in which the tanks were received from “F” Squadron at the servicing unit. This most unsatisfactory condition was documented and sent to the Q(AE) 21 Army Group for corrective action. First Canadian Army attached two specialists to the AOD to carefully select tanks sent to First Canadian Army.<sup>122</sup>

By 18 March, McKinlay had arranged for approximately 110 tanks that had been declared “beyond local repair” (BLR) by the servicing unit to be repaired in 824 British Tank Troops Workshop, No. 2 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop and No. 4 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop. CREME, 79 Armoured Division, provided transporters and started hauling the BLR’d tanks the same day.

By the 30<sup>th</sup>, there were 127 unserviceable tanks distributed between the workshops, the servicing units and “F” Squadron. All but 36 were undergoing repair. A month later, the severity of the repair and servicing problem had shrunk and disappeared in the growing shadow of Operation *Eclipse*.

### 3 AFV SU REME In Retrospect

On the 15<sup>th</sup>, Maj DC Ferguson, DADME AFV Servicing, was called in by Boehm and given one week to get the servicing unit’s daily production rate up to ten. Perry was called in by Maj DRB McArthur, DADME Org, to discuss the inspectorate’s capability. Perry showed that each of his four teams was capable of doing three new inspections and four re-inspections, or four new inspections and two re-inspections per day. McArthur agreed that this was ample inspection capacity for the required daily production of ten tanks.

After reading the servicing unit’s diaries from the War Office, it is difficult to understand why Maj Case was given a daily minimum production rate of ten AFVs. His production rate was certainly available to Brig Grant, and known to the senior RCEME officers concerned, prior to the date 3 AFV SU was loaded to First Canadian Army.

The records show that Lt-Col Boehm visited Case in Antwerp on 12 December 1944, and that the previous day’s production was two tanks.

Lt-Col McKinlay visited Case the following day, and the previous day’s production was four tanks. Lt-Col TT Truman, RCEME, GHQ, First Echelon, 21 Army Group visited him on 15 December. The previous day’s production was eight tanks. Finally he was visited by Lt-Col BH Miller, CO No. 4 Armoured Troops Workshop, RCEME, (later succeeded by H Bruce McAdam) on the 16<sup>th</sup> and the previous day’s production was seven tanks. The production rate for December 1944, calculated by dividing the month’s production by the number of days that tanks were produced, was five tanks per day.<sup>123</sup>

After Case moved his unit to Eindhoven and came under Canadian command, his unit’s efficiency and morale dropped considerably due to what Case described as “constant detailed interference and red tape, as well as removing key Canadian personnel for other units.”

When asked about the availability of spare parts Maj Case wrote:

“Under the British we had access to British, American, and Canadian Base Depots. Under Canadian command we were ordered to obtain all parts through Canadian channels (No. 1 Ordnance Maintenance Company). Less than ten per cent of our requirements could be met and production practically stopped. After several weeks we convinced RCOC that,

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. (84), Feb 45.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. (170), Dec 44.

due to diversified equipments, we should be permitted to return to our former supply system under 21 Army Group.”<sup>124</sup>

The weekly Field Returns of Other Ranks for 3 February 1945 records that Case had been given an increment of fourteen RCEME tradesmen, although the decision of Brigadier Grant made on 31 January already referred to above was for 16 tradesmen. His average for the month of February jumped to 7.3 tanks.

Under the watchful eyes of Lt-Cols McKinlay and McAdam, and Maj MacInnes (Case’s successor), and also taking full advantage of the improved conditions of tank selection and spare parts, the average for March climbed to eight tanks.

MacInnes moved his unit to Enschede in April, and although his average dropped to 6.9 tanks he achieved a record day’s production of sixteen tanks per day.

In May, as might be expected, the average dropped to 4.4 tanks per day.

## **No. 1 Canadian Section AFV Inspectorate In Retrospect**

In reviewing the problems of reinforcement AFVs from the point of view of Maj Perry’s inspectorate, several points should be mentioned that the reader may not be aware of, or may only attribute to the more “sophisticated” post-war tanks.

The tanks, once out of preservation were vulnerable to the cold and wet of the winter months. This was particularly true of the electrical systems. An idle tank could become inoperable after a week’s exposure to a damp atmosphere. Perry’s men re-inspected tanks after six days in the “ready-park”. These tanks had been through the servicing unit, had been passed by the inspectorate, and were awaiting movement forward. After six days of idleness, many refused to start, and had to be reprocessed through the servicing unit – purely and simply because moisture had condensed in their electrical systems.

As rugged as a tank may seem, it will not stand much misuse or abuse. There are too many mechanisms that have to be properly adjusted at all times. When inexperienced or unsupervised personnel attempted repairs and adjustments, they probably created more damage than improvements to the equipment.

Service manuals were next to impossible to obtain in the field, notwithstanding that most tanks were initially issued with such a manual. Service manuals for British equipments were generally not well prepared in contrast to American manuals.

From his experience as an inspector, Maj Perry had the feeling that 21 Army Group were dumping as much unserviceable equipment on the Canadian Army as they could – particularly British equipment such as Churchills, Crusaders, Cromwells, etc.

Another contributing factor was the single repair standard throughout The Corps. Despite the latter, repair expedients, and improvisations were unofficially recognized and encouraged and in no small part contributed to the successes enjoyed by the more aggressive and imaginative LAD officers.

It is the opinion of many of The Corps’ officers that the single repair standard concept should be enlarged to recognize field expedients and improvised repairs at the first line level in the field. Such recognition would at once prohibit this type or repair being attempted at the higher echelons (lines).

Returning once more to the role of Perry’s AFV Inspectorate. Charged with the responsibility of inspecting the outputs of the third line workshops feeding Case’s 3 AFV SU, and in turn, the servicing unit’s output to the reinforcement stream, Perry rejected all equipments repaired by expedient and not meeting specification. Perry was absolutely correct in his fundamental approach, and it is to his credit that

<sup>124</sup> Case, Maj Ken, RCEME, to RHH, 2 Jul 63. Maj Case’s letter is his recollection and those of his officers who were Capt Frank A Wyman, REME, Capt SG McMullen, RCOC, and Lt Wm F Nuttall, REME.

he refused to alter his rulings in spite of the heavy criticism and pressure his opposition brought to bear against him. Perry successfully rejected the entire output for one week of one of the Canadian third line workshops supplying repaired tanks to 3 AFV SU, because they were not repaired to specification. He also refused to pass any tank that was not equipped with a serviceable wireless set. Perry's name is remembered with pride by his colleagues in the LADs, which more than offset the rancour his name produced in the hearts of some of his "production first" colleagues in the rear echelons.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Author's personal recollections.

## ***RCEME from January to May 1945***

### **The Canadian Tactical Situation 1 Jan 1945 – 8 May 1945**

Apart from several companies of No. 1 Canadian Forestry Corps and the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Parachute Battalion, no other Canadian units were directly involved in the German offensive in the Ardennes that had started in mid-December, and there is no record that these Canadian units were supported by other than the British for repair and recovery of their equipment.

First Canadian Army wintered on the Maas and prepared for Operation *Veritable*. This was the code name for the destruction of all the enemy in the area west of the Rhine, from the flood positions south of Nijmegen as far south as the general line from Julich-Dusseldorf, as a preliminary to crossing the Rhine and engaging the enemy in mobile war north of the Ruhr.<sup>126</sup>

During January 1945, there were an unusual series of small-scale operations along the lower Maas at Kapelsche Veer. Here Colonel-General Kurt Student established a small bridgehead in allied territory for the training and battle inoculation of his young paratroopers. This training ground required a considerable Canadian effort before it was finally eliminated on 31 January. This was the end of the static period of winter warfare.<sup>127</sup>

Meanwhile First Canadian Army, with 30<sup>th</sup> British Corps under command, carried out preparations for Operation *Veritable*.<sup>128</sup>

For a period of time in February, General Crerar's command had grown to thirteen divisions, including nine from the United Kingdom.<sup>129</sup>

### **Operation Veritable**

*Veritable* began on 8 February, after an enormous buildup of guns, and, making its first appearance, the new 1<sup>st</sup> Rocket Unit, RCA, [later 1<sup>st</sup> Rocket Battery, RCA] which had twelve rocket projectors, each of 32 barrels. RCEME's only Type "F" LAD, No. 131 under command of Lt PIN Tripp was organized to support it.<sup>130</sup>

By midnight, all objectives for the first day had been attained. The Siegfried defences were pierced on 9 February, and the outskirts of Cleve entered. North of the Cleve-Nijmegen road, 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division successfully carried out amphibious operations. By 13 February, the Siegfried line had been completely breached and the Reichswald was cleared. The Canadians were opposite Emmerich. During the next nine days, with the extension of the front south and east of the Reichswald, Goch was captured and operations developed against Calcar.

While the Americans were launching an attack across the Roer River towards Dusseldorf and Munchen-Gladbach, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps were preparing to break through the enemy defences at Udem and Calcar and to exploit to Xanten. That operation began on 26 February and met desperate resistance.<sup>131</sup>

The enemy was so apprehensive about this area that he brought up fanatical paratroopers to block the Calcar-Xanten road north of the Hochwald, and at the same time placed special troops in the gap between the Hochwald and Balberger Wald. The appalling condition of the ground in the gap, which let the tanks

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. (42), p 456.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. (1), p 232.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. (4), p 94.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. (1), p 237.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. p 238.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. (4), p 94.

of the 21<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Regiment sink to their floor plates, and the natural strength of the enemy positions, prevented the Canadians from obtaining complete control of the Hochwald and the Balberger Wald until 4 March.<sup>132</sup>

With the success of this attack, the German forces retreated. By 10 March, 21 Army Group was along the west bank of the Rhine from Dusseldorf to Arnhem.

## Operation Goldflake [Moving 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps to NWE]

### Canada's Military Policy

On the political front, it had long been a cherished hope that the Canadian forces would fight together and not be separated as they now were. General Sir Arthur Currie had fought for this concept in the First World War with reasonable success, and General McNaughton had fought for this concept in the Second World War without success. As already mentioned, the Canadian government “considered it likely that when the Sicilian campaign was over, the division and the army tank brigade would be brought back to England...”

The Canadian Government declared that the national policy was for the Canadian Army Overseas to fight as a formation, and direction to this effect was sent to General HDG Crerar who had succeeded General McNaughton as GOC-in-C First Canadian Army on 20 March 1944. This policy was not easy to implement, but now the allied strategy showed the way. The combined Chiefs of Staff met at Malta and decided to send a number of British divisions and the Canadian forces in Italy to North-west Europe. General McNaughton's dream was at last to come true.<sup>133</sup>

On 2 February 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, which informed him that it was their intention “to build up the maximum possible strength on the western front and to seek a decision in that theatre.” The Canadian formations were among those to be withdrawn. *Goldflake*<sup>134</sup> was the code name given to the move of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps from Italy to North-west Europe.

### The Goldflake Route

Marseilles was chosen as the disembarkation port and D-Day, the date of starting embarkation from Italy, was set for 15 February.<sup>135</sup> In fact, the first flight left Italy on the 22<sup>nd</sup>.

“The immensity of the task was increased” wrote Colonel Nicholson<sup>136</sup> “by the fact that the Canadian units and formations in Italy were so widely scattered. Corps headquarters was then at Ravenna. To the North-west the 1<sup>st</sup> Division was dug in along the River Senio. On its left, the tanks of The Calgary Regiment were supporting the 56<sup>th</sup> (London) Division, while those of the Ontarios had reached Porto San Giorgio. The Three Rivers Regiment and the headquarters of the armoured brigade, en route from the Fifth Army's mountainous front to the Adriatic, were then at Borgo San Lorenzo, north of Florence. The 5<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division was in reserve, and spread along the coast for 30 miles from

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. (1), pp 249-251 and author's personal recollections.

<sup>133</sup> The entire narrative dealing with *Goldflake* except as otherwise indicated is based on Capt (?) Huffman's report to 131 Historical Section CMHQ entitled “Operation *Goldflake*, The Move of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps from Italy to North West Europe, February, March 1945”; dated 7 Aug 47.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. (1), p 164.

<sup>135</sup> Nicholson, Lt-Col GWL, *The Canadians in Italy*, p 662; Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1957.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. (195), p 661.

Cervia to Cattolica, with troops of its 12<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade stationed inland at Camerino, 30 miles south-west of Iasi.” The administrative units were even more widely dispersed.

All of these forces had to be routed out of Italy, through either of the ports of Leghorn or Naples. LSTs, cargo vessels, and troop ships carried out the sea movement from Italy.

The land route to be followed between Marseilles and the final dispersal point at Leuze in Belgium, a distance of almost 660 miles, was described in the administrative order and is shown in Table 8.

*Table 8 - Showing the Highway Route from Marseilles to Leuze<sup>137</sup>*

No. 538 from Marseilles to Senas  
 N No. 7 from Senas to Lyon  
 N No. 6 from Lyon to Chagny  
 N No. 74 from Chagny to Dijon  
 N No. 5 from Dijon to Melun  
 N No. 36 from Melun to Meaux  
 N No. 330 from Meaux to Senlis  
 N No. 32 from Senlis to Ham  
 N No. 30 from Ham to St Quentin  
 N No. 44 from St Quentin to Cambrai  
 N No. 29 from Cambrai to Valenciens  
 N No. 48 from Valenciens to Leuze

*Table 9 - Showing the Arrival of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps RCEME Units in North West Europe from the Italian Theatre*

<b>Serial No</b>	<b>Orbat<sup>138</sup></b>	<b>Arrival NWE<sup>139</sup></b>
	<b>Corps Troops</b>	
DEME/1	HQ DDME 1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps	24 February 45
1506	HQ RCEME 1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Troops	17 March
497	1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps Troops Workshop	16 March
651	26 Canadian LAD - (1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Survey Regiment)	27 February
109	50 Canadian LAD - (Signals 1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps)	25 February
655	51 Canadian LAD - (9 Canadian Field Park Coy)	25 February
685	67 Canadian LAD - (7 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Anti-tank Regiment)	27 February

<sup>137</sup> Route Nationale.

<sup>138</sup> ORBAT from CAORO (Secret), No. 5391, 30 Nov 1944; Pt I, Canadian Tps, AAI.

<sup>139</sup> Cook, Cpl GA, ORBAT First Canadian Army, and the dates these units arrived in their theatre of operations.

<b>Serial No</b>	<b>Orbat<sup>138</sup></b>	<b>Arrival NWE<sup>139</sup></b>
<b>First Canadian Army Troops under Control 1 Canadian C Troops in Italy</b>		
1597	1 Canadian Recovery Company	21 February
1597A	HQ 1 Canadian Recovery Company	21 February
1597B	1 Canadian Heavy Recovery Section	6 March
1597C	2 Canadian Heavy Recovery Section	25 February
1597D	3 Canadian Light Recovery Section	20 February
624	10 Canadian LAD - (1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Medium Regiment)	13 March
855	89 Canadian LAD - (2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian Medium Regiment)	13 March
684	66 Canadian LAD - (5 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Medium Regiment)	13 March
446	1 Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop	16 March
496	5 Canadian Armoured Troops Workshop	27 February
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division</b>		
1501	HQ RCEME 1 Canadian Div	21 March
116A	1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop	10 March
116B	2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop	15 March
116C	3 <sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop	18 March
609E	2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian LAA Workshop	18 March
627	13 Canadian LAD - (1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Anti-tank Regiment)	17 March
615	1 Canadian LAD - (1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)	11 March
616	2 Canadian LAD - (2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)	13 March
617	3 Canadian LAD - (3 <sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)	18 March
621	7 Canadian LAD - (1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Field Regiment)	18 March
622	8 Canadian LAD - (2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian Field Regiment)	10 March
623	9 Canadian LAD - (3 <sup>rd</sup> Canadian Field Regiment)	12 March
629	15 Canadian LAD - (2 Canadian Field Park Company)	15 March
628	14 Canadian LAD - (Signals 1 Canadian Division)	16 March
1092	86 Canadian LAD - (Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG))	18 March
692	74 Canadian LAD - (1 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment) *	15 March
<b>5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division</b>		
1505	HQ RCEME 5 Canadian Armoured Division	13 February
556	5 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop	25 February
557	11 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop	3 March

<b>Serial No</b>	<b>Orbat<sup>138</sup></b>	<b>Arrival NWE<sup>139</sup></b>
612E	12 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade Workshop	28 February
696E	5 Canadian LAA Workshop	21 February
691	73 Canadian LAD - (11 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)	24 February
686	68 Canadian LAD - (12 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade)**	3 March
619	5 Canadian LAD - (HQ 5 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division)	21 February
676	58 Canadian LAD - (17 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Field Regiment)	28 February
695	77 Canadian LAD - (4 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Field Park Squadron)	24 February
675	57 Canadian LAD - (Signals 5 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division)	28 February
690	72 Canadian LAD - (The Westminster Regiment (Motor))	28 February
625	11 Canadian LAD - (11 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Army Field Regiment)***	3 March
674	56 Canadian LAD - (3 Canadian Armoured Recce Regiment)	19 February
671	53 Canadian LAD - (2 Canadian Armoured Regiment)	19 February
688	70 Canadian LAD - (5 Canadian Armoured Regiment)	22 February
689	71 Canadian LAD - (9 Canadian Armoured Regiment)	21 February
1087	81 Canadian LAD - (8 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Field Regiment (SP))	24 February
694	76 Canadian LAD - (4 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Anti-tank Regiment)	25 Feb
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade</b>		
556	1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop	6 March
584	1 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop****	9 March
677	59 Canadian LAD - (11 Canadian Armoured Regiment)	6 March
678	60 Canadian LAD - (12 Canadian Armoured Regiment)	6 March
679	61 Canadian LAD - (14 Canadian Armoured Regiment)	6 March

Note:

\* 74 Canadian LAD (1 Canadian Armoured C Regiment) moved to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps<sup>140</sup>

\*\* 68 Canadian LAD (12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade) changed units (4 Canadian Recce Regiment) and moved to let Canadian Infantry Division

\*\*\* 11 Canadian LAD (11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Army Field Regiment) moved to First Canadian Army Troops

\*\*\*\* 1 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop moved to First Canadian Army Troops

AFVs and other tracked vehicles, and all personnel who could not be carried on wheels, were moved by rail along the route Marseilles, St Rambert, Lyon, Macon, Chagny, Dijon, Neuchateau, Bar le Duc, Chalons, Reims, Leon, Hirson, Aulmoye, Mons to Ath.

<sup>140</sup> From CAORO (Secret), No. 5941, 4 Jul 1945; Pt I, Canadian Tps, 21 AG.



### **The Movement of 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division 13 February - 22 February 1945**

The units of 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division received word on 6 February to move on the 10<sup>th</sup>. This was short notice to move approximately 19,723 (including attached) personnel, 5,614 wheeled vehicles, 455 tanks, and 320 carriers. The heavy tanks were loaded at Rimini, and the light tanks and carriers at Riccione. The tracked vehicles of the 12<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade were added to the tail of the divisional train at Jesi.

The rail journey from Rimini to Leghorn took about 50 hours. At the seaport, the tracked vehicles were loaded aboard LSTs for Marseilles, and there loaded on to warflats (special railway cars) to continue across France by rail to the off-loading point at Ath in Belgium.

The wheeled vehicle convoys started at Cattolica on the 10<sup>th</sup> and drove southward along the Adriatic. They took a circuitous route of 315 miles to Leghorn passing through Porto Civitanova, Foligno, Perugia, Arezzo, Pontassieve, Florence, Empoli, and Pontadera into Harrod's Camp, five miles north of Leghorn.

The sea crossing started on 15 February and was completed by 1 March. After a short stay at Marseilles while the vehicles were concentrating, the division moved to their new location at Dixmude, Belgium, on 27 February.

### **The Movement of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Armoured Brigade 26 February - 12 March 1945**

When 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade received its instructions to move to North-west Europe, its units were fairly widely spread in both the Fifth and Eighth Army areas.

On 1 February, brigade headquarters was at Borgo S. Lorenzo, north of Florence, under command of 13 Corps of Fifth Army, and was preparing to move to the Adriatic for operations under Eighth Army. On 4 February after 11 CAR had been transported to Porto San Giorgio on the Adriatic coast, the orders arrived and cancelled the rest of the move. The brigade now had some of its units 250 miles away, and one unit in the line. In spite of administrative difficulties, the brigade started the movement of the tracked vehicles of 11 CAR from Jesi on the 21<sup>st</sup>, and 14 CAR at Forli on the 24<sup>th</sup>, while the tanks of 12 CAR were sent by transporter to Leghorn. The wheeled vehicles began their journey to Harrod's Camp on the 26<sup>th</sup>. The brigade started embarkation on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March and completed it in five days.

The long road trip from Marseilles provided no unusual incident. The first wheeled convoy of brigade headquarters arrived at the area of Laurwe Belgium, on 12 March.

### **The Movement of HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps 13 February - 3 March 1945**

The first flight of wheeled vehicles set out from Ravenna on 13 February. The convoy followed Highway No. 16 south along the coast through Rimini, Pesaro, and Ancona, to Porto Recanati, the first staging camp on the route. The personnel slept in their vehicles or in pup tents on the beach, because there was no indoor accommodation and the bivouac area was muddy. The following day, the convoy drove along the coast through San Benedetto, Pescara, Ortona, San Vito, Rocca, and San Giovanni to the next staging camp near Mozzagrogna. Here the accommodations were Nissan huts. The guard had to be reinforced to give the troops privacy and rest. The route continued to Termoli, and turned inland to Foggia and a short distance beyond to the next camp in Giardinetto. From here the convoy turned west, and drove through Ariano di Puglia and Avellino into Naples, and to the tented accommodation of Lennie Camp. The vehicles went to Texas Camp in the Naples dock area. The personnel were transported to Marseilles separately by troop ship.

Rigid security measures were enforced for the entire move - formation badges and signs were removed and vehicle markings were painted over.

After six days in Naples spent in CB (confinement to barracks), the troops embarked on HMT *Esperance Bay* and disembarked at Marseilles at noon on 24 February. Personnel were transported to a staging camp eighteen miles north of the port near the village of Calas. Their vehicles arrived the next day and the convoy left on the 26<sup>th</sup>, following the Rhone River up to St Rambert, 163 miles from Calas. Here they spent the night in a tented camp on an abandoned airfield. The following day the convoy passed through Lyon and Villefranche to the village of Hurigny, near Macon, a distance of 80 miles from the last camp, to a staging area that had no sleeping accommodation. The next day the convoy travelled 140 miles passing through Chagny and Dijon to a camp at Touillons, near Les Laumes, a bivouac area without accommodation. The next camp was 110 miles away and well tented, and located south-east of Melun in the Bois d'Echou Forest, about 30 miles from Paris. From here, the convoy travelled through Meaux, Senlis, Ham, and St Quentin to the last staging area at Cambrai, 163 miles from Melun. The convoy crossed into Belgium on 3 March just north of St Amand-lea-Eaux and reached Renaix, their dispersal point in the afternoon. They came under command of 21 Army Group the same day.

### **The Movement of 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division 25 February - 23 March 1945**

The division moved from the Barghetto sector on 25 February to concentration areas about 150 miles down the Adriatic Coast at Fermo and Macerate. From here, the division moved to Leghorn by road through Foligno and Pontassieve. Carriers, half-tracks and 17-pounder guns were shipped from Rimini.

Embarkation for Marseilles started on 7 March and was completed two weeks later. On arrival in France, the wheeled convoys drove to Belgium, where division headquarters was established at Itegem. On 4 April, the division moved into Germany under command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps for its first operation in North-west Europe.

### **Adjustments and Reorganization**

The holdings of combat and soft-skinned vehicles of the newly arrived Canadian units were brought up to date to conform to the holdings of the other units in the theatre. For example, armoured regiments were issued with Humber scout cars and Sherman tanks mounting 17-pounder guns. These powerful guns, one per troop, narrowed the firepower gap between the Allies and the Germans. The 17-pounder gun was supposed to be able to defeat the heavy class of German tanks. The introduction of this new equipment meant that the regiments would have to take gunnery training in the use of the new gun before being committed to combat.

Another innovation for the troops from Italy was the practice of supplementing the tanks' armour with track welded to the aides and front. This practice was a source of controversy, which may be summed as follows:

Advantages:

- Additional crew protection for at least one hit.
- Acted like spaced armour against shaped charges.

Disadvantages:

- Greatly increased the weight, which directly affected the vehicles' performance (bhp/ton ratio).
- The volute springs in the suspension were overloaded - particularly the springs in the two front stations.
- The flying debris from a frontal hit decapitated many a crew commander.

The LADs with the armoured regiments were kept busy welding extra track on the sides and fronts of their tanks. Capt Kingsmill of 61 LAD, attached to 14 CAR, kept his men busy welding track on

Calgary's tanks from when they were issued until they moved to Germany on 10 April. The first concentration area was in the Reichwald forest, some 195 miles from their Belgian harbour area near Dottignies. Kingsmill's men immediately went back to work welding extra track on the tanks. It is not possible to transport the extra steel required by such a program when the unit is required to move. Kingsmill had to send back to Belgium for more track to finish the program.<sup>141</sup>

A similar re-equipping was carried out in the self-propelled artillery regiments. They exchanged their American SP Priest 105-mm guns for Canadian 25-pounder Sexton SP guns.

### Reorganization

On amalgamation of the two Canadian forces, it was necessary to disband certain administrative units, and to revise upwards the war establishments of those in 21 Army Group, so that they would be adequate to handle the much larger Canadian component.

The most noteworthy change in the organization of the fighting troops was the disbandment of Headquarters, 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade. Lt RJC Evans' 68 LAD ceased its attachment to 42 Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (4<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) in the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division. Capt HJ Rattan, 74 LAD (1 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment), moved with his regiment to 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps. Capt D Swan, 11 LAD (11 Canadian Army Field Regiment), moved with his regiment and Maj RH Ramsay, 1 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop, moved to First Canadian Army Troops.

### Operation Plunder

*Plunder*, the code name given to isolating the northern and eastern forces of the Ruhr from the rest of Germany, began on the evening of 23 March. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps came under General Dempsey's Second British Army for participation in the operation by clearing Emmerich. The 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division participated in a "Pepper Pot", an innovation designed to neutralize targets at relatively short ranges by co-ordinated fire of all available tanks, machine guns, heavy mortars, anti-tank guns, and light anti-aircraft guns. In the shelling of Emmerich and Hoch Elten, 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division's massed fire supported Maj General RH Keller's 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division in their attack on these objectives. By the end of March, the Canadians had completed their initial part of *Plunder* - the occupation of Hoch Elten, the high wooded hill northwest of Emmerich.<sup>142</sup>

After the fall of Emmerich, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps reverted to under command First Canadian Army and then advanced rapidly north to the outskirts of Doesburg and Zutphen while 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps attacked from Nijmegen. This was completed by 5 April.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps advanced towards Oldenburg and secured a bridgehead across the Ems. After the capture of Zutphen and Deventer, 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Infantry Division advanced towards Apeldoorn. Arnhem was cleared by 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps on 15 April, and the Zuider Zee was reached by the 18<sup>th</sup>.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps advance continued from Oldenburg to Groningen and Leeuwarden, reaching the south bank of the Ems opposite Emden. By the 26<sup>th</sup>, North-east Holland was cleared. At 1820 hours on 4 May, plenipotentiaries of the German High Command surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, at Luneburg Heath and the order to cease fire became effective at 0800 hours on the 5<sup>th</sup>.<sup>143</sup> The formal surrender was signed at Rheims on the 7<sup>th</sup>, and 8 May 1945 was declared "VE Day".<sup>144</sup>

<sup>141</sup> RCEME History Study Paper, 61 LAD, pp 101 (o), 103 (q), 7 Jan 62 and author's personal recollections.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. (1), p 257-260.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. (4), p 95.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. (1), p 271.

## Tire and Tube Repair

In the late summer of 1944 it became apparent that arrangements would have to be made to repair tires and tubes in the theatre for 21 Army Group. To this end 1<sup>st</sup> (British) Mobile Tire Repair Unit (1 MTRU) was mobilized and sent to France.

Equipment for a second such unit was prepared at Old Dalby, and mainly because of the shortage of trained tire maintenance mechanics in the British Army, it was decided to raise a Canadian unit which would use the British equipment. Thus a new RCEME unit was created on 17 November 1944, the first and only one of its kind. Its commanding officer was Capt AL Maclean.

No. 1 Canadian Tire Repair Unit (1 CTRU) was designed to be mobile, but once on the continent it never moved from Boortmeerbeek, Belgium, about twelve miles east of Brussels on the Malines-Louvain Road.

No. 1 CTRU operated under three headquarters: Headquarters Advanced Base Workshop, 21 Army Group, for workshop operations, Headquarters 4 L of C (later 20 L of C) Sub Area for local administration and tactical operation, and Canadian Section, General Headquarters, First Echelon, 21 Army Group, for most administrative matters.

The advance party arrived in Ostende, Belgium on 7 December 1944 and set out for Boortmeerbeek. They made a few trial runs on small batches of tires, and on 1 January 1945 they started production.<sup>145</sup>

First MTRU commanded by Capt Hawkins REME arrived in Boortmeerbeek from France on 10 January. These two identical units were combined under the command of Capt Maclean on 23 February.

Before amalgamation, these units were inspected by General ELM Burns, Lt-Col Truman, CREME Canadian Section, 1<sup>st</sup> Echelon 21 Army Group, Lt-Col Binns from the Ministry of Supply, Lt-Col Hampton, and Maj Elstone from ME 8, the War Office, on 19 January. Their main comment was that neither unit was very mobile, nor were they.

In the meantime, Lt-Col Binns and Maj Elstone, accompanied by Maj DF Cornish, DADME Vehicles, First Canadian Army, visited several workshops to study the tire situation in the theatre, which was steadily getting worse for lack of replacements in certain tire sizes. Bomb, shell, and mortar fragments and bad “road” conditions greatly increased the number of tires that required replacement from wear alone.<sup>146</sup>

A month later (23 February), Brig Grant held a meeting at his headquarters with Colonel JG Pope, DME CMHQ, and Lt-Col RH Winters, RCEME from NDHQ (who later became the Hon RH Winters in the St-Laurent Cabinet) in Ottawa. They decided that, for a maximum effort, First Canadian Army required its own tire repair facilities.

On the 29<sup>th</sup>, Brig Grant put forward a proposal to the Colonel A/Q First Canadian Army in which he recorded that DDOS had advised him that the volume of tires returned through salvage channels averaged 6,000 per month for an army of two corps. He estimated that 8,000 tires would require replacing in a three-corps army, and from the REME inspection reports, that one-third of these tires could be repaired in the theatre with equipment used by 1 CTRU. He estimated that there would be on the average 2,700 tires that could be repaired in the theatre each month. First Canadian Army should therefore have 1 CTRU plus one similar unit placed on its order of battle. Any surplus capacity left after Canadian requirements were met would be made available to 21 Army Group.<sup>147</sup>

As already recorded 1 MTRU and 1 CTRU were combined and they stayed that way for the remainder of the hostilities. Their production is shown in Table 10.

<sup>145</sup> MacLean, Col AL, RCEME Study Paper, 1 CTRU.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. (84), Jan 45.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. Feb 45.

*Table 10 - Production of Tires and Tubes by 1 CTRU and 1 British MTRU*

1945	Type of Repair			No. of Repairs
	Tires Repaired	Tubes Repaired	Tires Retreaded	
Jan	1,338	362		1,832
Feb	1,587	1,478		2,199
Mar	2,902 (a)	4,098		4,143
Apr	3,443	5,285		5,346
May	2,319	3,165	172 (b)	4,784
Jun	2,157	3,632	540	4,010
Jul	1,837	5,203	842	3,607
Aug (c)	1,489	11,180	860	3,730
Totals	17,072	34,403	2,414	29,651
Notes:				
(a) 1 CTRU and 1 British MTRU combined 23 Feb 1945.				
(b) Retread equipment came into production on VE Day.				
(c) 1 CTRU and 1 British MTRU were replaced by 958 British Tyre Retreading Unit on 1 September 1945.				

After the defeat and surrender of the enemy, RCEME assisted in the immediate task of disarming the capitulated and surrendered forces, and in the initial phase of diverting captured enemy equipment to essential civilian channels, and to allied forces that had been liberated in Belgium and Holland.

Soon after the surrender, the Canadian Army in Europe was divided into two portions, one of which was to remain in Germany as part of the army of occupation for a year; the other (major) portion was withdrawn into Holland and Belgium to await return to Canada and discharge.

The RCEME portion of the Canadian Army Occupation Force maintained the normal role of repairing the equipment in use, while the RCEME units in Holland and Belgium assisted in the sorting of all the guns, vehicles, and equipment turned in by units before their return to Canada. Much of this equipment was turned over to the Belgians and the Dutch, so that they could have equipment with which to train their armies. This involved the checking of the equipment to see that it was in working order, and also required giving instruction on its operation, maintenance and repair to the future users.

In addition to this, RCEME units and personnel were involved in a scheme to aid in the rehabilitation of personnel from other corps by instructing in trades training preparatory to getting back into civilian life.

## ***Annex A - Types of Ships and Landing Craft in Force “J”***

(Compiled from Second Army Operation Order No.1, and 3 Canadian Infantry Division Operation Order No. 1. Where discrepancies in totals occur, the divisional order has been accepted as final.)

<b>Number</b>	<b>Short Title</b>	<b>Nomenclature</b>	<b>Function</b>
1	L.S.H.	Landing Ship Headquarters	Ex-merchant ship converted to serve as Divisional Commander’s and Force Commander’s Headquarters Ship. Accommodates Force H.Q. staff and large communications complement. Speed 15 knots.
2	A.G., H.Q. Ships	Assault Group Headquarters Ship	Frigates serving as Assault Group and Assault Brigade Headquarters.
3	L.S.I. (L)	Landing Ships, Infantry (Large)	Converted merchant ships ranging from 7,300 to 14,000 tons. Carry 18 L.C.A. and 1,100 troops. Speed 16 knots.
12	L.S.I. (H)	Landing Ships, Infantry (Hand Hoisting)	Former cross-channel ships of between 2,400 and 4,200 tons. Carry 6 craft and 360 troops in an assault. Speed 15 knots
20	L.C.I. (L)	Landing Craft Infantry (Large)	Personnel-carrying craft that transport 200 fully equipped men (seated) and can disembark all troops in under 5 minutes. Speed 12½ knots. Length 160 ft. Fuel: Diesel.
8	L.C.I. (S)	Landing Craft Infantry (Small)	Carry 96 fully equipped men below deck and 18 bicycles on upper deck. Troops disembarked by ramps manhandled over bow sponsons. Length 104 ft. 8 in. Speed 11 ½ knots. Fuel: petrol.
142	L.C.A.	Landing Craft Assault	Carried in L.S.I. Land 30 fully equipped troops. Speed 6 knots. Fuel: petrol.
4	L.C.A. (O.C.)	Landing Craft Assault (Obstacle Clearance)	L.C.A. fitted with horizontal asdic and carrying Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units. Towed.
18	L.C.A. (H.R.)	Landing Craft Assault (Hedgerow)	Project “Hedgerows” (24 60-lb bombs), the blast from which clears a lane through wire and anti-personnel mines. Towed.
8	L.C.S. (I)	Landing Craft Support (Medium)	Provide close support by means of smoke cover. Can be hoisted fully loaded and can be beached. Length 40 ft. 9 in. Speed 7 knots. Fuel: petrol.
4	L.C.H.	Landing Craft Headquarters	A converted L.C.I. (L) functioning as a local Senior Officer’s headquarters ship and battalion headquarters and suitably equipped as regards communications. Fuel: Diesel. Speed 12 knots. Can also lift 60 men.

Number	Short Title	Nomenclature	Function
22	L.S.T. (2)	Landing Ship Tank Mark II	Carry 300 troops and 60 tanks and vehicles and can beach. Displacement 1,490 tons light and 3,776 tons loaded. Speed 9 knots. Fuel: Diesel.
2*	L.C.T. (3)	Landing Craft Tank, Mark III	Land an average of 55 men and 11 vehicles. Length 191 ft. 11 in. Speed 8 knots. Fuel: Diesel and petrol.
7*	L.C.T. (4)	Landing Craft Tank, Mark IV	Carrying capacity 55 men and 11 vehicles. Length 187 ft. 3 in. Speed 6 knots. Fuel: Diesel.
2*	L.C.T. (5 & 6)	Landing Craft Tank; Marks V and VI	Similar carrying capacity to L.C.T. (3) and (4). Speed 5 ½ knots. Length of L.C.T. (5) 112 ft. 4 in. Fuel: Diesel.
7	L.C.F.	Landing Craft Flak	Converted L.C.T. (3) or (4). Provide protection for assault forces against close-range air or E-boat attack. Secondary function, close support. Speed 7 knots. Fuel: Diesel.
7	L.C.G. (L)	Landing Craft Gun (Large)	Gun Support Craft. Converted L.C.T. (3) or (4) mounting two 4.7-in. guns on a false deck built over the hold. Provide close support fire during assault and subsequent advance. Speed 7 knots. Fuel: Diesel.
2	L.C.T. (C.B.)	Landing Craft Tank (Concrete Buster)	Carry 2 or 3 tanks (Sherman V C) each mounting 17-pounder guns, which provide high-velocity fire for attacking concrete.
8	L.C.T. (A)	Landing Craft Tank (Armoured)	Converted L.C.T. (5) armoured. Carry 2 or 3 Centaur Tanks with 95-mm. guns, two of which provide close support for assault by direct aimed fire using H.E. shell. Fuel: Diesel.
8	L.C.T. (H.E.)	Landing Craft Tank (High Explosive)	As L.C.T. (A) but unarmoured.
9	L.C.T. (R)	Landing Craft Tank (Rocket)	L.C.T. (3) fitted with 5-in. rocket projectors to provide drenching fire on an area target prior to touchdown. Length 160 ft. Speed 8 knots. Fuel: Diesel.
36	L.C.P. (L) Smoke	Landing Craft Personnel (Large) Smoke Layer	Personnel landing craft fitted out to lay smoke. Speed 7 to 10 knots. Fuel: petrol.
4	L.B.F.	Landing Barge Flak	Former Thames barges. Naval complement 5. Mount 40-mm guns that are manned by R.A. and controlled by Army. Supplement A.A. defence of assault beaches. Speed 5 knots. Fuel: petrol.

<b>Number</b>	<b>Short Title</b>	<b>Nomenclature</b>	<b>Function</b>
4	LCS (L) (1)	Landing Craft Support (Large) Mark I	Support the assaulting forces by 2-pounder fire from close inshore. Length 104 ft. 8 in. Speed 11½ knots. Fuel: petrol.
3	LCS (L) (2)	Landing Craft Support (Large) Mark II	Similar, but mounting a 6-pounder gun instead of a 2-pounder.
1	LSD	Landing Ship (Dock)	Provide emergency docking facilities for repairs to small craft. Function as a floating dock. Centre well is flooded and craft move out under their own power.
15		Rhino Ferry	Pontoon barges constructed of Naval Landing pontoons, designed for the carriage of vehicles. Are towed to assault area and used for discharging L.S.T. Can be beached. Capacity about 40 vehicles. Self-propelled to and from the beaches.
* Flotillas of 10 craft each			



## Part 6

# The Role of RCEME in North West Europe, Operation *Eclipse*, Military Government, and the Canadian Army Occupation Forces 1944-1946

*This part edited by LCol (Ret'd) Neil Johnstone*

### **Editor's Note**

Part 6 records the part that RCEME played in the time immediately following the end of the war in Europe. The editor thanks LCol (ret'd) N. Johnstone for his invaluable assistance in proofreading the scanned text. Although the accounts have been edited for clarity and to remove abbreviations, no major effort was carried out to modernize the grammar and copy edit for consistency.

Note – because of the small typeface, some of the organization charts may not print well, but they are readable on the screen using the zoom feature.

### **Operation Eclipse**

Extensive planning for operations in Europe had begun months in advance of launching Operation *Overlord*, when it had been judged possible that Germany would surrender in the fall of 1943. These plans and preparations had been given the code name “*Eclipse*”. Towards the end of July 1944, these plans had to be reviewed and updated.

Briefly these plans, insofar as they affected the British and Canadian Forces<sup>1</sup>, contemplated that the eventual military organization for the British Zone of Germany would be under the command of British Zone Headquarters. The Zone would be subdivided into four Corps Districts. Later planning reduced these to three<sup>2</sup>.

In the first phase, following immediately upon the German surrender, British and Canadian troops were to advance with all possible speed in order to seize strategic areas within 21 Army Group's boundaries.

In the second phase, occupation of the remaining sections of 21 Army Group's area would be completed. Redeployment of forces would be undertaken to ensure that the areas actually occupied by the American, British, and Russian forces coincided with the agreed zones of occupation.

In the final phase, the British and Canadian occupation forces could settle down to their long term tasks which were stated in 21 Army Group's pamphlets:

- a. to ensure that the Germans have no opportunity of reviving their ability to make war,
- b. to complete the eradication of Nazism and German militarism, and
- c. to re-educate the German youth.

Because of the inability to reach an Anglo-American agreement, a directive for specific preparations for military government expected from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was never issued.

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<sup>1</sup> On the 11th of Dec 1944, the Canadian Government approved the participation of Canadian troops in the British Army of Occupation in Germany, Canadian Military Headquarters being advised of this decision in cable No 894 dated 22 Dec 1944 (CMHQ file TS 1/occup Gp/1).


<sup>2</sup> Donnison, FSV; Civil Affairs and Military Government North West Europe 1944-46; page 225. HM Stationery Office, 1961.

On 8 May 1945, the Supreme Commander decided that since his directive for *Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender*, and the SHAEF *Handbook for Military Government of Germany*, were not significantly different from the policies of UK and USA, insofar as they were known to him, the directive and the handbook were in force for the post-surrender period.

It had long been planned to establish military government control at three levels below that of the central government. The highest level was that of the Provinzen and the larger Länder, the next that of the Regierungsbezirke and the smaller Länder, and the lowest but first to be established - the Kreise. Control was to be indirect whenever possible. Contact would be between the Military Government and the heads of these civil divisions, the Oberpräsidenten, the Regierungpräsidenten the Oberbürgermeister, and the Ländrate.

It had been planned that *Eclipse* would follow *Overlord* either on the formal surrender date or if there were no formal surrender, on an arbitrary date. However, because the occupation of Germany was piecemeal, it was decided in April 1945 that the transition from *Overlord* to *Eclipse* would be assumed to have begun in those areas of Germany progressively occupied as the advance continued<sup>3</sup>.

*Eclipse* involved RCEME to such a degree that an establishment increment “G” was added to Brigadier Grant’s Headquarters on 19 February 1945 to ensure adequate planning for Operation *Eclipse* without interfering with normal operations.



<sup>3</sup> Ibid pp 194-196.

## The Cease Fire

At 0800 hours on 5 May the cease fire took effect. The 2<sup>nd</sup> British Army was stretched across the North-western plains of Germany from the Rhine to the Baltic.

First Canadian Army occupied Oldenburg and the surrounding territory for some weeks, to the west of 30<sup>th</sup> British Corps, which had pushed northward from Bremen to clear the Cuxhaven peninsula. At this time, the Canadians main responsibilities lay in the Netherlands.

The forces of 21 Army Group were redeployed (Phase 2) to enable 1<sup>st</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 30<sup>th</sup> British Corps to assume responsibility for their respective districts and to adjust the external boundaries of the area occupied by 21 Army Group to bring them into accord with agreed boundaries between the American, British and Russian forces<sup>4</sup>.

## Battle of the Winter

F. V. S. Donnison concisely describes the problems that faced 21 Army Group Military Government.

“Not the least of the difficulties facing the 21 Army Group Military Government staff at this stage was that of explaining to the rest of the forces under Army Group command why on 4 May 1945 it had been their duty to kill Germans and to destroy the material resources of Germany, but since 5 May it had all at once become their duty to save the lives of their enemies, to rebuild their houses, and to revive their public services, notwithstanding the fact that Hitler himself had done his utmost to destroy these. However, the argument was clear. It was scarcely summer yet. But it was only six months to the winter in all its northern European severity. Unless more food, coal and housing could be made available by then a catastrophe of death by cold and by starvation stared Germany in the face. It was instantly decided by Major-General Templer that, even on the narrow basis of military necessity, 21 Army Group Headquarters must accept responsibility and begin planning for the sheltering and even more particularly the feeding of the people of the British zone through the winter. This undertaking came to be known as the Battle of the Winter. If this battle were to be lost, such disease and unrest must be expected as would involve the British forces in police operations for the restoration of order and in relief operations on a scale far greater than would have sufficed to win the battle in the first place. The result of these would be to prevent the redeployment of forces needed to bring to an end the war in the Far East, and would delay demobilization of those who could be spared from this task. The rescue of Germany from famine and anarchy was demanded not by sentiment but by self-interest. Indeed, the initial fixing of a ration scale that would yield to the ordinary consumer about 1,100 calories a day, its raising to 1,550 calories after the harvest, and its subsequent reduction in March 1946 to 1,000 calories were unlikely to convey any impression of sentimentality. They were more likely to incur charges of vindictiveness –which in their turn were unfounded. The level of nutrition for Germany was dictated by world shortages and a resolve that Germans should not feed better than their neighbours, upon whom they had fattened for so long.

“It was realized, quickly by the British, apparently more slowly by the Americans, that the Battle of the Winter consisted in reality of two battles. There was the struggle, conducted against physical difficulties, which had for its object the saving of Germans from starvation and disease. But there was at the same time the fight against Russian intransigence, against exploitation by the Russians of their control of the main food

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid pp 224-225.

producing areas of Germany, and against Russian clandestine interference to prevent Germany being saved from starvation and disease since these were the conditions in which Communism would be propagated best. In this second battle the object was to save western Germany from disappearing into the Communist sphere of influence and to prevent Russia throwing her outposts across the Rhine<sup>5</sup>.”

## Road Transport

In order to try to win the Battle of the Winter<sup>6</sup>, which also included the repatriation of refugees, all forms of transportation had to be restored as quickly as possible. To REME 21 Army Group and in turn RCEME Second Canadian Corps fell the task of restoring wheeled transport in their areas.

A survey of the vehicles available in the British Zone showed that 29,950 load carriers and 28,129 cars were ‘fit’ for use. They were fit only by the lowered standards of a desperate situation, and to keep them operational even in this sense was a formidable task. An estimate at the time showed that as soon as industry began to revive another 15 to 20,000 trucks and 10,000 cars would be required.

By the end of July 530 Kries workshops were in operation under the direction of DME 21 Army Group for Military Government. In addition, nine Provincial Heavy Workshops were stripping vehicles so badly run down that it was considered better to use their components for the repair (by the replacement method) of vehicles relatively easier to repair. Sixteen Provincial Auxiliary Workshops were employed overhauling vehicle assemblies such as transmissions, axles and engines.

In August, shortages of tires, tubes and batteries influenced the progress of restoring and maintaining the transport until local production could be restarted<sup>7</sup>.

Ultimately the Battle of the Winter was won, but primarily by the German people staffing and working in all aspects of the project with the aid and help of Military Government<sup>8</sup>.

## RCEME, 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps

Second Canadian Corps was made responsible for *Eclipse* in the area of North-west Germany occupied by the Canadian forces. Cloppenburg was initially chosen as a concentration area for enemy vehicles but was found to be located too far south. Wilhelmshaven and Oldenburg were made the concentration centres.

To provide repair facilities for the large number of unserviceable vehicles in these centers, the workshop company of a German Naval transport unit was ‘frozen’<sup>9</sup> in Wilhelmshaven and a civilian workshop was organized in Oldenburg. On 1 June 1945 a German naval transport unit workshop similar to, but smaller than that at Wilhelmshaven, was taken over from the Royal Navy at Emden, this location being made the third area and Enemy Vehicle Park (EVP).

The Corps’ task in Germany, under the direction of Colonel MCG Meighan, DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps, was to concentrate the enemy vehicles with the aid of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps’ recovery facilities into EVPs and to organize essential repair services for Military Government, Royal Navy and civilian operated vehicles. Reports on the location of enemy vehicles were obtained from the War Materiel Reconnaissance Teams and passed to the CREMEs for collection.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid pp 231-232.

<sup>6</sup> Which also included the repatriation of refugees.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid Ref (3), pp 430-431.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid pp 433-434.

<sup>9</sup> The term “to freeze” meant to hold units as not available for disbandment. First Canadian Army Instruction no. 4, para 2, 13 May 1945.

The RCEME *Eclipse* workshops at Wilhelmshaven and Emden, staffed by enemy service personnel, were operated and administered through the senior German technical officer in the respective transport units. The Oldenburg *Eclipse* workshop and all the Military Government workshops were administered through civilian managers, usually the owner of the garage being employed for this purpose. The RCEME representatives controlled the flow of vehicles between EVPs and the workshops, and authorized repairs to vehicles being used by the Military Government, Navy or civilians, as well as providing general supervision of the workshops. Only on the authority of RCEME were spare parts obtained from other than existing stocks in the workshops. The following tables show the RCEME controlled *Eclipse* Workshops in North West Germany.

Table 1		
<i>Eclipse</i> Workshops Wilhelmshaven Area (1)		
Workshops (2)	Employees	Organized
First and Second Echelon (3) (Artillery Barracks) (Frederich Ebert Strasse)		15 May 45
Third and Fourth Echelon (3) (Infantry Barracks)		15 May 45
Total Employees	200 (4)	
Notes:		
(1) Based on Report on RCEME <i>Eclipse</i> Operations 5-50/ME/ <i>Eclipse</i> , Adm HQ First Canadian Army, 7 July 1945.		
(2) These workshops were part of the German Naval Transport Unit's organization that provided transport for the German military and naval forces in the area.		
(3) This shop had space for 35 vehicles and ancillary shops.		
(4) Ibid (1) shows approximate total. Additional help was supplied by unemployed drivers from the transportation company. The total strength of the transportation company was about 839 including 15 officers.		

Table 2		
<i>Eclipse Workshops Emden Area (1)</i>		
Workshops (2)	Employees	Organized
Vehicle repair shop Machine and electric repair shop		
Motorcycle repair shop		
Total Employees	40 (3)	2 Jun 45 (4)
Notes:		
(1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		
(2) Four buildings were available, the fourth being a salvage depot.		
(3) German Naval personnel.		
(4) This workshop, previously part of the German Naval Transport Unit for the Emden Area, was under the control of the Royal Navy until it was turned over to <i>Eclipse</i> RCEME 2 <sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps on 2 June 45.		

Table 3		
<i>Eclipse Workshops Oldenburg Area (1)</i>		
Workshop (2)	Employees	Organized
Opel Garage (3) (10 Lehmkuhlen Strasse)		
Total Employees	54	2 May 45
Notes:		
(1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		
(2) This workshop was staffed by civilians.		
(3) Only repairs to vehicles from the EVP and Allied Military Government were carried out here. Civilian vehicles were repaired in the Military Government administered garage (Table 4).		

## Military Government Workshops

Three additional workshops were organized by RCEME for the Military Government. These workshops were turned over to them for administration, with RCEME providing a periodical technical inspection to ensure that they were employed on legitimate repairs.

Table 4		
<i>Eclipse Workshop for Military Government Oldenburg Area (1)</i>		
Workshop	Employees	Organized
Garage (1719 Alexander Strasse)	20	4 Jun 45
Notes: (1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		

Table 5		
<i>Eclipse Workshop for Military Government Cloppenburg Area (1)</i>		
Workshops	Employees	Organized
Garage	8	26 Apr 45
Machine shop (2)	6	26 Apr 45
Total Civilian Employees	14	
Notes: (1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1. (2) Used for manufacture of farm machinery parts.		

Table 6		
<i>Eclipse Workshop for Military Government Leer (1)</i>		
Workshop	Employees	Organized
Garage	6	16 Jun 45
Notes: (1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		

### Production by the Kreis Workshops During *Eclipse*

The production of the Kreis workshops in Germany excluding the three garages for Military Government up to and including date of hand-over was:

Cars	284
Trucks	322
Buses	12
Ambulances	14
Tractors	57
Trailers	101
Motorcycles	<u>45</u>
<b>Total vehicles</b>	<b>835</b>





## Hand-Over of RCEME Eclipse Commitments in Germany

The responsibility for RCEME *Eclipse* workshops in North-west Germany was turned over by DDME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps to DDME 30 British Corps on 15 June 1945. On the request of DDME 30 British Corps, the supervision of RCEME *Eclipse* operations in the Canadian Area was made the responsibility of 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division for the period of 15 June until the arrival of 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division (CAOF) on 11 July 1945.

## The Application of Eclipse to the Netherlands

The decision to apply ‘*Eclipse*’ to the Netherlands, a friendly country, meant that considerable relaxation had to be introduced into the application of the Plan. Instead of Military Government it was 21 Army Group Civil Affairs teams that provided the helping hand to the Netherlands Military Administration (NMA).

At this point a word of explanation is in order regarding NMA. Donnison has written that “A Civil Affairs agreement was negotiated between the Netherlands Government and the British and American Governments ... In Belgium it was planned that the indigenous administration, through which the Supreme Commander would initially act ... should be on the one hand, the existing local civil administration and, on the other, the re-established civil government at the centre. The Netherlands Government planned to create an additional organization, a Netherlands Military Administration, which would in the first stages be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander and would later assume temporary governmental responsibility until the Netherlands Government felt able to do so. The ostensible reason for this was that the indigenous civil administration was believed to have been seriously ‘dislocated and distorted’, if not completely destroyed by four years of Nazi rule, and that it would be unable to function satisfactorily without the aid and control of the NMA. In Belgium the Germans had established a temporary military administration, which until a few weeks before liberation left the indigenous administration intact, so long as it met German requirements. In Holland, the civil administration had been taken over and Nazified from the beginning under Reichskommissar Dr Arthur Seyss-Inquart, responsible direct to Hitler... The fears of the London Government (Netherlands Government in exile) regarding the competence and loyalty they could expect from the indigenous administration may well have been justified”.

There was another reason for establishing the NMA — the exile government were not sure of its reception because of a large proportion of Nazi sympathizers in the population on one side and the strong communist element in the Resistance organizations on the other<sup>10</sup>.

During the fall of 1944, it became clear that the Germans in the Netherlands would not withdraw. Plans had to be revised for the administration in the Netherlands. The country was divided into four areas “A”, “B1”, “B2” and “C”. Area “A” was that already liberated. “B2” was the provinces of North and South Holland and the western part of Utrecht.

The reasons for the acute starvation conditions that existed in the B2 Area and the plans and action taken for the relief of population are beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>11</sup> However, transport in large quantities and of every kind was needed to transport huge quantities of food into the stricken areas. The first convoys used military vehicles loaned by 21 Army Group Civil Affairs.

To 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps RCEME fell the task of recovering abandoned and unserviceable transport to collection points for repair and handover to NMA. These vehicles would provide the equipment for a civil road transport system.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid Ref (3), pp 129-130.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. See Chap VIII.

## ***RCEME First Canadian Corps***

First Canadian Corps was made responsible for the application of the relaxed version of Operation *Eclipse* in the Netherlands, the main area being the B2 Area, earlier referred to in the planning as “Western Holland” and renamed “Netherlands District” in March 1945.

The B2 Area was subdivided into four sub-areas centred on the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. There were also two minor areas centred on the cities of Enschede and Groningen.

The Corps’ task under the direction of Colonel JW Bishop, DDME 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Corps, was to concentrate the large number of enemy vehicles in the Netherlands District into enemy vehicle parks (EVPs), and to organize civilian workshops to repair the unserviceable vehicles in these parks. Number 1 Canadian Recovery Company was made available to the *Eclipse* staff for this purpose. Each division concentrated the enemy vehicles in their areas into dumps which were then cleared to the nearest EVP. In the Groningen area recovery was provided by CREME 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Armoured Division, and in the Enschede area CREME 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division.

Vehicle repair workshops were organized and operated by RCEME in each of the concentration centres. In Amsterdam, additional workshops were operated for rebuilding tires and batteries and for the production of oxygen and acetylene, which were in short supply.

The control and administration of the *Eclipse* workshop was handled through civilian area managers who worked under the direction of RCEME representatives.

The following tables show the RCEME controlled *Eclipse* workshops in the Netherlands District:

Table 7		
<i>Eclipse</i> Workshops Amsterdam Area (1)		
Workshop	Employees	Organized (4)
Main Wksp, RAI Works (Ferdinand Bolsterstraat)	280	13 May 45
Car Shop, Koster Garage (16 Nierstraat)	35	15 May 45
Autopark Machine Shop (Obrecht Plein)	31	2 Jun 45
Varta Battery Wksp (46 Spuistraat)	16	3 Jun 45
AGA Acetylene Plant (43 Molenkade)	14	6 Jun 45
AREVI Tire Rebuilding and Rubber Works (6 Donker Curtius Straat)	21	6 Jun 45
Loos Oxygen Plant (2)		
Total Civilian Employees	397 (3)	
Notes:		
(1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		
(2) Was started up under its own management with the production controlled by RCEME.		
(3) Ref (1) shows this to be 407.		

Table 8		
<i>Eclipse</i> Workshops Rotterdam Area (1)		
Workshops	Employees	Organized
Ford Motor Company (2)	84	18 May 45
Notes:		
(1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		
(2) Ford's buildings had been stripped of tools and equipment. Sufficient tools and equipment were eventually located in German motor transport stores and local garages. In order to prevent the Germans from looting the tools for Germany, dealers had placed their stocks in preservation and then buried them underground in barrels. It was from these buried stocks that Capt EF Hendricks was able to retool his workshop.		

Table 9		
<i>Eclipse Workshops Hague Area (1)</i>		
Workshops	Employees	Organized
Car Shop, Toren Garage (142 Torenstraat)		15 May 45
Truck and Bus Shop (635 Loosduinscheweg)		20 May 45
<b>Total Civilian Employees</b>	<b>71 (2)</b>	
Notes: (1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1. (2) Ibid (1) shows only total.		

Table 10		
<i>Eclipse Workshops Utrecht Area (1)</i>		
Workshops	Employees	Organized
Jan Jonerius Works (2) (Kanaalweg)	160	17 May 45
Notes: (1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1. (2) This workshop was complete with tools and equipment including overhead cranes and ancillary shops.		

Table 11		
<i>Eclipse Workshops Enshede Area (1)</i>		
Workshops	Employees	Organized
Garage Franz Roeloffzen (120 Hengeloschestraat)	25	7 May 45
Notes: (1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		

Table 12		
<i>Eclipse Workshops Groningen Area (1)</i>		
Workshops (2)		Employees
a. (Garages)		
Hofstee & Mihnhardt	21 Schuiterdiep	30
HUVO	16 Papestraat	8
Actief	Hellman	6
Ennam	22 Haresweg	20
Ford	6 Heereweg	15
Garter	Farmsum (Delfzijl)	15
Wedda	Farmsum (Delfzijl)	6
b. (Bus Company Works)		
NV Marnedienst	Zoutkamp	
E. S. A.	Marum	
G. D. S.	Harem	
Roland	Slechteren	
N. V. Gado	Hoogezand	
Burgman	Ter Apel	
Total Civilian Employees		100
Notes:		
(1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.		
(2) RCEME <i>Eclipse</i> representative arranged with these garages and bus repair companies to handle the repair load from the EVP. Work began on the 24 <sup>th</sup> of Apr 1945. These garages and shops were under the direction of civilian <i>Eclipse</i> managers. These shops also repaired civilian vehicles in addition to their <i>Eclipse</i> commitments.		

## ***Production of the Eclipse Workshops***

The production of the workshops in B2 Area up to and including date of hand-over was:

Cars	439
Trucks	372
Buses	44
Trailers	62
<hr/>	
Total Vehicles	917
<hr/>	
Batteries	352
Tires	304
Acetylene (bottles)	298

## ***Handover of RCEME Eclipse Commitments in B2 Area***

The control and administration of the workshops in B2 Area along with all financial commitments were turned over to the Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Department of Rehabilitation of Means and Transport as shown in Table 13.

Table 13	
<i>Eclipse Workshops</i>	
Area	Date of Hand-Over (1)
Netherlands District (Wksp)	15 Jun 1945
Netherlands District (Vehs, etc)	30 Jun 1945
Groningen	21 Jun 1945
Enschede	23 Jun 1945
Note:	
(1) Ibid Note (1) Table 1.	

### **3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division, (CAOF), (Canadian Army Occupation Force)**

The Canadian Occupation Area varied but little throughout the whole of the Canadian participation. The CAOF were responsible for Regierungsbezirk Aurich (consisting of Landkreise, Aurich, Leer, Norden, Wittmund and Stadtkreis Emden) and Land Oldenburg (consisting of Landkreise Ammerland, Friesland, Oldenburg, Vechta and Stadtkreise, Delmhorst, Oldenburg and Wilhelmshaven).<sup>12</sup>

DDME Second Canadian Corps who was responsible for the RCEME portion of Operation *Eclipse* in the Canadian Section of the British Zone handed over his responsibilities to the DDME 30 British Corps on 15 June 1945; who in turn requested CREME 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division to carry out the supervision of these responsibilities until the arrival of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Division (CAOF) on 11 July.

The CAOF was formed specifically for the occupation and in order to avoid the confusion of having two 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Infantry Divisions in the theatre at the same time, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division that fought so well in North-west Europe adopted the designation “CDA” (Canada) after its title.

In preparing the RCEME officers for their role in *Eclipse* and the occupation there was a considerable difference between the study papers, based by necessity on earlier intelligence reports, and the catastrophic conditions they had to work in when the time came. For example, paragraph 2 of “RCEME *Eclipse* Notes No. 2” (The German Army Repair Service) says:

“The two German High Commands (OKH and OKW) are included ...to show the chain of command, although the Military District, Wehrkreis, is the highest formation that will be encountered normally by RCEME during *Eclipse*”.

This inferred anticipation of taking over a reasonably complete military repair organization of the Home Replacement Army (at least at the Wehrkreis level) was not possible, because of the destruction caused by the fanatic resistance to the Allied advance on one hand, and of Hitler’s policy of total destruction of Germany (including her people) in defeat on the other.

The RCEME *Eclipse* war diaries for May and June 1945 show the largest *Eclipse* workshops to be started up during this period were at Wilhelmshaven, a “frozen” (10) German unit not directly identified as a Wehrkreis workshop and a Kriegsmarine workshop at Emden, most of whose employees had already fled. The vast majority of the workshops returned to production by RCEME CAOF, the “Kreis Workshops”, were reorganized and were of course civilian rather than military just as the original plan indicated and in all probability (in many cases) the same garages and machine shops that formed the repair facilities for the Home Replacement Army at the Wehrkreis level under control of the Kraftfahrparks (KPs) each of which controlled from 120 to 150 civilian garages.

The RCEME CAOF diaries refer to Kreis workshops being organized, and Donnison in discussing the problem not only refers to 530 Kreis workshops controlled by REME/RCEME in the British zone, but also mentions “Nine Provincial Heavy Workshops...” and “Sixteen Provincial Auxiliary Workshops...”<sup>13</sup>


The terms “Provincial Heavy” and “Provincial Auxiliary Workshops” do not fit in the German repair organization of the Home Replacement Army, and at the time of writing there is no evidence at hand that these terms fit the organization of the regional administration of the Lander which had eleven provinces in 1943 (and fifteen in 1945) either.

<sup>12</sup> Hist Sect, CMHQ; The Canadian Occupation Force in Germany May 1945 to June 1946: Report No 174 (probably late 1946 or early 1947).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid Ref (3), p 430.

# Organization Charts

**ORGANIZATION  
RCEME SERVICES  
OPERATION "ECLIPSE"  
19 FEB 45 – 11 JUL 45 (a)**



**NOTES:** (a) The general date is shown because this chart is a compilation over a period of time from 19 Feb 45 until the last responsibility was handed over to 3 Cdn Inf Div (CAID) presumably 11 July 1945, the first day that they assumed their new duties.

(b) Increment "G" to HQ DDME First Cdn Army consisted of:  
 ADME (Lt-Col L S Strickland)  
 DADME (Major G Harvey)  
 3 EME (Capts P D Falk, W D M. Lean and Lt G H Mc-Kendrick)  
 4 Armament artificers  
 9 Clerks

In addition:  
 DADME HQ DDME 1 CDN CORPS (Major AJH Stethem)  
 DADME HQ DDME 2 CDN CORPS (Major H L K Mason)

(c) Eclipse staffs were organized for Netherlands District and Eindhoven and Groningen areas. The RCEME E-tipar Staff at 1 Cdn Corps consisted of: DADME, Maj AJH Stethem; EME, Capt RA Edwards; WO 1 Arm Art Veba, ASM RB Miller; WO 1 Arm Art (P) ASM JP Lambrecht; WO 1 Arm Art Wria, ASM RD Parsons; one sgt and two agts.

(d) With the very large amount of enemy equipment in the Netherlands district, a "Q" Eclipse team was organized for each of the four sub-areas. The RCEME portion consisting of one EME and two NCOs.

(e) The EME was Capt DW Thomason. Two additional NCOs were later added to assist in supervising the subsidiary workshops (battery, tire and assembly).

(f) The EME was Capt EF Hendricks.

(g) The EME was Capt JF Ross.

(h) The EME was Capt CI Howell.

(i) The EME was Lt G H Mc-Kendrick.

(j) The EME was Capt P D Falk.

(k) The RCEME E-tipar Staff at 2 Cdn Corps for Canadian occupied North West Germany consisted of: DADME, Maj H L K Mason; EME, Capt W D M. Lean and WO 1, Arm Art (P) ASM JP Lambert (he is recorded in both 1 and 2 Corps' Orgs); and Maj G Barclay (attached to 2 Cdn Corps for four weeks) and who, from the reports he wrote, must have been the supervising officer of the German E-tipar Workshops.

(l) The workshop organization of a German transport unit was "frozen" to operate the shops under the command of Hauptmann Schultz. This was the biggest and busiest of the Eclipse workshops in Germany.

(m) This workshop was also part of a German transport unit. It had been seized by the Royal Navy before being handed over to RCEME Eclipse on 1 June 1945. Unfortunately the bulk of the personnel had been dispersed earlier leaving the workshop with a small staff.

(n) The largest garage (Opel) was taken over.


(o) These shops were organized by RCEME. They were run by their owners for the Military Government and subject to periodic checks by RCEME to ensure they were employed on legitimate repairs.

REF: 1. Report on RCEME E-tipar Operations, 5-5-45/AMFKG E-tipar, Adm HQ First Cdn Army, 7 Jul 45. Located in pages 12 to 14 of E-tipar Increment to DDME from 1st Cdn Army, Jun 1945.

2. W.D. E-tipar Increment to DDME from 1st Cdn Army, May 1945.



**ORGANIZATION CHART  
RCEME SERVICES  
CANADIAN ARMY OCCUPATION FORCE  
3 CDN INF DIV (a)  
11 JUL 45 TO 15 MAY 46**



- REF: 1. Report No 174; The Cdn Army Occupation Forces in Germany, May 1945 to June 1946. Historical Section, CMIHQ.  
 2. Location State, RCEME Units under Command HQ RCEME, 3 Cdn Inf Div (CAOF) 6 Aug 45.  
 3. Ibid Ref 2, (25 Oct 45)  
 4. Ibid Ref 2, (20 Dec 45)  
 5. Ibid Ref 2, (23 Mar 46)  
 6. Ibid Ref 2, (1 Apr 46)  
 7. Ibid Ref 2, (6 Apr 46)  
 8. Ibid Ref 2, (9 Apr 46)  
 9. WD HQ RCEME 3 Cdn Inf Div (CAOF) May 1946.


- (e) Varel. Oldenburg (Ref 5).  
 (f) For Org HQ Inf Bde, see page 438.  
 (g) Aurich.  
 (h) For LAD WEs Type "A" & "B", CDN 11/317/4\*, see 111/100/5.  
 (i) Zetel. Sengwarden (Ref 3).  
 (j) Obenstrohe.  
 (k) Div Tps were based on nearest workshop.  
 (l) Leer.  
 (m) Artillery units were:  
     HQ RCA, 3 Cdn Inf Div                   2/14 Cdn Fd Regt  
     2/12 Cdn Fd Regt                         2/3 Cdn A Tr Regt  
     2/13 Cdn Fd Regt                         2/4 Cdn LAA Regt  
 (n) HQ RCA 156438. Wilhelmshaven (Ref 3).  
 (o) Ref 1 shows "ARTY UNITS" for 11 Jul 45. Ref 2 shows LAD attached to Cdn Sec GHQ 1 Ech, 21 Army Group at Bad Saizuflen. Cdn Sec 2 Ech HQ BAOR (Ref 4). Three Cdn Inf Tps Wksp, Oldenburg Airport. (Ref 5).  
 (p) Rostrup.  
 (q) Rostrup Airport.  
 (r) Not Listed (Ref 6).  
 (s) Not Listed (Ref 7).  
 (t) Not Listed (Ref 8).  
 (u) HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div, CAOF passed all operational commitments to 52 (Brit) (L) Div 15 May 46. WD closed 29 May 46 (Ref 9).

- NOTES: (a) 2 Cdn Inf Div implemented the first phase of ECLIPSE, the code name given to the planning and preparation for the operation of occupying Germany, by performing occupation duties from 5 May to 11 July 1945. Third Cdn Inf Div (CAOF) occupied Germany from 11 July 45 to 15 May 46.  
 (b) Bad Zwischenahn. Third Cdn Div (CAOF) came under 30 Brit Corps. DDME 30 Brit Corps was at Neiburg. For Org HQ CREME, see page 432.  
 (c) Leer. The prefix "2" distinguished units of the reorganized Division. Thus The Second Seventh Cdn Inf Bde Wksp.  
 (d) Aurich. Jever (Ref 3).

GENERAL NOTE: This chart is primarily based on the Location States referred to in the References and is no more accurate than these lists which are indeed questionable as the end of the occupation neared. RHH May 1963.



**ORGANIZATION CHART  
SHOWING  
COMMAND AND TECHNICAL CHANNELS  
FROM  
GERMAN ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND  
TO THE  
AREA WORKSHOPS (a)  
1945**



**ORGANIZATION CHART  
SHOWING  
COMMAND AND TECHNICAL CHANNELS  
FROM  
GERMAN ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND  
TO THE  
AREA WORKSHOPS  
1945**

(Continued from)  
( previous page )





CHART SHOWING  
UNITS OF REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION  
OF  
GREATER GERMANY



REF: 1. Germany Basic Handbook, Part II Administration, Chap 2. British War Office Apr 1944.  
2. 30 Corps District Handbook, Chap II: Aug 1945 (Sec).

NOTES: (a) The units in which most executive and administrative decisions were taken were: for Preussen, the Regierungsbezirke (Reg-Bez); for the other parts of the Reich, the Länder and the Reichsgaue.  
(b) The activities of the 4 Regierungen of Sachsen were suspended as from 1. 7. 43 (British abbreviation) for the duration of the war.  
(c) The "Party Gaue" are not administrative units of the Reich, and their boundaries do not always coincide with those of the Länder; Reichsgaue (where they exist) coincide with the Party Gaue. The Party Gaue were originally based on the constituencies of the Weimar Republic.

(d) The Palatinate, one of the Bayern Regierungsbezirke, formed the larger part of the Reichsgaue westmark, the smaller part being the Saarland.  
(e) This part of the chart is more detailed than that given in Ref 1.  
(f) Thirty Corps District consisted of the Prussian Provinz of Hanover and Länder Brunswick and Oldenburg.  
(g) The fifteen Länder were divided into Provinzen and each Provinz was further divided into Regierungsbezirke (Reg-Bez). A Reg-Bez was made up of a number of Kreise, which is the basic unit of local government in Germany. Kreise are either Stadtkreise, normally consisting of a town of over 20,000 inhabitants or Landkreise, which are rural areas, though they may contain towns of some size. Kreise are further subdivided into Gemeinden, the smallest German administrative unit. A Stadtkreise normally consists of one Gemeinde, a Landkreise may contain more than two hundred.

## German Transport

### Military Transport

The German Transport system consisted almost exclusively of railways, inland waterways, and to a much smaller degree roads.<sup>14</sup>

It is difficult to place the military transport system in the framework of the entire transport organization.<sup>15</sup> German military transport was neither centralized nor uniformly administered. Consequently there were a number of military and semi-military organizations functioning independently of each other. The OKW regulated a number of transportation units; the army, air force and navy maintained individual transportation services, for example the RCEME *Eclipse* workshops at Wilhelmshaven and Emden.

The Ministry for Armament and War Production as well as the Todt Organization formed separate transportation units, which they regulated and operated on the basis of their needs.<sup>16</sup>

The Ministry of Transport placed Local Traffic Plenipotentiaries for the control of motor transport in each Wehrkreis in order to promote full utilization of truck space. They imposed restrictions on motor traffic, issued permits, maintained registers of available cars, and attempted to pool motor transport within their area.<sup>17</sup>

One other civilian agency, The Traffic Staff Speer steadily increased in importance. It tried to ward off the transportation catastrophe, which, since 1944, threatened to paralyze civilian and military life. Operational unity between Traffic Staff Speer and the armed forces had to be secured by Field Marshall Milch, who was Chief of the Staff organization. As the military situation grew more and more hopeless, political measures for carrying on the war conflicted with the views held by the more conservative members of the staff. The Government, which was synonymous with the Party, ordered that nobody and nothing should survive a lost war. The decisions of Traffic Staff Speer were more influenced by the conviction that the German State must survive a lost war and possible collapse of the Party. This point of view was particularly prevalent when solutions were sought regarding the question of transport for Germans fleeing from the advancing Allies, for agriculture, for the transportation of food to areas in immediate danger of Allied occupation, and finally the prohibition of senseless demolition of transportation facilities unless urgently required by the military situation.<sup>18</sup>

The most important regional control office for motor transport was the Bevollmächtigter für den Nahverkehr (Nbv). These officials were appointed in 1936, one to each Wehrkreis.

In the course of the re-shuffle of the districts of economic administration, which took place in 1942-43, the districts of the Nbv were also changed from the Wehrkreis to the Party Gau. The powers of the Nbv were very extensive. He could stop transports, or could prescribe the route that they had to take. He could also prescribe the means of transport (rail, barge, etc) to be used to relieve road transport.

The Fahrbereitschaftsleiter was the Nbv representative at the Kreis level. He assisted the Landrat or Oberbürgermeister in the control of transport. No transport of goods by road could be carried out without a permit issued him on behalf of the Nbv nor repairs to transport carried out.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> German Military Transport, p 1; Intelligence Division, WDGS, War Dept Washington DC, July 1946.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p 7.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid p 18.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p 21.

<sup>19</sup> Germany, Basic Handbook Part II, Annexe Va, Regional Controls in Germany, p 700; The War Office, May 1945.



German Corps Areas  
Wehrkreise

## ***The Role of RCEME in Eclipse and the CAOF***

As we have seen, the civilian garages and machine shops in Germany repaired the military transport for the Home Replacement Army and performed some heavy repairs for the field army under the control of the Wehrkreise through the Kraftfahrparke. The non-military transport systems were also repaired in the same manner under the control of the Gau and authorized by the Nbv representatives in the Kreise.

The wide spread destruction by the advancing allies and the demolition of their facilities by the retreating Germans resulted in a complete breakdown in local government communications and transportation and changed somewhat the implementation of the Plan inferred in “RCEME *Eclipse* Notes No. 2” which had anticipated some semblance of order in the Wehrkreise.

To 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps RCEME *Eclipse* teams under Lt-Col LS McGregor, ADME *Eclipse* at First Canadian Army, and after 10 July 1945 to Lt-Col RF Jobson, CREME CAOF, fell the task of reorganizing and controlling the former Kreise workshops in the Canadian Sector, garage by garage and shop by shop under their former owners, wherever possible, for Military Government.

A reclamation program was introduced in what had formerly been 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Corps’ backloading point (T2CBP) at Oldenburg and now renamed 3DBP. The vehicles collected there were set aside for repair or stripped for parts according to their classification. The parts and assemblies were cleaned and then identified with yellow paint before being distributed to all the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> line workshops who in turn were responsible for serviceability checks before their use. The LADs and the LAA workshops dealt directly with the OC of 3 DBP for their share of the reclaimed parts.

Demands could be made on 3DBP for parts or assemblies urgently required. These demands were filled by reclamation squads who searched out the required items and stripped them from the classified vehicles set aside for that purpose.<sup>20</sup>

As soon as conditions permitted, the rigorous life of a seven-day week gave way to the peacetime approach of a five and a half day week, and conforming to CAOF Policy, the enforcing of proper dress, compliments and exemplary behaviour. Ceremonial functions such as guards and church parades were re-introduced to impress the public.

RCEME inspection teams reported regularly on the general condition of the CAOF's technical equipment. The general standard of this equipment was raised by the adherence to the "Daily Task System of Maintenance" and prompt repairs. Newly painted vehicles no longer bore the large white star on the top and sides or the patch of gas detector paint on the hood in front of the driver.<sup>21</sup>

## ***The Withdrawal of the CAOF***

Although the Canadian Government had approved the participation of Canadian troops in the British Army of Occupation in Germany as far back as 11 January 1944, it had not decided for how long a period. As a result of high-level discussions as to the future occupation of Germany it became clear that the Canadian Government would have no voice in the direction of the policy for the control of Germany.

Of much concern to the government were the large numbers of men in the CAOF who had six years of overseas service, notwithstanding the numbers of low-point-score men and volunteers who had been transferred into the division.

After several exchanges with the British Government about these problems, a cabinet decision was reached on 8 December 1945 (and transmitted to the British Government) that the CAOF would be withdrawn commencing April 1946 with repatriation expected to be complete by the fall.<sup>22</sup>

Even before the GOC of the CAOF went to the headquarters of the BAOR on 7 January 1946 to discuss the withdrawal of his Division, the RCEME control of the Kreis Workshops was transferred by 30 British Corps to the CREME of the 52<sup>nd</sup> British (Lowland) Division. Ultimately it was decided that the provisional commitments of the CAOF would continue until 1 May, but there is no further mention of Kreis workshops in CREME's diary. Captain GE Bacher, Kreis EME, was withdrawn from 613 Detachment Military Government (Aurich) on 3 January, the same day that control of the Kreis workshops passed to the 52<sup>nd</sup> (L) Division, and reassigned to other duties.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> HQ RCEME 3 Cdn Inf Div (CAOF) CREME Instruction No 2, 14 Jul 1945.

<sup>21</sup> A large five-pointed star was painted on each side when practical. By this sign an Allied vehicle was quickly identified. This is not meant to imply that allied and enemy vehicles were readily mistaken for each other. A similar star, circumscribed by a wide white circle was painted on the engine hood or other flat surface for 'air to ground' recognition. It was not effective, for pilots have told me that at the speed they travelled at, they could not distinguish the star. The value of the recognition symbol was negated by the air force's practice of bombing and strafing any vehicle ahead of the bomb line and for that matter, those tragic errors, when they bombed well behind the bomb line.

I once took a young RCAF Typhoon pilot to task over the destruction of some of our tanks in Belgium by his Squadron. His reply "that's nothing, our Squadron has a British destroyer to its credit, that's why we don't fly over the Royal Navy any more."

I always felt that the star formed an excellent aiming point for an enemy gunner. I used the star as an aiming point in sighting training for my men in their infrequent chances for refresher training on the use of small arms and machine guns.

The gas detector paint was usually in the shape of a free form blob, a geometric figure or a regimental crest painted just in front of the driver on the hood. The paint, yellow ochre in color, would change color, (we were told) if a droplet of war gas came in contact with it. Fortunately we never had to check its efficiency.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid Ref (13), p 24.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, WD HQ RCEME (CAOF), Jan 1946; Part II Order No 2, 10 Jan 1946, HQ RCEME (CAOF).





Gemeinde	The lowest administrative unit throughout Germany; any local Authority, from the largest city to the village. Each house, hamlet and village belongs to a Gemeinde. Each Landkreis is sub-divided into Gemeinden, each Stadtkreis is a Gemeinde.																								
Kreis	See Landkreis and Stadtkreis.																								
Land	<p>The Länder are the former independent States, from which the German Reich was created in 1871. The Land is now merely an administrative sub-division of the Reich, of varying importance, but without any real independence. There are now fifteen Länder, of very different size and population; eleven of them are in the BR-US area:</p> <table border="0" style="margin-left: 40px;"> <tr> <td style="padding-right: 20px;">Land</td> <td>Seat of Landesregierung</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Preussen (Prussia) (only partly in BR-US area)</td> <td>München</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bayern (Bavaria)</td> <td>Stuttgart</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Wurttemberg</td> <td>Karlsruhe</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Baden</td> <td>Darmstadt</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hessen</td> <td>Hamburg</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hamburg</td> <td>Oldenburg</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Oldenburg</td> <td>Bremen</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bremen</td> <td>Braunschweig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Braunschweig (Brunswick)</td> <td>Detmold</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lippe</td> <td>Bückeberg</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Schaumburg-Lippe</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Land	Seat of Landesregierung	Preussen (Prussia) (only partly in BR-US area)	München	Bayern (Bavaria)	Stuttgart	Wurttemberg	Karlsruhe	Baden	Darmstadt	Hessen	Hamburg	Hamburg	Oldenburg	Oldenburg	Bremen	Bremen	Braunschweig	Braunschweig (Brunswick)	Detmold	Lippe	Bückeberg	Schaumburg-Lippe	
Land	Seat of Landesregierung																								
Preussen (Prussia) (only partly in BR-US area)	München																								
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Bremen	Braunschweig																								
Braunschweig (Brunswick)	Detmold																								
Lippe	Bückeberg																								
Schaumburg-Lippe																									
Landeshauptmann	Deputy of the Prussian Oberpräsident in the field of “self-government.”																								
Land eskommissärbezirk	Land Baden is sub-divided into four Landeskommisärbezirke: Freiburg, Karlsruhe, Konstanz and Mannheim. Each of these districts is headed by a Landeskommisär who reports to the Landesregierung of Baden.																								
Landesregierung	The Government of a Land (see above list). A Landesregierung still exists in each Land other than Prussia, but it is now controlled by the Reichsstatthalter, on behalf of the Reich Government. The Government of Prussia has been completely amalgamated with the Reich Government. A Landesregierung may consist of a number of Ministries, or merely of Departments under the Reichsstatthalter.																								

Landkreis	Rural administrative district, formed by a number of Gemeinden, and headed by a Landrat. The capital of the Landkreis, where the Land-rat's office is located, is called the Kreisstadt. In 1943, there were 727 Landkreise in Germany proper.
Landrat	The administrative head of a Landkreis, originally only in Prussia, but since 1939 in the whole of Germany. The Landrat is a Reich official, appointed by Hitler, at the proposal of the Reich Minister of the Interior: He reports to the Landesregierung, or to the Regierungspräsident (in Prussia and Bavaria).
Mittelinstanz	Any regional authority between the central and the Kreis level.
Oberbürgermeister	The administrative head of a Stadtkreis; since 1935 in the whole of Germany. Formally appointed by the town in question, in reality chosen by the Party, in conjunction with the Reichsstatthalter, or the Reich Minister of the Interior (in the case of towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants). Controlled by the Landesregierung, or by the Regierungspräsident (in Prussia and Bavaria). Assisted by Stadtrate and Ratsherren; deputy: Bürgermeister.
Oberpräsident	The administrative head of a Prussian Provinz and, within it, the permanent representative of the Reich Government. Each of the fourteen Oberpräsidenten is, at the same time, a Party Gauleiter; but several Provinzen include a number of Party Gaue.
Provinz	Administrative sub-division of Land Prussia, and headed by an Oberpräsident. Prussia is divided into fourteen Provinzen, seven of which are in the BR-US area:

Provinz	Regierungsbezirke
Schleswig-Holstein	Schleswig
Hannover	Hannover, Hildesheim, Lüneburg and Stade
Aurich-Osnabrück*	Aurich and Osnabrück
Westfalen	Arnsberg, Minden and Munster
Rheinprovinz	Aachen, Düsseldorf, Koblenz, Köln and Trier
Kurhessen**	Kassel
Nassau**	Wiesbaden

\* In June, 1944, the Regierungsbezirke Aurich and Osnabrück were taken out of the Provinz Hannover, and an Oberpräsident was appointed for them in the person of the Reichsstatthalter of Bremen and Oldenburg, with whom they are now combined for most administrative purposes.

\*\* Two new Provinzen, created in June, 1944, out of the former Provinz Hessen-Nassau.

Regierungsbezirk	<p>Administrative sub-division of Land Bayern and of a Preussen Provinz, headed by a Regierungspräsident. Land Bayern has five Regierungsbezirke:</p> <p>Mainfranken  Niederbayern und Oberpfalz  Oberbayern  Oberfranken und Mittelfranken  Schwaben.</p> <p>The sixth Bavarian Regierungsbezirk, the Pfalz, now forms part of Reichsgau Westmark.</p> <p>A Prussian Provinz (see above list) may consist of several or only one Regierungsbezirk; the Regierungsbezirk Sigmaringen, however, does not form part of any Provinz. Altogether, Prussia has thirty-four Regierungsbezirke, eighteen of which are in the BR-US area (the seventeen listed above and Sigmaringen).</p>
Regierungspräsident	<p>The administrative head of a Prussian or Bavarian Regierungsbezirk, or the deputy of a Prussian Oberpräsident, or of a Reichsstatthalter in a Reichsgau. The Regierungspräsident as head of a Prussian Regierungsbezirk does not report to the Oberpräsident, but directly to the central authorities. The Regierungspräsidenten are Reich officials, appointed by Hitler, on the recommendation of the Reichs Minister of the Interior.</p>
Reichsgau	<p>Administrative sub-division of the Reich, created in annexed territories (Austria and Poland) and corresponding to the Land in Germany proper. Headed by a Reichsstatthalter, whose deputy is a Regierungspräsident. In Germany proper, there is only one Reichsgau Westmark, consisting of the Pfalz (Palatinate), a Bavarian Regierungsbezirk, and the Saar, which is not part of any Land, but directly under the Reich.</p>
Reichsstatthalter	<p>High Reich officials, appointed in 1933 to control the Government of the various Länder; they are nominated and dismissed by Hitler. A Reichsstatthalter is either the head of the administration of a Reichsgau, or controls the Government of one or two Länder. With the exception of the Reichsstatthalter of Bavaria, each of the twenty-two Reichsstatthalter is, at the same time, a Party Gauleiter. The following nine Reichsstatthalter are located in the BR-US area:</p>

Land

Location

Bayern	München
Württemberg	Stuttgart
Baden	Karlsruhe
Westmark (Reichsgau)	Saarbrücken
Hessen	Darmstadt
Hamburg	Hamburg
Oldenburg and Bremen	Oldenburg
Braunschweig (and Anhalt)	(Dessau)
Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe	Detmold

### Reichsverteidigungskommissar

The Party Gauleiter in his capacity as a regional control authority of the entire administration, with the only exception of the Sonderverwaltungen of finance, justice, railways and postal services. No new administrative machinery has been created for this purpose, but each Reichsverteidigungskommissar works through two authorities of general administration, one being his executive authority, and the other his authority of economic administration. These authorities may be a Regierungspräsident, an Oberpräsident, a Reichsstatthalter, or a Minister of a Land. There is one executive authority to each Party Gau; but the authority of economic administration may be responsible for several Party Gaue (combined to form one Wirtschaftsbezirk).

The institution of the Reichsverteidigungskommissar is the means by which the Nazi Party has established its influence over the state administration, and by which the forty-two Gauleiter have become the most powerful control authority on the regional level.

### Sonderverwaltung

A special administration which is not attached, on the regional and local level, to any authority of general administration, but only reports to a Reich Ministry or other highest authority in Berlin. Examples are: the financial administration, the legal administration, the mining administration, the railways, the postal services, the Autobahnen. Theoretically, the labour administration is still classified as a Sonderverwaltung, but in practice this no longer applies.

### Stadtkreis

Urban administrative district, usually formed by a town of more than 20,000 inhabitants, and headed by an Oberbürgermeister. In contrast to the Landkreis, the Stadtkreis is not further sub-divided into Gemeinden, but the town itself is a Gemeinde. In 1943, there were 221 Stadtkreise in Germany proper.

## Wehrkreis

The Wehrkreis is the basic geographical unit of German military administration and police control, and not to be confused with the ordinary Kreis, three or four score of which may go to make up one single Wehrkreis. It was formerly used also for purposes of economic administration. The Wehrkreis boundaries overlap with those of the districts of general administration as well as those of the Party Gaue. Each Wehrkreis is controlled by a Wehrkreiskommando. There are seventeen Wehrkreise in “Greater Germany”, eight of them with their capital in the BR-US area:

Wehrkreis	Location of Wehrkreiskommando
X	Hamburg
XI	Hannover
VI	Münster
IX	Kassel
XII	Wiesbaden
V	Stuttgart
XIII	Nürnberg
VII	München

## Wirtschaftsbezirk

District of economic administration, created in November, 1942, and comprising either one or several Party Gaue (see Reichsverteidigungskommissar). The boundaries of the Wirtschaftsbezirke usually follow those of the districts of general administration, but a Wirtschaftsbezirk may comprise several districts of general administration. There are thirty-one Wirtschaftsbezirke in “Greater Germany,” fifteen of them being in the BR-US area:

Schleswig-Holstein	Kurhessen
Hamburg	Rhein-Main
Weser-Ems	Westmark
Hannover	Baden
Westfalen	Württemberg
Niederrhein	Nordbayern
Köln-Aachen	Sildbayern
Moselland	